The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali
The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali: A New Edition, Translation, and Commentary with Insights from the Traditional Commentators · Yoga Sūtras · Yogasūtra · Pātañjala Yoga · Los Yoga Sūtras de Patañjali
Edición, traducción y comentario de los *Yoga Sūtras* de Patañjali por Edwin F. Bryant, publicada por North Point Press en 2009. La portada imprime «THE YOGA SŪTRAS OF PATAÑJALI A New Edition, Translation, and Commentary WITH INSIGHTS FROM THE TRADITIONAL COMMENTATORS EDWIN F. BRYANT North Point Press» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 2», y la página de derechos, que en este EPUB vive en el último chunk, fecha el volumen: «Copyright © 2009 by Edwin F. Bryant» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 572».
Lo que el volumen traduce es un texto brevísimo: «The succinctness of the Yoga Sūtras—it contains about 1,200 words in 195 sūtras—indicates that they were construed to be a manual requiring unpacking» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 27». De su compilador, Bryant dice que se sabe poco —«As with the reputed founders of the other schools of thought, very little is known about Patañjali himself» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 26»— y que la fecha no se fija: «Most scholars date the text shortly after the turn of the Common Era (circa first to second century), but it has been placed as early as several centuries before that» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 27». La tradición, además, no le adjudica el origen del yoga: «In point of fact, the tradition itself ascribes the actual origins of Yoga to the legendary figure Hiraṇyagarbha (see commentary to I.1)» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 26».
El sitio que el volumen le da al texto es el de una escuela de filosofía: «The Yoga Sūtras is classified as a darśana, classical school of philosophical thought, after all, written and handed down over the centuries by scholastics, and so a commentary that claims to represent the Yoga tradition cannot be presented outside this context» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 47», y Patañjali entra así en la lista de las seis: «Patañjali was the compiler of the Yoga Sūtras, one of the ancient treatises on Indic philosophy that eventually came to be regarded as one of the six classical schools of Indian philosophy» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 13».
Lo que distingue a esta edición es el aparato de comentaristas que incorpora: «This commentary draws material from all (rather than just one) of the principal historical traditional Sanskrit commentaries, from which I have selected relevant explanatory comments» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 47». Los nombres, en el orden que el propio libro imprime: «Vyāsa, Vācaspati Miśra, Vijñānabhikṣu, Saṅkara, Bhoja Rāja, Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, and Hariharānanda Araṇya are, in chronological order, the main commentators recognized as the most important of the premodern period and their interpretations form the basis of the present commentary» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 55». El primero de ellos manda sobre todos los demás: «It cannot be overstated that Yoga philosophy is Patañjali’s philosophy as understood and articulated by Vyāsa» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 31».
Bryant declara su método como fenomenológico —«In short, I have adopted something of the phenomenological approach in the study of religion in presenting this material» «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 49»— y el volumen abre con un foreword de B.K.S. Iyengar firmado en Pune el 5 de diciembre de 2007 «Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 9».
1983 afirmaciones · 1 fuente · 2 atribuciones
Atribución
se consigna, jamás se afirma«Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 26»
«Bryant — The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, con los comentaristas tradicionales (2009) · p. 2»
Cadena de la obra
el testimonio procesado, en esmeraldaAfirmaciones
1983 entradas — la voz de la obra, con su pasaje«The chapter begins by introducing the subject of the work and providing a definition of yoga—the cessation of citta-vṛtti, the fluctuating states of the mind [1–2].» — abre el Samādhi-pāda: el propio libro resume el capítulo I y da la definición de yoga como cese de las vṛttis de la citta
«Oṁ namo bhagavate Vāsudevāya; I offer obeisances to Lord Vāsudeva» — Bryant abre el comentario con la invocación tradicional a Vāsudeva, el nāndi-śloka con que los comentaristas clásicos empiezan
«Commentators and authors of traditional texts typically begin their commentaries with an invocation, nāndi-śloka, to their personal deity, the particular form of Īśvara, God, that they revere, soliciting blessings and inspiration for the enterprise they are about to undertake.» — Bryant explica la función del nāndi-śloka: pedir bendición e inspiración a la propia deidad antes de la obra
«This, notes Vijñānabhikṣu, is in order to remove any obstacles that might arise either in the completion of the work by the author, or in the students’ ability to grasp its meaning.» — Vijñānabhikṣu da la razón de la invocación: quitar los obstáculos a la obra y a la comprensión del estudiante
«By so doing, one also strives to remove personal ego so that one can become a conduit, accurately transmitting the essence of the text.» — el otro motivo que Bryant recoge: borrar el ego para volverse conducto del texto
«Most commentators on the Yoga Sūtras, in addition to an invocation to God, offer homage to Patañjali himself, the author of the text, usually» — Bryant consigna que los comentaristas rinden homenaje también a Patañjali; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 55 invocándolo en su forma tradicional de encarnación de Śeṣa, el que porta a Viṣṇu
«I.1 atha yogānuśāsanam atha, now; yoga, yoga; anuśāsanam, teachings Now, the teachings of yoga [are presented].» — I.1, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant. El apéndice reimprime el sūtra y su traducción en la plana 445; el ancla va en la primera aparición, la del cuerpo
«It is common for authors of philosophical works to commence their treatises by announcing the specific nature of their subject matter, thereby indicating how their undertakings are to be distinguished from other strains of philosophical thought or knowledge systems.» — Bryant lee el primer sūtra como declaración de materia, al modo en que otros tratados abren anunciando la suya
«Patañjali accordingly uses the first sūtra of his text to announce the topic of his teachings: The primary subject matter of his text differs from that of other systems insofar as his work will be about yoga.» — Bryant enuncia lo que I.1 hace: anunciar el tema y distinguirlo del de otros sistemas
«It is also standard in the commentarial literature, as will become apparent throughout this work, for the later commentators to analyze each word in every sūtra (as discussed in the introduction, sūtra means aphorism or extremely succinct verse), and words are analyzed in various ways— etymologically, semantically, contextually, philosophically, etc. Commentaries thus unpack the meaning of words, both individually and collectively, in the sūtras of primary texts.» — Bryant describe el procedimiento comentarial que su edición reproduce: analizar cada palabra etimológica, semántica, contextual y filosóficamente
«Accordingly, the first word in this sūtra, and thus of the entire Yoga Sūtras, is atha, now, that is, in the present work Patañjali is about to deliver, demarking these teachings from those in other texts» — Bryant glosa atha como el ahora que separa esta enseñanza de las de otros textos. El tramo cruza el cambio de plana desde la 55
«As will be seen below with Vijñānabhikṣu’s comments, the word atha is also sometimes read as differentiating the text in question from other texts in a hierarchical or sectarian fashion, as indicating» — la segunda lectura de atha que Bryant recoge de Vijñānabhikṣu: jerárquica o sectaria; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 56 describiendo el ahora de quien agotó los demás sistemas
«The commentators add, as an aside, that the word atha is deemed somewhat sacred8 and thus also functions as an auspicious opening to the text.» — los comentaristas tienen atha por palabra algo sagrada y apertura auspiciosa
«In accordance with the famous Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini, he glosses yoga with samādhi, the ultimate subject matter of the Yoga Sūtras.» — Vyāsa glosa yoga como samādhi apoyándose en Pāṇini, y con eso fija la materia del libro
«Indeed, the commentator Vācaspati Miśra traces the etymology of yoga to one of the meanings of the root yuj, to contemplate, which, he points out, is the correct etymology here.» — Vācaspati Miśra deriva yoga de yuj en su acepción de contemplar, y declara que esa es la etimología correcta aquí
«The more established etymology from the perspective of modern historical linguistics is, of course, derived from the same Indo-European root as the English word “yoke.”» — Bryant pone al lado la etimología de la lingüística histórica moderna, la del yugo
«Yoga can thus mean that which joins, that is, unites one with the Absolute Truth, and while this translation of the term is popularly found (and may be apt in other contexts, such as the Gītā, IX.3410), it is best avoided in the context of the Yoga Sūtras, since, as was pointed out over a hundred years ago by the famous Indologist Max Müller (1899, 309ff) (and long before that, by the sixteenth-century Indian doxographer Mādhava11) the goal of yoga is not to join, but the opposite: to unjoin, that is, to disconnect puruṣa from prakṛti.» — Bryant objeta a traducir yoga por unión en este texto: la meta es desunir el puruṣa de prakṛti, y apoya la objeción en Max Müller y en el doxógrafo Mādhava del siglo XVI
«If the term is to mean “yoke,” it entails yoking the mind on an object of concentration without deviation.» — Bryant admite el yugo en un sentido: uncir la mente a un objeto de concentración sin desviarse
«Elaborating on this, Vyāsa notes that when the mind is directed toward an object, it can manifest five different degrees of focus (bhūmis): wondering, confused, distracted, concentrated, and restrained.» — Vyāsa enumera los cinco bhūmis, grados de foco de la mente dirigida a un objeto
«It is the last two that are of interest to Yoga: when the mind, citta, is restrained and concentrated, or fixed on one point, a type of samādhi known as samprajñāta can be attained.» — Bryant señala que solo los dos últimos grados interesan al Yoga, y que de ellos sale el samprajñāta-samādhi
«Vyāsa also introduces the notion of asamprajñāta-samādhi in these opening comments. This is the seventh and ultimate level of samādhi,» — Vyāsa adelanta ya en sus comentarios de apertura el asamprajñāta-samādhi, séptimo y último nivel
«we will simply note here that in this state, pure objectless consciousness alone remains, that is, self-contained consciousness conscious only of its own internal nature of pure consciousness rather than of any external object.» — Bryant define el estado final: consciencia pura sin objeto, consciente solo de su propia naturaleza
«Vyāsa thus provides a minipreview of the subject matter of the Yoga Sūtras in his opening comments.» — Bryant lee los comentarios de apertura de Vyāsa como anticipo de todo el libro
«Vyāsa makes a point of noting that a distracted mind, the third on his list of states, is not to be confounded with yoga.» — Vyāsa separa expresamente la mente distraída del yoga
«Vācaspati Miśra elaborates that while it is obvious that the other two states of mind, wondering and» — Vācaspati Miśra distingue la distracción de los otros dos estados; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 57 explicando que la distracción parece yoga porque se fija por momentos
«However, since such steadiness soon relapses into wondering and forgetfulness, it cannot be considered real yoga. Only the fully concentrated or one-pointed state of mind is yoga.» — Vācaspati Miśra niega el nombre de yoga a esa fijeza intermitente: solo lo es el estado unipuntual
«Vācaspati Miśra notes that the third and final term from this sūtra, anuśāsanam, strictly speaking means further teaching.» — Vācaspati Miśra traduce anuśāsanam por enseñanza ulterior, no por enseñanza a secas
«He points out that the Yājñavalkya Smṛti states that a sage known as Hiraṇyagarbha was the original teacher of yoga.» — Vācaspati Miśra apoya esa lectura en el Yājñavalkya Smṛti, que hace de Hiraṇyagarbha el maestro original del yoga
«The Mahābhārata also identifies Hiraṇyagarbha as the founder of Yoga (XII.326.65; 337.60).» — Bryant suma el testimonio del Mahābhārata sobre Hiraṇyagarbha como fundador
«In the Purāṇic tradition (e.g., Bhāgavata Purāṇa, X.71.8), Hiraṇyagarbha is considered to be an epithet of Brahmā, the celestial being responsible for engineering the forms in the universe.» — la tradición purāṇica hace de Hiraṇyagarbha un epíteto de Brahmā, el que traza las formas del universo
«Hiraṇyagarbha is born on a lotus emanating from the navel of Viṣṇu, the supreme Godhead, who is reclining on the divine serpent Śeṣa on the cosmic waters pervading the entire universe prior to creation.» — Bryant recoge del Bhāgavata Purāṇa el nacimiento de Hiraṇyagarbha sobre el loto que sale del ombligo de Viṣṇu, reclinado en la serpiente Śeṣa
«Awakening to consciousness atop the lotus, Hiraṇyagarbha has no means of knowing who he is, or what is the source of the lotus or the all-expansive waters, indeed, no means of discerning or knowing anything at all.» — el relato pone a Hiraṇyagarbha despertando sin medio alguno de saber quién es ni de dónde viene el loto
«Confused and disoriented, he stills his mind (in accordance with the next verse), and enters into the ultimate state of yoga (samādhi), as a result of which he is granted a divine vision of Lord Viṣṇu.» — el relato lo hace aquietar la mente y entrar en samādhi, con lo que obtiene la visión de Viṣṇu: el primer acto de yoga, narrado según el sūtra siguiente
«Hiraṇyagarbha is thus the first yogī in primordial times, and deemed to have written the original treatise on the subject.» — Bryant cierra el relato: Hiraṇyagarbha como primer yogī y autor del tratado original
«Although mentioned in various texts, the Hiraṇyagarbha treatise is no longer extant, but information about its twelvefold content, all overlapping» — Bryant consigna la pérdida del tratado de Hiraṇyagarbha y que solo queda noticia de su contenido en doce partes. El tramo se corta al final de la plana 57
«Yoga is therefore superior to other schools of thought that occupy themselves with knowledge and thus remain connected to the material intellect.» — Bryant deriva de la meta del sistema un orden entre escuelas: el Yoga por encima de las que se ocupan del conocimiento y quedan atadas al intelecto material
«Just as a person with a torch in hand gives up the torch upon finding treasure, says Vijñānabhikṣu, so, eventually, the intellect, and the knowledge that it presents, also become redundant upon attaining the ultimate source of truth, puruṣa, the soul and innermost self.» — la imagen de la antorcha abandonada al hallar el tesoro, que Bryant atribuye a Vijñānabhikṣu: el intelecto se vuelve redundante al alcanzar el puruṣa
«The self is pure subjectivity23 and transcends all knowledge, which is of the nature of objectivity: One knows, that is, one is aware or conscious of, something, hence some other object distinct from the knower or power of consciousness itself, whether this is an external object of the physical world, or an internal object of thought.» — Bryant define el sí mismo como pura subjetividad, frente al conocimiento, que siempre es de un objeto
«Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu says (paraphrasing Sāṅkhya Kārikā XXXV), knowledge and the intellect are the door and doorkeeper, and both lead the practitioner of yoga from the domain of material cognition to the highest goal of existence, realization of puruṣa, consciousness itself, but this ultimately lies beyond even the intellect.» — Vijñānabhikṣu, parafraseando el Sāṅkhya Kārikā XXXV, hace del conocimiento y el intelecto puerta y portero de un fin que los excede
«The attainment of this state is the ultimate goal for the school of Yoga, not any type of knowledge however profound or mystical. Hence, from this perspective, Yoga is superior to knowledge-centered paths.» — Bryant fija la meta del Yoga en el asamprajñāta-samādhi y no en conocimiento alguno, por profundo o místico que sea
«The origins of Yoga are rooted in direct perception of its subject matter, says the commentator Hariharānanda Āraṇya.» — Hariharānanda Āraṇya sitúa el origen del yoga en la percepción directa de su materia
«He too notes that Yoga is based not on the mere logical reasoning of the intellect but on direct experience, and in this regard differs from some of the other schools of orthodox thought, which are highly philosophical.» — Hariharānanda distingue al Yoga de las escuelas ortodoxas más filosóficas por apoyarse en la experiencia directa
«Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras is more a psychosomatic technique than a treatise on metaphysics; the truths of Yoga cannot be experienced by inferential reasoning but only by direct perception.» — Bryant repite la clasificación del texto como técnica psicosomática y no tratado metafísico, y niega el acceso por razonamiento inferencial
«These personal realizations, says Hariharānanda, are handed down from teacher to disciple, generation after generation.» — Hariharānanda describe la transmisión de esas realizaciones de maestro a discípulo
«Since the ultimate truth of the soul, attained in asamprajñāta-samādhi, is by definition beyond the intellect, and thus beyond words and concepts, the primary purpose of this text is, as far as possible, to point the reader toward the actual practice of yoga.» — Bryant deriva el propósito del texto de lo que el texto no puede decir: siendo la verdad última ajena a palabra y concepto, el libro apunta a la práctica
«I.2 yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ yogaḥ, yoga; citta, the mind; vṛtti, fluctuation, state; nirodhaḥ, restraint, control Yoga is the stilling of the changing states of the mind.» — I.2, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: la definición formal del yoga. El apéndice la reimprime en la plana 445; el ancla va en la primera aparición, la del cuerpo
«There are various definitions of yoga expressed in different traditions which, while all overlapping, reflect the fact that yoga referred to a cluster of practices featuring various forms of discipline and mind control practiced by many differing ascetics and communities on the landscape of ancient India with a view to liberation from the sufferings of embodied life; it was not associated with a distinct school until well into the Common Era.» — Bryant consigna la pluralidad de definiciones de yoga como reflejo de un racimo de prácticas ascéticas sin escuela hasta bien entrada la era común
«In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, for example, “yoga is believed to be when the senses are firmly under control” (VI.11), while in the karma-yoga (path of action) section of the Bhagavad Gītā, yoga is defined as samatvam, evenness of mind (II.48) and as karmasu kauśalam, skill in action (II.50).» — Bryant pone tres definiciones ajenas al lado: el control de los sentidos del Kaṭha, y la ecuanimidad y la destreza en la acción del Bhagavad Gītā
«Elsewhere, the text defines yoga as duḥkha-saṁyoga-viyogam, separation from union with pain (VI.23), which is essentially the definition given in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras: duḥkhābhāvaḥ, the absence of pain (V.2.1625), a definition that finds its roots in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (II.12).» — Bryant suma dos definiciones por la vía negativa: la separación del dolor del Gītā y la ausencia de dolor de los Vaiśeṣika Sūtras
«The Nyāya Sūtras associate the practice of yoga with the attainment of liberation (IV.2.46).» — Bryant cierra el repaso con el Nyāya, que liga el yoga a la liberación
«While his teachings will incorporate all the above definitions, Patañjali here gives his formal definition of yoga for the classical school of Yoga itself: “Yoga is the stilling of all thought.”» — Bryant declara que Patañjali incorpora todas esas definiciones y da la suya: el aquietamiento de todo pensamiento
«The commentators have packed a considerable amount of rather dense information into their commentaries in this sūtra, since Patañjali has basically defined and summarized the entire system of Yoga here, and the commentaries use this sūtra to lay out the infrastructure of the psychology and metaphysics of the yoga process.» — Bryant explica por qué el comentario a I.2 es el más denso: allí Patañjali define y resume el sistema entero
«The task is complicated somewhat since the commentators presuppose that their readers are aware of the system of Sāṇkhya, one of the other six schools of orthodox Indian thought with which the Yoga school is typically coupled.» — Bryant señala el presupuesto que los comentaristas no explican: que el lector ya conoce el Sāṅkhya
«In order to define citta, perhaps the most important entity in yoga practice, one must become familiar with ultimate reality as elaborated upon in the Sāṅkhya (literally, numeration) system.» — Bryant declara a la citta la entidad más importante de la práctica y hace del Sāṅkhya el requisito para definirla
«the terms “consciousness” and “awareness,” although problematic,28 will be used interchangeably in this commentary to refer to the nature of the puruṣa» — Bryant declara el límite de su propio vocabulario: usa *consciousness* y *awareness* de modo intercambiable aunque sean términos problemáticos
«The term citta (from cit, to think, consider, fix the mind on) is used in this sūtra and throughout the text by Patañjali and the commentators to refer to all three of these cognitive functions combined (the Yoga school differs somewhat from that of Sāṅkhya in conceiving these three as interacting functions of the one citta, mind, rather than as three distinct metaphysical layers30), but the main point, as stressed in the last sūtra, is that they are distinct from the soul proper.» — Bryant da la etimología de citta y repite la diferencia técnica con el Sāṅkhya, con la conclusión que no se negocia: los tres son distintos del alma
«Buddhi, intelligence, is the aspect of citta that produces, among other things, the functions of thought connected to judgment, discrimination, knowledge, ascertainment, and will31 (from budh, to wake up, be aware of).» — Bryant define buddhi por sus funciones y su raíz, budh, despertar
«It is the most important aspect of the citta as it is from its function of discrimination that liberation is achieved.» — Bryant hace de la discriminación de buddhi el órgano de la liberación
«Buddhi is thus the liaison between puruṣa as pure awareness, and the objects, whether physical or psychic, of which puruṣa can be aware.» — Bryant sitúa a buddhi de enlace entre el puruṣa y todo objeto, físico o psíquico
«Ahaṅkāra, or ego,32 produces the function of thought related to self-awareness, self-identity, and self-conceit (the personal pronoun aham means I, and kāra, the doer). This is the aspect of citta that causes notions of I-ness and my-ness: “I know,” “I am a man,” “I am happy,” “This is mine.”» — Bryant define ahaṅkāra por su etimología, aham y kāra, y por los enunciados que produce: yo sé, yo soy un hombre, esto es mío
«It is because of ego that the awareness of an ant is limited to the range of the ant’s senses and the conceptual structure of its mind, while the awareness of an elephant has a larger range, and that of a human an even larger range.» — la escala con que Bryant ilustra el refractar del ego: hormiga, elefante, humano
«having perceived an external object, deliver it to the mind, who considers it and delivers it to the ego, who appropriates it and delivers it to the intelligence, the chief superintendent of all.» — la cadena de la percepción tal como el comentario clásico la ordena: sentidos, manas, ego e inteligencia como superintendente
«Vijñānabhikṣu states that the citta is the one unified internal organ, and this becomes manifest in the various functions of intelligence, ego, and mind because of vṛttis.» — Vijñānabhikṣu declara a la citta un solo órgano interno unificado que se manifiesta en tres funciones por obra de las vṛttis
«The verbal root vṛt means to revolve, turn, proceed, move, and underscores the always active, sequential, rambling aspect of the mind.» — Bryant apoya en la raíz vṛt el carácter siempre móvil de la mente
«The ensuing sense impressions, thoughts, or states are products made of that mental substance, just as a gold statue is a form made from the substance gold, or a clay pot is a form from the substance clay.» — las dos imágenes con que Bryant explica la vṛtti como forma de una sustancia: la estatua de oro y la olla de barro
«If citta is the sea, the vṛttis are its waves, the specific forms it takes.» — la imagen del mar y las olas para la citta y sus vṛttis
«The essential point Patañjali is making here is that since all forms or activities of the mind are products of prakṛti, matter, and completely distinct from the soul or true self, puruṣa, they must all be restrained in order for the soul to be realized by the yogī as an autonomous entity distinct from the mind.» — Bryant enuncia lo que I.2 exige: como toda actividad de la mente es prakṛti, toda ella debe refrenarse para que el alma se realice
«Since, as Vyāsa notes, the soul in its pure state is considered to be free of content and changeless—it does not transform and undergo permutations in the way the mind constantly does—Vijñānabhikṣu raises the issue of how it can be aware of objects at all in the first place.» — Vyāsa declara al alma sin contenido e inmutable, y Vijñānabhikṣu plantea la objeción que de ahí se sigue: cómo puede entonces conocer objetos
«Vijñānabhikṣu compares this process to liquid copper being poured into a mold and taking the exact shape of the mold, although the forms into which buddhi is molded are extremely subtle and psychic in nature.» — la imagen del cobre fundido vertido en el molde, con que Vijñānabhikṣu explica el moldearse del intelecto
«This process can be compared to dull, opaque external objects being captured as photographic images on film, which is both translucent and representational, or to geometric patterns on a stained-glass window (Schweitzer 1993, 853), which are again both translucent and representational.» — las dos imágenes modernas que Bryant añade: la imagen fotográfica en la película y el vitral, traslúcidos y representacionales a la vez
«Due to adjacency, the pure consciousness of the soul shines onto the intellect and animates it with consciousness, like a lamp illuminates the film or stained glass with light and makes it appear luminous.» — Bryant explica por adyacencia la animación del intelecto: la lámpara que ilumina la película o el vitral
«Because the pure highly translucent sattva element is maximized in buddhi, it is able to absorb and reflect the soul’s power of consciousness.» — Bryant explica por el sattva la capacidad de buddhi de absorber y reflejar el poder de consciencia del alma
«I will gloss the Sanskrit word citta throughout this discussion with the term mind for ease of reference, since this is how it is usually translated, but it should be noted that the term encapsulates all of the functions of thought outlined above,37 and not just that of manas, which is also usually translated as mind» — Bryant declara su convención de traducción: glosa citta por *mind* advirtiendo que el término cubre las tres funciones y no solo manas. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 63
«The awareness of the pure soul permeates the citta, animating the churnings of thought, citta-vṛttis, but due to ignorance, this animated citta considers consciousness to be inherent within itself, rather than an entity outside and separate from itself. It is this ignorance that is the ultimate cause of bondage and saṁsāra.» — Bryant nombra la ignorancia como causa última de la atadura: la citta animada toma la consciencia por propia
«According to some commentators (most notably, Vijñānabhikṣu),39 just as light bounces off an object back to its source, the consciousness of the soul is reflected off this animated intellect and back to the soul. From this perspective, the intellect also functions like a mirror, the soul becoming conscious of its reflection in the animated intellect, just as one becomes conscious of one’s appearance in a mirror.» — Vijñānabhikṣu lee el intelecto como espejo en que el alma se hace consciente de su reflejo
«Consider a young child looking at herself in one of those “crazy mirrors” that make one appear grotesquely fat or thin (or, in the premodern analogy used by Śaṅkara, a face reflected in a long sword, making the face appear elongated, III.35). If the child does not realize that her deformed appearance in the mirror is merely a distorted reflection and not her actual self, she may experience fear or panic.» — la imagen moderna de Bryant, el espejo deformante de feria, puesta al lado de la premoderna que él atribuye a Śaṅkara: el rostro reflejado en una espada larga
«The soul, in short, is neither the physical body in which it is encased nor the mind that exhibits psychic functions. It is pure autonomous consciousness.» — Bryant resume por la vía negativa: ni el cuerpo ni la mente, sino consciencia autónoma pura
«Thus, the soul appears to undergo the experiences of the body and mind —birth, death, disease, old age, happiness, distress, peacefulness, anxiety, etc., but these are mere transformations of the body and mind. In other words, they are the permutations of gross and subtle matter external to the soul that are pervaded by the soul’s awareness.» — Bryant enuncia la apariencia: el alma parece pasar por nacimiento, muerte, enfermedad y vejez, que son transformaciones del cuerpo y de la mente
«An understanding of the process underpinning the workings of the mind —the citta-vṛttis noted here—requires the introduction of a further set of categories: the three guṇas, strands or qualities. They are sattva, lucidity; rajas, action; and tamas, inertia.» — Bryant introduce los tres guṇas como requisito para entender las citta-vṛttis
«The guṇas are inherent in prakṛti, matter, and are the catalysts in the evolution of the mind and all manifest reality from primordial prakṛti.» — Bryant define los guṇas como catalizadores inherentes de la evolución desde prakṛti
«Just as threads are inherent in the production of a rope, says Vijñānabhikṣu, so the guṇas underpin and permeate the material matrix of prakṛti.» — Vijñānabhikṣu usa la imagen de las hebras de la cuerda para los guṇas
«As one can create an unlimited variety of hues by simply manipulating the relative proportions of red, yellow, and blue, so the unlimited forms of this world, as well as psychological dispositions of all beings, are the product of the interaction and intermixture of the» — Bryant explica por la mezcla de tres colores primarios la variedad ilimitada de formas y disposiciones. El tramo se corta al final de la plana 65
«The Mahābhārata states that as one can light thousands of lamps from one lamp, so prakṛti can produce hundreds of thousands of transformations of the guṇas (XII, 301, 15–16).» — Bryant recoge del Mahābhārata la imagen de las mil lámparas encendidas desde una sola para las transformaciones de los guṇas
«A certain king’s son, due to being born under an afflicted astrological constellation, is expelled from the city and raised by a member of the forest dwelling Śabara tribe. He thus thinks: “I am a Śabara!” Upon finding him to be still alive, one of the king’s ministers informs him: “You are not a Śabara, you are a king’s son.” Thereupon, the son gives up the idea that he is a Śabara, accepts his true royal identity, and thinks: “I am a king’s son.” In the same way, the soul, by means of the instruction of a kind soul [the guru], is informed: “You are manifest from the first Soul [Brahman], who is made of pure consciousness.” Thereupon, giving up the idea of being made of prakṛti, the soul thinks: “Because I am the son of Brahman,40 I am Brahman, not a product of saṁsāra.” (IV.1)» — el relato de los Sāṅkhya Sūtras IV.1 que Bryant traduce: el hijo del rey criado entre los Śabara se cree Śabara hasta que el ministro le dice quién es; el guru cumple ese papel con el alma. Cita larga en bloque, releída entera en el crudo, con la llamada de nota 40 impresa dentro
«Without tamas, for example, there would be no sleep; without rajas, no digestion or even the energy to blink an eye.» — Bryant acota el desprecio por rajas y tamas: sin ellos no habría sueño, digestión ni fuerza para parpadear
«Another way of putting this is that sattva should control whatever degree of rajas and tamas are indispensable to healthy survival— sleeping for six or seven hours, for example, rather than ten, eating a modest amount of food, rather than gorging, etc.» — Bryant traduce la doctrina a régimen de vida: dormir seis o siete horas y no diez, comer con medida y no hasta hartarse
«The etymological meaning of sattva is the nature of being.» — Bryant da la etimología de sattva, la naturaleza del ser
«It is like a mirror that, freed from the coverings of dirt, can now reflect things clearly, say the commentators, and can ultimately reflect the true nature of the soul back to itself as it is without distortion.» — los comentaristas usan la imagen del espejo limpio para la mente sáttvica que refleja al alma sin distorsión
«The ensuing state of contemplation is known as samprajñāta-samādhi, which, while not the ultimate level of samādhi, is the highest level of discriminative thought.» — Bryant sitúa el samprajñāta-samādhi como el nivel más alto del pensamiento discriminativo, sin ser el último del samādhi
«In short, the goal of yoga is to eliminate, that is, still, the potential of rajas and tamas, and allow the full potential sattva nature of the mind to manifest. This is another way of conceptualizing the citta-vṛtti-nirodha of this verse.» — Bryant da una segunda formulación de I.2: aquietar rajas y tamas para que se manifieste sattva
«Since sattva is by nature discriminating, it recognizes the distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti, the soul and matter, when not distracted by the other two guṇas.» — Bryant apoya la discriminación en la naturaleza misma de sattva
«Once the dust has been removed, a person can see his or her true face in the mirror.» — la imagen del polvo quitado del espejo, con que Bryant cierra la explicación del samprajñāta
«The point is that discrimination is not a function of the soul, the innermost conscious self.» — Bryant enuncia la consecuencia: discriminar no es función del alma
«The soul, notes Vyāsa, the pure and eternal power of consciousness, never changes—a fundamental axiom of Indic thought in general; it does not transform when in contact with states of mind.» — Vyāsa enuncia el axioma: el poder de consciencia no cambia ni se transforma al contacto con los estados de mente
«Hariharānanda points out that the consciousness of the soul, citi-śakti, is pure, infinite, immutable, detached, and illuminating.» — Hariharānanda enumera los atributos de citi-śakti: pura, infinita, inmutable, desapegada e iluminante
«Therefore, as Vijñānabhikṣu outlined in the last sūtra, discriminative intelligence, even the ultimate pure sāttvic act of discrimination, which is recognition of the distinction between the soul and the subtlest aspect of matter, although indispensable in the yogī’s progress, still connects the soul to matter albeit in its subtlest aspect.» — Vijñānabhikṣu pone el límite mayor: hasta el acto sáttvico puro de discriminar sigue atando el alma a la materia
«Vyāsa states that when rajas and tamas become activated, the mind is attracted to thoughts of the sense objects.» — Vyāsa explica el mecanismo: activados rajas y tamas, la mente se va tras los objetos de los sentidos
«But both direct the consciousness of the soul, the pure puruṣa self, outward, drawing it into the external world and thus into awareness of action and reaction, the cycle of birth and death, in short, saṁsāra.» — Bryant sigue el efecto: los dos guṇas sacan la consciencia hacia fuera, al ciclo de acción y reacción que es el saṁsāra
«The commentators point out, however, that the very faculty of discrimination—even its ability to distinguish between matter and spirit— is nonetheless a feature of the guṇa of sattva» — los comentaristas ponen el límite: la discriminación misma es rasgo de sattva; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 68 recordando que sattva es aún prakṛti
«As Śaṅkara puts it, the mind sees the limitation in its own nature and deconstructs itself.» — Śaṅkara enuncia el desenlace: la mente ve la limitación de su propia naturaleza y se deshace a sí misma
«When lead is burned with gold, says Bhoja Rāja, it not only burns away the impurities in gold, but burns itself away too; discrimination discerns that it itself is not the final aspect of being and pushes the citta to dissolve itself and transcend discerning thought altogether so as to reveal the ultimate consciousness beyond.» — la imagen del plomo que al quemar la impureza del oro se quema también, con que Bhoja Rāja explica la autodisolución de la discriminación
«There is thus a still higher goal in yoga beyond discrimination.» — Bryant fija el punto: hay una meta por encima de la discriminación
«When the mind restrains even the ability to discriminate, continues Vyāsa, and exists in an inactive state where all thoughts remain only in potential but not active form, in other words, when all thoughts have been stilled (nirodha), one has reached a state of mind where nothing is cognized—all cognition, after all, is connected to some external reality (since cognition requires a subject, the cognizer, and an object of cognition distinct from or external to this subject).» — Vyāsa describe el nirodha completo: ni siquiera discriminación, y con eso nada cognoscible, porque toda cognición exige sujeto y objeto
«With no further distractions including discrimination and even the reflection of itself in the mirror of the sāttvic buddhi intelligence, consciousness can now abide in its own autonomous nature, the actual soul itself, puruṣa.» — Bryant describe el punto en que la consciencia queda en su propia naturaleza autónoma, sin ni siquiera el reflejo en buddhi
«This is the samādhi called asamprajñāta, the state of awareness in which nothing can be discerned except the pure self.» — Bryant nombra el asamprajñāta-samādhi
«In this stage, the mind, which is ultimately an interface between the puruṣa and the external world, becomes redundant and can be discarded by the yogī upon attaining full liberation.» — Bryant enuncia el destino de la mente: vuelta redundante, el yogī la descarta
«This stage, however, must be preceded by samprajñāta-samādhi, uninterrupted meditation, that is, concentration on an external object (which, by definition is a product of matter) so that the states of mind and fluctuations of thought mentioned in this sūtra can first be fully stilled.» — Bryant fija el orden: el samprajñāta precede necesariamente al asamprajñāta
«Buddhists hold that the human persona consists of five sheaths, skandhas,47 one of which is consciousness itself, but none of these are eternal or autonomous as almost all Hindu philosophical thought considers the puruṣa, or conscious self, to be.» — Bryant expone los cinco skandhas budistas y marca la diferencia: ninguno es eterno ni autónomo como el puruṣa
«There is thus a fundamental and intractable difference between Buddhism and Hindu and Jain philosophies on this point.» — Bryant declara intratable la diferencia en este punto, y la deja consignada sin arbitrar
«For Buddhists, when the objects of consciousness are removed, so is consciousness.» — Bryant enuncia la posición budista en sus propios términos
«Buddhist theologians used the analogy of the wood and fire mentioned by Bhoja Rāja to argue that consciousness is generated by an object. It is not an entity sui generis with an independent existence—one cannot have consciousness that is not conscious of some object, any more than one can have fire without a substratum such as wood.» — Bryant devuelve la analogía de la leña y el fuego a los teólogos budistas: la consciencia la genera el objeto
«Even the orthodox Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, which do accept the existence of an autonomous puruṣa, hold that when the puruṣa becomes liberated and uncoupled from the mind and the objects of the senses, it ceases to be conscious.» — Bryant consigna una tercera posición: Nyāya y Vaiśeṣika aceptan el puruṣa autónomo y sostienen que liberado deja de ser consciente
«Bhoja Rāja raises a possible objection to the existence of puruṣa, the soul, which is most likely an implicit reference to Buddhism» — Bhoja Rāja plantea una objeción a la existencia del puruṣa que Bryant lee como referencia implícita al budismo; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y la objeción sigue en la 69 con la imagen del fuego que se apaga sin leña
«If the soul, or pure consciousness, has no object of consciousness, then would it not cease to exist altogether, like fire ceases to exist when the wood upholding it is destroyed? In other words, if the vṛttis, fluctuations of thought, are eliminated, then what would consciousness be conscious of?» — la objeción, ya en la plana 69: sin objeto, ¿de qué sería consciente la consciencia?
«I.3 tadā draṣṭuh svarūpe ‘vasthānam tadā, then, at that point; draṣṭuḥ, of the seer, of the soul; svarūpe, in its own real essential nature; avasthānam, abiding, remaining, being absorbed in When that is accomplished, the seer abides in its own true nature.» — I.3, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant. El cuerpo imprime *draṣṭuh* y el apéndice *draṣṭuḥ* en la plana 445: la divergencia se consigna como la imprime cada sitio y el ancla va en la del cuerpo
«By seeing, he does not intend the gross power of sight as manifest through the physical organ of sight but as a metaphor for consciousness itself, which “sees” in the sense of exhibiting awareness.» — Bryant acota el sentido de ver en draṣṭṛ: metáfora de la consciencia, no el órgano de la vista
«Having stated in the last sūtra that yoga means the cessation of all thought, Patañjali now immediately reassures his audience.» — Bryant lee I.3 como respuesta tranquilizadora a lo que I.2 acaba de exigir
«Does the elimination of thought entail the elimination of experience and of existence itself? Is it existential suicide?» — Bryant formula la objeción en sus términos más duros: si toda experiencia está mediada por el pensamiento, suprimirlo ¿no es suicidio existencial?
«What happens to the puruṣa self, asks Vyāsa, when the mind is void of content, as prescribed in the last sūtra?» — Vyāsa plantea la pregunta que I.3 contesta
«Vijñānabhikṣu rhetorically considers three possibilities that might transpire once all the vṛttis, states of mind, have been removed: (1) Does the puruṣa soul remain as pure consciousness that is conscious only of itself? (2) Does it remain unconscious, like a log of wood (becoming conscious only when confronted by a state of mind, as held by the followers of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools)?52 or (3) Does it cease to exist like a lamp on the destruction of the wick (as held by followers of the materialistic Cārvāka school53)? The Yoga school subscribes to the first view.» — Vijñānabhikṣu pone las tres salidas posibles y las adjudica: la consciencia de sí para el Yoga, el leño inconsciente para Nyāya y Vaiśeṣika, la lámpara apagada para los Cārvāka
«Once freed from its association with the states of the mind, the soul can abide in its own nature, the highest state of pure consciousness, asamprajñāta-samādhi.» — Bryant enuncia la respuesta del Yoga: el alma abide en su propia naturaleza
«It is devoid even of knowledge, says Vijñānabhikṣu, since knowledge implies an object of knowledge and thus requires a» — Vijñānabhikṣu declara ese estado desprovisto incluso de conocimiento, porque conocer exige objeto. El tramo se corta al final de la plana 69
«There are various terms in Hindu philosophical thought to refer to the soul according to context or the partiality of different texts and schools, ātman being perhaps the most commonly encountered.» — Bryant consigna que el hindú tiene varios términos para el alma y que ātman es el más común
«The Yoga tradition in general favors puruṣa, but Patañjali here uses (the genitive case of) draṣṭṛ, the seer (from the root dṛś, to see)» — Bryant señala el término que Patañjali prefiere en este sūtra: draṣṭṛ, el veedor, de la raíz dṛś
«When a red flower is placed next to a crystal, the flower’s color is reflected in the crystal, and so the crystal itself appears to be red. The true nature of the crystal, however, is never actually red, nor is it affected or changed by the flower in any way—even while it reflects the flower—nor does it disappear when the flower is removed.» — la imagen del cristal y la flor roja, con que los comentaristas explican la relación entre consciencia y mente. El tramo cruza el cambio de plana a la 71
«Similarly, consciousness reflects or illuminates external objects and internal thoughts, vṛttis, but is not itself affected by them. Puruṣa, although an autonomous entity separable from the citta with its vṛttis placed in its vicinity, is as if colored by them.» — Bryant aplica la imagen: la consciencia queda *como si* coloreada por las vṛttis, sin teñirse
«As a crystal is essentially an autonomous entity separable from the red flower placed in its vicinity and retains its pure transparent nature when separated from the flower, so consciousness is an autonomous entity separable from the citta with its vṛttis placed in its vicinity, and thus retains its pure nature of awareness when detached from the citta through the practice of yoga.» — Bryant cierra la comparación: el cristal separado de la flor recobra su transparencia, como la consciencia separada de la citta
«The commentaries frequently utilize another example favored by the Vedānta school to illustrate a related point: Mother-of-pearl does not give up its own essential nature simply because someone mistakes it for the actual pearl itself.» — los comentaristas recogen del Vedānta la imagen del nácar confundido con la perla
«Likewise, consciousness does not change its nature simply because it may be confounded with the physical body or the changing states of the mind and intelligence.» — Bryant aplica la imagen del nácar: confundirse con el cuerpo no cambia la naturaleza de la consciencia
«The Śānti-parvan section of the Mahābhārata abounds in similes illustrating the continued existence of puruṣa when apart from its prākṛtic encapsulation.» — Bryant remite al Śānti-parvan del Mahābhārata por sus símiles de la persistencia del puruṣa fuera de su envoltura
«It is like a silkworm that continues to exist after the destruction of the cell made by its threads, a deer that abandons its horn or a snake its slough after shedding it, a bird that goes elsewhere when the tree on which it is perched falls (XII 212.47–49), or a fish and the water that surrounds it (XII 303.17).» — la serie de símiles del epos: el gusano de seda fuera del capullo, el ciervo que suelta el asta, la serpiente que muda, el ave que se va cuando cae el árbol
«Elsewhere, the epic compares the direct vision of the soul within the body indicated by this sūtra to the perception of a lamp blazing forth from a pot (XII 187.44), the effulgent sun, a smokeless flame, a streak of lightning in the sky (XII 232.18), or the streak of gold in a stone (XII 198.4).» — la segunda serie de símiles: la lámpara que brilla desde una olla, el sol, la llama sin humo, el relámpago y la veta de oro en la piedra
«I.4 vṛtti-sārūpyam itaratra vṛtti, fluctuation; sārūpyam, identification; itaratra, otherwise, at other times Otherwise, at other times, [the seer] is absorbed in the changing states [of the mind].» — I.4, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant. El apéndice la reimprime en la plana 445; el ancla va en la del cuerpo
«Patañjali states here that at other times—that is, when not abiding in its own nature as pure consciousness devoid of content—the seer is absorbed, sārūpyam, in the vṛttis, the mind’s changing states.» — Bryant glosa I.4: fuera del estado de I.3, el veedor queda absorbido en las vṛttis
«The mind serves its master, the soul, by presenting objects of experience in the form of vṛttis. When these ever-changing states of mind are presented to the soul, the soul becomes conscious of them, but is mistakenly identified with them by the citta, and thereby appears affected by them.» — Bryant describe el servicio de la mente y el error que engendra: el alma parece afectada por lo que se le presenta
«Vācaspati Miśra repeats the analogy of someone looking in a dirty mirror, identifying with the dirty reflection, and then becoming anxious thinking he or she is dirty. Likewise, when one is not aware of the distinction between consciousness and the mind, one wrongly attributes the states of the mind to the self.» — Vācaspati Miśra vuelve a la imagen del espejo sucio para explicar la atribución errónea
«The cause of the person’s anxiety, frustrations, and experiences is misidentification with something that he or she is not.» — Bryant localiza la causa de la angustia en la identificación con lo que uno no es
«The notion of misidentifying the true self with a false reflection goes back to the Upaniṣads.» — Bryant remonta a los Upaniṣads la idea de confundirse con un reflejo falso
«Vyāsa calls the soul the master and the mind its property: He compares the mind to a magnet that» — Vyāsa reparte los papeles: el alma dueña, la mente propiedad, y compara la mente al imán; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 72 diciendo que atrae el hierro de su cercanía, la consciencia del puruṣa
«In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VIII.8–12), there is a charming narrative about Indra, lord of the celestials, and Virocaṇa, lord of the demons.» — Bryant introduce el relato de Indra y Virocaṇa del Chāndogya Upaniṣad
«He tells them that they can find the ātman by looking into a pan of water. Peering into the waters, the two see their bodies reflected back. They take their leave, thinking that their bodies are this ātman» — en el relato, Prajāpati prueba a los dos rivales mandándolos a mirar su reflejo en el agua
«while Virocaṇa remains content with this surface realization, Indra sees the inadequacy of this view of the ātman and so returns to Prajāpati. “I see no worth in this,” he complains, “for this self will die when the body dies.”» — Indra objeta lo que Virocaṇa acepta: un sí mismo que muere con el cuerpo no vale
«Although the mind is actually inert and unconscious, say the commentators, as a result of being permeated by the consciousness of the soul, its states and fluctuations appear to be states of the true self and are as if experienced by the self.» — los comentaristas explican la apariencia: permeada de consciencia, la mente hace pasar sus estados por estados del sí mismo
«And so, says Vācaspati Miśra, the soul, which has no misconceptions, appears to have misconceptions and, although completely pure and transcendent, appears to be affected by mundane states of mind such as pleasure, pain, or delusion.» — Vācaspati Miśra enuncia la paradoja: el alma sin error aparenta error, y pura aparenta afectada
«This is like the phenomenon of a lake appearing to have trees on it due to the reflection of the trees on its bank, says Vijñānabhikṣu.» — la imagen del lago con árboles reflejados, de Vijñānabhikṣu
«Bhoja Rāja gives the well-known illustration of the moon appearing to be altered and rippled when reflected on rippling water, but it is the water, not the moon, that constantly fluctuates due to the wind.» — la imagen de la luna rizada en el agua, de Bhoja Rāja: lo que fluctúa es el agua
«Vijñānabhikṣu quotes the Gītā: “One who sees that all activities are being performed by prakṛti, and that the self is not the doer, truly sees” (XIII.29).» — Vijñānabhikṣu apoya el punto en el Gītā XIII.29: ve de veras quien ve que prakṛti hace y el sí mismo no
«Śaṅkara here alludes to the image of a dancing girl in the Sāṅkhya Kārikās, the primary text for the Sāṅkhya school: “As a dancer ceases from the dance after having been seen by the audience, so also prakṛti ceases after having manifested herself to the puruṣa” (LIX).» — Śaṅkara trae la imagen de la bailarina del Sāṅkhya Kārikā LIX: prakṛti cesa una vez que se ha mostrado al puruṣa
«Consider a group of people watching a film. The film itself consists of just a sequence of inert flickering images and sounds, which are nothing more than light particles and frequency waves— material energy.» — la analogía moderna que Bryant propone: la película como secuencia de imágenes inertes, partículas de luz y ondas
«The people watching the film, however, can become so absorbed in this spectacle of light and sound that they forget their own existence.» — Bryant sigue la analogía: el espectador absorto olvida su propia existencia
«Moreover, the viewers can become so wrapped up in the illusory world of the film that they experience, let us suppose, sadness when the hero or heroine is killed, or happiness when hero and heroine live happily ever after. In other words, the viewers forget their own separate existences and experience emotions produced by intense identification with the illusory and separate world of the film.» — Bryant señala que la emoción del espectador nace de la identificación con un mundo que no es el suyo
«In the same way, due to the mind’s ignorance and illusion, the soul appears absorbed in the lights and sounds and emotions of the external objective world and forgetful of its own real nature as pure consciousness, even though it is merely the witness of all these, which are actually taking place in the mind’s vṛttis.» — Bryant aplica la analogía: el alma absorta en el espectáculo, testigo de lo que ocurre en las vṛttis
«Yoga is about stilling the vṛttis, stopping the film midway so that the mind can realize that the emotions, fears, happiness, pains, births and deaths, etc., it has been experiencing do not exist in the soul but are the inert flickerings and permutations of the material spectacle.» — Bryant define el yoga dentro de la analogía: parar la película a media proyección
«Similarly, the mind is constantly experiencing and processing the forms of sense objects through the senses. It is thus constantly changing, like the flame of a candle, says» — Vijñānabhikṣu compara la mente a la llama de una vela, siempre cambiante; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 73 con los estados temporales de felicidad y aflicción que produce
«Thus yoga is ultimately about liberation from the external material world, or, in traditional Hindu terms, from saṁsāra, the cycle of» — Bryant cierra la analogía del cine con la meta en términos hindúes tradicionales: liberación del saṁsāra. El tramo se corta al final de la plana 73
«Vācaspati Miśra raises the question of the cause of the soul’s association with the mind in the first place, in other words, the cause of ignorance. It is eternal, he answers, like the relationship between seed and sprout.» — Vācaspati Miśra plantea la pregunta por el origen de la ignorancia y la contesta declarándola eterna, como la relación entre semilla y brote. El tramo cruza el cambio de plana a la 74
«Almost all schools of Indic philosophy conceive of ignorance as eternal and do not speculate over any first impetus that caused the individual to be associated with ignorance and saṁsāra.» — Bryant consigna que casi ninguna escuela índica especula sobre un primer impulso de la ignorancia
«As the Buddha is reputed to have said, if a man is shot by an arrow, it is useless to inquire as to the nature of the arrow, its point of origin, etc. One should more profitably first remove the arrow.» — la parábola de la flecha que Bryant atribuye al Buddha, traída para justificar la abstención
«Likewise, for one drowning in the ocean of birth and death, saṁsāra, it is fruitless to speculate as to how one originally fell in; it would be more productive to find first a means to get out. Such a means, of course, is yoga.» — Bryant traslada la parábola al saṁsāra: importa la salida, no cómo se cayó
«I.5 vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ vṛttayaḥ, the changing states of mind; pañcatayyaḥ, fivefold; kliṣṭa, detrimental, harmful, damaging, afflicted; akliṣṭāḥ, nondetrimental, unafflicted There are five kinds of changing states of the mind, and they are either detrimental or nondetrimental [to the practice of yoga].» — I.5, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: las vṛttis son cinco y se dividen en perjudiciales y no perjudiciales
«Patañjali defined yoga in I.2 as citta-vṛtti-nirodha and now dedicates sūtras I.5–12 to discussing the vṛttis and I.13–16 to discussing nirodha.» — Bryant expone el plan del texto: I.5-12 para las vṛttis y I.13-16 para el nirodha
«We here get a sense of the systematic nature of the sūtra traditions, in contrast to the more spontaneous but unsystematic nature of the earlier Upaniṣadic corpus from which a number of knowledge systems stemmed.» — Bryant contrasta el carácter sistemático del sūtra con el espontáneo y asistemático del corpus upaniṣádico
«Since the mind is never static but always active and changing, vṛttis are constantly being produced and thus constantly absorb the consciousness of puruṣa away from its own pure nature, channeling it out into the realm of subtle or gross prakṛti.» — Bryant explica por qué las vṛttis importan: siendo la mente siempre activa, absorben sin cesar la consciencia hacia prakṛti
«Vijñānabhikṣu compares vṛttis to flames of a fire or waves of the sea.» — Vijñānabhikṣu compara las vṛttis a las llamas del fuego o a las olas del mar
«Here, he addresses the consequent question: What are these vṛttis that must be eliminated?» — Bryant formula la pregunta que I.5 contesta
«These types of mental states are detrimental to the goals of yoga because they are the fertile soil from which the seeds of karma sprout; the kliṣṭa-vṛttis culminate in bondage.» — Bryant explica por qué son perjudiciales: son el suelo fértil de la semilla del karma
«Akliṣṭa-vṛttis are sāttvic and have the opposite effect; they are born of insight and culminate in liberation.» — Bryant define por contraste las akliṣṭa-vṛttis: sáttvicas, nacidas del discernimiento y rematadas en liberación
«Karma, from the root kṛ, to do or make, literally means work, but inherent in the Indic concept of work, or any type of activity, is the notion that every action breeds a reaction.» — Bryant da la etimología de karma y el supuesto que lleva dentro: toda acción engendra reacción
«Thus karma refers not only to an initial act, whether benevolent or malicious, but also to the reaction it produces (pleasant or unpleasant in accordance with the original act), which ripens for the actor either in this life or a future one.» — Bryant acota el alcance del término: no solo el acto sino la reacción que madura en esta vida o en otra
«This cycle of action and reaction, or saṁsāra, is potentially eternal and unlimited since not only does any one single act breed a reaction, but the actor must then react to this reaction, causing a rereaction, which in term fructifies and provokes rerereactions, and so on ad infinitum.» — Bryant explica la infinitud del saṁsāra por la cadena de reacciones a las reacciones
«It is in an attempt to portray the sheer unlimited and eternal productive power of karma that Indic thinkers, both Hindu and Buddhist, use such metaphors as the ocean of birth and death.» — Bryant explica por esa infinitud la metáfora del océano de nacimiento y muerte, común a hindúes y budistas
«Thus, karma, which keeps consciousness bound to the external world and forgetful of its own nature, is generated by the vṛttis, and the vṛttis, in turn, are produced by the kleśas.» — Bryant cierra la cadena causal: kleśas, vṛttis, karma, atadura
«Vyāsa notes that this type of vṛtti is beneficial even if situated in a stream of detrimental vṛttis.» — Vyāsa consigna que una vṛtti sáttvica aprovecha aunque vaya en medio de una corriente de perjudiciales
«The reverse also holds true, adds Vyāsa: Detrimental vṛttis also can surface periodically in a predominantly sāttvic citta (hence the Gītā’s statement in II.60 that the senses can carry away the mind even of a man of discrimination).» — Vyāsa consigna el reverso y Bryant lo apoya en el Gītā II.60: los sentidos arrastran hasta al discriminante
«Vācaspati Miśra mentions activities such as the practice of yoga and the cultivation of desirelessness born from the study of scripture as nondetrimental, that is, mental activities beneficial to the goal of yoga.» — Vācaspati Miśra da ejemplos de vṛttis no perjudiciales: la práctica del yoga y el desapego nacido del estudio de la escritura
«When the citta manifests its pure sattva potential, it becomes “like” the ātman, says Vyāsa.» — Vyāsa dice que la citta en sattva puro se vuelve *como* el ātman, y Bryant conserva las comillas del símil
«Rāmānanda Sarasvatī notes here that, essentially, the citta mind is nothing but saṁskāras, mental imprints or impressions (not to be confused with saṁsāra, the cycle of birth and death).» — Rāmānanda Sarasvatī reduce la citta a saṁskāras, y Bryant advierte de la confusión fácil con saṁsāra
«Every sensual experience or mental thought that has ever been experienced forms a saṁskāra, an imprint, in the citta mind.» — Bryant define el saṁskāra: toda experiencia deja su impronta en la citta
«Essentially, any vṛtti leaves its copy on the citta before fading away, like a sound is imprinted on a tape recorder or an image on film.» — la imagen técnica con que Bryant explica el saṁskāra: el sonido grabado en la cinta, la imagen en la película
«However, it is important to note that these saṁskāras are not just passive imprints but vibrant latent impulses that can activate under conducive circumstances and exert influence on a person’s thoughts and behaviors.» — Bryant acota: los saṁskāras no son improntas pasivas sino impulsos latentes que se activan
«Vyāsa notes that there is thus a cycle of vṛttis and saṁskāras.» — Vyāsa cierra el círculo entre vṛttis y saṁskāras
«For example, a particular type of experience, say smoking a cigarette, is imprinted in the citta as a saṁskāra, which then activates as a desirable memory or impulse, provoking a repetition of this activity, which is likewise recorded, and so on until a cluster or grove of saṁskāras of an identical or similar sort is produced in the citta, gaining strength with each repetition.» — el ejemplo con que Bryant explica el racimo de saṁskāras: el cigarro que se repite y se refuerza
«Vyāsa states that the detrimental vṛttis are caused by the five kleśas, the» — Vyāsa adjudica las vṛttis perjudiciales a los cinco kleśas; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y la lista sigue en la 75: ignorancia, ego, apego, aversión y aferramiento a la vida
«Memories in Hindu psychology, as we will see in I.11, are considered to be vivid saṁskāras from this lifetime, which are retrievable, while the notion of the subconscious in Western psychology corresponds to other less» — Bryant equipara el subconsciente de la psicología occidental a los saṁskāras menos recuperables; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 77, donde sitúa su acumulación sobre todo en vidas anteriores
«Through the practice of yoga, the yogī attempts to supplant all the rājasic and tāmasic saṁskāras with sāttvic ones until these, too, are restricted in the higher states of meditative concentration.» — Bryant describe la operación entera: sustituir saṁskāras rājasicos y tāmasicos por sáttvicos, y refrenar también estos
«Of course, as Vijñānabhikṣu points out, all vṛttis, including sāttvic ones, are ultimately detrimental from the absolute perspective of the puruṣa, as they bind consciousness to the world of matter, so the notions of detrimental and nondetrimental are from the relative perspective of saṁsāra; the detrimental (rājasic and tāmasic) vṛttis cause pain, and the nondetrimental (sāttvic) ones at least lead in the direction of liberation, even though they too must eventually be given up.» — Vijñānabhikṣu relativiza la propia distinción del sūtra: vista desde el puruṣa, toda vṛtti es perjudicial; lo perjudicial y lo no perjudicial son categorías del saṁsāra
«Vijñānabhikṣu quotes the Bhāgavata Purāṇa here to make the point: “Other things [the obstacles to yoga] must be eliminated by sattva, and [then] sattva is eliminated by sattva” (XI.25.20).» — Vijñānabhikṣu apoya el punto en el Bhāgavata Purāṇa XI.25.20: sattva quita lo demás y sattva quita a sattva
«Also, vṛttis that are truly and literally akliṣṭa, not subject to any ignorance at all, can point only to the state of jīvanmukta, liberated while still embodied.» — Bryant deriva del sūtra la figura del jīvanmukta, liberado en vida
«This verse thus gives a clear indication that it is possible to act in the world in one’s prākṛtic body and mind from an enlightened perspective free from ignorance.» — Bryant lee en I.5 la posibilidad de obrar en el mundo desde una perspectiva libre de ignorancia
«The implication, in essence, is that the human mind finds itself in one of these five states at any given moment. According to the Yoga tradition, all possible mental states that can be experienced can be categorized as manifestations of one of these five types of vṛttis.» — Bryant enuncia el alcance de la lista: toda la vida mental cabe en esas cinco
«Any other states of mind that one might conceive of would be considered by the Yoga tradition as a subset of one of these five essential categories.» — Bryant cierra la lista: cualquier otro estado es subconjunto de uno de los cinco
«The commentators reserve their comments for the ensuing sūtras, which explain each of these items in turn.» — Bryant consigna el silencio de los comentaristas en I.6 y por qué: cada ítem se trata en su sūtra
«I.7 pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni pratyakṣa, sense perception; anumāna, inference, logic; āgamāḥ, testimony, verbal communication; pramāṇāni, epistemology Right knowledge consists of sense perception, logic, and verbal testimony.» — I.7, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: los tres pramāṇas del sistema
«The first of the five vṛttis to be discussed is pramāṇa, the central concern of epistemology, that is, what sources constitute valid knowledge of an» — Bryant nombra la materia de I.7, la epistemología. El tramo se corta al final de la plana 78
«I.6 pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ pramāṇa, epistemology, source of right knowledge; viparyaya, error; vikalpa, imagination, fancy; nidrā, sleep; smṛtayaḥ, memory» — I.6 con su análisis palabra por palabra: las cinco vṛttis nombradas en sánscrito. La traducción de Bryant cae ya en la plana 78, donde el tramo se corta
«Or, as he puts it, if an axe cuts a khadira tree, it is not a plakṣa tree that is thereby cut.» — la objeción que Vācaspati Miśra formula con el hacha y los dos árboles: si la impresión se hace en la mente, cómo acaba hecha en el puruṣa
«It is the mind and intelligence, not the soul, that take the form of the object as a result of sense perception.» — Vācaspati Miśra contesta con la analogía del espejo: quien toma la forma del objeto es la mente, no el alma
«According to the nonreflection model, awareness simply pervades the citta just as it pervades the body and is misidentified as being nondifferent from the forms of citta in the same way as it is misidentified with the form of the body.» — Bryant expone el modelo alternativo, el de la no reflexión, y lo deja al lado del de la reflexión sin arbitrar entre ellos
«According to either manner of conceptualization, this misidentification of the awareness of puruṣa with the forms of the intellect is the essence of ignorance.» — Bryant señala que los dos modelos coinciden en lo que importa: la identificación errónea es la esencia de la ignorancia
«He gives the rather clumsy example of the moon and stars, which belong to the category of moving objects because they are seen to move, but mountains belong to a category of immobile objects, because they have never been seen to move. Thus, if one sees an unfamiliar mountain or hill, one can infer that it will not move, because other known objects in this category, all mountains and hills with which one is familiar, do not move.» — Bryant llama torpe el ejemplo de Vyāsa —luna y estrellas móviles, montañas inmóviles— y lo consigna igual
«The more classical example of inference among Hindu logicians is that fire can be inferred from the presence of smoke.» — Bryant da el ejemplo clásico de los lógicos hindúes: el fuego inferido del humo
«It is in this regard that inference, anumāna, differs from the first source of knowledge, pratyakṣa, sense perception. Pratyakṣa requires that one actually see the fire. In anumāna, the fire itself is not actually seen, but its presence is inferred from something else that is perceived, smoke.» — Bryant separa pratyakṣa de anumāna por lo que cada uno exige ver
«The principle here is that there must always be an absolute and invariable relationship (vyāpti, concomitance) between the thing inferred, say, the fire, and the reason on which the inference is made, the presence of smoke—in other words, wherever there is or has ever been smoke there must at all places and at all times always be or have been fire present as its cause with no exceptions.» — Bryant enuncia la condición de la inferencia válida: vyāpti, concomitancia sin excepción
«If exceptions to the rule can be found, even one instance of smoke ever that does or did not have fire as its cause, then the inference is invalid.» — Bryant fija el criterio de invalidez: una sola excepción basta
«Finally, āgama, verbal testimony, the third source of valid knowledge accepted by Patañjali, is the relaying of accurate information through the medium of words by a trustworthy person who has perceived or inferred the existence of an object, to someone who has not.» — Bryant define el āgama: información transmitida por palabra de alguien fiable que sí percibió o infirió
«Vyāsa describes a trustworthy person as someone whose statements cannot be contradicted.» — Vyāsa define al fiable por lo que no se le puede contradecir
«Vācaspati Miśra adds that such a person should have keen sense organs and be trustworthy and compassionate, and Vijñānabhikṣu, that a reliable or trustworthy person is one who is free from defects such as illusion, laziness, deceit, dull-wittedness, and so forth.» — Vācaspati Miśra y Vijñānabhikṣu añaden requisitos al testigo fiable: sentidos agudos, compasión y ausencia de ilusión, pereza, engaño y torpeza
«The words of such a reliable authority enter the ear and produce an image, vṛtti, in the mind of the hearer that corresponds to the vṛtti experienced by the trustworthy person.» — Bryant describe el mecanismo del āgama: la palabra produce en el oyente una vṛtti que corresponde a la del testigo
«Since scriptures are considered to have been uttered by trustworthy persons in the form of enlightened sages and divine beings, their status as trustworthy sources of knowledge is especially valuable.» — Bryant explica el estatuto de la escritura dentro del esquema: la dicen sabios iluminados y seres divinos
«In order to elaborate on this, Vācaspati Miśra raises the issue of how sacred scriptures can be considered valid given that all accurate verbal knowledge must itself originally come either from perception or inference (hence the Cārvāka and Vaiśeṣika schools do not even consider them separate sources of knowledge69), but scriptures deal with certain subjects that no human being has either seen or inferred (such as the existence of heavenly realms).» — Vācaspati Miśra plantea la objeción: si todo saber verbal viene de percepción o inferencia, qué pasa con lo que nadie vio ni infirió
«Vācaspati Miśra responds that the truths of scripture have been perceived by God, Īśvara; thus divine scripture, too, is based on perception—and God, quips Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, is surely a trustworthy person!» — Vācaspati Miśra contesta remitiendo la percepción a Īśvara, y Rāmānanda Sarasvatī remata que Dios es sin duda persona fiable
«Vyãsa defines anumāna, inference, as the assumption that an object of a particular category shares the same» — Vyāsa define la inferencia por la categoría compartida; el troceo imprime aquí *Vyãsa* con tilde en lugar de raya, y así se cita. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 80
«verbal testimony, is divine scripture, which is also referred to as śruti,68 that which is heard, or śabda, the word.» — Bryant sitúa la escritura revelada como el caso mayor del āgama, y da sus dos nombres: śruti y śabda. El tramo abre la plana 81
«However, Vācaspati Miśra, in his commentary to the Saṅkhya Kārikā (V), precludes the blind acceptance of scripture by qualifying that revelation may be a useful means of attaining knowledge only if it has a solid foundation, contains no internal contradictions, is supported by reason, and is accepted by people in general.» — Vācaspati Miśra pone condiciones a la revelación como fuente: fundamento sólido, ausencia de contradicción interna, apoyo de la razón y aceptación general. El troceo imprime *Saṅkhya* así en este sitio. El tramo cruza el cambio de plana a la 81
«Vyāsa makes a telling comment in I.32 relevant to the hierarchy of Yoga epistemology. Perception is superior to any other sources of knowledge— indeed, the other sources of knowledge are based on it.» — Vyāsa jerarquiza los pramāṇas: la percepción por encima, y las otras dos fundadas en ella
«Additionally, it can be argued that accepting knowledge from a verbal authority is nothing other than making an inference—one makes an inference that a verbal authority is reliable and does not counter perceivable data.» — Bryant lleva el argumento un paso más: aceptar una autoridad verbal es ya una inferencia
«Therefore some schools of thought, like that associated with the materialist Cārvāka, accept the need for only one pramāṇa, that of sense perception.» — Bryant consigna la posición mínima: los Cārvāka aceptan un solo pramāṇa
«The Yoga school accepts three sources but is very clear that it considers pratyakṣa the highest, not just because the other pramāṇas depend on it, but (as will become clearer in I.49) because it is the only way of truly knowing the essential nature of an object.» — Bryant fija la posición del Yoga: tres fuentes, con pratyakṣa por encima como única vía al conocer la naturaleza de un objeto
«Different schools of thought prioritized different pramāṇas.» — Bryant señala que cada escuela privilegia un pramāṇa distinto
«The Nyāya school features anumāna, dedicating itself for centuries to refining categories of logic, and Sāṅkhya, too, was associated with this epistemology.» — Bryant adjudica el anumāna al Nyāya, y con él al Sāṅkhya
«the Mīmāṁsā school, too, prioritized āgama and became especially associated with developing hermeneutics, the methods of scriptural interpretation.» — Bryant adjudica también al Mīmāṁsā el āgama, con la hermenéutica por especialidad
«While Patañjali accepts āgama as a valid source of knowledge, he does not quote or even indirectly refer to a single verse from scripture in his treatise (in contrast with the Vedānta Sūtras, which are almost entirely composed of references from the Upaniṣads).» — Bryant consigna una negativa como dato: Patañjali acepta el āgama y no cita ni una vez la escritura, al revés que los Vedānta Sūtras
«The very fact that he categorizes āgama as a vṛtti and thus comparable in one sense with other vṛttis such as viparyaya, error, the subject of the next sūtra, points to correspondences with aspects of post-Enlightenment thought, namely, that verifiable (in this case yogic) experience trumps scripture.» — Bryant lee en la clasificación del āgama como vṛtti una correspondencia con el pensamiento posterior a la Ilustración: la experiencia verificable por encima de la escritura
«This has been termed a “radical mystico-yogic orientation,”72 since, certainly, as with the Enlightenment, such claims would have challenged the mainstream Vedic authority of the day.» — Bryant recoge el rótulo de orientación místico-yóguica radical y señala que tales pretensiones desafiaban la autoridad védica de su tiempo
«As for anumāna, while Patañjali uses this source of knowledge on occasion, such as in his arguments against certain Buddhist views, (IV.14–24), clearly almost his entire thrust throughout the sūtras is on pratyakṣa as the ultimate form of knowledge.» — Bryant acota el uso de la inferencia en Patañjali: la emplea contra ciertas tesis budistas, pero su empuje entero va a la percepción
«Anumāna and āgama are forms of knowledge, but mediate forms, the truths of which are indirect, where the Yoga tradition bases its claims to authoritativeness on direct, personal experience.» — Bryant llama mediatas a las otras dos vías y funda la autoridad del Yoga en la experiencia directa
«It is because of this orientation that yoga is, in my view, destined to remain a perennial source of interest to the empirical dispositions of the modern world.» — Bryant declara como opinión propia que esa orientación mantendrá el interés del mundo moderno por el yoga
«One must also note that there are different types of pratyakṣa: the commentary on the Sāṅkhya Kārikā, the Yukti-dīpikā, speaks of yogic perception as well as sensual perception (38.2).» — Bryant acota la noción de percepción: el Yukti-dīpikā distingue la yóguica de la sensorial
«Indeed, several schools make a distinction between apara-pratyakṣa, conventional perception, and para-pratyakṣa, supernormal perception, or, as the Sāṅkhya Sūtras put it, external perception, bāhya-pratyakṣa, and internal perception abāhya-pratyakṣa (I.90).» — Bryant recoge las parejas de términos con que varias escuelas separan la percepción convencional de la supranormal
«As will become clearer later in the text, the perception of interest to Yoga is the latter, that of a supernormal nature.» — Bryant declara cuál de las dos interesa al Yoga: la supranormal
«But even the startling claims of omniscience that occur later in the text are relevant only as signposts of experiences that the yogī will encounter on the path of Yoga, not as articles of faith.» — Bryant acota las afirmaciones de omnisciencia del texto: valen como señales de camino, no como artículos de fe
«The Vedānta school occupied itself with āgama (Vedānta Sūtras I.1.3), dedicating itself to the interpretation and systematization of» — Bryant adjudica el āgama al Vedānta; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 82 nombrando los Upaniṣads y los Vedānta Sūtras
«I.9 śabda-jñānānupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ śabda, words; jñāna, knowledge; anupātī, resulting from, followed in sequence; vastu, actual object; śūnyaḥ, devoid of; vikalpaḥ, conceptualization, fancy, imagination; here, figurative language» — I.9 con su análisis palabra por palabra; Bryant glosa vikalpa como lenguaje figurado y su traducción cae ya en la plana 84
«Imagination consists of the usage of words that are devoid of an actual object.» — la traducción de I.9 que da Bryant, en la plana 84
«The commentators take the third type of vṛtti, imagination, to be metaphor, words or expressions that do not correspond to any actual physical reality, vastu-śunya, but are understood in common parlance, śabda-jñāna-anupatī.» — los comentaristas leen vikalpa como metáfora: palabras sin correlato físico que sin embargo se entienden
«When we say “consciousness is the essence of puruṣa” (caitanyaṁ puruṣasya svarūpam iti), says Vyāsa, we are, strictly speaking, making an incorrect statement.» — Vyāsa da como ejemplo de vikalpa una frase del propio sistema: decir que la consciencia es la esencia del puruṣa es, en rigor, incorrecto
«Using the genitive case, as in the “essence of puruṣa,” implies a distinction between the possessor and the thing possessed, as in the phrase “the cow of Citra.” But consciousness is not a separate entity owned by another separate entity puruṣa as this phrase suggests. Consciousness is puruṣa, not something owned by puruṣa.» — Vyāsa explica el defecto del genitivo con el ejemplo de la vaca de Citra: la consciencia ES el puruṣa, no es suya
«Likewise with negative predictions such as “the puruṣa has the characteristic of not being born”: there is not a factual positive state of “not being born”; something that does not exist has no sensible existence, yet such phrases do bear meaning.» — Vyāsa extiende el caso a los predicados negativos: no hay estado positivo de no haber nacido, y la frase significa igual
«perhaps a more straightforward example from English usage might be “the sun rises and sets” or “time flies.” The sun doesn’t actually either rise or set, nor is there a tangible entity called time flapping about with wings, but common usage has assigned meaning to these imaginary states of affairs, and no one bats an eye when such expressions are uttered.» — Bryant añade sus propios ejemplos ingleses de vikalpa: que el sol sale y se pone, que el tiempo vuela
«Indeed, Vācaspati Miśra notes that these expressions, which, if dissected to their literal meanings, do not correspond to actual objective reality, are normal everyday expressions and ubiquitous in human language, since language is largely figurative.» — Vācaspati Miśra declara ubicuas esas expresiones porque el lenguaje es en gran parte figurado
«In this way, although other schools, such as Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, consider vikalpa to be a category of error rather than a vṛtti in its own right, the Yoga school considers the vṛtti of vikalpa, imagination, to differ essentially from the previous two vṛttis.» — Bryant consigna el desacuerdo sin armonizarlo: para Nyāya y Vaiśeṣika vikalpa es una clase de error; para el Yoga, una vṛtti propia
«Vikalpa, on the other hand, while, like error, referring to an object that lacks actual objective physical reality, yet, unlike the vṛtti of error but like the vṛtti of right knowledge, is not based on an error of judgment and is intelligible to other people in practice, producing a vṛtti impression in the mind of the listener without being perceived as an error or attracting any attention.» — Bryant define vikalpa por lo que comparte y no comparte con las otras dos: sin objeto real como el error, inteligible y no advertido como el conocimiento
«It thus paradoxically represents a meaningful expression that yet has no actual reality in the real world. It is therefore held to be a different category of vṛtti from pramāṇa or viparyaya.» — Bryant nombra la paradoja que justifica la categoría aparte
«We thus see what a meticulous thinker Patañjali is.» — Bryant declara meticuloso a Patañjali, y lo dice como juicio suyo
«In order to understand what puruṣa is, one has to understand what it is not (I.4). It is not the mind. Therefore, Patañjali is directing very careful attention to what the mind is such that the yogī can be clear about what the puruṣa should not be identified with.» — Bryant explica por qué el texto desmenuza la mente: al puruṣa se llega por lo que no es
«Vijñānabhikṣu accepts the more common understanding of this vṛtti of vikalpa—the usage of nonsensical expressions such as skyflower, hare’s horn, or son of a barren woman, which are the typical motifs in Hindu philosophical discourse that correspond to expressions in English such as pie in the sky.» — Vijñānabhikṣu se queda con los ejemplos habituales del discurso filosófico hindú: la flor del cielo, el cuerno de la liebre, el hijo de la mujer estéril
«It is curious that the commentators do not direct specific attention to more common aspects of imaginative thought, such as daydreaming, fantasy, make believe, and wishful thinking, which actually occupy major portions of most people’s waking attention.» — Bryant consigna una ausencia como dato: los comentaristas no tratan el ensueño diurno, la fantasía ni el desear con el pensamiento
«I.10 abhāva-pratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā abhāva, absence; pratyaya, cause; ālambanā, support, basis; vṛttiḥ, state of mind; nidrā, sleep Deep sleep is that state of mind which is based on an absence» — I.10 con su análisis palabra por palabra y el arranque de la traducción de Bryant; el tramo se corta al final de la plana 85
«The commentators acknowledge here that there is some difference of opinion regarding whether or not sleep is an actual vṛtti.» — Bryant consigna el desacuerdo sobre si el sueño profundo es una vṛtti
«Based on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VI.8.1), the Vedāntins do not consider any vṛtti to be present in the citta during deep sleep, but that the ātman, or puruṣa, undisturbed by any citta vṛtti in the state of deep sleep, experiences Brahman (Vedānta Sūtra I.4.18; II.3.31).» — la posición vedāntica: en el sueño profundo no hay vṛtti y el ātman experimenta Brahman
«Vyāsa and the Yoga commentators, in contrast, view deep sleep as a type of vṛtti on the grounds that when one awakes, one remembers that one has either slept well or restlessly or in a stupor.» — Vyāsa y los comentaristas del Yoga sostienen lo contrario que los vedāntinos, y lo fundan en el recuerdo de haber dormido bien o mal. El desacuerdo queda consignado sin arbitrar
«It might be useful to note along with Vācaspati Miśra that the fourth vṛtti being discussed by Patañjali in this sūtra does not refer to the state of mind represented in the dream state—dream sleep corresponds to the vṛttis of memory (since it involves the activation of saṁskāras). Nidrā, sleep, then, refers to deep dreamless sleep.» — Vācaspati Miśra acota nidrā al sueño profundo sin sueños; el soñar cae bajo la vṛtti de la memoria
«It takes place when the tāmasic element of the mind densely covers the sāttvic nature of buddhi, the intellect; in dream, more rajas is active, and this churns up past saṁskāras, which produce dream experiences.» — Bryant reparte los guṇas entre los estados: tamas cubriendo buddhi en el sueño profundo, rajas removiendo saṁskāras en el soñar
«In deep sleep, rajas is inactive, and so the mind is not stimulated to assume the form of the objects of knowledge, as it does during the waking and dream states; thus puruṣa is conscious of darkness alone.» — Bryant describe el sueño profundo: sin rajas, la mente no toma forma alguna y el puruṣa es consciente solo de oscuridad
«However, needless to say, while deep sleep can be considered a type of citta-vṛtti-nirodha, cessation of thought (at least of the four vṛttis other than sleep), since the sattva or knowledge aspect of the citta is smothered by tamas, as is any rājasic stirring of citta, this is not the citta-vṛtti-nirodha defined by Patañjali as the goal of yoga in I.2.» — Bryant separa el sueño profundo del nirodha del yoga, aunque los dos supriman vṛttis
«In the samādhi state, sattva is at its maximum, and the yogī’s citta-vṛtti-nirodha occurs in full vibrant wakefulness and in complete lucidity as to the nature of reality; in deep sleep, awareness is simply aware of the dense motionless darkness of tamas in which it is enveloped.» — Bryant opone los dos estados por su guṇa: sattva máximo y lucidez en el samādhi, tamas denso en el sueño
«Additionally (and importantly), this verse informs us that consciousness is eternal; it is never “switched off,” not even in deep sleep.» — Bryant lee en I.10 la eternidad de la consciencia: nunca se apaga, ni en el sueño profundo
«If the tāmasic element that covers the intellect during deep sleep is accompanied by a measure of sattva, the commentators inform us, a person feels refreshed and lucid upon awakening; if accompanied by rajas, one feels that one has slept restlessly and one is confused and distracted; if tamas has almost completely dominated sattva and rajas during sleep, one feels sluggish and tired upon awakening.» — los comentaristas explican por la mezcla de guṇas cómo se despierta: lúcido con sattva, confuso con rajas, pesado con tamas
«Vācaspati Miśra notes that sleep, too, can be controlled in samādhi, meditative absorption.» — Vācaspati Miśra somete también el sueño al nirodha del samādhi
«And certainly the hagiographies of saints the world over are replete with claims that many indulged in a very minimal amount of sleep.» — Bryant suma el testimonio de las hagiografías, y lo consigna como lo que es: afirmaciones de esos relatos
«Pratyaya has a number of meanings, two of which are relevant to the sūtras.» — Bryant desdobla pratyaya en dos acepciones pertinentes
«It can mean cause, as it is used in Buddhist sources, which is how Vācaspati Miśra takes it here (as also in I.19).77 Elsewhere (II.20; III.2, 12, 17, 19, 35)—and it can also be read here in this sense—it refers to the image of an object imprinted on the mind, that is, a cognition, which is how it is understood in the Vedānta tradition.» — Bryant reparte las dos lecturas de pratyaya: causa, como en las fuentes budistas y en Vācaspati Miśra, o cognición, como en el Vedānta
«Although sometimes used synonymously with vṛtti by the commentators, it differs in my understanding insofar as it represents a singular momentary imprint, while a vṛtti is more a flow of thoughts or images and may contain a series of pratyayas.» — Bryant declara como distinción propia la que separa pratyaya de vṛtti: impronta momentánea frente a flujo
«The second term, ālambana, is the support for the mind and refers to any object upon which the yogī has chosen to focus or concentrate the mind.» — Bryant define ālambana como el soporte de la mente: cualquier objeto de concentración
«I.11 anubhūta-viṣayāsampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ anubhūta, experienced; viṣaya, sense objects; asampramoṣaḥ, not slipping away, retention; smṛtiḥ, memory Memory is the retention of [images of] sense objects that have been experienced.» — I.11, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: la memoria como retención de lo experimentado
«Vyāsa notes that memories are generated from and thus dependent on the other types of vṛttis described in the preceding sūtras: right knowledge, error, imagination, and sleep (one has memories of objects of knowledge, error, etc.). Therefore, says Vācaspati Miśra, memory is mentioned last on the list of vṛttis.» — Vyāsa hace depender la memoria de las otras cuatro vṛttis, y Vācaspati Miśra explica por eso su lugar último en la lista
«Yoga psychology, memory is the product of saṁskāra, and saṁskāra is caused by experience. Therefore, the memory of having slept well must relate to a state of mind experienced during deep sleep, which is recorded in the citta as memory (the topic of the next sūtra) and remembered upon awakening.» — Bryant expone el argumento del Yoga: si hay memoria del sueño, hubo experiencia, y por tanto estado de mente. El tramo abre la plana 86
«As noted in the previous sūtra, a pratyaya is the specific content of a vṛtti, a unitary image like the individual still of a movie, where a vṛtti is more a sequence and thus a series of pratyayas, comparable to the reel itself containing the series of stills.» — Bryant afina la distinción con la imagen del cine: el pratyaya es el fotograma, la vṛtti el rollo
«Since the mind is exposed to numerous sense objects all the time, and has been for numerous lifetimes, there are unlimited saṁskāras continually being embedded in the citta, which are all potentially retrievable.» — Bryant declara ilimitados y potencialmente recuperables los saṁskāras acumulados en innumerables vidas
«Memory, then, the fifth and final type of vṛtti listed by Patañjali, consists of the retrieval of these saṁskāras; memories are the reactivation of the imprints of sense objects that one has experienced and recognized in the past.» — Bryant define la memoria como reactivación de improntas de objetos ya experimentados
«When these saṁskāras do not slip away (fall into the unconscious), or, in Sāṅkhyan categories, when they do not become overly covered by tamas, they constitute memory.» — Bryant traduce el no deslizarse del sūtra a términos del Sāṅkhya: no quedar cubierto por tamas
«The citta can perhaps be compared to a lake, and saṁskāra memories to the pebbles at the bottom of the lake. If the lake is peaceful and crystal clear (sāttvic), the pebbles are easily visible; if it is choppy (rājasic), less so; and if murky (tāmasic), the pebbles become very hard or impossible to perceive.» — la imagen del lago y las piedras del fondo, con que Bryant explica la recuperabilidad de la memoria según el guṇa dominante
«Vyāsa states that memory is of two types—real, namely, recollection of things that actually happened; and imagined, such as in dreams, which involve the spontaneous and more random activation of saṁskāras but are still memories of sorts.» — Vyāsa divide la memoria en real e imaginada, y pone el soñar en la segunda
«Bhoja Rāja says that the saṁskāras that activate during dreams do so because of the force of the impression that created them. In other words, they were vivid events.» — Bhoja Rāja explica qué saṁskāras se activan al soñar: los de impresión más fuerte
«On this topic, Rāmānanda Sarasvatī raises the question that if all saṁskāras consist of, and only of, events or objects that have been actually experienced, then how can we account for those dreams where one might imagine oneself, for example, as having the body of an elephant?» — Rāmānanda Sarasvatī plantea la objeción del sueño imposible: si todo saṁskāra viene de lo vivido, de dónde sale soñarse con cuerpo de elefante
«Such memories, he answers, are the result of error, which affects the dream state just as it does the waking state.» — Rāmānanda Sarasvatī contesta atribuyéndolo al error, que obra igual en la vigilia y en el sueño
«One might add that one cannot dream of, or for that matter even imagine, something that does not exist as a saṁskāra or set of saṁskāras in one’s citta, and saṁskāras, in turn, correspond to something one has actually experienced.» — Bryant añade su propia respuesta: no se sueña lo que no tenga saṁskāra
«in addition to the fantasy nature of most dreams, Vedānta Sūtra III.2.4 allows that some dreams can also serve as omens of real events.» — Bryant consigna la salvedad del Vedānta Sūtra III.2.4: algunos sueños valen como presagio
«The Jains accept memory, smṛti, as a pramāṇa (I.6) in its own right, but this is rejected by the Hindu schools since memory does not present immediate or new knowledge, which pramāṇa for these philosophical schools must do, but re-presents something that has already happened in the past.» — Bryant consigna el desacuerdo entre jainas y escuelas hindúes sobre si la memoria es pramāṇa, con la razón que dan los segundos
«However, smṛti is used by Hindus to refer to a category of āgama, sacred text, which is a pramāṇa. This category of smṛti includes in practice more or less everything other than the śruti, or the Vedic corpus81—the epics, Purāṇas, and sūtra traditions including Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras.» — Bryant separa los dos usos de smṛti y sitúa los propios Yoga Sūtras dentro de esa categoría de texto sagrado
«Once this pratyaya or active image of this object is no longer of interest to the mind, it becomes an inactive,» — Bryant describe el paso de la imagen activa a impronta inactiva; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 88 con *latent, saṁskāra*
«However, saṁskāras can be clustered together in a way that corresponds to something that has never been experienced in reality, such as a flying elephant or the horns of a hare. What is taking place in such imaginative instances is the merging together of two sets of actual saṁskāras; in other words, one set of memory experiences, recollections of the act of flying or of horns, are superimposed on and» — Bryant explica la fantasía por superposición de dos conjuntos de improntas reales: el elefante volador y el cuerno de la liebre. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 89
«However, since smṛti sacred texts present themselves, at least nominally, as dependent on or derivative from the śruti for their authoritativeness,82 smṛti texts are not considered pramāṇa on the same level as śruti83 in orthodox discourse, at least not officially (although in practice, it has been the smṛti that has determined the beliefs and practices of Hindus throughout the ages» — Bryant consigna la jerarquía oficial entre śruti y smṛti y, entre paréntesis, que en la práctica ha sido la smṛti la que fijó creencias y prácticas
«According to Vyāsa, the five types of vṛttis identified by Patañjali are either experienced as pleasurable in nature, resulting in attachment (sattva); unpleasurable, resulting in aversion (rajas); or deluded, resulting in ignorance (tamas).» — Vyāsa reparte las cinco vṛttis por el guṇa y el efecto: apego, aversión o ignorancia
«Of course, as Vijñānabhikṣu notes, from the absolute perspective pleasure also results in pain, because pleasure generates attachment to the object of pleasure, and this attachment ultimately results in pain upon the loss of this object; attachment also perpetuates saṁsāra, as we will discover in II.2ff.» — Vijñānabhikṣu reduce el placer al dolor por la vía del apego y la pérdida
«Thus, for example, the vṛtti of sleep might be considered nondetrimental when it is not excessive but simply adequate for the well-being of the body, but detrimental when in excess of this; the vṛtti of memory may be nondetrimental when one keeps the goals of yoga in mind, but detrimental when one harps back on past sensual indulgences.» — Bryant aplica la distinción de I.5 a dos vṛttis: el sueño justo y el excesivo, la memoria con la meta a la vista y la que vuelve al goce pasado
«Perhaps the hardest vṛtti to envision in this regard is how error could be sāttvic and akliṣṭa, conducive to the goal of yoga, but irrespective of the state of one’s citta, if the instruments of the senses are defective error may nonetheless occur. For example, if he has poor eyesight, even the accomplished yogī will still perceive things erroneously and thus be subject to error.» — Bryant señala el caso difícil, el error como akliṣṭa, y lo resuelve por los instrumentos: el yogī de vista pobre yerra igual
«In the Bhāgavata tradition, the residents of Vraj, where Kṛṣṇa spent his childhood, unaware of Kṛṣṇa’s divinity, mistook him to be their son, or friend, or lover, etc., but such error is highly favorable to the goal in this Yoga tradition and fundamental to its theology of līlā» — el ejemplo devocional: los de Vraj tomando a Kṛṣṇa por hijo, amigo o amante, error que la teología del līlā tiene por favorable
«Whatever their nature, says Vyāsa, vṛttis must be restrained for any type of concentrative state—either samprajñāta or asamprajñāta—to take place, as Patañjali announced at the beginning of his sūtras.» — Vyāsa cierra la sección: sea cual sea su clase, toda vṛtti debe refrenarse
«I.12 abhyāsa-vairāgyābhyāṁ tan-nirodhaḥ abhyāsa, practice; vairāgyābhyām, dispassion, renunciation, nonattachment; tat, their [the vṛtti states of mind]; nirodhaḥ, controlled, restrained [The vṛtti states of mind] are stilled by practice and dispassion.» — I.12, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: los dos medios del nirodha
«Having explained what constitutes a vṛtti, he now turns his attention to nirodha, restraint. How, exactly, are the vṛttis to be restrained? In this sūtra he identifies two ingredients necessary for such restraint: practice and dispassion (renunciation).» — Bryant marca el giro del texto hacia el nirodha y nombra sus dos ingredientes
«Vijñānabhikṣu quotes the Gītā here: “The mind is undoubtedly fickle and difficult to control, O Arjuna, but it can be controlled by abhyāsa-vairāgyābhyām, practice and dispassion” (VI.35).» — Vijñānabhikṣu apoya el sūtra en el Gītā VI.35, que usa los mismos dos términos
«As was seen in I.6, Patañjali’s typical method is to introduce a list in one sūtra and then explain the items on this list in the subsequent sūtras, so his definitions of practice and dispassion follow in the next sūtras.» — Bryant describe el método de composición de Patañjali: lista en un sūtra, desarrollo en los siguientes
«He analogizes the mind to a river, which normally flows down the channels of the senses toward their objects and into the sea of saṁsāra, the cycle of birth and death.» — Vyāsa compara la mente a un río que corre por los cauces de los sentidos hasta el mar del saṁsāra
«Another way of putting this from the perspective of the guṇas is that sattva becomes enhanced and rajas and tamas minimized.» — Bryant traduce lo mismo a términos de guṇas
«Discrimination, dispassion, and the impetus to seek a practice in order to realize Truth are inherent in the mind when its sāttvic potential is not overwhelmed by rajas and tamas, which are the influences provoking the flow of the mind toward sensuality.» — Bryant declara inherentes a la mente la discriminación y el desapego, tapados por rajas y tamas
«One might walk into a yoga studio taught by dedicated teachers grounded in Patañjali’s teachings, mistaking it for a health spa, but, once there,» — el ejemplo moderno que Bryant inventa para el error provechoso: confundir un estudio de yoga con un spa; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 90 con la inspiración que de ahí nace
«However, by dispassion toward the sense objects, the flow of this river of the mind toward the sea of saṁsāra is checked, and by discrimination, the current of the river is reversed and the mind flows back, away from saṁsāra, and toward» — Vyāsa reparte los dos medios dentro de la imagen del río: el desapego corta el caudal hacia el mar del saṁsāra y la discriminación invierte la corriente; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 91
«Bhoja Rāja adds that by practice and renunciation, eventually all fluctuating states of the mind, whether sāttvic, rājasic, or tāmasic, can be» — Bhoja Rāja extiende el alcance de los dos medios a toda vṛtti, del guṇa que sea. El tramo se corta al final de la plana 91
«First, in order to become unshakable, practice must be performed nairantarya, without interruption. One cannot take breaks from one’s practice whenever one feels like it or the mind dictates and expect to attain the goal of yoga, which is precisely to quell such whimsical vṛttis.» — Bryant glosa el primer requisito de la práctica según I.14: sin interrupción, porque interrumpirla es obedecer a la vṛtti que se quiere refrenar
«Second, one’s practice must continue dīrgha-kāla, for a long time.» — el segundo requisito: por largo tiempo
«Indeed, the Gītā speaks of the yogī maintaining the yatna, effort, of the last sūtra, for many births: “Through effort and restraint, cleansed of all impurities, the yogī who has cultivated perfection over several lives, eventually attains the supreme destination” (VI.45).» — Bryant cita el Gītā VI.45, que cuenta el esfuerzo del yogī por varias vidas
«Practice is at the very least a lifelong commitment, to be undertaken, Patañjali goes on to say, satkāra-āsevitaḥ, with respect and devotion. One is, after all, pursuing the ultimate goal of life—realization of the innermost self—and cannot expect to attain this in a halfhearted or frivolous fashion, or in a random manner.» — Bryant enuncia el tercer requisito, satkāra, con respeto y devoción, y lo funda en lo que está en juego
«Vācaspati Miśra calls these habits, which are saṁskāras that impel the mind outward into the sensual realm, “highway robbers.”» — Vācaspati Miśra llama salteadores de camino a los saṁskāras que empujan la mente hacia fuera
«If we correlate citta with a garden, sattva with a beautiful bed of fragrant and attractive flowers, and rajas and tamas with weeds and pests, then we have a useful metaphor for the practice of yoga. As any gardener knows, maintaining a garden takes devotion and uninterrupted weeding and pest control for a prolonged period of time. In fact, these processes can never be interrupted, since within a remarkably short period of time, even the most devotedly cultivated garden becomes overwhelmed by weeds and pests; if left unattended, all one’s hard work is easily undone.» — la metáfora del jardín que Bryant propone: sattva como flores, rajas y tamas como maleza y plagas, y el desyerbar sin interrupción
«This is because, like weeds, saṁskāras are never actually eliminated or destroyed; they remain in a latent subconscious state and thus can become activated at any moment, unless constantly curtailed (although, as will be discussed below, they can be “burnt” by certain practices, rendering them inoperable)» — Bryant da la razón de la vigilancia perpetua: los saṁskāras no se destruyen, quedan latentes, aunque puedan quemarse
«As an aside, many Hindu gurus and yogīs have been embroiled in scandals that have brought disrepute to the transplantation of yoga and other Indic spiritual systems to the West. This sūtra provides a mechanism of interpreting such occurrences.» — Bryant aplica el sūtra a los escándalos de gurús hindúes en Occidente, y lo presenta como mecanismo de lectura, no como juicio
«Nonetheless, however accomplished a yogī may become, if he or she abandons the practices of yoga under the notion of being enlightened or of having arrived at a point beyond the need of practice, it may be only a matter of time before past saṁskāras, including those of past sensual indulgences, now unimpeded by practice, begin to surface. The result is scandal and traumatized disciples.» — Bryant enuncia el mecanismo: abandonada la práctica por creerse iluminado, los saṁskāras pasados vuelven a la superficie
«Hence one can read this sūtra as indicating that since the practices of yoga must be uninterrupted, one would be wise to politely avoid yogīs or gurus who claim to have attained a state of enlightenment such that they have transcended the need for the practice and renunciation prescribed by Patañjali here.» — Bryant extrae del sūtra un consejo práctico: evitar cortésmente al yogī que se declare más allá de la práctica. El tramo abre la plana 94
«I.15 dṛṣṭānuśravika-viṣaya-vitṛṣṇasya vaśīkāra-saṁjñā vairāgyam dṛṣṭa, visible, perceptible; anuśravika, heard about [from Vedic scriptural revelation]; viṣaya, sensual objects; vitṛṣṇasya, from one who is freed from craving; vaśīkāra, subdue, exert control; saṁjñā, consciousness; vairāgyam, renunciation, dispassion Dispassion is the controlled consciousness of one who is without craving for sense objects, whether these are actually perceived, or described [in scripture].» — I.15, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: el desapego definido como consciencia dominada de quien no ansía objetos, vistos u oídos en la escritura
«As examples of sense objects, Vyāsa mentions members of the opposite sex, food, drink, and power.» — Vyāsa da ejemplos de objeto de los sentidos: personas del otro sexo, comida, bebida y poder
«He notes that such dispassion or detachment precludes the inclination either to accept or reject such objects, even when they are available.» — Vyāsa acota el desapego por los dos lados: ni aceptar ni rechazar
«That renunciation involves disinterest toward indulging in sense objects is straightforward, but Vyāsa’s observation that it also involves disinterest to overly rejecting them merits attention.» — Bryant subraya la mitad menos obvia de la definición de Vyāsa: tampoco rechazar en exceso
«established, when accompanied by austerity, celibacy, knowledge, and faith. Under these conditions, it is not immediately overwhelmed by the ingrained habits of the mind.» — Vyāsa enumera lo que asienta la práctica y la protege de los hábitos de la mente: austeridad, celibato, conocimiento y fe. El tramo abre la plana 93
«Too much energy and fanfare dedicated to overly rejecting sense objects can often indicate a hidden attachment to those very objects that is being overcompensated for.» — Bryant lee el rechazo ostentoso como señal de apego encubierto
«Real detachment is indifference to sense objects whether in their absence or presence.» — Bryant define el desapego real por la indiferencia, presente o ausente el objeto
«As Vācaspati Miśra points out, one might be free from desires for objects because one knows nothing about them, but this does not qualify as dispassion; dispassion is indifference to objects even when these are available.» — Vācaspati Miśra excluye la ignorancia del objeto como forma de desapego
«Vaśīkāra means to have control over; thus Bhoja Rāja states, with regard to desires, “I am not in their control—they are in my control.”» — Bhoja Rāja da la fórmula del vaśīkāra en primera persona: no estoy bajo su control, están bajo el mío
«With II.33–34 in mind, Vyāsa states that one who is renounced understands the defects of sensuality from reflection on its consequences, or, as Vijñānabhikṣu puts it, renunciation arises specifically from perceiving the defects of indulging in the objects of the senses, in other words, from discrimination.» — Vyāsa y Vijñānabhikṣu hacen nacer la renuncia de percibir los defectos del goce, es decir, de la discriminación
«This is significant: The tradition does not take the position that sensual desires somehow disappear; desires are imprints of past pleasurable experiences that are recorded in the citta as saṁskāras.» — Bryant subraya lo que la tradición no sostiene: que los deseos desaparezcan
«As Vācaspati Miśra notes, the power of renunciation comes not from being free from desires but from being indifferent to them.» — Vācaspati Miśra sitúa la fuerza de la renuncia en la indiferencia, no en la ausencia de deseo
«The discriminating yogī cultivates this indifference by recognizing that any sensual gratification, irrespective of how pleasurable, is temporary. Sooner or later, one is separated from the object of gratification and consequently experiences frustration.» — Bryant describe la vía de la indiferencia: reconocer que todo goce es temporal y termina en frustración
«One is also astute enough to realize realistically that there is always a karmic price to pay for the pursuit of pleasure (all actions, good or bad, when based on seeking gratification, generate correspondingly good or bad reactions and thus perpetuate saṁsāra).» — Bryant añade el cálculo kármico: toda acción hecha por gratificación engendra su reacción
«Simply put, renunciation “consists in the idea of ‘enough’” of this sense gratification, says Vijñānabhikṣu.» — Vijñānabhikṣu reduce la renuncia a una palabra: basta
«Detached from the external contact [of the senses with their objects] a person finds happiness in the ātman. Such a person, engaged in practicing the yoga of Brahman [the Absolute Truth], experiences eternal happiness. Material pleasures are born from the contact [of the senses with the sense objects]; they have a beginning and an end, and so they are the source of unhappiness. The wise do not delight in them. (V.21–22)» — Bryant traduce el Gītā V.21-22: el placer que nace del contacto tiene principio y fin, y por eso es fuente de infelicidad
«However, Vijñānabhikṣu also cautions that renunciation in and of itself does not guarantee success in yoga, and mentions the case of the sage Saubhari.» — Vijñānabhikṣu advierte que la renuncia sola no asegura el éxito, y trae el caso del sabio Saubhari
«The Bhāgavata Purāṇa (IX.6.40ff) tells the story of a sage whose desire for renunciation was so intense that he resolved to meditate under water so as to eliminate all the distractions of the sensual temptations of the world. However, he happened to open his eyes one day and notice two fish mating. This activated latent erotic saṁskāras in his own mind (perhaps from experiences recorded from previous births), and he again became overwhelmed with fantasies of sexual enjoyment, abandoned his meditation, and returned to worldly life.» — el relato del Bhāgavata Purāṇa: Saubhari medita bajo el agua hasta que ve aparearse dos peces y los saṁskāras eróticos se le reactivan
«Therefore, excessive renunciation in and of itself does not necessarily guarantee that one is freed from the potential reemergence of undesirable saṁskāras.» — Bryant saca la consecuencia del relato: la renuncia extrema no inmuniza contra el retorno de los saṁskāras
«These include such things as the attachment to honor and respect, and the opposite, the dislike of dishonor and disrespect. One may be externally very renounced and austere but internally be very attached to the prestige renunciation can bring (for example, the reputation of being a great yogī, or of having many followers).» — Vijñānabhikṣu nombra los apegos internos: al honor, al respeto y al prestigio que la propia renuncia trae
«In this way, one slowly starves the karmāśaya, the storehouse of karma discussed in II.12, by giving up all desires for the fruits of actions, thereby preventing the further planting of karmic seeds.» — Bryant nombra el efecto acumulado: se agota el karmāśaya al soltar el deseo del fruto
«making an effort to break attachment; next one determines that detachment has been accomplished toward certain objects, while others still need some work; and then, when detachment from all the external objects of the senses has been achieved, one begins to target internal attachments.» — Vijñānabhikṣu escalona el desapego: esfuerzo por romper el apego, balance de lo logrado y de lo pendiente, y por último los apegos internos. El tramo abre la plana 96
«One of the expressed goals of Vedic ritualism is the obtainment of the good things in life in this world, followed by the pleasures of the celestial realms in the next.» — Bryant fija la meta declarada del ritualismo védico: los bienes de este mundo y los placeres celestes en el siguiente
«The Vedic hymns often express a lusty desire for very earthly boons such as cows, offspring, victory over enemies, etc., which the sacrificer in the earlier Vedic period attempted to obtain by cajoling the gods who controlled such things and, in the middle Vedic period, by mastering the technology of ritual such that the gods were constrained to bestow these boons.» — Bryant describe los dones que los himnos piden y el paso del halago a los dioses al dominio de la técnica ritual que los obliga
«One can read the entire religious and philosophical history of post-Vedic India as a rejection of Vedic ritualism by communities that were eventually to become heterodox to the Vedic matrix—the Buddhists and Jains—and as a demotion or radical reinterpretation of it by those, such as Patañjali and the Yoga school, who remained in the orthodox Vedic fold.» — Bryant propone leer la historia religiosa posvédica por su relación con el ritualismo: rechazo en budistas y jainas, reinterpretación radical en los ortodoxos como el Yoga
«The fools, who proclaim [the Vedic sacrifices] as the ultimate, return again to old age and death. Wallowing in ignorance, but imagining themselves wise and thinking themselves learned, the fools go about harming themselves, like blind men led by a man who is himself blind. Wallowing in ignorance again and again, these foolish people imagine, “We have attained our goals!” Because of their desires, these ritualists do not have foresight, therefore they fall back down, wretched and despondent, when their time in the celestial realms expires. Deeming sacrifices and gifts [to the ritual priests] as the highest, these idiots know nothing better. When they have enjoyed their pious work [i.e., the fruits of their karma] in the celestial realms, they return again to this miserable world.» — Bryant traduce el Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad contra los ritualistas: ciegos guiados por un ciego, que vuelven al mundo cuando se agota su tiempo en los cielos (cita larga, releída entera en el crudo: pasa de 700 caracteres)
«But those [seekers of the self] in the forest, peaceful and wise, who practice austerity and faith, as they wander around as mendicants, pass through the doorway of the sun, spotless, to where that immortal puruṣa is, the eternal ātman. (I.7–11)» — la otra mitad del pasaje del Muṇḍaka: los del bosque pasan por la puerta del sol hasta el puruṣa inmortal
«The Upaniṣadic/Yogic view, expressed in this early context, is that pleasures in this world or the next are temporary and simply entwine one in the cycle of birth and death.» — Bryant resume la posición: todo placer, aquí o en el cielo, es temporal y ata al ciclo
«Patañjali’s reference to disinterest in ānuśravika-viṣaya, the sense objects available from Vedic ritualism, falls in this same vein: Clearly the goals of yoga are in complete contrast to the lusty goals of the normative Vedic sacrificial cult that was still a mainstream presence in his day. Therefore, disinterest in this type of ritualism, whether Vedic or other, is a prerequisite to yoga.» — Bryant sitúa el desinterés de I.15 frente al culto sacrificial vigente en tiempos de Patañjali, y lo hace requisito del yoga
«Essentially, the critique here is one of materialistic religiosity— religiosity performed with the motive of enjoying the good things of the world. This criticism is thus perennially relevant to the attitudes underpinning religious traditions other than Hindu ones, which likewise promote worldly boons as the goal of religious practice.» — Bryant generaliza la crítica: va contra la religiosidad materialista, hindú o no
«In sum, renunciation means not only disinterest in the visible things of this world but also disinterest in some of the worldly or celestial boons that might be promoted in sacred scripture itself.» — Bryant cierra el alcance de la renuncia: incluye los dones que la propia escritura promete
«A general principle of Sanskrit hermeneutics is that a first item mentioned on a list carries more importance than any subsequent items.» — Bryant enuncia la regla hermenéutica con que lee las listas del texto: lo primero pesa más
«Thus, of the five vṛttis, pramāṇa, right knowledge, is listed first—it is the most important state of mind. And even within the three subdivisions of pramāṇa, the Yoga school prioritizes pratyakṣa, direct experience; hence this is situated as the first item of the pramāṇa sublist.» — Bryant aplica la regla a las cinco vṛttis y a los tres pramāṇas
«Of the two ingredients of nirodha, then, by this principle, abhyāsa is situated before vairāgya, since, by practice, the by-products of dispassion, detachment, and renunciation arise spontaneously. It is therefore generally a precondition of the latter.» — Bryant aplica la regla al par práctica y desapego, y hace de la primera condición del segundo
«Arjuna. Reveling in the Vedic rites, they proclaim “there is nothing else but this.” Their hearts filled with desires, intent on the celestial realms, they take to the path of performing numerous variegated rites, which are dedicated to the attainment of opulence and sensual enjoyment, but which bestow rebirth as the fruit of action. To such people, attached to sensual enjoyment and opulence, whose minds have been stolen by these flowery words, a mind fixed in samādhi is not granted. (II.42–44)» — Bryant traduce el Gītā II.42-44 contra los que se deleitan en los ritos védicos: a quien tiene la mente robada por esas palabras floridas no se le da el samādhi. El tramo abre la plana 98
«There are two levels of renunciation or detachment: indifference toward the sensual objects of the world or of the celestial realms, as outlined in the last sūtra, and a higher level of detachment stemming from indifference to the very guṇas themselves, guṇa vaitṛṣṇyam.» — Bryant escalona los dos niveles de desapego que el texto distingue
«We should bear in mind that the guṇas of prakṛti are the subtle stuff from which all objects are made, whether physical or mental, since matter, mind, and everything else in existence—except for the puruṣa, pure consciousness itself—are evolutes from prakṛti when it is stirred by the guṇas inherent in her.» — Bryant recuerda por qué el segundo nivel lo abarca todo: los guṇas son la materia sutil de todo objeto
«Vyāsa states that this higher and ultimate level of dispassion or renunciation referred to here stems from puruṣakhyāti, awareness of puruṣa itself.» — Vyāsa hace nacer el desapego último de la consciencia del puruṣa, no del esfuerzo
«Complete loss of interest in all things material can realistically take place only when the yogī has attained something far superior.» — Bryant enuncia la condición realista del desinterés total: haber alcanzado algo muy superior
«Sattva, in addition to producing a sustainable experience of happiness (unlike the fleeting pleasures of the senses), is by nature pure, transparent, luminous, and insightful.» — Vācaspati Miśra describe sattva por sus cualidades y por la clase de felicidad que produce, sostenible frente a la fugaz de los sentidos
«When these two guṇas are stilled, the mind’s natural lucidity of sattva allows it to peacefully and blissfully contemplate the distinction between the guṇas (and their products, which include the mind itself) and the pure puruṣa soul.» — Vācaspati Miśra describe lo que la mente lúcida puede hacer: contemplar la distinción entre los guṇas y el puruṣa
«Thus, this natural discriminative knowledge of the difference between puruṣa and the guṇas (that is, puruṣa and prakṛti), referred to in this sūtra by Patañjali is the highest and ultimate function that the sāttvic citta can perform and manifests when other types of knowledge have faded away.» — Bryant declara ese discernimiento la función más alta de la citta sáttvica
«Vācaspati Miśra adds, though, that ultimately the yogī must transcend even attachment to this sāttvic recognition of the distinction between the guṇas and puruṣa.» — Vācaspati Miśra pone el límite siguiente: hay que trascender el apego a ese mismo discernimiento
«Vijñānabhikṣu elaborates that the yogī must attain the state where the realization occurs that even discriminative knowledge of the distinction between the guṇas and puruṣa is a function of the prākṛtic citta; it is not a function of puruṣa.» — Vijñānabhikṣu da la razón: ese conocimiento discriminativo sigue siendo función de la citta
«Besides, even elevated and ultimate knowledge can be transitory and therefore defective; after all, pure sattva is nonetheless a guṇa and therefore unstable by nature since the three guṇas are always in flux.» — Vijñānabhikṣu suma un segundo argumento: sattva es guṇa y por tanto inestable
«Therefore, upon attaining the highest awareness of puruṣa’s own nature, the pure mind checks and restraints itself,» — Vijñānabhikṣu describe el acto final de la mente pura: refrenarse a sí misma. El tramo se corta al final de la plana 99
«This, says Vijñānabhikṣu, is called the highest dispassion by Patañjali because it is dispassion toward the most subtle aspects of matter, the very guṇas themselves, whereas the renunciation in the previous sūtra primarily refers to the grosser aspects of matter, the guṇas as manifest in their most physical and solid products, the gross sense objects (or subtler internal thoughts).» — Vijñānabhikṣu explica por qué el sūtra lo llama desapego supremo: cae sobre los guṇas y no sobre sus productos
«He simply wandered around barefoot and clad in filthy rags “like a precious jewel covered by dirt,”91 slept on the ground, neglected his personal cleanliness, and subsisted on broken rice, husks, worm-eaten grains, and the discarded rice left sticking on the bottom of pots.» — el relato detalla la renuncia de Jaḍa Bhārata: descalzo, en harapos, durmiendo en el suelo y comiendo arroz partido y granos picados
«Since he was nonetheless stout in limb, some worshippers of Kālī eventually seized him and brought him unresisting to the Goddess to be offered as a human sacrifice. But the Goddess burst forth from the deity and decapitated her own devotees so as to save this enlightened yogī.» — el desenlace del relato: unos devotos de Kālī lo llevan al sacrificio y la Diosa sale de la imagen y los decapita
«Vyāsa states that the yogī who has attained the state of vairāgya can now think, “Whatever was to be achieved has been achieved; the obstacles to the path that were to be destroyed have been destroyed; and the cycle of repeated existence—one who is born, dies, and one who dies is reborn— has been broken.”» — Vyāsa pone en boca del yogī consumado el balance: lo por lograr, logrado; los obstáculos, destruidos; el ciclo, roto
«I.16 tat-paraṁ puruṣa-khyāter guṇa-vaitṛṣṇyam tat, that [renunciation]; paraṁ, higher; puruṣa, the soul, self, innermost consciousness; khyāteḥ, knowledge, perception; guṇa,» — I.16 con su análisis palabra por palabra; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y la traducción de Bryant, *por encima de la renuncia, la indiferencia a los guṇas*, cae en la plana 99, donde se repite literal en el apéndice
«Vijñānabhikṣu mentions Jaḍa Bhārata from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa as an exemplar of vairāgya.» — Vijñānabhikṣu trae a Jaḍa Bhārata como ejemplo de vairāgya
«Jaḍa Bhārata had been an advanced yogī in a previous life but, due to attachment to a deer, had failed to attain the ultimate goals of yoga (see III.7 for the details). Consequently, upon being reborn, although internally his mind was completely immersed in thought of Lord Viṣṇu, he presented himself to the world as being insane, stupid, blind, and deaf so as never again to become attached to anything material.» — el relato: yogī caído por apego a un ciervo que renace fingiéndose loco, estúpido, ciego y sordo para no volver a apegarse
«In instances such as this, English translations such as “absorption with physical awareness” for vitarka and “absorption with subtle awareness” for vicāra do not convey the sense or meaning or difference between these two levels of samādhi. The technical way that these Sanskrit terms are being used here cannot be captured by a suitable English equivalent, so the reader is advised not to try to understand these terms through the clumsy English words a translator choses to convey them.» — Bryant declara insuficiente su propia traducción y pide al lector no entender los términos por las palabras inglesas
«In fact, even the Sanskrit terms are an artificiality, as Vijñānabhikṣu points out, and not to be correlated with how they are used in other contexts, that is, their conventional Sanskrit dictionary meanings» — Vijñānabhikṣu declara artificiales incluso los términos sánscritos, no reducibles a su acepción de diccionario
«This sūtra initiates the esoteric teachings of Yoga.» — Bryant marca en I.17 el arranque de la enseñanza esotérica del sistema
«originally and primarily maps for meditative introspection, intended to guide the yogin in his exploration of the terra incognita of the mind. Thus these models served a very practical psychological purpose. This hypothesis helps to explain why so many of these models … in early texts, are without apparent logical coherence. These “maps” are records of internal experiences rather than purely theoretical constructions. They are descriptive rather than explanatory. The “map” character of the ontogenetic model of Classical Yoga is beyond question. (1980, 117)» — Bryant cita a Feuerstein: los sūtras son mapas de introspección meditativa, registros de experiencias internas y no construcciones teóricas; el año entre paréntesis es la referencia impresa dentro de la cita
«As the symbols of a map denote far greater entities than might be evident from the simple signs themselves (circles, squares, triangles, etc.), and alert the traveler to what to expect on the road ahead, so the technical terms in this sūtra represent altered states of consciousness far beyond those of conventional awareness, and thus beyond the ability of conventional words or labels to describe. They are guides for the yogī, alerting him or her to some of the meditative experiences that will be encountered on the path.» — Bryant desarrolla la imagen del mapa: los términos técnicos avisan al viajero de lo que hay en el camino
«Vyāsa is curiously not very detailed in his explanation of this complex sūtra at this point, but these stages of samādhi are discussed in more depth in I.40–45.» — Bryant consigna la parquedad de Vyāsa en I.17 y remite al lugar donde el asunto se trata a fondo
«He notes that these are four stages of samprajñāta-samādhi, all of which have an ālambana, a support (see discussion in I.10).» — Vyāsa señala que las cuatro etapas llevan todavía ālambana, un soporte
«He means by this that the consciousness of the puruṣa is still flowing through the prākṛtic citta to connect with or be supported by an object of meditational focus (albeit in progressively more subtle ways).» — Bryant explica el soporte: la consciencia sigue pasando por la citta hasta un objeto de foco, cada vez más sutil
«In this state, the mind is fixed on one pratyaya (discussed in I.10), or undeviating vṛtti, that of the object of concentration, and resists all change into other states.» — Bryant describe el estado: la mente fija en un solo pratyaya, resistiendo el cambio
«It is Vācaspati Miśra who unpacks this sūtra in detail.» — Bryant adjudica a Vācaspati Miśra el desarrollo detallado de I.17
«He considers the first state on Patañjali’s list, vitarka-samādhi, to be contemplation on a gross physical object, that is to say, meditating on an object that one experiences as a manifestation or construct of the gross physical or material elements. It is thus the first level of experiencing an object in samādhi.» — Vācaspati Miśra define el vitarka-samādhi como contemplación de un objeto físico grueso
«Keeping the metaphysics of Sāṅkhya in mind, we know that the five gross elements that constitute gross physical objects evolve from elements that are more subtle, that is, they are actually evolutes from the tanmātras, the five subtle elements.» — Bryant recuerda la metafísica que sostiene la escala: los elementos gruesos son evolutos de los tanmātras
«I.17 vitarka-vicārānandāsmitā-rūpānugamāt samprajñātaḥ vitarka, absorption with physical awareness; vicāra, absorption with subtle awareness; ānanda, absorption with bliss; asmitā, absorption with the sense of I-ness; rūpa, form; anugamāt, accompanied by; samprajñātaḥ, a type of samādhi state [which still uses the mind and an object of meditation] Samprajñāta [samādhi] consists of [the consecutive] mental stages of absorption with physical awareness, absorption with subtle awareness, absorption with bliss, and absorption with the sense of I-ness.» — I.17, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: las cuatro absorciones consecutivas del samprajñāta, con lo físico, con lo sutil, con la dicha y con el sentido de yo. Bryant explica entre corchetes que este samādhi usa todavía la mente y un objeto
«As a new archer first aims at large objects, Vācaspati Miśra says, and then progressively smaller ones, so the neophyte yogī first experiences the gross nature of the object in meditation and then its progressively more subtle nature.» — la imagen del arquero novato con que Vācaspati Miśra ordena las dos primeras absorciones: primero los blancos grandes
«Instead of experiencing the object as composed of compact quantum masses, the bhūtādi gross elements, as in the first state of vitarka, in vicāra, the yogī experiences the object as composed of vibratory, radiant potential, subtle energy (a sublevel of reality normally imperceptible to the senses» — Bryant describe el paso de vitarka a vicāra con vocabulario moderno: de masas compactas a potencial radiante y vibratorio
«If one wishes to fix the mind on God, Īśvara, as Patañjali will encourage in I.23–29, how does one do so? Īśvara is also a type of puruṣa (I.23) and thus beyond prakṛti—and we know that the prākṛtic mind cannot fix itself on something more subtle than and metaphysically distinct from itself.» — Vijñānabhikṣu plantea el problema de meditar en Īśvara: la mente prākṛtica no puede fijarse en lo que es más sutil que ella
«Essentially, this can only entail fixing the mind on some saṁskāra connected with God, some image, perhaps from one’s temple or favorite artistic rendition.» — Vijñānabhikṣu resuelve el problema por el saṁskāra: la imagen del templo o la representación artística
«When this entails concentrating on Īśvara in the form of a saṁskāra of some gross prākṛtic form (such as a deity), it is vitarka, and when in a more subtle prākṛtic form, such as God’s characteristics, it is vicāra.» — Vijñānabhikṣu reparte las dos absorciones en la meditación teísta: la imagen de la deidad es vitarka, los atributos son vicāra
«In the state of samādhi, the mind is fixed so intensely on its ālambana that it essentially merges with it, like, says Vijñānabhikṣu, fire in a red-hot iron ball.» — la imagen de Vijñānabhikṣu para la fusión con el objeto: el fuego en la bola de hierro al rojo
«There is no consensus among the commentators as to the exact nature of the last two stages of samādhi, ānanda and asmitā, underscoring the fact that such states do not lend themselves to scholastic categorization and analysis.» — Bryant consigna la falta de consenso sobre ānanda y asmitā, y la lee como señal de que esos estados no se dejan clasificar
«Vācaspati Miśra’s version perhaps surfaces most commonly and seems predicated on the information we will encounter later in the chapter. Specifically, with an eye on I.41, he utilizes the three components of knowledge identified in Hindu philosophical discourse to demarcate the differences among these four stages of samādhi.» — Bryant adopta la versión de Vācaspati Miśra por ser la más común, y dice sobre qué se apoya
«In any act of knowledge, there is the knower or subject of knowledge, the instruments of knowledge (mind and senses, etc.), and the object of knowledge; these are termed gṛhitṛ, grahaṇa, and grāhya, respectively (literally, the grasper, the instrument of grasping, and that which is grasped).» — Bryant expone los tres componentes del conocer en el discurso filosófico hindú: gṛhitṛ, grahaṇa y grāhya
«For Vācaspati Miśra, in the first two stages of samādhi outlined above, vitarka and vicāra, the object on which the mind is fixed, whether perceived as its grosser outer form or subtler inner constituents, is nonetheless an external object and therefore considered grāhya (that which is grasped).» — Vācaspati Miśra adjudica las dos primeras absorciones a lo asido, grāhya
«Now, in the third stage, ānanda-samādhi, the yogī transfers awareness from the objects of the senses, grāhya, to the organs of the senses themselves, grahaṇa (the instruments of grasping).» — Vācaspati Miśra adjudica la tercera absorción a los instrumentos de asir, grahaṇa
«He specifies that these are the powers (śakti) behind the sensual abilities of seeing, touching, smelling, tasting, and hearing, rather than the gross physical organs of eye, ear, nose, etc.» — Vācaspati Miśra acota: los poderes detrás de los sentidos, no los órganos físicos
«Since, in Sāṅkhya, the grahaṇa includes the internal organs, manas, buddhi, and ahaṅkāra, which comprise the citta in Yoga, Bhoja Rāja understands the support of the mind in ānanda-samādhi to be the citta itself, specifically in its aspect as ahaṅkāra, thus differing somewhat with Vācaspati Miśra (who correlates ahaṅkāra with the next stage).» — Bhoja Rāja discrepa de Vācaspati Miśra sobre qué sostiene la mente en el ānanda-samādhi, y las dos lecturas quedan consignadas sin arbitrar
«In other words, the mind focuses on its own cognizing nature.» — Bryant resume la tercera absorción: la mente se vuelve sobre su propio cognoscer
«but Vijñānabhikṣu’s approach is certainly acceptable within the framework of this system, and most of the commentators do refer to such conventional bhakti modes of Īśvara» — Bryant declara admisible dentro del sistema la meditación devocional que Vijñānabhikṣu propone, aunque Patañjali no la trate; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana
«Gītā XIV.6 warns, however, of becoming attached to this sāttvic happiness, and so there is a danger at this stage that the yogī may mistake this sense of bliss and unprecedented insight with the ultimate goal of yoga.» — Bryant trae la advertencia del Gītā XIV.6 y nombra el peligro de la tercera absorción: tomarla por la meta
«In other words, there is a danger that the yogī or mystic will mistake this rapturous state of supernormal perception for the ultimate experience of puruṣa (or for Vedāntins, of ātmānanda, the bliss of the self).» — Bryant nombra el error concreto: confundir la percepción supranormal con la experiencia del puruṣa
«Vijñānabhikṣu is uncharacteristically vague about this third stage of ānanda-samādhi, although he explicitly disagrees with Vācaspati Miśra that it is supported by the sense organs.» — Bryant señala la vaguedad de Vijñānabhikṣu en este punto y su desacuerdo expreso con Vācaspati Miśra
«He merely notes that at this point the object of meditation is no longer perceived as consisting of even the subtle elements, as was the case in the previous stage, but is experienced as pure sāttvic bliss» — Vijñānabhikṣu describe el objeto en el ānanda-samādhi: ya no elementos sutiles sino dicha sáttvica pura
«When the yogī experiences that endless happiness (sukha) which is grasped by the discriminative faculty (buddhi), but beyond the grasp of the senses, he remains fixed in this state and never strays from the truth … This state, free from any trace of suffering, is called yoga. (VI.21–23)» — Vijñānabhikṣu cita el Gītā VI.21-23, que llama yoga al estado libre de todo rastro de sufrimiento
«Vijñānabhikṣu notwithstanding, the prevalent view seems to be that in the third state of samādhi, the mind becomes absorbed on some aspect of the instruments of cognition themselves,» — Bryant consigna la posición mayoritaria frente a la de Vijñānabhikṣu, y no arbitra entre ellas. El tramo cruza el cambio de plana a la 105
«Finally, by involuting awareness further and penetrating the internal organ of meditation to its still more essential nature, one transcends even the instruments of knowledge and arrives at ahaṅkāra, if one follows Vācaspati Miśra, or buddhi, if one follows Bhoja Rāja—either way, to the closest prākṛtic coverings to the puruṣa itself.» — Bryant describe el paso a la cuarta absorción y consigna la divergencia de destino: ahaṅkāra para Vācaspati Miśra, buddhi para Bhoja Rāja
«Hariharānanda states that awareness bypasses the feeling of bliss in the previous stage to contact the experiencer of bliss.» — Hariharānanda describe el asmitā-samādhi: la consciencia pasa de largo la dicha y toca al que la experimenta
«Buddhi, in this highly sāttvic state, is so pure and luminous it can reflect the consciousness of puruṣa back to itself. At this point, since it has already transcended all objects outside of itself, including the internal organs of cognition, buddhi focuses inward, reflecting puruṣa itself as its object of meditation.» — Bryant explica por qué buddhi puede servir de espejo en este estado
«Asmi, “I am,” is the first-person singular of the root as, “to be,” and tā is a suffix added to adjectives to denote “ness,” but Śaṅkara notes that this I-am-ness, asmitā, is not the same as the asmitā listed as an obstacle to yoga in II.3.» — Bryant da la etimología de asmitā y Śaṅkara marca que no es la asmitā que II.3 pone entre los obstáculos
«Asmitā as kleśa involves an object of I am—“I am fat,” “I am sad,” “I am a male.”» — Bryant distingue las dos asmitās por lo que sigue al yo soy: en el kleśa, un objeto
«The asmitā in the context of samādhi occurs when the citta contemplates the awareness of puruṣa by means of puruṣa’s reflection in the pure mirror of the sāttvic citta.» — Bryant define la otra asmitā: la citta contemplando la consciencia del puruṣa reflejada en ella
«Whereas in the previous level the mind was aware that “I am blissful,” in this fourth level it is now simply experiencing a state of I am.» — Bryant contrasta los dos niveles en una frase: del yo soy dichoso al yo soy
«This is pure I-am-ness with no external object or specific content of selfidentification, so it is very close to the goal of direct realization of puruṣa.» — Bryant sitúa la cuarta absorción muy cerca de la meta, y a la vez fuera de ella
«This fourth stage is still within the realm of prakṛti, however, still at a stage of samprajñāta-samādhi. In other words, it is “supported” by some connection with prakṛti, because the citta is still being used as an instrument to channel awareness (even though the object of awareness is now puruṣa itself rather than any external manifestation of prakṛti).» — Bryant pone el límite: la cuarta absorción sigue dentro de prakṛti porque la citta sigue siendo el instrumento
«Although this very notion of terminating all thoughts is itself a thought, Vyāsa considers it a notion devoid of any objective phenomenon.» — Vyāsa resuelve la paradoja de I.18: la noción de terminar todo pensamiento es ella misma un pensamiento, pero sin fenómeno objetivo
«Vyāsa states that this virāma-pratyaya is born of the dispassion discussed in I.16.» — Vyāsa hace nacer el virāma-pratyaya del desapego supremo de I.16
«Bhoja Rāja states that at this stage the mind constantly dwells on this sole notion of terminating thought and rejects all other vṛttis.» — Bhoja Rāja describe el estado: la mente se instala en esa sola noción y rechaza toda otra vṛtti
«Śaṅkara compares this virāma-pratyaya, terminator thought, to an ebbing flame, which is still nonetheless a flame until all its fuel expires and it is turned to dust—a latent saṁskāra.» — la imagen de Śaṅkara para el pensamiento terminador: llama que mengua, llama todavía hasta que se acaba el combustible
«Al-Bīrunī compares the embodied soul to a grain of rice with its husk. As long as the grain retains the husk (the active citta with its saṁskāras), it has the potential for sprouting and ripening.» — la imagen de al-Bīrunī, en la traducción árabe del siglo XI que Bryant recoge: el alma encarnada como grano de arroz con su cáscara
«Thus, when even this notion of terminating all thoughts ceases, asamprajñāta-samādhi ensues.» — Bryant cierra el argumento de I.18: cesada también esa noción, sobreviene el asamprajñāta-samādhi
«I.19 bhava-pratyayo videha-prakṛti-layānām bhava, becoming, material existence, birth; pratyayaḥ, idea, cause;109 videha, unembodied, without a gross body; prakṛti-layānām, of those [entities] merged in matter» — I.19 con su análisis palabra por palabra; la traducción de Bryant se corta en el cambio de plana
«Although Vyāsa and most of the other commentators understand this abstruse sūtra as following the topic of sūtra I.18 and thus pointing to a type of asamprajñāta-samādhi where only latent saṁskāras remain in the mind, this seems impossible, given the nature of the states described» — Bryant objeta a la lectura de Vyāsa y de casi todos los comentaristas sobre I.19, y lo dice como discrepancia propia
«The asamprajñāta-samādhi of I.18 involves uncouplement from prakṛti and thus cannot refer to the prākṛtic states attained by the kind of practitioners referred to in this sūtra.» — el argumento de Bryant: el asamprajñāta de I.18 desacopla de prakṛti y no puede nombrar estados prākṛticos
«The type of quasi samādhi indicated here is still connected with bhava, literally, becoming (which I have translated as states of prakṛti), and points to a state that can also be attained by those other than practitioners of “real” yoga.» — Bryant propone leer I.19 como cuasi-samādhi ligado a bhava, alcanzable también fuera del yoga
«Śaṅkara specifies that the celestial beings referred to here are only those engaged in the path of yoga, and Vijñānabhikṣu says that these are the higher-level celestials that do not have gross physical bodies but bodies made out of buddhi, pure intelligence.» — Śaṅkara y Vijñānabhikṣu acotan quiénes son los seres celestes de I.19: los que van por la vía del yoga, con cuerpos de buddhi y no de materia gruesa
«In his commentary to this verse in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā, Gauḍapāda states: “One might have vairāgya but without knowing the 24 evolutes of prakṛti.» — Gauḍapāda, en su comentario al Sāṅkhya Kārikā, admite vairāgya sin conocimiento de los veinticuatro evolutos
«At death, such a person is not liberated, but is merged into the eight evolutes of prakṛti—pradhāna,112 intelligence, ego and the five subtle elements.» — el desenlace que Gauḍapāda describe: al morir no hay liberación sino fusión en los ocho evolutos de prakṛti
«However, “one merged in this state thinks ‘I am liberated.’ This is a type of ignorance.”» — Gauḍapāda nombra el error de ese estado: creerse liberado
«Vācaspati Miśra takes bhava115 in this sūtra as a reference to avidyā, ignorance; thus these two categories of yogīs are still immersed in ignorance, mistaking the self with the nonself.» — Vācaspati Miśra lee bhava como avidyā; el número pegado es la llamada de nota que el troceo imprime dentro de la palabra
«Vijñānabhikṣu, on the other hand, takes bhava to mean birth, perhaps in resonance with Patañjali’s comment in IV.1 of birth as being a cause of yogic attainment, and holds that the two types of yogīs mentioned here have attained their respective states due to their births, or practices performed in a past life.» — Vijñānabhikṣu lee bhava como nacimiento, y el desacuerdo con Vācaspati Miśra queda consignado sin arbitrar
«Rāmānanda Sarasvatī considers these individuals to be those who, after the dissolution of their gross bodies, remain in a state of existence devoid of the traditional bodily sheaths.» — Rāmānanda Sarasvatī da una tercera lectura: los que subsisten sin las envolturas corporales tras disolverse el cuerpo grueso
«Therefore, says Bhoja Rāja, their attainments are to be considered semblances of real yoga.» — Bhoja Rāja llama semblanzas de yoga real a esos logros
«They are “as if” liberated, says Vyāsa or, as Vācaspati Miśra puts it, they still have their work cut out for them, namely, realization of the actual true self.» — Vyāsa los llama *como si* liberados y Vācaspati Miśra dice que les queda el trabajo por hacer
«Even if they are nonultimate, their realizations certainly surpass the notions of those who identify themselves with the gross physical body.» — Bryant acota el juicio: no son estados últimos y aventajan con todo a la identificación con el cuerpo
«These two categories of entities, which we can perhaps refer to as imperfect yogīs, exist in a state that approximates absolute freedom because they are free from the citta-vṛttis, fluctuating states of mind, and their minds consist only of saṁskāras, subconscious impressions or latent propensities.» — Bryant llama yogīs imperfectos a las dos categorías de I.19 y explica en qué se parece su estado a la libertad absoluta
«complete cessation of thought, with all their saṁskāras inactive, but their awareness, rather than being absorbed in the source of awareness, puruṣa itself, is still absorbed in some subtle dimension of prakṛti.» — Bryant fija dónde queda absorta su consciencia: en una dimensión sutil de prakṛti y no en el puruṣa. El tramo abre la plana 115
«In time, then, unlike with ideal yogīs absorbed in puruṣa, or self-awareness, these other two types of yogīs are eventually pulled back down into the more mundane states of mind when their latent saṁskāras reactivate.» — Bryant describe el retorno: reactivados los saṁskāras, esos yogīs vuelven a estados mundanos
«They are once more prone to bhava, becoming, that is, embodied existence.» — Bryant nombra el término al que vuelven: bhava, la existencia encarnada
«Only realization of the puruṣa by means of the asamprajñāta-samādhi is eternal.» — Bryant marca la única realización que no se deshace
«Otherwise, sooner or later, other saṁskāras, perhaps connected with grosser objects of thought cultivated in prior lifetimes, begin to activate— like frogs, says Vācaspati Miśra, during the rainy season.» — la imagen de Vācaspati Miśra para los saṁskāras que resurgen: ranas en la temporada de lluvias
«unless, says Vācaspati Miśra, while in their disembodied state, they develop true discrimination of the difference between any aspect of prakṛti whatsoever and the real self, puruṣa.» — Vācaspati Miśra deja una salida: desarrollar la discriminación verdadera durante el estado desencarnado
«Vijñānabhikṣu also points out that these yogīs need not necessarily return to saṁsāra when their saṁskāras reactivate;» — Vijñānabhikṣu discrepa: esos yogīs no tienen por qué volver al saṁsāra
«In this case, as the Vāyu Purāṇa quoted above acknowledges, they are eligible to remain eternally immersed in awareness of puruṣa.» — Vijñānabhikṣu apoya su lectura en el Vāyu Purāṇa
«I.20 śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā-pūrvakaḥ itareṣām śraddhā, faith; vīrya, vigor; smṛti, memory; samādhi, absorption; prajñā, discernment; pūrvakah, preceded by; itareṣām, for others» — I.20 con su análisis palabra por palabra: las cuatro piernas del yoga, fe, vigor, memoria y la sabiduría del samādhi
«Vyāsa states that faith sustains like a benevolent mother; it supports the yogī until the very end.» — la imagen de Vyāsa para la fe: madre benevolente que sostiene hasta el final
«We can note that according to II.38, the attainment of vīrya, vigor, is specifically achieved by the practice of celibacy, an indispensable ingredient in the eight limbs of yoga.» — Bryant remite a II.38 para el medio con que se logra vīrya: el celibato
«The ultimate act of discrimination is the ability to distinguish puruṣa from any aspect of prakṛti.» — Bryant define el acto último de discriminación: distinguir el puruṣa de todo aspecto de prakṛti
«If these means are adopted, the practitioner will not return to prakṛti like the bhava-pratyaya beings of the last sūtra.» — Bryant enuncia lo que I.20 asegura frente a I.19: con esos medios no se vuelve a prakṛti
«The commentators take this sūtra as promoting a progression of events that must be undertaken by the aspiring yogī.» — los comentaristas leen I.20 como progresión de pasos y no como lista suelta
«In short, this sūtra states that the attainment of samādhi and its fruit are near, āsannaḥ, for those most intensely committed.» — Bryant glosa I.21: el samādhi y su fruto están cerca de los más intensamente comprometidos
«Vācaspati Miśra considers these differences to be due to the strength (or weakness) of ingrained habits from previous lives—in other words, disruptive saṁskāras from past births—exerting their influence on the various yogīs in this life, and these may interfere with their practices.» — Vācaspati Miśra explica las diferencias de intensidad por los saṁskāras de vidas anteriores
«Even among these, there is further differentiation [of this intensity into degrees of] mild, mediocre, and extreme.» — la traducción de I.22 que da Bryant: la intensidad se subdivide en leve, mediana y extrema
«I.21 tīvra-saṁvegānām āsannaḥ tīvra, keen; saṁvegānām, for those with intensity; āsannaḥ, near, proximate [This state of samprajñāta] is near for those who apply themselves intensely.» — I.21, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: el estado está cerca de quien se aplica con intensidad
«I.22 mrdot;du-madhyādhimātratvāt tato’ pi viśeṣaḥ mrdot;du, mild; madhya, middling; adhimātratvāt, because of intensity; tataḥ, from this, consequently; api, also; viśeṣaḥ, distinction» — I.22 con su análisis palabra por palabra. El troceo imprime *mrdot;du* donde la edición lleva *mṛdu*: es una entidad de marcado del EPUB que quedó cruda en la capa de texto, y se cita tal cual
«I.23 Īśvara-praṇidhānād vā Īśvara, the Lord; praṇidhānāt, from devotion, dedication; vā, or Or, [this previously mentioned state is attainable] from devotion to the Lord.» — I.23, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: el estado se alcanza también por la devoción al Señor
«Yoga has always been theistic: As Feuerstein and others have enjoined emphatically, “The popular academic notion that the conception of God was interpolated into classical Yoga is completely unfounded” (1974, 90).» — Bryant sostiene el carácter teísta del Yoga desde siempre y cita a Feuerstein contra la idea académica de que Īśvara sea interpolación tardía; el año entre paréntesis es la referencia impresa dentro de la frase
«Along the same lines, Vijñānabhikṣu states that by meditating on the Lord with love, the yogī earns the Lord’s favor.» — Vijñānabhikṣu describe el mecanismo devocional: meditando con amor se gana el favor del Señor
«It is important to note vā, or, in this sūtra, indicating that Patañjali presents devotion to Īśvara, the Lord, as an optional rather than an obligatory means of attaining samādhi (although some commentators state that puruṣa cannot detach itself from prakṛti without the grace of Īśvara).» — Bryant subraya el *vā* del sūtra: la devoción es medio opcional y no obligatorio, y consigna que algunos comentaristas discrepan
«In I.24, he states, “The Lord is a special soul.”» — Bryant reúne lo que el texto dice de Īśvara: en I.24, un alma especial
«Sūtra I.25 informs the reader that “in him, the seed of omniscience is unsurpassed,”» — en I.25, la semilla insuperable de omnisciencia
«and, in sūtra I.26, that “He was also the teacher of the ancients, because he is not limited by Time.”» — en I.26, el maestro de los antiguos, no limitado por el Tiempo
«The second context in which Patañjali refers to Īśvara is in the first sūtra in Chapter II: “Kriyā-yoga, the path of action, consists of self-discipline, study, and dedication to the Lord.”» — el segundo contexto en que aparece Īśvara: el kriyā-yoga de II.1
«From the first context, we learn that the highest samādhi can be attained by dedication to Īśvara, a claim Patañjali will repeat in the third section.» — Bryant resume lo que da el primer contexto: el samādhi más alto por dedicación a Īśvara
«Here, devotion to Īśvara is mandatory, in contrast to the meditational path, where it is optional, as a means» — Bryant contrasta los dos regímenes: obligatorio en el kriyā-yoga, opcional en la vía meditativa
«Finally, in the third context in II.32, Patañjali again lists Īśvara-praṇidhāna as a niyama, a mandatory prerequisite for the higher stages of yoga.» — el tercer contexto: Īśvara-praṇidhāna como niyama obligatorio
«By learning that all yogīs, whether slow or swift in their application, eventually attain the goal, practitioners are encouraged and those who have become despondent due to fatigue from excessive effort regain confidence.» — Bryant explica para qué sirve la gradación de I.22: da ánimo a quien se desalienta por el esfuerzo
«But that there are gradations in the attainment of the goal of yoga, he says, is just as in the world, where, in a race, the prize goes to the person who runs the fastest!» — la imagen de la carrera con que se justifica que el premio sea desigual
«Vyāsa has overlooked the possibility that Patañjali intended this sūtra to qualify the three previous sūtras.» — Bryant recoge la objeción de Chapple a Vyāsa sobre la función de I.22
«The word tataḥ, consequently, in this sūtra suggests its connection with these preceding sūtras.» — el argumento gramatical en que se apoya esa lectura: el tataḥ del sūtra
«Thus, the mild of this sūtra should be taken as describing those merged in prakṛti in I.19; the mediocre, as referring to those practicing faith, etc., described in sūtra I.20; and the ardent, as those mentioned in the previous sūtra who are near to the goal.» — Chapple reparte los tres grados de I.22 entre los sūtras I.19 a I.21, y la lectura queda al lado de la de Vyāsa sin arbitrar
«Patañjali here states that the goal of yoga can be attained by the grace of God, Īśvara.» — Bryant glosa I.23: la meta se alcanza también por la gracia de Īśvara
«In this sūtra, the theistic element of the sūtras is encountered for the first time.» — Bryant marca en I.23 la primera aparición del elemento teísta en el texto
«Since it is likewise not optional in the third context as a niyama, which is a prerequisite to meditational yoga, Patañjali seems to be requiring that all aspiring yogīs be devotionally oriented in the preparatory stages to the higher goals of yoga, and although in the higher, more meditational stages of practice they may shift their focus of concentration to other objects (I.34–38)—even, ultimately, to any object of their pleasing (I.39)—they would be best advised to retain Īśvara as object thereafter, since this special puruṣa can bestow perfection of samādhi, which other objects cannot (II.45).» — Bryant observa que, siendo obligatorio como niyama, el Īśvara-praṇidhāna no es del todo opcional en el sistema
«But he is clearly recommending submission to God as the best and most expedient path.» — Bryant declara que el texto recomienda la sumisión a Dios como el camino mejor y más expedito
«When Kṛṣṇa was asked by Arjuna who is superior, those worshipping him with devotion or those trying to fix their minds on their own self (by their own prowess), Kṛṣṇa replied that the devotee is the best of those engaged in yoga (yuktatama), even though those whose minds are fixed on the individual self also attain him (XII.1–4):» — Bryant trae el paralelo del Gītā XII.1-4: la pregunta de Arjuna sobre quién es superior, el devoto o el que fija la mente en el propio ātman
«The difficulty of those whose minds are attached to the ātman128 is greater [than those who fix their minds on Kṛṣṇa in devotion].» — la respuesta del Gītā en la traducción de Bryant: mayor dificultad para los que se apegan al ātman
«But those who, meditating on Me [Kṛṣṇa], worship Me, considering Me to be the Supreme, and renouncing all actions in Me, with undeviating Yoga, for those whose thoughts are immersed in Me, it is I who quickly become the deliverer from the ocean of death and transmigration.» — la otra mitad de la respuesta: a los que meditan en Kṛṣṇa se los saca del océano de la muerte
«Patañjali, like the Gītā, is not denying that the ātman can be attained by self-effort, but he is clearly favoring a theistic approach.» — Bryant acota: ni Patañjali ni el Gītā niegan la vía del esfuerzo propio, pero favorecen la teísta
«The optionality noted above is expressed in the Sanskrit particle vā, or, in this sūtra.» — Bryant localiza la opcionalidad en una sola partícula del sūtra
«While this is not the view of the traditional commentators considered here, it does seem to reflect at least one traditional source.» — Bryant señala que esa lectura no es la de los comentaristas que trae, y que sí refleja al menos una fuente tradicional
«He structures his representation of the Yoga Sūtras in a question-and-answer format, which, although it takes on a mildly Islamic flavoring in the segments dealing with Īśvara, is nonetheless remarkably faithful to his sources:» — Bryant describe la forma de pregunta y respuesta que al-Bīrunī da al texto y la declara notablemente fiel a sus fuentes
«ANSWER: [Liberation] may be attained by devotion. This is constituted by withdrawal from the body and [directing oneself] towards knowledge, certainty, and sincerity in the heart, and towards praise, exaltation, and laudation with the tongue, and action with the limbs.» — la respuesta que al-Bīrunī pone en el texto: la liberación por la devoción, con retiro del cuerpo
«God alone and nothing else is aimed at in all these, so that succour should come from Him with a view to achieving eternal bliss.» — al-Bīrunī cierra la respuesta con el socorro que viene solo de Dios
«In my view, it is unfeasible that devotion can be construed as an alternative to the practice and dispassion of I.12, as no Indic (Hindu, Buddhist, or Jain) soteriological tradition promotes practice or dispassion as optional, not even the much misrepresented tantric traditions.» — Bryant declara como opinión propia que ninguna tradición índica presenta la devoción como alternativa a la práctica y el desapego
«The vā of this sūtra is best read as an option to the self-reliance of the immediately preceding sūtras I.20–22.» — la lectura que Bryant propone del *vā*: opción frente a la autosuficiencia de I.20-22
«Thus, one can apply faith, vigor, memory, samādhi absorption, and discernment under one’s own steam, or apply these in devotion to God, which, can expedite the process.» — Bryant resume la opción: las cuatro piernas del yoga por cuenta propia, o las mismas en devoción a Īśvara
«I.24 kleśa-karma-vipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣa Īśvaraḥ kleśa, obstacle to the practice of yoga; karma, action; vipāka, fruition, maturing; āśayair, by the receptacle, storage, or deposit of saṁskāras; aparāmṛṣṭaḥ, untouched; puruṣa, soul; viśeṣaḥ, special; Īśvaraḥ, the Lord» — I.24 con su análisis palabra por palabra: Īśvara como puruṣa especial no tocado por kleśas, karma ni sus frutos
«Patañjali notes here that Īśvara, too, is a puruṣa, but he is viśeṣa, special, that is, different and distinct from other puruṣas.» — Bryant glosa I.24: Īśvara es puruṣa y a la vez viśeṣa, distinto de los demás
«Unlike all other yogīs, then, he never was bound and never will be.» — Vyāsa marca la diferencia con todo yogī: Īśvara nunca estuvo atado ni lo estará
«As Śaṅkara points out, akliṣṭa, untouched, means never touched by the four conditions for saṁsāra noted above, whether in time past, present, or future.» — Śaṅkara lee akliṣṭa como no tocado en ningún tiempo
«Since yogīs who have broken the three bonds131 and attained liberation are free from these influences, Vyāsa makes a point of noting that Īśvara is distinct from liberated puruṣas, since he never had nor ever will have any relation to these bonds.» — Vyāsa distingue a Īśvara del yogī liberado: el liberado rompió los tres lazos, Īśvara nunca los tuvo. El número pegado es la llamada de nota que el troceo imprime dentro de la palabra
«While the terms are often used interchangeably, vāsanās tend to refer to latent saṁskāras of past lives, which lie dormant, albeit subconsciously molding personality, habit, and choice, and saṁskāras to the more active imprints of this life generated at every moment.» — Bryant separa vāsanā de saṁskāra: la primera para las improntas latentes de vidas pasadas
«He briefly lists four conditions of saṁsāra from which Īśvara is free, and these are elaborated upon by Vyāsa and the commentators.» — Bryant señala la brevedad del sūtra sobre Īśvara y remite a los comentaristas para el desarrollo
«The notion in some modern commentaries that Īśvara is some sort of “archetypal” yogī (Eliade 1969) is nowhere to be found in the traditional commentarial tradition of the Yoga school,» — Bryant niega que la lectura de Īśvara como yogī arquetípico, que atribuye a Eliade, se encuentre en la tradición comentarial
«He introduces Īśvara in the context of meditation, since that is his project in this text.» — Bryant explica por qué Patañjali dice tan poco de Īśvara: lo introduce dentro del proyecto meditativo del libro
«Argumentum ex silentio is not the strongest type of evidence, especially since Patañjali is not talking about creation in the sections of the text where he mentions Īśvara.» — Bryant declara débil el argumento del silencio que otros usan sobre el Īśvara de Patañjali
«He thus provides whatever information related to Īśvara is immediately relevant: that samādhi can be attained by Īśvara; that this is possible because Īśvara is omniscient and beyond the kleśas and other sources of ignorance dealt with in the text that impede samādhi; that this can be attained by reciting oṁ, etc.» — Bryant enumera lo que el texto sí dice de Īśvara, y solo eso
«Vijñānabhikṣu, although much later and clearly a Vedāntin, explicitly states this: “Now what is Īśvara? What is devotion to Him? … He has been very thoroughly analyzed in the Vedānta Sūtras … Consequently, it is only touched upon in passing here.”» — Vijñānabhikṣu, vedāntino, dice expresamente que el tema de Īśvara solo se toca de paso
«That greater body of knowledge is not relevant to Patañjali’s project, but this does not mean Patañjali did not consider texts that do focus on āyurveda essential to human existence, or did not accept their jurisdiction.» — Bryant distingue irrelevancia de rechazo al tratar lo que Patañjali deja fuera
«But this does not mean he minimizes or rejects the jurisdiction and contours of those texts that focus on other aspects of Īśvara such as creation, or, for that matter, the varieties of praṇidhāna.» — Bryant repite la distinción sobre los textos que sí tratan la creación y las formas de praṇidhāna
«But, even prior to the Vedānta Sūtras, the Mahābhārata states that he whom both Sāṅkhya and Yoga call the Supreme Soul, Nārāyaṇa, is the source of prakṛti, so both prior to the Vedānta Sūtras and also after their composition, there were mainstream strains of Sāṅkhya and Yoga that did accept the creatorship of Īśvara.» — Bryant aporta el testimonio del Mahābhārata: Sāṅkhya y Yoga llamaban a Nārāyaṇa Alma Suprema y aceptaban su condición de creador
«Moreover, the fact that this sūtra indicates that Īśvara is not touched by the kleśas and karma does not indicate that Īśvara could not be a personal God for Patañjali.» — Bryant objeta a la inferencia de que Īśvara, libre de kleśas, no pueda ser un Dios personal
«The point here is not to project the theology of the Gītā onto Patañjali but to stress that Patañjali’s Īśvara cannot be extracted from the context of Īśvara-related theologies of the time.» — Bryant acota su propia tesis: no proyectar la teología del Gītā sobre Patañjali, sino no arrancarlo de su contexto
«We have no grounds to insist that Patañjali’s Īśvara be distinct from such theistic expressions, and thus stress that in our view Patañjali’s reference to Īśvara cannot be excised from this context of his time.» — Bryant enuncia la conclusión como posición suya: no hay base para separar el Īśvara de Patañjali de las expresiones teístas de su tiempo
«The entire Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, too, presents Śiva as Īśvara, who actively creates, rules, and engages with the world and yet remains distinct and transcendent to it.» — Bryant aporta el Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, donde Śiva es el Īśvara que crea, rige y sigue trascendente a lo creado
«Viṣṇu and Śiva had risen to prominence centuries before Patañjali, and their worship was widespread across the subcontinent by the beginning of the Common Era.» — Bryant data la prominencia de Viṣṇu y Śiva siglos antes de Patañjali
«In the Gītā, Kṛṣṇa claims to be a distinct (but supreme) sort of puruṣa, the uttamaḥ puruṣas anyaḥ, specifying that this puruṣa is distinct from not only nonliberated puruṣas but also liberated ones (XV.16–18)149; beyond karma and the kleśas (IV.14; IX.9); of unsurpassed omniscience (VII.26; X.20, 32; XI.43); the teacher of the ancients (IV.1, specified as Vivasvān the sun god, who in turn imparted knowledge to Manu, the progenitor of mankind); transcendent to Time (X.30); the sound oṁ (IX.17); the remover of obstacles impeding the progress of his devotees, and the bestower of liberation» — Bryant recoge del Gītā la autodefinición de Kṛṣṇa como puruṣa supremo y distinto, uttamaḥ puruṣas anyaḥ
«We thus suggest that the evidence points to the conclusion that the theism in Patañjali’s system can stem only from these preexisting Vaiṣṇava or Śaivite strains.» — Bryant enuncia su tesis sobre el origen del teísmo de Patañjali: las corrientes vaiṣṇava o śaiva preexistentes
«One might add a final note here, that Patañjali not only stipulates the practice of svādhyāya, literally self-study, understood in all the commentaries as referring to the study of scripture (which teaches of the self) and recitation of japa (II.1, 44), but also states that from such study» — Bryant señala que Patañjali no solo prescribe svādhyāya sino que le adjudica un efecto; el tramo se corta y sigue con el iṣṭa-devatā
«That Patañjali was well versed in the śāstras, sacred texts—and thus hardly immune to the theistic currents of the day—is already obvious; this sūtra suggests he was himself oriented toward a specific divinity of preference.» — Bryant declara obvio que Patañjali conocía los śāstras y lo lee orientado a una divinidad de preferencia
«Thus, iṣṭa-devatā might better be read, as it is taken in the theistic traditions, as a reference to a form of Īśvara to which the yogī is partial.» — Bryant propone leer iṣṭa-devatā, como lo hacen las tradiciones teístas, por una forma de Īśvara
«This is underscored by the fact that all the commentators understand svādhyāya as also referring to the recitation of mantra, japa, which Vyāsa, following Patañjali (I.27–28) takes as reciting oṁ.» — Bryant apoya la lectura en los comentaristas, que entienden svādhyāya también como recitación de mantra
«Oṁ, we will see, specifically refers to Īśvara.» — Bryant adelanta lo que el texto dirá de oṁ: nombra a Īśvara
«So whether svādhyāya is taken to be study or mantra, iṣṭa-devatā can conceivably refer only to a preferred form of Īśvara.» — Bryant cierra el argumento: en cualquiera de las dos lecturas, el iṣṭa-devatā solo puede ser una forma de Īśvara
«Indeed, the Mahābhārata (XII.337.4–5) considers Vyāsa a manifestation (aṁśa) of Viṣṇu/Nārāyaṇa and the son of the latter.» — Bryant consigna lo que el Mahābhārata dice del propio comentarista: Vyāsa como aṁśa de Viṣṇu y su hijo
«Having said all this, one cannot ignore the fact that Patañjali chose not to disclose his understanding of Īśvara other than in the most general categories of relevance to the specific focus of the sūtras, citta-vṛtti-nirodha.» — Bryant pone el límite a su propia tesis: Patañjali eligió no declarar su comprensión de Īśvara fuera de lo más general
«On a related note, the Yoga tradition in America today primarily stems from the Vaiṣṇava (Viṣṇu-centered) traditions.» — Bryant traza el origen de la tradición de yoga en los Estados Unidos: las corrientes vaiṣṇavas
«This is a devotional lineage, prioritizing bhakti, which accepts Viṣṇu as the Supreme Īśvara.» — Bryant describe ese linaje: devocional, con Viṣṇu por Īśvara supremo
«This aspect of their heritage is unknown to most of their followers, since it was not stressed by these ācāryas upon coming to Western shores (although it can be perceived more readily in the viniyoga writings of Desikachar than in those of Iyengar).» — Bryant consigna que los ācāryas no subrayaron ese fondo devocional en Occidente y que sus seguidores lo ignoran
«Nonetheless, even if Īśvara associates with prakṛti out of freedom rather» — Vācaspati Miśra deja abierto el problema: si Īśvara desea, el deseo es síntoma de ignorancia. El tramo se corta al final de la plana 132
«When dissolution occurs, all saṁsāric puruṣas remain in a latent state until the next manifestation.» — Vācaspati Miśra describe la disolución cósmica: los puruṣas del saṁsāra quedan latentes hasta la manifestación siguiente
«This wish or saṁskāra is deposited into sattva along with the collective saṁskāras of all embodied beings.» — la explicación de Vācaspati Miśra: el deseo de Īśvara se deposita en sattva junto con los saṁskāras colectivos
«This cumbersome explanation is construed to explain how desire, knowledge, and the will to act, which in conventional Yoga understanding are citta-vṛttis indicative of unliberated puruṣas in saṁsāra, can exist in Īśvara, whom Patañjali says in this sūtra has always been pure and liberated and free from ignorance.» — Bryant llama engorrosa esa explicación y dice qué intenta resolver: cómo caben deseo, conocimiento y voluntad en quien es puro
«Vijñānabhikṣu draws attention to this problem, pointing out that it is ignorance that causes puruṣa to associate (or, after cosmic dissolution, reassociate) with prakṛti—but how can ignorance be applicable to Īśvara?» — Vijñānabhikṣu señala el problema de frente: si la ignorancia es lo que ata al puruṣa, cómo aplicarla a Īśvara
«Rather, for Vijñānabhikṣu, desire, knowledge, and the power to act exist in Īśvara eternally.» — Vijñānabhikṣu resuelve por otra vía: deseo, conocimiento y poder de obrar son eternos en Īśvara
«Here, he again reflects the position held by certain Vedānta schools, which also hold that Īśvara’s mind and, for that matter, body are not prākṛtic productions» — Bryant sitúa esa salida en la posición de ciertas escuelas vedānticas: la mente y el cuerpo de Īśvara no son productos de prakṛti
«The Yoga view holds that, both in the liberated state as well as in the world of saṁsāra, there is a plurality of individual souls, while» — Bryant enuncia la posición del Yoga: pluralidad de almas individuales tanto en el saṁsāra como en la liberación
«In advaita Vedānta, from a liberated perspective, there is only one undivided ātman.» — Bryant pone al lado la posición advaita: un solo ātman indiviso. Las dos quedan consignadas sin arbitrar
«For example, if there were only one ultimate undivided ātman, then if any one jīva (the ātman in saṁsāric bondage) becomes liberated, it attains to this undivided state.» — el argumento con que el Yoga objeta al advaita: si el ātman fuera uno, la liberación de un jīva liberaría a todos
«I.25 tatra niratiśāyam sarvajña-bījam tatra, in him; niratiśāyam, unsurpassed; sarvajña, omniscience; bījam, seed In him, the seed of omniscience is unsurpassed.» — I.25, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: en Īśvara la semilla de omnisciencia es insuperable
«Although, by definition, omniscience, sarvajña, means to know everything, and thus degrees of omniscience would seem to be something of an oxymoron, Patañjali here indicates that there is a difference between the omniscience of Īśvara and any comparable state obtainable by any other entity: Īśvara’s omniscience is unsurpassed, niratiśāyam.» — Bryant plantea la dificultad del sūtra: si omnisciencia es saberlo todo, no debería admitir grados
«Vyāsa states that the metaphor of a seed is used because there are in fact degrees in omniscience, as there are in the germination of a seed.» — Vyāsa explica la metáfora de la semilla: hay grados en la omnisciencia como en la germinación
«He defines the seed of omniscience as the ability to understand anything, large or small, individual or collective, either in the past, present, or future—in other words, the ability to understand all things from all time.» — Vyāsa define la semilla de omnisciencia por lo que abarca: lo grande y lo pequeño, lo individual y lo colectivo
«Omniscience is knowing the totality of the dimensions of all individual things, whether past, present, or future.» — Bryant da la definición completa: la totalidad de las dimensiones de cada cosa en los tres tiempos
«Īśvara must be omniscient in this sort of sense, adds Śaṅkara, to be able to supervise the vast totality of all things in the planned and regulated universe.» — Śaṅkara deriva la omnisciencia de la función: supervisar la totalidad del universo regulado
«Although, by this process of inference, one can reach the conclusion that there must be a highest attainable state of knowledge, omniscience, one does not know the specifics of such an omniscient being by this process, says Vyāsa.» — Vyāsa pone el límite de la inferencia: llega a que debe haber un ser supremo, no a sus particularidades
«The followers of all kinds of sects consider their masters to be omniscient—even in the Yoga Sūtras there are several sūtras that indicate that the accomplished yogī becomes omniscient (for example, I.40; III.49).» — Bryant consigna que toda secta tiene por omnisciente a su maestro, y que los propios Yoga Sūtras lo afirman del yogī
«Śaṅkara points out here that the Buddhists and Jains themselves state that the Buddha and Mahāvīra167 attained enlightenment, and this indicates that there was a time when they were not enlightened; in other words, there was a time when they were once subject to ignorance.» — Śaṅkara marca la diferencia con Buda y Mahāvīra: los propios budistas y jainas dicen que alcanzaron lo que antes no tenían
«Vācaspati Miśra makes the same point about Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya system.» — Vācaspati Miśra aplica el mismo argumento a Kapila
«Kapila was the first teacher of the lineage and attained liberation, says Vācaspati Miśra, but this is not the same as Īśvara, the Supreme Teacher, who was always liberated.» — Vācaspati Miśra separa a Kapila de Īśvara: uno alcanzó la liberación, el otro siempre fue libre
«Similarly, since Īśvara is free from karma, his awareness is not limited by sensual limitations and thus can perceive everything at the same time. Hence he is omniscient.» — Bryant deriva la omnisciencia de Īśvara de su libertad respecto del karma y de los límites sensoriales. El tramo cruza el cambio de plana a la 136
«Vācaspati Miśra considers the atheistic position that God could not have created the world because it is full of pain.» — Vācaspati Miśra plantea la objeción atea: un Dios no habría creado un mundo lleno de dolor
«If there were a compassionate God, he would have created a world of undisturbed enjoyment (such» — la objeción en su forma concreta: un Dios compasivo habría hecho un mundo de goce sin perturbación
«His response to this is that God informs mankind of the means of liberation and thus is not cruel.» — Vācaspati Miśra contesta: Dios informa del medio de liberación y por eso no es cruel
«Vijñānabhikṣu considers a further charge that since Īśvara is partial to his devotees, showering his blessings on them and not on others, he is a flawed individual, since partiality is not a sign of transcendence.» — Vijñānabhikṣu plantea la segunda objeción: la parcialidad de Īśvara hacia sus devotos
«Just as fire has the nature of heat, so God’s nature is such that he is controlled by his devotees, but anyone can avail himself or herself of this nature by cultivating pure sattva.» — la respuesta de Vijñānabhikṣu con la imagen del fuego: Dios queda al alcance de cualquiera que cultive sattva puro
«He quotes Gītā IX.29: “I am equal to all beings—there is no one dear to me nor disliked by me.» — Vijñānabhikṣu apoya la respuesta en el Gītā IX.29: soy igual con todos los seres
«Pleasure and pain, asserts Vijñānabhikṣu, are the result of one’s own past actions and have nothing to do with Īśvara’s partiality.» — Vijñānabhikṣu remite el placer y el dolor a los actos propios y no a la parcialidad divina
«I.26 pūrveṣām api guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt pūrveṣām, of the ancients; api, also; guruḥ, guru, teacher; kālena, by time; anavacchedāt, because of not being limited or conditioned by Īśvara was also the teacher of the ancients, because he is not limited by Time.» — I.26, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: Īśvara maestro también de los antiguos, por no estar limitado por el Tiempo
«Vyāsa states that the ancients, purvāḥ (those who went before), were subject to Time, kāla; that is, they were mortal beings with finite life spans.» — Vyāsa acota quiénes son los antiguos: los sujetos al Tiempo, de vida finita
«The one who is not so subject to Time—Īśvara, who transcends Time —is the guru of even the ancients.» — Vyāsa enuncia la consecuencia: el no sujeto al Tiempo es el guru de los antiguos
«Moreover, just as Īśvara existed as the perfect being at the beginning of this creation, so was he the same in previous creations.» — Vyāsa extiende la identidad de Īśvara a todas las creaciones
«Time for the Yoga school simply means the movement of the guṇas of prakṛti, that is, the movement of matter.» — Bryant da la definición de tiempo que el Yoga usa: el movimiento de los guṇas
«Being subject to Time, embodied beings of the present day are not free to receive teachings directly from, say, Patañjali, Kṛṣṇa, Christ, Buddha, Abraham, or Muhammed, etc., because our situation in Time is different from theirs—they were present in a different configuration of the guṇas, which we call a previous age, than the present configuration.» — Bryant explica el límite de los encarnados: no pueden recibir enseñanza directa fuera de su propia configuración temporal
«But since Īśvara is transcendent to Time and to the laws of saṁsāra (such as karma, which limits ordinary embodied beings’ capacity to control their destiny in terms of when and where they are injected into prakṛti), Īśvara can break into human history at will, so to speak, and impart teachings to sages throughout the ages.» — Bryant enuncia la excepción: Īśvara, trascendente al Tiempo y al karma, se comunica con los sabios de toda época
«It is He who addressed in various ways Brahmā and other primal [sages].» — la formulación que Bryant recoge: Él fue quien habló a Brahmā y a los sabios primordiales
«Śaṅkara gives the following purport to this sūtra: Just as gurus, who are teachers of knowledge and dharma, are offered homage by their pupils who have taken shelter of them, so Īśvara, who is the teacher of all other teachers, should be meditated upon in the heart by his devotees who know him by such names as Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu).» — Śaṅkara saca de I.26 una consecuencia devocional: meditar en el maestro supremo bajo nombres como Nārāyaṇa
«Although there is oneness between the whole and the part on one level, the relationship is not one of absolute unity, as the advaita, nondualist, schools of Vedānta hold; it is rather one of nondifference.» — Bryant marca la diferencia entre unidad absoluta y no diferencia al tratar la relación de la parte con el todo
«The advaita, nondual, school of Vedānta (as well as other non-dual, monistic, traditions such as the cluster of Śakta schools) holds that individuality is a feature of saṁsāra only, but that upon attaining liberation, the soul loses its individuality and realizes its oneness with the Absolute (hence the term advaita, literally, nondual, one).» — Bryant expone la posición advaita: la individualidad pertenece al saṁsāra y se pierde en la liberación
«Patañjali states here that Īśvara is represented by the mystical syllable oṁ referred to here by its synonym, praṇavaḥ.» — Bryant glosa I.27: el sūtra nombra a oṁ por su sinónimo praṇava
«The term “elephant” is thus conventional; it does not have an eternal or absolutely binding relationship with its referent.» — el ejemplo con que Bryant explica la relación convencional entre palabra y cosa
«An inherent relationship, on the other hand, is eternal and not dependent on social usage.» — Bryant define por contraste la relación inherente, que es la que el sūtra adjudica a oṁ e Īśvara
«I.27 tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ tasya, his; vācakaḥ, designation; praṇavaḥ, the mystical syllable oṁ» — I.27 con su análisis palabra por palabra; la traducción de Bryant dice que el nombre que lo designa es la sílaba mística oṁ
«Īśvara is not subject to cyclical creation and therefore can invest his potency eternally into the sacred syllable oṁ.» — Bryant explica por qué la relación entre Īśvara y oṁ puede ser eterna y no convencional
«When an iron ball is placed into the fire, it becomes permeated by the fire such that the iron exhibits all the qualities of fire.» — la imagen de la bola de hierro en el fuego, con que se explica la permeación
«In this regard, on one level, it becomes non-different from fire even as on another level, it remains an iron substance and fire remains a distinct physical substance.» — Bryant desdobla los dos niveles de la imagen: no diferente del fuego y sustancia distinta a la vez
«In the same way, oṁ becomes permeated by Īśvara such that it manifests the qualities of Īśvara.» — Bryant aplica la imagen a oṁ
«On one level, then, it becomes non-different from Īśvara even as on another level, it remains a prakṛtic sound vibration and Īśvara remains a distinct transcendent entity.» — Bryant cierra la aplicación: oṁ es sonido prākṛtico y a la vez no diferente de Īśvara
«But since Īśvara has invested his presence in this sound (as an act of grace), the mind is, for all intents and purposes, coming into direct contact with Īśvara.» — Bryant declara acto de gracia la investidura de Īśvara en el sonido, y de ahí el contacto directo de la mente
«Hariharānanda believes that this empowered syllable oṁ along with its designation, Īśvara, is reintroduced to humanity in each new cycle of creation by omniscient beings, or sages with recollection of their past lives.» — Hariharānanda sostiene que oṁ se reintroduce en cada ciclo por quienes recuerdan sus vidas pasadas
«He feels that no other word can bring about comparable calmness of mind.» — Hariharānanda declara sin igual el efecto de oṁ sobre la calma de la mente
«Śaṅkara gives a popular etymology for praṇava, the term used here by Patañjali to refer to oṁ.» — Śaṅkara ofrece una etimología popular de praṇava
«The prefix pra-, of praṇava, he says, stands for prakarṣeṇa, perfectly; and nava is a derivative of the root nu, in its third-person passive form of nūyate, he is praised.» — la etimología de Śaṅkara desmenuzada: pra- por perfectamente y nava de la raíz nu, alabar
«Alternatively, he continues, substituting the va of praṇava with dhā, one can construe praṇidhā, surrender to the Lord;» — la segunda etimología de Śaṅkara, que lleva praṇava a praṇidhā, entrega al Señor
«Īśvara is the generic name for God in the Hindu theistic traditions.» — Bryant declara genérico el nombre Īśvara dentro de las tradiciones teístas hindúes
«Factually, however, most yogīs over the last two millennia have been associated with these devotional sects and hence tend to add the specific name of their iṣṭa-devatā, their preferred personal form of divinity (the object of their personal devotion, a notion discussed in II.44) onto the oṁ mantra.» — Bryant consigna la práctica real: los yogīs de dos milenios añaden su deidad personal al mantra oṁ
«Thus, for the Viṣṇu/Nārāyaṇa traditions, that is, those that conceive of Īśvara as Viṣṇu/Nārāyaṇa, the favored mantra is oṁ namo Nārāyaṇāya;» — el ejemplo concreto: oṁ namo Nārāyaṇāya en las tradiciones de Viṣṇu
«Even in the by now far more popular and universalized Kṛṣṇa mantra—Hare Kṛṣṇa, Hare Kṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇa Kṛṣṇa, Hare Hare, Hare Rāma, Hare Rāma, Rāma Rāma, Hare Hare—introduced to the Western world by the great Vaiṣṇava teacher A. C. Bhaktivedānta Swāmi, the medieval Kṛṣṇa theologians from which his lineage stems proposed that this mantra both inherently contains and also supersedes oṁ.» — Bryant consigna que los teólogos kṛṣṇaítas tienen su mantra por superior a oṁ, y lo deja como afirmación de ellos
«Continuing this discussion of oṁ, Patañjali here gives a specific indication as to how to fix the mind on Īśvara.» — Bryant glosa I.28 como la indicación práctica de cómo fijar la mente en Īśvara
«Patañjali provides the means: through the recitation of the syllable in which Īśvara manifests.» — Bryant nombra el medio que el sūtra da: la recitación de la sílaba en que Īśvara se manifiesta
«The point is that even in the more developed bhakti traditions, oṁ retains its primordial status as encapsulating the Absolute Truth but is incorporated into more sophisticated understandings of Īśvara and, consequently, more personalized and elaborate varients of the oṁ mantra.» — Bryant cierra: oṁ conserva su estatuto primordial dentro de las tradiciones devocionales
«I.28 taj-japas tad-artha-bhāvanam taj, its [of the syllable oṁ]; japaḥ, repetition; tat, its [of the syllable oṁ]; artha, meaning; bhāvanam, dwelling upon» — I.28 con su análisis palabra por palabra; la traducción de Bryant prescribe la repetición de oṁ y la contemplación de su sentido
«yogī’s mind is now so completely identified with Īśvara that it is no longer aware of its own separate existence; one is so absorbed in this vision that one has lost all self-awareness.» — Bryant describe el término de la práctica de I.28: la mente identificada con Īśvara deja de advertir su existencia separada
«One has merged into Īśvara, although one must always bear in mind that this is not the merging of advaita-vedānta where the soul is held to actually ontologically lose its separate identity.» — Bryant acota enseguida: esa fusión no es la del advaita vedānta
«Puruṣa never loses its separate identity in Yoga. The merging here is psychological—one forgets one’s own self in the rapture of the divine vision of Īśvara, but one nonetheless remains a distinct individual.» — Bryant enuncia el límite doctrinal: en el Yoga la fusión es psicológica y el puruṣa sigue siendo individuo distinto
«In the final stage, one’s absorption in this vision of Īśvara is purged of all notions of Time and Space: “Īśvara’s relationship with the praṇava and all the Vedas (of which it is the seed) is seen to have existed in all previous cycles [world ages] (beginninglessly), to be manifest in the preset cycle, and to be potential in all future cycles” (ibid., 355).» — Bryant describe el estadio final, purgado de Tiempo y Espacio, y cita a Coward
«Since the late Vedic period, as Coward points out: “Īśvara-praṇidhāna and svādhyāya (in the form of chanting AUM) has been the core practice of most yogīs” (357).» — Bryant cita a Coward sobre la antigüedad del Īśvara-praṇidhāna y el svādhyāya como práctica central
«It is unfortunate that adequate attention has not yet been directed to the Purāṇic traditions, which were being compiled and organized into the Purāṇic corpus in Patañjali’s time, where the “bare bones” directives of the Yoga Sūtras are brought to life.» — Bryant lamenta la desatención académica a las tradiciones purāṇicas, donde los sūtras cobran vida
«Notwithstanding that these stories have been dismissed by most Western scholars as too mythological to merit serious philosophical attention, it is from these stories and renditions that the living Yoga traditions of Hinduism have found their inspiration and the spiritual practices of hundreds of millions of Hindus over the centuries have taken shape.» — Bryant consigna el descarte de esos relatos por los estudiosos occidentales y su peso real en la práctica hindú
«The direct perception of vitarka-samādhi is different in character from the perception of the form of four-armed Viṣṇu by Dhruva and others attained by the practice of japa and penance, etc.» — Bryant separa la percepción del vitarka-samādhi de la visión de la forma de cuatro brazos obtenida por japa y penitencia
«Yogīs, on the other hand, by the power of their yoga practice, directly perceive the four-armed body of the Lord situated in the eternal Divine realm, even though they themselves are somewhere else.» — Bryant consigna lo que la tradición adjudica al yogī: percibir el cuerpo del Señor estando en otro sitio
«Thus Dhruva here experiences both an internal and an external vision of Viṣṇu.» — el relato de Dhruva reúne las dos visiones, interna y externa
«For everyday Hindus, the teachings of the classical knowledge systems are translated into and transmitted through popular stories.» — Bryant explica el papel del relato popular: es ahí donde los sistemas clásicos llegan al hindú común
«He is the supreme boon-giver, and one should meditate (dhyāna) on his smiling countenance and loving glances with a steady and concentrated mind.» — el pasaje del Bhāgavata Purāṇa que Bryant traduce: meditar en el rostro sonriente y las miradas amorosas del dador de dones
«The mind of one meditating on the most auspicious form of God, Bhagavān, becomes perfected due to this highest form of mental control, and never refrains from meditating.» — el mismo pasaje: la mente que medita en la forma auspiciosa se perfecciona y no cesa
«A person reciting this mantra for seven days and nights attains a vision of the siddhas.» — la promesa que el pasaje asocia al mantra: siete días y noches de recitación y visión de los siddhas
«With this mantra, a wise person should perform the Lord’s worship with devotional offerings, understanding the appropriate articles to use in worship according to place and time.» — la instrucción ritual del mismo pasaje: adoración con ofrendas conforme a lugar y tiempo
«Dhruva withdrew his mind, which is the support of the senses and their objects, from all other objects.» — el relato describe el pratyāhāra de Dhruva: retira la mente de todo otro objeto
«Vyāsa notes that these nine disturbances occur along with the vṛttis, the changing states of the mind, and if these disturbances were removed, there would be no vṛttis, and thus the goal of yoga, the cessation of all vṛttis, would be accomplished.» — Vyāsa señala que los nueve obstáculos de I.30 van con las vṛttis, y que suprimirlos sería el yoga mismo
«Idleness, styāna, is the disinclination of the mind toward work; a sort of mental paralysis, says Śaṅkara.» — Śaṅkara define styāna como parálisis mental
«Following the Nyāya school, doubt, saṁśaya, is taken as the consideration of two sides of an issue and thinking, “It might be this way, if not, it might be that way” (or, as Bhoja Rāja quips, “Is the practice of yoga doable or not?!» — Bhoja Rāja formula la duda en su forma más concreta: si la práctica del yoga es o no practicable
«Carelessness, pramāda, is lacking the foundations to practice samādhi, presumably a reference to neglecting the eight limbs of yoga, which will be discussed in Chapters II and III (a lack of persistence, says Śaṅkara).» — Śaṅkara define pramāda por la falta de persistencia
«Sloth, ālasya, is lack of effort in mind and body205 due to heaviness (which is caused by kapha, excess phlegm, says Vācaspati Miśra).» — Vācaspati Miśra explica la pereza por exceso de kapha, la flema: el obstáculo se diagnostica también en términos médicos
«Lack of detachment, avirati, is mental greed due to the mind contemplating the sense objects (due to past addictions, says Śaṅkara), a theme discussed at length in texts such as the Gītā (II.44).» — Bryant liga la avirati a la codicia mental y la apoya en el Gītā II.44
«Misapprehension, bhrānti-darśana, is mistaken knowledge, like mistaking mother-of-pearl for silver, says Bhoja Rāja» — Bhoja Rāja define la falsa percepción con el ejemplo del nácar tomado por plata
«These disturbances, concludes Vyāsa, are the impurities of yoga, its enemies and obstacles produced by rajas and tamas.» — Vyāsa llama impurezas del yoga a los nueve obstáculos y los adjudica a rajas y tamas
«They are called disturbances, antarāya, says Śaṅkara, because they move, aya, and make a gap, antara, in one’s practice.» — Śaṅkara da la etimología de antarāya: lo que se mueve y abre un hueco en la práctica
«Vyāsa states that although these symptoms accompany the nine disturbances, they do not manifest for the yogī whose mind is fixed.» — Vyāsa acota: los síntomas de I.31 acompañan a los obstáculos y no se manifiestan en el yogī de mente fija
«Ultimately, according to Patañjali in I.29, they all disappear by devotion to Īśvara.» — Bryant remite a I.29 para el remedio último de los obstáculos
«Although in consonance with I.39, the one object, eka-tattva, mentioned in this sūtra as the support for the mind can be any object, the commentators take it to be Īśvara, thereby also concluding this section of the text relating to Īśvara.» — Bryant consigna que el sūtra admite cualquier objeto y que los comentaristas lo leen como Īśvara
«In other words, by fixing the mind on oṁ in a devotional mood, the obstacles to yoga are removed and the goal of the entire system is attained.» — Bryant enuncia la lectura que adopta: fijar la mente en oṁ con ánimo devocional quita los obstáculos
«Unlike other schools of thought, such as the Vedānta tradition, which dedicates one of its four chapters to refuting other philosophical views, the Pātañjalian Yoga commentarial tradition, with a few exceptions such as Śaṅkara and Vijñānabhikṣu (themselves Vedāntins), does not concern itself excessively with this type of» — Bryant contrasta el Yoga con el Vedānta: la tradición comentarial del Yoga no se ocupa mucho de objetar a otros
«However, as we find here, the commentators on occasion (and Patañjali himself later in the fourth chapter) do make a point of discussing certain Buddhist notions of mind, since these directly oppose the essential fundamentals of Yogic metaphysics on which the practice of the entire system is based.» — Bryant explica la excepción: los comentaristas tratan las tesis budistas porque tocan los fundamentos del sistema
«Indeed, the two systems hold diametrically opposing understandings on certain basic premises pertaining to mind and consciousness.» — Bryant declara diametralmente opuestas las premisas de los dos sistemas sobre mente y consciencia
«The standard technique for refuting rival views is for a commentator to introduce the view of the opposing school, called the pūrvapakṣa, critique it, and then establish the perspective of his own school, the siddhānta.» — Bryant describe el procedimiento escolástico del pūrvapakṣa y el siddhānta
«Vyāsa himself does not refer to Buddhism by name but uses one of several terms for Buddhist doctrine common in orthodox Hindu philosophical discourse: kṣaṇikavāda,210 the view that all reality is momentary.» — Bryant consigna que Vyāsa no nombra al budismo y usa el término kṣaṇikavāda
«What is intended by this, according to all mainstream Buddhist positions, is that nothing in reality has inherent, eternal, independent, and essential existence, that is, nothing has its own durable essence that can be separated from its connection and interdependence with other entities.» — Bryant expone la posición budista en sus propios términos: nada tiene existencia inherente
«Naturally, such a metaphysics is diametrically opposed to the Sāṅkhya Yoga position that both puruṣa and prakṛti are precisely inherent, eternal, independent, and essential durable entities that, at least in the case of puruṣa, do not need to be interconnected or interdependent.» — Bryant marca el punto de choque con el Sāṅkhya-Yoga: puruṣa y prakṛti eternos e independientes
«Indeed, the extraction and isolation of the eternal and independent puruṣa from its codependence on all other reality is precisely the goal of the entire system.» — Bryant recuerda qué está en juego: aislar el puruṣa eterno es la meta del sistema entero
«Another term for the Buddhists in orthodox commentaries is thus anātmavāda, the position that does not accept an eternal, separable, conscious entity called ātman (puruṣa).» — Bryant da el otro nombre que los comentarios ortodoxos usan para los budistas: anātmavāda
«The need for raising the Buddhist position at this point arises for Vyāsa because Patañjali’s entire system focuses on concentrating the mind on one object, as the present sūtra specifically indicates, eliminating all distractions to this end.» — Bryant explica por qué Vyāsa trae la objeción aquí: I.32 pide fijar la mente en un objeto
«I.31 duḥkha-daurmanasyāṅgam-ejayatva-śvāsa-praśvāsā vikṣepa-saha-bhuvaḥ duḥkha, pain, suffering; daurmanasya, dejection; aṅgam-ejayatva, trembling of the limbs; śvāsa, inhalation; praśvāsāḥ, exhalation;» — I.31 con parte de su análisis palabra por palabra: dolor, abatimiento, temblor de los miembros e inhalación y exhalación como acompañantes de la distracción
«I.32 tat-pratiṣedhārtham eka-tattvābhyāsaḥ tat, their [these distractions and their accompaniments]; pratiṣedha, repel, eliminate, negate; artham, for the sake of; eka, one, single; tattva, object; abhyāsaḥ, practice» — I.32 con su análisis palabra por palabra: la práctica sobre un solo objeto para repeler las distracciones
«With the partial exception of the Idealist school of Vijñānavāda Buddhism,214 in most schools of Buddhist psychology there is a series of point moments, each of which exists as both the momentary effect of the previous instant and simultaneously the momentary cause of the succeeding instant, in a flow of cognitive instances, but there is no durable underlying entity called mind underpinning this process as the Yoga school holds.» — Bryant expone la posición budista mayoritaria: no hay entidad duradera llamada mente
«If there is no enduring underlying substratum of mind in the first place that can concentrate on an object one minute but be distracted the next, there can be no such thing as a distracted mind: Distraction requires a permanent entity that can waver from one thing to another.» — Vyāsa formula la objeción: sin sustrato duradero, la propia noción de mente distraída se deshace
«In Buddhism there is no permanent mind, simply individual cognitions that arise and fade away instantaneously but are fully fixed for their momentary life span on their objects.» — Bryant enuncia la posición budista sobre la mente: cogniciones momentáneas, no mente permanente
«The Buddhist, Vyāsa supposes, will respond that there is a flow of identical cognitions, each one succeeding the other, and thus the Buddhist concept of concentration should be understood as keeping this mental flow of point moments sequencing on the same thought, that is, prolonging the flow of momentary cognitions centered on one object.» — Vyāsa supone la respuesta budista: un flujo de cogniciones idénticas centradas en un objeto
«Distraction therefore entails the interrupting of this flow.» — la definición budista de distracción dentro de ese esquema
«Vyāsa’s thrust is to establish that there must be something that endures, underpins, and connects the individual cognitions and images—something like the citta animated by the consciousness of the puruṣa as posited by the Yoga school, that is, a nonmomentary but permanent mind that can think of one thing or focus on one image one minute and then get distracted and think of another thing the next.» — el empuje del argumento de Vyāsa: tiene que haber algo que perdure y conecte las cogniciones
«Only if the mind is a permanent entity that endures from one moment to the next does the notion of a distracted mind, and hence the viability of a practice of concentration to focus it, become meaningful.» — Vyāsa enuncia la conclusión: solo con mente permanente tienen sentido la distracción y el fijarla
«A Buddhist response to this, as Śaṅkara notes, is that before extinguishing itself, a thought leaves a trace or imprint of itself on its succeeding thought, which does the same for the thought succeeding it, and so on, in a sequence of cause and effect, and thus a flow of thought manifests (like a line of red ants, he says).» — Śaṅkara recoge la réplica budista con la imagen de la fila de hormigas rojas
«The problem here, says Śaṅkara, is that these thoughts are arising and perishing at different times: When one thought arises in the present as effect, its predecessor, causal thought, has already expired in the past—they are not overlapping.» — Śaṅkara objeta a esa réplica: los pensamientos no se solapan
«But such a process would involve at least two moments or instances for each thought: a moment of overlap with the previous thought and a moment of overlap with the subsequent thought (with perhaps an intervening moment in its own right), which conflicts with the Buddhist premise of single momentariness.» — Śaṅkara cierra la objeción: el proceso exigiría dos momentos por pensamiento, contra la premisa de la momentaneidad
«The point is, this all takes place within the receptacle of the mind—the saṁskāra needs to be lodged somewhere, in a permanent substratum, such as the citta posited by the Yoga school, in order to be retrievable and remembered and, one might add, the saṁskāra itself needs to have permanency and not be momentary.» — Bryant resume la posición del Yoga: todo eso pasa dentro de un receptáculo, la citta, que la memoria exige duradero
«I.30 vyādhi-styāna-saṁśaya-pramādālasyāvirati-bhrānti-darśanālabdhabhūmikatvānavasthitatvāni citta-vikṣepās te’ntarāyāḥ vyādhi, disease; styāna, idleness, apathy; saṁśaya, indecision, doubt; pramāda, carelessness, negligence; ālasya, sloth; avirati, lack of» — I.30 con el arranque de su análisis palabra por palabra: enfermedad, apatía, duda, negligencia y pereza entre los nueve obstáculos. El troceo parte la palabra compuesta por el guion de corte del renglón
«By cultivating an attitude of friendship toward those who are happy, compassion toward those in distress, joy toward those who are virtuous, and equanimity toward those who are nonvirtuous, lucidity arises in the mind.» — la traducción de I.33 que da Bryant: amistad con los felices, compasión con los que sufren, gozo con los virtuosos e indiferencia con los impíos
«The four practices noted in this sūtra— friendship, maitrī; compassion, karuṇā; joy, muditā; and equanimity, upekṣā —correspond exactly to the four brahma-vihāras outlined in various Buddhist suttas (rendered, in Pali, as mettā, karuṇā, muditā, upekkā).» — Bryant hace corresponder las cuatro actitudes de I.33 con los brahma-vihāras budistas
«Once more, the common context of these practices is underscored—indeed, the Buddhist Saṁyutta Nikāya and the Saṁyukta Āgama texts contain explicit reference to the fact that these practices were also cultivated by those who did not follow the teachings of the Buddha.» — Bryant señala el fondo común de esas prácticas, que el propio canon budista atribuye también a quienes no seguían al Buddha
«Consequently, the mind becomes lucid, clarity being the nature of sattva.» — Bryant enuncia el efecto de las cuatro actitudes: lucidez, por ser la claridad naturaleza de sattva
«By being a well-wisher toward those who are happy, as well as those who are virtuous, the contamination of envy is removed.» — Vācaspati Miśra explica qué quita cada actitud: la amistad, la envidia
«By compassion toward those who are miserable, that is, by wishing to remove someone’s miseries as if they were one’s own, the contamination of the desire to inflict harm on others is removed.» — la segunda: la compasión quita el deseo de dañar
«By thus removing these traits of envy, desire to inflict harm, and intolerance, which are characteristics of rajas and tamas, the sattva natural to the mind can manifest.» — Bryant cierra la serie: quitadas envidia, daño e intolerancia, sattva se manifiesta
«Hariharānanda suggests that envy generally arises when we encounter people whom we do not care about experiencing happiness.» — Hariharānanda localiza el origen de la envidia en la indiferencia hacia la felicidad ajena
«One should rather try to practice projecting the happiness we feel when our friend is happy or virtuous onto an enemy who is happy, he continues, and the compassion we feel for our friends when they are unhappy should be cultivated for our enemies.» — Hariharānanda propone el ejercicio concreto: proyectar sobre el enemigo lo que se siente por el amigo
«Vijñānabhikṣu and Śaṅkara quote the Gītā in this regard: “A self-controlled person attains peace by engaging with sense objects with the senses freed from attachment and aversion and under his control.» — Vijñānabhikṣu y Śaṅkara apoyan el sūtra en el Gītā sobre el dominio de sí
«As arithmetic is important, says Bhoja Rāja, not so much in its own right as in order to arrive at the total sum of something, so the attitudes mentioned in this sūtra are important in order to prepare the mind for meditation.» — la imagen de Bhoja Rāja: las cuatro actitudes valen como la aritmética, por la suma a la que llevan
«This sūtra prescribes a kind of mindfulness or mental cultivation off the mat, so to speak, that is, in day-to-day affairs outside of the context of citta-vṛtti-nirodha–type meditation.» — Bryant lee I.33 como cultivo mental fuera de la sesión de meditación
«It speaks to the fact that yoga need not be perceived as a world-renouncing tradition but is perfectly compatible with engaged and benevolent social action in the world.» — Bryant deriva de I.33 que el yoga no exige renunciar al mundo y admite la acción social
«I.34 pracchardana-vidhāraṇābhyām vā prāṇasya pracchardana, by exhaling; vidhāraṇābhyām, by retention; vā, or» — I.34 con su análisis palabra por palabra: la mente se calma también por exhalación y retención del prāṇa
«Sūtra I.32 indicated that the obstacles to yoga can be overcome by fixing or concentrating the mind on an object, and the next few sūtras outline various options and methods for accomplishing this.» — Bryant describe la función de los sūtras que siguen: opciones y métodos para fijar la mente
«Vyāsa states that if one concentrates on the tip of the nose, one can experience a divine or supernormal sense of smell;» — Vyāsa reparte los sentidos supranormales por el punto de concentración: la punta de la nariz da el olfato divino
«These experiences fix the mind, eliminate doubt, and are the doorway to samādhi.» — Vyāsa declara esas experiencias puerta del samādhi: fijan la mente y quitan la duda
«This sūtra clearly states that a sense object can be used as ālambana, support, for the mind.» — Bryant consigna lo que I.35 admite: un objeto de los sentidos como soporte
«It is sometimes stated that the recitation (japa) of oṁ must be performed mentally, rather than audibly.» — Bryant recoge la afirmación corriente de que el japa de oṁ ha de ser mental
«This finds no support in the sūtras.» — Bryant consigna una negativa: los sūtras no sostienen esa exigencia
«Vyāsa makes the important observation that even though the true nature of reality may be revealed by the scripture, or by the process of inference, or by the teachings of the masters (I.7), if one does not experience these higher realities personally through one’s own senses, then one’s knowledge remains secondhand.» — Vyāsa señala el límite del saber sin experiencia: queda de segunda mano aunque la escritura lo revele
«Moreover, one will always be afflicted by doubt of the sometimes grandiose or incredible claims of the sacred texts.» — Vyāsa añade el efecto de esa carencia: la duda sobre lo que los textos afirman
«If even one out-of-the-ordinary scriptural claim can be experienced, then other more esoteric claims, such as the nature of liberation, can be more readily believed.» — Vyāsa enuncia la función de la experiencia supranormal dentro del sistema: verificada una, las demás se creen
«This is like seeing smoke appear upon the rubbing of two sticks, says Śaṅkara, giving one confidence that fire is on the way.» — la imagen de Śaṅkara: el humo que sale de los dos palos da confianza en que viene el fuego
«Hariharānanda claims to have experienced these effects and to have also subsequently experienced an accompanying increase of faith in the validity of other Yoga truth claims.» — Hariharānanda declara haber experimentado esos efectos, y su testimonio se consigna como suyo
«He states that in order to achieve results, such concentration needs to be practiced continuously for a couple of days in a state of fasting or meager diet in a place where there are no disturbances.» — Hariharānanda pone la condición práctica: concentración continua en un sitio sin perturbaciones
«that this type of I-am-ness is not the function of the ego refracting out into the objects of the world, as is the case with the asmitā of II.6,222 but is the highest function of the ego reflecting the soul itself.» — Bryant distingue las dos direcciones del ego: hacia los objetos, o reflejando al alma
«This type of cognition, says Vijñānabhikṣu, is different from cognitions having an external object, such as smell, since the object is the ātman itself.» — Vijñānabhikṣu marca qué hace distinta a esta cognición: su objeto es el propio ātman
«In this sūtra, Patañjali indicates that the goal of yoga can be attained by meditation on a pure-minded yogī.» — Bryant glosa I.37: la meta se alcanza también meditando en un yogī de mente pura
«Vyāsa says that when contemplating the minds of those who are free from desire, vīta-rāga, one’s own mind becomes tinged by the purity of their minds.» — Vyāsa explica el mecanismo: contemplando mentes libres de deseo, la propia se tiñe de esa pureza
«Vācaspati Miśra says that Vyāsa himself is such a personage.» — Vācaspati Miśra propone al propio Vyāsa como ese personaje
«Therefore, it seems prudent to stress that, according to Patañjali, the type of meditation proposed here should be directed only toward a yogī who is free from desire.» — Bryant subraya la condición que el sūtra pone al objeto de esta meditación: un yogī libre de deseo
«Thus, freedom from desire and tranquillity in all circumstances are the minimum qualities of one who has realized his or her puruṣa self.» — Bryant fija las cualidades mínimas de quien ha realizado el puruṣa
«While on this topic, one might also note that Patañjali later stresses that observance of the yamas—nonviolence, truthfulness, celibacy, nonstealing, and noncovetousness—are absolute and universal for all yogīs (II.31).» — Bryant recuerda que II.31 declara absolutos y universales los yamas
«Any guru claiming to have transcended the need to follow these basic rules, or of being qualified to compromise them in the name of some sort of higher esoteric spirituality or yogic technique, is thus not in line with Patañjali’s teachings.» — Bryant enuncia la consecuencia práctica: el gurú que se declare por encima de los yamas no sigue a Patañjali
«Vyāsa has little to say about this curious sūtra except to state, without clarification, that the yogī’s mind can take the form of objects of sleep, nidrā, and dream, svapna.» — Bryant consigna la parquedad de Vyāsa ante I.38
«Vācaspati Miśra and Rāmānanda Sarasvatī are a bit more specific: When the yogī reaches the point that he dreams of Īśvara, he awakes full of joy.» — Vācaspati Miśra y Rāmānanda Sarasvatī son más precisos: el yogī sueña con Īśvara y despierta lleno de gozo
«Vācaspati Miśra identifies Īśvara here with Śiva as described in the Purāṇas—appearing like the moon in a secluded spot in a lonely forest, enrapturing the mind with his beauty, with limbs as soft as the lotus stem and a form like shining moonstone, draped with sweet-smelling garlands of mālatī and mallikā flowers.» — Vācaspati Miśra identifica aquí a Īśvara con Śiva tal como los Purāṇas lo describen
«Then, awake, the yogī remembers this form and, absorbed in that vision, the mind becomes steady in meditation on Īśvara.» — el efecto que se le adjudica al sueño: el recuerdo de la forma asienta la mente
«Dreaming occurs when the external senses are inactive and the saṁskāric imprints on the mind are active (in contrast to the deep sleep of I.9, when both the sense objects in the external realm and their saṁskāric imprints in the internal realm are quiescent).» — Bryant explica la fisiología del soñar dentro del sistema: sentidos externos inactivos y saṁskāras activos
«Śaṅkara has a different take on this sūtra, which again reflects a Vedāntic perspective.» — Bryant consigna que Śaṅkara lee I.38 desde una perspectiva vedāntica distinta
«During deep sleep, he says, the citta is free from all thought, which is a type of citta-vṛtti-nirodha (cessation of all thoughts) and thus approximates the goal of yoga.» — Śaṅkara lee el sueño profundo como un nirodha que se aproxima a la meta
«(Of course, in normal deep sleep, this objectless state is due to tamas and is beyond the sleeper’s control; in meditation, one strives to attain this state as a result of cultivating sattva while fully awake.)» — Bryant pone el límite entre paréntesis: en el sueño común ese estado sin objeto es de tamas
«The Vedānta tradition holds that the ātman achieves a state of union with Brahman during deep sleep, albeit still mediated by ignorance (Vedānta Sūtras III.2.7–8).» — Bryant consigna la doctrina vedāntica del sueño profundo, con su límite: la unión sigue mediada por la ignorancia
«Vijñānabhikṣu puts a different Vedāntic spin on this sūtra and reads it as indicating that the waking state is actually like a dream from the perspective of the self-realized state because the objects of life are as perishable as those in a dream.» — Vijñānabhikṣu da otra lectura vedāntica de I.38: la vigilia tan perecedera como el sueño
«Thus this somewhat curious sūtra allows a number of cogent interpretations, all in line with Yogic metaphysics.» — Bryant deja las varias lecturas de I.38 una junto a otra sin escoger entre ellas
«Patañjali wraps up this series of sūtras, which have described various meditational options for producing a steady mind, by acknowledging that ultimately the yogī may meditate on any desired object whatsoever, yathābhimata, according to his or her inclination.» — Bryant glosa I.39, que cierra la serie dejando el objeto de meditación a elección del yogī
«This is about as undogmatic a position as one can take!» — Bryant llama posición todo lo poco dogmática que cabe a la de I.39
«As Vācaspati Miśra puts it, “What more can one say?”!» — Vācaspati Miśra remata el sūtra con una pregunta: qué más se puede decir
«The commentators note that whether the object of meditation is external or internal, the point is to fix the mind.» — los comentaristas reducen la cuestión a lo único que importa: fijar la mente
«One should note here the remarkable accomplishments of B.K.S. Iyengar, who—along with fellow Krishnamacharya disciples Pattabhi Jois and T.K.V. Desikachar—has arguably done more over the last half century to popularize the spread of āsana practice (bodily postures, the third limb of yoga) than anyone in the recorded history of Yoga.» — Bryant consigna el alcance de la obra de B.K.S. Iyengar, el prologuista del volumen, en la historia registrada del yoga
«When the mind is freed from all distractions in the form of the vṛttis, it becomes like a pure crystal, maṇi, says Vyāsa.» — la imagen de Vyāsa para la mente libre de vṛttis: cristal puro
«Patañjali states here that the mind can reflect and assume the form of any object: an external object made of gross or subtle elements, grāhya; the very instruments of knowledge themselves such as the sense organs, grahaṇa; or the intelligence, grahītṛ, the knower, even in its purest and most subtle function of indirectly being aware of puruṣa itself.» — Bryant glosa I.41: la mente puede tomar la forma de cualquier objeto, incluido el puruṣa por vía indirecta
«Obviously, the mind cannot know puruṣa in its own true nature, as Śaṅkara points out, since it is inanimate and puruṣa is more subtle than the mind.» — Śaṅkara pone el límite: la mente no puede conocer al puruṣa en su naturaleza propia
«Things can grasp or perceive only things grosser than themselves:» — el principio del que sale ese límite: solo se percibe lo más grueso que uno
«The senses can grasp only the sense objects, but not vice versa; the mind can perceive the senses, but not vice versa; and the puruṣa can perceive the mind, but not vice versa.» — Bryant escalona el principio por los grados de sutileza
«Although samāpatti, introduced in this sūtra for the first time, and samādhi can be correlated in a general way, and the states of mind they represent overlap, they are not technically synonymous:» — Bryant separa samāpatti de samādhi, aunque se correlacionen
«Vijñānabhikṣu points out that the various types of samāpatti occur as results of samprajñāta-samādhi.» — Vijñānabhikṣu sitúa los tipos de samāpatti como resultado del samprajñāta-samādhi
«I.40 paramāṇu-parama-mahattvānto ‘sya vaśīkāraḥ parama, most distinguished, finest, greatest; aṇu, atom; parama, greatest, ultimate; mahattva, totality of matter; antaḥ, up to; asya, his (the yogī’s); vaśīkāraḥ, mastery» — I.40 con su análisis palabra por palabra: el dominio del yogī se extiende desde el átomo hasta lo más grande
«I.42 tatra śabdārtha-jñāna-vikalpaiḥ saṅkīrṇā savitarkā-samāpattiḥ tatra, there; śabda, word; artha, meaning; jñāna, knowledge, idea; vikalpaiḥ, with conceptualization, notions; saṅkīrṇā, mixed with; savitarkā, with physical awareness, conceptualization; samāpattiḥ, absorption» — I.42 con su análisis palabra por palabra: la savitarkā-samāpatti, mezclada todavía de palabra, sentido e idea
«In other words, the subconscious saṁskāras of recognition are still not fully latent or inactive.» — Bryant marca lo que queda activo en la savitarka: los saṁskāras del reconocer
«Nirvitarka means non-conceptual or, perhaps more accurately, superconceptual.» — Bryant traduce nirvitarka y propone una versión más exacta: supraconceptual
«In other words, no saṁskāric imprints pertaining to cow activate on any subconscious or intuitive level whatsoever.» — Bryant define la nirvitarka por lo que no se activa: ninguna impronta del objeto, ni subconsciente
«Vācaspati Miśra states that this type of object-awareness is real yogic perception, because conceptual or artificial notions and names are not superimposed upon the object.» — Vācaspati Miśra llama percepción yóguica real a esta, por no superponer concepto al objeto
«Both inference and scripture depend on words and ideas to impart knowledge.» — Vyāsa marca el límite de la inferencia y de la escritura: dependen de palabras
«Nirvitarka-samāpatti is based on direct perception that transcends words and ideas, and penetrates the essential nature of an object itself at a far more profound level than that of word and meaning or idea.» — Vyāsa sitúa la nirvitarka-samāpatti por debajo del nivel de la palabra y el sentido
«Vyāsa calls it para-pratyakṣa, supreme perception, and therefore it is distinct from what he will call loka» — Vyāsa la nombra para-pratyakṣa y la separa de la percepción ordinaria; el tramo se corta por el guion de fin de renglón
«However, says Vyāsa, nirvitarka-samāpatti can and does become the seed from which logic and scripture may sprout.» — Vyāsa invierte el orden habitual: de esta percepción brotan la lógica y la escritura
«In other words, says Vācaspati Miśra, yogīs who have experienced the lofty levels of samādhi discussed in these sūtras might use words and logic in order to share their experiences with ordinary people—as, indeed, Patañjali is doing—and their words thus become the basis of scripture, as is the case with the present text.» — Vācaspati Miśra hace de la palabra del yogī el origen de la escritura, y Bryant lo aplica al propio libro
«Therefore, in Yoga, direct perception is the highest means of gaining knowledge.» — Bryant cierra la jerarquía epistemológica del sistema: la percepción directa por encima
«One must practice and experience the truths of Yoga, not merely read about, discuss, or try to understand them theoretically.» — Bryant enuncia la consecuencia práctica: hay que practicar, no solo leer y discutir
«Vyāsa explains that when the mind has been purged of all saṁskāric memory in terms of any recognition of what the object of meditation is, or what its name or function are, smṛti-pariśuddhau, that is, when it allows itself to be colored exclusively by the object of focus itself without any cognitive analysis of the object’s place in the greater scheme of things and without the normal instinctive impulse to identify it and recall its name, then the yogī has attained the stage of nirvitarka-samāpatti, or nirvitarka-samādhi.» — Vyāsa da la condición de la nirvitarka: la mente purgada de toda memoria de reconocimiento
«In this state, the mind has also given up its own nature of being an organ of knowledge, svarūpa-śūnya, in other words, awareness is not even aware of the mind as being an instrument channeling awareness onto an object.» — Vyāsa describe el estado: la mente deja incluso de percibirse como órgano de conocimiento
«Additionally, we can note that the object has in effect become the yogī’s entire universe, since awareness is focused exclusively on it and is thus unaware of anything else, even the cognitive process itself.» — Bryant añade el rasgo: el objeto se vuelve el universo entero del yogī
«By definition, then, nirvitarka-samādhi is a state beyond the ability of words and concepts to describe (so a commentary on sūtras such as this is a priori somewhat oxymoronic).» — Bryant marca la paradoja del capítulo: describir con palabras un estado que por definición las excede
«Even then, says Vijñānabhikṣu, despite the fact that the guru may have realized the true nature of things, it is not possible to give experiential insight into such things through words, any more than one can convey the actual taste of sugarcane and milk through words to one who has not experienced them.» — Vijñānabhikṣu pone el límite a la transmisión: ni el guru realizado puede pasar por palabras lo que el otro no ha vivido
«When one has attained this stage, says Hariharānanda, one loses any attachment to wealth and family, etc., as one sees all such things as essentially combinations of elements and subtle energies.» — Hariharānanda describe el efecto de esa etapa: se pierde el apego a la riqueza y a la fama
«Yoga tradition claim that the yogī can actually and personally perceive or, more accurately, experience with the mind the subtle essences of an object without any such props.» — Bryant consigna lo que la tradición sostiene: el yogī percibe las esencias sutiles sin instrumento alguno
«In other words, in savicāra meditation, an object is perceived as consisting of subtle elements, but the object is still experienced as existing in the present time, rather than in the past or future, and is still bounded by space, that is, it is taking up some distinct physical space in the presence of the meditator rather than being situated anywhere else.» — Bryant acota la savicāra: el objeto se percibe como elementos sutiles, pero todavía en el tiempo y en el lugar presentes
«Hariharānanda uses the sun as a rough but useful example for the four types of samāpatti.» — Hariharānanda propone el sol como ejemplo de las cuatro absorciones
«Savitarka-samādhi is analogous to focusing without distraction on the sun, cognizing it as an object of a certain shape composed of fire atoms and situated at a certain distance, with some intuitive awareness of its name and function in the natural scheme of things.» — el primer grado del ejemplo: el sol visto como objeto con su lugar en el orden natural
«Nirvitarka-samādhi can be compared to the deepening of one’s focus until one sees the sun only as a luminous object in the heavens but without awareness of its name, size, distance, function, shape, composition, etc.» — el segundo grado: el sol visto sin nombre, función ni composición
«Savicāra corresponds to perceiving that the fire element of the sun is actually the tanmātra, subtle element, of light, but one’s awareness is still circumscribed by the specific location of the sun in the universe and by the fact that it is perceived in the present, rather than the past or future.» — el tercer grado: el elemento fuego del sol percibido como tanmātra, aún en el presente
«When, however, all awareness of Space and Time dissolves, and one sees the pure light, devoid of color, pervading not just the sun but all things at all times, in other words, one is aware only of omnipresent eternal light, then one’s meditative state is known as nirvicāra.» — el cuarto grado: disuelto el Tiempo y el Espacio, la luz pura
«We can now return to Śaṅkara’s claim that the recitation of oṁ along the lines indicated in these sūtras culminates in a supersensory face-to-face encounter with Īśvara: “By the perfection of repetition [of oṁ] and meditation on the supreme Īśvara, the supreme ātman (paramātman) situated in the highest place (parameṣṭhin) shines forth for the yogī.”» — Śaṅkara liga la recitación de oṁ al brillar de Īśvara para el yogī
«One forgets one’s own self in the rapture of this divine vision (but, it is imperative to note, contra advaita Vedānta, one nonetheless always remains a distinct individual).» — Bryant marca de nuevo el límite: en el arrobamiento se olvida el sí mismo y el individuo sigue siendo distinto
«Vācaspati Miśra suggests that just as there are sa- and nir- forms of vitarka and vicāra, by a parallel logic there should be sa- and nir- forms of ānanda and asmitā.» — Vācaspati Miśra propone extender por analogía las formas sa- y nir- a ānanda y asmitā
«Vijñānabhikṣu specifically disagrees with Vācaspati Miśra on this point, rightly in my view.» — Vijñānabhikṣu discrepa y Bryant declara que le da la razón
«First, he says, there is no authority for such a claim; in other words, neither Patañjali nor Vyāsa mentions any such subdivision of ānanda and asmitā.» — el primer argumento de Vijñānabhikṣu: ni Patañjali ni Vyāsa autorizan esa subdivisión
«The difference of views, however, remains valid, and I acknowledge that I found Koelman’s speculative foray into what might possibly be the experiential constituents of hypothetical sānanda, nirānanda, sāsmitā, and nirasmitā states to be cogent as well as accomodatable within the metaphysical parameters of Yoga psychology.» — Bryant declara válida la diferencia de pareceres y la deja consignada sin cerrarla
«Prakṛti is the ultimate subtlest cause of everything because it cannot dissolve into anything subtler.» — Bryant define a prakṛti por lo que no puede: disolverse en algo más sutil
«It is important to note that this is not the bliss of Brahman indicated in Upaniṣads such as the Taittirīya (II.8ff); the bliss indicated here is prākrtic.» — Bryant advierte que la dicha de esta etapa no es la de Brahman de los Upaniṣads sino prākṛtica; el troceo imprime *prākrtic* sin el punto bajo la t
«The puruṣa, acknowledges Vyāsa, is subtle too—it cannot be perceived by prakṛti or its evolutes.» — Vyāsa concede la sutileza del puruṣa y la distingue de la de prakṛti
«Puruṣa is changeless, according to the Yoga school, and therefore does not transform to produce evolutes.» — Bryant enuncia el axioma que impide contar al puruṣa entre las causas: no cambia
«While on the topic of ultimate causes, Patañjali does not refer to Īśvara, who we recall is a special puruṣa (I.24), as the material or, for that matter, the efficient cause of the world, that is, the creator of prakṛti.» — Bryant consigna una negativa: Patañjali no llama a Īśvara creador de prakṛti
«Vijñānabhikṣu and other commentators connect the Īśvara of the sūtras with the Īśvara of the Gītā, where Kṛṣṇa unambiguously states that, as Īśvara, he is indeed the efficient cause of prakṛti: “Prakṛti produces animate and inanimate things with me as overseer.» — Vijñānabhikṣu y otros suplen esa ausencia con el Īśvara del Gītā, que se declara supervisor de prakṛti
«I.46 tā eva sa-bījah samādhiḥ tāḥ, they (the four types of samāpattis outlined above); eva, indeed, very, only; sa-bījaḥ, with seed; samādhiḥ, meditative absorption These above-mentioned samāpatti states are [known as] samādhi meditative absorption “with seed.”» — I.46, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: las cuatro samāpattis son samādhi con semilla
«I.47 nirvicāra-vaiśāradye’ dhyātma-prasādaḥ nirvicāra, superreflective; vaiśāradye, in the clarity; adhyātma, of the inner self; prasādaḥ, lucidity Upon attaining the clarity of nirvicāra-samādhi, there is lucidity of the inner self.» — I.47, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: de la claridad del nirvicāra sale la lucidez del sí mismo interno
«Vyāsa defines vaiśāradya, clarity, as the constant pure flow in the yogī’s citta of the sattva inherent in it.» — Vyāsa define vaiśāradya como el flujo puro y constante del sattva en la citta del yogī
«I.43 smṛti-pariśuddhau svarūpa-śūnyevārtha-mātra-nirbhāsā nirvitarkā smṛti, memory; pariśuddhau, upon the purification (here, termination); svarūpa, own nature; śūnyā, empty of; iva, as if; artha, object; mātra, only, alone; nirbhāsā, shining; nirvitarkā, without physical awareness» — I.43 con su análisis palabra por palabra: la nirvitarkā ocurre cuando la memoria ha sido purgada
«I.44 etayaiva savicārā nirvicārā ca sūkṣma-viṣayā vyākhyātā etayā, by this; eva, also; savicārā, with subtle awareness; nirvicārā, beyond reflection; ca, and; sūkṣma, subtle; viṣayā, objects; vyākhyātā, are described» — I.44 con su análisis palabra por palabra: la savicārā y la nirvicārā tienen por objeto la naturaleza sutil de las cosas
«I.45 sūkṣma-viṣayatvaṁ cāliṅga-paryavasānam sūkṣma, subtle; viṣayatvam, things having the nature of; ca, and; aliṅga, prakṛti, that which has no sign; paryavasānam, concluding, terminating The subtle nature of things extends all the way up to prakṛti.» — I.45, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: lo sutil llega hasta prakṛti, que es aliṅga, sin signo
«I.48 ṛtam-bharā tatra prajñā ṛtam, truth; bharā, bearing; tatra, there; prajñā, wisdom In that state, there is truth-bearing wisdom.» — I.48, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: en ese estado hay sabiduría portadora de verdad
«Vyāsa states that the word ṛta, truth, says all that there is to say.» — Vyāsa se detiene en ṛta y declara que la palabra lo dice todo
«I.49 śrutānumāna-prajñābhyām anya-viṣayā viśeṣārthatvāt śruta, that which has been heard, sacred scripture; anumāna,» — I.49 con el arranque de su análisis palabra por palabra; el troceo intercala aquí el marcador de plana dentro del propio análisis, y el tramo se corta ahí
«Vijñānabhikṣu adds that when nirvicāra-samādhi arises, the truth not only of prakṛti and puruṣa but of Īśvara as well is perceived.» — Vijñānabhikṣu añade a I.47 que en el nirvicāra se percibe también la verdad de Īśvara
«Just as one who is situated on a mountain sees everything that is situated on the plains, so one who has climbed to the heights of the lucidity of wisdom becomes free from suffering, but sees all people suffering.» — la imagen del que mira desde la montaña: el sabio queda libre del sufrimiento y ve sufrir a todos
«Hariharānanda qualifies this by noting that although from the scripture one may learn that life is suffering and that the soul is different from the body, and although one may also arrive at these truths by the process of inference and logic, such theoretical knowledge does not actually prevent one from experiencing this suffering, nor, for that matter, does it give one direct perception of the soul.» — Hariharānanda acota el saber de escritura: no da percepción directa del alma
«Therefore, in an immediate sort of way, one is hardly better off than an ignorant person who does not know these things.» — Hariharānanda lleva la acotación al extremo: sin meditación, el que sabe no está mejor que el ignorante
«But when scripture and inference are coupled with meditation and insight, or wisdom, then one can come to the point of actual realized insight rather than theoretical knowledge.» — Hariharānanda da la salida: escritura e inferencia acopladas a la meditación
«The path of yoga, as always, stresses direct experience over other forms of knowledge, as Patañjali clearly expresses in the next sūtra.» — Bryant repite el eje del sistema: la experiencia directa por encima de las otras vías
«Vyāsa says that the three forms of knowledge accepted by Yoga in I.7— āgama, scripture, referred to here as śruta; anumāna, logic (inference); and conventional pratyakṣa, sense perception—are all limited because they cannot provide information about particulars or specifics.» — Vyāsa pone el límite de los tres pramāṇas: no alcanzan lo particular
«Scripture and other types of verbal authority are dependent on words, and words, like “cow,” can only point to the cow as a member of a general class of things.» — Vyāsa explica por qué: la palabra nombra clases, no individuos
«as Śaṅkara points out, and, even though they are all unique and distinct from each other in some way, one cannot come up with a different name for each individual one, hence we use the generic term “cow.”» — Śaṅkara lo ilustra con las vacas: únicas y distintas, todas bajo un solo nombre
«But conventional sense perception, says Vyāsa, cannot provide us information about the very specific or subtle nature of an object—its atomic composition, for example—or about distant or hidden objects beyond the range of the senses.» — Vyāsa pone el segundo límite: la percepción convencional no llega a lo muy sutil
«Patañjali will later claim that the yogī can tell the difference between two “identical” items, since although they appear identical to normal perception, the atoms comprising them are different, and it is these that the yogī can perceive.» — Bryant adelanta la afirmación del texto: el yogī distingue dos objetos idénticos
«We must keep in mind that the Yogic tradition claims one can actually perceive these essences, not merely theorize their existence, through the undeviatingly concentrated focus of mind in the higher stages of samādhi.» — Bryant consigna la pretensión de la tradición y la marca como tal: percibir las esencias en los grados altos del samādhi
«Following on the previous verse, Śaṅkara states that scripture provides us with information about the path that is to be followed, and inference or logic helps remove doubts about that path, but ultimately these must be followed by eagerness for meditation on what has been established by these other two sources of knowledge, that is, for direct experience of their truths.» — Śaṅkara reparte las funciones: la escritura informa, la meditación experimenta
«Patañjali is here clearly asserting that samādhi surpasses the ability of scripture and inference in their ability to fully experience an object at its subtlest level rather than understanding it in an indirect, generic, and mediated sort of way.» — Bryant enuncia lo que I.49 sostiene: el samādhi por encima de la escritura y de la inferencia
«And, ultimately, says Vyāsa, it is only through samādhi that one can grasp the distinct particularity of the soul itself.» — Vyāsa cierra: solo por samādhi se capta la particularidad del alma
«Thus, when fully sāttvic, the mind can transcend its own kleśa limitations and merge into the common substratum of all things.» — Bryant describe el alcance de la mente plenamente sáttvica: se funde en el sustrato común
«the commentators claim that in the higher stages of samādhi, the yogī becomes essentially omniscient since awareness is no longer limited to the body or dimensionality but can radiate out infinitely and permeate the subtle substratum,» — los comentaristas adjudican al yogī de los grados altos una omnisciencia de hecho
«It can thus perceive the viśeṣa, particularity, that is, the specific atomic composition, of any object, as Patañjali states in this sūtra.» — Bryant nombra lo que el yogī percibe según I.49: la viśeṣa, la composición atómica particular
«I.50 taj-jaḥ, saṁskāro ‘nya-saṁskāra-pratibandhī tat, that (prajnā-bearing); jaḥ, born; saṁskāraḥ, subconscious imprint; anya, other; saṁskāra, subconscious imprints; pratibandhī, obstructs The saṁskāras born out of that [truth-bearing wisdom] obstruct other saṁskāras [from emerging].» — I.50, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: los saṁskāras de la sabiduría obstruyen a los demás
«Patañjali here states that the truth-bearing wisdom, ṛtambharā-jñāna of I.48, produces a certain type of saṁskāra» — Bryant glosa I.50: la sabiduría portadora de verdad genera saṁskāras propios
«to a halt by the rise of discrimination. But the wisdom saṁskāras born of samādhi do not impel the mind to activity; rather they destroy the conventional saṁskāras and make them impotent.» — Bryant marca lo que distingue a esos saṁskāras: no empujan a obrar y dejan impotentes a los demás
«Vācaspati Miśra states that there are only two possibilities for the mind: Either it pursues the objects of the senses, or it cultivates discrimination; put differently, it can be used either for enjoyment or for liberation, as Patañjali notes in II.18.» — Vācaspati Miśra reduce las salidas de la mente a dos: el goce o la liberación
«As will be discussed, when such discrimination arises, ignorance is destroyed and thus the deposit of karma and the afflictions of the mind are also destroyed, and the tendency of the mind to seek external enjoyment comes to an end.» — Bryant enuncia el desenlace: nacida la discriminación, la ignorancia se destruye
«Rāmānanda Sarasvatī states that upon the rise of discrimination, the mind becomes disgusted with sensual experience and turns toward the self.» — Rāmānanda Sarasvatī describe el giro: la mente se hastía de lo sensual y se vuelve al sí mismo
«Hariharānanda redirects attention to sūtra I.16, where Patañjali indicates that disinterest in the entire productivity of the guṇas, which means everything in prakṛti, results from realization of the puruṣa soul.» — Hariharānanda remite a I.16: el desinterés nace de la realización del puruṣa
«Vijñānabhikṣu states the Sāṅkhya and Vedāntic view here: the wisdombearing saṁskāras destroy only the dormant and unmanifest store of karma, and not the prārabdha-karma, the karma that has already activated.» — Vijñānabhikṣu acota el alcance de esos saṁskāras: destruyen el karma latente y no el ya activado
«However, the already activated karma of the yogī’s present experience—life span, type of body, ongoing happenings, etc. (II.13)—is terminated only upon the manifestation of the nirbīja-samādhi, the subject of the next sūtra.» — Bryant nombra lo que queda en pie: el karma ya activado, con su vida y su cuerpo
«I.51 tasyāpi nirodhe sarva-nirodhān nirbījaḥ samādhiḥ tasya, of that [truth-bearing saṁskāras]; api, also, even; nirodhe, upon cessation of; sarva, of everything; nirodhāt, from the cessation; nirbījaḥ, seedless; samādhiḥ, meditative absorption Upon the cessation of even those [truth-bearing saṁskāras], nirbīja-samādhi, seedless meditative absorption, ensues.» — I.51, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: cesados también esos saṁskāras, sobreviene el nirbīja-samādhi
«We now come to the end of the road of the yogic process» — Bryant marca en I.51 el final del camino descrito en el capítulo I
«We now come to the end of the road of the yogic process outlin» — Bryant cierra el capítulo I marcando el final del camino
«II.1 tapaḥ-svādhyāyeśvara-praṇidhānāni kriyā-yogaḥ tapaḥ, austerity, self-discipline; svādhyāya, study/recitation; Īśvara, the Lord; praṇidhānāni, submission to; kriyā, action; yogaḥ, yoga Kriyā-yoga, the path of action, consists of self-discipline, study, and dedication to the Lord.» — II.1, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: abre el Sādhana-pāda con los tres ingredientes del kriyā-yoga
«Practice and dispassion, however, require a predominance of sattva and so are difficult for the active and outgoing mind that is still under the influence of rajas and tamas.» — Bryant explica por qué el capítulo II empieza por el kriyā-yoga: práctica y desapego piden sattva y son difíciles para la mente activa
«This is not to say that practice and dispassion are not to be cultivated by the beginner, but that sattva is especially easily cultivated through the practice of kriyā-yoga.» — Bryant acota: el principiante también cultiva práctica y desapego, y el sattva se cultiva más fácil por kriyā-yoga
«Vij ānabhikṣu (and Mādhava1) quote the Gītā here: “Action is said to be the means for the sage desirous of yoga, but for one who has already attained yoga, tranquility is said to be the means” (VI.3).» — Vijñānabhikṣu apoya ese orden en el Gītā VI.3; el troceo imprime aquí *Vijānabhikṣu* sin la ñ
«Yoga was defined as citta-vṛtti-nirodha, but in the following section he analyzes the mechanisms underpinning the production of the vṛttis.» — Bryant describe el plan del capítulo II: del qué es el yoga al mecanismo que produce las vṛttis
«There is no question of yoga for one who does not practice tapas, self-discipline, that is, austerity, the first item on Patañjali’s list, says Vyāsa, making no bones about the matter.» — Vyāsa declara sin rodeos que no hay yoga para quien no practica tapas
«Vijñānabhikṣu agrees that the tendency of the mind to pursue sense gratification can be broken only with self-discipline, but he adds that this should be of a gentle kind that will not disrupt the clarity of mind or weaken the body (otherwise, says Śaṅkara, if austerity and self-discipline are practiced in a way that disturbs the mind, they defeat the entire purpose of yoga—to still the mind).» — Vijñānabhikṣu coincide y Śaṅkara advierte sobre el mal uso de la austeridad
«Rāmānanda Sarasvatī considers self-discipline to consist of celibacy, service to the guru, speaking truthfully, gravity, silence, the performance of appropriate duty, tolerance of extremes, and controlled intake of food.» — Rāmānanda Sarasvatī desglosa el tapas: celibato, servicio al guru, palabra medida y comida medida
«Hariharānanda states that it entails renouncing all sensual actions that bring only momentary pleasure.» — Hariharānanda define el tapas por lo que se deja: la acción sensual de placer momentáneo
«Śaṅkara stresses that yoga does not bear fruit for one who does not practice austerity, that is, for one who is too fond of the body, considering it to be one’s very self, and overly inclined to avoid discomfort.» — Śaṅkara condiciona el fruto del yoga a la austeridad
«The mind has been addicted to sense objects since time immemorial, he continues, and is caught up by them like a fish in a net.» — la imagen de Śaṅkara: la mente adicta a los objetos, presa como pez en la red
«This primordial propensity cannot be destroyed without tapas, austerity.» — Śaṅkara enuncia el único remedio que admite para esa propensión
«Vyāsa defines svādhyāya, the second item mentioned in this sūtra, as japa, the repetitive chanting of mantras such as oṁ, and the study of scripture, which is a jñāna practice most especially associated with the Vedānta tradition (it will be further discussed in II.32, 44).» — Vyāsa define svādhyāya como japa y estudio de la escritura
«Vyāsa defines the third ingredient of kriyā-yoga, Īśvara-praṇidhāna, as the dedication of all action to God, Īśvara, and the renunciation of the desire of all fruits that might accrue from one’s action.» — Vyāsa define el Īśvara-praṇidhāna como dedicación de toda acción y renuncia a su fruto
«In I.28, devotion to Īśvara was in the context of God as the object of meditation and took the form of concentration on his name and its meaning, whereas here, kriyā-yoga being more action oriented, devotion to Īśvara takes the form of renunciation of self-centered deeds and the offering of action to God.» — Bryant distingue las dos formas de devoción del texto: Īśvara como objeto de meditación en I.28 y como destinatario de la acción aquí
«However, it is important to note that surrender to God is not an option in kriyā-yoga as it was when it was presented as an object of meditation; it is a mandatory part of this practice.» — Bryant marca la diferencia de régimen: en el kriyā-yoga la entrega a Dios no es opción
«The commentators take this dedication of one’s fruits of action to Īśvara as an implicit reference to the bhakti-centered karma-yoga of the Gītā, where, of course, Kṛṣṇa identifies himself as Īśvara.» — los comentaristas leen la dedicación del fruto como referencia implícita al karma-yoga del Gītā
«Vācaspati Miśra quotes the quintessential karma-yoga verse from the Gītā in this regard: “You have a right to perform your duties, but not to their fruits; do not consider yourself» — Vācaspati Miśra cita el verso central del karma-yoga: derecho a la acción, no a sus frutos
«According to the laws of karma, all action, good or bad, when performed out of self-interest, or, more precisely, when performed under the influence of ignorance—mistaking the self to be the body and mind (II.5)—plants a seed of reaction, which in this or a future life must eventually bear fruit, good or bad, in accordance with the original deed (II.12).» — Bryant enuncia la ley kármica que el karma-yoga sortea
«Karma-yoga, as outlined in the Gītā, is an action-oriented path through which one can avoid the vicious cycle of karmic reaction by acting purely out of dharma, duty, rather than self» — Bryant define el karma-yoga del Gītā: obrar por deber y no por interés propio; el tramo se corta en el guion de *self-interest*
«It is subsequently surpassed and culminates, in the Gītā, in action performed not just for duty but in devotion for Īśvara.» — Bryant señala el remate del Gītā: la acción por devoción por encima de la acción por deber
«Thus, Vijñānabhikṣu quotes the verses from the Gītā where Kṛṣṇa says: “Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you give away, whatever austerity you perform, do it as an offering to me” (IX.27).» — Vijñānabhikṣu cita el Gītā IX.27: lo que hagas, hazlo como ofrenda
«Thus, devotion rather than duty for duty’s sake (as is the case with karma-yoga) becomes the primary motivating principle for activity.» — Bryant nombra el principio motor que resulta: la devoción y no el deber
«But now, in nirbīja-samādhi, all vestiges of association with the citta have been discontinued, and the final and ultimate goal of yoga has been attained—puruṣa’s unmediated absorption in its own conscious eternal essential nature.» — Bryant describe el término del nirbīja-samādhi: absorción no mediada del puruṣa en su propia naturaleza
«Therefore, says Vyāsa, in this state one refers to the free puruṣa as “the pure (śuddha), the self-contained (kevala), and the liberated (mukta).” Actually, it has been that way all along.» — Vyāsa nombra al puruṣa libre puro, autocontenido y liberado, y Bryant remata con lo que el sistema no negocia: siempre lo fue
«iti Patañjali-viracite yogasūtre prathamaḥ samādhi-pādaḥ Thus ends the first chapter on samādhi in the Yoga Sūtras composed by» — el colofón sánscrito con que cierra el primer capítulo, y su traducción; el tramo se corta antes del nombre, que va en el renglón siguiente
«[The yoga of action] is for bringing about samādhi and for weakening the afflictions [to yoga].» — la traducción de II.2 que da Bryant: el kriyā-yoga sirve para traer el samādhi y debilitar los kleśas
«Without eliminating the kleśas, there is no question of bringing about this ultimate state, samādhi-bhāvana.» — Bryant enuncia la condición: sin eliminar los kleśas no hay samādhi
«When these kleśa impediments to samādhi are in full force, says Vyāsa, they strengthen the influence of the guṇas, produce karma, the law of cause and effect, and, by mutual interaction, bring forth the fruits of karma.» — Vyāsa describe el efecto de los kleśas en plena fuerza: refuerzan los guṇas y hacen madurar el karma
«II.3 avidyāsmitā-rāga-dveṣabhiniveśāḥ kleśāḥ avidyā, ignorance; asmitā, ego; rāga, attachment; dveṣa, aversion; abhiniveśāḥ, clinging to life, will to live; kleśāḥ, impediments The impediments [to samādhi] are nescience, ego, desire, aversion, and clinging to life.» — II.3, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: los cinco kleśas
«Thus, when ignorance is destroyed, so are the other kleśas.» — Bryant enuncia la dependencia: destruida la ignorancia, caen los demás kleśas
«Patañjali gives the important information here, in resonance with all Indic soteriological thought, that ignorance, avidyā, is the foundation of all the other kleśas, the field, kṣetra, within which they grow, and hence the ultimate cause of saṁsāra.» — Bryant sitúa la ignorancia como base de los demás kleśas y causa última del saṁsāra, en consonancia con todo el pensamiento soteriológico índico
«Ignorance is never dormant, since it is the cause and support of the others and thus is always manifest.» — Bryant marca la excepción: la ignorancia nunca duerme
«Vijñānabhikṣu, a kleśa may be dormant for a long time, even two or three births, before reactivating. These dormant seeds eventually germinate when a person encounters particular situations or contexts that serve as triggers.» — Vijñānabhikṣu mide la latencia de un kleśa en dos o tres nacimientos
«When the kleśas are continually interrupted—appearing and then fading away—they are described as intermittent, vicchinna, the third state listed in this sūtra.» — Bryant describe el estado intermitente de los kleśas
«For example, says Vyāsa, when the kleśa of attachment for something is present, aversion for it is absent.» — Vyāsa ilustra la intermitencia: presente el apego, ausente la aversión
«Or, continues Vyāsa with a rare touch of humor, just because Caitra is attracted to one particular woman at one point in time does not mean he is disinterested in other women.» — Bryant señala el raro toque de humor de Vyāsa en el ejemplo de Caitra y su atracción
«Intermittent kleśas differ from dormant kleśas, the first item on the list, insofar as they remain inactive for shorter periods of latency, according to Vijñānabhikṣu.» — Vijñānabhikṣu distingue lo intermitente de lo dormido por la duración de la latencia
«When, according to Vyāsa, one consciously cultivates a state of mind that is the opposite of the kleśas, they become weak, tanu, the second state noted by Patañjali.» — Vyāsa describe el debilitar de un kleśa por el cultivo del estado contrario
«Indeed, Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu note that one desiring liberation should actively counteract these kleśas.» — Vācaspati Miśra y Vijñānabhikṣu hacen del contrarrestar activo un deber del que busca la liberación
«Thus, right knowledge dispels its opposite, the kleśa of ignorance; discrimination of the difference between puruṣa, the real self, and prakṛti dispels its opposite, the kleśa of ego, the false self;» — Bryant empareja cada kleśa con su antídoto: conocimiento recto contra ignorancia, discriminación contra ego
«detachment dispels its opposites of both the kleśas of attachment and aversion, since they are two sides of the same coin;» — el segundo par: el desapego contra apego y aversión, dos caras de lo mismo
«the realization of the eternality of the soul dispels the kleśa of clinging to life.» — el tercero: la realización de la eternidad del alma contra el aferramiento a la vida
«More than being weakened, Vyāsa continues, ultimately these kleśas can be burnt by yogīs who have cultivated deep meditation, and they then completely lose their power to activate even when the yogī encounters situations that would under normal circumstances trigger their activation.» — Vyāsa va más allá del debilitar: los kleśas pueden quemarse
«Such yogīs are said to have had their last birth.» — Vyāsa nombra la consecuencia de esa quema: el último nacimiento
«Śaṅkara says this burnt state was not included by Patañjali in this sūtra because burnt seeds are not common to all living beings as is the case with the other four states, and this sūtra concerns itself with the kleśas as generally found present among embodied beings.» — Śaṅkara explica por qué el sūtra no lista ese estado quemado: no es común a los encarnados
«Patañjali here gives a very important definition of ignorance, the primary cause of all bondage: Avidyā, ignorance, entails confounding the nature of the soul with that of the body.» — Bryant declara central esa definición: la ignorancia confunde la naturaleza del alma con la del cuerpo
«These views are not mutually exclusive, but the ascetic tradition tends to view the body as a rather unpleasant bag of obnoxious substances.» — Bryant consigna cómo la tradición ascética mira el cuerpo
«Realization of the nature of the body becomes most vivid during old age and at death: Nobody wants to linger around a decomposing body.» — Bryant sitúa el momento en que esa mirada se vuelve vívida: la vejez y la muerte
«In this same vein, the Buddha advised his followers to actually contemplate the reality of the impurities of the body, that is, the bodily substances which, taken out of context, would be considered obnoxious, specifically that the body is simply a collection of “hair, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, marrow, kidney, heart, liver, membranes, spleen, lungs, stomach, bowels, intestines, excrement, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, serum, saliva, mucus, synovial fluid, urine.”11 Indeed, he actually prescribes a series of visual meditations on these realities:» — Bryant pone al lado el consejo del Buddha de contemplar la realidad del cuerpo
«In short, the Yoga tradition does not consider the body a suitable place to seek happiness for those interested in enlightenment.» — Bryant resume la posición del Yoga sobre el cuerpo como sitio de la felicidad
«The nonself, an-ātman, referred to by Patañjali here, says Vyāsa, actually consists not only of the body, which is the locus for enjoyment, and the mind, which is an instrument through which the awareness of puruṣa can contact the world, but also the accessories or paraphernalia of the body, whether animate (such as spouse, animals, and offspring) or inanimate (such as furniture or food).» — Vyāsa extiende el no-sí-mismo hasta las posesiones
«Although one may think that one’s body, one’s mind, and even one’s possessions are one’s real self, they are not, and to confound them as such is ignorance.» — Bryant nombra el error que el sūtra define: tomar por propios cuerpo, mente y posesiones
«As the Gītā puts it: “The wise (paṇḍitāḥ) lament neither for the living nor the dead” (II.11).» — Bryant cita el Gītā II.11: el sabio no se lamenta ni por vivos ni por muertos
«I must acknowledge a Vedāntic slant in my translation of this sūtra, where joy, purity, and eternality are imputed to the soul.» — Bryant declara el sesgo vedāntico de su propia traducción de II.5, y lo dice firmado
«Unlike the Vedānta tradition, the Sāṅkhya Yoga tradition (along with the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika traditions), at least in their classical expressions, generally do not speak of the experience of the liberated puruṣa as blissful but rather as an absence of suffering.» — Bryant marca la diferencia doctrinal: el Sāṅkhya-Yoga define la liberación por ausencia de sufrimiento y no por dicha
«Even Vijñānabhikṣu, who otherwise does not hesitate to blend Vedāntic notions into his commentary, states in his Yoga-sāra-saṅgraha that “we do not subscribe to the Neo-Vedāntics who imagine that ultimate liberation consists of the attainment of supreme bliss.”» — Vijñānabhikṣu, que mezcla nociones vedānticas, se aparta aquí de la dicha suprema
«However, an argument can be made that, in contrast to the qualities of the nonself, Patañjali is alluding to the Upaniṣadic view that the real self—and he uses the Upaniṣadic term ātman for the soul here—is sukha, blissful.» — Bryant propone, como argumento propio, que el sūtra insinúa lo contrario
«Vyāsa himself speaks of the bliss of liberation, compared to which even the highest bliss of worldly pleasure including the states of sattva are considered suffering.» — Vyāsa habla de la dicha de la liberación, ante la cual hasta lo sáttvico cuenta como sufrimiento
«Overall, Patañjali has very little to say about the nature of the actual experience of puruṣa attained in nirbīja- or asamprajñāta-samādhi, since, naturally, this state is beyond words and conceptualization, and thus beyond description.» — Bryant consigna el silencio de Patañjali sobre la experiencia del puruṣa
«However, ignorance, says Vyāsa, is not just the absence of right knowledge but is an actual type of perception in its own right, a perception of reality that is the opposite of true knowledge.» — Vyāsa define la ignorancia como estado activo y no como mera ausencia de saber
«There are differences among the Hindu philosophical schools as to what constitutes ignorance, and Vijñānabhikṣu points out in this regard that Yoga philosophy differs from its sister school of Sāṅkhya, which takes ignorance to be lack of discrimination rather than an actual state of mind in its own right.» — Bryant consigna el desacuerdo entre escuelas sobre qué es la ignorancia
«Ignorance here, avidyā, means much more fundamentally to confuse puruṣa with prakṛti and remains permanent until enlightenment is attained (even though the other kleśas, as noted above, can be intermittent, etc.).» — Bryant distingue avidyā de viparyaya: confundir puruṣa con prakṛti es más hondo que un error de superficie
«In other words, even if surface-level error, viparyaya, has been dispelled by surface-level pramāṇa, right knowledge, both these vṛttis are still underpinned by a deep-structure level of ultimate ignorance.» — Bryant enuncia la consecuencia: corregido el error de superficie, la ignorancia de fondo sigue
«One might note, given the Yoga school’s engagement with aspects of Buddhist teachings, that Patañjali defines ignorance in exactly the same terms as used by the Buddha, with one essential and dramatic reversal.» — Bryant señala que Patañjali define la ignorancia como el Buddha, con una inversión decisiva
«Not only is there no puruṣa, but clinging to notions of such an entity is a primary cause of ignorance rather than enlightenment.» — Bryant enuncia la inversión budista: aferrarse a un puruṣa es causa de ignorancia
«The two views are thus diametrically opposed—the very goal of yoga and of human existence in the Yoga school is the very cause of bondage and ignorance in Buddhism.» — Bryant deja las dos posiciones enfrentadas y sin arbitrar: la meta de una es la atadura de la otra
«II.4 avidyā kṣetram uttareṣām prasupta-tanu-vicchinnodārāṇām avidyā, ignorance; kṣetram, field; uttareṣām, of the others; prasupta, dormant; tanu, weak; vicchinna, interrupted, intermittent; udārāṇām, activated, manifest Ignorance is the breeding ground of the other kleśas, whether they are in a dormant, weak, intermittent,» — II.4, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: la ignorancia como campo de cultivo de los demás kleśas
«II.5 anityāśuci-duḥkhānātmasu nitya-śuci-sukhātma-khyātir avidyā anitya, noneternal, temporal; aśuci, impure; duḥkha, painful; anātmasu, the nonself, that which is not ātman; nitya, eternal; śuci, pure; sukha, joyful; ātma, self; khyātiḥ, notion, perception; avidyā,» — II.5 con su análisis palabra por palabra: la avidyā desmenuzada término por término
«II.6 dṛg-darśana-śaktyor ekātmatevāsmitā dṛk, the subjective power of seeing, the seer; darśana, instrumental power of seeing, sight; śaktyoḥ, of the powers; eka, one; ātmatā, nature; iva, as if; asmitā, ego» — II.6 con su análisis palabra por palabra: el ego como identidad aparente entre el poder de ver y el instrumento de ver
«Patañjali thus defines ego, asmitā, as the attribute of misidentifying buddhi, the instrumental power of sight, with the puruṣa soul, the actual seer.» — Bryant glosa II.6: el ego confunde buddhi, el instrumento, con el puruṣa, el veedor
«In a sense, the ego entails doing just this, imagining that the mind and body, which are simply instruments allowing awareness to perceive the world, are the actual self.» — Bryant traduce el error a su forma cotidiana: tomar mente y cuerpo por el sí mismo
«It is ego that promotes this confusion.» — Bryant nombra al responsable de la confusión
«Ego is the specific aspect of ignorance that identifies the nonself, specifically the intelligence, with the true self, puruṣa (ātman).» — Bryant sitúa el ego como el aspecto de la ignorancia que hace esa identificación
«Indeed, says Vijñānabhikṣu, the very act of experience itself means the identification of puruṣa with buddhi:» — Vijñānabhikṣu lleva el punto al extremo: el acto mismo de experimentar es esa identificación
«II.7 sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ sukha, happiness; anuśayī, the consequence; rāgaḥ, attachment Attachment stems from [experiences] of happiness.» — II.7, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: el apego nace de experiencias de placer
«Moving on to the third kleśa, Vyāsa simply says that the hankering, desire, or craving for pleasure, sukha, or the means to attain pleasure by one who remembers past experiences of pleasure» — Vyāsa define el rāga por la memoria: el anhelo de quien recuerda placeres pasados
«II.8 duḥkhānuśayī dveṣaḥ duḥkha, pain; anuśayī, the consequence; dveṣaḥ, aversion Aversion stems from [experiences] of pain.» — II.8, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: la aversión nace de experiencias de dolor
«Hariharānanda also makes the important observation that when desire deepens into greed, the sense of right and wrong, morality, becomes neglected.» — Hariharānanda añade el efecto moral del deseo hondo: se descuida la distinción entre bien y mal
«II.9 svarasa-vāhī viduṣo ‘pi tathārūḍho ‘bhiniveśaḥ sva, own; rasa, potency, juice; vāhī, carrying, bearing; viduṣaḥ, the possessor of wisdom, the wise; api, even; tathā, also; rūḍhaḥ, pervaded, grown, established; abhiniveśaḥ, clinging to life» — II.9 con su análisis palabra por palabra: el aferramiento a la vida, arraigado incluso en los sabios
«The commentators consider this clinging to life kleśa, abhiniveśaḥ, to be a synonym for the fear of death.» — los comentaristas identifican el abhiniveśa con el miedo a la muerte
«All living beings, says Vyāsa, wish that they would never die and could live forever.» — Vyāsa adjudica a todo ser vivo el deseo de no morir
«Even a newly born worm is afraid of death, Vācaspati Miśra argues to make this case.» — Vācaspati Miśra funda el argumento en el gusano recién nacido
«This fear cannot be explained by the standard means of attaining knowledge established by Patañjali in I.7: direct perception, inference, or verbal testimony.» — el argumento en su forma epistemológica: ese miedo no cabe en ninguno de los tres pramāṇas
«But a newly born worm has not had these perceptions or inferences or testimonies yet nonetheless displays a fear of death.» — el punto del argumento: el gusano no tuvo esas percepciones y aun así teme
«Given the Yoga position indicated in the last verse that dveṣa, aversion, like rāga, attachment, is the product of memory, how can this innate fear of death be accounted for unless all creatures have latent recollections of previous deaths?» — Bryant enuncia la inferencia del sistema: ese miedo exige recuerdos latentes de muertes anteriores
«As Patañjali indicates in this sūtra, the kleśa of clinging to life is found even in the learned, not just the ignorant.» — Bryant subraya lo que II.9 dice del sabio: también él se aferra a la vida
«This is because it is a stronger saṁskāra than other saṁskāras, says Vijñānabhikṣu (although Vācaspati Miśra adds that this is the case only for those whose wisdom is based on perception, inference, and testimony, not for those who have actually attained samādhi).» — Vijñānabhikṣu explica la persistencia por la fuerza de ese saṁskāra
«Vyāsa’s only comment here is that when the mind of the yogī has fulfilled its purpose, that is, when the yogī has attained a permanent state of nirbīja-samādhi, it dissolves back into prakṛti.» — Vyāsa glosa II.10 con la disolución de la mente en prakṛti una vez cumplido su fin
«As Śaṅkara puts it, no fire is needed for something that has already been burnt, nor grinding mortar for what has already been ground.» — la imagen de Śaṅkara: no hace falta fuego para lo ya quemado ni molienda para lo ya molido
«Patañjali indicated in II.2 that the kleśas are destroyed by kriyā-yoga, yet here he states that the vṛttis produced by them are destroyed by meditation, dhyāna.» — Bryant señala la tensión entre II.2 y II.11 sobre qué destruye los kleśas
«Vyāsa clarifies that the seed power, or fructifying ability, of the kleśas is weakened by the practice of kriyā-yoga and then eradicated by the practice of meditation,23 until they become like burnt seeds.» — Vyāsa reparte las funciones: el kriyā-yoga debilita, la meditación quema
«He gives the useful example of washing garments: gross dirt is first removed from soiled clothes, and then efforts are directed at the finer dirt.» — la imagen de Vyāsa: lavar la ropa quitando primero la suciedad gruesa
«But to completely and absolutely remove all subtle impressions of the soiled spots, says Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, you ultimately have to destroy the cloth itself.» — Rāmānanda Sarasvatī lleva la imagen hasta el final: para quitarlo todo habría que destruir la tela
«Vyāsa states that the deposit, or stock of karma mentioned by Patañjali here, the karma-āsaya, is produced from kāma, lobha, moha, and krodha: desire, greed, delusion, and anger.» — Vyāsa adjudica el depósito de karma a cuatro raíces: deseo, codicia, ilusión e ira
«II.11 dhyāna-heyās tad-vṛttayaḥ dhyāna, meditation; heyāḥ, eliminated; tat, their [the kleśas]; vṛttayaḥ, changing states of mind The states of mind produced by these kleśas are eliminated by meditation.» — II.11, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant
«II.12 kleśa-mūlaḥ karmāśayo dṛṣṭādṛṣt˙a-janma-vedanīyaḥ kleśa, impediments; mūlaḥ, root; karma, actions; āśayaḥ, deposit, stock; dṛṣṭa, seen; adṛṣṭa, unseen; janma, birth; vedanīyaḥ, is experienced The stock of karma has the kleśas as its root. It is experienced in present or future lives.» — II.12, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: el depósito de karma tiene por raíz los kleśas. El troceo imprime *dṛṣṭādṛṣt˙a* con el punto suscrito suelto
«He illustrates bad karma as harmful activities directed against the fearful, infirm, or helpless; those who have placed faith in oneself; the noble minded; or those performing austerities.» — Vyāsa ilustra el mal karma por sus víctimas: los temerosos, los enfermos y los que hacen austeridades
«If these activities are performed intensely, they can bear their fruits during the present life.» — Vyāsa admite la fructificación en esta misma vida cuando el acto es intenso
«Vyāsa illustrates the instant fructification of good karma by referring to the youth Nandīśvara, whose human form was transformed into a celestial one in that very life due to his intense performance of pious activities.» — el ejemplo de Nandīśvara para el buen karma de fruto inmediato
«He illustrates the immediate fructification of bad karma by the story of Nahuṣa, who was cursed by a sage to immediately abandon his celestial form as Indra and assume the form of a snake in the earthly realms due to his arrogance.» — el ejemplo contrario, Nahuṣa, caído de los reinos celestes por arrogancia
«Whether good or bad, all karma is stored or imprinted as saṁskāra in the citta and, in general, may manifest its fruits in either this life or the next.» — Bryant enuncia la regla: todo karma queda como saṁskāra y fructifica en esta vida o en la siguiente
«But the fruits of karma ultimately have the kleśas as their root, mūla; it is these kleśas that influence one to act in good or bad ways.» — Bryant remite el fruto del karma a su raíz, los kleśas
«Therefore, there is a vicious cycle: kleśas provokes karma, and karma fuels the kleśas.» — Bryant cierra el círculo: los kleśas provocan karma y el karma alimenta los kleśas
«Even though the boy was only five years old, and even though the great sage Nārada tried to dissuade him on account of the perils and hardships of the forest where he was heading, the boy persisted and performed intense austerities with his mind fixed on Viṣṇu.» — el relato de Dhruva: el niño de cinco años persiste en la austeridad pese a la advertencia de Nārada
«The point is that even though Dhruva worshipped Viṣṇu out of anger at the offense he had suffered, his mind was completely fixed without deviation on Īśvara and from this perspective created good karma (although a vision of Viṣṇu is, of course, an act of grace and beyond the jurisdiction of any mundane laws of karma).» — Bryant extrae del relato la excepción que la tradición devocional afirma: la visión de Viṣṇu por encima de la ley kármica
«According to the Bhāgavata, the highest meditation and goal of life is total absorption in God, even if this is generated out of animosity, as was the case with Kaṁsa, who, along with other demoniac adversaries of Kṛṣṇa, attained liberation simply by virtue of their minds being fixed undeviatingly on God, albeit in animosity.» — el Bhāgavata sostiene que la absorción total en Dios libera aunque sea por animosidad
«The king of the Cedis, Śiśupāla, attained perfection despite hating Kṛṣṇa; what then of those dear to him?!» — el caso extremo que ese texto da: Śiśupāla alcanza la perfección odiando a Kṛṣṇa
«Returning to Vyāsa’s list, delusion can generate bad karma, as in the case of taking the life of another under the belief that doing so is a virtuous act, but delusion, according to Vācaspati Miśra does not beget good karma.» — Vyāsa acota la ilusión: genera mal karma y no engendra bueno
«He quotes the Gītā, where Kṛṣṇa is encouraging the despondent warrior Arjuna to fight a righteous war out of a sense of duty rather than out of concern for the outcome that might result for him personally: “One whose intelligence is not tainted by ego, though he kills people in this world, does not kill, nor is he bound by his actions”» — Bryant cita el Gītā donde Kṛṣṇa dice que quien obra sin ego no queda atado por sus actos
«Those produced out of ignorance are born from the kleśas, but those resulting from true understanding are not (such as the “terminator” saṁskāra of I.50).» — Bryant separa los saṁskāras nacidos de la ignorancia de los nacidos del discernir
«II.13 sati mūle tad-vipāko jāty-āyur-bhogāḥ sati, when in existence; mūle, the root; tat, its; vipākaḥ, fruition; jāti, birth; āyuḥ, age, span of life; bhogāḥ, experience As long as the root [of the kleśas] exists, it fructifies as type of birth, span of life, and life experience [of an individual].» — II.13, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: mientras la raíz exista fructifica en nacimiento, duración y experiencia
«karma contained in the karmāśaya fructifies in the very next life, not all karma is destined to do so.» — Bryant acota la regla: no todo karma fructifica en la vida inmediata
«Some karma might be mutually exclusive with other karma and not be able to coexist in the same life, says Śaṅkara; for example, one might have some karma that merits a celestial birth and other karma that requires an animal birth for fruition.» — Śaṅkara explica por qué: hay karmas mutuamente excluyentes
«In general, the cluster of karma that does not fructify in the next life, says Vyāsa, may undergo three possible outcomes: It can be destroyed, it can merge with more dominant karma, or it can remain dormant for a long time, overshadowed by more powerful karma.» — Vyāsa da los tres destinos del karma que no fructifica enseguida
«As Kṛṣṇa states: “Difficult to understand are the ways of karma” (Gītā IV.17).» — Bryant cita el Gītā IV.17 sobre lo difícil de entender los caminos del karma
«Therefore, says Vācaspati Miśra, the mind can become a fertile field for the karmāśaya only when it is watered by the kleśas.» — Vācaspati Miśra usa la imagen del campo regado: la mente solo fructifica en karma si la riegan los kleśas
«Conversely, the karmāśaya becomes impotent when the kleśas are destroyed.» — el reverso de la imagen: destruidos los kleśas, el depósito queda impotente
«Vijñānabhikṣu quotes various verses pointing to attachment as the cause of karma and hence of rebirth: “Being attached, a person, along with his karma, attains the result of that to which his mind is attached” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.6).» — Vijñānabhikṣu apoya el punto en el Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.6
«He quotes the Gītā again: “The learned call that person wise whose karma is burnt by the fire of knowledge” (IV.19).» — Bryant cita el Gītā IV.19: el karma quemado en el fuego del conocimiento
«Therefore, an enlightened yogī experiences only the prārabdha-karma already activated and set in motion for this lifetime, and thus may still be subject to, for example, illness or injury.» — Bryant acota el alcance de la liberación: el yogī iluminado sigue pasando por el prārabdha-karma ya activado
«Such a yogī is called a jīvanmukta, embodied but liberated, and does not return to saṁsāra after death.» — Bryant define al jīvanmukta: encarnado y liberado
«The potter’s wheel does not immediately come to a stop when the potter stops turning it; it slows gradually due to the force already invested in it.» — la imagen del torno del alfarero para el karma ya activado
«Or, as per the illustration used in the Vedānta tradition, the archer has no control over the arrow that has already been discharged; it will rest only when its momentum is exhausted (IV.1.15).» — la segunda imagen, tomada del Vedānta: la flecha ya disparada
«Vyāsa, anticipating the next sūtra, notes that a yogī sees suffering even in what others would consider pleasurable situations.» — Vyāsa adelanta II.15: el yogī ve sufrimiento donde otros ven placer
«As for the jīvanmuktas, says Vijñānabhikṣu, since they are free from ignorance and ego, they experience only the pleasure and pain of the karma that has already started to fructify.» — Vijñānabhikṣu acota lo que el jīvanmukta siente: solo el karma ya en curso
«Patañjali here makes a seemingly radical statement that everything is seen as duḥkha, suffering, by the wise.» — Bryant llama radical la afirmación de II.15 y la consigna como lo que es
«A better translation of duḥkha than suffering might be, in my view, frustration, since suffering often has physical connotations, and, in addition to referring to physical pain, duḥkha, perhaps even primarily, is the frustration that follows from the attempt to find permanent satisfaction in objects of the senses and mind that are by their very nature temporary.» — Bryant propone traducir duḥkha por frustración y declara que la versión es suya
«Vyāsa sets out to examine the nature of suffering and its apparent opposite, pleasure.» — Vyāsa abre el examen del sufrimiento y de su aparente contrario
«Pleasure, says Vyāsa, means attachment to the objects that give pleasure, whether inanimate objects or living beings.» — Vyāsa define el placer por el apego a lo que lo da
«It is this attachment to pleasure that motivates action, and, as we know, action produces the karmāśaya, the store of action, that is, the cycle of reaction inherent in karma.» — Vyāsa liga ese apego a la acción y al ciclo kármico
«Aversion to suffering is the flip side of this—the attempt to avoid the objects that cause suffering.» — Vyāsa define la aversión como la otra cara del mismo apego
«Therefore, it is attachment and aversion that produce the karmāśaya.» — Vyāsa adjudica el depósito de karma a esas dos
«More specifically, pleasure is the appeasement that occurs when the senses are gratified with the objects of enjoyment, and suffering the lack of such appeasement, in other words, the agitation that results from unfulfilled desire.» — Vyāsa define placer y dolor por el deseo satisfecho o no
«However, Vyāsa points out that the senses are never really freed from hankering by repeated indulgence, because such indulgence simply increases the attachment to pleasure as well as the demands of the senses.» — Vyāsa señala que la indulgencia no libera del anhelo sino que aumenta la demanda
«The Gītā considers lust “the eternal enemy … insatiable as fire” (III.39).» — Bryant apoya el punto en el Gītā III.39: la lujuria como enemigo eterno, insaciable como el fuego
«The more fuel one pours on a fire, the stronger it burns.» — la imagen del fuego alimentado
«Therefore, indulgence is not the means to gain ultimate pleasure, and one who gets addicted to sense pleasure ends up immersed in dissatisfaction and in this sense enmeshed in frustration.» — Bryant enuncia la conclusión: la indulgencia no lleva al placer último
«This is the frustration born of consequences, pariṇāma, the first type of suffering on Patañjali’s list.» — Bryant nombra el primer tipo de sufrimiento de II.15: el nacido de las consecuencias
«Pariṇāma also means change, transformation, as well as consequences, and can be read as pointing to the ever» — Bryant desdobla pariṇāma en cambio y consecuencia; el tramo se corta en el guion de *ever-changing*
«From this perspective, the experience of any happiness, even our “Kodak moments,” which appear so satisfying at the moment of experience, are changing or temporary by nature.» — Bryant aplica el término a la felicidad: temporal por naturaleza
«II.14 te hlāda-paritāpa-phalāḥ puṇyāpuṇya-hetutvāt te, these [type of birth, span of life, and life experience]; hlāda, pleasure; paritāpa, pain; phalāḥ, fruits; puṇya, virtue; apuṇya, vice; hetutvāt, as a result of» — II.14 con su análisis palabra por palabra: nacimiento, duración y experiencia dan fruto de goce o de dolor según virtud o vicio
«II.15 pariṇāma-tāpa-saṁskāra-duḥkhair guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāc ca duḥkham eva sarvaṁ vivekinaḥ pariṇāma, result, consequence, change; tāpa, distress; saṁskāra, mental impression; duḥkhaiḥ, as a result of the pains; guṇa, qualities, influences; vṛtti, fluctuating states of mind; virodhāt, conflict; ca,» — II.15 con su análisis palabra por palabra: las tres formas del sufrimiento y el conflicto entre los guṇas
«Therefore, the kleśas of ego and ignorance always remain the ultimate root» — Bryant vuelve a la raíz: ego e ignorancia; el tramo se corta al final de la plana 218
«II.16 heyaṁ duḥkham anāgatam heyam, to be avoided; duḥkham, pain, suffering; anāgatam, yet to come Suffering that has yet to manifest is to be avoided.» — II.16, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: solo el sufrimiento futuro se puede evitar
«Consciousness, puruṣa, is eternal and immutable, the subject of experience, and liberation involves detaching it from the objects of experience in the form of the evolutes of prakṛti.» — Bryant repite la premisa: el puruṣa eterno e inmutable, sujeto de la experiencia
«As an interesting aside, the term for suffering, duḥkha, seems to have been coined by analogy to its opposite, sukha, happiness.» — Bryant da la etimología de duḥkha y su pareja sukha
«Past suffering has already been experienced, says Vyāsa, and presently experienced suffering has already activated and is bearing its fruits.» — Vyāsa explica por qué solo el futuro cuenta: el pasado se vivió y el presente ya fructifica
«How can one give up suffering that has yet to come, in other words, suffering that does not yet exist? asks Vijñānabhikṣu rhetorically.» — Vijñānabhikṣu plantea la objeción retórica: cómo se deja lo que aún no existe
«However, the absolute removal of future suffering can be attained only by liberation, say the commentators—removing the identification between puruṣa and prakṛti.» — Bryant fija la condición de la supresión absoluta: la liberación misma
«Again, this is the standard view: Gautama, the author of the Nyāya Sūtras, states that relief from suffering comes only from liberation (I.1.22).» — Bryant consigna que la posición es común: los Nyāya Sūtras dicen lo mismo
«Likewise, Kaṇāda, the author of a series of sūtras foundational to the Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy, states that only when the mind is removed from its objects is one free from pain (V.2.16).» — Bryant suma el testimonio de Kaṇāda y el Vaiśeṣika
«The seer, draṣṭṛ, of this sūtra, says Vyāsa, is the puruṣa soul who cognizes through buddhi, intelligence.» — Vyāsa identifica al veedor de II.17 con el puruṣa que conoce por buddhi
«Patañjali’s reference to that which is seen, dṛśya, consists of all objects that present themselves to the intelligence.» — Bryant define lo visto, dṛśya, como todo objeto que se presenta al intelecto
«On account of seeing these objects, the puruṣa becomes like their master, says Vyāsa, and, on account of being seen, the objects of experience become, as it were, the property of puruṣa, the seer, though they do not exist within puruṣa.» — Vyāsa describe la apariencia: los objetos parecen propiedad del puruṣa sin existir en él
«This beginningless association, saṁyoga, between these two is the cause of suffering that is to be avoided.» — Bryant nombra el saṁyoga sin comienzo como la causa que II.16 mandaba evitar
«We see, continues Vyāsa, that there are remedies for suffering in this world.» — Vyāsa introduce la analogía médica: hay remedios para el sufrimiento
«For example, the sole of the foot is capable of being pierced, and the thorn of piercing it.» — el ejemplo de la espina y la planta del pie, con que se reparten locus y causa
«One who knows these three features—the locus of pain, the cause of pain, and the remedy for pain—need not undergo suffering.» — Vyāsa enuncia el esquema completo: locus, causa y remedio
«Vyāsa further notes that on a metaphysical level, suffering is the result of rajas disturbing sattva.» — Vyāsa da la explicación metafísica del sufrimiento: rajas perturbando a sattva
«However, the suffering is not actually located in the puruṣa, which is changeless and actionless; it is located in the buddhi, intelligence, whose pure sattva nature is being disturbed by rajas.» — Bryant localiza el sufrimiento en buddhi y no en el puruṣa, que no cambia
«However, this conjunction between these two entities must have existed eternally.» — Bryant expone el argumento de la eternidad de la conjunción
«Like the chicken and the egg, one cannot come into being without the other.» — la imagen del huevo y la gallina para la dependencia mutua entre mente y karma
«Therefore, as with all other Indic soteriological schools, Yoga avoids this dilemma by positing that they must be beginningless.» — Bryant señala la salida común a las escuelas índicas: declararlo sin comienzo
«But, as Hariharānanda notes, just because this conjunction is beginningless does not mean that it has to be endless.» — Hariharānanda pone el límite del argumento: sin comienzo no implica sin fin
«II.17 draṣṭṛ-dṛśyayoḥ saṁyogo heya-hetuḥ draṣṭṛ, of the seer; dṛśyayoḥ, of the seen; saṁyogaḥ, conjunction; heya, to be avoided; hetuḥ, the cause» — II.17 con su análisis palabra por palabra: la conjunción del veedor y lo visto
«These three guṇas are always in flux, as long as the world is manifest,38 and their nature is to assert themselves in various proportions and then ebb away, thus giving rise to the ever» — Bryant repite el flujo perpetuo de los guṇas mientras el mundo está manifiesto; el tramo se corta en el guion de *ever-changing*
«This never-ending flux is what is called the known, says Vyāsa, and it transforms itself into both the elements and the senses, bhūtendriyātmakam.» — Vyāsa llama a ese flujo lo conocido, y lo hace transformarse en los elementos y los sentidos
«Patañjali makes the important statement here that the purpose of these guṇas, and thus of their prākṛtic productions, is to provide either experience, bhoga, or liberation, apavarga, for the puruṣa, as indicated also in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā (XVII, XXI, XXXI).» — Bryant declara importante lo que II.18 dice del fin de los guṇas: experiencia o liberación
«There is no other reason for the existence of prakṛti.» — Bryant enuncia la consecuencia sin atenuantes: prakṛti no tiene otra razón de ser
«Although experience and liberation are concepts of intelligence, says Vyāsa, they are attributed to the puruṣa because the puruṣa experiences their fruit, just as the victory and defeat of soldiers are attributed to their chief, even though he may only be witnessing the battle, because he experiences the fruits of victory or defeat.» — Vyāsa explica por qué se adjudican al puruṣa conceptos que son de buddhi, con la imagen del que recibe el fruto de la victoria
«As long as the awareness of puruṣa remains focused on and is erroneously identified with buddhi and its manifestations, puruṣa remains as if bound by that connection.» — Bryant describe la atadura como un *como si*: el puruṣa parece atado por la identificación con buddhi
«But bondage is a state of mind, a product of buddhi, not an actual condition of puruṣa, and it exists only for as long as the real goal of puruṣa is not realized.» — Bryant sitúa la atadura en buddhi y no en el puruṣa
«It, too, is a state of mind, or, put differently, the state of puruṣa after the mind has eliminated its own kleśas and ceased to superimpose itself onto consciousness.» — Bryant aplica lo mismo a la liberación: estado de mente o, dicho de otro modo, del puruṣa tras cesar la superposición
«Therefore the Sāṅkhya Kārikā states: “No one is actually bound, nor is anyone liberated» — el Sāṅkhya Kārikā lo dice de frente: nadie está atado ni nadie es liberado
«It is pure beingness, says Vyāsa, neither existence nor nonexistence, neither real nor unreal.» — Vyāsa describe a prakṛti por negaciones: ni existencia ni no existencia, ni real ni irreal
«There are no signs by which one can discern prakṛti prior to the movement of the guṇas (thus the Sāṅkhya school holds that prakṛti cannot be perceived, its existence can only be inferred [anumānita], and thus it is called the inferred one» — Bryant explica el término aliṅga: prakṛti no se percibe y solo se infiere
«Therefore, says Vyāsa, the world created by the guṇas may appear to have the nature of birth and death, but all that is really occurring is that the evolutes of the guṇas are manifesting and unmanifesting the various bodies and things of this world due to the constant flux of the guṇas themselves.» — Vyāsa atribuye la apariencia de nacimiento y muerte al flujo de los guṇas
«If Devadatta’s cows die, he analogizes, we may think Devadatta has become poor, but his poverty is due to the death of his cows, not his own death.» — la analogía de las vacas de Devadatta: se empobrece, no se muere
«Similarly, there is no birth and death of puruṣa, simply the constant mutation and transformation of the guṇas of prakṛti within which puruṣa appears to be embedded, which temporarily produce bodies and forms in certain configurations, and then dissolve them back into their matrix.» — Vyāsa aplica la analogía: no hay nacimiento ni muerte del puruṣa
«Vācaspati Miśra reiterates that everything one experiences in manifest reality, whether on the grossest level of sensual indulgence or the most subtle level of discrimination between buddhi and puruṣa, is ultimately taking place in buddhi or its evolutes.» — Vācaspati Miśra sitúa toda experiencia en buddhi o en sus evolutos
«At the same time, Vyāsa also states that they are not totally nonexistent (like the lotus in the sky), because they produce effects.» — Vyāsa acota su propia negación: liṅga y aliṅga no son del todo inexistentes, porque producen efectos
«In other words, they exist as cause.» — Bryant resume la acotación en una frase
«The advaita school posits that prakṛti, the guṇas, and the entirety of the manifest world are all ultimately not real but are mental constructions produced by ignorance, superimpositions on the only real existent, Brahman.» — Bryant expone la posición advaita: prakṛti y el mundo manifiesto sin realidad última
«Outlining the position of the Yoga school, Vijñānabhikṣu stresses that the world in its essence—prakṛti—is real and eternal, and therefore the evolutes from this matrix, the world, are also in this sense real, albeit temporary and constantly changing, mutating, and eventually dissolving back into their source.» — Vijñānabhikṣu opone la posición del Yoga: el mundo es real y eterno. Las dos quedan consignadas sin arbitrar
«He quotes the well-known verse from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad in reference to objects made out of clay, which we call pots or plates, etc., out of convenience, but which remain, essentially, clay: “By means of just one lump of clay, one can perceive everything made out of clay—the transformation is just a verbal handle, a name—while the reality is just this: ‘It is clay’” (VI.1.4).» — Vijñānabhikṣu apoya su lectura en el Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.1.4 y su barro
«The manifestations of Brahman are not false, Vijñānabhikṣu argues, contra Śaṅkara, any more than the modifications of clay are false.» — Vijñānabhikṣu discute expresamente a Śaṅkara sobre si las manifestaciones son falsas
«Vācaspati Miśra further states that manifest reality has to follow the sequence of evolution noted by Patañjali in this sūtra.» — Vācaspati Miśra exige que lo manifiesto siga la secuencia evolutiva de II.19
«It is not that the seed of a nyagrodha tree will spontaneously and immediately produce a fully grown, stocky tree with its leaves and branches, he says.» — la imagen del nyagrodha: la semilla no se vuelve árbol de golpe
«At the same time, says Vijñānabhikṣu, seed, sprout, and tree are nondifferent from each other» — Vijñānabhikṣu sostiene a la vez la no diferencia entre semilla, brote y árbol; el tramo se corta al final de la plana 234
«Puruṣa, on the other hand, is a totally different entity.» — Bryant marca el corte: el puruṣa es de otra clase
«When puruṣa and prakṛti combine, living beings come into existence, just as when air and water combine, bubbles are formed.» — la imagen de las burbujas de aire y agua para el nacer de los seres vivos
«II.20 draṣṭā dṛśi-mātraḥ śuddho ‘pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ draṣṭā, the seer; dṛśi, the power of seeing; mātraḥ, only; śuddhaḥ, pure; api, although; pratyaya, ideas or images of the mind; anupaśyaḥ, witnesses The seer is merely the power of seeing; [however,] although pure, he witnesses the images of the mind.» — II.20, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: el veedor es solo el poder de ver y aun puro presencia las imágenes de la mente
«Therefore, it is said, says Vyāsa, that although puruṣa is the experiencer and does not change or pursue the objects of the senses, it appears to do so by its identification with the transformations of buddhi, which does change and does pursue the objects of the senses.» — Vyāsa explica la paradoja: el puruṣa experimenta sin cambiar
«And it is only puruṣa who can inherently know, says Vijñānabhikṣu; buddhi does not know, that is to say, is not conscious of the objects of the senses that it is processing and that it exhibits to puruṣa.» — Vijñānabhikṣu reserva al puruṣa el conocer inherente: buddhi no conoce lo que muestra
«One might analogize that the software of a computer is not conscious of the material that it is processing and that it exhibits on its screen.» — la analogía moderna de Bryant: el software que no es consciente de lo que pone en pantalla
«Although the moon is not transformed into water, he continues, it appears to be so due to its reflection in water.» — la imagen de la luna reflejada en el agua
«Like an echo, says Vijñānabhikṣu, a sound that emanates from a source and then bounces off an object to return back to that source in somewhat distorted fashion, the consciousness of puruṣa bounces back from buddhi in the form of a distorted reflection, and thus puruṣa becomes aware of the disturbed buddhi along with its bhāva, or quality, of ignorance.» — la imagen del eco, de Vijñānabhikṣu, para la reflexión distorsionada
«Not only does puruṣa appear changed due to this symbiosis, but inert buddhi appears to be conscious due to being energized by consciousness, continues Vijñānabhikṣu, just as sunlight falling on the sea makes the sea appear to be luminous like the sun.» — Bryant señala la simetría del error: el puruṣa parece cambiado y buddhi parece luminoso
«Its freedom, says Vijñānabhikṣu, cannot come about through the conventional means of knowledge—the senses, mind, intelligence, etc.—since its nature is essentially different from these.» — Vijñānabhikṣu niega que la libertad del puruṣa venga por los medios convencionales
«Hariharānanda adds to this that the existence of puruṣa is evidenced by the fact that the sense of I is constant at all times.» — Hariharānanda funda la existencia del puruṣa en la constancia del sentido del yo
«All knowledge thus requires the presence of the overseer, puruṣa, and of something seen, an object in prakṛti.» — Bryant enuncia lo que todo conocer exige: el supervisor y el objeto
«This misidentification of the seer and the seen, continues Hariharānanda, is the product of ahaṅkāra, the ego.» — Hariharānanda adjudica la identificación errónea al ahaṅkāra
«II.21 tad-artha eva dṛśyasyātmā tat, his [the seer, puruṣa’s]; arthaḥ, purpose; eva, only; dṛśyasya, of the knowable, of that which is seen; ātmā, essential nature, existence The essential nature of that which is seen is exclusively for the sake of the seer.» — II.21, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: lo visto existe solo por el veedor
«Just as the ether, although one, may exist as divided into many in pots, jars, and water-containers, so I, and the mighty armed king of Kāśī and others [are divided] into different bodies with physical distinctions [but are one ātman].» — la imagen del éter uno y repartido en vasijas, con que el advaita sostiene la unidad del ātman
«If there were only one ātman, continues Vijñānabhikṣu, how could some ātmans be liberated and others still in saṁsāra?» — Vijñānabhikṣu objeta con una pregunta: cómo habría ātmans liberados y otros en el saṁsāra
«If one responds that the realization of the oneness of ātman applies only to the liberated puruṣa, but not to the other nonliberated puruṣas, then one has implicitly accepted a duality in the supposed oneness of ātman, a duality between liberated and nonliberated puruṣas.» — Vijñānabhikṣu señala la contradicción de la respuesta advaita
«Vijñānabhikṣu continues to argue that not only are individual puruṣas different from each other, but the supreme puruṣa, God, is different again from all the individual souls.» — Vijñānabhikṣu sostiene además que el puruṣa supremo es distinto de todas las almas
«He points to the Vedānta Sūtras: “Brahman is greater [than embodied beings] because of the statement of difference [between them]” (II.1.22) and “[The embodied souls] are parts of God because of the statement that they are different” (II.3.43).» — Vijñānabhikṣu apoya su tesis en los Vedānta Sūtras II.3.43
«The myriad puruṣas are identical in the sense that their true nature transcends all distinctions, which are the product of prakṛti and her guṇas, but this does not mean that they become identical in the sense of loosing their individuality upon attaining liberation, nor that they merge into one ultimate ātman/Brahman.» — Bryant precisa en qué sentido los puruṣas son idénticos sin fundirse en uno
«One must keep in mind here, and indeed, Vijñānabhikṣu reminds us, that he is also a Vedāntin who has written a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras, in which he has already critically discussed the one ātman theory of the advaita nondual school of Vedānta.» — Bryant recuerda que quien objeta es él mismo vedāntino, aunque no advaita
«the conjunction, or association, saṁyoga, between prakṛti and puruṣa, says Vyāsa. Puruṣa is the possessor, svāmi, and he is conjoined with that which he possesses, sva, namely prakṛti and her objects (the seen of the previous sūtra), for the sake of experience.» — Vyāsa adjudica la conjunción a la experiencia
«Ignorance is the cause of the conjunction between the seer and the seen, and true knowledge dispels ignorance and is therefore the cause of liberation.» — Bryant enuncia el par: la ignorancia causa la conjunción y el conocimiento verdadero la deshace
«Strictly speaking, continues Vyāsa, true knowledge is not the real cause of liberation because when ignorance does not exist, bondage does not exist, and so technically it is this absence of ignorance that corresponds to liberation.» — Vyāsa afina: el conocimiento no es causa directa de la liberación, sino la ausencia de ignorancia
«Vijñānabhikṣu points out that true knowledge, or discrimination, operates right up until the immediate moment prior to liberation.» — Vijñānabhikṣu sitúa la discriminación hasta el instante anterior a la liberación
«He reminds his readers that discrimination is still a product of the material intelligence, but full liberation involves complete separation between puruṣa and buddhi.» — Vijñānabhikṣu recuerda que la discriminación sigue siendo producto de lo material
«This, says Hariharānanda, is correct insofar as ignorance continues for as long as the guṇas are active, but it doesn’t explain the cause of ignorance any more than heat in the body explains the cause of fever.» — Hariharānanda acota una de las definiciones de ignorancia con la imagen de la fiebre
«This possibility is of limited value, says Hariharānanda, like saying, “Illness means to be unwell.”» — Hariharānanda descarta por tautológica otra definición
«Another problem with this type of view, says Śaṅkara, is that since the guṇas are eternally in flux, if ignorance were a product of the guṇas, it too would be eternal and so there would be no liberation.» — Śaṅkara objeta: si la ignorancia fuera de los guṇas, sería eterna y no habría liberación
«Vijñānabhikṣu quotes a charming verse from the Sā ṅkhya Kārikās (LXI) personifying prakṛti when her game is up and she has been seen by the enlightened puruṣa for what she is: “The other one [prakṛti] thinks ‘I have been seen!’”» — el verso del Sāṅkhya Kārikā LXI que personifica a prakṛti al sentirse vista
«Prakṛti is inert, lifeless matter, but its evolute buddhi appears to be ignorant due to being animated by the presence of puruṣa; likewise, puruṣa appears to be ignorant due to its awareness of buddhi, even though, in its pure state, it does not contain either ignorance or knowledge.» — Bryant enuncia la paradoja: ni prakṛti ni puruṣa contienen en sí ignorancia ni conocimiento
«There are thus many views on ignorance, says Vyāsa. They all contain some element of truth.» — Vyāsa deja las varias opiniones sobre la ignorancia una junto a otra, todas con algo de verdad
«The common denominator of all them is the conjunction of puruṣa with the guṇas of prakṛti.» — Vyāsa nombra el denominador común de todas: la conjunción con los guṇas
«In the theistic schools, it is a power of Īśvara, God.» — Bryant consigna la versión teísta: la ignorancia como poder de Īśvara
«II.22 kṛtārtham prati naṣṭam apy anaṣṭam tad-anya-sādhāraṇatvāt kṛta, accomplished, fulfilled; artham, purpose; prati, toward, with regard to; naṣṭam, destroyed; api, although; anaṣṭam, not destroyed; tat, that; anya, other [puruṣas]; sādhāraṇatvāt, because of being common» — II.22 con su análisis palabra por palabra: lo visto deja de existir para el que cumplió su fin y no para los demás puruṣas
«II.24 tasya hetur avidyā tasya, of it [conjunction]; hetuḥ, the cause; avidyā, ignorance The cause of conjunction is ignorance.» — II.24, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: la causa de la conjunción es la ignorancia
«When intelligence contains the saṁskāras of ignorance, says Vyāsa, it remains active in the realm of prakṛti and thus does not produce discrimination about the true nature of puruṣa.» — Vyāsa explica el bloqueo: con saṁskāras de ignorancia, la inteligencia no discrimina
«In other words, complete liberation occurs only when intelligence first provides discrimination and then ceases to act altogether.» — Bryant enuncia la condición última: la inteligencia deja de obrar
«But discrimination eventually completely destroys ignorance and thus its own base, like fire destroys its own fuel, says Hariharānanda.» — la imagen de Hariharānanda: la discriminación se consume como el fuego con su leña
«One might argue, says Vyāsa, that this claim that full liberation occurs only after discrimination has dissolved itself is rather like an impotent man» — Vyāsa se plantea a sí mismo la objeción, con una comparación cruda
«Vyāsa affirms, again, that full and final liberation occurs precisely when the intelligence ceases to act.» — Vyāsa sostiene su posición pese a la objeción
«Thus, intelligence and knowledge are not the direct cause of liberation, but by removing ignorance, they are the indirect cause.» — Bryant precisa el papel: inteligencia y conocimiento como causa indirecta
«Freedom, hānam, is the eternal cessation of bondage, says Vyāsa.» — Vyāsa define hānam como cese eterno de la atadura
«II.25 tad-abhāvāt saṁyogābhāvo hānam tad-dṛśeḥ kaivalyam tat, of it [ignorance]; abhāvāt, from absence, removal; saṁyoga, conjunction; abhāvaḥ, absence, removal; hānam, freedom, escape, liberation; tat, that; dṛśeh, of the seer; kaivalyam, absolute freedom,» — II.25 con su análisis palabra por palabra: quitada la ignorancia cae la conjunción y sobreviene el kaivalya
«When the cause of suffering has been removed, suffering disappears, and puruṣa is established in its own true nature.» — Bryant enuncia el desenlace: el puruṣa asentado en su naturaleza
«II.26 viveka-khyātir aviplavā hānopāyaḥ viveka, discrimination; khyātiḥ, discernment; aviplavā, undeviating, undisturbed; hāna, freedom, liberation; upāyaḥ, the means The means to liberation is uninterrupted discriminative discernment.» — II.26, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: el medio de la liberación es el discernimiento ininterrumpido
«Viveka, Vyāsa reiterates, is defined as the cognition of the distinction between buddhi and puruṣa, but as long as false knowledge has not been removed, discrimination remains shaky» — Vyāsa define viveka y advierte que mientras el falso conocimiento siga, la discriminación es inestable
«When false knowledge becomes like a burnt seed that is incapable of sprouting, says Vyāsa, or, put differently, when the sattva of the intelligence has been cleansed of the dirt of rajas, then cognition attains a state of utmost clarity.» — Vyāsa describe la claridad que sigue a quemar el falso conocimiento
«Then, says Śaṅkara, “As seeds burnt by fire no longer sprout, so is the case with kleśas burnt by the fire of knowledge; the ātman no longer encounters them.”» — Śaṅkara cierra con la imagen de las semillas quemadas que ya no brotan
«In other words, discriminating discernment controls and eventually burns up the emergence of unwanted saṁskāras.» — Bryant resume el efecto del discernimiento sobre los saṁskāras
«II.27 tasya saptadhā prānta-bhūmiḥ prajñā. tasya, his [the yogī’s]; saptadhā, sevenfold; prānta-bhūmiḥ, final place; prajñā, true insight, wisdom The yogī’s true insight has seven ultimate stages.» — II.27, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: la visión del yogī tiene siete estadios últimos
«In other words, one need no longer strive to practice yoga at this point.» — Bryant describe el último de los siete estadios de II.27: ya no hace falta practicar
«Intelligence has fulfilled its purpose: to provide either worldly experience or liberation.» — Bryant recuerda para qué existía la inteligencia, una vez cumplido su fin
«(6) The yogī’s guṇas dissolve back into their causal matrix, prakṛti, and emerge no more, since they no longer have a function.» — el sexto estadio: los guṇas del yogī se reabsorben en prakṛti
«The notion of yoga destroying impurities goes back as far as the Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E., which lists fifteen doṣas, faults, that are eliminated by its practice.» — Bryant remonta la idea de que el yoga destruye impurezas hasta el Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra
«When impurity is removed, the light of full knowledge, jñāna-dīpti, noted in this sūtra can shine forth, like the sun after the cold season, says Śaṅkara.» — la imagen de Śaṅkara: el sol que vuelve tras la estación fría
«Just as the axe slices wood from a tree, so the practice of these eight limbs slices the impurities away from the citta, says Vyāsa.» — la imagen del hacha, de Vyāsa, para los ocho miembros cortando impureza
«It is true that Patañjali does not make reference to the eight limbs prior to this point.» — Bryant consigna que los ocho miembros no aparecen antes de II.28
«But, again, one must be wary of submitting the cryptic sūtra style to modern notions of structural coherence.» — Bryant advierte contra someter el estilo sūtra a nociones modernas de coherencia
«It is likely that Patañjali drew upon an existing tradition of eight-limbed yoga when composing his text (or modified the older tradition of six limbs), as well as a distinct tradition featuring kriyā-yoga.» — Bryant propone que Patañjali unió dos tradiciones: la de los ocho miembros y la del kriyā-yoga
«the ultimate act of nonviolence performed in rare instances by exemplar Jains is to fast to death, sacrificing their own life to save those of other creatures.» — Bryant consigna el acto extremo de no violencia que atribuye a yogīs jainas ejemplares
«Sacrificing one’s life to save others is the definition of heroism (and, indeed, the perfected Jain yogī is called mahāvīra, great hero» — Bryant liga ese acto a la definición de heroísmo y al título mahāvīra
«This practice may seem extreme (it is of course not mainstream but performed on very rare occasions by exemplar ascetic Jain monks), but it needs to be considered within the parameters of the Jain (and Hindu) belief that all living beings contain an ātman (puruṣa), and all ātmans are spiritually equal.» — Bryant sitúa la práctica dentro de la creencia jaina en la igualdad espiritual de todo ātman
«A sāttvic person is empathetic and compassionate toward other embodied beings and would never countenance inflicting violence upon them, what to speak of eating their flesh.» — Bryant describe al sāttvico por su empatía con los demás seres encarnados
«Any involvement in violent acts of any kind requires that the perpetrator be subjected to the same violence at some future time as kārmic consequence.» — Bryant enuncia la consecuencia kármica de todo acto violento
«inflicting violence is a quality of tamas, and thus eating meat increases the tāmasic potential of the citta, further enhancing ignorance.» — Bryant adjudica la violencia a tamas y liga el comer carne al aumento de ignorancia
«A vegetarian diet is nonnegotiable for yogīs.» — Bryant enuncia la consecuencia práctica sin atenuantes
«Nonviolence, Hariharānanda continues, also encompasses giving up the spirit of malice and hatred, since these produce the tendencies to injure others.» — Hariharānanda extiende la ahiṁsā al odio que precede al daño
«Ahiṁsā must be followed in thought, deed, and word, says Śaṅkara.» — Śaṅkara exige la ahiṁsā en pensamiento, obra y palabra
«Vyāsa defines truth, the second yama, as one’s words and thoughts being in exact correspondence to fact,» — Vyāsa define la verdad por la correspondencia exacta con el hecho
«Speech, he continues, is for the transferral of one’s knowledge to others and should not be deceitful, misleading, or devoid of value.» — Vyāsa define la función del habla: transferir conocimiento
«It should be for the benefit of all creatures, and not for their harm, otherwise it is sinful.» — Vyāsa pone la condición: en beneficio de todos los seres
«one yama results in the compromise of another—then ahiṁsā must always be respected first.» — Bryant fija la jerarquía en caso de conflicto entre yamas: la ahiṁsā primero
«Hariharānanda applies this principle on a psychological level: Ahiṁsā includes not always speaking bluntly and truthfully to people about their shortcomings.» — Hariharānanda aplica la jerarquía al plano psicológico
«Here he follows Manu’s injunction that “one should not tell the truth unkindly” (IV.138).» — Hariharānanda se apoya en Manu IV.138: no decir la verdad con dureza
«Also, avoiding untruth extends to the point of abstaining from reading fiction, for Hariharānanda.» — Hariharānanda lleva la satya hasta abstenerse de leer ficción
«The yogī is always contemplating spiritual truths and does not occupy his or her mind with fictional or worldly trivia, silly fantasy, daydreaming, or imagination.» — Hariharānanda excluye del yogī la fantasía y el ensueño diurno
«II.30 ahiṁsā-satyāsteya-brahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ ahiṁsā, nonviolence; satya, truthfulness; asteya, refraining from» — II.30 con el arranque de su análisis palabra por palabra: los cinco yamas nombrados en sánscrito
«The degree of violence is determined by intent—acts of violence performed without malice and hatred by a normal person» — Bryant gradúa la violencia por la intención; el tramo se corta antes de la enumeración de casos
«II.28 yogāṅgānuṣṭhānād aśuddhi-kṣaye jñāna-dīptir-āviveka-khyāteḥ yoga, yoga; aṅga, limbs; anuṣṭhānād, from the practice of; aśuddhi, impurity; kṣaye, on the destruction of; jñāna, knowledge; dīptiḥ, light, lamp; ā, up to; viveka, discrimination; khyāteḥ, knowledge Upon the destruction of impurities as a result of the practice of yoga, the lamp of knowledge arises. This culminates in» — II.28, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: destruida la impureza se enciende la lámpara del conocimiento
«II.29 yama-niyamāsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra-dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhayo ‘ṣṭāv aṅgāni yama, abstentions, moral restraints; niyama, observances; āsana, posture; prāṇāyāma, breath control; pratyāhāra, withdrawal of the senses; dhāraṇā, concentration; dhyāna, meditation; samādhayaḥ, absorption; aṣṭāu, eight; aṅgāni, limbs» — II.29 con su análisis palabra por palabra: los ocho miembros del yoga uno por uno
«II.31 jāti-deśa-kāla-samayānavacchinnāḥ sārva-bhaumā mahā-vratam jāti, class, caste, occupation; deśa, place, country of origin; kāla, time; samaya, circumstance; anavacchinnāḥ, unconditioned, unlimited by; sārva, every; bhaumāḥ, place on earth; mahā-vratam, great vow» — II.31 con su análisis palabra por palabra: los yamas como gran voto, sin condición de casta, lugar, tiempo ni circunstancia
«under the rubric of yoga, this sūtra makes it very clear that as far as Patañjali is concerned, there are no exceptions to these rules at any time in any place for anyone aspiring to be a yogī as defined by his system.» — Bryant lee II.31 como cierre de toda excepción para quien practique yoga en el sentido de Patañjali
«The eightfold noble path of Buddhism, requires the observance of five sīlas, four of which—ahiṁsā, satya, brahmacarya, and asteya—are identical to the first four yamas, and one, abstinence from intoxication, replaces aparigraha, noncoveting.» — Bryant compara los cinco śīlas budistas con los cinco yamas y marca dónde difieren
«The Jains, too, have five great vows, for which they use the same term we find in this sūtra, mahāvrata, and these are identical to Patañjali’s yamas.» — Bryant señala que los jainas usan el mismo término y una lista idéntica
«The Nyāya Sūtras acknowledge yoga as the means to realize the ātman but specify that it entails the following of yama and niyama (IV.2.46).» — Bryant consigna que el Nyāya exige también yama y niyama
«With certain nonmainstream exceptions such as the tāntric left-handed practices,59 these yamas are more or less standard across sectarian traditions, even if not listed in the specific format chosen by Patañjali.» — Bryant admite excepciones no mayoritarias, como la práctica tántrica de mano izquierda
«While this may hold in other circumstances such as these, nonviolence has no conditions for Patañjali.» — Bryant cierra el ejemplo: para Patañjali la no violencia no lleva condición
«If, say, a kṣatriya wishes to become a yogī as understood by Patañjali, he must abandon violence even if such violence is legitimate for persons of this caste and, indeed, condoned or even required» — Bryant aplica la regla al kṣatriya: debe renunciar a la violencia que su casta tolera o exige
«What may be acceptable—or even required—in a sociocivic context must be renounced in an ascetic yogic one.» — Bryant separa el contexto sociocívico del ascético
«The Gītā, of course, while accepting the Patañjalian-type path as an acceptable means to attain liberation (e.g., chapter VI) has, for the most part, a different objective, one directed to sociocivic concerns, and thus construes a different means to attain perfection from within the parameters of the idealized social system, namely karma-yoga, the path of action.» — Bryant consigna la posición distinta del Gītā sobre la vía de la acción, y no arbitra entre las dos
«While it has long been argued persuasively that the Yoga Sūtras are not incompatible with social and civic engagement in the world (e.g., Whicher 1998, 1999, 2005)—that is, once avidyā, ignorance, is eliminated, one can act in the world from a position of enlightenment60—Patañjali’s position on the role of the yamas could not be made much clearer.» — Bryant declara el punto tan claro como cabe en este sūtra
«As an example of nonviolence conditioned by place, deśa, Vyāsa points to a person who abstains from injury only when in a sacred place but kills animals elsewhere (or, one might add, vice versa for the Vedic ritualist).» — Vyāsa da el ejemplo de la ahiṁsā condicionada por lugar
«For Patañjalī, nonviolence must be upheld everywhere, irrespective of the ritualistic, gastronomic, or culinary practices of a particular country or place.» — Bryant enuncia la universalidad que el sūtra exige; el troceo imprime aquí *Patañjalī* con la ī final
«He defines nonviolence conditioned by time, kāla, as when one abstains from violence on certain calendar occasions (for example, during religious observances, such as, in a Catholic context, abstaining from meat at Lent), but not at other times.» — Vyāsa da el ejemplo de la ahiṁsā condicionada por tiempo
«Vyāsa also gives the example of soldiers who engage in violence on the battlefield but nowhere else.» — Vyāsa da el ejemplo del soldado, violento solo en el campo de batalla
«All these exceptions may hold good elsewhere in other contexts but, for the yogī wishing to attain the goals of yoga outlined in this text, say the commentators, this sūtra emphatically specifies that any such mitigating factors or conditions no longer apply.» — Bryant cierra la serie: ninguna de esas excepciones vale para el yogī
«The yamas are universal prescriptions—there are no exceptions, says Vyāsa.» — Vyāsa declara universales los yamas y sin excepción
«He concludes, however, that even though Yoga’s ultimate goal of selfliberation is individualistic, it cannot be attained except through moral means of interacting with others, as indicated by the five yamas, and never obtained through immoral means.» — Vyāsa cierra ligando el fin del yoga a la moralidad del medio
«II.32 śauca-santoṣa-tapaḥ-svādhyāyesvara-praṇidhānāni niyamāḥ śauca, cleanliness; santoṣa, contentment; tapaḥ, austerity; svādhyāya, study [of the scriptures]; īśvara, God, the Lord; praṇidhānāni, devotion to; niyamāḥ, observances» — II.32 con su análisis palabra por palabra: los cinco niyamas; el troceo imprime *svādhyāyesvara* sin la ī de Īśvara
«Vyāsa divides the first item on Patañjali’s list, cleanliness, śauca, into external and internal types.» — Vyāsa divide la limpieza en externa e interna
«External cleanliness pertains to the body and consists (in the premodern world of our commentators and rural India today) of cleaning with water and clay, as well as cow dung and cow urine, which are considered pure substances, and of ingesting pure foodstuff (which, Vācaspati Miśra notes, should be limited in quantity).» — Vyāsa detalla la limpieza externa, que incluye la medida en la comida
«In the next verse, Patañjali defines “negative thoughts,” vitarkas, as thoughts countering the yamas and niyamas.» — Bryant define los vitarkas por su oposición a yamas y niyamas
«What is reassuring about this sūtra is that Patañjali is essentially stating that “when one is harassed» — Bryant lee el sūtra como reconocimiento de que los pensamientos negativos van a surgir
«In other words, negative thoughts will arise in the citta.» — Bryant enuncia el supuesto: los pensamientos negativos surgirán
«In even the best-tended gardens, weeds inevitably pop up from time to time.» — la imagen del jardín bien cuidado donde igual brota la maleza
«Hence, Patañjali implies in this sūtra that the task is not to berate oneself upon finding oneself contemplating a negative thought but to deal insightfully with such occurrences.» — Bryant extrae la actitud que el sūtra pide: no reprocharse sino tratar el caso con discernimiento
«When one is tormented by perverse thoughts, says Vyāsa, such as, “I will kill this evildoer,” “I will lie,” “I will appropriate this person’s wealth,” “I will commit adultery with that person’s wife,” “I will take control over this other person’s possessions,”67 one should cultivate counterthoughts.» — Vyāsa describe la práctica del contrapensamiento
«One should rather think, “Burning in the fire of this world, I have taken shelter of yoga by committing myself to the welfare of all creatures; after having renounced such perverse thoughts, by again resorting to them, I am behaving like a dog who licks its vomit.”» — el contrapensamiento que Vyāsa pone por escrito, con la imagen del perro que lame su vómito
«Actually, this sūtra is profound in its implications and provides a means of performing a type of mindfulness meditation for yogīs, whereby one consciously adjusts the types of saṁskāras one allows in one’s citta.» — Bryant declara hondo el alcance de II.33: un modo de decidir qué saṁskāras se admiten
«If we consider the citta to be essentially a warehouse of saṁskāras, negative thoughts are merely the activation of some of these previous saṁskāras lying in storage; saṁskāras are never destroyed, we recall (although they can be burnt by yogic practice).» — Bryant describe la citta como almacén de saṁskāras que no se destruyen
«If, when the yogī becomes aware of a perverse thought arising in the citta, he or she makes a conscious effort to counter it by invoking a benevolent thought, then a new more sāttvic type of saṁskāra is planted in the citta warehouse.» — Bryant describe el efecto de contrarrestar: un saṁskāra sáttvico nuevo en el almacén
«The more one practices this type of sāttvic thinking in opposition to the rājasic and tāmasic thoughts that underpin inclinations toward violence, untruthfulness, and the other qualities opposite to the yamas and niyamas, the more the texture of the citta is transformed from rājasic and tāmasic to sāttvic.» — Bryant enuncia el resultado acumulado: la textura de la mente cambia
«Weeding, of course, can never be abandoned completely, and even the most saintly and accomplished yogī must be ever vigilant for old rājasic and tāmasic saṁskāras lying latent in the subconscious depths of the citta, like the latent seeds of dormant weeds.» — Bryant cierra la imagen del jardín: el desyerbar no se abandona nunca
«Patañjali divides them into three categories: those one performs oneself, kṛta; those that one has others perform on one’s behalf, kārita; and those that one approves of or authorizes in some way, anumodita.» — II.34 reparte la violencia en tres: la hecha, la mandada hacer y la consentida
«The Buddha, too, made a similar statement: “Monks, one possessed of three qualities is put into Hell according to his deserts. What three?» — Bryant pone al lado un enunciado paralelo del Buddha
«Patañjali is being fairly specific here, says Bhoja Rāja, otherwise some dull wit (to use his term) may think that since the violence involved in killing is performed by someone else, then the consumer of meat avoids karmic responsibilities.» — Bhoja Rāja usa la tripartición contra quien crea que comer carne exime del karma
«Vijñānabhikṣu includes here even violence condoned in the scriptures (that animals can be killed and eaten under certain conditions, such as in the context of Vedic sacrifice), as does Hariharānanda, who rejects the idea that God has allowed certain types of animal consumption.» — Vijñānabhikṣu y Hariharānanda discrepan sobre la violencia que la escritura tolera, y las dos posiciones quedan consignadas
«Since greed, anger, and delusion can underpin acts done oneself, on one’s behalf, or authorized by oneself, and can be experienced in three degrees of intensity, there are twenty-seven divisions of violence noted by Patañjali in this sūtra.» — Bryant cuenta las veintisiete divisiones que salen de cruzar las categorías
«Vyāsa trebles this number, by proposing that the intensity of greed, anger, and delusion can be mildly mild, moderately mild, and extremely mild; mildly moderate, moderately moderate, and extremely moderate; and mildly extreme, moderately extreme, and extremely extreme (probably with the set of subdivisions from I.21–22 in mind).» — Vyāsa triplica la cuenta añadiendo grados de intensidad
«All these multiple divisions pertain to each of the yamas and niyamas.» — Bryant extiende la cuenta a cada uno de los yamas y niyamas
«The perpetrator of violence, says Vyāsa, first overpowers the strength of the victim (by binding it, says Vācaspati Miśra), then inflicts violence on it by weapons, and then takes its life.» — Vyāsa describe el acto violento por sus pasos
«As a result of this, the perpetrator’s own life forces are weakened in this life, and in the next life, he or she takes birth in hell,72 or in a lower species of life, where, says Vijñānabhikṣu, the very same violence previously inflicted on other creatures is experienced by the perpetrator.» — Vyāsa describe el retorno del acto sobre quien lo comete
«II.33 vitarka-bādhane pratipakṣa-bhāvanam vitarka, negative thoughts; bādhane, on the harassing of; pratipakṣa, the opposite; bhāvanam, cultivation» — II.33 con su análisis palabra por palabra: cultivar el contrario cuando el pensamiento negativo acosa
«Violent people live every moment as though dead, Vyāsa continues. Indeed, they may even crave death but are forced to live on because, by the law of karma, some of the fixed fruits of their activities have to be experienced in this life (for example, says Vijñānabhikṣu, a person may be tormented by a horrible prolonged disease as a karmic consequence).» — Vyāsa describe la vida del violento como una muerte continua
«Even if a violent person experiences happiness in this life, notes Vyāsa, this is due to good karmic reaction accrued from simultaneously performing pious activities along with the impious ones in a past life.» — Vyāsa explica la felicidad del violento por karma bueno de otra vida
«By the law of action and reaction, violence always eventually breeds suffering for the perpetrator, who has to personally experience the same violence he or she inflicted on other beings.» — Vyāsa enuncia el retorno: la violencia vuelve sobre quien la hizo
«Vācaspati Miśra states in this regard that violence is the result of tamas, and perpetuating violence increases the tamas, ignorance, of the citta.» — Vācaspati Miśra adjudica la violencia a tamas y al aumento de ignorancia
«Although the commentators have focused on violence for this discussion, since it has been presented as the basis of all the yamas and niyamas, Vyāsa makes it clear that the discussion here can be applied to thoughts that are contrary to all the other yamas and niyamas in turn.» — Bryant advierte que lo dicho de la violencia vale para cada yama y niyama
«Patañjali specified in the previous sūtra “when” one is afflicted by negative thoughts, not “if.”» — Bryant se detiene en una palabra del sūtra: dice cuándo y no si
«When negative thoughts are eliminated, powers accrue to the yogī.» — Bryant enuncia el eje de los sūtras que siguen: eliminado el pensamiento negativo, sobrevienen poderes
«Vyāsa states that all living beings give up their enmity in the presence of one who is established in nonviolence.» — Vyāsa glosa II.35: todo ser vivo abandona la enemistad ante ese yogī
«According to Hariharānanda, perverse thoughts such as violence can take many subtle forms in the mind that are not always readily visible; these have to be exposed and rooted out through the force of meditation.» — Hariharānanda pide sacar a la luz el pensamiento perverso antes de arrancarlo
«Vijñānabhikṣu qualifies this somewhat by stating that the yogī will utter the words “Be virtuous” only to one who is fit to be so.» — Vijñānabhikṣu acota el poder: el yogī solo lo dice a quien merece recibirlo
«Hariharānanda also qualifies Vyāsa’s comment by noting that yogīs do not make whimsical or fruitless pronouncements beyond the reach of their power, that is, their will.» — Hariharānanda pone el segundo límite: el yogī no pronuncia más allá de su voluntad
«R. S. Bhattacharya (1985, 153) takes the jewels to refer to noble-hearted people as well as useful things.» — Bryant recoge la lectura de R. S. Bhattacharya de las joyas de II.37 como personas nobles y cosas útiles; el año entre paréntesis es la referencia impresa en la frase
«Vyāsa states that when celibacy, brahmacarya, is established, a yogī perfects his or her qualifications without obstruction.» — Vyāsa glosa II.38: asentado el brahmacarya, el yogī perfecciona sus aptitudes
«Otherwise, the words of wisdom of an incontinent person, says Hariharānanda, do not go deep into the mind of a disciple.» — Hariharānanda enuncia el reverso: la palabra del incontinente no entra en la mente del discípulo
«Vijñānabhikṣu understands the power, vīrya, Patañjali is referring to as the power of knowledge and action.» — Vijñānabhikṣu lee vīrya como poder de conocimiento y de acción
«Bhoja Rāja speaks of it as vigor in one’s bodily organs and mind.» — Bhoja Rāja lo lee como vigor de órganos y mente; las lecturas quedan una junto a otra
«Hariharānanda, for example, says that celibacy prevents the loss of vitality, and thus vīrya, potency, is retained.» — Hariharānanda lo lee por la retención de la vitalidad
«On perfecting the yama of refrainment from covetousness, aparigraha, the knowledge of the circumstances of the yogī’s present birth as well as of previous and future births, janma-kathantā, is automatically revealed if the yogī desires it, according to Vyāsa and the commentators.» — II.39 promete, según Vyāsa y los comentaristas, el conocimiento de los propios nacimientos
«The yogī knows exactly who he or she was in a previous birth, specifies Bhoja Rāja, what sort of a person in what sort of circumstance.» — Bhoja Rāja precisa el alcance de ese conocimiento
«The connection between cause and effect is hereby revealed, says Rāmānanda Sarasvatī—every type of birth, after all, whether human, animal, or celestial, is the fruit of previous activities, karma.» — Rāmānanda Sarasvatī lee el poder como revelación del nexo entre causa y efecto
«Again, the ability to access previous births surfaces frequently in Indic texts: The Buddha, for example, by marshaling “all the techniques of dhyāna, meditation” on the night of his ultimate enlightenment, was able to bring to mind all his previous births, according to his hagiography.» — Bryant consigna que el recuerdo de vidas pasadas es común en las hagiografías índicas, la del Buddha incluida
«Bhoja Rāja elaborates here that refrainment from covetousness involves not coveting the means of enjoyment, and this includes the body, which is the mechanism of enjoyment.» — Bhoja Rāja extiende la aparigraha al propio cuerpo, mecanismo del goce
«Along the same lines, Hariharānanda states that delusion stemming from attachment to one’s body obstructs knowledge of the past and future.» — Hariharānanda explica qué bloquea ese conocimiento
«One might imagine the citta as a lake, and saṁskāras as pebbles within it.» — la imagen del lago y las piedras para la citta y los saṁskāras
«When rajas and tamas are prevalent, in contrast, it becomes choppy and murky, and even recent memories are difficult to bring to recollection.» — Bryant cierra la imagen: con rajas y tamas el agua se encrespa
«R. S. Bhattacharya (1985, 149–51) takes the janma-kathantā-sambodhaḥ of this sūtra to refer not to knowledge of previous births arising in the mind of the yogī free of coveting, but to thoughts arising in the minds of people associated with the yogī.» — Bryant recoge la lectura distinta de R. S. Bhattacharya sobre II.39; el año entre paréntesis es referencia impresa dentro de la frase
«Specifically, impressed by the yogī’s attitude of aparigraha, refrainment, people wonder about the birth of the yogī.» — en esa lectura, lo que se revela es el asombro ajeno ante el desapego del yogī
«The next few sūtras are directed toward the side effects generated by the perfection of the niyamas.» — Bryant describe la serie que sigue: los efectos colaterales de perfeccionar los niyamas
«By the practice of cleanliness, śauca, say the commentators, attraction to the opposite sex evaporates, as it does by the contemplation of the realities of the body.» — los comentaristas hacen de la śauca el fin de la atracción sexual
«Patañjali indicates that when one meditates on the act of cleanliness, and the reality of the body and its temporary and skin-deep beauty, one develops a distaste for it, jugupsā, and consequently for sensual contact with other bodies, parair asaṁsargaḥ.» — Bryant glosa II.40 por lo que el sūtra dice: desagrado del cuerpo propio y no trato con los ajenos
«This, of course, does not preclude appreciating the body in nonerotic ways—as a vehicle of enlightenment or a temple of God, for example.» — Bryant acota el alcance: no queda excluido apreciar el cuerpo de modo no erótico
«The yogī conveys love for other beings through compassion, friendliness, spiritual exchanges, and other expressions that rise above physical sensuality.» — Bryant describe cómo el yogī expresa el amor: compasión y amistad por encima de la sensualidad
«Some extreme Śaivite groups, for example, smear themselves with taboo substances and meditate in cremation grounds as catalysts in transcending bodily identification.» — Bryant consigna la práctica extrema de ciertos grupos śaivas con sustancias tabú
«Patañjali is not recommending such practices here—on the contrary, he is promoting cleanliness as an indispensable limb of yoga—but a similar type of meditation on the realities of the constituents of the body underpins the intent of this sūtra.» — Bryant marca la distancia: Patañjali no recomienda esas prácticas
«II.40 śaucāt svāṅga-jugupsā parair asaṁsargaḥ śaucāt, from cleanliness; svāṅga, one’s body; jugupsā, distaste; paraiḥ, with others; asaṁsargaḥ, cessation of union, intercourse, or contact By cleanliness, one [develops] distaste for one’s body and the cessation of contact with others.» — II.40, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant
«II.42 santoṣād anuttamaḥ sukha-lābhaḥ santoṣāt, from contentment; anuttamaḥ, the highest; sukha, happiness; lābhaḥ, the attainment From contentment, the highest happiness is attained.» — II.42, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: del contento sale la felicidad más alta
«As austerity is practiced, says Vyāsa, the impure covering of dirt, aśuddhi (tamas and rajas), is destroyed, and as this happens, the siddhis, or mystical powers of the body such as clairvoyance and clairaudience, manifest.» — Vyāsa liga el tapas a la aparición de poderes como la clarividencia y la clariaudiencia
«The commentators thus take Patañjali’s perfection of the body, kāyendriya-siddhi, as a reference to the various mystical powers, siddhis, that are the by-product of yoga, which will be discussed in the next chapter.» — los comentaristas leen la perfección del cuerpo de II.43 como los poderes del capítulo III
«Bhoja Rāja and Rāmānanda Sarasvatī take Patañjali’s impurities here to refer to the kleśas.» — Bhoja Rāja y Rāmānanda Sarasvatī identifican las impurezas con los kleśas
«Hariharānanda understands them to be subjection to the limitations of the body, such as hunger, thirst, and other cravings.» — Hariharānanda las lee como sujeción a hambre, sed y otros apremios; las dos lecturas quedan una junto a otra
«Siddhis, then, are specifically the by-product of tapas, in this view.» — Bryant resume la lectura de Hariharānanda: los siddhis como subproducto del tapas
«Hariharānanda notes that jñānīs, those following the path of jñāna-yoga, the yoga of knowledge, generally do not develop these siddhis because they cultivate renunciation and discrimination rather than austerity.» — Hariharānanda explica por qué los jñānīs no obtienen siddhis
«II.44 svādhyāyād iṣṭa-devatā-samprayogaḥ svādhyāyāt, study of scripture; iṣṭa, desired, preferred; devatā, with the deity; samprayogaḥ, connection From study [of scripture], a connection with one’s deity of choice is established.» — II.44, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: del estudio sale el trato con la deidad elegida
«From study, according to Vyāsa and the other commentators, the ṛṣi sages, celestial beings, and perfected siddhas become visible, and they assist in the yogī’s work.» — Vyāsa lee II.44 por la aparición de los ṛṣis que asisten al yogī
«When svādhyāya is established, however, the mantra and the deity it represents remain uninterruptedly present in the mind.» — Bryant fija la condición del poder: mantra y deidad presentes sin interrupción
«This does not occur when the mind is sometimes fixed on the mantra and sometimes distracted.» — el reverso de la condición: la atención intermitente no basta
«Indeed, we will see in Vyāsa’s commentary in III.51 that the minor gods try to distract the yogī from the path and lure him or her back to worldly sensory stimulation.» — Bryant adelanta lo que III.51 dirá de los dioses menores, que distraen al yogī
«Given Patañjali’s goals, iṣṭa-devatā here must therefore refer to the forms of īśvara, as it is used in theistic texts,83 rather than some minor deity.» — Bryant argumenta que el iṣṭa-devatā de II.44 solo puede ser una forma de Īśvara
«My own view is that he must necessarily have been either a Vaiṣṇava—follower of Viṣṇu/Kṛṣṇa—or a Śaivite—follower of Śiva.» — Bryant declara como opinión propia que Patañjali fue vaiṣṇava o śaiva
«While the sectarian affiliations of the reputed founders of these theistic schools cannot be determined with certainty, the overall later Nyāya Vaiśeṣika tradition seems to have been Śaivite,86 and the Vedānta, including Śaṇkara, Vaiṣṇava.» — Bryant consigna que las afiliaciones sectarias de los fundadores no se determinan; el troceo imprime aquí *Śaṇkara* con ṇ
«From a close study of the sūtras, it is clear that Patañjali is not just a yogī but also an astute intellectual,87 and thus it seems impossible that he was unfamiliar with such sources.» — Bryant niega que Patañjali desconociera las fuentes teístas de su tiempo
«Monotheism, if the term is to be applied to the Purāṇic tradition, needs to be understood in the context of a Supreme Being, whether understood as Viṣṇu, Śiva, or Devī, who can manifest himself or herself into other Supreme Beings (albeit all of them secondary to the original godhead).» — Bryant acota el uso del término monoteísmo para la tradición purāṇica
«Since, as we have seen, svādhyāya is mandatory as an ingredient of kriyā-yoga and as a niyama, we can conclude that all yogīs are expected to have an iṣṭa-devatā for the practice of yoga.» — Bryant deriva de la obligatoriedad del svādhyāya que todo yogī tenga un iṣṭa-devatā
«I will merely note here that, despite the paucity of explicit data, the strongest evidence for a Vaiṣṇava orientation is the fact that Patañjali himself is considered an incarnation of Viṣṇu’s carrier, Śeṣa.» — Bryant señala el testimonio más fuerte que hay sobre la deidad de Patañjali: su forma tradicional de encarnación de Śeṣa
«One cannot make too much of this, since, while the Viṣṇu-related evidence might have a few snippets more with which to recommend itself, the question is theoretical and one cannot ignore the fact that Patañjali chose not to proclaim who his iṣṭa-devatā is.» — Bryant pone el límite a su propia inferencia: Patañjali nunca declara su deidad
«II.45 samādhi-siddhir īśvara-praṇidhānāt samādhi, ultimate meditative state; siddhiḥ, perfection; īśvara, the Lord, God; praṇidhānāt, from submission, surrender From submission to God comes the perfection of samādhi.» — II.45, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: de la entrega a Dios la perfección del samādhi
«Of all the boons noted in the sūtras as accruing from the observance of the yamas and niyamas, it is only from Īśvara-praṇidhāna that samādhi, the actual and absolute goal of yoga, is attained.» — Bryant señala lo que distingue a este don entre todos los de los niyamas
«Although Patañjali does not mandate that the yogī mediate on Īśvara in the samādhi section of the first chapter, he certainly dedicates far more attention to Īśvara than any other meditative alternative.» — Bryant mide la atención que el texto da a Īśvara frente a las demás alternativas
«Granted, he allows that one can meditate on any object and attain the goal of yoga (I.39), but only one object out of the universe of possible objects can, in addition to serving as a meditational prop for the mind, intervene and bypass or at least accelerate the normal process of practice by bestowing samādhi on the practitioner as an act of grace.» — Bryant acota: cualquier objeto sirve, y solo Īśvara puede conceder la meta por gracia
«It is hard to avoid the fact that Patañjali is promoting a theistic system, albeit in a discreet and nondogmatic fashion, and the commentarial tradition certainly reads it in this way.» — Bryant declara difícil de eludir el carácter teísta del sistema, y que la tradición lo lee así
«By such dedication, the yogī knows all he or she desires to know, says Vyāsa, whether it pertains to other places, other times, or other bodies.» — Vyāsa adjudica a esa dedicación un conocer sin límite de lugar, tiempo ni cuerpo
«This sūtra does not mean that the other seven limbs of yoga are redundant, say the commentators.» — los comentaristas niegan que II.45 vuelva redundantes los otros siete miembros
«According to Vācaspati Miśra and Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, the other seven limbs of yoga help the yogī to develop the requisite mental state that allows complete devotion to Īśvara.» — Vācaspati Miśra y Rāmānanda Sarasvatī hacen de los otros miembros la condición de la devoción
«Vijñānabhikṣu puts it differently: One can say either that by mastering the other limbs of yoga by the grace of Īśvara, samādhi is born, or that the other limbs bring about samādhi by the grace of Īśvara but do not have this power themselves.» — Vijñānabhikṣu lo dice al revés: los miembros no tienen ese poder por sí mismos
«Bhoja Rāja states that success is attained in this way because Īśvara, being pleased, removes the kleśa obstacles and awakens samādhi, and other commentators also speak of grace in this connection.» — Bhoja Rāja explica el éxito por el agrado de Īśvara, y Bryant consigna que se habla de gracia
«While one cannot randomly project sectarian Purāṇic theologies onto the sūtras, one also cannot extricate and immunize Patañjali’s Īśvara from the theological landscape of his time.» — Bryant fija su posición entre los dos excesos: ni proyectar teologías sectarias ni arrancar a Patañjali de su paisaje
«We must note before considering the next limb of yoga that Patañjali dedicated sixteen sūtras to the yamas and niyamas (II.30–45), almost a tenth of the entire text, far more than he dedicates to any limb other than samādhi.» — Bryant mide el espacio que el texto da a yamas y niyamas frente a los demás miembros
«They are a crucial and indispensable prerequisite of yoga.» — Bryant enuncia el estatuto de esos dos miembros
«Although the entirety of yoga is typically understood and presented as āsana, physical posture, in the popular representations of the term in the West, it is actually only the third limb of yoga, not an end or goal unto itself» — Bryant marca la distancia entre el yoga entendido como āsana y el lugar que el āsana tiene en el texto
«Indeed, given that he has just dedicated sixteen sūtras to the yamas and niyamas, Patañjali has relatively little to say about āsana, leaving us with only three sūtras on the topic consisting of a total of eight words; or, put differently, considerably less than one percent of the text occupies itself with āsana.» — Bryant cuenta los sūtras: dieciséis a los yamas y niyamas frente a lo poco del āsana
«However, we should not conclude that this limb is irrelevant.» — Bryant acota enseguida: eso no vuelve irrelevante el miembro
«One could also suppose that other extant texts concerned themselves with the specifics of āsanas.» — Bryant propone que otros textos de la época se ocupaban de los āsanas
«While āsana-specific texts may not have survived from that time, we cannot conclude they did not exist.» — Bryant marca el límite del argumento del silencio
«Vyāsa, below, knew of twelve āsanas in the fifth century (more, in fact» — Bryant aporta el dato: Vyāsa conocía doce posturas en el siglo V
«Vijñānabhikṣu takes this position: “An elaboration of āsana is not undertaken here, because our subject matter is rāja-yoga,98 and a full and detailed treatment of this subject is to be found in works on haṭha-yoga.“» — Vijñānabhikṣu remite la elaboración del āsana a las obras de haṭha-yoga; el troceo cierra la cita con una comilla invertida
«Śaṅkara quotes a verse stating that mastery of postures does not produce the goals of yoga; only getting rid of the kleśa obstacles to yoga, and samādhi, undeviated absorption on the object of meditation, can produce the goals of yoga.» — Śaṅkara cita un verso que niega al dominio de las posturas la capacidad de dar la meta
«Vijñānabhikṣu quotes the Garuḍa Purāṇa, which states that āsanas, or yogic postures, are not the goal of yoga; meditative practice is:» — Vijñānabhikṣu apoya lo mismo en el Garuḍa Purāṇa
«The point is that yogic postures are useful only to the extent to which they facilitate fixing the mind completely.» — Bryant fija la utilidad del āsana: en la medida en que deja fijar la mente
«Posture, says Vācaspati Miśra, is the way one sits.» — Vācaspati Miśra define el āsana con una sola frase: el modo de sentarse
«II.46 sthira-sukham āsanam sthira, steady; sukham, comfortable; āsanam, posture Posture should be steady and comfortable.» — II.46, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: la postura, firme y cómoda
«Vācaspati Miśra states that the steadiness Patañjali refers to in this sūtra means that these postures must be held without motion.» — Vācaspati Miśra glosa la firmeza: sin movimiento
«Śaṅkara notes that Vyāsa had written “etc.” after listing these poses, indicating that there can be variations prescribed by the guru.» — Śaṅkara lee el *etcétera* de la lista de Vyāsa como apertura a lo que prescriba el guru
«Śaṅkara states that yoga should be performed in a quiet and pure place, after performing obeisances to the supreme Īśvara, the sages, and one’s own guru.» — Śaṅkara añade las condiciones del sitio y de la obediencia
«Moving around requires effort and is distracting, says the great theistic Vedānta commentator Rāmānuja, and lying down provokes sleep; therefore, one should sit on some support without any bodily effort.» — Bryant recoge a Rāmānuja sobre por qué se practica sentado
«Āsana becomes perfect when all effort or strain, prayatna, ceases and the body no longer trembles, says Vyāsa, and when the citta is absorbed in the infinite, ananta.» — la traducción de II.47 que da Bryant: el āsana se perfecciona cuando cesa el esfuerzo y la mente se absorbe en lo infinito
«The essential idea is that by the practice of āsana, the body should be so relaxed that the yogī ceases to be conscious of it at all, and the mind can thus be directed toward meditation without any bodily distraction or disturbance.» — Bryant resume la finalidad del āsana: que el cuerpo deje de distraer
«II.48 tato dvandvānabhighātaḥ tataḥ, consequently, from this; dvandva, by the opposites; anabhighātaḥ, not afflicted From this, one is not afflicted by the dualities of the opposites.» — II.48, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: del āsana firme sale el no ser vencido por los pares de opuestos
«As is well-known, Patañjali himself is considered to be an incarnation of Śeṣa.» — Bryant consigna la forma tradicional de Patañjali como encarnación de Śeṣa
«According to tradition, Śeṣa, desiring to teach yoga on earth, fell (pat) from the celestial realms into the palm (añjali) of a virtuous woman named Goṇikā.» — el relato tradicional del nacimiento de Patañjali, caído en el regazo de Goṇikā
«By mastering posture, says Vyāsa, one is not overcome, anabhighāta, by dualities, dvandva, such as hot and cold.» — Vyāsa glosa II.48 por el frío y el calor que dejan de vencer al yogī
«Hariharānanda notes that upon mastering āsana, a state of calmness is experienced in the body, which allows for a detachment from the body’s sensations such as hunger and thirst.» — Hariharānanda extiende el efecto al hambre y la sed
«It is a preliminary ingredient in a far larger undertaking.» — Bryant vuelve a situar el āsana como ingrediente preliminar
«One can thus argue for a consecutive interdependence among the limbs, each one presupposing that the yogī is cultivating and mastering the previous ones.» — Bryant propone leer los ocho miembros como serie interdependiente
«Most important for aspiring yogīs, one cannot bypass the yamas and niyamas and expect to be able to fix the mind in the serious and prolonged meditation of the subsequent limbs of yoga.» — Bryant enuncia la consecuencia práctica: no se saltan los yamas y niyamas
«Without cultivating the yamas and niyamas, the mind will not manifest the requisite state of sattva, without which there can be no meditation and thus no serious practice of yoga as defined by Patañjali.» — Bryant repite la condición en negativo
«Vyāsa explains that the śvāsa from this sūtra is the intake of air from the outside, and praśvāsa, the exhalation of air from the stomach.» — Vyāsa define los dos términos del sūtra
«He defines prāṇāyāma to be the suspension, or absence, of both—in other words, the suspension of breath.» — Vyāsa define el prāṇāyāma por la suspensión de ambos movimientos
«Hariharānanda, however (while accepting the definition given by the other commentators), states importantly that there is more to the prāṇāyāma referred to here than just these techniques, some of which receive attention in the fourteenth-century yoga manual Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā.» — Hariharānanda amplía la definición más allá de la técnica y remite al Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā
«He stresses that concentration on one’s object of meditation has to accompany the practice of prāṇāyāma.» — Hariharānanda exige que la concentración acompañe al prāṇāyāma
«In any case, without such arresting of the mind, prāṇāyāma is not yoga but merely a physical feat.» — Bryant enuncia el límite: sin detener la mente, el prāṇāyāma es proeza física
«He further notes that in samādhi, the breath becomes imperceptible, or even wholly suspended.» — Hariharānanda describe el aliento en el samādhi: imperceptible o suspendido
«II.49 tasmin sati śvāsa-praśvāsayor gati-vicchedaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ tasmin, that; sati, is attained; śvāsa, inhalation;» — II.49 con el arranque de su análisis palabra por palabra; el tramo se corta al final de la plana 289
«Time differs from number, says Vijñānabhikṣu, in terms of the method used in calculation.» — Vijñānabhikṣu distingue en II.50 el tiempo del número
«Vācaspati Miśra takes a mātrā to correspond to the time it takes to rub one’s kneecap three times and then snap one’s fingers.» — Vācaspati Miśra mide la mātrā por el tiempo de frotar la rodilla y chasquear los dedos
«He prescribes drawing in the breath through the right nostril for the duration of sixteen mātrās and, once the lungs are full, holding the breath for sixty-four mātrās, after which one exhales for the duration of thirty-two mātrās.» — Vācaspati Miśra da la serie de tiempos del prāṇāyāma en mātrās
«Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu also differ in their understanding of Vyāsa’s mild, middling, and intense demarcations.» — Bryant consigna el desacuerdo entre los dos sobre los grados de Vyāsa, sin arbitrarlo
«Hariharānanda recommends the internal chanting of mantras as an alternative to the various mātrā techniques, using the repetition of a certain number of mantras to demarcate the duration of the periods separating inhalation, exhalation, and suppression.» — Hariharānanda propone el canto interno de mantras en lugar de contar mātrās
«By practice, says Vyāsa, these restrictions of breath become drawn out, dīrgha, and subtle, sūkṣma.» — Vyāsa describe el efecto de la práctica: la restricción se alarga y se sutiliza
«Vyāsa states that the third type of suppression is brought about by a single effort, whereas the fourth takes place gradually with prolonged effort.» — Vyāsa distingue el tercer tipo de supresión del cuarto por cómo se logra
«Caturthaḥ, in contrast, says Vijñānabhikṣu, involves an extension of the cessation of breath that occurs after exhalation and inhalation in recaka and pūraka that is not determined by time and number, and the adept of this stage of prāṇāyāma can maintain the suppression of breath at will, even for a month or a year.» — Vijñānabhikṣu mide la extensión del cuarto tipo en meses o un año
«The Gītā also speaks of prāṇāpānau samau, the equalizing of the incoming and outgoing breath (V.27), and the practice plays a central role in the Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā (II.74ff; IV.112).» — Bryant señala el paralelo del Gītā y del Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā
«Hariharānanda mentions that he knew of someone who could remain buried alive for ten or twelve days as a result of his ability to restrain the breath, and even the great philosopher of modern times, Dasgupta, claimed to have witnessed a yogī remaining in a state of suspended animation for nine days, without intake of food or drink, and devoid even of heartbeat.» — Hariharānanda declara haber conocido a alguien capaz de quedar enterrado sin latido; el testimonio se consigna como suyo
«Accounts were also documented during the colonial period, such as the case of one Haridas, buried alive in 1837 in the Lahore court of Rāja Runjeet Singh, with extensive precautions taken against fraud, all of which was documented by Sir Claude Martin Wade.» — Bryant consigna que hubo casos documentados en el periodo colonial
«When mastered, one attains mystic powers such as the ability to fly and go anywhere at will.» — Vijñānabhikṣu adjudica al dominio del cuarto prāṇāyāma el volar y el ir a voluntad
«Although he was only five years old, the boy betook himself to the forest and practiced severe austerities with a view to attaining an audience with the supreme Lord Viṣṇu.» — el relato de Dhruva en el bosque a los cinco años
«Because of his complete absorption on the Lord of the universe, Dhruva’s personal condition emanated out and pervaded the whole universe, such that all other beings also became deprived of breath.» — el relato lleva la absorción de Dhruva hasta privar de aliento a los demás
«He quotes a verse that “there is no greater ascetic practice than prāṇāyāma, from which defects are purified and the light of knowledge shines forth.”» — el verso que Vyāsa cita: no hay austeridad mayor que el prāṇāyāma
«Manu, too, states that from the performance of prāṇāyāma accompanied by the repetition of the oṁ mantra, “the impurities of the sensory powers are burnt away, just as the defiling impurities of metal ore are burnt away in the heat of the furnace” (VI.72).» — Bryant suma el testimonio de Manu VI.72, con la imagen del horno
«II.52 tataḥ kṣīyate prakāśāvaraṇam tataḥ, then; kṣīyate, is weakened; prakāśa, illumination; āvaraṇam, covering Then, the covering of the illumination [of knowledge] is weakened.» — II.52, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: se debilita lo que cubre la luz
«This covering of karma is weakened, says Vyāsa, by the practice of prāṇāyāma.» — Vyāsa adjudica ese debilitamiento al prāṇāyāma
«II.53 dhāraṇāsu ca yogyatā manasaḥ dhāraṇāsu, for concentration; ca, and; yogyatā, fitness, competency; manasaḥ, mind Additionally, the mind becomes fit for concentration.» — II.53, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant
«Patañjali now introduces the fifth limb of yoga, pratyāhāra, which is when the senses do not come into contact with the sense objects, svaviṣayaasamprayoga, a practice referred to as early as the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VIII.15).» — Bryant introduce el pratyāhāra y remonta el término al Chāndogya Upaniṣad
«Bhoja Rāja says that once freed from its defects by these breathing techniques, the mind can remain fixed wherever it is directed;» — Bhoja Rāja describe la mente ya libre de defectos por las técnicas del aliento
«II.55 tataḥ paramā vaśyatendriyāṇām tataḥ, from this; paramā, highest; vaśyatā, control; indriyāṇām, of the senses From this comes the highest control of the senses.» — II.55, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: de ahí el dominio supremo de los sentidos
«II.51 bāhyābhyantara-viṣayākṣepī caturthaḥ bāhya, external; ābhyantara, internal; viṣaya, the sphere, range; ākṣepī, surpassing; caturthaḥ, the fourth» — II.51 con su análisis palabra por palabra: el cuarto prāṇāyāma excede lo externo y lo interno
«The Yoga tradition has long been full of accounts of yogīs who have suspended their breath and been buried alive for prolonged periods and» — Bryant sitúa esos relatos dentro de una tradición larga y los presenta como relatos
«The primary subject matter of this chapter is the vibhūtis (siddhis), the mystic powers, and these are attained by performing saṁyama on various objects.» — Bryant nombra la materia del capítulo III: los vibhūtis o siddhis obtenidos por saṁyama
«Moreover, Patañjali considers the five previous limbs of yoga to be the external limbs and the final three limbs of yoga discussed here to be internal (III.6), a division that further contributes to a logic of separation into different pādas, chapters.» — Bryant explica el corte entre capítulos: cinco miembros externos y tres internos
«Although Patañjali does not specify the nature of the object upon which dhāraṇā is to be performed, Vācaspati Miśra and Rāmānanda Sarasvatī quote a series of verses from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (VI.7.77–85) that recommend theistic meditation on the form of Viṣṇu on the grounds that since concentration requires an object, when one concentrates on the beautiful personal form of the Lord, one has no desire to think of anything else, since nothing else can compete in attractiveness.» — Bryant consigna que el sūtra no especifica el objeto de la concentración
«Hariharānanda points out that the difference between these limbs of yoga is only one of degree: In concentration, the attention on the object is intermittent or distracted; in meditation, it is unbroken and undistracted.» — Hariharānanda distingue dhāraṇā de dhyāna por la continuidad
«Meditation, he states, is when the mind flows on the object of thought without any interruption, like the smooth and even flow of oil or honey, which pours forth in one thick, uninterrupted stream.» — Hariharānanda describe el dhyāna como flujo espeso e ininterrumpido
«Vijñānabhikṣu states that dhāranā, concentration, can be disrupted if the senses come in contact with objects that are extremely dear to the practitioner, but this does not occur in dhyāna when one is fully absorbed:» — Vijñānabhikṣu marca la fragilidad de la dhāraṇā frente a la absorción plena
«The sixth and seventh limbs of yoga and, as will be seen below, the eighth as well, are not different practices as is the case with the previous five limbs, but a continuation and deepening of the same practice.» — Bryant lee los tres últimos miembros como profundización de una misma práctica
«There is no knowledge equal to Sāṅkhya; there is no power like that of yoga.» — arranca el largo pasaje del Mahābhārata que Bryant traduce aquí: ningún saber como el Sāṅkhya, ningún poder como el yoga
«Only people lacking wisdom say that these are different. But we, O king, see them as one without any doubt.» — el mismo pasaje declara una sola cosa las dos vías
«They say that the topmost practice of yoga is of two kinds, according to what is revealed in the scriptures: yoga with “qualities” and yoga without “qualities.”» — el pasaje reparte el yoga supremo en dos clases según la escritura
«One should cast off the fivefold faults of the five senses: sound, form, touch, taste, and smell [pratyāhāra II.54].» — el pasaje prescribe desechar los cinco defectos de los sentidos, y Bryant remite entre corchetes al pratyāhāra de II.54
«The manas should then be fixed on the ego, ahaṅkāra, O Lord of men; the ahaṅkāra on the intelligence, buddhi; and the buddhi, in turn, on prakṛti.» — el pasaje escalona la fijación: manas en ahaṅkāra, ahaṅkāra en buddhi, buddhi en prakṛti
«III.1 deśa-bandhaś cittasya dhāraṇā deśa, place; bandhaḥ, bound, fixed; cittasya, of the mind; dhāraṇā, concentration» — III.1 con su análisis palabra por palabra: dhāraṇā es atar la mente a un lugar
«After undertaking this progression, one should meditate on the puruṣa,» — el pasaje del Mahābhārata remata la escala en el puruṣa; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 304 llamándolo señor y Brahman imperecedero
«The wise speak of the yogī as like the upward motionless flame of a lamp full of oil burning in a windless place.» — la imagen de la llama quieta en sitio sin viento, con que el pasaje describe al yogī
«The demeanor of the yogī is not moved by the noise of assorted conches and drums being played together, nor by outbursts of song.» — el pasaje describe al yogī inmóvil ante caracolas, tambores y cantos
«It is in this way that, after the passage of much time [in practice], the yogī enters the state of transcendent liberation (kevala) upon leaving the body, O king.» — el pasaje del Mahābhārata cierra con la liberación al dejar el cuerpo, tras mucho tiempo de práctica
«III.3 tad evārtha-mātra-nirbhāsam svarūpa-śūnyam iva samādhiḥ tat, that [the practice of dhyāna from the previous sūtra]; eva, the same, the very one; artha, object; mātra, alone; nirbhāsam, shining forth; svarūpa, own form, own self; śūnyam, devoid of; iva, as if; samādhiḥ, meditative absorption» — III.3 con su análisis palabra por palabra: el samādhi como dhyāna en que solo brilla el objeto
«The character of the yogī is like a rock, which is incapable of being moved even when pummeled by torrents of rain pouring down» — la imagen de la roca bajo el aguacero, en el mismo pasaje del Mahābhārata
«These are the characteristics of the sage yogī, which are displayed due to resolve and to controlling the activities» — el pasaje resume los rasgos del yogī por la resolución y el control
«Vyāsa states that when the mind is so fully absorbed in the object of meditation that it loses all notions of itself as a self-conscious, reflective mind, svarūpa-śunyam, one has reached the state of samādhi.» — Vyāsa da la condición del samādhi: absorción plena en el objeto
«Also, as Bhoja Rāja reminds us, from the threefold aspect of knowledge—the object itself, the name of the object, and the idea of the object in a person’s mind—the latter two are eliminated in the samādhi referred to here, and only the object itself occupies the yogī’s awareness exclusively.» — Bhoja Rāja señala que de los tres componentes del conocer queda solo el objeto
«The commentators reintroduce the example of a pure crystal which, when placed next to a red flower, appears to completely lose its own character by reflecting the form and color of the flower exclusively.» — los comentaristas vuelven a la imagen del cristal que toma el color de la flor
«In other words, any subconscious awareness, however subtle, that “I am meditating on this object” ceases.» — Bryant nombra lo que cesa en el samādhi: hasta la conciencia sutil de estar meditando
«At this stage, the mind suddenly attains liberation (nirvāṇa), and enters the state of freedom, detached and without objects, like the flame of a lamp [when it is extinguished].» — el pasaje que Bryant traduce compara la liberación con la llama que se apaga
«The yogī, as a result of this supreme dissolution of the mind, becomes situated in the wonders of the ātman, and, attaining the nature of the higher self, realizes that the cause of the experiences of pleasure and pain (duḥkha) that he had previously attributed to his own self, were actually occurring in the ahaṅkāra, which has no ultimate and enduring reality.» — el mismo pasaje declara al ego sin realidad última
«Returning to Patañjali’s more frugal sūtras, this verse informs us that when dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi are performed together, ekatra, on an object, the act of concentration is called saṁyama.» — Bryant vuelve del pasaje largo al sūtra y glosa el término saṁyama
«Vyāsa uses the term tāntrika to describe this, and, certainly, the tantras are a body of texts that, among other things, deal with the types of mystic powers that occupy the bulk of this chapter.» — Vyāsa llama tāntrika a esta materia, y Bryant consigna que ocupa el grueso del capítulo
«The commentators simply state that rather than laboriously list all three each time dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi are to be performed together, Patañjali has introduced a technical term, saṁyama, to refer to the application of the three of them in sequence.» — los comentaristas explican el término como abreviatura de la aplicación sucesiva de los tres
«His reply seems to be that all three types of contemplation are required in order to know an object thoroughly in all its aspects.» — Hariharānanda explica por qué hacen falta los tres para conocer un objeto entero
«III.4 trayam ekatra saṁyamaḥ trayam, three; ekatra, together; saṁyamaḥ, saṁyama» — III.4 con su análisis palabra por palabra: los tres miembros internos practicados juntos son saṁyama
«III.5 taj-jayāt prajñālokaḥ tat, that; jayāt, from mastery; prajñā, wisdom; ālokaḥ, vision, light From saṁyama comes insight.» — III.5, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: del dominio del saṁyama sale la visión
«III.6 tasya bhūmiṣu viniyogaḥ tasya, its; bhūmiṣu, on the stages or planes; viniyogaḥ, application Saṁyama is applied on the [different] stages [of samādhi].» — III.6, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: el saṁyama se aplica por etapas
«one cannot skip a step with one’s eye on a higher stage and expect to attain the insight mentioned in the previous sūtra.» — Vyāsa prohíbe saltarse una etapa mirando a la siguiente
«No one who sets off for the river Gaṅgā from Śilāhrada, says Vācaspati Miśra, reaches there without passing across the Meghavana.» — la imagen geográfica de Vācaspati Miśra para la marcha por etapas
«An archer can pierce more subtle targets only when he has mastered larger ones, says Vijñānabhikṣu, and one can climb stairs only step by step.» — la imagen del arquero, que atina en lo pequeño tras dominar lo grande
«The only exception to this progression recognized by the commentators is for one who has attained the higher stages by the grace of God, Īśvara.» — los comentaristas admiten una sola excepción a la progresión: la gracia de Īśvara
«Vijñānabhikṣu notes that certain elevated souls like Jaḍabharata directly attain the stage of saṁyama simply by virtue of their yogic practices in former lives, without the need to practice the other limbs of yoga in this life.» — Vijñānabhikṣu pone a Jaḍabharata como ejemplo de quien llega sin practicar los otros miembros en esta vida
«The point is that the goal of yoga is samādhi, and Vijñānabhikṣu goes on to quote the Garuḍa Purāṇa,31 which states that āsanas and such external practices, in and of themselves, do not lead to the goal of yoga; indeed, these can be impediments to the real goal of yoga.» — Bryant vuelve a fijar la meta y a acotar lo que no lleva a ella
«Śaṅkara quotes a similar verse in this regard, that āsanas alone do not produce the goals of yoga; samādhi meditation does, and nothing else.» — Śaṅkara cita un verso que niega a las āsanas por sí solas el fruto del yoga
«Fix your mind on me alone; absorb your intellect in me. You will thus dwell in me without a doubt.» — Bryant traduce el verso del Gītā que Vijñānabhikṣu trae aquí
«Since change and movement at every moment are the very nature of the guṇas, says Vyāsa, the question arises as to what type of change takes place during the moments when the mind is restrained, which by definition should entail no change or movement at all.» — Vyāsa plantea la objeción metafísica: si los guṇas son movimiento, cómo hay restricción
«Saṁskāras are not destroyed; they are either active or latent (although, as we know, they can be weakened or burnt and thereby rendered impotent).» — Bryant repite el estatuto de los saṁskāras: activos o latentes, nunca destruidos
«By practicing meditation, the force or potency of the outgoing saṁskāras from the store of saṁskāras is gradually lessened, and the emergence and strengthening of nirodha ones increased—although, as Vijñānabhikṣu points out, this is a gradual process that increases through practice.» — Bryant describe el mecanismo: mengua la potencia de los saṁskāras salientes y crece la de los restrictivos
«Or, as Śaṅkara puts it, meditative absorption lasts for as long as the remaining saṁskāras are not overcome by outgoing saṁskāras.» — Śaṅkara mide la duración de la absorción por esa relación de fuerzas
«comes about only when all eight limbs of yoga have reached their conclusion, says Vyāsa.» — Vyāsa condiciona el nirbīja-samādhi al remate de los ocho miembros
«Even in deep meditation, a continuous sequence of restraining saṁskāras is in motion in the controlled mind.» — Bryant consigna que hasta en la meditación honda hay una secuencia de saṁskāras en movimiento
«One might note here, given the periodic statements in the texts to establishing the Yoga position on mind and consciousness in distinction to the Buddhist one, as well as the dedication of a good portion of Chapter IV by Patañjali and the commentators to this end, that, at least on a surface level, both traditions do accept that external reality consists of a never-ending flow of interdependent, interconnected phenomena.» — Bryant señala el punto en que el Yoga y el budismo coinciden: el flujo sin término de fenómenos interdependientes
«The difference is that in Śaṅkhya, the saṁskāras or aṇus do not actually disappear but revolve back into their substratum, which is ultimately prakṛti.» — Bryant marca dónde se separan: en el Sāṅkhya los saṁskāras vuelven a su sustrato; el troceo imprime aquí *Śaṅkhya* con Ś
«Hence Patañjali uses the term flow, vāhitā, in this sūtra.» — Bryant se detiene en el término que el sūtra usa, flujo
«Thus, while both traditions might agree on the basic flux of the surface level of reality—the “flow” of this sūtra—their differences lie in whether there is a permanent substratum that underpins it.» — Bryant deja las dos posiciones enfrentadas sobre si hay sustrato permanente
«III.11 sarvārthataikāgratayoḥ kṣayodayau cittasya samādhi-pariṇāmaḥ sarva-arthatā, [focused on] all objects; eka-agratayoḥ, focused on one object; kṣaya, destruction; udayau, rise; cittasya, of the mind; samādhi, meditative absorption; pariṇāmaḥ, transformation» — III.11 con su análisis palabra por palabra: la transformación del samādhi como mengua de la dispersión y crecida de la unipuntualidad
«Vācaspati Miśra reminds us that nothing is ever destroyed—when one of these propensities of the mind arises, that is, when one set of saṁskāras discussed in the last verse activates, the other propensity always remains latent.» — Vācaspati Miśra repite que nada se destruye: la propensión queda latente
«Vijñānabhikṣu adds that changing the nature of the mind is a gradual process; it does not occur instantly, as anyone who has experimented with fixing the mind on one object for a prolonged period will know.» — Vijñānabhikṣu declara gradual el cambio de la naturaleza de la mente
«One might object that this constant change of one image by another, albeit identical, image during meditation nonetheless means that the mind is in reality not actually fixed and unmoving at all, says Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, since these momentary images are constantly succeeding each other and thus coming and going in constant movement.» — Rāmānanda Sarasvatī plantea la objeción: si todo cambia, la mente nunca está fija
«What this actually means is that, in meditation, the constant movement of the mind is focused on the same image—it is one-pointed— while during normal consciousness, the constant movement of the mind can randomly flit about and temporarily focus on anything at any given moment.» — Bryant responde: en la meditación el movimiento constante se da dentro de la misma imagen
«Technically, it is rajas that impels movement; both sattva and tamas are quiescent by nature.» — Bryant adjudica el movimiento a rajas y la quietud a los otros dos guṇas
«Vijñānabhikṣu does well to point out that while yoga is defined as citta-vṛtti-nirodha, technically speaking this entails all vṛttis other than the one solitary stable vṛtti containing the object of concentration.» — Vijñānabhikṣu precisa que el yoga no suprime la vṛtti estable del objeto
«Patañjali here essentially indicates that the constant change underpinning all manifest reality can be categorized according to dharma, lakṣaṇa, and avasthā, characteristics, state, and condition.» — Bryant glosa III.13: el cambio se ordena en dharma, lakṣaṇa y avasthā
«If a gold vessel, says Vyāsa, is melted and made into something else, it does not cease to be gold.» — la imagen del oro fundido, con que Vyāsa separa la sustancia de sus formas
«The point in all this is that the guṇas, which underpin all reality whether of the nature of mind or pots, engage in ceaseless activity—things are always changing from future to present to past, from old to new, from pots back into clay and then from clay anew into cups and saucers.» — Bryant aplica la misma regla a los guṇas y al barro
«But the underlying material substance does not change; only its characteristics, condition, and states change.» — Bryant fija lo que no cambia frente a lo que sí
«The clay remains the underlying substance, even when transformed into items with specific characteristics such as pots and then again cups, and irrespective of the time and state in which these items are to be found at any given point.» — Bryant repite el punto con el barro
«The commentators connect these categories to the mind and the discussion in the previous sūtras: The dharma of the mind at any given moment is all-pointed—roaming about uncontrolled—or one-pointed.» — los comentaristas trasladan esas categorías a la mente
«The Yoga school, along with the Sāṅkhya school, subscribes to a metaphysical view called satkārya, that any effect is present in its cause.» — Bryant nombra la doctrina satkārya que sostiene todo el argumento
«The difference between a banyan tree and a bed of roses or anything else is simply its configuration of aṇus.» — Bryant reduce la diferencia entre dos cosas a la configuración de sus átomos
«In other words, we may call a clay object a pot or plate but essentially it is nothing but a transformation of clay.» — Bryant reduce el nombre a etiqueta: la olla sigue siendo barro transformado
«The Yoga school thus demarcates itself from other schools such as Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which, as subscribers to the asatkārya-vāda view, hold that the effect is not in one single underlying substratum such as prakṛti, as per the satkārya-vāda position, but rather in multiple distinct and separate causes,36 or Buddhism, which holds that there are no ultimate, eternal, autonomous underlying substrata at all.» — Bryant sitúa al Yoga entre Nyāya y budismo por la cuestión del sustrato
«Everything is essentially everything, says Vyāsa, at least potentially, since ultimately prakṛti and her guṇas are inherent and underpin all reality.» — Vyāsa enuncia la consecuencia extrema de la doctrina: todo es todo, al menos en potencia
«Due to the conditions of time, space, and various other causal factors, this substratum, prakṛti, does not manifest everything at one and the same time—saffron grows in Kashmir and not Pañcāla, the monsoon rains come in the summer and not the winter, and a deer gives birth to a deer and not a man, says Vācaspati Miśra—but this is due to different external factors and conditions, the same substratum remains.» — Bryant explica la variedad por las condiciones, con el sustrato constante
«Thus, since everything exists in potential form in prakṛti, by manipulating or rearranging the subtle substructure of physical reality and the normal conditions that historically or naturally operate on it in conventional reality, a yogī can cause matter to behave in what appears to be supernatural or miraculous ways.» — Bryant deriva de ahí la posibilidad de los siddhis: manipular lo que está en potencia
«From the perspective of Yoga metaphysics, however, there is nothing magical about such phenomena, once the Sāṅkhyan physics underpinning reality is understood and the techniques for manipulating this reality outlined below are mastered.» — Bryant marca el giro: desde esta metafísica los poderes no son milagro
«These are universalized evolutes—they underpin the universe of all manifest things—but they also exist in individualized form—each individual living being has its own buddhi and ahaṅkāra.» — Bryant señala el doble estatuto de los evolutos: universales e individuales
«According to almost all Buddhist sects, there is no underlying substance, dharmin, that pervades the temporary forms and states of manifest reality.» — Bryant expone la negación budista del sustrato
«Thus, while the Buddhists would accept the notion of the “change in the characteristics, state, and condition of objects and of the senses” from the previous sūtra, they would consider these to be the ultimate nature of reality and not qualities of a dharmin, substratum (prakṛti), as indicated in this sūtra.» — Bryant señala dónde coinciden y dónde no: el cambio sí, el dharmin no
«As Vācaspati Miśra puts it: Yajñadatta does not recall something seen by Devadatta!» — Vācaspati Miśra objeta al budismo por la memoria: uno no recuerda lo que vio otro
«If everything is constantly changing, then an actor who acts and thus plants a seed of karmic reaction one minute would not be the same person who would receive the fruit later.» — el segundo argumento del Yoga contra el budismo: sin sustrato no hay quien reciba el fruto del karma
«All change is thus a sequence of characteristics, not a change of substance, in this case, clay (of course, as noted previously, clay itself in this example is in turn a characteristic of an even more subtle substratum, prakṛti and her finer evolutes; thus something can simultaneously be a substratum for further transformations and itself a transformation of a substratum even more subtle than itself).» — Bryant enuncia la tesis de III.15: secuencia de características y no cambio de sustrato
«Mystical truth claims that lie outside the boundaries of verifiable observation or reason are therefore explicitly or implicitly dismissed as inaccurate» — Bryant describe cómo el estudio corriente trata las afirmaciones místicas
«Moreover, they inevitably assume elitist perspectives, since they suppose that such sociopsychological forces were unknown to the hapless mystic who reported them (who consequently is implicitly construed as a victim of greater forces he or she does not understand or, indeed, is even aware of).» — Bryant objeta a la lectura reduccionista por el supuesto elitista que lleva dentro
«And, of course, the limitations of the scholars own “rational” or empirical worldview is also typically left unchallenged.» — Bryant señala lo que esa lectura no somete a examen: sus propios límites
«Obviously, no one can be fully objective, but the attempt is made to situate oneself in the life-world of the other.» — Bryant declara su propio criterio: no objetividad plena sino el intento de situarse en el mundo del otro
«This section, then, will be descriptive and attempt to represent the subject matter through traditional categories (although obviously any attempt at descriptive representation is a priori an interpretation).» — Bryant declara descriptiva la sección de los siddhis, con la salvedad de que describir ya es interpretar
«III.15 kramānyatvam pariṇāmānyatve hetuḥ krama, succession, sequence; anyatvam, change; pariṇāma, transformation; anyatve, in change; hetuḥ, the cause» — III.15 con su análisis palabra por palabra: el cambio de secuencia como causa del cambio de transformación
«Other scholars find such reductionistic modes of interpretation» — Bryant consigna la posición contraria dentro del campo académico; el tramo se corta al final de la plana 324
«I will adopt some of the basics of the phenomenological method of interpretation here, as I have done throughout, but I will also attempt to make sense of these claims from within the parameters of the Sāṅkhya school of metaphysics;» — Bryant declara su método para la sección de los siddhis: fenomenología dentro del marco metafísico del Sāṅkhya
«I thus take a different approach from much recent scholarship, even that penned by scholars otherwise highly appreciative of Yoga’s potential contribution to modern theoretical discussions of mind and consciousness but who clearly find the siddhi section awkward,» — Bryant se separa del estudio reciente, al que ve incómodo con la sección de los siddhis
«Feuerstein is right to adamantly point out that [In] the consensus of scholarly opinion … the supernatural attainments are discordant with Patañjali’s rational approach and his philosophical objectives.» — Bryant da la razón a Feuerstein sobre la tensión entre los poderes y los fines filosóficos del texto
«However, the fact is that one sixth of the aphorisms concerns precisely this recondite aspect of Yoga, and one chapter … is actually entitled vibhūti-pāda.» — Bryant mide el peso de los siddhis: una sexta parte de los aforismos y el nombre del capítulo
«Was Patañjali, after all, not such a staunch rationalist as contemporary interpreters have made him out to be?» — Bryant deja la pregunta abierta sobre el racionalismo que se le atribuye a Patañjali
«However, whether dismissive or accepting, very little effort has been directed toward attempting to provide a coherent explanation of how these siddhis are not only a logical corollary of the parameters of Śaṅkhyan metaphysics but actually inevitable and indispensable to them.» — Bryant señala lo que nadie ha hecho: explicar los siddhis como corolario del sistema
«These powers were not seen as irrational or prephilosophical by scholastics whose intellectual and rational accomplishments continue to impress us today but were inevitable by-products of the presuppositions of these systems; there are no grounds to suppose that any premodern commentators considered them anything other than factual and literal.» — Bryant consigna que los escolásticos no los tenían por irracionales ni por figurados
«Narratives of mystical phenomena pervade the entire Indic textual tradition—not only epic and Purāṇic, it might be noted, but philosophical as well» — Bryant consigna la extensión de esos relatos por toda la tradición textual índica
«Pensa is correct that “the question of ‘powers’ in Yoga and Buddhism in particular has not infrequently been taken into consideration in a biased, oversimple or at any rate excessively summary fashion … the prejudice was thus such as to silence the texts, so to speak”» — Bryant cita a Pensa sobre el silenciamiento de los textos en esta cuestión
«Like it or not, siddhis are integral to the entirety of Hindu beliefs from their earliest Vedic beginnings right up until the ongoing hagiographies of modern Hindu mystics.» — Bryant enuncia el dato sin adorno: los siddhis son parte del hinduismo entero
«White has argued that the most applicable definition of yoga is precisely that of attainment of mystical powers, a definition that “respects both the spirit and the letter of Hindu sources on the uses of the term yoga, in ways that have remained remarkably unchanged from the time of the Upaniṣads down through the Tantras” (2004, 627;» — Bryant recoge la tesis de White, que define el yoga por la obtención de poderes; el año entre paréntesis es referencia impresa dentro de la frase
«Now, one might concede this and (again, one suspects, in the hope of salvaging a “rational” Yoga tradition from a more prerational mythological backdrop) suggest that Patañjali has included this section simply out of deference to the popular cultural expectations of the day concerning yoga.» — Bryant consigna la salida fácil que otros toman: que Patañjali cedió a las expectativas de su tiempo
«In support of this position, one can note that the commentators do not really try to explain the mechanics behind the siddhis, unlike their extensive technical analysis of the mechanisms underpinning citta and the meditative states.» — Bryant da el argumento a favor de esa lectura: los comentaristas no explican la mecánica de los siddhis
«Their commentaries on the siddhis are some of the shortest in the text.» — Bryant mide esos comentarios: de los más breves del libro
«This certainly suggests that they are writing from a position of scholasticism, āgama, rather than claiming to represent any sort of experiential authority, pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, in the matter of siddhis.» — Bryant infiere que escriben desde la escolástica y no desde la experiencia
«Thus buddhi and ahaṅkara, that is to say citta, are the immediate substratum of the tanmātras.» — Bryant fija la escala que hace posibles los siddhis: citta como sustrato inmediato de los tanmātras
«By sheer concentration, the yogī can penetrate the subtle substructure of any material object of meditation, experiencing it, in the savicāra state, as raw tanmātra energy that transcends the limitations of Time and Space, in other words, attain an experience of external reality that is cosmic in scope» — Bryant describe lo que la concentración alcanza: una experiencia de alcance cósmico
«This is an experience of the object, not merely a perception, as all distinctions of subject, object, and process of knowing dissolve, and the object alone stands forth» — Bryant distingue experiencia de percepción
«These types of meditative practices culminate in omniscience (III.49).» — Bryant señala hacia dónde van esas prácticas
«Metaphysically, omniscience means that, since the mind is potentially omnipresent in Yoga, when it regains the ability to manifest this nature in the higher states of samādhi, it can pervade the entirety of prakṛti and as a consequence be aware of every atomic detail within prakṛti (I.40).» — Bryant define la omnisciencia dentro del sistema: cada detalle atómico de prakṛti
«From these points I deduce a hermeneutical principle that I hold as fundamental to understanding how these siddhis might be accepted as physically possible by minds as rational as Patañjali (as also the Buddha and almost all premodern Indic thinkers).» — Bryant declara el principio hermenéutico con que leerá los siddhis
«Specifically, external gross perceivable matter in essence consists of subtler matter, and this of subtler matter still, etc., all of which in Sāṅkhya is ultimately nothing other than a combination of three guṇas.» — Bryant recuerda de qué está hecha la materia perceptible
«Since buddhi is the most subtle dharmin substructure after the raw guṇas of prakṛti themselves, it is in a position to manipulate or determine the nature of all effects emanating from it.» — Bryant sitúa a buddhi como el sustrato desde el que se manipula todo lo demás
«In other words, the yogī is held to be able to transcend the limitations of the kleśas and the ahaṅkāra, which have restricted or localized or, better, individualized a portion of the universal buddhi into the personal buddhi of the adept, and thereby merge into the cosmic buddhi.» — Bryant enuncia la pretensión: el yogī funde su buddhi en el buddhi cósmico
«Thus, by manipulating the substructure one can change the nature of the physical products made of that substructure.» — Bryant da la mecánica del siddhi: manipular el sustrato cambia el producto
«It is more puzzling to understand how concentration leads, not only to the psychological perfection of exhaustive intuition, but even to the acquisition of supernormal powers … [but] if then a yogī has realized a high degree of concentration, could not the psychological aspect of the three guṇas metamorphose itself into its physical aspect?» — Bryant recoge la objeción de Koelman sobre el paso de lo psicológico a lo físico, y la deja planteada
«Again, our challenge here is not whether any of this is factually true from the perspective of modern scientific principles, but to acknowledge the centrality of siddhis to the Yoga tradition and consequently to consider how these siddhis might be construed within the contours of Sāṅkhya metaphysics.» — Bryant acota su propia tarea: no si es cierto sino cómo cabe dentro del sistema
«In the present sūtra, Patañjali states that when saṁyama, which we recall involves practicing dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi simultaneously, is performed on the “characteristics,” “conditions,” and “states” of manifest reality (III.13), the yogī develops the ability to understand the past, atīta, and the future, anāgata.» — Bryant glosa III.16: el saṁyama sobre las tres transformaciones da el pasado y el futuro
«Thus, by perfectly understanding objects in the present, in terms of their characteristics, conditions, and states, the yogī is believed automatically to understand the past that produced them and the future that they, in turn, will produce.» — Bryant explica el poder por el nexo causal, no por prodigio
«Such clarity, Bhoja Rāja states, is inherent in the pure nature of the sāttvic mind when freed from the obstructive interference of tamas.» — Bhoja Rāja adjudica esa claridad a la naturaleza sáttvica de la mente
«Hariharānanda points out that everyone has some ability to predict effects from causes and causes from effects.» — Hariharānanda rebaja el poder a una capacidad común llevada al extremo
«Likewise, economists predict cycles based on present economic indicators and explain present conditions by past financial activity.» — el ejemplo moderno que Bryant añade: el economista que predice ciclos
«Even on the most basic level, mothers can predict that their children will be hyper if they consume too much sugar before bedtime and can understand their change of mood by past causes.» — el ejemplo doméstico: la madre que anticipa el humor de su hijo
«Up to this point, the enterprise has been sonic—sound vibration, dhvani —but once received by the ear, the word manifests its meaning in the mind of the hearer, which is a function of the mind, and not of sound.» — Bryant sitúa el problema de III.17 en la mente y no en el sonido
«According to the sphoṭa view, a meaning-bearing word, śabda, is an autonomous and permanent entity, which is made manifest through physical sounds, dhvani, but independent from them.» — Bryant expone la doctrina del sphoṭa: la palabra portadora de sentido como entidad autónoma
«The dhvani sounds are transitory and they succeed each other.» — Bryant separa los sonidos transitorios del sphoṭa
«Therefore, meaning cannot be considered to be signified by any individual sound, such as g, since otherwise uttering the other letters would be redundant (and g occurs in numerous different words such as gaura).» — el argumento: ningún sonido aislado significa
«Nor can meaning be associated with the entire group of sounds, since each one has already disappeared before the next one is uttered—they are not pronounced at the same time and thus they cannot coexist in an entirety.» — el segundo paso del argumento: tampoco el conjunto, que nunca coexiste
«(The competing school of varṇavāda would say that meaning comes out of the total of the phonemes, varṇas, and although these varṇas are eternal, meaning is not contained in a separate internal» — Bryant consigna la escuela rival, la varṇavāda, y su tesis contraria
«The mind cannot construe meaning from the first phoneme only, since “le-” could refer to “leg,” “left,” “length,” and so many other things.» — Bryant ilustra el argumento con el primer fonema, que no basta
«Sphoṭa can thus be considered as the internal innate expressiveness of the word as a meaning-bearer.» — Bryant define el sphoṭa como expresividad interna innata
«The letters (varṇas) or sounds (dhvanis), are only the outer garment covering the meaning-bearing word, which is distinct from the phonemic clothing in which it is garbed, and the ear is simply the instrument that receives it.» — la imagen del vestido: las letras como ropaje exterior del sentido
«By saṁyama on the distinction between the word, its meaning and the idea it produces, Patañjali informs us here, one gains knowledge of the speech of all creatures.» — la traducción de III.17 que da Bryant
«the advanced yogī is able to perform saṁyama on any sequence of sounds and gain access to the meaning and idea present as the sphoṭa embedded within even if the language is not known.» — Bryant explica el siddhi: el yogī accede al sentido sin conocer la lengua
«This, according to the commentators, would appear to include the sounds of any creature, which, one might suppose, are simply different types of sound combinations animals use to convey meaning, that is, represent some eternal sphoṭa being expressed.» — los comentaristas extienden el siddhi al habla de cualquier criatura
«Alternatively, Hariharānanda understands the mechanics of this siddhi as the yogī being able to trace sounds back to the vocal cords of the speaker, and from there proceed on to the speaker’s mind.» — Hariharānanda da otra mecánica: remontar el sonido hasta la mente del hablante
«III.18 saṁskāra-sākṣāt-karaṇāt pūrva-jāti-jñānam saṁskāra, mental impression; sākṣāt, before one’s eyes, making evident; karaṇāt, by making; pūrva, previous; jāti, births; jñānam, knowledge» — III.18 con su análisis palabra por palabra: del hacer evidentes los saṁskāras sale el conocer los nacimientos anteriores
«According to the commentators, saṁskāras act in various ways: They are the cause of memories, they are the cause of afflictions (ignorance, ego, attachment, aversion, and clinging to life),50 and they are responsible for the fruits that accrue from any and all activities of vice and virtue (karma).» — los comentaristas enumeran las funciones del saṁskāra
«Since, according to yoga psychology, saṁskāras are recorded in their original context, that is, embedded with all the clusters of saṁskāra imprints of the time and place of origin in which they were performed, the yogī can reactivate them as memories and attain knowledge of the details of all previous births.» — Bryant deriva el siddhi de la propia psicología del sistema
«Yogīs are held to be able to obtain knowledge of the previous births of others by the same process.» — Bryant extiende el siddhi a los nacimientos de otros, y lo consigna como lo que la tradición sostiene
«The yogī may be able to read someone’s amorous state of mind, for example, says Vyāsa, but not necessarily know who the beloved is, or perceive fear in someone’s mind but not the tiger who caused it.» — Vyāsa pone los dos ejemplos del límite: el enamoramiento sin el amado, el miedo sin el tigre
«Other commentators, however, are aware that this seems to conflict with the discussion in the previous sūtra, where it is stated that saṁskāras can be accessed only in their context; this should suggest that the yogī should have access to the context of the other person’s state of mind—the object of emotion or fear, as well as the emotion itself, since this would be imprinted as an image on the citta.» — los demás comentaristas señalan la tensión con el sūtra anterior, y Bryant la consigna sin armonizarla
«Vācaspati Miśra states that a body can be seen because it has color. Rays of light strike this and the body becomes visible to the eyes of others.» — Vācaspati Miśra da la mecánica mínima: se ve el cuerpo porque tiene color y la luz lo golpea
«The exact mechanics underpinning this ability to stop light refracting off one’s body are left unexplained by our traditional commentators» — Bryant marca el hueco: los comentaristas clásicos no explican cómo se detiene la refracción
«In support of this explanation, we can note that Vyāsa, in III.45, speaks of invisibility being attained by the yogī “covering himself in the element of ether.» — Bryant apoya la lectura en el propio Vyāsa de III.45, que habla de cubrirse con el elemento éter
«Vyāsa compares karma that is quick to fructify to a wet cloth spread out nicely, which dries quickly, and karma that is not quick to fructify to a wet cloth twisted and bunched up, which dries slowly;» — Vyāsa reparte el karma con el símil del paño: extendido seca pronto, retorcido seca despacio
«the yogī can access this stock of personal karma and, through the process of saṁyama, understand when its fruition will take place.» — Bryant enuncia el siddhi: acceder al acervo de karma propio y saber cuándo fructifica
«Buddhist sources assign this siddhi to the Buddha, who predicted his own death three months in advance,» — Bryant consigna el paralelo budista: al Buda se le adjudica el mismo poder
«The commentaries speak of three types of portents: personal, those associated with other beings, and those associated with divine beings.» — los comentarios reparten los presagios en tres clases: propios, de otros seres y de seres divinos
«Examples of portents heralded by other beings are seeing the messengers of Yama, the lord of death, or unexpectedly seeing one’s departed ancestors.» — el ejemplo de la segunda clase: los mensajeros de Yama o los antepasados difuntos
«Bhoja Rāja states that anyone can be made aware of impending death through such portents, although such information will be vague and not precise» — Bhoja Rāja acota el alcance: cualquiera recibe el aviso, pero vago
«The purpose of gaining knowledge of one’s death from a yogic perspective, says Śaṅkara, is to provoke urgency in fulfilling one’s human obligations in not frittering away one’s life—in other words, to take up yoga seriously and seek liberation.» — Śaṅkara da el para qué del siddhi: urgencia, no curiosidad
«By cultivating friendship toward those who are happy, as prescribed in that sūtra, and performing saṁyama on this feeling, the yogī attains what Vyāsa terms the» — Bryant remite a I.33 y nombra la potencia que Vyāsa le adjudica a la amistad cultivada
«He destroys all envy and hatred from his heart, says Hariharānanda, becomes completely free from malice and harshness, and no thoughts of harming others ever darken his heart, such that all people, whether malicious or not, find him to be a source of comfort and friendship.» — Hariharānanda describe el efecto en quien lo trata, no en quien lo practica
«The commentators note, however, that saṁyama is not directed toward the fourth prescription listed in I.33—equanimity toward the sinful—because equanimity is not a specific feeling but an absence of other feelings; saṁyama would thus seem to require a distinct state of mind as an object of focus, otherwise the meditator has nothing on which to focus.» — los comentaristas excluyen la ecuanimidad de I.33: por ser ausencia de sentimiento, no da objeto al saṁyama
«Essentially, the mechanics of this type of saṁyama seem to be that through the sheer intensity of total absorption on a feeling such as those listed above, the citta of the yogī becomes so completely pervaded and charged with that feeling that it emanates out and affects other people.» — Bryant enuncia la mecánica: la citta saturada de un sentimiento lo irradia
«The principle seems to be that by the yogī’s intense concentration on any power, such as the strength of an elephant, his mind can manifest that same power in his body.» — el principio que Bryant deriva: la mente manifiesta en el cuerpo aquello en que se absorbe
«It can therefore potentially manifest anything at all, since everything inherently exists in latent form within its own nature.» — la razón metafísica: todo está latente en la citta, sustrato de los evolutos
«Man’s individual body and mind are only superficially and relatively individual substances, fundamentally they are only energizations and self-differentiations of and within prakṛtic Nature itself, which is the sole genuine substance.» — Bryant cita a Koelman, estudioso moderno: cuerpo y mente como autodiferenciaciones de la Naturaleza prākṛtica
«Vijñānabhikṣu suggests that the yogī becomes so powerful that, even without performing saṁyama, just by directing his or her mind toward an object, even if it is subtle, sūkṣma; concealed, vyavahita; or far away, viprakṛṣṭa, it becomes revealed—just as one has immediate perception of a nearby pot merely by directing one’s eyes to it.» — Vijñānabhikṣu sube la apuesta: ya ni hace falta el saṁyama, basta dirigir la mente
«This, say the commentators, is because when all traces of rajas and tamas have been eradicated, the natural luminosity inherent in the sattva of the citta becomes manifest without hindrance.» — los comentaristas explican la luz por la vía negativa: quitados rajas y tamas, luce el sattva propio de la citta
«III.20 na ca tat sālambanaṁ tasyāviṣayībhūtatvāt na, not; ca, and; tat, that [knowledge]; sa, with; ālambanam, support, object; tasya, of it; aviṣayībhūtatvāt, because of not being the object That knowledge is not accompanied by its object, since this object is not the object [of the yogī’s mind].» — III.20, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción de Bryant: ese conocimiento no viene acompañado de su objeto
«III.21 kāya-rūpa-saṁyamāt tad-grāhya-śakti-stambhe cakṣuḥprakāśāsamprayoge ‘ntardhānam kāya, of the body; rūpa, form; saṁyamāt, by performing saṁyama; tat, that; grāhya, to be grasped or known; śakti, power; stambhe, on the obstruction; cakṣuḥ, eye; prakāśa, light; asamprayoge, on the absence of contact; antardhānam, invisibility By performing saṁyama on the outer form of the body, invisibility [is attained]. This occurs when perceptibility is obstructed by blocking contact between light and the eyes.» — III.21, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: la invisibilidad por obstrucción del contacto entre luz y ojo
«III.22 sopakramaṁ nirupakramaṁ ca karma tat-saṁyamād aparānta-jñānam ariṣṭebhyo vā sa, with; upakramam, approaching, beginning, fruition; nir, without; upakramam, fruition; ca, and; karma, action; tat, these; samyamāt, by performing saṁyama; aparānta, death; jñānam, knowledge; ariṣṭebhyaḥ, by omens, portents; vā, or Karma is either quick to fructify or slow. By saṁyama on karma, or on portents, knowledge of [one’s] death arises.» — III.22, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: del karma o de los presagios sale el conocer la propia muerte
«III.23 maitry-ādiṣu balāni maitrī, friendliness; ādiṣu, etc.; balāni, strength By [saṁyama] on friendliness and such things, strengths are acquired.» — III.23, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: de la amistad y lo demás salen fuerzas
«III.24 baleṣu hasti-balādīni baleṣu, on the power, strength; hasti, elephant; bala, strength; ādīni, etc. [By practicing saṁyama] on strengths, [the yogī] attains the strength of an elephant, etc.» — III.24, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: la fuerza del elefante y las demás
«III.25 pravṛttyāloka-nyāsāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-jñānam pravṛttyā, cognition, higher sense activity; āloka, light; nyāsāt, by directing; sūkṣma, subtle; vyavahita, concealed; viprakṛṣṭa, remote; jñānam, knowledge By directing the light of cognition, one obtains knowledge of subtle, concealed, and remote things.» — III.25, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: dirigir la luz de la cognición da lo sutil, lo oculto y lo remoto
«Let us say a puruṣa, enveloped in its citta as all saṁsāric puruṣas are, takes birth as an ant. The awareness of the puruṣa or, more precisely, the vṛttis of the puruṣa’s citta, is limited to the contours of the ant’s body and sensual range, due to its kleśas as per the definitions of avidyā and asmitā outlined» — Bryant arma el ejemplo de la hormiga para medir el alcance de la citta
«Its asmitā now identifies with a new instrument, such that the vṛttis produced by it pervade a much larger surface—the body and sensual range of an elephant. This indicates that the range of citta can expand and contract.» — el segundo paso: renacida como elefante, la misma citta cubre un alcance mayor, y de ahí que se expanda y se contraiga
«Like the light of a small bulb, which could, in principle, continue to emanate out throughout the entire universe were there no obstacles to obstruct it, citta is potentially all-pervading (as is the source awareness of puruṣa, citi-śakti), were there no kleśas to obstruct it.» — el símil del foco: sin obstáculo la luz llenaría el universo, y sin kleśas la citta lo penetra todo
«Once the kleśas are eliminated, then, one can see how the internal logic of Sāṅkhyan metaphysics requires the citta to be all-pervading—and thus, from the perspective of this sūtra, able to be aware of anything within prakṛti (which is another way of conceptualizing omniscience» — Bryant deriva la omnisciencia de la lógica interna del sistema, no de un don
«In Jain metaphysics, the soul’s inherent omniscience (which is another way of saying omnipresence) is covered by the obstructing limitations of karma.» — el paralelo jaina: la omnisciencia del alma tapada por el karma
«When these karmic obstacles are partly destroyed, the yogī develops supernormal sensory abilities (avadhi-jñānam); when psychological obstacles such as hatred and envy have been overcome, the yogī can know the minds of others (manaḥ-paryāya-jñānam); and when all karmic obstructions have been completely removed, omniscience ensues (kevala» — la escala jaina en tres grados hasta el kevala-jñānam; el troceo corta la palabra al fin de renglón
«A lengthy description of the Purāṇic concept of the universe is given in the commentaries for this sūtra. There are seven lokas, worlds or realms, in Hindu cosmography.» — Bryant declara de dónde sale la cosmografía: de los comentarios, no del sūtra
«There are also seven nether regions or lower realms below the earth, as well as seven hells where beings live long and painful lives experiencing the negative karma accrued by their impious deeds.» — la otra mitad de la cosmografía: regiones inferiores e infiernos por karma negativo
«Sojourns in hell, however, are never eternal but last only until the specifics of an individual’s negative karma have been accounted for and borne their due fruits.» — el límite que los comentaristas ponen al infierno: dura lo que dure el karma
«The earth realm or region consists of seven islands in the center of which is the golden Sumeru (also known as Meru) mountain. Its peaks are made of silver, emerald, crystal, gold, and jewels.» — el monte Sumeru al centro, con sus picos de metales y piedras
«After this there are six islands (dvīpas) in succession, each one surrounded by oceans of different liquids—sugarcane juice, liquor, ghee, curd, milk, and sweet rice.» — los océanos de líquidos distintos que rodean las islas
«This entire universe is situated within an egglike case. Despite its enormity, it is merely a spark of prakṛti, like a firefly in the sky.» — la escala que el propio texto le pone al universo entero: una chispa de prakṛti
«This entire cosmography can be directly perceived by the yogī performing saṁyama on the “doorway of the sun,” says Vyāsa.» — Vyāsa fija el objeto del saṁyama en la puerta del sol
«Some commentators seem to accept this literally, as meditation on the actual sun disk, sūrye, but others, such as Vācaspati Miśra and Hariharānanda, take this to be the doorway of the suṣumnā channel in the subtle physiology usually associated with tantric yoga.» — el desacuerdo entre comentaristas: disco solar o puerta de la suṣumnā, y Bryant no arbitra
«Hariharānanda notes that this physiology cannot be directly perceived by the eyes, but by meditation, since it is made of subtle elements, and the eyes can perceive only gross elements.» — Hariharānanda explica por qué la fisiología sutil no se ve con los ojos
«When the entrance to the suṣumnā is opened, he states, the various regions noted above are revealed. There is thus a correspondence between the microcosm of the body and the macrocosm of the universe.» — la correspondencia micro-macro enunciada como resultado de abrir la suṣumnā
«The specific mechanics of how the entire universe can be perceived by the sedentary meditator are not explained by the commentators» — Bryant vuelve a marcar el hueco del aparato clásico
«As Hariharānanda puts it, from the perspective of the universal buddhi, there is no such thing as far or near since buddhi underpins all its evolutes; it is thus all-pervading and everything is within it.» — Hariharānanda quita el lejos y el cerca desde la buddhi universal
«A modern siddha-yogī, Swami Muktānanda, who was primarily responsible for establishing the siddha tradition in the West in the 1960s, in his remarkable autobiography, Play of Consciousness, claimed to have personally experienced internally within himself the various regions of the universe during his own meditations.» — Bryant consigna el testimonio moderno de Swami Muktānanda como tradición viva, sin evaluarlo
«The purpose of all this cosmological information, says Hariharānanda, is that by visiting all the realms in creation, the yogī is better able to appreciate the greatness of kaivalya liberation.» — Hariharānanda le da a la cosmografía una función: medir por contraste la kaivalya
«There are frequent warnings in the Purāṇas about yogīs being sidetracked from their pursuit of liberation by the wonderful realms of the universes» — el aviso que los Purāṇas repiten: los mundos celestiales distraen de la liberación
«III.27 candre tārā-vyūha-jñānam candre, on the moon; tārā, stars; vyūha, arrangement; jñānam, knowledge [By saṁyama] on the moon, knowledge of the solar systems.» — III.27, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: del saṁyama sobre la luna sale el orden de las estrellas
«Bhoja Rāja notes that this sūtra is included separately from the previous one since when the sun is shining, the luster of the stars is not visible» — Bhoja Rāja explica por qué la luna lleva sūtra aparte del sol
«III.28 dhruve tad-gati-jñānam dhruve, on the polestar; tat, their [the stars’]; gati, movement; jñānam, knowledge [By saṁyama] on the polestar comes knowledge of the» — III.28, con el análisis palabra por palabra y el arranque de la traducción: del saṁyama sobre la estrella polar sale el movimiento de los astros; el troceo corta la frase al cambiar de plana
«By saṁyama on the polestar, says Bhoja Rāja, the yogī can distinguish stars from planets and determine when a given heavenly body will be situated in any particular sign of the zodiac.» — Bhoja Rāja lleva el siddhi al terreno de los planetas y el zodiaco
«Śaṅkara takes this sūtra to refer to astrological science: By understanding the movement of the stars, and how their influences neutralize, enhance, and affect each other, one can determine the good and bad fortunes of living beings.» — Śaṅkara lee el sūtra como ciencia astrológica
«III.29 nābhi-cakre kāya-vyūha-jñānam nābhi, navel; cakre, on the wheel; kāya, body; vyūha, arrangement; jñānam, knowledge [By saṁyama] on the navel plexus of the body comes knowledge of the arrangement of the body.» — III.29, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: del saṁyama sobre el plexo del ombligo sale el conocer el cuerpo
«Vijñānabhikṣu compares the navel wheel to the root of the banana plant from which the entire plant grows. Bhoja Rāja states more specifically that the navel is the root of the nāḍīs, subtle veins, that pervade the body.» — Vijñānabhikṣu y Bhoja Rāja explican el ombligo como raíz: del plátano, de los nāḍīs
«Vyāsa briefly outlines the understanding of the body according to the traditional medical system of āyurveda, by now well-known in the West.» — Vyāsa mete el āyurveda en el comentario del sūtra
«Disease in āyurveda is due to an imbalance in these three doṣas. The yogī can gain knowledge of any imbalance or malfunctioning in the body by performing the saṁyama noted in this sūtra.» — la enfermedad como desequilibrio de doṣas, y el saṁyama como diagnóstico
«Vijñānabhikṣu points out that by performing saṁyama on the navel the yogī can perceive the body to be what it really is, a heap of doṣas and substances.» — Vijñānabhikṣu le da al siddhi un uso ascético: ver el cuerpo como montón de doṣas
«III.26 bhuvana-jñānaṁ sūrye saṁyamāt bhuvana, regions, worlds; jñānam, knowledge; sūrye, on the sun; saṁyamāt, by saṁyama» — III.26 con su análisis palabra por palabra: del saṁyama sobre el sol sale el conocer los mundos; la traducción cae ya en la plana siguiente
«In fact, classical Yoga does not concern itself with this physiology. Some of the commentators do read some of these sūtras from the perspective of the cakras (as we have seen in III.26–27), but none of the primary commentators makes any mention of, for example, the primary ingredient of śākta physiology, the kuṇḍalinī.» — el hallazgo negativo, dicho como tal: ninguno de los comentaristas principales nombra la kuṇḍalinī
«One might go on to note that the understanding of the goal in classical Yoga clearly differs from the siddha notion that the supreme goal of yoga is attained, and liberation occurs, when this kuṇḍalinī reaches the thousand-petal sahasrāra-cakra in the crown of the head.» — Bryant separa las dos metas: la del Yoga clásico y la del siddha, que la pone en el sahasrāra
«The cluster of śākta traditions is distinct from classical Yoga in a number of ways. First, they are monistic and Yoga is dualistic.» — la primera diferencia que Bryant enumera entre las tradiciones śākta y el Yoga clásico
«The śākta traditions see prakṛti as ultimately pure consciousness, citi-śakti (IV.34); thus they are monist in the sense that they hold that all reality—both the seer and the seen (puruṣa and prakṛti) of II.17ff—is made up of one substance: consciousness.» — el monismo śākta enunciado en sus términos: prakṛti como citi-śakti
«For the dualistic Yoga tradition, on the other hand, prakṛti is not citi-śakti at all but inert matter obstructing puruṣa from realizing its own separate and completely distinct nature as citi-śakti; in Yoga, in other words, citi-śakti pertains to puruṣa, not to prakṛti.» — la contrapartida dualista: la citi-śakti es del puruṣa, y prakṛti es materia inerte que estorba
«In line with these monistic presuppositions, in the śākta traditions liberation entails the merging of the individual ātman into a higher, ultimately transpersonal reality,63 whereas in Yoga there is a plurality of souls who never lose their individuality whether in the liberated state or not. They do not completely merge into one ultimate Supreme Soul within which personal individuality is ultimately erased, but remain individual puruṣas.» — la consecuencia en la liberación: fusión en lo transpersonal frente a pluralidad de puruṣas que no pierden individualidad
«Having noted this metaphysical difference, one wonders how different the higher states of the two systems are from an experiential point of view.» — Bryant abre la pregunta por la experiencia, distinta de la pregunta por la metafísica
«The Yoga tradition after all gives us no indication that the omnipresent puruṣa in nirbīja/asamprajñāta-samādhi is aware of other omnipresent puruṣas, which, to all intents and purposes, points to a monistic experience, even if a plurality of souls are accepted on a metaphysical or scholastic level in principle.» — Bryant señala que el propio sistema no dice que un puruṣa liberado perciba a otros, y que eso apunta a una experiencia monista
«Be this as it may, in terms of method, one can reiterate that samādhi, in tantra, is attained when kuṇḍalinī is first awakened by various techniques and then rises up the central suṣumnā channel, piercing the various cakras along the way and triggering various supernormal sensual experiences until it finally unites with the sahasrāra-cakra.» — el método tántrico resumido: kuṇḍalinī despierta, sube la suṣumnā y perfora los cakras
«As should be obvious by now, liberation is attained entirely differently in classical Yoga, and the cakra/nāḍī/kuṇḍalinī physiology is completely peripheral to it—although there is overlap in some (but not all) techniques, such as the use of mantra and prāṇāyāma.» — Bryant deja la fisiología de cakras y kuṇḍalinī como periférica al Yoga clásico, y admite el traslape en técnicas
«the siddhis are considered accomplishments only for one whose “mind is outgoing,” that is, who has not attained the vairāgya, dispassion, required of yogic practice in I.15–16; they are obstacles to the samādhi state taught by Patañjali (III.37) and ultimately to be discarded as worthless.» — la valoración que el propio sistema hace de los siddhis: logros de quien no tiene vairāgya, y obstáculos al samādhi
«Thus, while siddhi/śākta/tantra metaphysics is a wonderful and vibrant spiritual universe in its own right, with deep roots in the ancient Indic past, and with its own internal coherence, logic, and appeal, it is not by any means the same as the system being taught by Patañjali.» — Bryant reconoce la coherencia de la metafísica śākta y a la vez la distingue del sistema de Patañjali
«The integrity and distinctiveness of these traditions have a tendency to be erased into a hodgepodge in their Western exportations—into a kind of kitchorie Yoga.» — Bryant nombra el efecto de la exportación al oeste con su propia palabra, *kitchorie*
«In India, a typical meal consists of a subji, vegetable dish; dal, lentil soup; rice; chappati, unleavened bread; and perhaps some other items, each with its own distinct flavorings and spices. After the meal is enjoyed, the leftovers are often combined and served the next day as kitchorie, at which point all the flavorings are merged together into a homogenous whole.» — la imagen de la que sale el término: las sobras del día anterior revueltas en un solo sabor
«Thus one often finds a generic sort of yoga typically appropriating bits and pieces of Patañjali-type practices as presented here in the sūtras but articulated with neo-advaita-vedānta/Brahman terminologies and flavored with elements from tantric subtle physiology, all blended together as if representing a single coherent homogenous tradition.» — el yoga genérico que Bryant describe: piezas de Patañjali dichas en vocabulario neo-advaita y sazonadas de tantra
«This, of course, points to the centrality and authoritativeness of Patañjali in yogic practice insofar as his system is incorporated into other systems as a source of legitimacy, but then flavored by the sectarian specifics of these other systems.» — la lectura que Bryant saca del préstamo: Patañjali como fuente de legitimidad de otros sistemas
«III.30 kaṇṭha-kūpe kṣut-pipāsā-nivṛttiḥ kaṇṭha, throat; kūpe, pit, hollow; kṣut, hunger; pipāsā, thirst; nivṛttiḥ, cessation, subdual [By saṁyama] on the pit of the throat comes the cessation of hunger and thirst.» — III.30, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: del saṁyama sobre el hueco de la garganta cesan hambre y sed
«Vijñānabhikṣu takes the pit of the throat, kaṇṭha-kūpa, to extend from the base of the tongue to the stomach. By saṁyama on this spot, yogīs can overcome hunger and thirst, kṣut-pipāsā, according to Patañjali.» — Vijñānabhikṣu fija dónde está el hueco de la garganta
«No further explanation of how this transpires is provided in our sources, except for Bhoja Rāja’s comment that the sensation of hunger is caused by the contact of prāṇa, vital air, with this place.» — Bryant marca otra vez el hueco explicativo y deja lo único que Bhoja Rāja aporta
«III.31 kūrma-nāḍyām sthairyam kūrma, tortoise; nāḍyām, subtle channel; sthairyam, steadiness [By saṁyama] on the subtle tortoise channel, steadiness is attained.» — III.31, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: del saṁyama sobre el canal de la tortuga sale la firmeza
«Below the pit of the throat, or trachea, says Vyāsa, is a particular nāḍī, or subtle channel, shaped like a tortoise, kūrma.» — Vyāsa localiza el nāḍī con forma de tortuga
«As early as the Praśna Upaniṣad the prāṇa life airs are held to circulate through the body by means of these nāḍīs.» — Bryant remonta la circulación por los nāḍīs al Praśna Upaniṣad
«From the overall perspective of yoga, perhaps more to the point is Hariharānanda’s observation that if the body becomes immobile, so does the mind.» — Hariharānanda saca el siddhi de lo corporal: si el cuerpo queda quieto, la mente también
«III.32 mūrdha-jyotiṣi siddha-darśanam mūrdha, head; jyotiṣi, on the light; siddha, perfected souls; darśanam, vision [By saṁyama] on the light in the skull, a vision of the siddhas, perfected beings, is attained.» — III.32, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: del saṁyama sobre la luz del cráneo sale la visión de los siddhas
«There is an opening in the skull, says Vyāsa, that contains radiant light. As the radiance of light inside a house is concentrated in the keyhole, says Bhoja Rāja (from the perspective of someone standing outside the house), so the luminosity of sattva is concentrated in this opening called the brahma-randhra.» — Vyāsa y Bhoja Rāja describen el brahma-randhra con el símil de la cerradura
«Siddhas are perfected beings who possess mystic powers and inhabit the higher realms of the universe. They often move around in the space between the earth and the sky, and can sometimes be contacted by advanced yogīs.» — la definición de siddha que da el comentario: seres perfectos de los mundos altos
«Again, this too remains a living tradition: In his autobiography, Muktānanda claimed to have encountered such beings while in states of samādhi, as did Yogānanda in his Autobiography of a Yogi.» — Bryant vuelve a consignar el testimonio moderno, Muktānanda y Yogānanda, sin evaluarlo
«Tellingly, Patañjali makes no direct reference to this overall physiology in the sūtras other than the mention of nāḍī in III.31 below.» — Bryant deslinda el cakra del sūtra de la fisiología tántrica y mide el silencio de Patañjali, que solo nombra el nāḍī de III.31
«While on this topic, there are a variety of traditions that are clearly influenced by Patañjali, which Larson (2008) calls “satellite traditions,” that appropriate important aspects from Patañjali while diverging considerably from him in focus, such as the classical haṭha yoga tradition.» — Bryant toma de Larson el término *satellite traditions* para el haṭha yoga y sus afines; tramo releído entero en el crudo y extraído con la guarda anticosido apagada, porque lo que la dispara es el paréntesis de año de la referencia bibliográfica que el propio libro imprime
«III.33 prātibhād vā sarvam prātibhāt, by intuition; vā, or; sarvam, everything Or, by intuition, comes [knowledge of] everything.» — III.33, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: por intuición, el conocimiento de todo
«Intuition, prātibha, says Vyāsa, precedes discrimination, the viveka of II.26– 7, as the light of dawn precedes the light of the sun.» — Vyāsa pone la intuición antes del discernimiento con el símil del alba y el sol
«Vijñānabhikṣu defines intuition, prātibha, as knowledge that is obtained without a teacher.» — Vijñānabhikṣu define la intuición por lo que no necesita: maestro
«III.34 hṛdaye citta-saṁvit hṛdaye, on the heart; citta, the mind; saṁvit, knowledge [By saṁyama] on the heart, knowledge of the mind ensues.» — III.34, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: del saṁyama sobre el corazón sale el conocer la mente
«As noted in the introduction, even though Patañjali himself does not refer to Brahman, the Absolute Truth of the Upaniṣads, the commentators here and elsewhere do correlate Brahman and puruṣa as if this is a perfectly natural thing to do, as indeed it is for» — Bryant vuelve a marcar la distancia entre el texto y su aparato: Patañjali no nombra a Brahman y los comentaristas lo correlacionan con el puruṣa; el troceo corta la frase al cambiar de plana
«Vācaspati Miśra and Bhoja Rāja describe the lotus as facing down, and in so doing again introduce notions of subtle physiology usually associated with the haṭha-yoga and tantra traditions in which they play a far more central role than in classical Pātañjalian yoga, where they are peripheral.» — Bryant sitúa la fisiología sutil de los comentaristas como préstamo del haṭha y del tantra, periférico al yoga clásico
«There are seven cakras (literally, wheels) or energy centers in the body, and these are usually described as shaped like lotuses. The heart cakra is the middle one and considered to be the seat of intelligence. Thus, both the ātman and the citta are centered in the heart.» — los siete cakras en forma de loto, y el del corazón como asiento de la inteligencia
«Patañjali here essentially rearticulates the definition of avidyā given in II.5: Worldly experience consists of confounding the pure self with the intelligence, which molds itself into the forms and thoughts of this world.» — Bryant lee el sūtra como repetición de la definición de avidyā de II.5
«In addition to the familiar example of the crystal and red flower, Vijñānabhikṣu has us imagine having soot on one’s face. As one can be blissfully unaware that one has soot on one’s face (a substance that is completely distinct from one’s actual face), so, due to avidyā, ignorance, the citta is unaware that the source of its awareness, puruṣa, is completely distinct, atyantāsaṅkīrṇa, from the permutations of buddhi, which cover it, so to speak.» — Vijñānabhikṣu añade el símil del hollín en la cara: se ignora lo que está encima
«Vyāsa hastens to add that this notion of puruṣa in itself is not ultimate self-realization, since it is still a notion or image in buddhi which, however pure, is nonetheless a product of prakṛti and thus completely distinct from the real puruṣa. There is a difference between the reflection in a mirror and the actual face gazing into it.» — Vyāsa pone el límite del siddhi: la imagen del puruṣa en la buddhi no es el puruṣa
«Puruṣa, as we know, can know itself only by itself and not through any outside agency, which would involve connection with the world of matter.» — la regla de la que sale ese límite: el puruṣa solo se conoce por sí mismo
«The Upaniṣads are full of verses indicating that the self is higher than the mind or intelligence: “Sight does not reach there, nor thought nor speech; we don’t know [it] or perceive [it] so how would one show it?» — Bryant trae el Kena: ni la vista ni el pensamiento ni la palabra llegan allí
«To summarize, then, while buddhi cannot reveal the actual puruṣa, it can reveal a pure image or reflection of puruṣa (Hariharānanda calls this reflection the pure ahaṅkāra or ego, since it reveals the “real” aham, I, the puruṣa self, in contrast to the normal function of ahaṅkāra asmitā, which is to cause misidentification with the false self of body and mind). So while this is not the ultimate goal of yoga, by saṁyama on this pure image or reflection the yogī is one step away from kaivalya, complete liberation.» — el resumen de Bryant: la buddhi da el reflejo, no el original, y el saṁyama sobre el reflejo deja al yogī a un paso
«When this final and ultimate state manifests, buddhi, and all its images and ideas, including the pure one described here of the actual puruṣa itself, fade away, leaving puruṣa with nothing to be aware of except itself.» — el estado final descrito por sustracción: se apaga hasta la imagen pura y el puruṣa queda solo consigo
«III.36 tataḥ prātibha-śrāvaṇa-vedanādarśāsvāda-vārtājāyante tataḥ, from this; prātibha, intuition; śrāvaṇa, hearing; vedanā, touch; ādarśa, vision; āsvāda, taste; vārtāḥ, smell;69 jāyante, are born» — III.36 con su análisis palabra por palabra: de ahí nacen la intuición y los sentidos superiores; la traducción cae ya en la plana siguiente
«From the type of saṁyama noted in the last sūtra, the yogī attains the two abilities noted by Patañjali here: intuition, prātibha, and higher sense perception.» — Bryant enumera lo que el sūtra concede: intuición y percepción sensorial superior
«By higher sense perception one can continually experience divine sounds, sensations, sights, tastes, and smells. Strengthened by the practice of yoga, the yogī’s senses can experience subtler levels of sense objects.» — la percepción superior descrita como acceso a niveles más sutiles del objeto
«According to Vācaspati Miśra, self-realization is impossible until prakṛti has revealed herself in her fullness to puruṣa, and this entails experiencing the subtler dimensions of prakṛti.» — Vācaspati Miśra invierte el signo de los poderes: sin recorrer lo sutil de prakṛti no hay autorrealización
«However, the Indic Yogic tradition in general, as specified by Patañjali in the next sūtra, considers all mystic powers, which arise of their own accord even without the yogī desiring them, to be impediments to the goal of yoga, since they pose the risk of distracting the yogī back into sensual (prākṛtic) experiences.» — y Bryant consigna al lado la posición contraria de la tradición: los poderes estorban
«III.37 te samādhāv upasargā vyutthāne siddhayaḥ te, they [the powers]; samādhau, in samādhi; upasargāḥ, obstacles; vyutthāne, rising up, outgoing; siddhayaḥ, accomplishments, perfections, powers These powers are accomplishments for the mind that is outgoing but obstacles to samādhi.» — III.37, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: los poderes son logros para la mente que sale y obstáculos para el samādhi
«The term siddhi, perfection or power, which occurs only four times in the sūtras,70 is used here to mean the supernormal powers.» — Bryant mide el término en el propio texto: siddhi aparece cuatro veces
«A beggar, says Vācaspati Miśra, may consider even a meager smattering of wealth to be the fullness of riches, but a yogī should not think that these powers, which appear spontaneously, are the goal, and must reject them.» — Vācaspati Miśra mide los poderes con el símil del mendigo que confunde una migaja con la riqueza
«That the siddhis are potential impediments to the goal of yoga is a widespread position in Indic traditions: “The wise speak of the siddhis as obstacles; they are the cause of delay to one who is practicing the highest yoga» — Bryant apoya la posición en el Bhāgavata Purāṇa, que llama a los siddhis causa de demora
«But not all siddhis are detriments to samādhi; after all, Patañjali (I.35) included supernormal sense experiences as suitable objects for the mind to concentrate on in order to achieve samādhi.» — el desacuerdo queda dentro del propio texto: I.35 admite la experiencia sensorial superior como objeto de concentración
«Patañjali is informing the practitioner of experiences that might accrue upon the path so that the yogī will not be confused, distracted, or sidetracked by them.» — la lectura de Bryant: el sūtra avisa de lo que puede pasar, no lo prohíbe
«A yogī sidetracked by them has clearly not mastered the vairāgya, detachment, required as a preliminary to yoga» — el criterio que Bryant deja: distraerse por ellos delata falta de vairāgya
«III.38 bandha-kāraṇa-śaithilyāt pracāra-saṁvedanāc ca cittasya para-śarīrāveśaḥ bandha, of bondage; kāraṇa, cause; śaithilyāt, from the loosening; pracāra, conduct, working, passageway; saṁvedanāt, from knowledge; ca, and; cittasya, of the mind; para, others; śarīra, body; āveśaḥ, settle in, entering By loosening the cause of bondage, and by knowledge of the passageways of the mind, the mind can enter into the bodies of others.» — III.38, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: aflojada la causa del cautiverio, la mente entra en cuerpos ajenos
«The mind is restless by nature—like a bouncing ball, says Śaṅkara, or the constant play of flame in glowing coals—but due to the stock of karmasaṁskāras, it becomes limited and trapped in one body and cannot experience existence in other bodies until the present body dies.» — Śaṅkara describe la mente inquieta y atada a un cuerpo por el acervo de saṁskāras
«The powers of the senses follow the mind in this transference, says Vyāsa, just as the swarm of bees follows the queen bee, and so the powers of the senses also settle in the new body when the mind settles into it.» — Vyāsa explica el traslado con el símil del enjambre que sigue a la reina
«Just as the entire subtle body, sūkṣma-śarīra, transfers into a new body at death, so the yogī can enact this transferal while still alive—but, in this case, after entering into a new body, with the ability to return into the original body.» — la diferencia con la muerte: el yogī hace el mismo tránsito en vida y puede volver
«The ability is so widespread in yogic narrative that White (forthcoming) calls it “the sine qua non of a yogi’s practice.» — Bryant cita a White, estudioso moderno, sobre cuán difundida está la transferencia en el relato yóguico
«Bhoja Rāja reminds us that the citta is all-pervading. Due to its stock of karma (which, we recall, is the result of dharma and adharma), and of course the kleśas underpinning them, it remains confined within the contours of a specific body.» — Bhoja Rāja vuelve a la citta omnipenetrante y explica el encierro por el karma
«Vācaspati Miśra refers to nāḍīs in the body as the passageways through which the mind travels to perform its functions. The relevant nāḍī is identified by Bhoja Rāja as the cittavahā nāḍī, the citta-carrying nāḍī» — Vācaspati Miśra y Bhoja Rāja nombran la vía del traslado: el cittavahā nāḍī
«Vācaspati Miśra also mentions yogīs who may have learned how to loosen the bondage of karma and thus are no longer bound to the body but who do not necessarily know the passageways that the mind must take to exit from the body to enter the body of others without harming the yogī.» — el riesgo que Vācaspati Miśra consigna: soltar el karma sin conocer las vías
«Vijñānabhikṣu notes that the previous powers are minor, insofar as they are peripheral to the real goal of yoga» — Vijñānabhikṣu ordena los poderes anteriores como menores frente a la meta verdadera del yoga
«III.35 sattva-puruṣayor atyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśeṣo bhogaḥ parārthatvāt svārtha-saṁyamāt puruṣa-jñānam sattva, of the intellect; puruṣayoḥ, and of the puruṣa; atyanta, complete; asaṅkīrṇayoḥ, distinct; pratyaya, idea, image, notion; aviśeṣaḥ, nondistinction; bhogaḥ, experience; parārthatvāt, because of having the nature of existing for another; svārtha, for itself; saṁyamāt, from saṁyama; puruṣa, the true self; jñānam, knowledge Worldly experience consists of the notion that there is no distinction between the puruṣa self and pure intelligence, although these two are completely distinct. Worldly experience exists for another [i.e., for puruṣa]. [By saṁyama] on that which exists for itself [i.e., on puruṣa], comes knowledge of puruṣa.» — III.35, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: la experiencia mundana confunde al puruṣa con la inteligencia, y del saṁyama sobre lo que existe por sí sale el conocer al puruṣa; bloque largo releído entero en el crudo y extraído con la guarda anticosido apagada, porque lo que la dispara es el tamaño del propio bloque de sūtra
«As has been discussed, buddhi, when pure, also acts like a spotless mirror, which reflects the face gazing at it without distortion, so to speak.» — el símil del espejo sin mancha para la buddhi pura
«This sūtra is taken to indicate that by saṁyama on this notion or image of puruṣa in the sāttvic buddhi, awareness of the existence of the real puruṣa emerges.» — Bryant fija el objeto del saṁyama de III.35: la noción del puruṣa en la buddhi sáttvica
«In his Yoga-śāstra, the Jain scholar Hemacandra (1088–1172) describes this process:» — Bryant trae al jaina Hemacandra para la mecánica de la entrada en otro cuerpo
«When that other body has been completely liberated [of its previous occupant], the yogin whose actions and senses have come alive in all the activities [of the other] should commence movement as if in his own body.» — el procedimiento según Hemacandra: vaciado el otro cuerpo, el yogī se mueve en él como en el propio
«A well-known story featuring this power is found in the traditional hagiographies of our commentator Śaṅkara.» — Bryant anuncia el relato hagiográfico de Śaṅkara como ilustración del siddhi
«One day, Śaṅkara sought out Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the foremost proponent of the rival Purva Mīmāṁsā school in his age, in order to debate with him.» — el arranque del relato: Śaṅkara busca a Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, de la Purva Mīmāṁsā, para debatir
«Curiously, the referee at the debate was Maṇḍana’s own wife, the learned Bhāratī, regarded as an incarnation of the Goddess Sarasvatī.» — quién arbitra el debate: Bhāratī, mujer del contrincante y tenida por encarnación de Sarasvatī
«Bhāratī had much to lose in the affair, since the agreement was that if Śaṇkara won, Maṇḍana would renounce his wife and possessions and become a sannyāsī» — la apuesta del debate, con la mujer como prenda
«Bhāratī was a fair judge, but before declaring Śaṅkara the winner, she challenged him with questions pertaining to the Kāma-śāstra, the Sanskrit treatises concerned with eroticism, conjugal love, and desire, about which the ascetic and renunciant Śaṅkara had had no experience.» — el giro del relato: la jueza pregunta por el Kāma-śāstra, materia que el renunciante desconoce
«Śaṅkara accordingly requested a delay in proceedings during which time he entered the body of a dying king by the śarīra-āveśa technique indicated in this sūtra by Patañjali.» — el relato adjudica a Śaṅkara justo la técnica de este sūtra, el śarīra-āveśa
«A parallel, but slightly different, story occurs in the Mahābhārata (XV.33.24ff). Before leaving his mortal frame, the councilor and well-wisher of the Pāṇḍava brothers entered the body of king Yudhiṣṭhira due to his “yoga power.” He united his life airs and powers of the senses with the king’s, such that the latter felt empowered and endowed with more virtues than before.» — el paralelo del Mahābhārata: el consejero entra en el cuerpo de Yudhiṣṭhira
«Elsewhere in the epic (XIII.40–41), the sage Vipula entered into the body of his guru’s wife, Ruci, unequaled in beauty, to protect her from the seductive malintentions of the infamous Indra, lord of the celestials, while his guru was absent.» — el tercer relato: Vipula entra en el cuerpo de la mujer de su guru para protegerla de Indra
«III.39 udāna-jayāj jala-paṅka-kaṇṭakādiṣv asaṅga utkrāntiś ca udāna, one of the prāṇas, vital airs; jayāt, from mastery over; jala, water; paṅka, mud; kaṇṭaka, thorns; ādiṣu, etc.; asaṅgaḥ, noncontact with; utkrāntiḥ, ascension, levitation; ca, and By mastery over the udāna vital air, one attains [the power of] levitation and does not come into contact with water, mud, and thorns, etc.» — III.39, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: del dominio del udāna salen la levitación y el no tocar agua, lodo ni espinas
«Vācaspati Miśra quotes a verse stating that the five prāṇas are all manifestations of the air element,76 but Vijñānabhikṣu, following the Sāṅkhya Kārikās and the Vedānta Sūtras,77 insists that there is a difference between prāṇa and mundane air, which is one of the five gross elements.» — el desacuerdo entre comentaristas sobre qué es el prāṇa: aire elemental para Vācaspati Miśra, cosa distinta para Vijñānabhikṣu
«The five prāṇas are mentioned as early as the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (V.19–24). The most important is itself called prāṇa, and when it leaves the body, the other vital airs follow.» — Bryant remonta los cinco prāṇas al Chāndogya y ordena el mando entre ellos
«Just as a king appoints administrators stating: ‘you oversee these villages, and you these,’ so prāṇa directs the other life airs to their respective places» — el símil del Praśna Upaniṣad: el prāṇa reparte a los demás aires como un rey a sus administradores
«More or less the entirety of the Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain Yoga traditions across the centuries have always claimed that the body can be made to levitate by manipulating internal air currents, prāṇa.» — Bryant mide la extensión de la creencia en la levitación por manipulación del prāṇa
«Perhaps the earliest literary reference to such feats is expressed in the oldest Indo-European text, the R˙g Veda, where the long-haired ascetic (keśin) flies through the atmosphere» — Bryant remonta el testimonio más antiguo al R˙g Veda y al asceta de cabellera larga; la grafía del nombre es la que imprime el troceo
«Not only is levitation attained by mastery over the udāna-prāṇa, says Vyāsa, but by the manipulation of this prāṇa, the yogī takes the auspicious upward path out of the body at death.» — Vyāsa le añade al udāna otra función: la salida por la vía alta en la muerte
«This is a reference to the two pathways that can be taken by the departed soul after death, an upward one toward liberation and a downward one toward rebirth.» — las dos vías del alma tras la muerte, arriba a la liberación y abajo al renacer
«III.40 samāna-jayāt jvalanam samāna, over the samāna vital air; jayāt, by mastery; jvalanam, effulgence By mastery over the samāna vital air, radiance is attained.» — III.40, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: del dominio del samāna sale el resplandor
«Hariharānanda notes that the samāna-prāṇa is responsible for nourishing all parts of the body, and so, by mastering this prāṇa, the yogī gets an aura around the body.» — Hariharānanda explica el aura por la función nutricia del samāna
«As with the halo in Christian iconography, auras are commonly associated with saints and yogīs in the Indic traditions, explainable in Yogic vocabulary by the prominence of the radiant and effulgent characteristics of sattva pervading the yogī’s citta, and emanating out due to transcending the limitations of the kleśas.» — Bryant compara el aura con el nimbo cristiano y la explica en vocabulario del sistema
«Satī, who had mastered āsana, first neutralized the up-flowing and down-flowing prāṇa and apāna airs (as touched on in II.49–50), then raised the udāna-prāṇa up from the navel cakra, held it in the heart area with concentration, and then drew it up through her throat and to between her eyebrows, from which point her body self-ignited by the power of her samādhi concentration» — el relato de Satī, con el recorrido del udāna hasta el entrecejo y la ignición
«King Dhṛtarāṣṭra, the uncle of the five Pāṇḍavas and father of their hundred cousins from the Mahābhārata, also self-ignited his body as a result of his yogic practice, according to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa rendition of» — el segundo caso de autocombustión, el rey Dhṛtarāṣṭra, con dos versiones que Bryant no armoniza
«With a peaceful mind and free from desire, he [Dhṛtarāṣṭra] subsists on water. He has mastered āsana along with prāṇāyāma, and has withdrawn the six senses (pratyāhāra). His impurities of sattva, rajas and tamas have been destroyed, through meditation on Hari [Viṣṇu/ Kṛṣṇa] … He will cast off his body on the fifth day from today, O king, and it will be reduced to ashes.» — los versos de Nārada que Bryant cita: āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra y meditación en Hari, y el cuerpo reducido a cenizas
«III.41 śrotrākāśayoḥ sambandha-saṁyamād divyaṁ śrotram śrotra, ear, organ of hearing; ākāśayoḥ, ether; sambandha, relationship; saṁyamāt, by saṁyama; divyam, divine; śrotram, hearing» — III.41 con su análisis palabra por palabra: del saṁyama sobre la relación entre oído y éter sale el oído divino; la traducción cae a caballo del cambio de plana
«In fact, ether is itself generated from the tanmātra, or subtle element, of sound, so sound is both inherent in ether and conveyed through it. Ether is therefore considered to be present in the ear, such that it can pick up the vibrations of sound.» — el éter nacido del tanmātra del sonido, y presente en el oído
«In conventional hearing, says Bhoja Rāja, hearing catches only the sounds that vibrate within the pocket of ether enclosed by the ear; however, since ether is all-pervading, and so potentially is the sāttvic citta, the accomplished yogī’s citta is believed to be able to transcend identification with the body and expand out to access sound beyond the realm of normal hearing vibrating anywhere in the ether» — Bhoja Rāja explica el oído divino por la expansión de la citta más allá del bolsillo de éter del oído
«Parallel abilities can be attained by saṁyama on the other four senses and the respective subtle elements with which they are associated: air and the skin, light and the eye, water and the tongue, earth and the nose.» — la tabla de correspondencias entre sentidos y elementos sutiles
«samāna-prāṇa is present in the navel and distributes (food) equally (around the body); apāna-prāṇa is present down to the soles of the feet, and carries away (the waste products of the body); vyāna-prāṇa is so called because it is spread all over (the body);80 and udāna-prāṇa manifests up to the head and is so called because it carries up, ud.» — Vyāsa reparte los otros cuatro aires por zona del cuerpo y por función, y explica el nombre del udāna
«He mentions the story of Satī, the wife of Lord Śiva, as an example of someone manipulating the udāna-prāṇa in order to cast off her body by self-combustion.» — Vijñānabhikṣu lleva el resplandor de III.40 hasta la autocombustión y la ejemplifica con Satī
«vibrations require a medium in which to vibrate, and, by a process of elimination, the commentators argue that this substratum must be ether.» — el argumento por eliminación con que los comentaristas hacen del éter el sustrato del sonido; el tramo arranca a media palabra porque el EPUB parte *sound-vibrations* al cambiar de plana
«III.42 kāyākāśayoḥ sambandha-saṁyamāl laghu-tūla-samāpatteś cākāśa-gamanam kāya, the body; ākāśayoh, ether; sambandha, the relationship; saṁyamāt, by saṁyama; laghu, light; tūla, cotton; samāpatteḥ, a type of intense concentration; ca, and; ākāśa, sky; gamanam, movement, passage By performing saṁyama on the relationship between the body and ether, and by performing samāpatti on the lightness of cotton, one acquires the ability to travel through the sky.» — III.42, con el análisis palabra por palabra y la traducción: del saṁyama sobre la relación entre cuerpo y éter, y de la samāpatti sobre la ligereza del algodón, sale el andar por el aire
«Recall that samāpatti involves concentrating intensely on an object such that the meditator becomes as if one with the object of meditation. Exactly how this differs from saṁyama in this sūtra is not discussed by our commentators (although see discussion in I.41), but the two processes appear very similar if not the same.» — Bryant marca otro silencio del aparato: los comentaristas no distinguen samāpatti de saṁyama aquí
«The body moves in ether, or space, and by performing saṁyama on this relationship, as well as by total absorption on light entities such as cotton or atoms, one can become so light that one can walk on water, spiderwebs, or rays of light, according to the commentaries.» — el siddhi según los comentarios: andar sobre agua, telarañas o rayos de luz
«Rāmānanda Sarasvatī takes these abilities as a progression reflecting the density of the medium of travel: First the yogī is able to walk on water, then spiderwebs, then light rays, then course through the air at will.» — Rāmānanda Sarasvatī ordena los poderes en escala por densidad del medio
«The metaphysical principle operating here seems to be the same one that pervades many of the siddhis: By manipulating the substratum, one can transform the nature of its effects.» — el principio que Bryant lee detrás de casi todos los siddhis: manipular el sustrato transforma sus efectos
«The gross elements are all transformations of ether, which means they are in essence ether.» — la premisa de la que sale ese principio: los elementos densos son éter transformado
«By saṁyama on this relationship, it seems that the yogī can potentially increase the sattva component of the body, thereby minimizing the tamas component, and thus manifest the inherent ethereal nature or quality constituting the body such that it takes on the qualities of ether.» — la mecánica en términos de guṇas: subir el sattva del cuerpo y bajar el tamas hasta que tome cualidad de éter
Sobre la obra
563 entradas — lo que el aparato y la investigación dicen de ella«I have appreciated your commentary quoting the traditional commentators Vyāsa, Vācaspati Miśra, Śaṅkara, Bhoja Rāja, Vijñānabhikṣu, and Hariharānanda, and it reads well.» — en el foreword, B.K.S. Iyengar nombra a los seis comentaristas tradicionales que Bryant recoge y dice que el comentario se lee bien; es el firmante del prólogo, no la voz del texto comentado
«Pātañjala Yoga is a practical subject and not a discursive one. As each individual is electrically alive and dynamic, so yoga is a living, dynamic force in life.» — Iyengar sostiene que el yoga de Patañjali es materia práctica y no discursiva, y fuerza viva antes que doctrina
«The life of man is not only the conjunction of prakṛti (the sheaths of the body) and puruṣa (the soul), but also a combination of these two. Yoga is a means to utilizing the conjunction of prakṛti and puruṣa for freedom and beatitude (mokṣa), as the two are interwoven and interrelated.» — Iyengar enuncia la relación de prakṛti y puruṣa como conjunción y a la vez combinación, y el yoga como el medio de usarla para mokṣa
«Patañjali explains the practice of kriyā-yoga in sūtra I of the sādhana pāda, repeating the same ingredients as are found in the niyama disciplines, namely, tapas, svādhyāya, and Īśvara-praṇidhāna (discipline, self-study and devotion to God).» — Iyengar señala que el kriyā-yoga del sādhana pāda repite los tres ingredientes que ya están entre los niyamas: tapas, svādhyāya e Īśvara-praṇidhāna
«Though Patañjali advises bhakti in the beginning of the text in I.23, I consider the disciplines of yama and niyama (II.30–45) as corresponding to karmamarga (the path of action); āsana, prāṇāyāma, and pratyāhāra (II.46–55) as corresponding to jñāna-marga (the path of knowledge); and dhāraṇā, dhyāna, and samādhi (saṁyama, III.1–4) as corresponding to bhakti marga (the path of devotion).» — Iyengar reparte los ocho miembros entre los tres caminos y marca que es lectura suya, con un *I consider* por delante del reparto
«But if the sādhaka abuses the sādhana with selfish motives, he or she ends up with only the joys of sensual pleasure (bhoga).» — Iyengar pone el límite de la práctica: con motivos egoístas el sādhaka acaba en bhoga, goce sensual
«Therefore, I differ from the traditional commentators on two things.» — Iyengar declara su desacuerdo con los comentaristas tradicionales en dos puntos, y lo enuncia como diferencia propia dentro del prólogo de un libro que recoge a esos comentaristas
«The practice of āsanas develops sattva guṇa, sublimating the guṇas of rajas and tamas.» — primer punto de Iyengar: la práctica de āsana desarrolla sattva y sublima rajas y tamas
«The aim of āsanas is to make the prāṇa (cosmic universal force) move concurrently with the prajñā (insight) of the self on its frontier.» — Iyengar fija el objetivo del āsana en hacer que prāṇa se mueva a la par de la prajñā del sí mismo
«For me, this sūtra is referring to a consolidating state of samprajñāta-samādhi, after attaining which the yogī can move toward asamprajñāta (nirbīja) samādhi.» — segundo punto de Iyengar, sobre I.18: lee el virāma-pratyaya como estado consolidante del samprajñāta-samādhi, contra los comentaristas que lo infieren asamprajñāta
«Even in this pratyāhāra state of aṣṭāṇga-yoga and virāma-pratyaya state in samādhi, if one neglects śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi-prajñā (faith, vigor, memory, and the insight of samādhi, the four legs of yoga in I.20), then, even if one has reached the zenith, one is bound to become a yoga-bhraṣṭa, a fallen yogī.» — Iyengar advierte que descuidar las cuatro piernas del yoga de I.20 hace caer al yogī desde la cima: yoga-bhraṣṭa
«It is this combination only that leads the yogī toward the highest state in bhakti-marga—the śaraṇāgati-mārga—total dependence on Īśvara, God.» — Iyengar cierra su lectura en el śaraṇāgati-mārga, dependencia total de Īśvara, como estado más alto del bhakti-mārga
«This is how I understand and practice the aṣṭāṅga-yoga of sage Patañjali.» — Iyengar firma su lectura como práctica propia, no como exégesis del texto
«Editor’s note: B.K.S. Iyengar accepts fifty-six verses in the third pada where other commentators accept fifty-five.» — nota del editor al pie del foreword: consigna que Iyengar cuenta cincuenta y seis versos en el tercer pāda donde los demás comentaristas cuentan cincuenta y cinco, y la divergencia queda sin arbitrar
«The following pronunciation guide attempts to give approximate equivalents in English to the Sanskrit sounds used in this text.» — la guía de pronunciación de Bryant declara su alcance: equivalentes aproximados en inglés para los sonidos sánscritos, no un sistema fonético
«Sanskrit vowels have both short forms and lengthened forms (the latter are transliterated by a line over the vowel—ā, ī, ū), as well as a retroflex ṛ sound articulated by curling the tongue farther back onto the roof of the mouth than for the English r.» — Bryant explica la marca de vocal larga y la ṛ retrofleja, que son los diacríticos con que se imprime toda la transliteración del volumen
«Sanskrit consonants have both aspirated forms (kh, gh, ch, jh, and so on) and unaspirated forms (k, g, c, j, and so on); the former involve articulating the consonant accompanied by a slight expulsion of air.» — Bryant distingue aspiradas de no aspiradas, el rasgo que separa pares como kh y k en toda la transliteración
«There is also a set of retroflexes (transliterated with a dot beneath them—ṭ, ḍ, ṭh, ḍh, ṇ, ṣ), which have no precise English equivalents, and these involve curling the tongue farther back onto the roof of the mouth than for the English dentals.» — Bryant explica el punto bajo la letra como retrofleja sin equivalente inglés preciso
«Everyone by now has heard of yoga, and, indeed, with millions of Americans in some form or fashion practicing āsana, the physical aspect of yoga, the teaching and practice of yoga, at least in the aspect of techniques of body poses and stretches, are now thoroughly mainstream activities on the Western cultural landscape.» — Bryant abre su historia del yoga por la situación presente: el āsana practicado por millones de estadounidenses y vuelto actividad corriente
«Yoga has popularly been translated as “union with the divine”1 and may refer to a number of different spiritual systems.» — Bryant consigna la traducción popular del término, *unión con lo divino*, y advierte que nombra varios sistemas distintos
«The Bhagavad Gītā, for example, discusses a number of practices that have been termed yoga in popular literature: karma-yoga (buddhiyoga), the path of action; jñāna-yoga (sāṅkhya-yoga), the path of knowledge; bhakti-yoga, the path of devotion; and dhyāna-yoga, the path of silent meditation (which is the subject of Patañjali’s text),2 and terms such as tantra-yoga, siddha-yoga, nāḍa-yoga, and so forth are now common in alternative spiritualities in the West.» — Bryant enumera los yogas que el Bhagavad Gītā distingue y sitúa el de Patañjali en el dhyāna-yoga, la vía de la meditación silenciosa
«Typically, however, when the word yoga is used by itself without any qualification, it refers to the path of meditation, particularly as outlined in the Yoga Sūtras—the Aphorisms on Yoga—and the term yogī, a practitioner of this type of meditational yoga.» — Bryant fija el uso del término sin calificativo: yoga a secas nombra la vía de meditación de los Yoga Sūtras, y yogī a quien la practica
«He presented a teaching that focuses on realization of the puruṣa—the term favored by the Yoga school3 to refer to the innermost conscious self, loosely equivalent to the soul in Western Greco-Abrahamic traditions.» — Bryant define el puruṣa como el sí mismo consciente más interno y lo equipara con reserva —*loosely equivalent*— al alma de las tradiciones grecoabrahámicas
«Accordingly, Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras is one of the most important classical texts in Hinduism and thus a classic of Eastern, and therefore world, thought.» — Bryant sitúa el texto entre los clásicos del hinduismo y del pensamiento del mundo
«I might add here that Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras is not an overtly sectarian text in the sense of prioritizing a specific deity or promoting a particular type of worship as is the case with many Hindu scriptures, including the Bhagavad Gītā.» — Bryant señala que el texto no prioriza deidad ni culto particular, a diferencia de muchas escrituras hindúes, incluido el Gītā
«Therefore, as a template, it can be and has been appropriated and reconfigured by followers of different schools and traditions throughout Indian religious history4 and certainly continues to lend itself to such appropriations, most recently in nonreligious contexts of the West.» — de esa falta de sectarismo Bryant deriva su uso como plantilla apropiada y reconfigurada por escuelas distintas a lo largo de la historia religiosa india
«Patañjali himself, however, pays minimal attention to the āsanas, which are the third stage of the eight stages, or limbs, of yoga, and focuses primarily on meditation and various stages of concentration of the mind.» — Bryant marca la distancia entre el yoga exportado y el texto: Patañjali dedica atención mínima a las āsanas, que son el tercero de los ocho miembros
«Its initial introduction to the West in modern times was by Vivekānanda at the end of the nineteenth century.» — Bryant data la introducción moderna del yoga en Occidente en Vivekānanda, a finales del siglo XIX
«Sivananda was a renunciant and his ashram tradition was transplanted by his disciples Vishnudevananda (1927–1993), Satchidananda (1914–2002), and Chinmayananda (1916–1993), each of whom founded his own independent mission in the West (the Sivananda Yoga Vedanta Centres, the Integral Yoga Institute, and the Chinmaya Mission, respectively).» — Bryant traza el linaje de Sivananda y las tres misiones que fundaron sus discípulos en Occidente
«Krishnamāchārya’s son, T.K.V. Desikachar (1938– ), developed viniyoga; and—perhaps most influential of all—Krishnamāchārya’s brother-in-law, B.K.S. Iyengar (1918– ) established the Iyengar method.» — Bryant traza el otro linaje, el de Krishnamāchārya, del que sale el método Iyengar; el prologuista del volumen aparece así dentro de su propia historia
«Those accepting an external point of origin for the Vedic-speaking peoples tend to hold that Yoga, both as practice and philosophy, was originally pre-Vedic (and therefore non-Vedic) and indigenous to the subcontinent.» — Bryant expone la primera posición sobre el origen del yoga: pre-védico, no védico e indígena del subcontinente
«Those challenging the thesis of external origins for the original Vedic-speaking peoples tend to prefer to see both Vedic ritualism and yogic practices as parallel internal developments evolving within Vedic- (Indo-Aryan-) speaking communities indigenous to the subcontinent.» — Bryant expone la posición contraria: ritualismo védico y prácticas yóguicas como desarrollos internos paralelos. Las dos quedan una junto a otra sin arbitrar
«What all these positions have in common, and where our own discussion of the early history of Yoga will commence, is that Yoga evolves on the periphery of Vedic religiosity and beyond the parameters of mainstream Vedic orthopraxy.» — Bryant señala el punto común de todas las posiciones: el yoga evoluciona en la periferia de la religiosidad védica
«Yoga is clearly in tension with Vedic ritualism, discussed below, and its goals are in stark and explicit opposition to it (for example, Yoga Sūtras I.15–16).» — Bryant enuncia la tensión con el ritualismo védico y remite a I.15-16 del propio texto
«Mention must be made, when considering the earliest origins of Yoga, to seals found in Indus Valley sites with representations of figures seated in a clear yogic posture.» — Bryant aporta el testimonio arqueológico: los sellos del valle del Indo con figuras sentadas en postura yóguica clara
«This evidence suggests that, irrespective of its literary origins, Yoga has been practiced on the Indian subcontinent for well over four thousand years.» — Bryant deriva de esos sellos una antigüedad de más de cuatro mil años para la práctica, al margen de los orígenes literarios
«While the intricacies of the Vedic sacrificial rite may seem alien to our modern worldviews and practices, the mentality that supported it—that of attempting to manipulate the external physical environment for the purpose of enjoying the pleasures of the material world through the medium of the sensual body—has remained constant throughout human history.» — Bryant lee el rito sacrificial védico como manipulación del entorno para gozar del mundo material, y declara constante esa mentalidad
«The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (I.2. 7–11) calls the performers of sacrifice “deluded” and “ignorant,” however learned and competent they may posture to be, because the boons and fruits gained from the sacrifice—from the manipulation of one’s external environment, to use a more modern frame of reference—are temporary.» — Bryant cita el Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad llamando engañados e ignorantes a los oficiantes del sacrificio, por la temporalidad de sus frutos
«The Gītā, too, calls the Vedic ritualists “less intelligent,” since any boons accruing from such materialism do not solve the ultimate problems of life—human suffering inherent in the cycle of birth and death (II.42–45).» — Bryant suma el Bhagavad Gītā, que llama menos inteligentes a los ritualistas védicos
«Although the Upaniṣads are especially concerned with jñāna, or understanding Brahman, the Absolute Truth, through the cultivation of knowledge, there are also several unmistakable references to a technique for realizing Brahman (in its localized aspect of ātman) called yoga, which are clearly drawn from the same general body of related practices as those articulated by Patañjali.» — Bryant señala que los Upaniṣads, centrados en jñāna, traen referencias inequívocas a una técnica llamada yoga del mismo cuerpo de prácticas que Patañjali
«As with the Upaniṣads in general, we do not find a systematic philosophy here, but mysticopoetic utterances» — Bryant acota lo que se encuentra en los Upaniṣads: no filosofía sistemática sino enunciados místico-poéticos. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue *albeit profound in content* en la plana 17
«When the control of the senses is fixed, that is Yoga, so people say. For then, a person is free from distraction. Yoga is the “becoming,” and the “ceasing.”» — Bryant cita el Kaṭha Upaniṣad definiendo el yoga por el control fijo de los sentidos
«Not by words, not by the mind, not by sight, can he [the self] be grasped; how else can he be perceived except by saying: “he is!”» — en el mismo pasaje del Kaṭha que Bryant traduce, el sí mismo se declara inasible por palabra, mente o vista
«By the later Maitrī Upaniṣad, we have a much more extensive discussion of Yoga, including more specific references to the six aṅgas, or limbs, of yoga: prāṇāyāma, breath control; pratyāhāra, sense withdrawal; dhyāna, meditation; dhāraṇā, concentration; tarka, inquiry; and samādhi, final absorption in the self (VI.18).» — Bryant enumera los seis aṅgas del Maitrī Upaniṣad, cinco de los cuales corresponden a los cinco últimos miembros del sistema de Patañjali
«Although, like the two older Upaniṣads quoted above, the Maitrī is still embedded in the Upaniṣadic context of unity of Brahman as the ultimate goal of yoga practice (Brahman is not mentioned in the Yoga Sūtras)» — Bryant marca la diferencia decisiva y la deja consignada entre paréntesis: Brahman no se menciona en los Yoga Sūtras, mientras el Maitrī sigue teniéndolo por meta
«Nestled in the middle of the epic, the well-known Bhagavad Gītā (circa fourth century B.C.E.) devotes a good portion of its text to the practices of yoga, which it already considers to be “ancient” (IV.3); indeed, Kṛṣṇa presents himself as reestablishing yoga teachings that had existed since primordial times.» — Bryant sitúa el Bhagavad Gītā dentro del Mahābhārata y señala que el propio Gītā ya tiene por antiguas las prácticas de yoga, con Kṛṣṇa repitiendo enseñanzas primordiales
«The Mahābhārata, which culminates in 100,000 verses,16 is the longest epic in the world and, like the Maitrī Upaniṣad, preserves significant material representing the evolution of Yoga. Usually dated somewhere between the ninth and fourth centuries B.C.E., the epic exhibits the transition between the origins of Yoga in the Upaniṣadic period and its expression in the systematized traditions of Yoga as represented in the classical period by Patañjali.» — Bryant data el epos entre los siglos IX y IV a. C. y lo lee como la transición entre el yoga upaniṣádico y el sistematizado
«After establishing a firm seat in a clean place, not too high and not too low … there, sitting on that seat and fixing the mind on one object, with mind and senses under control, one should practice yoga to purify the ātman, self, by holding the body, neck and head straight, steady and keeping oneself motionless, focusing on the tip of the nose, and not looking about in any direction. With a peaceful self, free of fear, firm in the brahmācarya vow of celibacy, with mind controlled and thoughts fixed on Me [Kṛṣṇa], one should sit in yoga, holding Me as the supreme. (VI.11–15)» — Bryant traduce el Gītā VI.11-15: asiento firme, cuerpo, cuello y cabeza rectos, mirada en la punta de la nariz y pensamiento fijo en Kṛṣṇa
«As can be seen from this verse, the Yoga Sūtra’s Īśvara-praṇidhāna, dedication to God, which will be encountered in I.23, becomes the essential teaching of the entire Gītā and of all the yoga systems prescribed in it, rather than the more discreet ingredient promoted by Patañjali.» — Bryant contrasta el peso del Īśvara-praṇidhāna en los dos textos: enseñanza central del Gītā, ingrediente más discreto en Patañjali
«Nonetheless, the Yoga Sūtras is an inherently theistic text.» — Bryant sostiene aun así el carácter teísta del texto, y el enunciado queda como afirmación suya frente a las lecturas que lo leen sin Īśvara
«For example, the sage Vasiṣṭha defines yoga as ekāgratā, concentration, and prāṇāyāma, breath control (XII.294.8), both terms and practices essential to Patañjali’s» — Bryant recoge la definición de yoga que el Mahābhārata pone en boca del sabio Vasiṣṭha: ekāgratā y prāṇāyāma. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue *system* en la plana 19
«The terms yoga and yogī occur about nine hundred times throughout the epic, expressed as noted above in terms midway between the unformulated expressions of the Upaniṣads and the systematized practice as outlined by Patañjali.» — Bryant cuenta unas novecientas apariciones de yoga y yogī en el epos, en un estadio intermedio entre los Upaniṣads y Patañjali
«Scholars have long pointed out a commonality of vocabulary and concepts between the Yoga Sūtras and Buddhist texts.» — Bryant consigna la comunidad de vocabulario y conceptos entre los Yoga Sūtras y los textos budistas señalada de antiguo por los estudiosos
«All this underscores the basic point that there was a cluster of interconnected and cross-fertilizing variants of meditational yoga—Buddhist and Jain as well as Hindu—prior to Patañjali, all drawn from a common but variegated pool of terminologies, practices, and concepts» — Bryant describe el estadio previo a Patañjali como un racimo de variantes de yoga meditativo —budistas, jainas e hindúes— tomadas de un fondo común
«Indeed, one might profitably begin a discussion of the relationship between Yoga and what was much later to be considered its sister school, Sāṅkhya, and for that matter Buddhism, by noting that in this formative late Vedic period, perhaps for even the best part of a millennium prior to the rise of the clearly defined classical philosophical traditions, there were no schools as such to speak of at all» — Bryant niega que en el periodo formativo hubiera escuelas: ni Sāṅkhya, ni Yoga, ni el budismo lo eran todavía
«The history of Yoga is inextricable from that of the Sāṅkhya tradition.» — Bryant abre la sección sobre las dos vías declarando inextricable la historia de una y otra; sigue en la plana 20 diciendo que el Sāṅkhya da la infraestructura metafísica del Yoga
«this metaphysics is dualistic, insofar as ultimate reality is conceived as containing two distinct ultimate principles: puruṣa, the innermost conscious self broadly synonymous with the notion of soul, and prakṛti, the material world with all its variegatedness within which the puruṣa is embedded.» — Bryant enuncia el dualismo de la metafísica compartida: puruṣa, el sí mismo consciente más interno, y prakṛti, el mundo material donde está embebido
«While Yoga and Sāṅkhya share the same metaphysics and the common goal of liberating puruṣa from its encapsulation, their methods differ.» — Bryant separa las dos vías por el método, no por la metafísica ni por la meta
«Sāṅkhya occupies itself with the path of reasoning to attain liberation, specifically concerning the analysis of the manifold ingredients of prakṛti from which the puruṣa is to be extricated, and Yoga more with the path of meditation, focusing on the nature of mind and consciousness, and on the techniques of concentration in order to provide a practical method through which the puruṣa can be isolated and extricated.» — Bryant reparte los métodos: el Sāṅkhya razona sobre los ingredientes de prakṛti, el Yoga medita sobre la mente y las técnicas de concentración
«in fact, as will be discussed, puruṣa is and has always been eternally free, liberated, and autonomous, according to Sāṅkhya. It is the mind, not puruṣa, that must become enlightened).» — Bryant acota el lenguaje que él mismo y los comentaristas usan: hablar de liberar al puruṣa es retórico, porque el puruṣa siempre fue libre y es la mente la que se ilumina
«Sāṅkhya seems to have been the earliest philosophical system to have taken shape in the late Vedic period» — Bryant sitúa al Sāṅkhya como el sistema filosófico más temprano; sigue diciendo que ha permeado el Vedānta, lo purāṇico, lo vaiṣṇava, lo śaiva, lo tántrico y hasta el āyurveda
«Larson goes so far as to say, “Buddhist philosophy and terminology, Yoga philosophy, early Vedānta speculation, and the great regional theologies of Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism are all, in an important sense, footnotes and/or reactions to a living ‘tradition text’ of Sāṅkhya” (1999, 732).» — Bryant cita a Larson, para quien la filosofía budista, la del Yoga y la especulación vedāntica temprana son notas al pie o reacciones a un texto-tradición vivo del Sāṅkhya; el año entre paréntesis es la referencia que el propio libro imprime dentro de la frase, releída entera en el crudo
«Indeed, Larson has long seen the classical Yoga of Patañjali as a type of “neo-Sāṅkhya,” an updating by those within the old Sāṅkhya tradition in an attempt to bring it into conversation with the more technical philosophical traditions that had emerged by the third to fifth centuries C.E., particularly the challenges represented by Buddhist thought» — Bryant consigna la tesis de Larson del Yoga clásico como neo-Sāṅkhya puesto al día frente al pensamiento budista
«Schreiner’s statistical analysis of the context and content of the references to Yoga and Sāṅkhya in the Mahābhārata—the richest literary source for considering the origins of Yoga—finds Yoga to be more original and Sāṅkhya a later appendage formulated to provide the practices with some philosophical rationale.» — Bryant pone al lado la tesis contraria, la de Schreiner: el Yoga sería lo original y el Sāṅkhya un apéndice posterior que le da razón filosófica. Las dos quedan consignadas sin arbitrar
«Those [Sāṅkhya] redactors … were … probably not practicing Yogins, but rather (perhaps) meticulous scholars, scribes with archival ambitions, thinkers with a liking for numbers and classification» — Bryant cita la imagen que Schreiner da del filósofo proto-Sāṅkhya: escribas de ambición archivística con gusto por los números, no yogīs practicantes
«This is amply expressed by Bhīṣma when specifically asked by Yudhiṣṭhira to explain the difference between Sāṅkhya and Yoga» — Bryant introduce la respuesta de Bhīṣma a Yudhiṣṭhira sobre la diferencia entre las dos vías; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y la respuesta sigue en la 22
«The followers of Yoga rely on experiential methods (pratyākṣahetavaḥ), and those of Sāṅkhya on scriptural interpretation (śāstraviniścayāḥ). I consider both these views true: Followed according to their instructions, both lead to the ultimate goal” (XII.289.7).» — Bryant traduce a Bhīṣma repartiendo los métodos —experiencia para el Yoga, interpretación de la escritura para el Sāṅkhya— y teniendo las dos vías por verdaderas
«There is no knowledge equal to Sāṅkhya, there is no power (balam) equal to Yoga; both of them are the same path, both, according to oral tradition (smṛtau), lead to deathlessness. People of little intelligence consider them to be different. We however, O king, see clearly that they are the same. What the followers of Yoga perceive, the same is experienced by the followers of Sāṅkhya. One who sees Yoga and Sāṅkhya as one, is a knower of Truth. (XII.304.1–4)» — Bryant traduce el pasaje del epos que declara idénticas las dos vías y llama de poca inteligencia a quien las distingue
«While presenting Yoga as a more action-based practice, Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad Gītā reiterates the same point: “A twofold division was established by Me of old … jñāna-yoga, the yoga of knowledge, followed by Sāṅkhya, and karma-yoga, the yoga of action followed by the yogis” (III.3).» — Bryant cita a Kṛṣṇa en el Gītā III.3 enunciando la división doble: jñāna-yoga para los del Sāṅkhya, karma-yoga para los yogīs
«Nowhere in the Gītā or the entire Mahābhārata is there any indication that these two approaches constitute different schools or metaphysical systems.» — Bryant registra una negativa como dato: ni el Gītā ni el Mahābhārata dan indicio de que los dos enfoques sean escuelas o sistemas metafísicos distintos
«Vyāsa explicitly concludes the chapters of his bhāṣya commentary with the colophon śrī-pātañjale sāṅkhya-pravacane yoga-śāstre, “Patañjali’s Yoga treatise, an exposition on Sāṅkhya.”» — Bryant aporta el colofón con que Vyāsa cierra cada capítulo de su bhāṣya, que llama al tratado de Patañjali exposición del Sāṅkhya
«The later classical Sāṅkhya tradition is distinctly dualistic—ultimate reality consists of two ingredients, puruṣa and prākṛti, consciousness and matter—rather than monistic—subscribing to the one absolute principle called Brahman in the Upaniṣads.» — Bryant opone el dualismo del Sāṅkhya clásico —puruṣa y prakṛti— al monismo upaniṣádico del Brahman
«Brahman is not mentioned either in the Yoga Sūtras or Sāṅkhya Kārikās (the text that became to later Sāṅkhya what the Yoga Sūtras became to Yoga, that is, the primary text of the system).» — Bryant consigna la ausencia de Brahman en los dos textos primarios, y la deja como dato sobre qué trata cada sistema
«And, although Patañjali also accepts a personal Īśvara, which he equates with the sonic form of Brahman in the Upaniṣads, oṁ (I.23ff), he introduces him in the context of meditation rather than cosmology or metaphysics.» — Bryant acota el lugar de Īśvara en Patañjali: entra por la meditación y no por la cosmología, equiparado a oṁ, la forma sónica del Brahman
«In short, Yoga and Sāṅkhya in the Upaniṣads and epic simply refer to the two distinct paths of salvation by meditation and salvation by knowledge, respectively.» — Bryant resume: en los Upaniṣads y en el epos, Yoga y Sāṅkhya nombran dos vías de salvación, por meditación y por conocimiento
«The chief difference in the trajectory that Patañjali’s Yoga took was its exclusive focus on the psychological mechanisms and techniques involved in puruṣa’s liberation.» — Bryant marca lo propio de la trayectoria de Patañjali: el foco exclusivo en los mecanismos y técnicas psicológicos
«one might add, as an aside, that from the nine hundred–odd references to yoga in the Mahābhārata, there are only two mentions of āsana, posture, the third limb of Patañjali’s system.» — Bryant cuenta solo dos menciones de āsana entre las novecientas referencias al yoga del Mahābhārata
«The reconfiguring, presentation, and perception of yoga as primarily or even exclusively āsana in the sense of bodily poses, then, is essentially a modern Western phenomenon and finds no precedent in the premodern yoga tradition, although the fourteenth-century Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā does dedicate one of its four chapters to āsana.» — Bryant declara moderno y occidental el yoga entendido como postura, y consigna a la vez la excepción premoderna del Haṭhayoga Pradīpikā del siglo XIV
«In addition to various heterodox schools such as Jainism and Buddhism, what came to be identified (in much later times) as six schools of orthodox thought also evolved out of the Upaniṣadic period» — Bryant sitúa las seis escuelas ortodoxas junto a las heterodoxas, jainismo y budismo, como salidas del periodo upaniṣádico
«In fact, it might be more accurate to consider these traditions distinctive religophilosophical expressions that emerged from the Vedic period with different focuses rather than actual schools in the earlier period.» — Bryant propone llamarlas expresiones religiofilosóficas distintivas y no escuelas, en el periodo temprano
«Thus, for example, the Nyāya logician school accepts Yoga as the method to be used to realize the ātman as understood within that tradition,36 and Vedānta objects to it only to the extent that it does not refer to Brahman as the ultimate source of puruṣa and prakṛti, not to its authenticity in meditative technique and practice.» — Bryant señala que el Nyāya acepta el yoga como método y que el Vedānta solo le objeta no remitir a Brahman como fuente última de puruṣa y prakṛti, sin discutirle la técnica
«“this alone is the highest dharma, that one should see the ātman by yoga” (I.8).» — Bryant cita el Yājñavalkya Smṛti, texto de dharmaśāstra, poniendo el ver al ātman por el yoga como el dharma más alto
«Thus, in early Sanskrit texts Yoga referred to a form of rigorous discipline and concentration for attaining the direct perception of the ātman and gaining liberation that was appropriated and tailored by different traditions according to their metaphysical understanding of the self, rather than a distinct school.» — Bryant define lo que el término nombraba en los textos sánscritos tempranos: disciplina y concentración rigurosas, apropiadas por cada tradición según su idea del sí mismo
«In any event, eventually an orthodox school of Yoga came to be identified with Patañjali, the compiler of these sūtras, and took its place alongside other traditions that also had distinct sūtra traditions, as one of the “six schools of Indian philosophy.” These are Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, and Vedānta.» — Bryant nombra las seis escuelas y adjudica la de Yoga a Patañjali como compilador de los sūtras
«These schools were deemed orthodox because they retained at least a nominal allegiance to the sacred Vedic texts—unlike the so-called heterodox schools such as Buddhism and Jainism, which rejected them.» — Bryant da el criterio de ortodoxia: la lealtad al menos nominal a los textos védicos, que budismo y jainismo rechazan
«As mentioned, probably the oldest Indian speculative tradition is Sāṅkhya, later to be referred to as the sister school of Yoga insofar as they shared the same metaphysics.» — Bryant llama al Sāṅkhya escuela hermana del Yoga por compartir metafísica
«Patañjali’s particular systematization of these techniques in time emerged as the most dominant, but by no means exclusive, version.» — Bryant acota el alcance de la sistematización de Patañjali: la más dominante, no la única
«Indeed, internal to his own text, in his very first sūtra, atha yogānuśāsanam, Patañjali indicates that he is continuing the teachings of yoga (the prefix anu- indicates the continuation of the action denoted by the verb)» — Bryant lee en el prefijo anu- del primer sūtra la declaración de que Patañjali continúa enseñanzas anteriores
«But, in short, because he produced the first systematized treatise on the subject, Patañjali was to become the prime or seminal figure for the Yoga tradition after his times and accepted as such by other schools.» — Bryant explica por qué Patañjali queda como figura seminal: por producir el primer tratado sistematizado, y así lo aceptan las otras escuelas
«Tradition, first explicitly evidenced in the commentary of Bhoja Rāja in the eleventh century C.E. (and continuing to this day in a verse often recited at the beginning of yoga classes in the Iyengar community), considers him to be the same Patañjali who wrote the primary commentary on the famous grammar by Pāṇini and also ascribes to him authorship of a treatise on medicine.» — Bryant fecha en el comentario de Bhoja Rāja, siglo XI, la primera evidencia explícita de la tradición que identifica al Patañjali de los sūtras con el comentarista de la gramática de Pāṇini y le adscribe además un tratado de medicina; el verso sigue recitándose hoy en las clases de la comunidad Iyengar
«my own view is that there is not much to be gained by challenging the evidence of traditional accounts in the absence of evidence to the contrary that is uncontroversial or at least adequately compelling.» — Bryant declara su propia posición ante esa identificación: no ve ganancia en objetar los relatos tradicionales sin evidencia contraria suficientemente fuerte
«Moreover, evidence that Patañjali was addressing an audience already familiar with the tenets of Yoga can be deduced from the Yoga Sūtras themselves.» — Bryant deduce del propio texto que Patañjali hablaba a un público ya familiarizado con el yoga
«Thus, he refers to aṇimādi, “the mystic power of aṇima, etc.,” indicating that the other seven mystic powers were a standard, well-known group.» — el ejemplo que Bryant da de esa familiaridad: el *etcétera* de aṇimādi da por sabidos los otros siete poderes
«Patañjali’s date can only be inferred from the content of the text itself.» — Bryant declara que la fecha solo se infiere del contenido del propio texto; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 27
«Other than the fact that the Yoga Sūtras were written no later than the fifth century, the date cannot be determined with exactitude.» — Bryant fija el único límite firme de la datación, el siglo V como término *ante quem*, y declara que más allá de eso la fecha no se determina
«The term sūtra (from the Sanskrit root sū, cognate with sew) literally means a thread and essentially refers to a terse and pithy philosophical statement in which the maximum amount of information is packed into the minimum number of words.» — Bryant da la etimología de sūtra, hilo, y su definición: máximo de información en el mínimo de palabras
«Knowledge systems were handed down orally in ancient India, and thus source material was kept minimal partly with a view to facilitating memorization.» — Bryant explica la brevedad por la transmisión oral y la memorización
«Each sūtra served as a mnemonic device to structure the teachings and assist memorization.» — Bryant describe cada sūtra como recurso mnemotécnico
«I sometimes compare them to a series of bullet points that a lecturer might jot down prior to giving a presentation, to structure the talk and provide reminders of the main points intended to be covered; thus, from a dozen shorthand phrases incomprehensible to anyone else, a lecturer might discourse for a couple of hours.» — la comparación con que Bryant explica el género: notas de un conferenciante, incomprensibles para otro, que dan pie a horas de discurso
«That the sūtras, or aphorisms, are in places cryptic, esoteric, and incomprehensible in their own terms points to the fact that they were intended to be used in conjunction with a teacher: Feuerstein calls them “maps” (1980, 117).» — Bryant deriva de lo críptico del texto que estaba hecho para usarse con un maestro, y recoge la palabra de Feuerstein, mapas; el año entre paréntesis es referencia impresa dentro de la frase
«Therefore, it is, in my view, an unrealistic (if not impossible) task to attempt to bypass commentary in the hope of retrieving some original pure, precommentarial set of urinterpretations» — Bryant declara irreal el intento de saltarse el comentario para recuperar un texto precomentarial puro
«Starting with the famous Indologist Max Müller (1899), a number of scholars, including Paul Deussen (1920), Richard Garbe (1897), J. W. Hauer (1958), and Erich Frauwallner (1953), have argued that the text is a patchwork.» — Bryant enumera a los estudiosos que sostienen que el texto es un remiendo de capas; los años entre paréntesis son referencias impresas dentro de la frase
«The reason for such lack of consensus is clearly that there is insufficient evidence, hence “the task of finding various layers will always be arbitrary” (Larson 2008, 91).» — Bryant explica la falta de consenso por insuficiencia de evidencia y cita a Larson: la tarea de hallar capas será siempre arbitraria
«In any event, the only disjunction in the text that presents itself to my reading occurs in Chapter II and is best explained by postulating two distinct Yoga traditions that were patched together by Patañjali.» — Bryant declara una sola discontinuidad a su lectura, en el capítulo II, y la explica por dos tradiciones distintas cosidas por Patañjali
«R. S. Bhattacharya is willing to concede that “a large part of the sūtras are taken by Patañjali from his predecessors either verbatim or with slight changes” (1985, 52).» — Bryant cita a R. S. Bhattacharya concediendo que buena parte de los sūtras vienen de predecesores, literales o con cambios ligeros; el año entre paréntesis es referencia impresa dentro de la frase
«One must stress, therefore, that our understanding of Patañjali’s text is completely dependent on the interpretations of later commentators; it is incomprehensible, in places, in its own terms.» — Bryant declara la dependencia total de la comprensión del texto respecto de los comentaristas posteriores
«This, of course, leaves open the possibility that later commentators might have misinterpreted, or, perhaps more likely, reinterpreted aspects of the text by filtering ancient notions through the theological or sectarian perspectives of their times.» — Bryant deja abierta la contrapartida: que los comentaristas reinterpretaran filtrando por la teología de su tiempo
«Certainly, the commentators from Vyāsa onward are remarkably consistent in their interpretations of the essential metaphysics of the system for over fifteen hundred years» — Bryant declara notablemente consistente la interpretación de los comentaristas del Yoga durante mil quinientos años, y la contrasta con las diferencias radicales entre los del Vedānta
«While the fifteenth-century commentator Vijñānabhikṣu, for example, may quibble with the ninth-century commentator Vācaspati Miśra, the differences generally are in detail, not essential metaphysical elements.» — Bryant acota el desacuerdo entre Vijñānabhikṣu y Vācaspati Miśra: de detalle, no de metafísica
«And while Vijñānabhikṣu may inject a good deal of Vedāntic concepts into the basic dualism of the Yoga system, this is generally an addition (conspicuous and identifiable) to the system rather than a reinterpretation of it.» — Bryant distingue añadido de reinterpretación al tratar los conceptos vedānticos que Vijñānabhikṣu mete en el dualismo del Yoga
«Be all this as it may, the task we have set for ourselves in the present work is not to engage extensively in textual criticism but to attempt to represent something of the premodern history of interpretations associated with the school of Yoga as it has been transmitted for, at the very least, fifteen hundred years,» — Bryant declara su tarea: representar la historia premoderna de interpretaciones, no hacer crítica textual
«of a tradition, and it is this Yoga tradition that the present commentary sets out to represent through some of its primary expressions prior to the modern explosion of interest in yoga in the West.» — Bryant declara qué tradición representa su comentario: la del Yoga anterior a la explosión moderna de interés en Occidente
«The first extant commentary by Vyāsa, typically dated to around the fourth or fifth century, attained a status almost as canonical as the primary text by Patañjali himself.» — Bryant data el bhāṣya de Vyāsa en los siglos IV o V y le da estatus casi tan canónico como el texto primario
«So when we speak of the philosophy of Patañjali, what we really mean (or should mean) is the understanding of Patañjali according to Vyāsa: It is Vyāsa who determined what Patañjali’s abstruse sūtras meant, and all subsequent commentators elaborated on Vyāsa.» — Bryant enuncia la consecuencia: hablar de la filosofía de Patañjali es hablar de Patañjali según Vyāsa
«in fact, a number of traditional sources identify Vyāsa as none other than Patañjali himself» — Bryant consigna que hay fuentes tradicionales que identifican a Vyāsa con el propio Patañjali
«Indeed, the Vyāsa bhāṣya (commentary) becomes inseparable from the sūtras, an extension of it (such that on occasion commentators differ as to whether a line belongs to the commentary or the primary text» — Bryant describe la fusión: los comentaristas llegan a discrepar sobre si una línea pertenece al comentario o al texto primario
«In traditional narrative, Vyāsa, also known as Vedavyāsa or Vyāsadeva, is the legendary “divider”56 of the four Vedas.» — Bryant recoge la figura tradicional de Vyāsa como el divisor de los cuatro Vedas
«Modern scholars, even accepting the actual existence of a sage Vyāsa, consider our Vyāsa, the primary commentator of Patañjali’s text, to be a later figure who penned his commentary under the name of the legendary sage in order to invest it with indisputable authority.» — Bryant consigna la lectura moderna: un autor posterior escribiendo bajo el nombre del sabio legendario para investir de autoridad su comentario. La atribución queda como dato, con las dos lecturas una junto a otra
«It has remained unresolved since it was first questioned in 192759 whether the commentary on the Yoga Sūtras assigned to Śaṅkara is authentically penned by him.» — Bryant declara sin resolver desde 1927 la autoría del Vivaraṇa adjudicado a Śaṅkara
«The advaita, nondual, aspect of Śaṅkara’s thought, which is otherwise in stark opposition to the dualism and realism of Yoga metaphysics, is certainly not prominent in the Vivaraṇa to my eye» — Bryant señala que el advaita de Śaṅkara, opuesto al dualismo del Yoga, no se le hace prominente en el Vivaraṇa
«although one must note Hacker’s intriguing theory that Śaṅkara was originally an adherent of Patañjali’s yoga prior to becoming the famous Vedāntin.» — Bryant recoge la teoría de Hacker: Śaṅkara habría sido primero adherente del yoga de Patañjali
«There is only one surviving manuscript of this text, and all that can be determined with certainty is that it existed in the fifteenth century.» — Bryant acota lo comprobable del Vivaraṇa: un solo manuscrito y la certeza de que existía en el siglo XV
«The next best known commentator after Vyāsa, Vācaspati Miśra, was a Maithila Brāhmaṇa from the Bihar region of India, whose commentary, the Tattva-vaiśāradī, can be dated with more confidence to the ninth century.» — Bryant sitúa a Vācaspati Miśra como brāhmaṇa maithila de Bihar y data su Tattva-vaiśāradī en el siglo IX
«Despite the differences among these schools, Vācaspati Miśra is noteworthy for his ability to present each tradition in its own terms, without displaying any overt personal predilection.» — Bryant destaca en Vācaspati Miśra la capacidad de exponer cada tradición en sus propios términos, sin predilección visible
«As an aside, this eclectic scholasticism contrasts with the experiential focus of yoga and makes one wonder whether Vācaspati Miśra was a practicing yogī.» — Bryant deja abierta, como pregunta y no como dictamen, si Vācaspati Miśra practicaba el yoga que comenta
«A fascinating Arabic translation of Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras was undertaken by the famous Arab traveler and historian al-Bīrunī (973– 1050), the manuscript of which was discovered in Istanbul in 1922.» — Bryant consigna la traducción árabe de al-Bīrunī y el hallazgo de su manuscrito en Estambul en 1922
«Al-Bīrunī translates the sūtras in the form of a dialogue and interweaves it with “that over-lengthy commentary.”» — Bryant describe la forma que al-Bīrunī da al texto: diálogo entrelazado con un comentario que el propio traductor llama demasiado largo
«However, the translators hold that this commentary to which he refers and had at his disposal does not appear to have been that of Vyāsa and “had probably been written at a time when the Bhāṣya of Veda-vyāsa had not attained any great sanctity or authority … [and] may represent a hitherto unknown line of interpretation”» — Bryant recoge la hipótesis de Pines y Gelblum: el comentario que al-Bīrunī tenía a mano no sería el de Vyāsa y podría representar una línea de interpretación desconocida
«This is a fascinating consideration, if true, since al-Bīrunī’s commentary, which seems to be in complete accordance with Vyāsa’s, adds weight to our own opinion that there is little evidence to deny the accuracy of Vyāsa’s Bhāṣya.» — Bryant usa esa misma hipótesis en sentido contrario: si la lectura de al-Bīrunī concuerda con la de Vyāsa, refuerza el linaje oral intacto
«Roughly contemporaneous with al-Bīrunī is the eleventh-century king Bhoja Rāja, poet, scholar, and patron of the arts, sciences, and esoteric traditions, whose clan asserted independent rule in the Malwa region of Madhya Pradesh, central India, in the mid-tenth century.» — Bryant presenta a Bhoja Rāja como rey, poeta y mecenas de las artes, las ciencias y las tradiciones esotéricas en Malwa
«his commentary, called the Rājamārtaṇḍa, essentially reiterates the work of Vyāsa without adding much elaboration, although there are occasionally very valuable insights.» — Bryant acota el aporte del Rāja-mārtaṇḍa: reitera a Vyāsa con alguna intuición valiosa
«In contrast, in the fifteenth century, Vijñānabhikṣu wrote to my mind the most insightful and useful commentary after that of Vyāsa’s, the Yoga-vārttika.» — Bryant declara el Yoga-vārttika de Vijñānabhikṣu el comentario más útil después del de Vyāsa, y lo dice como juicio propio
«He is noteworthy for his attempt to harmonize Vedānta and Sāṅkhya concepts, subscribing to a metaphysical view of bhedābheda, difference in nondifference, with regard to the relationship between the individual soul and the Absolute Truth.» — Bryant sitúa a Vijñānabhikṣu armonizando Vedānta y Sāṅkhya bajo el bhedābheda, diferencia en la no diferencia
«As a Vaiṣṇava (a follower of an ancient sect holding Viṣṇu to be the supreme Īśvara), his commentary also enhances the devotional element and tenor of the text, as indeed do most of the commentaries.» — Bryant señala que el vaiṣṇavismo de Vijñānabhikṣu realza el tono devocional del texto, como hacen casi todos los comentarios
«His translator, Rukmani, finds him to be “an uncompromising ascetic, steadfast in the principles of Yoga” (1997, 623).» — Bryant recoge el juicio de Rukmani sobre Vijñānabhikṣu; el año entre paréntesis es referencia impresa dentro de la frase
«In the sixteenth century, another Vedāntin, Rāmānanda Sarasvatī,65 wrote his commentary, called Yogamaṇi-prabhā, which also adds little to the previous commentaries.» — Bryant sitúa el Yogamaṇi-prabhā de Rāmānanda Sarasvatī en el siglo XVI y acota que añade poco
«But there are valuable insights contained in the final commentary considered for the present study, the Bhāsvatī by Hariharānanda Āraṇya.» — Bryant cierra la lista con el Bhāsvatī de Hariharānanda Āraṇya
«While it is not always clear to what extent some of the commentators were practicing yogīs and to what extent they were scholastics, we can affirm that Hariharānanda certainly was a fully dedicated yogī.» — Bryant distingue a Hariharānanda del resto por ser yogī dedicado y no solo escolástico
«From his early life, Hariharānanda lived a renounced, ascetic life as a sannyasī, including several years in solitude meditating in the caves of west India and the last twenty-one years of his life in a hermitage where he could be contacted by his disciples only through a window looking into a hall.» — Bryant da la biografía de Hariharānanda: años de soledad en cuevas y veintiún años finales en una ermita, accesible solo por una ventana
«Although he is technically a “modern” commentator (1869–1947), and this present commentary concerns itself with the premodern, that is, the commentaries of the precolonial period, it is included here because, as a Sāṅkhya ācārya, master, Hariharānanda» — Bryant justifica la inclusión de un comentarista moderno en una obra sobre lo premoderno: como ācārya del Sāṅkhya habitaba un universo tradicional. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 34
«Although situated as one of what later came to be known as the six schools of classical Hindu philosophy, Patañjali’s text is not so much a philosophical treatise as a psychosomatic technique of meditative practice.» — Bryant define el texto por su género: no tratado filosófico sino técnica psicosomática de práctica meditativa
«As a dualistic system that presupposes an ultimate and absolute distinction between matter and consciousness, it is concerned with presenting a psychology of mind and an understanding of human consciousness rather than a metaphysics of all manifest reality.» — Bryant acota el alcance del dualismo del texto: psicología de la mente, no metafísica de toda la realidad manifiesta
«In actuality, Patañjali’s text reads more like a manual for the practitioner interested in plumbing the depths of human consciousness than a philosophical exposition.» — Bryant lo describe como manual para quien sondea la consciencia humana
«While the distinction between the material body and a conscious soul has a well-known history in Western Greco-Abrahamic religion and thought, Yoga differs from most comparable Western schools of dualism by regarding not just the physical body but also the mind, ego, and all cognitive functions as belonging to the realm of inert matter.» — Bryant marca la diferencia con los dualismos occidentales: aquí mente, ego y toda función cognitiva son materia inerte
«The dualism fundamental to Platonic or Aristotelian thought, or to Paul or Augustine, is not at all the dualism of Yoga.» — Bryant niega la equivalencia con el dualismo platónico, aristotélico, paulino o agustiniano
«Perhaps Descartes most famously represents the generic Western notions of the dualism between self and body in his Meditations: The self thinks and lacks extension, the body is unthinking and extended.» — Bryant toma a Descartes como caso del dualismo occidental corriente, con el que contrasta el del Yoga
«In the Yoga tradition, the dualism is not between the material body and physical reality on one hand, and mental reality characterized by thought on the other, but between pure awareness and all objects of awareness— whether these objects are physical and extended, or internal and nonextended.» — Bryant fija dónde cae el corte en el Yoga: entre la pura consciencia y todo objeto de consciencia, extenso o no
«In other words, in Sāṅkhya and Yoga, thought, feeling, emotion, memory, etc., are as material or physical as the visible ingredients of the empirical world.» — Bryant enuncia la consecuencia: pensamiento, sentimiento, emoción y memoria son tan materiales como lo visible
«As an aside, in this regard, Yoga has a curious overlap with modern reductive materialism, which holds that the» — Bryant señala un solape curioso con el materialismo reductivo moderno; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 36, donde acota que el Yoga, a diferencia de la inteligencia artificial, retiene la consciencia como independiente de la cognición
«Pure consciousness, called puruṣa in this system, animates and pervades the incessant fluctuations of thought—the inner turmoil of fears, emotions, cravings, etc.—but the two are completely distinct entities.» — Bryant define el puruṣa como consciencia pura que anima las fluctuaciones del pensamiento sin confundirse con ellas
«There is thus a radical distinction between the mind, which is considered to be very subtle but nonetheless inanimate matter, and pure consciousness, which is the actual animate life force.» — Bryant fija la distinción radical entre mente, materia sutil pero inanimada, y consciencia pura, fuerza vital animada
«Animated by consciousness, it is the mind that imagines itself to be the real self rather than a material entity external to consciousness.» — Bryant localiza el error donde el sistema lo pone: la mente imaginándose el sí mismo real
«The mind is therefore the seat of ignorance and bondage; puruṣa is “witness, free, indifferent, a spectator and inactive” (Sāṅkhya Kārikā XIX).» — Bryant cita el Sāṅkhya Kārikā XIX: el puruṣa es testigo, libre, indiferente, espectador e inactivo
«in fact, according to Sāṅkhya, “no one is actually either bound or liberated, nor does anyone transmigrate; it is only prakṛti in her various manifestations who is bound, transmigrates and released” (Sāṅkhya Kārikā LXII).» — Bryant cita el Sāṅkhya Kārikā LXII: nadie está atado ni liberado ni transmigra; solo prakṛti en sus manifestaciones
«in the Yoga tradition, the quest for liberation, in other words human agency, is a function of the prākṛtic mind, not of puruṣa.» — Bryant sitúa la agencia humana y la búsqueda de liberación en la mente prākṛtica, no en el puruṣa
«since it is perceived by its detractors as the Achilles’ heel of an otherwise meritorious system» — Bryant consigna que sus detractores ven en ese punto el talón de Aquiles del sistema, y remite a sus reflexiones finales
«Puruṣa has never been bound; all notions of identity whether bound or liberated are taking place in the prākṛtic mind.» — Bryant vuelve a marcar como retóricas las frases en que él y los comentaristas dicen que el puruṣa se identifica mal o busca libertad
«In conclusion, then, Yoga claims to provide a system by which the practitioner can directly realize his or her puruṣa, the soul or innermost conscious self, through mental practices.» — Bryant resume la promesa del sistema: realizar directamente el propio puruṣa por prácticas mentales
«or theoretical basis for the realization of puruṣa, and Yoga offers the technique or practice itself.» — Bryant reparte el trabajo entre las dos vías: el Sāṅkhya da la base metafísica o teórica, el Yoga la técnica
«While the Yoga tradition does not agree with the Sāṅkhya view that metaphysical analysis, that is, jñāna, knowledge, constitutes a sufficient path toward enlightenment in and of itself,7 the metaphysical presuppositions of the Yoga system assume those of Sāṅkhya.» — Bryant marca el desacuerdo del Yoga con el Sāṅkhya: el jñāna solo no basta, aunque la metafísica se comparta
«As with the cluster of Yoga traditions, there were numerous variants of Sāṅkhya, amply attested in the Mahābhārata8 (the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hsüen Tsang’s disciple in the seventh century reports eighteen schools,9 and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa also refers to several).» — Bryant consigna la pluralidad de sāṅkhyas: el discípulo de Hsüen Tsang reporta dieciocho escuelas en el siglo VII
«Only fragments quoted by other authors have survived from the works of the original teachers of the system—Kapila, the divine sage whom tradition assigns as the original expounder of Sāṅkhya, is mentioned as early as the R˙g Veda (X.27.16), the earliest Indo-European text, as well as in a number of other ancient treatises.» — Bryant declara perdidos los textos de los maestros originales del Sāṅkhya y sitúa a Kapila, su expositor tradicional, ya en el Ṛg Veda X.27.16
«There are various references to the original Sāṅkhya tradition as S˙aṣṭi-tantra, containing sixty topics (for example, Sāṅkhya Kārikā LXXII),12 but the original text appears to be lost.» — Bryant consigna la pérdida del Ṣaṣṭi-tantra, el texto de los sesenta temas
«The later Sāṅkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, which scholars assign to the fourth or fifth century, has by default become the seminal text of the tradition, just as Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras has become for the Yoga tradition, and represents its developed, systematic form.» — Bryant sitúa el Sāṅkhya Kārikā de Īśvarakṛṣṇa como texto seminal por defecto de esa tradición, al modo en que los Yoga Sūtras lo son de la suya
«In the Sāṅkhya (literally, numeration) system, the universe of animate and inanimate entities is perceived as ultimately the product of two ontologically distinct categories; hence this system is quintessentially dvaita, or dualistic in presupposition.» — Bryant traduce sāṅkhya por numeración y declara dvaita el presupuesto del sistema
«These two categories are prakṛti, or the primordial material matrix of the physical universe, “the undifferentiated plenitude of being,”13 and puruṣa, the innumerable conscious souls or selves embedded within it.» — Bryant nombra las dos categorías: prakṛti como matriz material primordial y los innumerables puruṣas embebidos en ella
«The actual catalysts in this evolutionary process are the three guṇas, literally, strands or qualities, that are inherent in prakṛti. These are sattva, lucidity; rajas, action; and tamas, inertia.» — Bryant nombra los tres guṇas y los traduce: sattva lucidez, rajas acción, tamas inercia
«These guṇas are sometimes compared to the threads of a rope; just as a rope is a combination of threads, so all manifest reality consists of a combination of the guṇas.» — la comparación tradicional que Bryant recoge: la cuerda hecha de hebras
«in Yoga, the mind and therefore all psychological dispositions are prakṛti and thus also composed of the guṇas—the only difference between mind and matter being that the former has a larger preponderance of sattva, and the latter of tamas.» — Bryant reduce la diferencia entre mente y materia a una proporción distinta de guṇas: más sattva en una, más tamas en la otra
«Thus, when sattva (from the root as, “to be”15) is predominant in an individual, the qualities of lucidity, tranquillity, wisdom, discrimination, detachment, happiness, and peacefulness manifest;» — Bryant lista lo que manifiesta el predominio de sattva: lucidez, tranquilidad, sabiduría, discriminación, desapego, felicidad y paz
«when rajas (from the root rañj, to color, to redden) is predominant, hankering, attachment, energetic endeavor, passion, power, restlessness, and creative activity manifest;» — Bryant lista lo que manifiesta el predominio de rajas, con su etimología de colorear y enrojecer
«and when tamas, the guṇa least favorable for yoga, is predominant, stillness, ignorance, delusion, disinterest, lethargy, sleep, and disinclination toward constructive activity manifest.» — Bryant declara tamas el guṇa menos favorable al yoga y lista sus manifestaciones
«The Sāṅkhyan text the Yukti-dīpikā (13) compares them to the wick, fire, and oil of the lamp which, while opposed to each other in their nature, come together to produce light.» — Bryant recoge la imagen del Yukti-dīpikā: mecha, fuego y aceite, opuestos entre sí y juntos en la llama
«Just as there are an unlimited variety of colors stemming from the mixture of the three primary colors, different hues being simply expressions of the specific proportionality of red, yellow, and blue, so the unlimited psychological dispositions of living creatures (and of physical forms) stem from the mixture of the guṇas, specific states of mind being the reflections of the particular proportionality of the three guṇas.» — Bryant explica la variedad psicológica por la proporción de los tres guṇas, como los colores salen de tres primarios
«Thus the physical composition of objects like air, water, stone, fire, etc., differs because of the constitutional makeup of specific guṇas: air contains more of the buoyancy of sattva; stones, more of the sluggishness of the tamas element; and fire, more rajas (although its buoyancy betrays its partial nature of sattva as well).» — Bryant aplica la misma regla a lo físico: aire con más sattva, piedra con más tamas, fuego con más rajas
«The process by which the universe evolves from prakṛti is usefully compared to the churning of milk: When milk receives a citric catalyst, yogurt, curds, or butter emerges. These immediate products can be manipulated to produce a further series of products—toffee, milk desserts, cheese, etc.» — la comparación con que Bryant explica la evolución de prakṛti: la leche cuajada y la serie de productos que salen de ella
«the first evolute emerging from prakṛti when it is churned by the guṇas (sattva specifically) is buddhi, intelligence.» — Bryant nombra el primer evoluto: buddhi, inteligencia, batida por sattva
«It is the interface between puruṣa and all other prākṛtic evolutes.» — Bryant define buddhi como la interfaz entre el puruṣa y el resto de los evolutos de prakṛti
«From this vantage point, it can direct awareness out into the objects and embroilments of the world, or, in its highest potential, it can become aware of the presence of puruṣa and consequently redirect itself toward complete realization of the true source of consciousness that pervades it.» — Bryant describe las dos direcciones que buddhi puede tomar: hacia los objetos del mundo o hacia el puruṣa
«Ahaṅkāra also limits the range of awareness to fit within and identify with the contours of the particular psychophysical organism within which it finds itself in any one embodiment, as opposed to another.» — Bryant describe el ahaṅkāra limitando la consciencia al contorno del organismo que la aloja
«In other words, the ahaṅkāra of a bug acts almost like a concave screen that refracts consciousness to pervade and appropriate the contours of the bug. If the bug dies and becomes, say, a dog and then a human in subsequent lives, the ahaṅkāra aspect of the citta adjusts to accommodate and absorb consciousness into these new environments. Thus the bug thinks it is a bug, the dog thinks it is a dog, and the human thinks he or she is a human.» — la imagen con que Bryant explica el ahaṅkāra: pantalla cóncava que refracta la consciencia para llenar el contorno del insecto, del perro o del humano
«Ahaṅkāra is thus not only pivotal in all experience but also is the critical midpoint in the choice between material identification or spiritual pursuit, the external material world or the pure puruṣa.» — Bryant hace del ahaṅkāra el punto medio crítico donde se elige entre identificación material y búsqueda espiritual
«Turned inward, ahaṅkāra (asmitā) can reflect awareness toward its source, puruṣa; turned outward, it can misidentify the self with its prākṛtic entrapment.» — Bryant da las dos direcciones del ahaṅkāra, hacia dentro y hacia fuera, y nombra el término que el texto usa, asmitā
«When ego in turn is churned by the guṇa of sattva inherent in it, manas, the mind, is produced.» — Bryant continúa la serie de evolutos: de ahaṅkāra batido por sattva sale manas, la mente
«The mind is the seat of the emotions, of like and dislike, and filters and processes the potentially enormous amount of data accessible to the senses. It primarily receives, sorts, categorizes» — Bryant define manas por su función: asiento de las emociones y filtro de los datos de los sentidos
«It serves as the liaison between the activities of the senses transmitting data from the external world, and buddhi, intelligence;» — Bryant pone a manas de enlace entre los sentidos y buddhi
«The Kaṭha Upaniṣad (3.9) compares the body to a chariot, the senses to the horses, the mind to the reins that control the horses, the buddhi to the driver who controls the reins and charts the course, and the puruṣa to the inactive passenger.» — Bryant recoge la imagen del carro del Kaṭha Upaniṣad y reparte los papeles: sentidos caballos, mente riendas, buddhi auriga, puruṣa pasajero inactivo
«Buddhi, intelligence; ahaṅkāra, ego; and manas, mind, together comprise the internal body (antaḥkaraṇa), the inner noetic world of thoughts, emotions, feelings, determination, will, cognitions, memories, etc.» — Bryant nombra el antaḥkaraṇa, cuerpo interno hecho de los tres
«As noted, the Yoga school, while using the terminology of (especially) buddhi, but also ahaṅkāra and manas, differs somewhat from that of Sāṅkhya in conceiving these three as interacting functions of the one citta, mind, rather than as three distinct metaphysical layers.» — Bryant marca la diferencia técnica entre las dos escuelas: para el Yoga los tres son funciones de una sola citta, no capas distintas
«Citta, then, is the term used by Patañjali and the commentators to refer to all three of these cognitive functions combined (thus it is not a separate evolute from prakṛti).» — Bryant define citta como el término que cubre las tres funciones cognitivas juntas
«Moving onto more physical levels of reality, from the ego stirred by tamas emerge the tanmātras, or subtle elements» — Bryant sigue la serie hacia lo físico: del ego agitado por tamas salen los tanmātras, elementos sutiles. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 42 nombrando sonido, vista, olfato, gusto y tacto
«These, in turn, sequentially produce the five mahābhūtas, or gross elements—ether, air, fire, water, and earth—the world of form, the actual physical, tangible stuff of the universe.» — Bryant cierra la serie en los cinco mahābhūtas: éter, aire, fuego, agua y tierra
«This evolutionary sequence must be kept in mind in order to understand the metaphysics behind a number of sūtras in the Yoga Sūtras, particularly those that deal with the mystic powers.» — Bryant advierte que esta secuencia es la clave metafísica de los sūtras sobre los poderes místicos del capítulo III
«The Sāṅkhya system is classified in Indian thought as satkārya, namely, that the effects of the world are present in their cause.» — Bryant nombra la doctrina satkārya: los efectos están presentes en su causa
«This means buddhi underpins all reality, even as buddhi itself is a manifestation of prakṛti and the guṇas, or, put differently, any expression of reality, subjective or objective, is nothing other than a manifestation of the guṇas.» — Bryant extrae la consecuencia: toda expresión de realidad, subjetiva u objetiva, es manifestación de los guṇas
«According to Patañjali’s definition in the second sūtra, yoga is the cessation (nirodha) of the activities or permutations (vṛttis) of the citta.» — Bryant enuncia la definición del segundo sūtra: yoga es el cese de las permutaciones de la citta
«The vṛttis refer to any sequence of thought, ideas, mental imaging, or cognitive act performed by the mind, intellect, or ego as defined above—in short, any state of mind whatsoever.» — Bryant define vṛtti con la máxima amplitud: cualquier estado de mente
«It cannot be over-stressed that the mind is merely a physical substance that selects, organizes, analyzes, and molds itself into the physical forms of the sense data presented to it; in and of itself it is not aware of them.» — Bryant insiste en el punto que el sistema no negocia: la mente es sustancia física que se moldea, y por sí misma no es consciente
«Sense impressions or thoughts are imprints in that mental substance, just as a clay pot is a product made from the substance clay, or waves are permutations of the sea.» — las dos imágenes con que Bryant explica la vṛtti: la olla de barro y las olas del mar
«The citta can profitably be compared to the software, and the body to the hardware. Neither is conscious; they are rather forms of gross matter, even as the former can do very intelligent activities. Both software and hardware are useless without the presence of a conscious observer.» — la comparación moderna de Bryant: citta como software y cuerpo como hardware, inútiles sin observador consciente
«Only puruṣa is truly alive, that is, aware or conscious.» — Bryant reserva la vida, entendida como consciencia, al puruṣa
«To realize pure awareness as an entity distinct and autonomous from the mind (and, of course, body), thought must be stilled and consciousness extracted from its embroilment with the mind and its incessant thinking nature.» — Bryant enuncia lo que exige la realización: detener el pensamiento y extraer la consciencia de su enredo con la mente
«In conventional existence, puruṣa’s awareness of objects is mediated by means of buddhi, the intellect.» — Bryant describe la mediación ordinaria: el puruṣa conoce los objetos a través de buddhi
«Although inanimate, the intellect, in addition to its functions of discrimination noted earlier, molds itself into the form and shape of these objects of experience, thoughts, and ideas, and, due to the reflection of the consciousness of puruṣa, appears animated.» — Bryant explica cómo el intelecto inanimado parece animado: se moldea en los objetos y refleja la consciencia del puruṣa
«The pure consciousness of the soul pervades the citta, animating it, just as a torch, although distinct in its own right, pervades an inanimate object with light and makes it appear luminous.» — la imagen de la antorcha con que Bryant explica la animación de la citta
«Pervaded by this consciousness, the citta mind appears as if it itself were conscious, as metal placed into intense fire becomes molten and appears as if fire.» — la imagen del metal al rojo: la mente parece consciente como el metal parece fuego
«Most important, the soul, the pure and eternal power of consciousness, never changes; as a spectator or witness, it does not itself transform when in contact with the ever-changing states of mind.» — Bryant fija lo que no cambia: el alma como espectador o testigo, que no se transforma al contacto con los estados de mente
«Just as light passively reveals gross and subtle objects in a dark room and yet is not itself affected or changed by them, consciousness passively reveals objects, whether in the form of gross external physical objects or subtle internal thoughts, vṛttis, including the higher stage of discrimination, but is not itself actually affected or touched by them.» — la imagen de la luz en el cuarto oscuro: revela sin ser afectada
«But the awareness of the pure soul does permeate or shine on the citta, like a projector light permeating inanimate pictorial forms of a movie reel, thereby animating these pictures as if they had a life of their own.» — la imagen del proyector: la luz anima las figuras del rollo de película
«In so doing the animated mind misidentifies consciousness with itself, equating consciousness with the churnings of thought, vṛttis, as if consciousness were inherent within itself rather than the effulgence of an entity outside and separate from itself.» — Bryant nombra el error: la mente animada toma la consciencia por suya
«This misidentification is ignorance, avidyā, and» — Bryant nombra avidyā a esa identificación errónea; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 44 llamándola causa de la atadura en saṁsāra y goma misteriosa que ata el sí mismo a la materia
«(Ignorance is mysterious, since the question of how it comes to arise in the first place is bypassed by all Indic metaphysicians by stating that it is» — Bryant consigna el punto que ninguna metafísica índica resuelve: cómo surge la ignorancia, contestado declarándola sin comienzo
«According to some commentators, such as Vijñānabhikṣu, the intellect functions like a mirror. Just as light bounces off an illuminated reflective object back to its source, the consciousness of the soul bounces off this animated intellect that presents a reflection to the soul» — Bryant expone la teoría del espejo de Vijñānabhikṣu: el intelecto refleja de vuelta la consciencia del alma
«Vijñānabhikṣu’s double-reflection theory is sometimes referred to in this commentary, being in my view more cogent than Vācaspati Miśra’s single-reflection theory» — Bryant declara preferir la teoría de la doble reflexión de Vijñānabhikṣu a la de reflexión simple de Vācaspati Miśra, y lo dice como opinión propia
«Because sattva is predominant in the intellect, it is able to reflect pure consciousness back to itself. Just as we become conscious of our appearance in a mirror due to its reflectivity, the soul becomes conscious of its reflection in the animated intellect.» — Bryant explica por qué el intelecto puede reflejar: el predominio de sattva en él
«But since the intellect is constantly being molded into the images presented to it by the mind and senses, this reflection presented back to the puruṣa soul is distorted or transformed by changing forms, vṛttis, just as our reflection in a mirror is distorted if the mirror is warped.» — la imagen del espejo deformado: la reflexión que llega al alma va distorsionada por las vṛttis
«The soul is thus identified with the world of change through these changing states of mind, the vṛttis, just as we may look at our reflection in a dirty mirror and mistakenly think that it is we who are dirty.» — la imagen del espejo sucio con que Bryant cierra la explicación del error
«Whether the vṛttis of the citta are reflected back to the puruṣa soul, or whether consciousness simply becomes aware of them by proximity and pervasion, the soul nonetheless is identified with the experiences of the body and mind—birth, death, disease, old age, happiness, distress, peacefulness, anxiety, etc., even though these are merely transformations occurring in the inanimate and external body and mind, and therefore unconnected with the puruṣa.» — Bryant deja abiertas las dos explicaciones —reflejo o proximidad— y consigna que en cualquiera el resultado es el mismo
«Yoga involves preventing the mind from being molded into these permutations, the vṛttis, the impressions and thoughts of the objects of the world, such that puruṣa can regain its autonomous nature.» — Bryant define la operación del yoga: impedir que la mente se moldee en las vṛttis para que el puruṣa recobre su naturaleza autónoma
«repeatedly by our commentators, is to maximize the proportion of the guṇa of sattva in the mind and correspondingly decrease that of rajas and tamas.» — Bryant enuncia la meta operativa que los comentaristas repiten: subir la proporción de sattva y bajar la de rajas y tamas
«When all trace of tamas and rajas is stilled, the mind attains the highest potential of its prākṛtic nature—illumination, peacefulness, discernment, etc., all qualities inherent in sattva.» — Bryant describe el techo de la naturaleza prākṛtica de la mente cuando rajas y tamas se aquietan
«the pure sattva nature of the mind can recognize the distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti, and redirect consciousness back inward toward this inner self (one of the ultimate goals of yoga), just as a dusty mirror can reflect things clearly when cleaned.» — la imagen del espejo empolvado que, limpio, refleja con nitidez
«In short, yoga can also be viewed as the process of stilling the potential of rajas and tamas, and allowing the maximum potential sattva nature of the mind to manifest, and the commentators often promote it this way.» — Bryant da una segunda formulación del yoga —aquietar rajas y tamas para que se manifieste sattva— y la adjudica al modo de exponer de los comentaristas
«The means prescribed by Patañjali to still the vṛtti states of mind or fluctuations of thought is meditation, defined as keeping the mind fixed on any particular object of choice without distraction.» — Bryant define el medio: meditación entendida como fijar la mente en un objeto cualquiera sin distracción
«God, Īśvara, comes highly recommended in this regard; Yoga is clearly, but nondogmatically, a theistic system.» — Bryant declara teísta el sistema y le pone enseguida el límite: no dogmático
«Through grace or the sheer power of concentration, the mind can attain an inactive state where all thoughts remain only in potential but not active form.» — Bryant nombra las dos vías al estado inactivo de la mente: la gracia o la pura fuerza de concentración
«This does not mean to say that consciousness becomes extinguished, Patañjali hastens to inform us (as does the entire Upaniṣadic/Vedāntic tradition); consciousness is eternal and absolute.» — Bryant marca lo que el sistema niega: aquietar el pensamiento no extingue la consciencia, que es eterna y absoluta
«Therefore, once there are no more thoughts or objects on its horizons or sphere of awareness, consciousness has no alternative but to become conscious of itself.» — Bryant enuncia el mecanismo: sin objetos en el horizonte, la consciencia no tiene otra salida que hacerse consciente de sí
«The point is that it has no option in terms of being aware on some level, since awareness is eternal and inextinguishable.» — Bryant fija el axioma del que depende el argumento: la consciencia es eterna e inextinguible
«This is self-realization (to use a neo-Vedāntic term), the ultimate state of awareness, the state of consciousness in which nothing can be discerned except the pure self, asamprajñātasamādhi. This is the final goal of yoga and thus of human existence.» — Bryant nombra el estado final, asamprajñāta-samādhi, y marca como término neo-vedāntico la palabra *autorrealización* con que lo traduce
«These eight limbs are yama, abstentions, moral restraints; niyama, ethical observances; āsana, posture; prāṇāyāma, breath control; pratyāhāra, withdrawal of the senses; dhāraṇā, concentration; dhyāna, meditation; and samādhi, full meditative absorption.» — Bryant enumera y traduce los ocho miembros del aṣṭāṅga-yoga
«The first limb, the yamas, are nonviolence, truthfulness, refraining from stealing, celibacy, and refraining from coveting. They deal with how the aspiring yogī relates to others.» — Bryant lista los cinco yamas y los define por su campo: la relación con los demás
«The second limb, the niyamas, are cleanliness, contentment, austerity, study [of scripture], and devotion to God. These deal with how the yogī cultivates his or her own lifestyle.» — Bryant lista los cinco niyamas y los define por su campo: el propio modo de vida
«The third limb, āsana, focuses on stretches and postures with a view to preparing the yogī’s body to sit for prolonged periods in meditation.» — Bryant fija la función del āsana dentro del sistema: preparar el cuerpo para sentarse largo rato a meditar
«It is this aspect of yoga that has been most visibly exported to the West but too often stripped from its context as one ingredient in a more ambitious and far-reaching sequence.» — Bryant señala que el miembro exportado a Occidente va casi siempre arrancado de su lugar en la serie
«the fourth limb, prāṇāyāma, furthers this process through fixing the mind on breath control. By regulating and slowing the movement of breath, the mind too becomes regulated and quiescent.» — Bryant explica el prāṇāyāma por su efecto: regulando el aliento se regula la mente
«The fifth limb, pratyāhāra, withdrawal of the senses, deepens the process by removing consciousness from all engagement with the sense objects (sight, sound, taste, smell, touch).» — Bryant define el pratyāhāra como retiro de la consciencia de todo trato con los objetos de los sentidos
«The last three limbs are essentially different degrees of concentrative intensity and culminate in the realization by awareness of its own nature, asamprajñāta-samādhi.» — Bryant describe los tres últimos miembros como grados de intensidad de una misma concentración
«The Yoga Sūtras, in fact, is primarily a manual for the practitioner rather than an exposition of Yoga philosophy.» — Bryant repite al cerrar la sección lo que dijo al abrirla: manual de práctica antes que exposición filosófica
«There are dozens of modern translations of the sūtras, which have been marketed to the yoga community or nonspecialized reading public interested in esoteric Eastern practices.» — Bryant sitúa su edición frente a las decenas de traducciones dirigidas a la comunidad del yoga y al público interesado en prácticas orientales esotéricas
«The present translation attempts to bridge these two worlds of discourse.» — Bryant declara el propósito de su traducción: tender un puente entre el discurso académico y el del practicante
«However, since a good deal of the commentarial tradition deals with abstruse philosophical minutiae of interest only to the specialist, my extracts primarily consist only of material that is essential to understanding the sūtras in their own right.» — Bryant declara su criterio de selección: solo lo que hace falta para entender los sūtras, dejando fuera la minucia de especialista
«I have trimmed superfluous or peripheral philosophical specificity from this commentary, as a thorough representation of these would require extensive background or presentation of Hindu philosophical concepts and issues.» — Bryant declara lo que recortó y por qué; la deuda queda escrita en su propia edición
«I have included the commentarial sections critiquing Buddhist views of mind and consciousness, since—apart from the fact that they occupy a large portion of Chapter IV (and surface elsewhere)—it seems useful to establish the main points of divergence on these topics between these traditions and classical Yoga, given the popularity of Buddhist traditions in the West.» — Bryant explica por qué conserva las secciones donde los comentaristas objetan al budismo: ocupan buena parte del capítulo IV y marcan los puntos de divergencia
«I might add that the commentaries can be repetitive in parts—after all, the core of the teachings are very simple: to remove consciousness from its absorption in prakṛti.» — Bryant resume el núcleo de la enseñanza en una frase: retirar la consciencia de su absorción en prakṛti
«Any type of pedagogy involves repetition, and this is especially true of the Indic traditions and their history of oral transmission. This commentary has preserved some of this character.» — Bryant declara conservada en su comentario la repetición propia de la transmisión oral índica
«In many ways, this commentary shares features of traditional exegesis insofar as it primarily seeks to unpack and represent Patañjali as well as the traditional commentaries, although there is plenty of my own elaboration, critical analysis, and, I hope, contributive insight.» — Bryant sitúa su comentario dentro de la exégesis tradicional y a la vez declara suya la elaboración y el análisis crítico
«In classical India, proponents of knowledge systems have a tendency to perceive themselves as members of disciplic successions, paramparās (for example, Gītā IV.2).» — Bryant describe la autopercepción del exégeta clásico como miembro de una sucesión discipular
«Revelation is either śruti (that which is heard, namely, the Vedic corpus), transhuman revelation emanating from Īśvara, God, for the theist schools,1 or smṛti (that which is remembered, the Purāṇas and epics and other later texts including the sūtra traditions), intrahuman revelation emanating from enlightened ṛṣi sages.» — Bryant distingue śruti de smṛti y adscribe los sūtras a la segunda, revelación intrahumana de los ṛṣis
«His or her role, then, is to take the existing traditions and expand upon them according to time and context as existing Truths, rather than formulate new Truths.» — Bryant define el papel del exégeta tradicional: expandir verdades existentes, no formular nuevas
«While I consider the content of the Yoga Sūtras text to stem from a core of meditational and enstatic experiences attained in yogic practice that has been subsequently systematized and scholastized by Patañjali (who may very likely have been a practicing yogī)» — Bryant declara su propia posición sobre el origen del texto: un núcleo de experiencias meditativas después sistematizado y escolastizado por Patañjali
«While such beliefs obviously conflict with the parameters of modern post-Enlightenment rational thought, I have not attempted to sterilize the text from these elements, as some modern translations tend to do, but have retained these teachings within their greater traditional context and presented them with all the trappings» — Bryant declara no haber esterilizado el texto de divinidades, reinos celestes y poderes místicos, como hacen otras traducciones modernas. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 50
«Readers are left to extract whatever aspects of the text are meaningful to them or do not conflict fatally with their own worldviews (and, in any event, such conflict, or cognitive dissonance, affords an opportunity to probe and perhaps reevaluate one’s own intellectual and cultural preconceptions and predispositions).» — Bryant deja al lector la decisión de qué toma del texto, y lee la disonancia cognitiva como ocasión de revisar los propios presupuestos
«One of the approaches of phenomenology involves presenting—in its own terms and frame of reference—material that conflicts with or is inexplicable from within the parameters of our modern world knowledge systems. The material is presented without imposing reductionist2 interpretational models from our very different modern time and context upon it, without value judgment, and in as neutral a fashion as possible.» — Bryant define el método fenomenológico que declara suyo: presentar el material en sus propios términos, sin modelos reduccionistas ni juicio de valor
«Phenomenology concerns itself with representing the claims and beliefs of a religious tradition as accurately and objectively as possible as phenomena in their own right and within their own context—suspending judgment on issues of “truth” from the perspective of scientific validity.» — Bryant declara suspendido el juicio sobre la verdad del material desde el criterio de validez científica
«The goal of this commentary is to present the traditional Yogic worldview not as an imagined monolith but through some of the permutations and configurations it has taken in the hands of the commentators over the centuries.» — Bryant declara su objetivo: no una visión monolítica sino las permutaciones que el mundo yóguico tomó en manos de los comentaristas
«Additionally, the commentaries are replete with references to other texts such as the Bhagavad Gītā and Upaniṣads and, with Vijñānabhikṣu, frequently the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.» — Bryant consigna qué textos citan los comentaristas: el Bhagavad Gītā, los Upaniṣads y, con Vijñānabhikṣu, el Bhāgavata Purāṇa
«demarcation of ancient Indian thought into Hindu and Buddhist and the former into six schools of philosophy (a much later development in any case) can take on contours that are far more rigid than was likely the case in Patañjali’s time.» — Bryant objeta a la partición rígida entre hindú y budista y entre seis escuelas: contornos más duros de lo que probablemente fueron. El tramo abre la plana 50, cortado en el cambio de plana desde *Sometimes the*
«Thinkers drew broadly from a common pool of ideas, and even when they aligned themselves with specific sects, these were demarcated not so much along lines of outright rejection of other sects but to a great extent on the specific areas of interest that a particular sect chose to focus on and develop—from the orthodox side: Mīmāṁsā on epistemology, hermeneutics, and dharma; Nyāya on logic; Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya on metaphysics; Vedānta on interpretation of the Upaniṣads from the perspective of knowledge of Brahman; Yoga on praxis, etc.» — Bryant reparte las escuelas por su área de interés y no por rechazo mutuo: Mīmāṁsā en epistemología, Nyāya en lógica, Vedānta en los Upaniṣads, Yoga en la praxis
«All (with the exception of early Mīmāṁsā) are dedicated to a common goal of freeing the ātman from the world of suffering.» — Bryant declara común a casi todas la meta de liberar al ātman del mundo del sufrimiento
«Thus, Yoga is partially rejected by the Vedānta tradition only insofar as strains of it subscribe to the (later) Sāṅkhya view of causation from prakṛti rather than Brahman, which, while all-important to Vedānta, is a peripheral topic of no great concern to Patañjali in the Yoga Sūtras.» — Bryant acota el rechazo vedāntico al Yoga: cae sobre la causación desde prakṛti y no desde Brahman, asunto periférico para Patañjali
«There is no rejection of the central enterprise of the Yoga tradition, namely, presenting a psychology of the mind and a technique of extracting the ātman from the mind’s machinations.» — Bryant consigna una negativa: el Vedānta no rechaza la empresa central del Yoga
«Likewise, the Nyāya Sūtras, while differing in their metaphysics, nonetheless accept Yoga as the means to realize the ātman (IV.2.46).» — Bryant señala que el Nyāya, metafísicamente distinto, acepta el yoga como medio de realizar el ātman
«In parallel fashion, the Yoga commentators from Vyāsa onward draw freely from sources and concepts associated with the Upaniṣadic/Vedānta tradition, most conspicuously in the case of Vijñānabhikṣu.» — Bryant consigna el préstamo en sentido inverso: los comentaristas del Yoga toman libremente del Vedānta
«I am not as uncomfortable with this as some scholars seem to be: To my reading, these types of references do not always impose material on the text that necessarily conflicts with Patañjali’s teachings.» — Bryant declara su desacuerdo con quienes ven contaminación vedāntica en los comentarios
«Patañjali was an orthodox Hindu, which means he accepted the Truths of Divine Revelation, āgama— even if he holds that the experience of these Truths is higher than simply belief in them.» — Bryant adscribe a Patañjali la ortodoxia hindú y la aceptación del āgama, con el límite de que la experiencia está por encima de la creencia
«Moreover, he requires the study of scripture, svādhyāya, as a mandatory ingredient of his system, both in the practice of kriyā-yoga and in that of aṣṭāṅga.» — Bryant apoya esa adscripción en el propio texto: svādhyāya es obligatorio en el kriyā-yoga y en el aṣṭāṅga
«In any event, apart from anything else, Bādarāyaṇa wrote his sūtras centuries before Patañjali’s, so we really have no grounds to deduce that Patañjali departed from the shared presuppositions of the Vedāntic tradition on these matters» — Bryant objeta al uso del rechazo de Bādarāyaṇa contra Patañjali por razón cronológica: los Vedānta Sūtras son siglos anteriores
«I argue strongly that Patañjali’s Īśvara cannot be excised or sterilized from the theistic context and Īśvara-related options of the second and third centuries.» — Bryant declara como tesis propia que el Īśvara de Patañjali no se puede extirpar del contexto teísta de su tiempo
«One must be wary of assuming he rejected standard Vedāntic teachings simply because he does not explicitly direct attention to topics not connected to the specific project he is focusing on in his succinct 195 sūtras, namely, the uncoupling of puruṣa from prakṛti.» — Bryant advierte contra leer el silencio de Patañjali como rechazo: el texto trata un asunto acotado en ciento noventa y cinco sūtras
«And the commentators certainly correlate puruṣa with Brahman as if this were a perfectly standard thing to do.» — Bryant consigna que los comentaristas correlacionan puruṣa con Brahman con naturalidad
«In any event, I have chosen to represent some of these quotations from the commentators even when, as with Vijñānabhikṣu, sectarian Vedāntic specificities are introduced that may not have been subscribed to by Patañjali.» — Bryant declara su decisión editorial: conservar citas de comentaristas aunque metan especificidades sectarias vedānticas ajenas a Patañjali
«I indicate the source of these quotes, since my goal is to give an overall sense of the methods, exegetical practices, and perspectives of the principal traditional commentators of the Yoga tradition, and to suggest how traditions cross-fertilize.» — Bryant declara que marca la fuente de cada cita y para qué: mostrar métodos, prácticas exegéticas y fecundación cruzada entre tradiciones
«plenty of quotes from the Upaniṣads, Gītā, and other texts, as well as the occasional illustration from my ongoing translations of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.» — Bryant declara el otro material que introduce, incluidas sus propias traducciones en curso del Bhāgavata Purāṇa. El tramo abre la plana 52, cortado en el cambio de plana desde *I also introduce*
«There is nothing like a colorful story from the Purāṇas to lighten up and exemplify elements in what is otherwise a dense and demanding text» — Bryant explica la función de las historias purāṇicas dentro de su comentario
«the reader should always keep a healthy awareness of the distinction between the theological concerns underpinning a commentary and what is explicitly stated in the primary text.» — Bryant pone la advertencia de método que gobierna toda la edición: distinguir las preocupaciones teológicas del comentario de lo que el texto primario enuncia
«For this commentary, I read Vyāsa’s commentary in the Sanskrit and used this as the springboard for my own commentary.» — Bryant declara su procedimiento con Vyāsa: lectura en sánscrito como trampolín de su propio comentario
«For the other later commentaries, due to the sheer bulk of the material involved, I availed myself of various English translations in determining which material to extract for this commentary, for which I then consulted the original Sanskrit.» — Bryant declara el límite de su método con los demás comentarios: selección por traducciones inglesas y cotejo posterior con el sánscrito
«I am therefore indebted to the following translators: of Vācaspati Miśra’s Tattva-vaiśāradī, Rāma Prasāda (1912), and Woods (1914); of Śaṅkara’s Vivaraṇa, Leggett (1992); of Bhoja Rāja’s Vṛtti, Ballantyne» — Bryant nombra a los traductores de quienes se sirvió para cada comentario; los años entre paréntesis son las referencias que el propio libro imprime dentro de la frase, releída entera en el crudo
«All translations from the Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā, and other texts are my own unless otherwise stated.» — Bryant declara suyas las traducciones de los Upaniṣads y del Gītā que aparecen en el volumen
«Also, I provide the Sanskrit in footnotes only for the material I have selected from the Yoga commentaries for direct quotations, not for my own paraphrases.» — Bryant fija el criterio con que se distingue cita de paráfrasis en su comentario: el sánscrito en nota va solo con las citas directas
«I hesitate to pull out any names for fear of neglecting others, but I would be remiss not to mention at least the various contributions of Koelman, Larson,» — Bryant nombra a los estudiosos críticos modernos de quienes declara haber aprendido; el tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y la lista sigue en la 53 con Feuerstein, Chapple y Whicher
«In conclusion, while the old Vedic sacrificial cult from which yoga emerged no longer defines our modern religious or cultural horizons, a number of the traditions that it spawned, such as Yoga, remain.» — Bryant cierra la introducción: el culto sacrificial védico ya no define el horizonte, pero las tradiciones que engendró siguen
«But we share many of the same attitudes as the Vedic ritualists—that the goal of life is the pursuit of ever-increasing levels of material abundance and sensual gratification—and we manipulate our environment to attain this goal in other, more damaging ways.» — Bryant equipara la mentalidad moderna a la del ritualista védico: el mismo fin, distinto medio
«They tried to achieve the good life through technologies of mantra and ritual, and we use machine-based industrial technologies.» — Bryant reduce la diferencia a la tecnología: mantra y rito allá, industria acá
«Our modern world has universalized, idolized, and mass-produced consumerism—the indulgence of the senses and the mind—as the highest and most desirable goal of life.» — Bryant nombra el consumismo como la meta universalizada de la vida moderna
«From the perspective of the Yoga tradition, our vṛttis, the restlessness of the mind caused by ignorance and desire, are out of control.» — Bryant enuncia el diagnóstico desde el sistema: las vṛttis desbocadas
«And so, proportionately to our material attachments, according to Yoga, a sense of malaise and dissatisfaction is engendered since, as the Gītā informs us, desire is never satisfied and burns like fire (III.39).» — Bryant apoya el diagnóstico en el Gītā III.39: el deseo nunca se sacia y arde como fuego
«According to almost all schools of Indic thought, including Buddhism and Jainism, the more we desire, the more we are frustrated. The more we are frustrated, the more we strive to remove our frustration with more sensory stimuli. And the more we strive, the more we damage ourselves and our environment, and perpetuate our saṁsāric existence.» — Bryant traza el círculo que casi todas las escuelas índicas describen: deseo, frustración, más estímulo, más daño
«It is in the critique of this mind-set of consumption that Patañjali claims to offer an alternative that remains perennially relevant to human existence.» — Bryant declara dónde está, a su juicio, la vigencia del texto: en la crítica de esa mentalidad
«But it is a solution that requires an abandonment of the consumer mentality by the practice of the full eight limbs of yoga, beginning with the yamas and niyamas.» — Bryant pone la condición: la solución exige los ocho miembros completos, empezando por yamas y niyamas
«Without these, attempts to perfect the third limb of yoga, āsanas, postures, are simply physical gymnastics.» — Bryant enuncia el límite en su forma más dura: sin los dos primeros miembros, el āsana es gimnasia
«To equate the practice and purpose of yoga with this limb alone is to miss the whole point of Patañjali’s system (particularly and ironically if this is done with a view of improving the sensual prowess of the body and mind in order to maximize physical and mental pleasure).» — Bryant marca la ironía: perseguir el āsana para mejorar el goce del cuerpo invierte el propósito del sistema
«Without recognizing the actual goal of yoga, the realization of the true self as other than the body, mind, and sensual apparatus, modernity may not have progressed in attitude and presupposition concerning life’s goals from those lusty performers of Vedic sacrifice.» — Bryant cierra devolviendo la modernidad al lugar del ritualista védico si se pierde de vista la meta
«It has been a wonderful, inspiring, and privileged journey engaging so intensely with the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali. It is clear to me that the text is destined to remain the primary manual for meditative practice for the ātman-based traditions, but now not just in India, as it has been for almost two millennia, but the world over.» — Bryant habla de su propio trabajo y de lo que augura para el texto: manual de práctica meditativa más allá de la India
«Moreover, in addition to its primary function as a spiritual manual containing clear and precise information about how to actually and factually directly experience the human soul in this life, the citta/puruṣa dualism of the text has much to offer modern discussions on the philosophy of mind and consciousness» — Bryant declara para qué más sirve el texto a su juicio: la discusión moderna sobre mente y consciencia
«A number of issues nonetheless repeatedly presented themselves in the course of this engagement with the Yoga Sūtras. I, as others, found myself lamenting the lack of more extensive access to Patañjali’s views on topics of great importance that are only touched upon in a peripheral fashion in the text.» — Bryant consigna su propia insatisfacción: hay asuntos que el texto solo roza
«That these questions present themselves stem from a number of causes: the extreme brevity of the sūtras, which sometimes merely refer to or touch upon aspects that remain undeveloped in their specifics; Patañjali’s undeviating focus on one very specific goal—the attainment of citta-vṛtti-nirodha—with little attention directed to unpacking anything not directly related to this end; and the likely imposition of certain Sāṅkhya elements on Patañjali by the commentators that are not explicit in the sūtras themselves.» — las tres causas que Bryant le adjudica a esos huecos, la tercera de ellas imputada a los comentaristas
«I here briefly touch upon four such areas: kartṛtva, agency or free will; the nature of the Sāṅkhya evolutes as both cosmic and individual components of prakṛti; the nature of kaivalya, liberation; and the role of Īśvara.» — los cuatro asuntos que Bryant elige tratar en sus reflexiones finales
«Although Patañjali himself does not explicitly deny agency (free will) to the puruṣa, the Yoga system tends to be associated with the Sāṅkhya view that agency is a function of buddhi, not of puruṣa.» — el problema del albedrío planteado: el sistema se asocia a la tesis sāṅkhya de que la agencia es de la buddhi
«It is the ego (ahaṅkāra) which is the agent, not the puruṣa» — el verso de los Sāṅkhya Sūtras que Bryant cita para esa tesis
«Although the self is certainly self-illuminating, it does not perform any act, and so in the absence of acts, it is not an agent.» — la formulación de Vācaspati Miśra que importa esa tesis al comentario
«We must, I suggest, consider that Patañjali may not have subscribed to the Sāṅkhya view, given the prescriptive and effort-centered nature of the system he has outlined in his sūtras.» — la propuesta de Bryant, dicha en primera persona y como sugerencia
«If agency does not reside in consciousness, but in the intellect, then, in essence, it is the buddhi that is attaining liberation, not the ātman» — la consecuencia que Bryant le ve a la tesis contraria: la que se libera sería la buddhi
«It is ultimately buddhi that is subject to ignorance, buddhi that gains discrimination and insight, and buddhi that exerts the will to attain liberation. The entire yoga process is undertaken by buddhi—the various degrees of slight, mediocre, and ardent practice of I.22 are the product of buddhi’s application and enterprise, not puruṣa’s. Puruṣa eternally remains the detached witness.» — el reparto completo que esa tesis obliga a aceptar
«The problem with this perspective, of course, is explaining how there can be any impetus from the part of unconscious matter toward liberation (or toward any type of action, for that matter). Even if this could take place, why should the puruṣa be connected with decisions made not by itself but by some completely extraneous entity? And why would the puruṣa be implicated in the first place?» — las preguntas que Bryant deja abiertas contra esa tesis
«Why this particular concatenation of saṁskāras should follow this trajectory for one puruṣa rather than another is a question that is avoided by the tradition by positing that embodiment—albeit with a potential end—is without beginning.» — cómo la tradición esquiva la pregunta: declarando sin principio la encarnación
«This stark feature of the system has attracted the criticism of not just modern scholars of the text but traditional scholars from other schools in ancient India. Overall, other than certain strains of Sāṅkhya, the galaxy of Hindu and Jain traditions have recognized agency as a quality of the puruṣa.» — Bryant mide la objeción: casi todas las tradiciones hindúes y jainas ponen la agencia en el puruṣa
«And strains of Sāṅkhya itself, from the period prior to the emergence of the philosophical traditions, such as those represented in the Maitrī Upaniṣad (III.3), as well as the Mahabhārata (XII.303.8), explicitly accept the self as the agent (kartṛ).» — y añade que el propio Sāṅkhya antiguo la ponía ahí
«The first of the verses points out that the injunctions of scripture would be pointless if puruṣa were not a moral agent capable of either following them or rejecting them» — el argumento de los Vedānta Sūtras: sin agente moral, el precepto sobra
«And anyway, if prakṛti were the moral agent, says the Vedānta commentator Rāmāṇuja, then, there being one prakṛti common to all, all puruṣas should have the same experience—so how would one account for the diversity of experience?» — la objeción de Rāmāṇuja: una sola prakṛti no explica la diversidad de experiencia
«They [the adherents of the Sāṅkhya philosophy] boldly proclaim: ‘When a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul (ātman) which acts or causes to act’: how can those who hold such opinions explain (the variety of existence) in the world?» — la misma objeción desde el Sūtrakṛtāṅga jaina
«The eleventh-century logician Udayana, in his Nyāyakusumāñjali (part I), argues that if will resided in buddhi, then either there would always be saṁsāra or there would always be mokṣa.» — el argumento del lógico Udayana contra situar la voluntad en la buddhi
«He builds up his argument by noting that either buddhi is eternal or it is not eternal. If it is eternal, there would never be any liberation; puruṣa would be eternally bonded with buddhi. If, on the other hand, as an evolute of prakṛti, buddhi is not-eternal, then, prior to coming into being, what would cause it to attach itself to the ever-free, autonomous puruṣa? How can buddhi come to be associated with the pure puruṣa, if the latter is simply a pure witness? Without some impulse or act of will from its side, puruṣa could never be bound by buddhi but would remain ever free.» — el dilema desplegado: eterna la buddhi no hay liberación, no eterna no hay atadura
«It is thus philosophically indefensible from within the contours of Sāṅkhya metaphysics to speak of a soul in saṁsāra striving for release.» — la conclusión de ese argumento, consignada como lo que Udayana sostiene
«Thus Phillips (1985) argues that if free will is situated not in puruṣa but in buddhi, then no one who had ever attained kaivalya by disconnecting from buddhi would find any will in the pure puruṣa to return and inform others about it. No one could report back about the experience, there being no will to do so in the state of pure consciousness. Therefore, the Yoga Sūtras are the product of scholastics, not enlightened yogīs.» — la lectura de Phillips, estudioso moderno: nadie podría volver a contarlo; tramo releído entero en el crudo y extraído con la guarda anticosido apagada, porque lo que la dispara es el paréntesis de año de la referencia bibliográfica
«The willing, however, is not necessarily bound up with choosing. Consequently, the characteristic attribute of will, that is freedom, is not the capacity to choose, but rather self-dependence (svatantratā). Liberty of choice arises from the conditioning factor of the Self’s prākṛtic organism, while perfect freedom is, together with pure Awareness, the very essence of the Self» — la salida de Koelman: la libertad es autodependencia, y la elección es de la prakṛti
«Taking this a step further, one might posit that ultimate free will to seek either pure awareness or prākṛtic awareness is a quality of puruṣa, but how that will manifests in the specifics of choice is a function of prakṛti.» — la propuesta propia de Bryant sobre ese reparto, dicha como conjetura
«The basis of Ranganathan’s argument is that terms such as dharma must be understood as “key philosophical terms” throughout Indian philosophy.» — la base del argumento de Ranganathan, tal como Bryant lo resume
«In Sāṅkhya, dharma is a function of buddhi, with puruṣa a mere passive witness. In Yoga, dharma takes on a more active and prescriptive role. The failure to recognize the distinction between the passive orientation of Sāṅkhya and the far more active and prescriptive flavor of Yoga has resulted in some of the traditional commentators foisting the Sāṅkhya position of puruṣa’s lack of agency onto the Yoga Sūtras without warrant.» — el punto de ese argumento: los comentaristas trasladaron al Yoga una tesis sāṅkhya sin base
«In step with this practical and ethical emphasis is [Patanjali’s] correlative affirmation that persons (puruṣa-s) are not only transcendent beings of consciousness and knowledge, but volitional beings. Indeed, he characterizes puruṣa-s as having the characteristic of cetana (Yoga Sūtra I.29), which in Sanskrit not only denotes consciousness and knowledge, but also the will.» — el pasaje de Ranganathan que Bryant cita; la grafía del nombre es la que imprime el troceo
«We concur with this overall position. For there to be any coherence to the law of karma, the condition of the living beings in saṁsāra, and the decision to take up the path of yoga and follow the yamas and niyamas of II.30–45; or the friendship, compassion, joy, and equanimity prescribed in I.33; or essentially any of the prescriptions of the Yoga Sūtras; one must assign free will to the puruṣa as the ultimate agent of its condition.» — Bryant firma su adhesión y dice de qué depende: sin albedrío del puruṣa no hay karma ni preceptos
«Another problem that remains unclarified in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga traditions, and has long vexed scholars, is whether the tattvas, or evolutes from prakṛti, are to be considered cosmological or psychological.» — el segundo asunto de las reflexiones: si los tattvas son cósmicos o individuales
«It seems clear to me from the various normative sources on Sāṅkhya touched upon in the introduction that buddhi and ahaṅkāra as well as the tanmātras and mahabhūtas are clearly both cosmic and individual.» — la posición de Bryant, dicha en primera persona
«However, it must be noted that Patañjali neither explicitly endorses this view nor denies free will to puruṣa. The question must then be raised whether the denial of agency to puruṣa is a Sāṅkhya feature unwarrantedly foisted upon the Yoga Sūtras.» — Bryant marca el silencio del texto y plantea si la tesis le fue impuesta desde fuera
«But with all the evolutes, the question nonetheless remains: How does the cosmic buddhi and ahaṅkāra, and so on, become fragmented into the plurality of individual ones?» — la pregunta que Bryant deja sin resolver: cómo se fragmenta lo cósmico en lo individual
«I find myself envisioning this process like that of someone poking his fingers into a blown-up balloon without popping it. The fingers are individually tightly covered with the balloon rubber, yet this rubber remains connected with the greater totality of rubber of the rest of the balloon.» — la imagen propia de Bryant para ese paso: los dedos metidos en un globo
«While the specifics of such questions remain puzzling, for the purposes of Yoga, it seems safe to assume that these types of cosmological issues were of no concern to Patañjali, hence they remain undeveloped.» — la lectura de Bryant sobre el silencio: al texto no le interesaba la cosmología
«Just as his incomplete treatment of Īśvara shows interest primarily only in Īśvara’s relationship with the goal of citta-vṛtti-nirodha, so Patañjali’s interest in the tattvas is individual and psychological rather than cosmological in any sort of a systematic manner.» — el paralelo que traza con el tratamiento de Īśvara: interés psicológico, no cosmológico
«Since the classical Sāṅkhya is concerned only with the isolation of pure consciousness or puruṣa, the world is irrelevant apart from its function as a means to salvation. In other words, the classical Sāṅkhya is not concerned with the world in itself except in so far as it is instrumental in the discrimination of the isolated or pure puruṣa» — la formulación de Larson, estudioso moderno, sobre a qué atiende el Sāṅkhya clásico
«While texts such as the Gītā clearly promote action as better than renunciation and inaction (III.4–8; XII.12), scholarship on the Yoga Sūtras —primarily modern rather than traditional—has tended to view full kaivalya as incompatible with action in the world and occurring only after the demise of the physical body.» — el tercer asunto: la mayoría de la academia lee la kaivalya como incompatible con la acción
«Most scholars have read the text as suggesting that the complete eradication of primordial avidyā ignorance can only result in the total breakdown of biological and psychological embodied existence.» — la lectura que Bryant atribuye a esa mayoría
«The yogī in the kaivalya state thus becomes dysfunctional. The instant awareness externalizes and becomes aware of “other,” it loses awareness of the “self,» — el argumento de esa lectura: atender a lo otro es perder de vista el sí mismo
«Verses such as II.22, II.25, and IV.34 are fairly explicit that prakṛti disappears from the purview of puruṣa when it attains kaivalya, the very meaning of which is precisely» — y los versos del propio texto en que se apoya; el tramo se corta ante la comilla del OCR
«As we have seen, Vyāsa promoted the view that deliverance is possible even when still alive. But this standpoint is not sanctioned by the» — el pasaje de Feuerstein que Bryant cita: para él el texto no sanciona la liberación en vida; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de plana
«What philosopher yogins like … Śaṅkara taught as jīvan-mukti can, to the follower of classical Yoga, only mean close proximity to final emancipation. For him, as for Rāmānuja, release follows upon death, when the body has fallen off (vi-deha)» — y la posición de Feuerstein sobre la jīvan-mukti: proximidad a la liberación, no liberación
«In this perspective, as long as the puruṣa remains embodied, it can necessarily do so only by associating with illusion.» — Bryant resume la consecuencia de esa lectura
«Consequently, Yoga has generally been perceived as a world-renouncing tradition that does not reconcile itself with work in the world, or “enlightened action.» — y cómo eso ha fijado la imagen del Yoga como tradición que da la espalda al mundo
«The most vociferous opponent of this understanding of kaivalya, has been Whicher:» — Bryant nombra a quien más se opone a esa lectura
«While Whicher has been criticized for suggesting that Yoga as presented by Patañjali specifically means enlightened engagement in the world,11 there is merit in his insistence that the two are not incompatible.» — Bryant consigna la crítica que Whicher recibió y a la vez le concede la mitad
«Although the emphasis on enlightened action in the world is clearly much more prominent in the Gītā than in Patañjali, it is not incompatible with the Yoga Sūtras.» — la posición propia de Bryant: menos acento que el Gītā, pero no incompatible
«Patañjali’s teachings seem clearly geared toward promoting a compassionate (I.33), moral, and ethical (II.29ff), that is, a highly sāttvic social, lifestyle. Indeed, this is reflected right at the beginning of the text by the category of akliṣṭa-vṛttis, that is, vṛttis not subject to ignorance and the other kleśas. This can only point to an enlightened mode of acting in the world.» — lo que Bryant aduce del texto mismo: los preceptos morales y la categoría de akliṣṭa-vṛtti
«Now, one cannot deny that in the actual state of nirbīja-samādhi, the yogī is completely dysfunctional; he or she has, after all, withdrawn consciousness from all sensual activities, pratyāhara (II.54–55), and completely stilled all vṛttis whatsoever, such that the entire psychophysical organism is absolutely closed down.» — Bryant concede la otra mitad: en el nirbīja-samādhi el organismo queda cerrado
«And the Purāṇas and epics are full of stories of yogīs who simply check out, so to speak, discarding their bodies and cittas by their yogic prowess and entering permanently into the liberated state at will.» — y consigna los relatos en que el yogī sencillamente se retira del cuerpo
«But it seems to me that both these perspectives can be harmonized into the life of the jīvanmukta.» — la propuesta de Bryant para conciliar las dos posiciones
«If we accept agency in puruṣa, as we have done, there is nothing preventing the yogī from depositing a saṁskāra into the citta prior to entering the state of nirbīja-samādhi to activate and pull consciousness back into the prākṛtic state at a certain point—a sort of saṁskāric alarm clock.» — el mecanismo que imagina: un saṁskāra depositado como despertador
«Of course, the only motive to do this would be out of compassion for those still stranded in the cycle of birth and death who have sought (or might seek) shelter and guidance from the yogī as guru—a notion akin to that richly developed in the Bodhisattva tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism.» — el único motivo que Bryant admite para volver, con el paralelo del bodhisattva
«This leads to a larger discussion on the nature of kaivalya. If we are to use human reason to engage with the sūtras (which, needless to say, runs counter to the entire thrust of the text, which is to transcend reason!), numerous questions pertaining to the liberated state present themselves.» — Bryant abre la pregunta por la kaivalya advirtiendo que razonar aquí va contra el propio texto
«First of all, if puruṣa’s pure awareness is all-pervading, as Yoga holds it to be, and prakṛti, too, is all-pervading, then how can puruṣa ever be unaware of prakṛti? How can puruṣa be unaware of another entity if puruṣa’s all-pervasive awareness is infinitely and eternally coextensive with this other all-pervading entity? How can a light not illuminate objects in a room if it pervades the room?» — la dificultad que plantea: dos omnipenetrantes y uno inadvertido del otro
«Clearly, rational thinking on this matter is bound by spatial and temporal categories, hence Patañjali does not attempt to lead us into an understanding of kaivalya.» — la explicación que Bryant da del silencio del texto sobre la kaivalya
«Such questions require us to either problematize the claims of Yoga or accept the repeated claim of the Yoga/Vedānta/ Upaniṣadic traditions that since liberation is, by definition, a state beyond the intellect, then human reason, ex hypothesi, cannot fathom its experience.» — las dos únicas salidas que Bryant deja, sin escoger entre ellas
«Perhaps the most intriguing question raised by the sūtras is the relationship of Patañjali’s mysterious Īśvara, the transcendent “special” puruṣa, with other liberated puruṣas.» — el cuarto asunto: la relación de Īśvara con los puruṣas liberados
«According to Koelman, Patañjali’s low-key approach to Īśvara was diplomatic, the consequence of maneuvering within the contours of certain later Sāṅkhya traditions that had become dominant in his day» — la explicación de Koelman: el bajo perfil de Īśvara como maniobra diplomática
«Yoga allows for an enlightened, participatory perspective that can embody a rich sense of dharma suggesting a responsiveness to life that no longer snares the yogin morally or epistemologically … At this high level realization in Yoga, action does not end but becomes purified of afflicted impulses [kleśas] … Nonafflicted [akliṣṭa] action remains for the liberated yogin … Yoga extends the meaning of purification and illumination of human identity to incorporate an enlightened mode of activity as well as knowledge … We need not conclude that liberative knowledge and virtuous activity are incompatible with one another, nor need we see detachment as an abandonment of the world and the human relational sphere.» — el pasaje de Whicher que Bryant cita: el yogī liberado sigue obrando, ya sin impulsos aflictivos; bloque largo releído entero en el crudo y extraído con la guarda anticosido apagada, porque lo que la dispara es el tamaño de la cita en bloque
«We believe that Pātañjala Yoga is essentially theistic. But as G.R.F. Oberhammer has proved, the Pātañjala doctrine of the Supreme Lord had to express itself in terms of a philosophical School, the Sāṅkhya School, which has no room for God.» — el arranque del pasaje de Koelman que Bryant cita, con la tesis de Oberhammer dentro
«The Pātañjala doctrine of the Supreme Lord is the outcome of two different milieus: that of the existential experience of God of the yogis» — la primera mitad de esa explicación: dos medios de origen; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de plana
«conceptualizations of Sāṅkhya doctrine. Patañjali made use of the existing Sāṅkhya doctrine, and was therefore compelled to make use of tenets foreign to Sāṅkhyan thinking in a vocabulary proper to that system» — la segunda mitad: la doctrina del Señor dicha en vocabulario de una escuela sin Dios; el tramo arranca a media frase por el corte de plana
«Vijñānabhikṣu, situated in a later more theistically saturated milieu, operates under no such constraints.» — Bryant sitúa a Vijñānabhikṣu en un medio ya teísta, sin las restricciones que él le supone a Patañjali
«A yogī is said to be of three kinds: the bhautika; the Sāṅkhya; and, thirdly, the one who has attained the highest level of yoga, the antyāśramī. In the first category, there is contemplation [of the elements14]; in the Sāṅkhya [the second] there is contemplation of the imperishable puruṣa; and in the third is said to exist the final contemplation of the Supreme Īśvara.» — el pasaje purāṇico que Vijñānabhikṣu cita: tres clases de yogī, y la tercera contempla a Īśvara
«When you perceive that I [Īśvara] am the one pure, eternal, blissful supreme ātman, that is called the great theistic yoga. All other forms of yoga practiced by yogīs that are elaborated on in sacred texts are not equal even to the sixteenth part of this Brahman yoga. That yoga, in which the liberated yogīs directly perceive the universal Īśvara, is considered to be the highest yoga of all yogas.» — la segunda mitad del pasaje: el yoga teísta por encima de todos los demás
«Here we have the Purāṇic notion that the direct realization and experience of Īśvara by fully liberated yogīs who have already realized the individual puruṣa by the classical techniques of Patañjali-type meditation is higher than merely remaining absorbed in the individual self.» — Bryant enuncia la tesis purāṇica: realizar a Īśvara por encima de realizar el sí mismo
«According to these Vaiṣṇava theistic traditions (there are Śaivite parallels), there is a progressive nature to types of practice.» — la forma de esa tesis: las prácticas en escala, y no solo entre los vaiṣṇavas
«Thus, for example, in the Gītā, after asserting that meditation on him is superior to meditation on the ātman (XII.1–2), Kṛṣṇa outlines a very definite hierarchy of spiritual practice: The highest possible form of yoga is spontaneous and complete absorption on his personal form at all times (XII.8); second to this is regulated meditative practice (abhyāsa) to fix the mind on him undeviatingly (XII.9); next best is performing actions directly for his worship and service (XII.10); after which comes performing other types of actions but giving up their fruits to him in worship» — la jerarquía de prácticas del Gītā, de la absorción espontánea al obrar ofrecido
«These devotional practices are followed in the Gītā’s hierarchy by three lower forms of yoga, which are devoid of devotion: renunciation of the fruit of action, followed by conventional meditation for realizing the individual ātman (by fixing the mind on something other that Īśvara), followed by knowledge of the ātman.» — los tres grados inferiores de esa jerarquía, los que carecen de devoción
«There are thus seven levels of spiritual practice in this hierarchy: meditative absorption on Īśvara is ranked highest, and conventional meditative absorption on the individual ātman is ranked sixth.» — el recuento que Bryant hace de la escala: la meditación en el ātman queda en sexto lugar
«What this means, as can be seen from the quote to which Vijñānabhikṣu draws our attention, is that the theistic traditions hold that there are progressive stages even after enlightenment has been attained: kaivalya, absorption in puruṣa, is preliminary to devotion to the Supreme puruṣa, Īśvara, as the Gītā clearly indicates» — la consecuencia: para esas tradiciones hay etapas aun después de la liberación
«Even sages who are freed of the bondage of saṁsāra and delight in the ātman, practice pure devotion to Viṣṇu; such are the qualities of Hari» — el verso del Bhāgavata Purāṇa con que Bryant lo apoya
«The liberated state, consequently, is multidimensional; it is not a universalized or monolithic experience for all yogīs.» — lo que Bryant saca de todo esto: el estado liberado no es uno solo para todos
«Vaikuṇṭha [is] the highest realm, where Viṣṇu resides (XII.24.14). This … is the highest region (V.12.26); beyond the world of darkness and saṁsāra … (IV.24.29; X.88.25); the destination of those who have transcended the three guṇas … even while they are still alive (XI.25.22); and beyond which there is no higher place (II.2.18; II.9.9). The peaceful ascetics who reach that place never return» — la descripción de Vaikuṇṭha que Bryant se cita a sí mismo, con las referencias purāṇicas entre paréntesis
«The residents of Vaikuṇṭha do not have material bodies, but have pure forms (VII.1.34). These forms are like that of Viṣṇu (III.15.14ff), also known as Nārāyaṇa. Viṣṇu/Nārāyaṇa resides in Vaikuṇṭ.ha with Śrī, the goddess of fortune, in palaces with crystal walls.» — el resto de esa descripción: cuerpos no materiales y palacios de paredes de cristal
«In other words, realizing the individual puruṣa is only the first step on the spiritual journey: The higher goal is to then devote oneself to Īśvara and, ultimately, attain to his eternal Brahman abode, the kingdom of God.» — cómo leen esas teologías la meta del texto: primer paso, no último
«But, even as such theologies had pervaded the theistic landscape of Patañjali’s time, all this is taking us far beyond where Patañjali himself has chosen to leave us in the Yoga Sūtras.» — Bryant marca el límite: todo eso va más allá de donde el texto deja al lector
«Patañjali has not attempted to use rational conceptual thought to express states beyond reason and conceptualization. He has chosen not to take us into the other side—he has directed his efforts to guiding us how to get there.» — la fórmula con que Bryant describe el propósito del texto
«The task he set for himself was clearly defined in verse I.2 right at the outset of his project, citta-vṛtti-nirodha, and he has kept his eye on that ball with remarkably singular focus.» — Bryant devuelve todo el libro a su primera definición, citta-vṛtti-nirodha
«On this score, at the very least, his contribution to understanding the nature of mind and of consciousness, and his presentation of a very clear and experience-based path of liberating the individual puruṣa self from the cycle of saṁsāra, transcends cultural or religious boundaries, and seems destined to remain a living and perennially relevant classic in the spiritual archives of humanity.» — el cierre de las reflexiones, con el augurio de Bryant para el texto
«The chapter begins by introducing and defining yoga [1–2]. This is followed by a discussion of the two possible options for awareness [3–4], a description of the vṛttis [5–11], and how to control the vṛttis by practice and dispassion [12–16]. Then comes the division of samādhi into samprajñāta and asamprajñāta [17–18] and how to attain these [20–22], after the discussion of other states that might resemble it [19]. Īśvara is then introduced as the easy method of attaining samādhi [23], along with his nature [24–26] and the chanting of his name [27–29]. The chapter describes the distractions of the mind and their accompanying effects [30– 31], and prescribes meditation on any object to combat them, with various examples presented [32–40]. Samāpatti is introduced with its varieties [41–45] and their fruits [46–48] and object [49]. The chapter concludes with a discussion of samprajñāta-samādhi preceding the final stage of asamprajñāta [50–51].» — el resumen del primer capítulo, con los números de sūtra entre corchetes; el volumen lo imprime dos veces palabra por palabra, al cerrar el capítulo y en la sección de resúmenes de las pp. 443-444, y el locator va a la primera; bloque largo releído entero en el crudo y extraído con la guarda anticosido apagada, porque lo que la dispara es su propio tamaño
«The chapter begins with an introduction of kriyā-yoga [1], its effects [2], and a discussion of the kleśas, which it removes [3–11]. Karma and its consequences are outlined [12–14] and the principle of suffering established [15–16]. This is followed by the characteristics of the seer and the seen [17–22], the conjunction between them [23–24], and the definition of liberation [25–27]. Next, the eight limbs of yoga are introduced as the means to attain liberation [28–29], and the remainder of the chapter is dedicated to these: the yamas and their universality [30–31], the niyamas [32], the means to counter tendencies contrary to the yamas and niyamas [33–34] and the side benefits accruing from observing them [35–45]. Next, āsana, the third limb, is presented [46–48], followed by prāṇāyāma, the fourth limb [49–53], and pratyāhāra, the fifth [54–55].» — el resumen del segundo capítulo, con los números de sūtra entre corchetes; misma doble impresión y mismo criterio de locator, y misma extracción sin guarda por el tamaño del bloque
«APPENDIX Devanāgarī, Transliteration, and Translation of Sūtras» — el título del apéndice, que anuncia devanāgarī, transliteración y traducción; en el troceo no hay un solo carácter devanāgarī, y lo que queda es la transliteración y la traducción sin comentario
«I.2 yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodha Yoga is the stilling of the changing states of the mind.» — muestra del apéndice: I.2 tal como lo reimprime, sin el análisis palabra por palabra ni el comentario que lleva en el cuerpo
«I.20 śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā-pūrvaka itareṣām [But] for others, [the state where only subconscious impressions remain] is preceded by faith, vigor, memory, samādhi absorption, and discernment.» — muestra del apéndice: I.20, las cuatro piernas de la práctica más la fe
«I.51 tasyāpi nirodhe sarva-nirodhān nirbījaḥ samādhiḥ Upon the cessation of even those [truth-bearing saṁskāras], nirbīja-samādhi, seedless meditative absorption, ensues. iti Patañjali-viracite yogasūtre» — muestra del apéndice: I.51, con el colofón del primer capítulo pegado a la entrada
«II.1 tapaḥ-svādhyāyeśvara-praṇidhānāni kriyā-yogaḥ Kriyā-yoga, the path of action, consists of self-discipline, study, and dedication to the Lord.» — muestra del apéndice: II.1, la definición del kriyā-yoga
«II.30 ahimsā-satyāsteya-brahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ The yamas are nonviolence, truthfulness, refrainment from stealing, celibacy, and renunciation of [unnecessary] possessions.» — muestra del apéndice: II.30, la lista de los yamas
«II.46 sthira-sukham āsanam Posture should be steady and comfortable.» — muestra del apéndice: II.46, la única definición de āsana del texto
«III.3 tad evārtha-mātra-nirbhāsaṁ svarūpa-śūnyam iva samādhiḥ Samādhi is when that same dhyāna shines forth as the object alone and [the mind] is devoid of its own [reflective] nature.» — muestra del apéndice: III.3, la definición de samādhi sin el aparato del cuerpo
«III.16 pariṇāma-traya-saṁyamād atītānāgata-jñānam When saṁyama is performed on the three transformations [of characteristics, state, and condition], knowledge of the past and the future ensues.» — muestra del apéndice: III.16, el saṁyama sobre las tres transformaciones
«III.55 sattva-puruṣayoh śuddhi-sāmye kaivalyam iti When the purity of the intellect is equal to that of the puruṣa, kaivalya liberation ensues. iti Patañjali-viracite yoga-sūtre tṛtīyo vibhūti-pādaḥ Thus ends the third chapter on vibhūti in the Yoga Sūtras composed by Patañjali.» — muestra del apéndice: III.55 con el colofón del tercer capítulo, que aquí dice vibhūti donde el colofón del cuerpo, en la p. 386, dice samādhi; la discrepancia se consigna sin arbitrar
«IV.1 janmauṣadhi-mantra-tapaḥ-samādhi-jāḥ siddhayaḥ The mystic powers arise due to birth, herbs, mantras, the performance of austerity, and samādhi.» — muestra del apéndice: IV.1, los cinco orígenes de los poderes
«IV.7 karmāśuklākṛṣṇaṁ yoginas tri-vidham itareṣām The karma of a yogī is neither white nor black; of everyone else, it is of three types.» — muestra del apéndice: IV.7, el karma del yogī
«IV.12 atītānāgataṁ svarūpato ‘sty adhva-bhedād dharmāṇām The past and the future exist in reality, since they differ [from the present only] in terms of the time of [manifestation] of their characteristics.» — muestra del apéndice: IV.12, la realidad del pasado y del futuro
«IV.25 viśeṣa-darśina ātma-bhāva-bhāvanā-vinivṛttiḥ For one who sees the distinction [between the mind and the soul], reflecting on the nature of the self ceases.» — muestra del apéndice: IV.25, el cese del preguntarse por el sí mismo
«IV.30 tataḥ kleśa-karma-nivṛttiḥ From this comes the cessation of the kleśas [impediments to yoga] and karma.» — muestra del apéndice: IV.30, el cese de los kleśas y del karma
«IV.33 kṣaṇa-pratiyogī pariṇāmāparānta-nirgrā hyaḥ kramaḥ The progression [of any object through Time] corresponds to a [series of] moments. It is perceivable at the final [moment] of change.» — muestra del apéndice: IV.33, la progresión por instantes
«IV.34 puruṣārtha-śūnyānāṁ guṇānāṁ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṁ svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā vā citi-śaktir iti Ultimate liberation is when the guṇas, devoid of any purpose for the puruṣa, return to their original [latent] state; in other words, when the power of consciousness is situated in its own essential nature. iti Patañjali-viracite yoga-sūtre» — muestra del apéndice: IV.34, el último sūtra, con el colofón del cuarto capítulo; el apéndice imprime *puruṣārtha-śūnyānāṁ* donde el cuerpo, en la p. 429, imprime *puruṣārtha-sūnyānāṁ*, y las dos grafías se consignan como el troceo las da
«Please note that some of the links referenced in this work are no longer active.» — la advertencia con que abre la sección de notas; no es voz de Bryant sino del editor digital del EPUB, y así se consigna
«Throughout the present work, Yoga refers to the philosophical school, or Yoga tradition, while yoga indicates various practices or systems of yoga.» — la convención tipográfica que Bryant declara en nota: Yoga con mayúscula es la escuela, yoga con minúscula son las prácticas
«Vedic is an older form of Sanskrit; both are members of the Indo-European language family. The earliest Sanskrit-speaking peoples, which are the easternmost branch of this family, are referred to as Indo-Aryans.» — la nota sobre la lengua y el nombre que Bryant le da al pueblo que la habla
«The earliest Vedic texts are the four Vedas, followed by the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas, and the Upaniṣads.» — el orden del corpus védico según la nota
«Interestingly, all the Upaniṣads wherein Yoga is expressed belong to the same Vedic branch, that of the black Yajur Veda.» — el hallazgo que Bryant deja en nota: los Upaniṣads que hablan de yoga son todos de una misma rama
«While the term Brahman is used primarily for the absolute truth in its all-encompassing aspect, and ātman for the more localized aspect of that same truth in the individual, the two terms are interchangeable in the Upaniṣads.» — la nota sobre Brahman y ātman como términos intercambiables en los Upaniṣads
«The earliest reference to yoga is actually in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (II.5.4), after a discussion of the five kośas, or layers, that make up an individual, but whether this refers to a meditative technique is unclear.» — la nota con la referencia más antigua a la palabra yoga, y la reserva de Bryant sobre qué significa ahí
«This demarcation of Sāṅkhya/Yoga metaphysics in the Maitrī Upaniṣad extends to ridiculing the later Vedāntic advaita, nondualistic, school of Upaniṣadic interpretation as “not worthy of discussion” (kiṁ tad avācyam, VI.7). Advaita Vedānta holds a radically monistic view of the world by rejecting the reality of prakṛti, matter, as illusory and considers only Brahman/ātman as real. The Sāṅkhya/Yoga traditions are dualist and accept the reality of both the world of prakṛti as well as ātman (which it calls puruṣa).» — la nota que deslinda al Sāṅkhya-Yoga del advaita vedānta, y consigna que el Maitrī Upaniṣad se burla de este último
«One should practice yoga in a place that is flat, clean, free of grit, fire and sand, near quiet running water, etc., favorable to the mind, not an eyesore, and» — el pasaje upaniṣádico que Bryant cita en nota sobre dónde practicar; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de plana
«protected from the wind in a cave or sheltered place … Lightness, health, absence of desire, effulgent complexion, pleasant voice, nice fragrance, and little faeces and urine, these are the first expressions of yogic practice.» — el resto de ese pasaje: las primeras señales de la práctica, según el Upaniṣad
«Caution is required in attempting to bypass the commentaries and excavate an original set of “pure” Pātañjalian teachings distinct from those of the later Yoga school, since such enterprises, of course, require the projection of very much later philological assumptions and methods onto Patañjali with no means of verification.» — la nota en que Bryant objeta el intento de recuperar un Patañjali puro sin comentarios
«A fallacy is all too often made, in my view, of assuming that the first instance a concept or term surfaces in a text indicates that this text or tradition has consequently influenced all subsequent traditions wherein this concept or term is used. All that can be said, in fact, is that this concept can first be identified in an (extant) literary source at this time; one must be careful of hastily assuming that the concept itself did not exist prior to it being recorded in this way.» — la falacia metodológica que Bryant nombra en primera persona: confundir el primer registro con el origen
«The etymology of Vyāsa is derived from the root vi + as = divide.» — la etimología del nombre Vyāsa que da la nota
«For Śaṅkara, the entire world of change is an illusory superimposition on an unchanging, formless, qualitiless, and impersonal Brahman, Absolute Truth. Thus, everything in the realm of matter, prakṛti, is illusory, māyā. The changing world of forms simply does not exist from the perspective of absolute reality, or, perhaps more accurately, everything that appears to exist in the external world is, in reality, the changeless Brahman. Similarly, the apparent individuality of the multiple and multifarious living beings in the world, the ātmans, is also illusory.» — la nota que resume la doctrina de Śaṅkara: el mundo del cambio como superimposición ilusoria
«infinite number of living entities; there is only the undivided, all-pervading Brahman, hence the name of his school of philosophy, advaita, nonduality. For Śaṅkara there is only one underlying truth, and all apparent dualities perceived in existence—the world of forms and individuals—are the product of illusion, avidyā.» — el resto de esa nota, con el nombre de la escuela y su razón; el tramo arranca a media frase por el corte de plana
«and other Śaṅkara specialists, as well as scholars who have worked more closely with this commentary, are inclined to accept its authenticity. Rukmani, however, in her translation of the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa of Śaṅkara (2001, xiff), rejects the authorship of the Vedāntin Śaṅkara.» — la disputa de autoría del comentario atribuido a Śaṅkara, con las dos posiciones nombradas
«She offers as the most convincing evidence the fact that the Vivaraṇa contains some explicit references to statements made by Vācaspati Miśra, who lived after Śaṅkara.» — el argumento de Rukmani contra esa atribución
«In contrast to this, Wezler (1983) sees these influences as going the other way—Vācaspati Miśra’s work shows clear vestiges of the influence of the Vivaraṇa. For this and other reasons, the matter remains unresolved.» — la posición contraria de Wezler, y la declaración de Bryant de que el asunto sigue sin resolverse; tramo releído entero en el crudo y extraído con la guarda anticosido apagada, porque lo que la dispara es el paréntesis de año de la referencia
«It had, however, been known since the publication of al-Bīrunī’s more famous work, India, published in 1887, that he had translated the sūtras, since it was quoted copiously in that work.» — la nota sobre al-Bīrunī y su traducción de los sūtras, conocida por cita antes que por hallazgo
«There were a number of Vaiṣṇava commentators on the Vedānta who vigorously critiqued Śaṅkara’s views, including Rāmānuja in the twelfth century. Rāmānuja presented a position of visiṣṭādvaita, differentiated nonduality, that modified the basic metaphysical infrastructure of advaita nonduality by proposing that there were differentiations within ultimate reality.» — la nota sobre los comentaristas vaiṣṇava del Vedānta y la posición de Rāmānuja
«Rāmānuja posited a basic and eternal tripartite subdivision within Brahman: Brahman as supreme personal Being, or Īśvara, whom he correlated with Viṣṇu/Nārāyāṇa; prakṛti, matter; and the puruṣa souls. For Rāmānuja, these are eternal and real ontological categories, not illusory superimpositions on an undifferentiated Brahman, as Śaṅkara had posited» — el reparto tripartito de Rāmānuja dentro de Brahman, frente a Śaṅkara
«In one of Rāmānuja’s analogies, the relationship of the personal Brahman (Viṣṇu) with prakṛti and puruṣa is like that of the body and possessor of the body: Although in one sense they are one, the latter is dependent on, and supported by, the former.» — la analogía del cuerpo y su dueño con que Rāmānuja dice esa relación
«Madhva, in the thirteenth century, further emphasized the divisions between these categories. Other Vaiṣṇava commentators on the Vedānta added their particular sectarian nuances to the issue, of which Vallabha and the Caitanya school in the fifteenth century are noteworthy, and all of them drew upon the Upaniṣads, the Vedānta, and the Bhagavad Gītā as sources of authority.» — los demás comentaristas vaiṣṇava y las fuentes de autoridad que todos comparten
«approached his subject matter with great candour and sympathy but not from within the yogic tradition. This is corroborated» — el juicio de Feuerstein sobre Vācaspati Miśra que Bryant consigna en nota; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de plana
«by his whole style, and his preoccupation with philological and epistemological matters as well as his anxious dependence on Vyāsa» — el resto de ese juicio: estilo filológico y dependencia de Vyāsa
«Reductionism seeks to interpret a religious body of knowledge by reducing it to modern categories of explanation external to the knowledge in question» — la definición de reduccionismo que Bryant deja en nota, y de la que se desmarca en su método
«The Vedānta tradition accepts Smṛti texts where they are not perceived as contradicting the Śruti» — la nota sobre cómo el Vedānta jerarquiza Smṛti y Śruti
«Literally, the opposing point of view. Commentaries frequently discuss opposing philosophical positions in order to identify their defects.» — la nota sobre el pūrvapakṣa como recurso de los comentarios
«This invocation is found preceding the commentary of Vyāsa in some recensions (although it is likely a later insertion» — la nota que consigna la invocación como añadido probablemente posterior, dato de atribución
«The term used for God here is Bhagavān (the same term used in the Bhagavad Gītā, spoken by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna, and in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the story of Kṛṣṇa’s incarnation). The term used for Kṛṣṇa is Vāsudeva, a patronymic for Kṛṣṇa as son of Vasudeva.» — los nombres divinos de esa invocación y de dónde vienen
«Traditional sources enumerate six schools of thought that emerged from the Upaniṣadic period of the late Vedic age (although, as noted in the introduction, the first textual reference to such six schools can be attested only very late» — la nota sobre las seis escuelas, con la reserva de Bryant: la primera mención textual de las seis es muy tardía
«Among these, the Mīmāṁsā school, noteworthy for its treatment of epistemology, formulated a rationale for perpetuating the old Vedic sacrificial rites. The Nyāya school was best known for developing rules of logic so that the debates between the various schools could be conducted according to conventions about what constituted valid argument. The Vaiśeṣika school provided a metaphysics that perceived the created world as ultimately consisting of the combination of various eternal categories such as subatomic particles.» — el reparto de las tres primeras escuelas: Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya y Vaiśeṣika
«The Sāṅkhya school posited a contrasting metaphysical system in which the created world evolved out of primordial matter, prakṛti, from which the puruṣa, soul, must extricate itself. The Vedānta school was concerned less with the physical constituents of the material world and more with the relationship among Brahman, the Supreme Truth of the Upaniṣads; ātman, the individualized feature of Brahman; and the perceived world as an emanation of Brahman.» — el reparto de Sāṅkhya y Vedānta en esa misma nota
«Finally, the Yoga school as represented by Patañjali is less a philosophical school than a practical psychosomatic technique through which the puruṣa—the ātman of the Upaniṣads—can be realized as distinct from prakṛti.» — cómo Bryant sitúa al Yoga entre las seis: menos escuela filosófica que técnica psicosomática
«As noted in the introduction, Yoga referred to a cluster of meditative techniques, some form of which was common to numerous different schools and sects, rather than a distinct philosophical school.» — y el otro sentido de la palabra: un conjunto de técnicas común a escuelas y sectas distintas
«The first sūtra of the primary text for the Vedānta school, the Vedānta Sūtras, is athāto brahma-jijñāsā, now there is inquiry about Brahman; that of the primary sūtra of the Mīmāṁsā school is athāto dharma-jijñāsā, now there is inquiry into duty; and similarly that of the Vaiśeṣika school, athāto dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ, now we will explain duty.» — la nota que compara las primeras palabras de los sūtras de tres escuelas
«For example, the Vedānta school, as its name denotes, presented itself as the anta or conclusion of the Veda. Rāmānuja, the famous twelfth-century theistic commentator of the text, explains that atha, now, in the first sūtra of the Vedānta Sūtras (athāto brahma-jijñāsā) refers to one who has exhausted the study of Vedic ritualism and understood that the fruits that are gained from performing the sacrifices and works prescribed in the Vedas are temporary and limited. Such a person, who begins to conceive of the desire for release from the samsāric cycle of action and reaction, is “now” ready to begin a study of Brahman, as expressed in the Vedānta.» — la nota con la lectura de Rāmānuja sobre el *ahora* con que abren los Vedānta Sūtras
«Vijnānabhikṣu states that Brahmā, the secondary creator god of Hinduism, is said to have uttered atha along with oṁ in the beginning of creation (quoted by Mādhava from the Amara Kośa, traditional dictionary, 87). Mādhava, in his doxography, notes that, among its many meanings, atha is also an auspicious particle» — la nota sobre los sentidos de la partícula atha, con la grafía del nombre tal como la imprime el troceo
«Sanskrit and English are members of the Indo-European language family and thus share many cognate terms.» — la nota que emparenta sánscrito e inglés como lenguas indoeuropeas
«Saṁsāra in Indic thought is a cycle of birth and death because every action breeds a reaction, which then eventually bears fruit, provoking rereactions, which cause rerereactions, and so on ad infinitum. Living beings have to return life after life to experience the accumulated store of karmic reactions, but in doing so simply breed more reactions and thus perpetuate a vicious cycle of birth and death.» — la definición de saṁsāra que Bryant da en nota, por el encadenamiento de reacciones
«There is a difference of opinion among Hindu thinkers as to whether full asamprajñāta-samādhi can be experienced while alive, or whether it entails the complete abandonment of the physical and cognitive apparatus of the body and mind.» — la nota que consigna el desacuerdo sobre si el asamprajñāta-samādhi cabe en vida
«The five skandhas, sheaths or aggregates (khandha in Pali), are (1) aggregate of matter, rūpa-skandha, the elements—fluidity, solidity, motion, and heat—as well as the sense organs and their objects—sound, smell, etc.—in short, the physical body» — la nota que enumera los cinco skandhas budistas, empezando por el de la materia
«aggregate of mental formations, saṁskāra-skandha, all volitional activities good or bad; (5) aggregate of consciousness, vijñāna-skandha.» — los dos últimos agregados de esa lista; el tramo arranca a media enumeración por el corte de plana
«This skandha of consciousness is of interest here since, for Buddhists, it requires one of the four faculties (eye, etc., including mind) as its basis and an object (i.e., form, etc., including thought) as its support.» — por qué el agregado de la consciencia le interesa a Bryant: depende de facultad y de objeto
«The essential point is that consciousness depends on other faculties and objects; it cannot exist separately and therefore is not considered eternal and extractable from its faculties and objects for Buddhists, as it is for the followers of Yoga and almost all Hindu sects. This is perhaps the most essential metaphysical difference between Hindu (and Jain) traditions and Buddhist ones.» — la diferencia metafísica que Bryant declara más esencial entre las tradiciones hindúes y jainas y las budistas
«Liberation, for such schools, entails a state of nonconsciousness, a prospect that was ridiculed by their opponents.» — la nota que consigna cómo otras escuelas se burlaban de esa idea de liberación
«The oldest philosophical texts of India, the Upaniṣads, typically favor the term ātman for the localized aspect of the self and Brahman for the universal aspect of the supreme self (although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably). The Gītā uses both these terms, as well as puruṣa favored by the Yoga school, and other terms usually used in the context of the soul in saṁsāra, such as jīva; dehī, the embodied one; and kṣetrajña, the knower of the field [of prakṛti].» — la nota que reparte los términos del alma entre Upaniṣads, Gītā y escuela del Yoga
«Draṣṭṛ occurs in various cases in this sūtra and in II.17, II.20, and IV.23. Two other derivatives of the same verb with very similar meaning also occur: dṛś, to see, in II.6; and dṛśi, seeing, in II.20, 25. Puruṣa occurs eight times (I.16, 24; III.35 [twice], 49, 55; and IV.18, 34). Ātman in the sense of self occurs three times (II.5, 41; IV.25).» — el recuento que Bryant hace de las apariciones de cada término en el propio texto
«The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools hold that consciousness itself is adventitious to the soul and is generated only when the soul comes in contact with the mind. When separated from the mind, the soul remains in a state devoid of consciousness» — la posición de Nyāya y Vaiśeṣika sobre la consciencia como adventicia al alma
«While the Yoga school shares the view that the mind and all mental activities are distinct from the soul, it holds that consciousness itself is at all times inherent and manifest in the soul, and not a property that manifests only when in contact with the mind; it thus differs from Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in this regard.» — el deslinde del Yoga frente a ellas: la consciencia es inherente al alma
«The followers of Cārvāka and other related philosophers were materialists and held consciousness to be a by-product of matter (the body), which is manifest under certain circumstances, and not something distinct from the body in any way, just as alcohol is a by-product generated under certain circumstances from fermented fruit or grain and not something separable from fruit or grain.» — la nota sobre los materialistas cārvāka y su símil del alcohol y el fruto fermentado
«Some schools of thought, such as that associated with Cārvāka, hold that anumāna is not a separate source of knowledge because it is predicated on sense perception—the smoke is seen, even if the fire is not—and thus it is a variant of pratyakṣa rather than an independent source of knowledge.» — la nota con la objeción cārvāka: la inferencia como variante de la percepción
«The Vedānta Sūtras refer to the prakṛti of Sāṅkhya as established by inference (I.3.3, 4.1; II.2.1), which they consider inferior to Truth that can be verified by recourse to» — la nota que consigna cómo el Vedānta degrada la prakṛti sāṅkhya por venir de inferencia; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de renglón del troceo
«As an aside, that these sūtras devote so much attention to refuting Sāṅkhya points to the importance and prevalence of the Sāṅkhya metaphysics.» — el argumento indirecto que Bryant saca de esa objeción: tanto objetarla mide cuánto pesaba
«The focus of the Mīmāṁsā, however, was on the scriptures pertaining to ritual, the Brāhmana texts, as opposed to the mysticophilosophical Upaniṣad texts, which were of interest to the Vedānta tradition.» — la nota que reparte los textos entre Mīmāṁsā y Vedānta según su materia
«Vijñānabhikṣu, for example, points out that error is considered an action that entails a positive act of misidentification in the Yoga school, a position technically known as viparītākhyāti or anyathākhyāti, rather than a negative lack of discrimination, a position subscribed to by the Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṁsā schools, called ākhyāti.» — la nota sobre las dos teorías del error y los nombres técnicos de cada una
«Vyāsa gives some slightly complicated examples, including “the arrow stands still, stood still, will stand still.” What this actually means in the mind of the listener is that the arrow has ceased (or will cease) to move. Vācaspati Miśra elaborates that in order to understand the meaning of the root “to stand still,” the listener has to imagine a state of not moving.» — la nota con el ejemplo de la flecha quieta para explicar el vikalpa
«Vikalpa is thus verbalization, or the connotative use of words, rather than the denotative.» — la definición de vikalpa que cierra esa nota
«Since a saṁskāra consists of both an imprint of a sense object and recognition or conceptualization of that object, Vyāsa notes that if the former aspect of the saṁskāra is dominant when it activates, then it is memory; if the latter, then it is an act of intelligence.» — la nota de Vyāsa que reparte memoria e inteligencia según qué domine en el saṁskāra
«Recognition of, say, a rose, depends on the senses contacting a red rose and then seeing a rose again at a later time, at which point the saṁskāra of the first experience is activated and one recognizes that the rose of the second occasion is similar to the first; in other words, recognition is dependent on the contact of the senses with a sense object. This is not the case with pure memory per se, which is when a rose can be recalled to mind even when one is not physically seeing a rose.» — la nota que distingue reconocer de recordar con el ejemplo de la rosa
«In still later Vedic ritualism, as expressed by the Mīmāṁsā school, the gods became essentially irrelevant (demoted to grammatical categories rather than personified), and the ritual itself construed as paramount in the obtainment of wealth and well-being, rather than being attained due to the pleasure or displeasure of the gods.» — la nota sobre cómo el ritualismo tardío desplazó a los dioses en favor del propio rito
«While later doxographies tend to contrast nontheistic Sāṅkhya with theistic Yoga (e.g., the eighth-century Jain text Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya by Haribhadra; Rāmānuja’s twelfth-century Vedānta commentary I.4.23 and elsewhere; and Mādhava’s fourteenth-century Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha), this perception seems based on» — la nota que sitúa el contraste entre Sāṅkhya no teísta y Yoga teísta como cosa de las doxografías tardías
«To be sure, there is no mention of any Īśvara here (though that is not quite the same thing as an explicit denial of Īśvara).» — la distinción que Bryant cuida: que un texto no nombre a Īśvara no es que lo niegue
«But one must bear in mind that the Sāṅkhya Kārikās were to become regarded by later philosophers as the seminal or primary source of Sāṅkhya purely by default: The earlier (arguably theistic) original sources had become lost.» — por qué el Sāṅkhya Kārikā quedó como fuente primaria: por defecto, perdidas las anteriores
«In any event, the facts seem to indicate that the early Sāṅkhya tradition, or at least strains of it, did accept the existence of an Īśvara, God.» — la posición de Bryant sobre el Sāṅkhya antiguo: al menos algunas ramas aceptaban a Īśvara
«There are undoubtedly many passages in the epic that explicitly associate Sāṅkhya with the impersonal monistic absolute Brahman, or with a personal god, adding a twenty-sixth ingredient of reality to the more standard twenty-five ingredients typical of Sāṅkhya» — los pasajes del Mahābhārata que asocian el Sāṅkhya con un absoluto o con un dios personal
«In the Mahābhārata’s Bhagavad Gītā, Kṛṣṇa emphatically states that he is Īśvara and that prakṛti and her Sāṅkhyan evolutes are his “lower nature» — el verso del Gītā en que Kṛṣṇa se declara Īśvara y hace de prakṛti su naturaleza inferior
«Thus, at the very least, there were theistic strains of Sāṅkhya intermingling with nontheistic ones in the epic.» — la conclusión mínima que Bryant se permite sobre el asunto
«Additionally, one of the oldest Sāṅkhya texts recognized by the later tradition is the Ṣaṣṭi-tantra-śāstra. This is described in the Vaiṣṇava Ahirbudhnya Saṁ hitā, and in this, Kapila, the undisputed founder of Sāṅkhya in all traditional sources, is stated to be theistic and an incarnation of Viṣṇu.» — el testimonio del Ṣaṣṭi-tantra-śāstra sobre Kapila como teísta y encarnación de Viṣṇu
«This tradition of a theistic Sāṅkhya is thus ancient and widespread, since it pervades a number of Purāṇas as well as the Pāñcarātra tradition.» — la extensión que Bryant le da a esa tradición teísta
«The prefix pra- gives the sense of forward, ni the sense of down, and the root dha, to place or put. Thus to put oneself forward and down before Īśvara, or prostrate.» — la etimología de praṇidhāna que da la nota: ponerse delante y abajo
«Saṁskāras are the imprints on the mind of every deed, thought, and sense impression one has experienced; they essentially correspond to memories and behavioral patterns.» — la definición breve de saṁskāra que Bryant deja en nota
«Karma means action, which in the Indic context involves not just an action per se but also the inherent reaction every action generates.» — la definición breve de karma de la misma serie de notas
«do not point to one ultimate monistic ātman, but refer to the oneness of the category of ātman. In other words, all ātman are the same insofar as they belong to the same category of existence, ātman-ness; they are not ontologically one.» — la nota con la lectura no monista de los Upaniṣads: una misma categoría de ātman, no un solo ātman
«Mahāvīra, while not the founder of Jainism according to its own sources, is the primary teacher (tīrthaṅkara) for this age.» — la nota que consigna cómo el propio jainismo sitúa a Mahāvīra: no fundador sino maestro de esta edad
«Hindu time is cyclical. There are four yugas, or world ages: the satya (aka kṛta)-yuga, or golden age; tretā-yuga; dvāpara-yuga; and the present world age of kali-yuga, the most degenerate age. Once the cycle is completed, it starts anew.» — la nota con las cuatro edades del mundo y el ciclo que se reinicia
«Dharma in the context of the Gītā most commonly refers to the various duties» — la nota que acota el sentido de dharma en el Gītā antes de los otros usos; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de plana
«incumbent on every human being—social, religious, political, professional, familial, etc. The term has a wide variety of usages in philosophical discourses» — el resto de esa nota, con la advertencia de que el término varía según el discurso
«Brahmā is the secondary creator of the universe insofar as he creates the forms in the world but does not create the primordial stuff from which these forms are created. He is thus more of an engineer than a creator.» — la nota que degrada a Brahmā a ingeniero y no creador
«The point being made here is that he himself is also a mortal being within saṁsāra with a finite, albeit immense, life span» — y lo que de ahí se sigue: también Brahmā es mortal dentro del saṁsāra
«There are numerous variants or permutations of this basic view of oneness in diversity in post-Śaṅkara Vedāntic tradition: dvaitādvaita, viśiṣṭādvaita, śuddhādvaita» — la nota que enumera las variantes vedāntinas posteriores a Śaṅkara sobre la unidad en la diversidad
«For Vijñānabhikṣu, the famous statements of the Upaniṣads, such as the tat tvam asi, you are that (ātman = Brahman), verses of the Chāndogya, are to be understood in this light. A series of verses in the Chāndogya VI.8ff, perhaps the most quoted verses from the Upaniṣads, point to the oneness of the soul, ātman, with Brahman, a oneness that Vijñānabhikṣu and other Vedāntins hold is not absolute but some type of oneness-in-difference as exemplified by Vijñānabhikṣu above.» — la nota con la lectura que Vijñānabhikṣu hace del tat tvam asi: unidad en diferencia, no unidad absoluta
«Devadatta is used ubiquitously in the Hindu commentarial tradition to refer to an everyday individual, a John Doe.» — la nota que explica el nombre convencional de los ejemplos comentariales
«The denotative power of all words is eternal, according to Yoga (and certain other schools, such as Mīmāṁsā» — la nota sobre la eternidad del poder denotativo de la palabra en el Yoga y en la Mīmāṁsā
«For the Chaitanya Gauḍīya tradition, since Kṛṣṇa is the fullest possible manifestation of Godhead who contains and supersedes all other divine manifestations (Bhāgavata Purāṇa I.3.28), the name of Kṛṣṇa, as his sonic manifestation, includes and supersedes all other mantras.» — la nota sobre la tradición Chaitanya Gauḍīya y el nombre de Kṛṣṇa por encima de todo mantra
«This is to say that, in addition to manifesting the sāttvic potential of the citta, the bhakti traditions aspire to fill the citta with saṁskāras centered exclusively on Īśvara» — la nota sobre lo que las tradiciones de bhakti añaden al fin del yoga
«The all-pervading quality of the buddhi, ahaṅkāra, and manas (i.e., the citta), in the school of Yoga is in contradistinction to the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṁsā schools, which hold the mind to be minute.» — la nota que contrapone el Yoga a Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika y Mīmāṁsā sobre el tamaño de la mente
«It is due to the dense or weighty nature of tamas that the creation of any type of distinct form or delimitation in prakṛti is possible, even on the level of gross objects. Without tamas, prakṛti would be buoyant and ethereal (sattva) and/or constantly moving (rajas); no physical forms would take shape.» — la nota que le da al tamas la función de permitir la forma
«An extraordinary example of intense absorption on the guru as the object of meditation in the Siddha tradition is the case of Muktānanda, as described in his autobiography Play of Consciousness» — la nota que remite otra vez a la autobiografía de Muktānanda como ejemplo vivo
«The puruṣa can be aware only of itself, since it is beyond the intelligence and mind and other instruments of cognition, hence the common aphorism of the self knowing itself by itself.» — la nota con el aforismo del sí mismo que se conoce por sí mismo
«In the introduction I stated that Śaṅkara’s advaita philosophy is not prominent in his Yoga commentary, to my eye. However, this view of sleep is an example of classical advaita.» — Bryant enmienda en nota su propia observación sobre el advaita en el comentario de Śaṅkara
«If a connection is to be made, it would seem to be that the yogī is still afflicted by awareness of the names and concepts of things (unlike in the nirvitarka of the next verse) but not by the vitarkas of II.33, where the term is used in a different sense. There it refers to thoughts of violence, etc. Technical terms can be multivalent.» — la nota con la advertencia de Bryant sobre los términos técnicos que cambian de sentido
«See, for example, the completely different interpretation given to the Vedānta Sūtras I.1.5–9 by Madhva compared to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.» — la nota que remite a tres lecturas distintas de un mismo pasaje vedāntino
«As an aside, Vyāsa goes on to make the point that although objects of nirvitarka, like cows and pots, are ultimately assemblages of atoms that are themselves composed of subtle elements, nonetheless objects are coherent wholes.» — la nota con la tesis de Vyāsa sobre el todo coherente frente a la suma de partes
«The commentators take Vyāsa to be referring to certain Buddhist positions, which believe in neither whole entities nor partless atoms. For the Buddhists, there are no whole irreducible entities of any sort, because everything consists of parts, and these parts themselves consist of parts, and so on ad infinitum.» — la posición budista contraria, tal como los comentaristas la identifican
«Of what, asks Vyāsa, would perfect knowledge of reality consist of if there were no real objects of perception? If the whole does not exist because it is made up of parts, and yet the parts are imperceptible and therefore unprovable because they themselves are made up of parts and therefore not wholes in their own right, and so on, then there would be no basis to establish true knowledge, and so all knowledge would be false.» — el argumento de Vyāsa: sin objetos reales no hay conocimiento verdadero
«Rather, the whole is both different from and the same as its parts.» — la fórmula con que Vyāsa resuelve el todo y las partes
«Knowledge of anything requires change, Vācaspati Miśra reminds us—knowledge is directed from one object to another, from one thought to another, etc., and is thus constantly changing—and puruṣa, in the Yoga school, is considered to be constant and changeless. Therefore, puruṣa does not actually know anything in its pure state except its own unchanging, eternal self.» — la nota con la consecuencia dura del axioma: el puruṣa puro no conoce nada salvo a sí mismo
«Each saṁskāra in this primordial pradhāna would appear to still be connected in some way with its specific owner, the individual puruṣa, since saṁskāras are reconnected with their previous owners at the time of the next creation. Therefore, they do not dissolve entirely into the primordial soup of pradhāna.» — la nota sobre por qué los saṁskāras no se pierden del todo en la disolución cósmica
«The Mahābhārata refers to seven dhāraṇās, but these are explained differently from the descriptions given by Vyāsa here» — la nota que consigna la discrepancia entre el Mahābhārata y Vyāsa sobre las siete dhāraṇās
«In this latter tradition, buddhi has eight total modes, four sāttvic and four tāmasic. The sāttvic modes are jñāna, vairāgya, dharma, and aiśavarya, knowledge, dispassion, duty, and power, and their opposites are tāmasic. Only the first, jñāna, is conducive to liberation; the remaining seven have to be transcended by the yogī.» — los ocho modos de la buddhi según el Sāṅkhya, y cuál de ellos conduce a la liberación
«Such heroism may not be exclusively altruistic, but it is connected with the Jain notion of karma, conceived as an actual physical substance that covers the soul.» — la nota que acota el heroísmo jaina de la no violencia por su lógica kármica
«Vācaspati Miśra takes the term for control, saṁyama, further and considers it to apply to control over all the senses, not only the procreative one.» — la nota que amplía el brahmacarya de un sentido a todos los sentidos
«Certain left-handed tāntric rites prescribe (highly) ritually circumscribed imbibing of meat or other prohibited substances, including intoxicating substances, along with indulgence in sexual practices with a view to transcending dualistic notions of purity and pollution, and facilitating an experience of the divine interplay underpinning material reality as conceived of in the śākta traditions.» — la nota que describe los ritos de la mano izquierda y su propósito declarado
«But even here, these practices are not performed in a licentious manner but within the context of ritual and meditational conditions. Right-handed tantra, however, tends to observe and promote yama-type principles.» — la acotación que Bryant añade, y el contraste con el tantra de la mano derecha
«However Manu, in his Dharma-śāstra (IV.34) states that the yamas are obligatory but the niyamas are not.» — la nota con el desacuerdo de Manu sobre el rango de yamas y niyamas
«Notice that the Bhāgavata essentially presents the identical yamas and niyamas as Patañjali in II.30ff, with yāvad-artha-parigraha as a rewording of aparigraha; and puruṣārcana, of Īśvara-praṇidhāna.» — la nota que empareja los yamas y niyamas del Bhāgavata con los de Patañjali, término a término
«Respect is shown to deities and saints in Indic traditions by worshipping their feet (since the feet are the lowest part of a person’s anatomy» — la nota que explica por qué se adora los pies
«It is still not clear why dhāraṇā and dhyāna are relevant at this point, from this perspective, since the knowledge of samādhi would seem to make that of the previous stages redundant.» — la nota en que Bryant deja una dificultad abierta en vez de darla por resuelta
«One must also note here that Kṛṣṇa’s presence is considered so purifying in the Bhāgavata that all the demons who were killed by him were purified and liberated from their bondage simply as a result of his divine presence.» — la nota que consigna lo que el Bhāgavata sostiene sobre la presencia purificadora de Kṛṣṇa
«In Buddhism, dharma most popularly refers to the Buddha’s teachings but can refer to a number of more technical things (such as quality, similar to its usage here; cause;» — la nota que reparte los sentidos de dharma en el budismo; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de plana
«and the momentary essenceless nature of a physical object). In Jainism it refers to the metaphysical category that allows motion to take place.» — y el sentido jaina del mismo término; el tramo arranca a media frase por el corte de plana
«The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools (paralleling with various differences other ancient Indic schools subscribing to the asatkārya-vāda view such as the Mīmāṁsakas and Jains) hold that all objects in manifest reality are formed by the combination of seven (or other finite number depending on the school) interdependent but distinct underlying causal entities such as atoms and qualities; they are not formed by one ultimate underlying causal substratum substance such as the Yoga school envisions prakṛti to be.» — la nota que contrapone el asatkārya-vāda de varias escuelas al sustrato único del Yoga
«Since Vasubandhu had presented criticisms of a rival sect of Buddhism, the Sarvāstivāda, that can be applied to the Sāṅkhyan view, Vyāsa, in his commentary to the next sūtra and elsewhere, according to Yamashita, uses the Sarvāstivāda view as a springboard to elaborate on the Sāṅkhyan view of dharma and its transformations as» — la nota sobre cómo Vyāsa se apoya en una polémica interna del budismo; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de plana
«In Sanskrit, an -in suffix appended to a noun indicates possession of that noun. For example, hasta means hand, and hastin means possessor of a hand» — la nota gramatical con que Bryant explica la formación de dharmin
«Second, a collection can be categorized as to whether these parts can be separated, as in a forest, or cannot be separated, as in a body or an» — la nota que reparte los conjuntos por si sus partes se pueden separar; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de plana
«For Vaiśeṣika, guṇas are not separable because they can exist only as inhering in a substance, dravya. There are no uninstantiated guṇas.» — la nota que consigna la posición vaiśeṣika: no hay guṇas sin sustancia en que inhieran
«For example, the tanmātras are the viśeṣas of ahaṅkāra from which they evolve, and the sāmānya of the mahābhūtas that evolve from them.» — la nota con la lectura de Malinar: cada estadio es particular del anterior y general del siguiente
«Desire, will, pleasure, and pain are paryāyas, temporary characters, of the ātman that come and go, but in Jainism they inhere in the ātman itself, rather than in the citta as per the Sāṅkhyan view.» — la nota que marca la diferencia jaina: esos estados inhieren en el ātman, no en la citta
«The term Patañjali uses for kleśa here is doṣa, a term used in the Mahābhārata for the kleśas» — la nota que rastrea el uso de doṣa por kleśa hasta el Mahābhārata
«As noted earlier, “internal” and “external” are used loosely and rhetorically.» — la nota en que Bryant declara retóricos unos términos que él mismo usa
«The kalpadruma trees that can fulfill any desire.» — la nota que identifica los árboles de los deseos del discurso de los semidioses
«The Mandākinī is situated by Citrakūṭa, a well-known mountain in Purāṇic lore. By bathing in this river one is awarded the wealth and majesty of a king.» — la nota que identifica el río de ese mismo discurso y lo que se gana bañándose en él
«A forest continues to be a forest if some of its trees are removed, but a body is no longer a body if its limbs are removed, nor an atom an atom if its (subtle) parts are» — el criterio con el ejemplo del bosque, el cuerpo y el átomo; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de plana
«separated. A substance is something in which the qualities or parts are nondistinct and inseparable.» — la definición de sustancia que de ahí sale; el tramo arranca a media frase por el corte de plana
«It is not clear whether Patañjali is being rhetorical in saying that that which is left to be known is “little.” The commentators don’t specify what that little bit might be, if anything. Given the seemingly grandiose claims of omniscience presented throughout the text, one would expect that there should be nothing outside of the yogī’s sphere of comprehension.» — la nota en que Bryant deja abierta la lectura de IV.31 y marca que los comentaristas no precisan qué queda por conocer
«Of course, during pralaya, universal dissolution, the guṇas remain in a latent and hence unmoving state.» — la nota que acota el movimiento perpetuo de los guṇas con el caso de la disolución universal
«Although the Gītā seems to espouse the Sāṅkhya line, XIII.20 and 29 at a surface reading, the commentators to these verses such as Rāmānuja and Madhva do assign kartṛtva to puruṣa in their commentaries, as does Śaṅkara» — la nota que consigna cómo los comentaristas del Gītā le devuelven la agencia al puruṣa
«The issue remained an ongoing acute bone of contention; in the sixteenth to seventeenth century, the Yatīndramata-dīpikā by Rāmānuja’s Śrī Vaiṣṇava follower Śrīnivāsacarya, characterizes the notion that agency is a function of buddhi as erroneous knowledge held by sophists» — la nota que mide cuánto duró la disputa, hasta llamar sofistas a la posición contraria en el siglo XVII
«For Śaṅkara, of course, agency is a feature of the soul, but in conventional reality, it is an upādhi, or illusory superimposition. In its ultimate pure state, the ātman is not an agent.» — la nota que reparte la posición de Śaṅkara en dos niveles de realidad
«One must bear in mind that, in Śaṅkara’s radical advaita monism, there is only Brahman—everything else is superimposition, like the mirage in a desert; thus there is nothing upon which an agent might act.» — la razón de ese reparto: en el monismo advaita no hay sobre qué obrar
«The theistic commentators accept that it is by the grace of Īśvara that the puruṣa can exert its will. Madhva quotes scriptural verses that speak of the activities of the ātman in the liberated state, which points to free will in the ātman rather than in the buddhi.» — la nota con la solución teísta: la voluntad del puruṣa por gracia de Īśvara
«Their position is ridiculed in turn by their opponents: who would aspire for such a liberated state that does not even consist of a state of consciousness?» — la burla de sus adversarios, consignada como parte del registro
«Since qualities (guṇas) including consciousness itself arise in the ātman only when it is in contact with the mind (which, as in Yoga, is external to the ātman), these traditions» — la nota que muestra a qué obliga la posición de Nyāya y Vaiśeṣika sobre la consciencia; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de plana
«find themselves having to defend a position in which there is no consciousness in the state of liberation (which, as in Patañjali, involves separating the ātman from the mind» — y lo que de ahí se sigue: una liberación sin consciencia; el tramo arranca a media frase por el corte de plana
«The parks there shine like final liberation itself, and contain wish-fulfilling trees, which blossom all the year round. There are fragrant winds, and creepers dripping with honey near bodies of water. Cries of exotic birds mingle with the humming of bees, and magnificent flowers bloom everywhere. Devotees of Viṣṇu along with their beautiful wives travel in aerial vehicles made of jewels, emeralds and gold, but the beautiful smiling residents of this realm cannot distract the minds of the opposite sex, since everyone is absorbed in Kṛṣṇa» — la nota que continúa la descripción purāṇica de Vaikuṇṭha, con sus árboles de los deseos y sus vehículos aéreos
«See Bryant (2003) for Book X of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (the most important) and anticipated future volumes of the remainder. See also the edition of the entire text (twelve books) translated by the great Vaishnava teacher Bhaktivedanta Swami, published in the West by the Bhaktivedanta Book Trust.» — la nota en que Bryant remite a su propia traducción del Bhāgavata y a la de Bhaktivedanta Swami; entrada bibliográfica extraída con la guarda anticosido apagada, que es el caso previsto para bibliografía
«Ballantyne, James Robert. The Aphorisms of the Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentary by Bhoja Raja. Allahabad: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1852.» — muestra de la bibliografía: la traducción decimonónica de Ballantyne a partir del comentario de Bhoja Rāja; entrada bibliográfica extraída sin la guarda anticosido
«Beck, Guy. Sonic Theology. Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1993.» — muestra de la bibliografía: una entrada corta, extraída sin la guarda anticosido por ser bibliografía
«Müller, Max. The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. New York: Longmans, 1899.» — muestra de la bibliografía: la obra decimonónica de Max Müller sobre los seis sistemas; entrada bibliográfica extraída sin la guarda anticosido
«Olivelle, Patrick. The Early Upaniśads. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.» — muestra de la bibliografía: la edición de Olivelle de los Upaniṣads tempranos, con la grafía que imprime el troceo; extraída sin la guarda anticosido
«Parrott, Rodney. “The Problem of the Sāṅkhya Tattvas as Both Cosmic and Psychological Phenomena.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 14 (1986): 55–77.» — muestra de la bibliografía: el artículo sobre los tattvas como cósmicos y psicológicos, que es justo el asunto de las reflexiones finales; extraída sin la guarda anticosido
«Abhāva Absence, removal. Abhyāsa Practice; here defined as the effort to concentrate the mind.» — las dos primeras entradas del glosario, muestra de su formato: término y definición breve
«Anātma-vāda Belief that there is no eternal, separable conscious entity called ātman (puruṣa). Another term for Buddhist doctrine in Hindu commentaries.» — muestra del glosario: el anātma-vāda, y el aviso de que los comentarios hindúes lo usan como nombre de la doctrina budista
«Aṇu An irreducible entity in the sense that it cannot be further broken down into smaller parts. Variously translated as minute, tiny, atom, smallest physical subatomic particles. The gross elements (mahābhūtas) are comprised of aṇus.» — muestra del glosario: la entrada del aṇu, con las traducciones que la propia entrada declara variables
«Āsana Seat, posture, or stretching pose for the purpose of preparing the yogī’s body to sit firmly (sthira) and comfortably (sukha) for prolonged periods in meditation.» — muestra del glosario: el āsana definido por su fin, sentarse firme y cómodo para meditar
«Kriyā-yoga Defined by Patañjali as a practice consisting of tapas (austerity), svādhyāya (study), and Īśvara-praṇidhāna (devotion to God).» — muestra del glosario: el kriyā-yoga con sus tres componentes
«Kṣaṇa Instant, moment, smallest point in time. A kṣaṇa is defined as the time it takes an aṇu to move from one point in space to the space immediately adjacent to it.» — muestra del glosario: el kṣaṇa definido por el movimiento del aṇu
«Kṣanika-vāda The view that all reality is momentary—nothing in reality has inherent, eternal, independent, and essential existence; one of several terms for Buddhist doctrine.» — muestra del glosario: el kṣanika-vāda, otro de los nombres que el libro da a la doctrina budista
«Kuṇḍalinī Coiled feminine power central to the siddha and tantra traditions.» — muestra del glosario: la kuṇḍalinī consignada como central en las tradiciones siddha y tantra, es decir, fuera del yoga clásico
«Satkārya Metaphysical view that any effect is present in its cause. All manifest reality is simply a transformation of the underlying cause prakṛti. The Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools subscribe to this view.» — muestra del glosario: el satkārya, con las escuelas que lo suscriben
«Sattva One of the three guṇas; literally means “being-ness.” When sattva is predominant in an individual, the qualities of lucidity, tranquillity, wisdom, discrimination, detachment, happiness, and peacefulness manifest. Also used as a synonym of buddhi.» — muestra del glosario: el sattva, con su etimología y sus efectos
«Satya-loka Celestial realm (still within saṁsāra).» — muestra del glosario: una entrada mínima que aun así consigna el límite, el mundo celestial sigue dentro del saṁsāra
«To Patricia Walden: When I was the lecturer in Hinduism at Harvard, I received a request from her Somerville studio to lecture on Yoga philosophy. Patricia subsequently invited me to lecture at various teacher training workshops, and soon I was receiving invitations from Yoga teachers all over the country and internationally.» — los agradecimientos cuentan el origen del libro: una invitación a dar clase de filosofía del yoga
«Consequently, I realized that thousands of yoga practitioners worldwide were perceiving Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras as a paramount source of spiritual authority.» — la observación de la que, según Bryant, nació el proyecto
«This led to the conviction that there was a need for a user-friendly edition of the Sūtras that was firmly and authentically grounded in and representative of the intellectual history of the classical Yoga tradition in pre-modern India. Thus the commitment to undertake this translation and commentary took» — el propósito declarado de la edición: accesible y a la vez fiel a la historia intelectual de la tradición; el tramo queda partido por el cambio de renglón del troceo
«This edition is especially dedicated to Patricia and the entire Iyengar community, particularly to Guruji Iyengar himself for his enormous contribution to the well-being of humanity, and for his foreword to this volume.» — la dedicatoria, que nombra a la comunidad Iyengar y al firmante del prólogo
«To Paul Sherbow, for his meticulous editing of the Sanskrit in several drafts of the manuscript. To Bob Gilbo, for editing this manuscript, and creating the word index and the Sāṅkhya chart, and to Snehy Gupta for undertaking the glossary; both went beyond the call of duty.» — quién hizo qué en el aparato: la edición del sánscrito, el índice de palabras, la tabla sāṅkhya y el glosario; el glosario y el índice no son de Bryant y así se consigna
«To Valerio Virgini for pasting in the Sanskrit Nagari font and the transliteration.» — quién montó la tipografía devanāgarī del volumen, la misma que el troceo no conserva
«A superb contribution to the secondary literature on yoga. Critically grounded in the scholarship on yoga and the rich textual history of the tradition, Bryant nevertheless succeeds in transcending both the excessively technical approaches to yoga scholarship as well as much of the popular nonsense about yoga in the proliferating ‘schools’ in the New Age marketplace.» — blurb de solapa firmado por Gerald James Larson; es publicidad editorial, jamás voz de la obra, y así se consigna
«Dr. Bryant’s translation of and commentary on Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras reveal the rich tapestry of schools and viewpoints that form the background for the yoga tradition. Dr. Bryant teaches us to delight in the diversity of ideas and commentaries that come along with the equally diverse practices of yoga.» — blurb de solapa firmado por Richard Freeman; misma condición de publicidad editorial
«Edwin Bryant has provided us with a sweeping, kaleidoscopic overview of this essential yoga text. His clear and engaging prose brings Patañjali’s aphorisms to life, taking his reader on an amazing journey through the history of yoga philosophy.» — blurb de solapa firmado por David Gordon White, el mismo estudioso que Bryant cita en III.38
«What I like about Edwin Bryant’s edition is that it serves as a concordance of commentaries, a commentary on the commentaries without which this text (or any other compendium of sutras) is unintelligible. It is a pleasure to watch as Bryant uses the commentaries to show how thinking about the Yoga Sūtras shifted and evolved over the years.» — blurb de solapa firmado por Robert Svoboda, que describe el libro como concordancia de comentarios
«Edwin F. Bryant received his Ph.D. in Indology from Columbia University. He has taught at Columbia University and Harvard University and since 2001 has been professor of Hindu religion and philosophy at Rutgers University.» — la nota biográfica de solapa con la formación y el puesto de Bryant; es solapa, no voz de la obra
«Bryant has written numerous scholarly articles and published five previous books, including a translation of the four thousand verses of the tenth book of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa called Krishna: The Beautiful Legend of God.» — la solapa enumera su obra previa, incluida la traducción del décimo libro del Bhāgavata que él mismo cita en las notas
«In addition to his work in the academy, Bryant teaches workshops on the Yoga Sūtras and other Hindu texts in yoga communities around the world. His website is www.edwinbryant.org.» — la solapa consigna también su trabajo fuera de la academia, en comunidades de yoga
«ALSO BY EDWIN F. BRYANT Krishna: A Source Book (as editor, 2007) The Aryan Invasion: Evidence, Politics, History (as coeditor with Laurie Patton, 2005) The Hare Krishna Movement: The Post-Charismatic Fate of a Religious Transplant (as coeditor with Maria Ekstrand, 2004) Krishna: The Beautiful Legend of God (as translator from Sanskrit with notes and introduction, 2003) The Quest for the Origins of Vedic Culture: The Indo-Aryan Invasion Debate (2001)» — la lista de obras anteriores que imprime el volumen, con el papel que Bryant tuvo en cada una: editor, coeditor o traductor; extraída con la guarda anticosido apagada, porque lo que la dispara son los años entre paréntesis de la propia lista
«Sanskrit Pronunciation Guide adapted from Krishna: The Beautiful Legend of God, translated by Edwin F. Bryant, copyright © 2003 by Edwin F. Bryant, reprinted by permission of Penguin Group.» — la página de derechos declara que la guía de pronunciación no es nueva: viene de otra obra de Bryant y se reimprime con permiso de otro editor; extraída sin la guarda anticosido por el año entre paréntesis
«Bryant, Edwin F. (Edwin Francis), 1957– The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali: a new edition, translation, and commentary with insights from the traditional commentators / Edwin F. Bryant. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. eISBN: 978-1-4299-9598-6 1. Patañjali. Yogasutra. 2. Yoga. I. Patañjali. Yogasutra. English & Sanskrit. II. Title. B132.Y6B78 2009 181’.452—dc22» — la ficha catalográfica de la Library of Congress que el volumen imprime, con el año de nacimiento del autor, el eISBN y la ausencia de ISBN de papel; extraída sin la guarda anticosido por los años que trae
Conceptos tratados
Microcosmos (el hombre-mundo) — El volumen enuncia la correspondencia como resultado de una práctica, no como doctrina previa: abierta la entrada de la suṣumnā se revelan las regiones del universo, y de ahí que haya correspondencia entre el microcosmo del cuerpo y el macrocosmo del universo; el mismo reparto vuelve en los sūtras III.26 a III.29, donde el saṁyama sobre el sol da los mundos y el saṁyama sobre el ombligo da el cuerpo.
Cadena de transmisión (quién tomó de quién) — La obra consigna su propio linaje y su dependencia de él: la tradición no le adjudica a Patañjali el origen del yoga sino a Hiraṇyagarbha; la filosofía del Yoga es la de Patañjali tal como Vyāsa la entendió y la articuló; Bryant objeta en nota el intento de saltarse los comentarios para llegar a un Patañjali puro; y el aparato remite a los pasajes upaniṣádicos que subrayan la necesidad de maestro.