The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way

«I prostrate to the Perfect Buddha, The best of teachers, who taught that Whatever is dependently arisen is Unceasing, unborn, Unannihilated, not permanent, Not coming, not going, Without distinction, without identity, And free from conceptual construction.» — los versos dedicatorios con que abre el tratado: N g rjuna postra ante el Buda por haber enseñado el originarse dependiente bajo ocho negaciones, sin cesación ni nacimiento, sin aniquilación ni permanencia, sin ir ni venir, sin distinción ni identidad. El volumen los imprime dos veces y se anclan en la primera

«Neither from itself nor from another, Nor from both, Nor without a cause, Does anything whatever, anywhere arise.» — I.1, el verso que abre el tratado: N g rjuna niega las cuatro posibilidades del surgimiento (de sí, de otro, de ambos, sin causa) para cualquier cosa y en cualquier lugar. Los versos están impresos dos veces en el volumen y se anclan en la primera

«There are four conditions: efficient condition; Percept-object condition; immediate condition; Dominant condition, just so. There is no fifth condition.» — I.2: N g rjuna enumera las cuatro condiciones que sí admite y cierra la lista

«The essence of entities Is not present in the conditions, etc …. If there is no essence, There can be no otherness-essence.» — I.3: N g rjuna niega que la esencia de los entes esté en las condiciones, y de ahí que tampoco quepa una esencia de otro

«Power to act does not have conditions. There is no power to act without conditions. There are no conditions without power to act. Nor do any have the power to act.» — I.4: N g rjuna desarma en cuatro pasos la relación entre la capacidad de obrar y las condiciones

«For neither an existent nor a non-existent thing Is a condition appropriate. If a thing is non-existent, how could it have a condition? If a thing is already existent, what would a condition do?» — I.6: N g rjuna objeta la condición por ambos lados, lo inexistente y lo ya existente

«If things did not exist Without essence, The phrase, “When this exists so this will be,” Would not be acceptable.» — I.10: N g rjuna ata la fórmula canónica del originarse dependiente a la falta de esencia

«If the effect’s essence is the conditions, But the conditions don’t have their own essence, How could an effect whose essence is the conditions Come from something that is essenceless?» — I.13: N g rjuna hace notar que las condiciones no tienen esencia propia, de modo que un efecto cuya esencia fueran las condiciones vendría de lo que carece de esencia

«Therefore, neither with conditions as their essence, Nor with non-conditions as their essence are there any effects. If there are no such effects, How could conditions or non-conditions be evident?» — I.14, cierre del capítulo: N g rjuna niega los efectos por los dos lados y con ellos la evidencia misma de condiciones y no condiciones

«What has been moved is not moving. What has not been moved is not moving. Apart from what has been moved and what has not been moved, Movement cannot be conceived.» — II.1, apertura del examen del movimiento: N g rjuna descompone el moverse en lo ya movido, lo no movido y lo que se mueve, y niega que fuera de los dos primeros quepa concebirlo

«Where there is change, there is motion. Since there is change in the moving, And not in the moved or not-moved, Motion is in that which is moving.» — II.2: N g rjuna localiza el movimiento en lo que se está moviendo, por ser ahí donde hay cambio

«If motion is in the mover. There would have to be a twofold motion: One in virtue of which it is a mover, And one in virtue of which it moves.» — II.5: N g rjuna saca la consecuencia del doble movimiento si el movimiento estuviera en el móvil

«Motion does not begin in what has moved, Nor does it begin in what has not moved. Nor does it begin in what is moving. In what, then, does motion begin?» — II.12: N g rjuna niega el comienzo del movimiento en los tres tiempos y deja la pregunta abierta

«That motion just is the mover itself Is not correct. Nor is it correct that They are completely different.» — II.18: N g rjuna rechaza a la vez la identidad y la diferencia total entre el movimiento y el que se mueve

«When neither in identity Nor in difference Can they be established, How can these two be established at all?» — II.21: N g rjuna cierra el dilema de identidad y diferencia preguntando cómo podrían quedar en pie entonces ninguno de los dos

«Neither an entity nor a non-entity Moves in any of the three ways. So motion, mover and And route are non-existent.» — II.25, cierre del capítulo: N g rjuna declara inexistentes el movimiento, el móvil y la ruta

«Seeing, hearing, smelling, Tasting, touching, and mind Are the six sense faculties. Their spheres are the visible objects, etc» — III.1: N g rjuna enumera las seis facultades sensoriales, con la mente entre ellas, y sus esferas

«That very seeing does not see Itself at all. How can something that cannot see itself See another?» — III.2: N g rjuna objeta que la visión pueda verse a sí misma, y de ahí que pueda ver otra cosa

«Without detachment from vision there is no seer. Nor is there a seer detached from it. If there is no seer How can there be seeing or the seen?» — III.6: N g rjuna niega que haya vidente separable de la visión ni visión sin vidente

«Just as the birth of a son is said to occur In dependence on the mother and father, So consciousness is said to arise In dependence on the eye and material form.» — III.7: N g rjuna da el símil del hijo que nace en dependencia de madre y padre para el surgir dependiente de la consciencia

«Apart from the cause of form, Form cannot be conceived. Apart from form, The cause of form is not seen.» — IV.1, apertura del examen de los agregados: N g rjuna niega que la forma se conciba aparte de su causa ni la causa aparte de la forma

«Form itself without a cause Is not possible or tenable. Therefore, think about form, but Do not construct theories about form.» — IV.5: N g rjuna manda pensar la forma y no construir teorías sobre ella

«Feelings, discriminations, and dispositions And consciousness and all such things Should be thought of In the same way as material form.» — IV.7: N g rjuna extiende el análisis de la forma a los otros cuatro agregados

«When an explanation is made through emptiness, Whoever would find fault with it Will find no fault, since the criticism will presuppose Exactly what is to be proven.» — IV.9, cierre del capítulo: N g rjuna sostiene que quien objete una explicación hecha por la vacuidad no hallará falla, porque la crítica presupone lo que había que probar

«Prior to a characteristic of space There is not the slightest space. If it arose prior to the characteristic Then it would, absurdly, arise without a characteristic.» — V.1, apertura del examen de los elementos: N g rjuna niega que haya espacio antes de su característica

«Neither in the uncharacterized nor in the characterized Does a characteristic arise. Nor does it arise In something different from these two.» — V.3: N g rjuna niega el surgir de la característica por las tres vías

«Therefore, space is not an entity. It is not a nonentity. Not characterized, not without character. The same is true of the other five elements.» — V.7: N g rjuna niega del espacio la entidad y la no entidad, lo caracterizado y lo no caracterizado, y extiende el resultado a los otros cinco elementos

«Fools and reificationists who perceive The existence and nonexistence Of objects» — V.8, cierre del capítulo: N g rjuna llama necios y reificadores a quienes perciben la existencia y la inexistencia de los objetos. El verso salta de plana y termina en la siguiente con *Do not see the pacification of objectification*

«If prior to desire And without desire there were a desirous one, Desire would depend on him. Desire would exist when there is a desirous one.» — VI.1, apertura del examen del deseo y el deseoso: N g rjuna toma la hipótesis de que el deseoso preceda al deseo

«In identity there is no simultaneity. A thing is not simultaneous with itself. But if there is difference, Then how would there be simultaneity?» — VI.4: N g rjuna niega la simultaneidad por los dos lados, el de la identidad y el de la diferencia

«Thus desire and the desirous one Cannot be established as simultaneous or not simultaneous. So, like desire, nothing whatever Can be established either as simultaneous or as nonsimultaneous.» — VI.10, cierre del capítulo: N g rjuna generaliza de la pareja deseo y deseoso a cualquier cosa. El troceo imprime aquí una palabra por renglón y el tramo conserva esa disposición

«If arising were produced, Then it would also have the three characteristics. If arising is not produced, How could the characteristics of the produced exist?» — VII.1, apertura del examen de lo condicionado: N g rjuna atrapa al surgir entre tener las tres características y no tenerlas

«If arising, abiding, and ceasing Have characteristics other than those of the produced, There would be an infinite regress. If they don’t, they would not be produced.» — VII.3: N g rjuna plantea el regreso al infinito de las características del surgir, el permanecer y el cesar

«Just as a butterlamp Illuminates itself as well as others, So arising gives rise to itself» — VII.8: N g rjuna recoge el símil de la lámpara de mantequilla que su oponente usa para el surgir que se produce a sí mismo. El verso salta de plana y termina en la siguiente con *And to other arisen things*

«In the butterlamp and its place, There is no darkness. What then does the butterlamp illuminate? For illumination is the clearing of darkness.» — VII.9: N g rjuna objeta el símil de la lámpara: donde está la lámpara no hay oscuridad, y la iluminación es el disipar la oscuridad

«If, when it is illuminated, The butterlamp illuminates itself and others, Darkness should, without a doubt, Conceal itself and others.» — VII.12: N g rjuna devuelve el símil al oponente, y de la lámpara que se ilumina a sí misma saca la oscuridad que se oculta a sí misma

«Inasmuch as the nature of all things Is aging and death, Without aging and death, What existents can endure?» — VII.24: N g rjuna pone el envejecer y el morir como naturaleza de todas las cosas y de ahí niega la permanencia

«Moreover, for a nonentity, Cessation would be untenable. Just as a second beheading Cannot be performed.» — VII.31: N g rjuna niega la cesación de una no entidad con el símil de la segunda decapitación

«Like a dream, like an illusion, Like a city of Gandharvas, So have arising, abiding, And ceasing been explained.» — VII.34, cierre del capítulo: N g rjuna resume el surgir, el permanecer y el cesar bajo tres símiles, el sueño, la ilusión y la ciudad de los Gandharvas

«Such a thing is essentially peaceful. Therefore that which is arising and arising itself Are themselves peaceful.» — VII.16: N g rjuna declara esencialmente apacible lo que surge dependientemente, y con ello el surgir mismo. El verso abre con *Whatever is dependently arisen*, fórmula que el volumen usa también en los versos dedicatorios

«N g rjuna, 2nd cent. [Madhyamakak rik . English & Sanskrit] The fundamental wisdom of the middle way: N g rjuna’s M lamadhyamakak rik / Translation and commentary by Jay L. Garfield, p. cm. ISBN 0-19-509336-4 (pbk.); ISBN 0-19-510317-3 (cloth) 1. M dhyamika (Buddhism)—Early works to 1800. I. Garfield, Jay L., 1955—. BQ2792.E5G37 1995 294.3» — el registro de la Library of Congress que la plana de derechos reproduce: encabeza la entrada por N g rjuna, lo fecha en el siglo II, declara la lengua del texto raíz y clasifica la materia como M dhyamika (Buddhism)

«I dedicate this work, with profound gratitude and respect, to the Most Ven. Professor Samdhong Rinpoche: scholar, educator, statesman, public servant and shining exemplar of monastic life.» — la dedicatoria del volumen, a quien Garfield nombra después en los agradecimientos como su anfitrión en el Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies

«Every translation, this one included, of any text embodies an interpretation, and my interpretation differs in various respects from those of my predecessors in this endeavor.» — el prefacio de Garfield sienta que toda traducción encarna una interpretación, y coloca la suya como una más entre otras

«So I claim no special privileged position vis à vis Streng (1967), Inada (1970), Sprung (1979), or Kalupahana (1986)—only a different position, one that I hope will prove useful in bringing M lamadhyamakak rik into contemporary philosophical discourse.» — Garfield nombra a sus cuatro predecesores y declara que no reclama posición privilegiada sobre ellos, solo distinta; los años entre paréntesis son de la fuente

«I, like any translator/ interpreter must acknowledge that there is simply no fact of the matter about the correct rendering of any important and genuinely interesting text.» — el prefacio de Garfield niega que haya un hecho del asunto sobre la versión correcta de un texto importante

«So each of the available versions of the text embodies a reading. Inada reads N g rjuna from the standpoint of the Zen tradition, and his translation reflects that reading;» — Garfield adjudica a cada versión inglesa previa la tradición desde la que se lee: a Inada el Zen

«Kalupahana reads N g rjuna as a Theravada commentator on the Kacc y nagotta-s tra, and his translation reflects that reading, as well as his view about the affinities between James’s pragmatism and Theravada Buddhism.» — y sigue la adjudicación de Garfield: Kalupahana lee a N g rjuna como comentarista Theravada del Kacc y nagotta-s tra

«Sprung adopts Murti’s Kantian interpretation of M dhyamika, and his translation reflects that interpretation. Streng reads the text as primarily concerned with religious phenomenology.» — cierre de la serie: a Sprung le adjudica la interpretación kantiana de Murti y a Streng la fenomenología religiosa

«There is no translation of this text into English, and no commentary on it, that specifically reflects an Indo-Tibetan Pr sa gika-M dhyamika interpretation. Inasmuch as this is my own preferred way to read N g rjuna, and the reading dominant in Tibetan and highly influential in Japanese and Chinese discussions of M lamadhyamakak rik , I believe that it is important to fill this lacuna in the English bibliography.» — Garfield declara el hueco que su libro viene a llenar y, de paso, cuál es su propia lectura: la Pr sa gika-M dhyamika indotibetana

«This is a translation of the Tibetan text of M lamadhyamakak rik . It is perhaps an odd idea to translate a Tibetan translation of a Sanskrit text and to retranslate a text of which there are four extant English versions.» — Garfield abre el prefacio declarando de qué lengua traduce y reconociendo que ya hay cuatro versiones inglesas del texto

«hence, that there is always some distance between an original text and a translation, however good and canonical that translation may be, it follows that M lamadhyamakakàrik and dBu-ma rtsaba shes-rab differ, however close they may be and however canonically the latter is treated.» — Garfield saca la consecuencia de que toda traducción interpreta: el sánscrito y el tibetano son dos textos distintos por buena y canónica que sea la versión tibetana

«Since dBu-ma rtsa-ba shes-rab is the text read by and commented on by generations of Tibetan philosophers, I think that it is important that an English translation of this very text be available to the Western philosophical public. This text is hence worthy in its own right of translation inasmuch as it is the proper subject of the Tibetan philosophical literature I and others find so deep and fascinating.» — la razón que Garfield da para traducir el tibetano y no el sánscrito: es el texto que los filósofos tibetanos leyeron y comentaron

«This is not a critical scholarly edition of the text. It is not philological in intent; nor is it a discussion of the commentarial literature on N g rjuna’s text. There is indeed a need for such a book, but that need will have to be filled by someone else.» — Garfield declara lo que su libro no es y deja la edición filológica y el estudio de los comentarios para otro

«This is rather meant to be a presentation of a philosophical text to philosophers, and not an edition of the text for Buddhologists.» — Garfield declara para quién escribe: filósofos, no budólogos

«I am not sure that I have always made the right decisions or that I have found the middle path between the extremes of Buddhological orthodoxy and Western revisionism. But that is the aim.» — Garfield declara el punto medio que busca entre la ortodoxia budológica y el revisionismo occidental, y que no está seguro de haberlo alcanzado

«But there is the fault of allowing the translation to become so mixed with the commentary that one no longer has a grip on, for example, what is N g rjuna and what is Garfield.» — Garfield nombra el riesgo de su propio formato: que traducción y comentario se mezclen hasta perderse de vista qué es de N g rjuna y qué suyo

«this text should still come out in translation as a text which could be interpreted in the ways that others have read it. Because the original does indeed justify competing interpretations. That is one of the things that makes it such an important philosophical work.» — cierre del prefacio: Garfield sostiene que el original justifica interpretaciones en competencia y que eso es parte de lo que lo hace importante

«Thanks to the Ven. Geshe Lobzang Tsetan for starting me in Tibetan, for much useful philosophical interchange, for teaching me an immense amount about M dhyamika, and for his close criticism of this text;» — los agradecimientos nombran a quien le enseñó tibetano y M dhyamika y le criticó de cerca el texto

«I am deeply grateful to the Ven. Prof. Geshe Yeshes Thap-Khas for reading dBu-ma rtsa-ba shes-rab and related texts with me and for giving me his invaluable oral commentary on these texts during that year and on many subsequent occasions.» — Garfield declara la fuente oral de su lectura: el comentario del Ven. Prof. Geshe Yeshes Thap-Khas sobre el dBu-ma rtsa-ba shes-rab

«about M dhyamika philosophy, and it is hard to imagine a more patient, generous, and incisive scholar and teacher. Without his lucid teachings, and without Geshe-la’s enormous patience, I could never have approached this text with any degree of success.» — continuación de la deuda con Geshe Yeshes Thap-Khas, ya en la plana siguiente: Garfield declara que sin esas enseñanzas no habría podido abordar el texto

«While he would not agree with everything I say, my own reading of this text is enormously influenced by his.» — y el desacuerdo que Garfield deja consignado sin resolverlo dentro del mismo agradecimiento

«I thank His Holiness the Dalai Lama for his encouragement and for valuable discussion of some difficult interpretative issues.» — los agradecimientos nombran al Dalai Lama entre quienes discutieron con Garfield puntos de interpretación

«I discovered when I—a Western, analytically trained philosopher of mind—began to work on Buddhist philosophy that many in philosophy and cognitive science took this as evidence of some kind of insanity, or at least as an abandonment of philosophy, per se.» — Garfield consigna el estigma que encontró en su propia profesión al ponerse a trabajar en filosofía budista

«This is not the place to speculate on the origins or nature of the stigma attaching in some parts of our profession to Asian philosophy. But it is a sad fact to be noted and to be rectified.» — y lo declara hecho lamentable que hay que rectificar, sin entrar a explicarlo

«The Tibetan edition of the text is from dGe ’dun grub, dBu ma rtsa shes rtsa ’grel bzhugs (Commentary on M lamadhyamakak rik ), Ge Lugs Pa Students’ Welfare Publishing, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, 1987.» — Garfield declara su base textual: la edición tibetana de dGe ’dun grub impresa en Sarnath, con lo que el texto de partida queda localizado

«Portions of the translations of and commentaries on Chapters I, II, XIII, and XXIV appeared in Philosophy East and West in Garfield (1990) and (1994). I thank the editors for permission to use that material here.» — Garfield declara qué partes del libro se publicaron antes y en qué revista; los años entre paréntesis son de la fuente

«I hope that I haven’t forgotten anybody.» — cierre de los agradecimientos

«Contents Part One The Text of M lamadhyamakak rik Dedicatory Verses» — el índice declara la arquitectura doble del volumen: la primera parte es el texto solo. El tramo se repite en el Table of Contents que el ebook imprime al final, y se ancla en la primera aparición

«Part Two The Text and Commentary Introduction to the Commentary Dedicatory Verses I Examination of Conditions» — y la segunda parte vuelve a dar el texto, ahora con comentario, empezando otra vez por los versos dedicatorios: los veintisiete capítulos se imprimen dos veces. El tramo se repite en el Table of Contents del final del ebook y se ancla en la primera aparición

«PART ONE The Text of M lamadhyamakak rik» — la portadilla de la primera parte, que es donde empieza la traducción corrida de los versos

«PART TWO The Text and Commentary» — la portadilla de la segunda parte, donde el volumen vuelve a imprimir los veintisiete capítulos, ahora con el comentario de Garfield intercalado

«N g rjuna, who lived in South India in approximately the second century C.E., is undoubtedly the most important, influential, and widely studied Mah y na Buddhist philosopher.» — Garfield sitúa a N g rjuna en el sur de la India hacia el siglo II y lo declara el filósofo budista Mah y na más importante e influyente

«He is the founder of the M dhyamika, or Middle Path schools of Mah y na Buddhism.» — Garfield adjudica a N g rjuna la fundación de la escuela M dhyamika, el Camino Medio, dentro del budismo Mah y na

«Most important of these is his largest and best known text, M lamadhyamakak rik (literally Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way). This text in turn inspires a huge commentarial literature in Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, Korean and Japanese.» — Garfield traduce el título del tratado como Versos Fundamentales del Camino Medio y consigna la literatura comentarial que generó en cuatro lenguas

«Divergences on interpretation of M lamadhyamakak rik often determine the splits between major philosophical schools. So, for instance, the distinction between two of the three major Mah y na philosophical schools, Sv tantrika-M dhyamika and Pr sa gika-M dhyamika reflect, inter alia, distinct readings of this text, itself taken as fundamental by scholars within each of these schools.» — Garfield declara que las divergencias de interpretación de este texto marcan la separación entre escuelas, y nombra dos de las tres mayores del Mah y na

«The central topic of the text is emptiness—the Buddhist technical term for the lack of independent existence, inherent existence, or essence in things.» — Garfield define la vacuidad como el término técnico budista para la falta de existencia independiente, de existencia inherente o de esencia

«This dual thesis of the conventional reality of phenomena together with their lack of inherent existence depends upon the complex doctrine of the two truths or two realities—a conventional or nominal truth and an ultimate truth—and upon a subtle and surprising doctrine regarding their relation.» — Garfield ata la tesis doble de la realidad convencional y la falta de existencia inherente a la doctrina de las dos verdades

«the method of reductio ad absurdum is the methodological core. N g rjuna, like Western sceptics, systematically eschews the defense of positive metaphysical doctrines regarding the nature of things, arguing rather that any such positive thesis is incoherent and that, in the end, our conventions and our conceptual framework can never be justified by demonstrating their correspondence to an independent reality. Rather, he suggests, what counts as real depends precisely on our conventions.» — Garfield declara el reductio ad absurdum como núcleo metodológico del tratado y empareja a N g rjuna con los escépticos occidentales

«It invites the question, Empty of what? And the answer is, Empty of inherent existence, or self-nature, or, in more Western terms, essence.» — Garfield contesta la pregunta que él mismo pone: vacío de existencia inherente, de naturaleza propia o, en términos occidentales, de esencia

«the M dhyamika philosopher will explain, is to say, as the Tibetans like to put it, that it does not exist “from its own side”—that its existence as the object that it is—as a table— depends not on it, nor on» — Garfield glosa la falta de esencia con la fórmula tibetana de no existir desde su propio lado, y con el ejemplo de la mesa cuya existencia depende también de nosotros