Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines

«Clearly, the first condition for such a study, and the most necessary of all, is to possess the mental qualifications for understanding the doctrines in question, and by this we mean for understanding them truly and thoroughly; it is this aptitude which, with very few exceptions, is lacking among Westerners.» — prefacio: enuncia la primera condición del estudio —tener las cualidades mentales para entender de veras las doctrinas— y sostiene que es justo lo que falta entre los occidentales, salvo excepciones.

«On the other hand, the fulfillment of this one vital condition can be considered a sufficient qualification, because once it is recognized by Easterners they show no reluctance whatever in communicating their thoughts without reserve.» — prefacio: y su contraparte, que acota el reproche: cumplida esa condición y reconocida por los orientales, señala que estos comunican su pensamiento sin reserva.

«One could hardly be accused of exaggeration in maintaining that they never actually have overcome it, seeing that so far they have only succeeded in producing works of erudition, valuable perhaps from a certain point of view but nevertheless of no interest at all when it comes to the question of understanding even the most simple of true ideas.» — prefacio: lo que objeta a los orientalistas es que solo han producido obras de erudición, valiosas quizá desde cierto punto de vista y sin interés alguno cuando se trata de entender una idea verdadera.

«The fact is that a knowledge of grammar and an ability to make a word for word translation are not in themselves sufficient to enable a person to enter into the spirit of a language or to assimilate the thoughts of the people who read and write it.» — prefacio: niega que saber gramática y traducir palabra por palabra baste para entrar en el espíritu de una lengua o asimilar el pensamiento de quienes la escriben.

«One might even go further and say that the more a translation is scrupulously literal the less likely it is to be faithful or to reveal the true nature of the original thought, because the correspondence between terms of expression belonging to two different languages is far from» — prefacio: la paradoja que enuncia contra el literalismo: cuanto más escrupulosamente literal es una traducción, menos probable es que sea fiel, porque la correspondencia entre términos de dos lenguas dista de ser exacta. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«Especially is this the case when those languages are widely separated, not merely from a philological standpoint, but also by reason of great diversity in the conceptions characteristic of the peoples speaking them; no amount of book-learning will be of any avail in bridging differences of this nature.» — prefacio: agrava el caso cuando las lenguas están separadas no solo filológicamente sino por la diversidad de concepciones de los pueblos que las hablan, y niega que la erudición libresca salve esa distancia.

«No doubt, dictionaries and similar compilations have their relative uses, which no one wishes to dispute, nor can it be said that all such work is entirely thrown away, especially when one remembers that those who devote themselves to it are as often as not unsuited to other branches of study; unfortunately, however, as soon as erudition becomes a ‘speciality’ it tends to be regarded as an end in itself instead of a means to an end, as it normally should be.» — prefacio: concede el uso relativo de diccionarios y compilaciones, y pone el límite donde la erudición se vuelve especialidad y pasa de medio a fin.

«It is this invasion of the intellectual field by erudition with its special methods that constitutes a genuine danger, because it threatens to absorb the attention even of people who otherwise might perhaps have been capable of devoting themselves to work of another kind, and also because the habits that grow with the use of such methods narrow the intellectual horizon and cause irremediable harm to those who submit to them.» — prefacio: llama peligro genuino a la invasión del campo intelectual por la erudición, por absorber a quien podría haberse dedicado a otro trabajo y por estrechar el horizonte de quien se somete a sus métodos.

«Certain people, however, have wished to go further by embarking upon the task of interpretation while still continuing to employ their usual methods, which have nothing at all to contribute in this sphere; at the same time they introduce all the preconceived notions which go to make up their own particular mentality, with the manifest intention of forcing the theories they are studying into the habitual framework of European thought.» — prefacio: describe lo que tiene por más grave que la erudición pura: interpretar con los mismos métodos y con las nociones preconcebidas propias, forzando las teorías estudiadas al marco habitual del pensamiento europeo.

«have the effect of making them believe, owing to some extraordinary aberration, that they are able to understand Eastern doctrines better than the Easterners themselves—a presumption that would be merely ridiculous, were it not also allied to a fixed determination to establish a kind of ‘monopoly over the studies in question.» — prefacio: a la exclusividad y la predilección por los sistemas les atribuye el efecto de hacer creer a esos orientalistas que entienden las doctrinas orientales mejor que los propios orientales, presunción que liga a una determinación de establecer un monopolio sobre esos estudios.

«Actually, except for these specialists, there is hardly anybody in Europe who takes an interest in such matters, unless one includes a certain class of extravagant dreamers and enterprizing charlatans who could be treated as a negligible quantity if they did not also exercise a deplorable influence in more respects than one.» — prefacio: fuera de los especialistas no ve en Europa interés por estas materias, salvo el de una clase de soñadores extravagantes y charlatanes emprendedores a los que atribuye influencia deplorable.

«this is the error that consists in studying the Eastern civilizations as one might study some civilization long since extinct. In the latter case it is clear that, for want of a better alternative, one is obliged to be content with approximate reconstructions of the past, without ever being sure of establishing an exact correspondence with what formerly existed, there being no way of obtaining direct proof.» — prefacio: nombra el abuso que adjudica al método histórico, estudiar las civilizaciones orientales como se estudia una extinta, donde no queda más que reconstrucciones aproximadas sin prueba directa.

«It is forgotten, however, that the Eastern civilizations, or those at least with which we are at present concerned, have continued to exist without interruption to the present day, and that they still possess their authorized representatives, whose advice is of incomparably greater value for the understanding of those civilizations than all the academic learning in the world;» — prefacio: lo que dice que se olvida: esas civilizaciones siguen existiendo sin interrupción y conservan representantes autorizados cuyo consejo vale, para entenderlas, incomparablemente más que toda la erudición académica.

«only, if the intention be to consult these people, one should not start out from the curious principle that one is oneself better informed as to the real meaning of their ideas than they are themselves.» — prefacio: y el límite con que cierra: si se va a consultarlos, no se parte del principio de estar mejor informado que ellos sobre el sentido real de sus propias ideas.

«In short, questions of method apart, the cardinal error of these orientalists is to look at everything from their own Western» — prefacio: nombra el error cardinal que adjudica a esos orientalistas, mirarlo todo desde su propio punto de vista occidental. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 19.

«the first condition for the correct interpretation of any doctrine is to make an effort to assimilate it by placing oneself as far as possible at the viewpoint of those who conceived it.» — prefacio: la continuación del tramo anterior, ya en la plana siguiente, con la primera condición de una interpretación correcta: colocarse cuanto se pueda en el punto de vista de quienes concibieron la doctrina.

«On the other hand, it must also be stated that Easterners, having formed a rather unfortunate though quite understandable opinion of European intellectuality, care very little for what Westerners in general may or may not think about them; therefore, they make no attempt to enlighten them, but on the contrary, taking up an attitude of somewhat disdainful politeness, they shut themselves up in a silence which Western vanity is never at a loss to interpret as a sign of approbation.» — prefacio: atribuye a los orientales una opinión desfavorable de la intelectualidad europea y, con ella, un silencio de cortesía desdeñosa que —dice— la vanidad occidental lee como aprobación.

«The fact is that ‘proselytism’ is practically unknown in the East, where in any case it could serve no purpose and would be regarded purely and simply as a sign of ignorance and lack of comprehension—a statement which will be explained in due course.» — prefacio: declara el proselitismo prácticamente desconocido en Oriente y anuncia que explicará por qué allí se tendría por signo de ignorancia.

«Its silence, for which the East is often reproached, but which is really so justifiable, can only be broken on rare occasions in favor of isolated individuals endowed with the requisite qualifications and showing a proper intellectual aptitude.» — prefacio: el silencio que se le reprocha a Oriente lo tiene por justificado, y dice que solo se rompe en favor de individuos aislados con la aptitud intelectual requerida.

«As for those who give up this attitude of reserve on other than the last-mentioned grounds, there is only one thing to be said: as a rule they represent elements of no great interest, being persons who for one reason or another have taken it upon themselves to purvey doctrines which they have corrupted under the plea of adapting them to the Western mentality;» — prefacio: de quienes sí abandonan esa reserva dice que suelen ser gente que corrompió las doctrinas bajo el pretexto de adaptarlas a la mentalidad occidental. Es el anuncio de la cuarta parte.

«The point we wish to emphasize at the moment and to which we drew attention from the outset, is that the Western mentality is alone responsible for the present situation, which places the greatest difficulties in the way of anyone who, through exceptional circumstances, has succeeded in assimilating certain ideas and wishes to express them as intelligibly as possible, though without distorting them;» — prefacio: carga la responsabilidad de la situación entera sobre la mentalidad occidental, y con ella las dificultades de quien logró asimilar ciertas ideas y quiere expresarlas sin distorsionarlas.

«such a man must be content, within the limits of what is possible, to expound the ideas he has understood, while carefully abstaining from any thought of popularization and without worrying in the slightest about trying to compel the convictions of other people.» — prefacio: el programa que se fija para sí mismo, exponer lo entendido absteniéndose de toda divulgación y sin buscar forzar convicciones ajenas.

«Enough has been said to make our intentions quite clear: we have no wish here to produce a work of erudition, for the point of view we have adopted takes us much further than that.» — prefacio: declara que el libro no es obra de erudición, porque el punto de vista adoptado lleva más lejos.

«Moreover, even short of attaining this end there would still be a good reason for undertaking a treatise such as the present one: Easterners might see in it an acknowledgment for all that we owe them intellectually, for no Westerner has ever introduced us to anything of the kind, not even in a partial and incomplete way.» — prefacio: da por razón del tratado un reconocimiento de lo que dice deberle intelectualmente a los orientales, y señala que ningún occidental los había introducido así.

«Firstly then, after disposing of a few preliminary but indispensable questions, we will outline, as clearly as possible, the essential and fundamental differences existing between the general modes of Eastern and Western thought.» — prefacio: anuncia el plan de las dos primeras partes, las cuestiones preliminares y las diferencias esenciales entre los modos generales del pensamiento oriental y el occidental.

«After that we shall concentrate more particularly on questions connected with the Hindu doctrines insofar as they contain special characteristics that distinguish them from the other Eastern doctrines, though all these doctrines possess enough features in common to justify the opposition between East and West in a general way.» — prefacio: anuncia la tercera parte, con el límite dicho en la misma frase: las doctrinas hindúes tienen rasgos que las distinguen de las demás orientales, y a la vez bastantes rasgos comunes con ellas para justificar la oposición general.

«Finally, with regard to the Hindu doctrines, we will draw attention to the inadequacy—we might even say the absurdity in some cases—of the interpretations current in the West.» — prefacio: anuncia la cuarta parte sobre lo que llama la insuficiencia, y en algunos casos el absurdo, de las interpretaciones corrientes en Occidente.

«As a conclusion to our survey we will outline, with all necessary precautions, the conditions for an intellectual adjustment between East and West, conditions that are far from being fulfilled on the part of the West, as is only too apparent; but it is merely to a possibility that we wish to draw attention, without going so far as to consider it capable of immediate or even of early fulfillment.» — prefacio: la conclusión anunciada, las condiciones de un ajuste intelectual entre Oriente y Occidente, con la reserva de que solo llama la atención sobre una posibilidad y no la considera de cumplimiento próximo.

«THE FIRST THING to be done in the study we have undertaken is to determine the exact nature of the opposition that divides East and West and, with this object in view, to define the meaning that we think should be attached to the two terms of this opposition.» — parte uno, capítulo Este y Oeste: fija como primera tarea determinar la naturaleza exacta de la oposición que divide a Oriente y Occidente y definir el sentido de los dos términos.

«It may be said as a first rough and ready approximation that for us the East is essentially Asia and the West is essentially Europe; but this in itself requires some further explanation.» — parte uno: la aproximación primera y tosca que propone, Oriente es esencialmente Asia y Occidente esencialmente Europa, y de inmediato dice que requiere explicación.

«When for example we speak of the Western or European mentality, using either of these two terms indifferently, we mean the mentality proper to the European race taken as a whole.» — parte uno: define mentalidad occidental o europea como la propia de la raza europea tomada en conjunto, y usa los dos términos indistintamente.

«We will describe therefore as European anything bound up with this race and we will affix this common denomination to all the individuals issued from it, whatever part of the world they may happen to inhabit: thus Americans and Australians, to mention two cases only, are Europeans from our point of view and come under exactly the same heading as men of the same race who have continued to live in Europe.» — parte uno: extiende el nombre de europeo a todo individuo salido de esa raza sin importar dónde habite, y cuenta por europeos a americanos y australianos.

«It is of course quite plain that the fact of removing oneself to another region or even of having been born there, cannot of itself alter the race nor consequently the mentality belonging to it; and even if a change of environment is liable sooner or later to produce certain modifications, these will only be modifications of quite a secondary kind, not really altering the fundamental characteristics of the race but on the contrary liable even to accentuate some of them.» — parte uno: niega que cambiar de región altere la raza ni la mentalidad, y acota que el cambio de entorno produce modificaciones secundarias, que incluso pueden acentuar rasgos.

«Thus it can easily be seen that certain tendencies which form part of the modern European mentality have in the case of the Americans been pushed to their extreme limit.» — parte uno: y lo ejemplifica diciendo que ciertas tendencias de la mentalidad europea moderna llegaron entre los americanos a su límite extremo.

«If by this is meant a primal race, possessing its original unity and a perfect homogeneity, then the answer is in the negative, because nobody can question the fact that the present population of Europe is made up of a mixture of strains drawn from very different races and that there exist fairly well-marked ethnic differences not only as between one country and another, but even inside each of the national groups themselves.» — parte uno: niega que exista una raza europea primordial con unidad originaria y homogeneidad perfecta, y señala la mezcla de estirpes y las diferencias étnicas dentro de cada grupo nacional.

«However, it is nonetheless true that the European peoples possess enough features in common for it to be possible to distinguish them quite easily from all other peoples; this unity, even though acquired rather than primal, is enough to allow one to speak, as we are doing, of a European race—only this race is naturally less fixed and less stable than a pure one;» — parte uno: sostiene que aun así los pueblos europeos comparten rasgos bastantes para distinguirlos, y llama a esa unidad adquirida y no primordial, menos fija que la de una raza pura.

«Moreover, it is these mental qualities which best characterize European unity such as it is: whatever the original differences may have been in this respect as in others, a mentality common to all the peoples of Europe has been formed little by little in the course of history.» — parte uno: hace de las cualidades mentales lo que mejor caracteriza la unidad europea, y data la formación de esa mentalidad común en el curso de la historia.

«This does not mean that a special mentality does not exist for each of these peoples, but the peculiarities that distinguish them are only of secondary importance when compared with the common foundation on which they appear to rest; they are, in short, as the species of a common genus.» — parte uno: el límite que pone enseguida: cada pueblo tiene mentalidad propia, pero sus peculiaridades son secundarias frente al fondo común, como las especies de un mismo género.

«Nobody, even among those who doubt whether it is permissible to speak of a European race, will hesitate to admit that there exists a European civilization; and a civilization is nothing else than the product and expression of a certain mentality.» — parte uno: aun quien dude de la raza europea admitirá, dice, que existe una civilización europea, y define civilización como producto y expresión de una mentalidad.

«we will simply remark that a number of influences have contributed to its formation, the preponderant one being undoubtedly the Greek, or, if preferred, the Greco-Roman influence.» — parte uno: nombra la influencia preponderante en la formación de la mentalidad europea, la griega o grecorromana.

«As for Roman influence, it is more social than intellectual, and it asserts itself especially in the concepts of the State, of law, and of institutions; besides, intellectually, the Romans borrowed nearly everything from the Greeks, so that it is largely Greek influence that has made itself felt indirectly through the Romans.» — parte uno: la influencia romana la tiene por más social que intelectual, afirmada en las nociones de Estado, derecho e instituciones, y dice que los romanos tomaron de los griegos casi todo lo intelectual.

«One must also note the importance, from the religious point of view especially, of the Judaic influence, which moreover is found similarly present in a section of the East; we have here to do with an element that is extra-European in its origin, though part of it is a constituent of the present European mentality.» — parte uno: añade la influencia judaica en lo religioso, y la llama elemento extraeuropeo por su origen y a la vez constituyente de la mentalidad europea actual.

«If we turn now to the East, it is not possible to speak in the same way of an Eastern or of an Asiatic race, not even with all the reservations we admitted when considering the European race.» — parte uno: niega que quepa hablar de raza oriental o asiática como se habló de la europea, ni siquiera con las reservas ya admitidas.

«an Eastern civilization cannot be said to exist in the same sense as a Western civilization; there are in reality several Eastern ones.» — parte uno: sostiene que no hay una civilización oriental en el sentido en que hay una occidental, sino varias.

«but in spite of everything, if one is less bound by form than by meaning, sufficient common elements, or rather principles, can be found to make it possible to speak of an Eastern mentality as opposed to a Western mentality.» — parte uno: y el criterio con que sostiene igual la oposición: atendiendo menos a la forma que al sentido, halla elementos comunes, o más bien principios, que permiten hablar de una mentalidad oriental.

«When we say that each of the Eastern races has its own particular civilization, that is not absolutely accurate; it is only strictly true of the Chinese race, whose civilization has its real foundation in ethnic unity.» — parte uno: enmienda su propia frase y dice que solo de la raza china es estrictamente cierto que su civilización se funde en la unidad étnica.

«In the case of the other Asiatic civilizations, the principles of unity on which they repose are of an entirely different nature, as will be explained later, and this it is which allows them to embrace in this unity elements belonging to widely differing races.» — parte uno: de las demás civilizaciones asiáticas dice que sus principios de unidad son de otra naturaleza, y que por eso abarcan elementos de razas muy distintas.

«But we must make it clear that, apart from Muslim elements, we do not in any way regard as Easterners the people who inhabit the east of Europe, or even certain districts adjoining Europe: one must not confuse an Easterner with a Levantine, who is rather quite the opposite, and who, at least as far as his mentality is concerned, displays most of the characteristics of a typical Westerner.» — parte uno: distingue al oriental del levantino, a quien atribuye, en cuanto a mentalidad, casi todos los rasgos de un occidental típico.

«The difference is comparable to that existing, in the geographical sense, between Asia and Europe, the second appearing only as a simple prolongation of the first; in the same way, fundamentally, the position of the West in relation to the East is that of a branch growing out of the trunk,» — parte uno: la imagen con que fija la relación entre las dos, Occidente respecto de Oriente como una rama que sale del tronco, como Europa es prolongación de Asia.

«As truth is not for us a question of mere historical fact, it would really seem a matter of small importance to determine the exact source of this or that idea.» — prefacio: como la verdad no es para él cuestión de hecho histórico, declara de poca importancia determinar la fuente exacta de una idea.

«Greek influence is practically supreme, in spite of the appearance of certain special tendencies that are entirely modern and of which we will speak later.» — parte uno, capítulo Este y Oeste: declara la influencia griega prácticamente suprema en lo filosófico y lo científico, salvo por ciertas tendencias enteramente modernas que anuncia para más adelante.

«At a first glance one is bound to be impressed by the disproportion between the two entities which constitute respectively what we have called East and West; though they may stand opposed to one another, there is in reality neither equivalence nor even symmetry between the two terms of the opposition.» — parte uno, capítulo Este y Oeste: señala la desproporción entre las dos entidades y niega que entre los dos términos de la oposición haya equivalencia ni simetría.

«IF WE COMPARE what is usually referred to as classical antiquity with the Eastern civilizations, it will readily be seen that, in some respects at least, it has more in common with those civilizations than modern Europe has.» — parte uno, capítulo La divergencia: sostiene que la antigüedad clásica tiene, al menos en ciertos aspectos, más en común con las civilizaciones orientales que la Europa moderna.

«The differences between East and West seem to have been continually on the increase, but this divergence can be said to have been one-sided in the sense that it is only the West which has changed, whereas the East, broadly speaking, has remained much the same as it was in times that we are accustomed to call ancient, but that nevertheless are comparatively recent.» — parte uno: llama unilateral a la divergencia creciente, porque —dice— solo Occidente ha cambiado mientras Oriente siguió como estaba en tiempos que se acostumbra llamar antiguos.

«Stability—one might even say immutability—is a quality quite commonly conceded to the Eastern civilizations, notably to the Chinese, but it is perhaps not quite so easy to agree on the assessing of this quality.» — parte uno: concede que la estabilidad, o inmutabilidad, se le reconoce comúnmente a las civilizaciones orientales, y de inmediato dice que valorarla es otra cosa.

«profess to see a sign of inferiority in this absence of change, whereas, for our part, we look upon it as a balanced condition which Western civilization has failed to achieve.» — parte uno: a los europeos que creen en el progreso y la evolución les atribuye ver un signo de inferioridad en esa ausencia de cambio, y declara su propia lectura, una condición equilibrada que Occidente no alcanzó.

«Moreover, this stability shows itself in small things as well as in great; a striking example of this is to be found in the fact that ‘fashion’, with its continual changes, is only to be met with in the West.» — parte uno: el ejemplo menor con que lo ilustra, la moda y sus cambios continuos como cosa exclusivamente occidental.

«In short, Westerners, and especially modern Westerners, ap-pear to be endowed with changeable and inconstant natures, hankering after movement and excitement, whereas the Eastern nature shows quite the opposite characteristics.» — parte uno: adjudica al occidental moderno una naturaleza mudable e inconstante, ávida de movimiento y excitación, y a la oriental los rasgos contrarios. El troceo parte *appear* por el guion de fin de renglón dentro de la línea.

«The East would have to be shown as the axis itself and the West as a line starting from the axis and moving further and further away from it, after the fashion of a branch growing out of a trunk, as mentioned before.» — parte uno: el esquema que pone en su lugar, Oriente como el eje mismo y Occidente como línea que arranca de él y se aleja, a la manera de una rama que sale del tronco.

«We are all the more justified in using this symbolism since the West, at least from the outset of the period called historical, insofar as it has had an intellectual life at all, has lived primarily by borrowing from the East, directly or indirectly.» — parte uno: justifica el símbolo diciendo que Occidente, desde el principio del período histórico y en cuanto tuvo vida intelectual, vivió sobre todo de préstamos de Oriente.

«The Greek civilization itself is far from possessing the originality ascribed to it by people of restricted vision, who would willingly go to the length of declaring that the Greeks libelled themselves whenever they happened to acknowledge their debt to Egypt, to Phoenicia, to Chaldea, to Persia, and even to India.» — parte uno: niega a la civilización griega la originalidad que le atribuyen los de visión estrecha, y recuerda que los propios griegos reconocían su deuda con Egipto, Fenicia, Caldea, Persia y aun la India.

«All these civilizations may well be incomparably more ancient than the Greek, but this does not prevent some people, blinded by what may be termed the ‘classical prejudice’, from persistently maintaining the theory, in the face of all the evidence, that it is those other civilizations that are indebted to the Greek and have felt its influence:» — parte uno: nombra el prejuicio clásico, el que sostiene contra toda evidencia que son esas civilizaciones más antiguas las deudoras de la griega.

«It is nevertheless true that the Greeks did possess a certain measure of originality, though not of the kind usually supposed; it was largely confined to the form under which they presented and displayed borrowed ideas, which they altered more or less happily in the process of adapting them to suit their own mentality, so unlike the mentality of the Easterners, and in many respects directly opposed to it.» — parte uno: el límite que pone a su propia objeción: concede a los griegos originalidad, pero la confina a la forma en que presentaron ideas prestadas, alteradas al adaptarlas a su mentalidad.

«Before going any further, it should be explained that we have no wish to dispute the originality of the Hellenic civilization in respect of what appear to us as certain secondary points of view, that of art for example; we only contest its originality from the purely intellectual standpoint, which was moreover much more restricted among the Greeks than among Easterners.» — parte uno: acota qué originalidad griega disputa y cuál no: no la del arte, que llama punto de vista secundario, sino la del plano puramente intelectual.

«Indeed, the study of the East as we know it today, if undertaken in a really direct way, would be of great assistance toward the understanding of all antiquity, on account of that very quality of fixity and stability to which we have referred;» — parte uno: sostiene que el estudio directo del Oriente actual ayudaría a entender toda la antigüedad, y lo funda en esa cualidad de fijeza y estabilidad.

«the contemporary Greeks can hardly lay claim to be the representatives of the ancient Hellenes, of whom they are probably not even lineal descendants.» — parte uno: niega a los griegos contemporáneos la representación de los helenos antiguos, de quienes dice que probablemente ni siquiera descienden en línea directa.

«It should be remembered nevertheless that Greek thought was, in spite of everything, Western in its essence and that it already contained among its other characteristics, the origin and, as it were, the germ of most of those tendencies which developed much later among the modern Westerners.» — parte uno: y el contrapeso que él mismo pone a la analogía: el pensamiento griego era occidental en esencia y contenía el germen de las tendencias que se desarrollaron mucho después entre los modernos.

«whenever they are found to have taken something from the East, it must not be imagined that they completely assimilated it, nor is one justified in concluding that this borrowing denotes identity of thought.» — parte uno: la reserva con que lee todo préstamo de Oriente a los antiguos de Occidente, que lo tomado no se asimiló por completo y que el préstamo no prueba identidad de pensamiento.

«therefore, unless one’s mind has shaken itself free of the Western outlook, even in its ancient form, one will inevitably neglect and misjudge just those aspects of Eastern thought that are the most important» — parte uno: la condición que impone al lector, sacudirse la perspectiva occidental aun en su forma antigua, so pena de desatender justo lo más importante del pensamiento oriental. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«Since it is plain that the ‘greater’ cannot issue from the ‘less’, this one distinction ought to be enough, in the absence of any other consideration, to show to which category a civilization belongs that has borrowed from others.» — parte uno: el principio con que fija la dirección del préstamo, que lo mayor no sale de lo menor, y de ahí deduce a qué categoría pertenece la civilización que tomó de otras.

«To return to the simile we used.a short while back, it must be pointed out that its main defect—natural to all schematic representations—is that it rather oversimplifies matters by representing the divergence as widening continually from the days of antiquity to the present time.» — parte uno: señala el defecto de su propio símil, que simplifica al pintar la divergencia como ensanchamiento continuo desde la antigüedad. El punto pegado sale así del troceo.

«In reality, there have been respites in the divergence, there have even been less remote times when the West again received the direct influence of the East: we allude mainly to the Alexandrian period and to the contributions to European thought during the Middle Ages made by the Arabs, some of which were entirely their own, the rest being derived from India;» — parte uno: nombra las treguas de esa divergencia, el período alejandrino y los aportes de los árabes al pensamiento europeo medieval, unos propios y otros venidos de la India.

«The divergence continued once more with the Renaissance, at which time the rift with the preceding period became very marked; the truth is that this so-called ‘rebirth’ proved to be the death of many things, even in the arts, but above all in an intellectual sense.» — parte uno: data en el Renacimiento la reanudación de la divergencia, y de ese renacimiento dice que resultó la muerte de muchas cosas, sobre todo en sentido intelectual.

«The attempted return to classical antiquity had for its result the diminution of intellectuality, a phenomenon comparable to that which had already occurred at an earlier time in the case of the Greeks themselves, but with this cardinal difference that now it was manifesting itself in the course of the existence of one and the same race and not during the passage of ideas from one people to another.» — parte uno: adjudica al retorno a la antigüedad clásica una disminución de la intelectualidad, y la distingue del caso griego porque ocurrió dentro de una misma raza y no al pasar las ideas de un pueblo a otro.

«It is almost as if the Greeks, at a moment when they were about to disappear from history, wished to avenge themselves for their own incomprehension by imposing on a whole section of mankind the limitations of their own mental horizon.» — parte uno: la figura con que lo dice, como si los griegos se vengaran de su propia incomprensión imponiendo a una parte de la humanidad los límites de su horizonte mental.

«When the Reformation also came to add its influence to that of the Renaissance, with which it was perhaps not altogether unconnected, then the fundamental tendencies of the modern world took definite shape; the French Revolution—which was equivalent to a rejection of all tradition—with all its repercussions in various fields, was bound to follow as a logical consequence of the development of» — parte uno: la serie con que cierra la formación del mundo moderno, Renacimiento, Reforma y Revolución Francesa, a la que llama rechazo de toda tradición. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«it is not our present intention to write a history of the Western mentality, but only to say as much as is necessary to show how greatly it differs from Eastern intellectuality.» — parte uno: acota su propio alcance, que no escribe una historia de la mentalidad occidental sino lo necesario para mostrar cuánto difiere de la intelectualidad oriental.

«We have only one more word to add with regard to the divergence of East and West: will this divergence go on increasing indefinitely? Appearances might lead one to think so, and in the present state of the world the question is one which is undoubtedly open to discussion; nevertheless, for our part, we do not think such a thing possible and we will give our reasons for this opinion at the finish.» — parte uno: deja planteada la pregunta de si la divergencia crecerá indefinidamente, dice que no lo cree posible y aplaza las razones para el final del libro.

«Therefore, if one wished to represent diagrammatically the divergence we are discussing, it would be incorrect to draw two lines» — parte uno, capítulo La divergencia: objeta el esquema de dos líneas divergentes como figura de la divergencia entre Oriente y Occidente. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana, con la nota del editor de por medio.

«WE HAVE ALREADY indicated what we mean by the ‘classical prejudice’: it consists essentially in a predisposition to attribute the origin of all civilization to the Greeks and Romans.» — parte uno, capítulo El prejuicio clásico: define el prejuicio clásico como la predisposición a atribuir a griegos y romanos el origen de toda civilización.

«because their own civilization hardly goes any further back than the Greco-Roman period and derives for the most part from it, Westerners are led to believe that it must have been the same in every other case and they have difficulty in conceiving of the existence of entirely different and far more ancient civilizations; it might be said that they are mentally incapable of crossing the Mediterranean.» — parte uno: la explicación que propone, que teniendo los occidentales una civilización que apenas se remonta al período grecorromano, les cuesta concebir civilizaciones distintas y más antiguas: dice que son mentalmente incapaces de cruzar el Mediterráneo.

«Furthermore, the habit of speaking of ‘civilization’ in the absolute also contributes largely toward maintaining this prejudice. ‘Civilization’, understood in this way and regarded as one entity, is something that has never existed; in actual practice there have always been and there still are ‘civilizations.» — parte uno: objeta hablar de la civilización en absoluto, y sostiene que así entendida nunca existió: lo que ha habido y hay son civilizaciones en plural.

«Western civilization, with its special features, is simply one civilization among others, and what is so pompously called ‘the evolution of civilization’ is nothing more than the development of that particular civilization from its comparatively recent origins, a devel-opment that is moreover far from having always proceeded by a regular and all-round ‘progress’:» — parte uno: reduce la civilización occidental a una entre otras, y a lo que se llama evolución de la civilización, al desarrollo de esa civilización particular, que niega haber procedido por progreso regular. El troceo parte *development* por el guion de fin de renglón.

«As we said before, their originality principally lay in their manner of expressing things, by means of a faculty for adaptation one cannot deny them, but which was necessarily limited by the extent of their comprehension; briefly, their originality was of a purely dialectical order.» — parte uno: cifra la originalidad griega en la manera de expresar y en una facultad de adaptación limitada por su comprensión, y la llama de orden puramente dialéctico.

«Actually, since Greeks and Easterners differed in their characteristic ways of thinking, there were necessarily corresponding differences in the modes of reasoning that they employed; this must always be borne in mind when pointing out certain analogies, real though they be, such as for instance the analogy between the Greek syllogism and what has fairly correctly been called the Hindu syllogism.» — parte uno: advierte que a modos de pensar distintos corresponden modos de razonar distintos, y pone por caso la analogía entre el silogismo griego y el que llama silogismo hindú.

«It cannot even be said that Greek reasoning is distinguished by an exceptional strictness; it only appears stricter than other methods of reasoning to people who are themselves in the habit of employing it exclusively, and this illusion is due solely to the fact that it is restricted to a narrower and more limited field and is therefore more easily defined.» — parte uno: niega al razonamiento griego un rigor excepcional, y atribuye esa impresión a que se lo emplea en exclusiva y a que su campo es más estrecho y por eso más fácil de definir.

«On the contrary, the faculty most truly characteristic of the Greeks, but which is little to their advantage, is a certain dialectical subtlety, of which the dialogues of Plato provide numerous examples; there is an apparent desire to examine each question interminably, under all its aspects and in minutest detail, in order to arrive finally at a rather insignificant conclusion;» — parte uno: la facultad que sí les reconoce, una sutileza dialéctica de la que da por ejemplo los diálogos de Platón, con el examen interminable de cada cuestión para llegar a una conclusión insignificante.

«it would appear that in the West the moderns are not the first people to have been afflicted with ‘intellectual myopia’.» — parte uno: y con el término que usa para los modernos, miopía intelectual, dice que no fueron los primeros en Occidente en padecerla.

«Perhaps, after all, the Greeks should not be blamed too severely for restricting the field of human thought as they have done; on the one hand this was an inevitable result of their mental constitution, for which they cannot be held responsible, and on the other hand they did at least in this way bring within reach of a large part of humanity certain kinds of knowledge that were otherwise in danger of remaining completely foreign to it.» — parte uno: la atenuación que él mismo introduce: no culpa a los griegos por estrechar el campo del pensamiento, porque resultó de su constitución mental y porque así pusieron ciertos conocimientos al alcance de mucha gente.

«In short, the ‘Greek miracle’ as it is called by its enthusiastic admirers, is reduced to something of comparatively small importance, or at least, whenever it implies a fundamentally new departure, this departure is usually in the nature of a degeneration; it stands for the individualization of conceptions, the substitution of the rational for the truly intellectual, and of the scientific or philosophical for the metaphysical point of view.» — parte uno: reduce el llamado milagro griego a poca cosa y describe su novedad como degeneración: individualización de las concepciones, sustitución de lo intelectual por lo racional y de lo metafísico por lo científico o filosófico.

«it might even be said that, in this respect, they assigned a less pure and disinterested purpose to knowledge, because their turn of mind only allowed them to remain within the domain of principles with some difficulty and as though by exception.» — parte uno: atribuye a los griegos un fin menos puro y desinteresado del conocimiento, porque su giro mental apenas les permitía permanecer en el dominio de los principios.

«This inclination toward the ‘practical’ in the most ordinary sense of the word is one of those factors that were fated to become increasingly marked during the course of Western civilization, until in modern times the tendency became frankly predominant. Only the Middle Ages, being much more given to pure speculation, can be said to have escaped it.» — parte uno: traza la inclinación a lo práctico como factor creciente de la civilización occidental hasta predominar en los tiempos modernos, y exceptúa a la Edad Media, más dada a la especulación pura.

«As a general rule, Westerners have very little natural aptitude for metaphysics; a comparison of their languages with those of the Easterners would alone be sufficient to prove this point, provided of course that philologists were really capable of understanding the spirit of the languages they studied.» — parte uno: adjudica a los occidentales poca aptitud natural para la metafísica, y dice que bastaría comparar sus lenguas con las orientales, a condición de que los filólogos entendieran el espíritu de las lenguas que estudian.

«On the other hand, Easterners show a strongly marked tendency to disregard applications. This is quite understandable, because anyone who above everything else cultivates the knowledge of universal principles can only take a lukewarm interest in special sciences, bestowing upon them at the most a passing curiosity, which would anyway be unlikely to call forth a large number of discoveries in this order of ideas.» — parte uno: la contraparte, la tendencia oriental a desatender las aplicaciones, que deriva de que quien cultiva el conocimiento de los principios universales solo puede interesarse tibiamente en las ciencias particulares.

«at most, the observation of facts can occasionally provide an example to illustrate, but in no way to prove, a theory, and any belief to the contrary is to labor under a grave delusion.» — parte uno: acota el alcance que concede a la observación, ilustrar una teoría y en ningún caso probarla, y llama grave engaño creer lo contrario.

«Thus the magnitude of the gap separating Eastern ‘knowledge’ from Western ‘research’ becomes strikingly apparent; all the same, it remains an astonishing thing that research can have come to be regarded by Westerners as an end in itself, quite independently of any possible results.» — parte uno: mide la distancia entre el conocimiento oriental y la investigación occidental, y llama asombroso que la investigación haya llegado a tenerse por fin en sí misma.

«Another point that should not be overlooked and that appears as a corollary of what has gone before, is that no one in the world has ever shown less inclination than the Easterners to follow the cult of nature, as it was followed in Greco-Roman times, since for them nature has always meant the world of appearances; appearances no doubt possess a reality of their own, but it is only transitory and impermanent, contingent and not universal.» — parte uno: niega a los orientales inclinación al culto de la naturaleza al modo grecorromano, porque para ellos la naturaleza es el mundo de las apariencias, con realidad propia pero transitoria y contingente.

«Therefore, to men who are metaphysicians by temperament, ‘naturalism’, in the many guises it is capable of assuming, only appears as an aberration, or even as a positive intellectual monstrosity.» — parte uno: y lo que el naturalismo le parece a quien es metafísico por temperamento, una aberración y aun una monstruosidad intelectual.

«It must however be admitted that the Greeks, in spite of their tendency toward naturalism, never went so far as to attach to experimentation the excessive importance that the moderns have given to it.» — parte uno: el límite que concede a los griegos: pese a su naturalismo, no dieron al experimento la importancia excesiva que le dieron los modernos.

«One finds throughout antiquity, even in the West, a certain attitude of contempt toward experiment, which would be difficult to explain unless it be taken as revealing a trace of Eastern influence.» — parte uno: en el desdén antiguo por el experimento, también en Occidente, lee un rastro de influencia oriental.

«In any case this does not alter the fact that in a certain sense one can already observe among the Greeks the point of departure of the experimental sciences as understood by the moderns, wherein the ‘practical’ tendency is linked to the ‘naturalistic’ tendency, neither of them being able to reach full development except at the expense of pure thought and disinterested knowledge.» — parte uno: sitúa ya entre los griegos el punto de partida de las ciencias experimentales modernas, donde la tendencia práctica se liga a la naturalista, y ninguna se desarrolla sino a costa del pensamiento puro.

«Thus, the fact that Easterners never devoted themselves to certain special branches of science is in no wise a sign of inferiority; from the intellectual point of view indeed it is quite the reverse, for it is nothing but the normal consequence of the fact that, in their case, their main activity was turned in another direction and toward totally different ends.» — parte uno: niega que el no haberse dedicado a ciertas ramas de la ciencia sea signo de inferioridad de los orientales, y lo llama consecuencia normal de tener la actividad vuelta hacia otros fines.

«It is precisely the different ways in which the mental activity of man can be exercised that stamp each civilization with its own particular character, by determining the basic direction of its development; here also lies the explanation of the illusion of progress among those who, being acquainted with one kind of civilization only, can conceive of no other line of development than their own, believing it to be the only way possible, so that they take no account of the fact that a development in one sense may be largely counterbalanced by retrogression in another.» — parte uno: hace de la dirección de la actividad mental lo que marca a cada civilización, y ahí sitúa la ilusión de progreso de quien, conociendo una sola, no ve que un desarrollo en un sentido puede compensarse con un retroceso en otro.

«If we turn to the intellectual order, which alone is essential to the Eastern civilizations, it will be seen that there are at least two reasons for thinking that the Greeks must have borrowed almost everything pertaining to that order from those civilizations, that is to say whatever is of real value in their conceptions:» — parte uno: enuncia las dos razones por las que sostiene que los griegos tomaron de las civilizaciones orientales casi todo lo intelectual.

«one we have hitherto stressed, follows from the rather limited aptitude of the Greek mentality in this respect; the other is that Hellenic civilization is of a much more recent date than the principal Eastern civilizations.» — parte uno: las dos razones dichas, la aptitud limitada de la mentalidad griega en ese orden y la fecha mucho más reciente de la civilización helénica.

«To the impartial observer it is plain that the Greeks, from the intellectual point of view at least, really borrowed very largely from» — parte uno, capítulo El prejuicio clásico: sostiene ante el observador imparcial que los griegos tomaron mucho de los orientales en el plano intelectual. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana y sigue en la 35 con que ellos mismos lo admitían.

«however unveracious they may have been at times, on this point at least they cannot have lied, for they had no possible interest in doing so, indeed quite the contrary.» — parte uno: el argumento con que respalda ese testimonio griego, que por mentirosos que fueran a veces, en ese punto no tenían interés en mentir.

«It is easy to realize the truth of this if one considers what Westerners are capable of today, when they happen to come into direct contact with certain Eastern conceptions and set about interpreting them in a manner conforming to their own particular mentality: anything they cannot connect» — parte uno: lo ilustra con lo que hacen hoy los occidentales al topar con concepciones orientales e interpretarlas conforme a su mentalidad. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«with the ‘classical’ idiom escapes them completely, and whatever can be made to tally with it, by hook or by crook, is so disfigured in the process that it becomes almost unrecognizable.» — parte uno: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: lo que no se deja conectar con el idioma clásico se les escapa, y lo que fuerzan a encajar queda casi irreconocible.

«When one knows as a mathematical certainty, or one might even say as a more-than-mathematical certainty, that things cannot be otherwise than what they are, one becomes as a matter of course disdainful of» — parte uno: funda el desdén por el experimento en saber con certeza más que matemática que las cosas no pueden ser otras de lo que son. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«experiment, because the verifying of a particular fact, whatever its nature, never proves anything more or anything different from the mere existence of that particular fact;» — parte uno: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: verificar un hecho particular no prueba nada más que la existencia de ese hecho.

«It would otherwise be rather difficult to account for this attitude on the part of the Greeks, whose preoccupations were hardly metaphysical in character and for whom esthetic considerations very often took the place of the deeper reasons which escaped them.» — parte uno: a los griegos les atribuye preocupaciones poco metafísicas y considerandos estéticos en lugar de las razones más hondas que se les escapaban.

«therefore these esthetic considerations which are usually invoked in order to explain their lack of interest in experiment, though we ourselves believe that there were other operative causes, at least in earlier times.» — parte uno: dice que son esas consideraciones estéticas las que se suelen invocar para explicar el desinterés griego por el experimento, y declara creer en otras causas, al menos en tiempos más antiguos.

«This is particularly true of India, although whenever any connection between the two civilizations can be authenticated, some persons push the ‘classical prejudice’ to the point of declaring a priori that this connection must be due to Greek influence.» — parte uno, capítulo El prejuicio clásico: señala que ante cualquier conexión autenticada entre India y Grecia hay quien lleva el prejuicio clásico hasta declarar a priori que la conexión se debe a influencia griega.

«However, if an influence of this sort was ever in fact felt by Hindu civilization, this could only have occurred very late, and the effects must» — parte uno: y su respuesta, que de haber existido tal influencia sobre la civilización hindú sería muy tardía. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«For instance, it is possible to admit the existence of an occasional artistic influence, though even from this special point of view Hindu conceptions always remained very different from those of the Greeks;» — parte uno: concede una influencia artística ocasional, con el límite dicho en la misma frase, que aun en ese punto las concepciones hindúes siguieron siendo muy distintas de las griegas.

«but in any case, unmistakable traces of such an influence are only to be found in a certain period of the Buddhist civilization, extremely restricted both in space and in time; moreover, this civilization is not to be confused with Hindu civilization proper.» — parte uno: acota los rastros de esa influencia a un período muy restringido de la civilización budista, y distingue esa civilización de la hindú propiamente dicha.

«THERE EXISTS A FAIRLY WIDESPREAD BELIEF that relations between Greece and India did not begin, or rather did not assume appreciable importance, until the time of Alexander’s conquests;» — parte uno, capítulo Relaciones entre los pueblos de la antigüedad: enuncia la creencia difundida que va a objetar, que las relaciones entre Grecia y la India no tuvieron importancia apreciable hasta las conquistas de Alejandro.

«whatever can unmistakably be assigned to an earlier date is therefore simply put down to casual resemblances between the two civilizations, while anything which arose or is supposed to have arisen later is naturally said to be the result of Greek influence, to meet the requirements of the peculiar logic inherent in the ‘classical prejudice’.» — parte uno: describe la lógica que atribuye al prejuicio clásico, lo anterior se atribuye a semejanzas casuales y lo posterior a influencia griega.

«Here again we encounter an opinion which, like so many others, is devoid of serious foundation, because intercourse between the peoples of antiquity, even when they lived great distances apart, was much more general than is usually supposed.» — parte uno: niega fundamento serio a esa opinión y sostiene que el trato entre los pueblos de la antigüedad, aun a gran distancia, era mucho más general de lo que se supone.

«On the whole, communications were then not much more difficult than they were no more than a century or two ago, or, to be exact, until the invention of railways and steamships;» — parte uno: data el corte de las comunicaciones en la invención del ferrocarril y el vapor, y sostiene que antes de eso no eran mucho más difíciles que un siglo o dos atrás.

«travel in earlier times, no doubt, was less frequent and above all less rapid than in our time, but people traveled more profitably because they gave themselves time to study the countries they visited; often journeys were undertaken with the sole purpose of carrying out such studies and for the intellectual benefits to be derived from them.» — parte uno: concede que se viajaba menos y más despacio, y a la vez con más provecho, porque se daba tiempo de estudiar los países y a veces se viajaba solo para eso.

«This being the case, there are no plausible reasons for treating the accounts of the travels of Greek philosophers as ‘legends’, the less so as these travels explain many things which would otherwise remain incomprehensible.» — parte uno: niega razón plausible para tener por leyendas los relatos de los viajes de los filósofos griegos, y dice que esos viajes explican muchas cosas.

«The fact we are referring to is the adoption around the whole of the Mediterranean basin of a common basic type of coinage, with variations of a secondary nature, serving as local distinguishing marks;» — parte uno: la prueba que aduce, la adopción en toda la cuenca del Mediterráneo de un tipo básico común de moneda, con variaciones secundarias por marca local.

«People have tried to interpret this fact as a simple imitation of Greek coinage, which accidentally found its way into distant countries; this is another example of the exaggerated importance they are always inclined to attribute to the Greeks, and it is also an example of the unfortunate tendency to treat as an accident everything that cannot be explained, as if ‘accident’ were anything but a word used in order to disguise our ignorance of real causes.» — parte uno: objeta que se lea ese hecho como imitación de la moneda griega, y llama a accidente una palabra con que se disfraza la ignorancia de las causas reales.

«What appears certain is that the common monetary type in question, of which the essential characteristic is that it bears a human head on one side and a horse or a chariot on the other, is not more specifically Greek than it is Italic or Carthaginian, or even Gallic or Iberian; its adoption must surely have demanded a more or less explicit agreement between the several Mediterranean peoples, even though the modalities of that agreement must needs escape us.» — parte uno: describe el tipo monetario, cabeza humana de un lado y caballo o carro del otro, lo declara no más griego que itálico, cartaginés, galo o ibérico, y de él infiere un acuerdo entre los pueblos mediterráneos.

«What is true of this monetary type is also true of certain symbols and traditions that are found again and again, unaltered and spread throughout still wider areas;» — parte uno: extiende el mismo argumento a ciertos símbolos y tradiciones que reaparecen sin alterarse en áreas aún más amplias.

«moreover, if no one denies that continuous relations were maintained between the Greek colonies and their parent cities, why should such doubt be felt about relations carried on between the Greeks and other peoples?» — parte uno: el argumento a fortiori con que cierra: si nadie niega la relación continua entre las colonias griegas y sus metrópolis, pregunta por qué se duda de la relación con otros pueblos.

«In order to gauge the significance of the facts we have indicated, though we have used them only by way of illustration, it must be added that commercial exchanges could never have been carried on continuously without being accompanied sooner or later by exchanges of quite another order, and more especially by intellectual exchanges;» — parte uno: sostiene que el intercambio comercial continuado trae tarde o temprano intercambios de otro orden, y sobre todo intelectuales.

«in certain instances it may even have happened that economic relations, far from taking first place, as they do with the modern peoples, occupied a position of more or less secondary importance.» — parte uno: y su reverso, que en ciertos casos las relaciones económicas, lejos de ir primero como entre los modernos, ocupaban un lugar secundario.

«The tendency to refer everything to the economic standpoint, whether it concerns the internal life of a country or its international relations, is actually quite a modern one; the ancient peoples, even in the West, with the possible exception of the Phoenicians, did not look on things in this light, neither do Easterners even today.» — parte uno: data como moderna la tendencia a referirlo todo al punto de vista económico, y exceptúa a los antiguos, con la posible salvedad de los fenicios, y a los orientales de hoy.

«Here we will take the opportunity of pointing out again how dangerous it always is to try, by the light of one’s own personal point of view, to arrive at an appreciation of human beings whose circumstances and mentality are different, being otherwise situated in time and space, and who therefore certainly never did adopt that point of view and could not have had any possible reason for doing so; nevertheless, this is an error only too frequently committed by the students of antiquity and it is also one, as we said at the beginning, which orientalists never fail to commit.» — parte uno: repite el aviso metodológico, que juzgar desde el punto de vista propio a hombres de otra época y mentalidad es error frecuente entre los estudiosos de la antigüedad y constante entre los orientalistas.

«To return to our starting-point: the fact that the earliest of the Greek philosophers lived several centuries before the period of Alexander does not in any way authorize us to conclude that they knew nothing about the Hindu doctrines.» — parte uno: niega que vivir siglos antes de Alejandro autorice a concluir que los primeros filósofos griegos no supieran nada de las doctrinas hindúes.

«To quote one example, atomism, long before it appeared in Greece, was upheld in India by the school of Kanada and later by Jains and Buddhists; it is possible that it was brought to the West by the Phoenicians, as certain traditions seem to suggest,» — parte uno: el ejemplo que da, el atomismo sostenido en la India por la escuela de Kanada y después por jainas y budistas, con la hipótesis de que llegó a Occidente por los fenicios.

«The early Greek philosophers may even have been acquainted not only with the Hindu but also with the Buddhist doctrines, for they certainly did not live earlier than Buddhism.» — parte uno: extiende el posible conocimiento de los primeros griegos a las doctrinas budistas, fundándolo en que no vivieron antes del budismo.

«Furthermore, Buddhism soon spread outside India into Asiatic regions lying nearer to Greece, which were therefore more accessible; this circumstance would appear to strengthen the argument, which is quite a tenable one, that borrowings were made chiefly, though not exclusively, from the Buddhist civilization.» — parte uno: refuerza esa hipótesis con la difusión temprana del budismo hacia regiones asiáticas más cercanas a Grecia, de donde se habrían hecho los préstamos principales.

«What is Curious in any case is that the points of resemblance that can be established with the doctrines of India are much more striking and numerous in the pre-Socratic age than in subsequent periods.» — parte uno: el dato que opone al prejuicio clásico, que las semejanzas con las doctrinas de la India son más numerosas en la edad presocrática que después. La mayúscula de *Curious* sale así del troceo.

«They do not in fact appear to have introduced any Hindu influences, except that contained in the logic of Aristotle—to which we have already alluded in connection with his syllogism—and also in the metaphysical part of the same philosopher’s work, in which it is possible to point to intellectual affinities with India far too close to be purely accidental.» — parte uno: reduce el papel de las conquistas de Alejandro a dos rastros, la lógica de Aristóteles y la parte metafísica de su obra, donde ve afinidades con la India demasiado estrechas para ser accidentales.

«If, with the object of safeguarding the originality of the Greek philosophers at all costs, the objection is put forward that there exists an intellectual fund common to all humanity, it is nonetheless true that the existence of this fund is something too general and vague to provide a satisfactory explanation for likenesses that are both close and clearly-defined:» — parte uno: objeta al fondo intelectual común de la humanidad que se alega para salvar la originalidad griega, por ser demasiado general y vago para explicar semejanzas estrechas y definidas.

«besides, differences of mentality in many cases go much further than is supposed by those who have only known one human type; between Greeks and Hindus especially, these differences were considerable.» — parte uno: y añade que las diferencias de mentalidad van más lejos de lo que supone quien conoce un solo tipo humano, y entre griegos e hindúes las llama considerables.

«Such an explanation only holds good when it is a question of two comparable civilizations that have developed in the same direction, though independently of one another, producing conceptions that are fundamentally the same, however unlike they may appear in form; this is the case with the metaphysical doctrines of China and India.» — parte uno: acota cuándo sí vale ese argumento, entre civilizaciones comparables desarrolladas en el mismo sentido e independientemente, y pone por caso las doctrinas metafísicas de China y la India.

«But even within these limits, it would perhaps be more convincing to recognize in this concordance the results of an identity of primordial traditions,» — parte uno: y aun ahí propone otra explicación, la identidad de tradiciones primordiales, que dice obligada allí donde se observa el uso común de los mismos símbolos.

«After Aristotle, the signs of Hindu influence on Greek philosophy become more and more rare, even to the point of disappearing, because that philosophy shut itself up in an increasingly limited and contingent sphere, ever further removed from any real intellectuality, and this sphere was for the most part that of ethics, which is concerned with questions that have always been quite foreign to the Easterners.» — parte uno: data después de Aristóteles la desaparición de los signos de influencia hindú, y la explica por el encierro de esa filosofía en la ética, asunto que declara ajeno a los orientales.

«It was only among the Neoplatonists that Eastern influences were again to make their appearance, and it is there indeed that certain metaphysical ideas, such as that of the Infinite, are to be met with for the first time among the Greeks.» — parte uno: sitúa entre los neoplatónicos la reaparición de las influencias orientales y la primera presencia entre los griegos de ideas metafísicas como la del Infinito.

«Until then, in fact, the Greeks had only possessed the notion of the indefinite, and ‘finished’ and ‘perfect’ were synonymous terms for them—a particularly characteristic trait of their mentality; for the Easterners on the contrary it is the Infinite which is identical with Perfection.» — parte uno: el contraste con que lo mide: los griegos solo tenían la noción de lo indefinido y hacían sinónimos *acabado* y *perfecto*, mientras que para los orientales el Infinito se identifica con la Perfección.

«Such is the gulf that separates a philosophic conception, in the European sense of the word, from a metaphysical idea;» — parte uno: nombra el abismo que ahí ve, el que separa una concepción filosófica en sentido europeo de una idea metafísica.

«development of which the moderns are far from forming a correct picture, and this state of things was normal and regular, quite apart from migrations of peoples, which doubtless only took place intermittently and under exceptional circumstances.» — parte uno: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: declara normal y regular ese estado, y lo distingue de las migraciones de pueblos, que sitúa como intermitentes y excepcionales.

«this doctrine, or at least to formulate it clearly, had traveled in Egypt, Persia, and India.» — parte uno: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: a Demócrito, de los primeros griegos en formular con claridad el atomismo, le atribuyen viajes por Egipto, Persia y la India.

«QUESTIONS OF CHRONOLOGY are among those which perplex orientalists most, and their embarrassment is usually not without justification; but they are mistaken on the one hand in attaching such enormous importance to these questions, and on the other hand in believing that they can solve them for certain by resorting to their usual methods, whereas in actual fact the conclusions they arrive at amount to so many more or less fanciful hypotheses, over which they are far from reaching any agreement even among themselves.» — parte uno, capítulo Cuestiones de cronología: concede que las cuestiones de cronología desconciertan con razón a los orientalistas, y les objeta dos cosas, darles importancia enorme y creerlas resueltas por sus métodos, que dan hipótesis en las que ni entre ellos coinciden.

«Such a case, for instance, is that of documents like the old Chinese annals, which contain an accurate description of the state of the heavens at the time to which they refer; the calculations for determining their exact date, based as they are on indisputable astronomical data, leave no room for any doubt.» — parte uno: el caso que declara sin dificultad, los antiguos anales chinos, cuya descripción del estado del cielo permite datarlos por cálculo astronómico.

«The claim to intellectual originality, which has played a considerable part in calling the schools of philosophy into being, is, even among Westerners, quite a modern tendency, which in the Middle Ages was still unknown;» — parte uno: data como moderna, y desconocida aún en la Edad Media, la pretensión de originalidad intelectual que dice haber hecho nacer las escuelas de filosofía.

«Moreover, to add to the difficulty, it must be pointed out that there exists in India, as also no doubt in some of the vanished civilizations, a system of chronology or, to be more exact, something having the appearance of chronology, that is based on symbolical numbers, which must not be taken as literally representing numbers of years; and is not something analogous to be met with even in biblical chronology?» — parte uno: describe en la India algo con apariencia de cronología basado en números simbólicos que no representan años, y remite por analogía a la cronología bíblica.

«This so-called chronology, however, is really meant to apply to cosmic and not to historical periods; a confusion of the two should be impossible unless it be as a result of astonishing ignorance; nevertheless it must be recognized that orientalists have only too frequently fallen into errors of this kind.» — parte uno: aplica esa cronología a períodos cósmicos y no históricos, y adjudica a los orientalistas haber caído a menudo en esa confusión.

«Among these same orientalists there is noticeable a common tendency to try to discount the antiquity of the civilizations they are dealing with as far as they possibly can, often beyond all reason, as if they feel embarrassed by the fact that these civilizations had been able to exist and were already in a full state of development in such remote ages, long before the earliest origins that can be claimed for our present civilization or rather for those civilizations from which it is directly derived; this seems to be the only excuse for their preconceived ideas on the subject—a lame excuse indeed.» — parte uno: atribuye a los orientalistas la tendencia a rebajar la antigüedad de las civilizaciones que estudian, y la explica por el estorbo que les supone que ya estuvieran desarrolladas en épocas remotas.

«thus for instance, an attempt was made to advance the date of the Hebraic Kabbalah in such a manner as to suggest that Alexandrian and Neoplatonist influences had been at work there, whereas it is most certainly the opposite that took place.» — parte uno: el ejemplo que da fuera del Extremo Oriente, el intento de adelantar la fecha de la cábala hebrea para sugerirle influencias alejandrinas y neoplatónicas, y sostiene que ocurrió lo contrario.

«Nevertheless, Plato, whose evidence ought not to be doubted in this connection, was not afraid of recording in his Timaeus that the Egyptians looked on the Greeks ‘as children’;» — parte uno: cita a Platón, cuyo testimonio dice no dudoso en esto, por lo que consigna en el Timeo, que los egipcios veían a los griegos como niños.

«However, we can recall an occasion when just this same opinion was expressed by a Hindu who, on hearing the ideas of certain Western philosophers expounded for the first time, was so far from being impressed that he declared them fit, at best, for a child of eight years.» — parte uno: el testimonio contemporáneo que le suma, el de un hindú que al oír por primera vez las ideas de ciertos filósofos occidentales las declaró buenas a lo sumo para un niño de ocho años.

«Anyone who feels that we unduly belittle the part played by the Greeks by presenting them entirely in the part of ‘adapters’ might object that we are not acquainted with all their ideas and that there are many things that have not come down to us.» — parte uno: se plantea a sí mismo la objeción, que al presentar a los griegos como adaptadores se olvida cuánto de sus ideas no ha llegado hasta nosotros.

«In certain respects, no doubt, this is true, particularly as regards the oral teachings of the philosophers; but is not what we do know of their ideas amply sufficient to enable us to judge of the remainder?» — parte uno: la concede en cuanto a la enseñanza oral de los filósofos, y responde preguntando si lo conocido no basta para juzgar del resto.

«moreover, according to the written teachings we possess, there are at least strong reasons for supposing that the corresponding oral teaching, precisely insofar as it contained something special and ‘esoteric’, that is to say something of a more inward nature, was even more strongly inspired by the East, to which it must in many ways have been related.» — parte uno: sostiene que la enseñanza oral griega, en lo que tenía de esotérico y más interior, estaba aún más inspirada por el Oriente.

«Indeed the very inwardness of that teaching cannot but provide a confirmation of the fact that it had remained nearer to its sources and was less deformed than the other teachings of the time, because it had been less adapted to the general mentality of the Greek people; otherwise its comprehension would clearly not have demanded a special training, above all a training so long and arduous as that, for example, in force in the Pythagorean schools.» — parte uno: lee en la interioridad de esa enseñanza el indicio de que había quedado más cerca de sus fuentes por estar menos adaptada a la mentalidad general griega, y pone por caso el entrenamiento de las escuelas pitagóricas.

«Besides, archaeologists and orientalists would hardly be in a position to contradict us by invoking an oral teaching, or even lost works, since the ‘historical method’ of which they are so enamored has, as its essential characteristic, the consideration only of visible» — parte uno: objeta que arqueólogos y orientalistas puedan invocar una enseñanza oral, porque el método histórico que profesan solo considera lo visible. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«monuments and of documents that can be handled; and it is here precisely that we see the ‘historical method’ revealed in all its insufficiency.» — parte uno: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: el método histórico solo atiende monumentos visibles y documentos manipulables, y ahí ve su insuficiencia.

«It may quite easily happen that older manuscripts of the same work are found later, and moreover, even if none such are discovered, it is not right to conclude that none are extant, nor, with all the more reason, that none have ever existed.» — parte uno: y su corolario, que de no hallarse manuscritos más viejos no se sigue que no existan ni, menos aún, que nunca hayan existido.

«Furthermore, in a civilization that has lasted down to our own time, it is hardly likely that such books as still remain will be abandoned to the chances of an archaeological discovery, as might have occurred in the case of an extinct civilization;» — parte uno: sostiene que en una civilización viva los libros que quedan no se abandonan al azar del hallazgo arqueológico, como podría ocurrir con una extinta.

«nor on the other hand is there any reason to believe that their custodians would one day feel themselves compelled to part with them for the benefit of learned Westerners, all the less so as there may be a special interest, on which we will not dwell at present, attaching to their preservation compared with which curiosity, even when garnished with the epithet of ‘scientific, is of very little account.» — parte uno: niega razón para creer que los custodios de esos libros se sientan obligados a entregarlos a eruditos occidentales, y opone al interés de su conservación una curiosidad que llama de muy poca cuenta aunque se adorne de científica.

«even without accidents, old manuscripts can disappear in quite a natural and so to speak normal fashion, simply as the result of wear and tear;» — parte uno: añade la desaparición natural de los manuscritos viejos por puro desgaste, sin accidente de por medio.

«A particularly good idea of this process can be obtained by observing what takes place constantly in the Islamic world: a manuscript circulates and is transferred according to requirements from one center of learning to another, often in very remote localities, until it is so badly damaged by use that it becomes practically unserviceable; a copy is then made, as accurately as possible, and this copy will henceforth take the place of the older manuscript and will be used in the same way, itself to replaced by another when it has deteriorated in its turn, and so on indefinitely.» — parte uno: describe el ciclo que dice observable en el mundo islámico, el manuscrito que circula entre centros de estudio hasta inutilizarse, se copia, y la copia lo sustituye hasta deteriorarse a su vez. La forma *to replaced* sale así del troceo.

«These successive replacements may certainly prove a great hindrance to the special researches of the orientalists; but those engaged on this kind of work give no thought to any such considerations, and even if they were conscious of them, they would certainly not consent to alter their habits for so unimportant a reason.» — parte uno: adjudica a esas sustituciones sucesivas el estorbo de las investigaciones orientalistas, y a los investigadores el no pensar en ellas ni cambiar de hábitos por eso.

«There is yet another fact that the partisans of the ‘historical method’ could hardly take into account without finding themselves in disagreement with their own tenets; it is that oral teaching almost everywhere preceded written teaching and that it has been the only method of teaching in use for periods of possibly very long duration, though it may be difficult to determine their exact length.» — parte uno: el hecho que dice incompatible con el método histórico, que la enseñanza oral precedió casi en todas partes a la escrita y fue la única durante períodos muy largos.

«In a general way and in most instances a traditional text is no more than a recording, at a relatively recent date, of a teaching that was originally transmitted by word of mouth and to which an author can rarely be assigned;» — parte uno: define el texto tradicional como registro relativamente reciente de una enseñanza transmitida de viva voz, a la que rara vez cabe asignar un autor.

«thus even were one entirely certain of being in possession of the original manuscript—though there is perhaps actually no recorded case of this having happened» — parte uno: y el límite que le pone al dato del manuscrito original, que aun teniéndolo quedaría por saber cuánto duró la transmisión oral previa. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«Unfortunately this case is not general, in fact it can almost be called exceptional, and other documents, Hindu documents in particular, provide nothing of the kind as a guide to research, which merely goes to show, however, that their authors were not in the least interested in ‘dating themselves’ for the purpose of establishing a priority of one kind or another.» — parte uno, capítulo Cuestiones de cronología: los documentos hindúes no dan ese apoyo astronómico, y de ello no deduce una falta sino un desinterés, que a sus autores no les importaba datarse para reclamar prioridad.

«and the biographical particulars of those who expounded or interpreted them are of minimal importance.» — parte uno: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: declara de mínima importancia los datos biográficos de quienes expusieron o interpretaron esas doctrinas.

«The reason for this confusion resides, as usual, in the fact that it is agreed a priori that everything must have come from the Greeks, that it is the Greeks who held the monopoly of knowledge in antiquity, just as the Europeans imagine thernselves to possess it» — parte uno: la razón que adjudica a esa confusión, el acuerdo previo de que todo vino de los griegos, tenidos por monopolistas del saber antiguo. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana; *thernselves* sale así del troceo.

«today, and that they were the appointed educators of humanity— just as these same Europeans claim to be at the present moment— and the fountain of its inspiration.» — parte uno: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: a los griegos se los tiene por educadores designados de la humanidad y fuente de su inspiración, como —añade— los europeos de hoy se tienen a sí mismos.

«if the manuscript of a certain work is discovered, the date of which is ascertainable by one means or another, then this undoubtedly proves that the work in question is not of a later date; but that is all, and the possibility of the work having originally been composed much earlier is in no wise excluded.» — parte uno: el límite lógico que fija al dato del manuscrito fechado, que la obra no sea posterior, sin que quede excluido que sea muy anterior.

«This rooted preference for oral teaching may have been due to various causes and therefore does not necessarily imply the absence of writing, the origin of which is certainly extremely remote, at any» — parte uno, capítulo Cuestiones de cronología: niega que la preferencia por la enseñanza oral implique ausencia de escritura, cuyo origen declara remotísimo. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«It is known, for instance, that the teaching of the Druids always remained entirely oral, even at a time when the Gauls were certainly acquainted with writing, since they made free use of a Greek alphabet in their commercial relations;» — parte uno: el caso de los druidas, cuya enseñanza dice enteramente oral aun cuando los galos conocían la escritura y usaban un alfabeto griego en el comercio.

«moreover, the Druidic teaching left no authentic traces, and the most one can do perhaps is to piece together, as best one can, a few very sparse fragments.» — parte uno: y el resultado que consigna, que la enseñanza druídica no dejó rastros auténticos y a lo sumo se recomponen fragmentos escasísimos.

«It would however be a mistake to suppose that oral transmission was bound, in the long run, to alter the teaching: given the importance attaching to its integral preservation, there is on the contrary every reason for thinking that all necessary precautions were taken in order that it might be maintained uncorrupted, not only in its essence but even in its form;» — parte uno: niega que la transmisión oral altere a la larga la enseñanza, y lo funda en las precauciones que supone tomadas para mantenerla incorrupta en esencia y en forma.

«one may also realize how this preservation is perfectly possible by observing what occurs even today among all the Eastern peoples, for whom the written record has by no means entailed the suppression of oral tradition, for they have never considered it an entirely adequate substitute.» — parte uno: apoya esa preservación en lo que dice observable hoy entre los pueblos orientales, donde el registro escrito no suprimió la tradición oral porque no se la tiene por sustituto adecuado.

«Curiously enough, it is commonly recognized that certain works were not written down at the moment of their composition; for example this is admitted in the case of the Homeric epics in classical antiquity and of the heroic poems of the Middle Ages;» — parte uno: señala que se admite sin problema para las epopeyas homéricas y los poemas heroicos medievales que no se escribieron al componerse.

«why then are people unwilling to admit this when it is no longer a question of works referring merely to the literary order but to the purely intellectual order, where oral transmission rests on much more profound reasons?» — parte uno: y pregunta por qué no se admite lo mismo cuando la obra no es del orden literario sino del puramente intelectual, donde la transmisión oral descansa en razones más hondas.

«There is nothing unnatural in this: are not present-day Europeans often in the habit of giving names borrowed from their own country to towns they have founded in their colonies or to other geographical features they may come across there?» — parte uno: apoya esa posibilidad en la costumbre europea de dar a las ciudades fundadas en las colonias nombres traídos del país propio.

«It has sometimes been debated whether the Hellas of the Homeric age actually was the Greece of more recent times or whether biblical Palestine really was the land we still refer to by that name; discussions of this kind are perhaps not as pointless as is generally supposed, and it is at least justifiable to ask the question even if, as in the two examples just cited, it seems fairly probable that the answer should be given in the affirmative.» — parte uno: recoge las discusiones sobre si la Hélade homérica era la Grecia posterior o si la Palestina bíblica es la tierra así llamada hoy, las declara no tan ociosas y admite que en esos dos casos la respuesta afirmativa parece probable.

«On the other hand, in the case of Vedic India, there are many reasons for giving a negative reply to a question of this kind. The ancestors of the Hindus, at a time which remains undetermined, must have inhabited a very northerly region, since, according to certain texts, there were occasions when the sun circled the horizon without setting;» — parte uno: para la India védica da razones de respuesta negativa, y sitúa a los antepasados de los hindúes en una región muy septentrional, apoyándose en textos donde el sol gira por el horizonte sin ponerse.

«THE MOST SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES standing in the way of any correct interpretation of Eastern doctrines are those arising from the essential differences between Eastern and Western ways of thinking; we have already touched upon this matter, but we wish to go into it in further detail in the present chapter.» — parte uno, capítulo Dificultades lingüísticas: sitúa las dificultades más serias de la interpretación en las diferencias esenciales entre los modos de pensar oriental y occidental.

«The difference naturally shows itself in a corresponding difference between the languages destined to express the respective modes of thought, and thus another difficulty, derived from the first, arises when it comes to rendering certain ideas in the languages of the West, which are deficient in the appropriate terms and are, above all, metaphysically expressive only in a very small degree.» — parte uno: deriva de esa diferencia otra, la de las lenguas, y declara a las occidentales deficientes en términos apropiados y poco expresivas metafísicamente.

«even in the latter case, terms that are considered to be synonymous, and that often have a common origin and derivation, are nevertheless in many cases very far from offering an exact equivalence of meaning.» — parte uno: y el límite que señala aun entre lenguas emparentadas, que los términos tenidos por sinónimos y de origen común distan de equivaler exactamente.

«This is quite understandable, for it is evident that every language must be specially adapted to the mentality of the people speaking it, and each people has its own mental make-up, which differs more or less widely from that of other peoples.» — parte uno: funda esa inequivalencia en que cada lengua se adapta a la mentalidad del pueblo que la habla.

«However, the differences we are referring to are naturally much more perceptible as between one people and another; if there can be several ways of speaking the same language, that is to say really several ways of thinking while using that language, then there is assuredly a particular way of thinking that is normally expressed in each distinct language;» — parte uno: sostiene que si hay varios modos de hablar una misma lengua, hay un modo de pensar que se expresa normalmente en cada lengua distinta.

«It is for this reason, as we pointed out at the very beginning, that the most literal translation is not always the most faithful one from the point of view of ideas, and that is also why the purely grammatical knowledge of a language is quite inadequate for a true understanding of it.» — parte uno: de ahí repite las dos consecuencias, que la traducción más literal no es la más fiel en cuanto a ideas y que el conocimiento gramatical de una lengua no basta para entenderla.

«When we speak of the separation of peoples, and consequently of their languages, it must also be noticed that this can be a separation in time as well as space, so that the foregoing remarks apply with equal force to the understanding of ancient languages.» — parte uno: extiende la separación de los pueblos y sus lenguas al tiempo además del espacio, y con ello el argumento a la comprensión de las lenguas antiguas.

«Indeed, even in the case of a single people, if it should happen that its mental outlook undergoes considerable modifications in the course of its history, not only do new terms come to take the place of older ones in its language, but also the meaning of those terms that remain varies proportionally to the mental changes;» — parte uno: dentro de un mismo pueblo, a los cambios de mentalidad les hace corresponder no solo términos nuevos sino variación en el sentido de los que quedan.

«It should be added that this is especially true of Western peoples, whose mentality, as we were explaining earlier on, is extremely unstable and changeable;» — parte uno: adjudica esa inestabilidad sobre todo a los pueblos occidentales.

«besides, there is another decisive reason why that kind of difficulty should not arise in the East, or rather should be reduced to a minimun;; it is that in the East a sharp line of demarcation separates the vernacular tongues, which are bound to vary to some extent in response to current needs, from the languages that are used for purposes of doctrinal exposition, immutably fixed languages that are protected from all contingent variations by their object,» — parte uno: la razón que da para que la dificultad no se dé en Oriente, la línea que separa las lenguas vernáculas de las lenguas de exposición doctrinal, fijadas inmutablemente y protegidas de toda variación por su objeto.

«Up to a point, something of this sort could have been found in Europe at the time when Latin was generally used in teaching and for intellectual intercourse; a language put to such a use cannot properly speaking be called a dead language, but it is a fixed language, wherein indeed lies its great advantage, not to mention its usefulness in international relations,» — parte uno: el paralelo europeo que admite, el latín usado en la enseñanza, al que llama no lengua muerta sino lengua fija, y ve en esa fijeza su ventaja.

«for which purpose the artificial ‘auxiliary languages’ advocated by the moderns are always bound to be a failure.» — parte uno: y su juicio sobre las lenguas auxiliares artificiales que proponen los modernos para ese uso, que fracasarán.

«If we are able to speak of unchangeable fixity, especially in the East, and of languages serving for the expression of doctrines that are purely metaphysical in essence, the reason is that these doctrines do not ‘evolve’ in the Western sense of the word, a fact, moreover, that entirely precludes the application of any ‘historical method’ to their study.» — parte uno: funda esa fijeza en que las doctrinas puramente metafísicas no evolucionan en el sentido occidental, y de ahí excluye el método histórico de su estudio.

«However strange and incomprehensible this may appear in the eyes of modern Westerners, who persist in believing in ‘progress’ applied to every field, it is nonetheless a fact, and whoever fails to recognize it condemns himself to a perpetual inability to understand the East in any of its aspects.» — parte uno: y el corolario que enuncia contra quien crea en el progreso aplicado a todo campo, que no reconocerlo condena a no entender el Oriente en ningún aspecto.

«There can be no question of metaphysical doctrines either altering their basis or even becoming perfected; they can only undergo development according as they are regarded from different points of view, when they merely take on the forms of expression more particularly appropriate to» — parte uno: niega que las doctrinas metafísicas alteren su base o se perfeccionen, y solo les concede desarrollo según los puntos de vista desde los que se las mire. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«There remains one last point that we would like to mention in this chapter: while a particular period in the existence of an ancient people may be difficult to situate accurately in time, it is sometimes just as difficult, strange as this may seem, to situate it in space—by which we mean that certain peoples may have migrated at various times from one place to another and that there is nothing to prove, for instance, that the works bequeathed by the ancient Hindus or Persians all originated in the countries where their descendants are now living.» — parte uno, capítulo Cuestiones de cronología: el último punto del capítulo, que a un pueblo antiguo puede costar tanto situarlo en el espacio como en el tiempo, y que nada obliga a suponer que las obras de los antiguos hindúes o persas nacieran donde viven hoy sus descendientes.

«for these same names might easily have been applied successively in the various regions where the people in question halted in the course of its migrations.» — parte uno: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: esos nombres pudieron aplicarse sucesivamente en las regiones donde el pueblo se detuvo al migrar.

«for philological affinities provide a much less certain basis for the establishment of real equivalences than mental resemblances.» — parte uno, capítulo Dificultades lingüísticas: fija la jerarquía de criterios, las afinidades filológicas dan base menos segura para fijar equivalencias reales que las semejanzas mentales.

«this is so true that even where a language remains almost unchanged in its outward form, the» — parte uno: sostiene que aun con la forma exterior de la lengua casi intacta las mismas palabras dejan de corresponder a los mismos conceptos. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«Under exceptional circumstances, should an intellectual deviation arise within a more or less restricted section of society, this deviation, if it is really serious, brings about before long the abandonment of the traditional language in the society in question; by and by it is replaced by some idiom of popular origin, which, however, in its turn acquires a certain relative fixity, because the dissident doctrine tends of its own accord to constitute itself as an independent tradition, though one deficient in regular authority.» — parte uno: describe lo que ocurre cuando surge una desviación intelectual seria, el abandono de la lengua tradicional y su reemplazo por un idioma popular que a su vez se fija, porque la doctrina disidente tiende a constituirse en tradición independiente sin autoridad regular.

«The Easterner, even when he has departed from the normal ways of his intellectuality, cannot exist without a tradition or something to take the place of one, and we shall later try to explain what tradition under all its various aspects means to him; this moreover provides one of the deepest reasons for his disdain of the Westerner, who only too often appears to him as a being devoid of any traditional attachment.» — parte uno: sostiene que el oriental, aun desviado, no puede existir sin una tradición o algo que la supla, y de ahí deriva su desdén por el occidental, que le parece un ser sin apego tradicional.

«It can be said that any expression of a thought is necessarily imperfect in itself, for it limits and cramps the conception by enclosing it within a definite form, which can never hope to be completely adequate inasmuch as a conception always contains something that surpasses its expression;» — parte uno: declara imperfecta toda expresión de un pensamiento, porque lo encierra en una forma que nunca le es adecuada del todo.

«this applies with still greater force when metaphysical conceptions are in question, which always require a due allowance to be made for the inexpressible, since it is in their very essence to open the door to limitless possibilities.» — parte uno: agrava eso en las concepciones metafísicas, que piden margen para lo inexpresable porque su esencia es abrir la puerta a posibilidades ilimitadas.

«but once one has to some extent succeeded in grasping the conception itself through its original expression, by identifying oneself as far as possible with the mental outlook of the person or persons whose thoughts it represents, it is evident that one can always make up largely for this disadvantage by resorting to an interpretation which, if it is to be intelligible, will have to be a commentary rather than a literal translation pure and simple.» — parte uno: la vía que propone en lugar de la traducción literal, identificarse cuanto se pueda con la perspectiva mental de quien piensa y dar una interpretación que sea comentario.

«There is only one really profitable way of studying doctrines: in order to be understood they must be studied so to speak “from the inside’, whereas the orientalists have always confined themselves to an investigation from the outside.» — parte uno: fija el único modo que declara provechoso de estudiar las doctrinas, desde dentro, y adjudica a los orientalistas haberse limitado a la investigación desde fuera.

«The kind of study referred to is, relatively speaking, easier in the case of doctrines that have been handed down regularly to the present day, and that still possess their authorized interpreters, than in the case of teachings that have only come down to us in a written or symbolic form, unaccompanied by the oral tradition that has long since died out.» — parte uno: gradúa esa dificultad, menor en doctrinas transmitidas con regularidad hasta hoy y con intérpretes autorizados vivos, mayor en las que llegaron solo por escrito o en símbolos sin la tradición oral.

«It is all the more regrettable that orientalists, through a prejudice that may have been partly involuntary but for that very reason all the more invincible, have always persisted in neglecting this help that is open to them—to those at least who embark on the study of still extant civilizations, if not to those others whose researches are concerned with extinct civilizations.» — parte uno: llama lamentable que los orientalistas desatiendan esa ayuda por un prejuicio que dice en parte involuntario y por eso mismo más invencible.

«Nevertheless, as we have already explained in an earlier context, even the latter, the Egyptologists and Assyriologists for example, could certainly spare themselves many a misunderstanding if they possessed a wider knowledge of the human mind and of the various modalities that it can assume;» — parte uno: extiende el reproche a egiptólogos y asiriólogos, a quienes atribuye malentendidos evitables con mayor conocimiento de la mente humana y de sus modalidades.

«but it is just this knowledge that can only be acquired by a genuine study of the Eastern doctrines, which could thus render the greatest service to the study of antiquity in all its branches, at least indirectly.» — parte uno: y sostiene que ese conocimiento solo se adquiere estudiando de veras las doctrinas orientales, con lo que estas servirían indirectamente al estudio de toda la antigüedad.

«It is this, we repeat once again, that constitutes the fundamental reason why the works of orientalists are utterly inadequate for bringing about the comprehension of any idea whatsoever, and they are at the same time useless, if not in some cases actually harmful, as a means toward promoting an intellectual understanding between East and West.» — parte uno: la conclusión del capítulo, que declara las obras de los orientalistas inadecuadas para comprender idea alguna e inútiles, y en casos dañinas, para el entendimiento intelectual entre Oriente y Occidente.

«WE HAVE ALREADY SAID that though it is possible to contrast the Eastern mentality as a whole with that of the West, it would nevertheless be incorrect to speak of an Eastern civilization in the same way that one speaks of a Western one.» — parte dos, capítulo Divisiones principales del mundo oriental: repite la distinción, que cabe contraponer la mentalidad oriental en bloque a la occidental y no hablar de una civilización oriental como se habla de una occidental.

«There exist several quite distinct Eastern civilizations, each one of which possesses a principle of unity peculiar to itself and differing in essential respects from the corresponding principle governing each of the other civilizations, as we shall show presently; but however marked such differences may be, all the Eastern civilizations nonetheless exhibit certain characteristics in common, chiefly in regard to their ways of thinking, and it is this fact which allows of its being said, in a general way, that there exists a specifically Eastern mentality.» — parte dos: cada civilización oriental tiene principio de unidad propio, y a la vez comparten rasgos, sobre todo en los modos de pensar, que permiten hablar de una mentalidad específicamente oriental.

«With this end in view, the East may be divided into three great regions, described respectively, according to their geographical relation to Europe, as the Near East, the Middle East and the Far East. The Near East, from our point of view, comprises the whole of the Islamic world; the Middle East is essentially constituted by India;» — parte dos: la división en tres regiones según su relación geográfica con Europa, con el Cercano Oriente por mundo islámico entero y el Medio Oriente constituido esencialmente por la India.

«for the Far East, it corresponds to the regions usually denoted by that name, that is to say to China and Indochina.» — parte dos: y el Lejano Oriente, que hace corresponder a China e Indochina.

«It can be seen at a glance that these three general divisions do in fact correspond to three quite distinct and independent civilizations, which, even if they are not the only ones to be found in the East, are in any case the most important and cover the widest areas.» — parte dos: hace corresponder esas tres divisiones a tres civilizaciones distintas e independientes, y las declara las más importantes y extensas sin decir que sean las únicas.

«Within each of these civilizations certain subdivisions are recognizable, with variations comparable to those which, in the European civilization, exist between different countries; only in this case it is not possible to assign national limits to these subdivisions, since the notion of nationality answers to a conception that is, generally speaking, foreign to the East.» — parte dos: admite subdivisiones dentro de cada civilización, comparables a las de los países europeos, y niega que quepa darles límites nacionales porque la noción de nacionalidad le resulta ajena al Oriente.

«But Islamic civilization, despite the many directions in which it has spread, has nonetheless always preserved the essential characteristics that it owes to its Eastern origin, and it has imprinted its most typical features on many very different peoples, thus endowing them with a common outlook, though not to the point of depriving them of all originality.» — parte dos: atribuye a la civilización islámica haber conservado los rasgos de su origen oriental pese a su difusión, y haberlos impreso en pueblos muy distintos sin quitarles toda originalidad.

«The Berber populations of Northern Africa have never fused with the Arabs inhabiting the same lands, and it is easy to distinguish them from the latter, not only by the special customs they have retained and by their physical appearance, but also by a kind of mental physiognomy which is peculiar to them; for instance it is quite obvious that a Kabyle [a Berber of Algeria or Tunisia] is in several respects more like a European than an Arab.» — parte dos: distingue a los bereberes del norte de África de los árabes por costumbres, aspecto y una fisonomía mental propia, y dice que un cabila se parece en varios aspectos más a un europeo que a un árabe.

«and it should be pointed out here that, in the Islamic world, what may be termed the Arab group holds a position of primary importance, not only because it is the group that gave birth to Islam, but also because its language is the traditional language of all Muslim peoples, irrespective of origin or race.» — parte dos: da al grupo árabe primacía dentro del mundo islámico por dos razones, haber dado nacimiento al islam y ser su lengua la tradicional de todos los pueblos musulmanes.

«The first group includes chiefly peoples of Mongolian race, like the Turks and the Tartars; its mental as well as its physical traits distinguish it in a marked degree from the Arabs; but being endowed with comparatively little intellectual originality of its own, it is fundamentally dependent on the Arabs in an intellectual sense;» — parte dos: describe el grupo turco, de pueblos de raza mongólica, con rasgos distintos de los árabes y poca originalidad intelectual propia, y lo declara dependiente de los árabes en lo intelectual.

«moreover, even from the religious point of view, these two sections, the Arab and the Turkish, in spite of a few differences in respect of ritual and law, together form one single whole that can be opposed to the Persian group: and here we come to the deepest cleavage that exists in the Muslim world, a division usually expressed by saying that the Arabs and Turks are ‘Sunnites’ while the Persians are ‘Shiites’;» — parte dos: sitúa la escisión más honda del mundo musulmán entre árabes y turcos por un lado y persas por el otro, la que suele decirse de sunitas contra chiitas.

«these descriptions, however, call for certain reservations, but this is not the place to enter into a discussion of them.» — parte dos: y el límite que pone de inmediato a esos dos nombres, que piden reservas que no discute ahí.

«From the foregoing remarks it can be seen that geographical divisions do not always correspond exactly with the field of expansion of the corresponding civilizations, but only with their places of origin and their principal centers.» — parte dos: separa la división geográfica del campo de expansión de cada civilización, que solo coincide con sus lugares de origen y sus centros principales.

«On the other hand, Persia ought by rights to be joined, racially and even geographically, to what we have called the Middle East; if we have not so included it, this is because its present inhabitants are entirely Muslim.» — parte dos: declara que Persia debería unirse por raza y geografía al Medio Oriente, y dice por qué no la incluye ahí, porque sus habitantes actuales son enteramente musulmanes.

«remaining completely faithful to the traditional spirit.» — parte uno, capítulo Dificultades lingüísticas: la condición que pone al desarrollo de una doctrina por puntos de vista, que cada formulación sucesiva permanezca del todo fiel al espíritu tradicional. El tramo arranca en la plana siguiente al corte.

«Fundamentally therefore, the real difficulty is the mental assimilation needed to arrive at this result; there are» — parte uno: cifra la dificultad real en la asimilación mental necesaria para llegar a ese resultado. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«certainly many minds that are quite incapable of it, and it is easy to gauge how far this effort transcends the scope of mere works of eru» — parte uno: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: hay mentes incapaces de esa asimilación, y el esfuerzo excede con mucho el alcance de las obras de erudición.

«In the Middle East two distinct civilizations should really be recognized, which however have both clearly issued from a common source: the first is that of India and the second that of the ancient Iranians; but nowadays the sole surviving representatives of the latter are the Parsis» — parte dos, capítulo Divisiones principales del mundo oriental: reconoce en el Medio Oriente dos civilizaciones salidas de una fuente común, la de la India y la de los antiguos iranios, y da por únicos representantes vivos de la segunda a los parsis. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«All that remains to be considered therefore, in the second of our main divisions, is Indian civilization proper, or Hindu civilization to be more exact, which embraces within its unity peoples of several different races;» — parte dos, capítulo Divisiones principales del mundo oriental: deja en el Medio Oriente solo la civilización hindú, que describe abarcando en su unidad pueblos de varias razas.

«nevertheless, all these peoples share one civilization, and also a common traditional language, which is Sanskrit.» — parte dos: pone la unidad de esos pueblos en compartir una civilización y una lengua tradicional común, el sánscrito.

«Indian civilization spread at certain periods further to the East and left clear traces of its influence in various parts of Indochina, such as Burma, Siam, and Cambodia, and even in some of the Oceanic islands, notably in Java.» — parte dos: traza la expansión de la civilización india hacia Birmania, Siam y Camboya, y hasta islas de Oceanía como Java.

«On the other hand, this same Hindu civilization gave birth to the Buddhist civilization, which spread, under its different forms, over a large part of Central and Eastern Asia;» — parte dos: hace nacer de la civilización hindú la budista, difundida en sus distintas formas por buena parte de Asia central y oriental.

«As for the civilization of the Far East, which is the only one where all the members really belong to the same race, it may properly be called the Chinese civilization;» — parte dos: declara a la del Lejano Oriente la única cuyos miembros son de una misma raza, y por eso la llama con propiedad civilización china.

«It must be stressed that the traditional language belonging to this civilization is essentially the written Chinese language, which is immune from the variations of the spoken tongue, whether these variations occur in time or in space;» — parte dos: hace de la lengua china escrita la lengua tradicional de esa civilización, inmune a las variaciones del habla en el tiempo y en el espacio.

«a Chinese from the North, a Southern Chinese, and an Annamite may be unable to understand one another in conversation, yet the use of the same ideographic characters, with all that this really implies, nonetheless establishes between them a bond the strength of which is quite unsuspected by Europeans.» — parte dos: el ejemplo con que lo mide, que un chino del norte, uno del sur y un anamita pueden no entenderse al hablar y quedar unidos por los mismos caracteres ideográficos.

«As for Japan, which we left out of our general classification, it is attached to the Far East in the measure in which it has been affected by Chinese influence, although in addition it possesses in Shinto a tradition of its own endowed with a very different character.» — parte dos: liga al Japón al Lejano Oriente en la medida de la influencia china, y le reconoce en el shinto una tradición propia de carácter muy distinto.

«To turn for a moment in another direction, it will be noticed that we have deliberately omitted all mention of the Tibetan civilization from our preceding survey, though it is very far from negligible, especially from the point of view that concerns us most. This civilization is connected in certain respects both with that of India and of China, while exhibiting many other characteristics that are entirely its own; but since it is far less familiar to Europeans than any of the other Eastern civilizations, it could not be discussed profitably without going into explanations that would be quite out of place in a work such as the present one.» — parte dos: declara omitida a propósito la civilización tibetana, lejos de ser desdeñable y ligada en parte a la India y a China, y dice por qué la omite, porque discutirla pediría explicaciones fuera de lugar.

«Bearing in mind the reservations we have mentioned, we need therefore only consider three great Eastern civilizations, corresponding respectively to the geographical divisions previously referred to, namely the Islamic, Hindu, and Chinese civilizations.» — parte dos: fija las tres civilizaciones orientales que va a considerar, la islámica, la hindú y la china.

«Iv 1S EXTREMELY DIFFICULT at the present time to discover a unifying principle in Western civilization; it might even be said that its unity, while naturally still resting on a number of tendencies that have combined to form a common mentality, no longer amounts to anything more than a simple unity of fact, as lacking in principle as the civilization itself.» — parte dos, capítulo Principios de unidad de las civilizaciones orientales: declara muy difícil hallar hoy un principio unificador en la civilización occidental, y reduce su unidad a una unidad de hecho, tan falta de principio como la civilización misma. La apertura sale así del troceo, por *It is*.

«This has been the case ever since the severing, at the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation, of the traditional bond derived from religion which provided the essential principle we have in mind and which gave to Western civilization in the Middle Ages its characteristic form of ‘Christendom’.» — parte dos: data ese estado en el corte, con el Renacimiento y la Reforma, del vínculo tradicional derivado de la religión que daba a la Edad Media su forma de Cristiandad.

«we mean by this that, apart from exceptions that could not become general in such an environment, tradition could not be conceived otherwise than in a religious mode.» — parte dos: y la razón que da de que nada supliera ese vínculo, que en ese medio la tradición no podía concebirse sino en modo religioso.

«With the rupture of the fundamental unity of Christendom, therefore, a danger arose of several European civilizations coming into being, without any effective or conscious bond to unite them; and in fact it is from this moment that the secondary, fragmentary, and reduced unities represented by the different ‘nations’ were formed, after many vicissitudes and tentative efforts.» — parte dos: hace nacer de la ruptura de la Cristiandad las unidades secundarias y fragmentarias que son las naciones.

«But this new civilization, far from being based upon any legitimate principle, was henceforth vowed, if one might say so, to the service of an ‘absence of principle’ which condemned it to a hopeless state of intellectual decadence.» — parte dos: describe esa civilización nueva como consagrada a una ausencia de principio, que la condena a decadencia intelectual.

«It might justifiably be argued that this was the price that had to be paid for the material progress toward which the Western world has been exclusively tending ever since, for there are certain paths of development that cannot be reconciled with one another;» — parte dos: admite el argumento de que ese fue el precio del progreso material, y lo funda en que hay vías de desarrollo irreconciliables entre sí.

«This very brief survey will make it plain why in the East there cannot exist anything comparable with the Western nations; the reason is that the appearance of nations within a civilization is undoubtedly the sign of a partial dissolution due to the loss of the element that constituted its basic unity.» — parte dos: deduce de ahí por qué no hay en Oriente nada comparable a las naciones occidentales, y lee la aparición de naciones como signo de disolución parcial por pérdida del elemento de unidad.

«Even in the West, it must be remembered, the conception of nations is a characteristically modern development; nothing analogous was to be found in earlier times, whether it be in the Greek cities, or in the Roman Empire that arose out of successive extensions of the original city, or in its more or less indirect medieval continuations, or in the confederations or tribal leagues after the Celtic model, or even in the states organized hierarchically on the feudal pattern.» — parte dos: data como característicamente moderna la concepción de nación, y la niega en las ciudades griegas, el Imperio romano, sus continuaciones medievales, las confederaciones célticas y los Estados feudales.

«On the other hand, what we have said about the former unity of ‘Christendom; an essentially traditional unity conceived according to the specifically religious mode, can also be applied fairly closely to the conception of unity in the Muslim world.» — parte dos: traslada lo dicho de la unidad tradicional de la Cristiandad, concebida en modo religioso, a la concepción de unidad del mundo musulmán.

«Among Eastern civilizations, Islam is in fact the one that approaches closest to the West, and it might even be said in some respects to occupy an intermediary position between East and West, as regards its characteristic features no less than geographically.» — parte dos: sitúa al islam como la civilización oriental más próxima a Occidente, en posición intermedia por rasgos y por geografía.

«Moreover Judaism, Christianity, and Islam appear as three complementary branches of a single body of tradition, outside of which it is indeed difficult to apply the term ‘religion’ correctly at all, that is if one wishes to preserve any precise and clearly defined meaning for it;» — parte dos: presenta judaísmo, cristianismo e islam como tres ramas complementarias de un mismo cuerpo de tradición, y fuera de ese cuerpo declara difícil aplicar con precisión el término religión.

«but in Islam, as we shall show later on, this purely religious side is really only its most external aspect.» — parte dos: y el límite que pone enseguida, que en el islam ese lado puramente religioso es solo su aspecto más externo.

«it will be seen that the whole organization of the Muslim world rests on a tradition that may be described as religious: it is not a case, as in present-day Europe, of religion being one of the elements of the social order, but on the contrary the entire social order forms an integral part of religion, from which all legislation is inseparable, since it finds there both its principle and its justification.» — parte dos: invierte la relación que ve en la Europa de su tiempo: no es la religión un elemento del orden social, sino el orden social entero parte integrante de la religión, de la que la legislación es inseparable.

«This is a point that has unfortunately never been grasped by those Europeans who have come into contact with Muslim peoples, with the consequence that this lack of understanding has led them into committing the crudest and most irretrievable political blunders;» — parte dos: adjudica a la incomprensión de ese punto por parte de los europeos en trato con pueblos musulmanes los errores políticos más burdos e irreparables.

«firstly, the conception of the Caliphate, which alone could provide a possible basis for a really serious ‘Pan-Islamism, is in no wise to be assimilated to any form of national government, and it is moreover well calculated to baffle Europeans, accustomed as they are to seeing an absolute separation, and even an opposition, between the ‘spiritual’ and the ‘temporal’ powers;» — parte dos: da al califato por única base posible de un panislamismo serio, lo declara no asimilable a un gobierno nacional y dice que desconcierta a europeos habituados a separar y oponer lo espiritual y lo temporal.

«secondly, the pretension of setting up various national groups inside Islam required all the ignorant self-conceit of certain ‘young’ Muslims, who so described themselves simply in order to advertise their own ‘modernism, and whose sense of tradition had been completely obliterated by the teachings of Western universities.» — parte dos: atribuye la pretensión de formar grupos nacionales dentro del islam a musulmanes que se decían jóvenes por hacer alarde de modernismo, y a quienes adjudica un sentido tradicional borrado por la universidad occidental.

«scriptural Arabic alone possesses that fixity which is required if it is to fulfill its task as a traditional language, whereas spoken Arabic, like any other tongue in daily use, naturally goes through various changes in course of time and in different regions.» — parte dos: reserva al árabe escriturario la fijeza que exige su tarea de lengua tradicional, frente al hablado, que cambia con el tiempo y la región.

«Nevertheless, these variations are far from being as marked as is commonly supposed in Europe; they chiefly affect pronunciation and the use of certain more or less specialized terms, and they are insufficient to amount to a plurality of dialects, for all Arabic-speaking peoples are quite able to understand one another; in fact, even in the case of vernacular Arabic, there exists but one language, spoken from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, and the so-called Arabic dialects, with their greater or lesser variations, are largely an invention of the orientalists.» — parte dos: rebaja esas variaciones a pronunciación y términos especializados, sostiene que hay una sola lengua de Marruecos al Golfo Pérsico y llama invención de los orientalistas a los llamados dialectos árabes.

«Passing now to the Hindu civilization, we find that its unity is also purely and solely of a traditional order; it includes in fact elements belonging to very different races or ethnic groups, all of which can with equal justice be called ‘Hindu in the strictest sense of the word, to the exclusion of certain other elements belonging to the same races» — parte dos: declara la unidad de la civilización hindú puramente tradicional, y no racial, porque incluye a elementos de razas muy distintas y excluye a otros de esas mismas razas.

«Certain people maintain that originally this was not the case, but their opinion rests on nothing better than the theory of a supposed ‘Aryan race’, which is merely an invention of the over-fertile imagination of the orientalists.» — parte dos: llama invención de la imaginación de los orientalistas la teoría de una raza aria de la que penden quienes sostienen lo contrario.

«The Sanskrit term arya, which gave its name to this hypothetical race, was never really anything more than an epithet applied exclusively to the members of the first three castes, independently of their membership of this or that race, which is not in any way material here.» — parte dos: niega que el término sánscrito *arya* nombre una raza, y lo declara epíteto aplicado solo a los miembros de las tres primeras castas, con independencia de su raza.

«It would be interesting to find out to what extent these various traditional elements have succeeded in maintaining themselves in the face of the modernization, that is to say of the Westernization» — parte dos, capítulo Divisiones principales del mundo oriental: deja planteada la pregunta por cuánto de los elementos tradicionales japoneses resistió a la modernización, que él llama occidentalización. El tramo se corta donde entra la nota del editor.

«The influences that produced the deviation worked everywhere in a similar manner, though in different degrees; thus there again emerged a common outlook and a civilization that continued to be shared by all in spite of many divisions.» — parte dos: describe cómo las influencias de esa desviación obraron por todas partes de modo semejante y en grados distintos, y volvió a surgir una perspectiva común compartida pese a las divisiones.

«Furthermore, its tradition can clearly be considered under two quite distinct modes, one purely Eastern, while the other, the religious mode properly so» — parte dos: distingue dos modos en la tradición islámica, uno puramente oriental y otro propiamente religioso. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«There is another point concerning Islam that should be stressed here, namely the unity of its traditional language: we have stated that this language is Arabic, but we must make it clear that by this» — parte dos: subraya la unidad de la lengua tradicional del islam, que declara el árabe, y anuncia una precisión. El tramo se corta donde entra la nota del editor.

«we mean scriptural Arabic, which is to some extent distinct from vernacular Arabic, the latter representing an altered form and a grammatical simplification of the scriptural language.» — parte dos: la precisión anunciada, que se trata del árabe escriturario, distinto del vernáculo, que describe como forma alterada y simplificación gramatical del primero.

«part in the Islamic tradition, it is nevertheless employed in numerous writings on ‘Sufism’ and this gives it an undoubted intellectual importance in that portion of Islam lying further East.» — parte dos, capítulo Principios de unidad de las civilizaciones orientales: al persa, sin papel fundamental en la tradición islámica, le reconoce importancia intelectual indudable por los escritos sobre sufismo en la parte oriental del islam. El tramo arranca al otro lado del corte de chunk, que reemite la marca de la plana 67.

«It is true that the principles of caste, like many other things, have been consistently misunderstood in the West, so that it is not at all surprising to come across a confusion of this kind;» — parte dos, capítulo Principios de unidad de las civilizaciones orientales: adjudica a Occidente una incomprensión constante de los principios de la casta, y de ahí explica la confusión con la raza.

«What is important to grasp at the moment is the fact that Hindu unity rests entirely on the acknowledgment of a certain tradition, which also embraces the entire social order, but this time only as a simple application to a contingent realm; the latter reservation is called for because the tradition in question is in no wise a religious one as in Islam, but is a more purely intellectual and essentially metaphysical tradition.» — parte dos: pone la unidad hindú entera en el reconocimiento de una tradición que abarca también el orden social, con la reserva de que no es religiosa como la islámica sino más puramente intelectual y esencialmente metafísica.

«The kind of twofold polarization we alluded to when speaking of the Islamic tradition is not to be found in India, so that we are precluded in the latter case from making comparisons with the West such as were rendered at least possible in the case of the external side of Islam; here we have absolutely nothing analogous to Western religions, and only superficial observers could maintain the contrary, thus proving their complete ignorance of Eastern modes of thought.» — parte dos: niega a la India la doble polarización que atribuyó al islam, y con ella toda analogía con las religiones occidentales, que solo un observador superficial sostendría.

«The Chinese civilization, as we have already pointed out, is the only one whose unity is essentially and in its very nature a unity of race; its governing feature, in this respect, is what the Chinese call Jen, a conception that can without too great inexactitude be translated as ‘solidarity of race’.» — parte dos: da a la civilización china por única cuya unidad es de raza, y nombra su rasgo rector, lo que los chinos llaman *Jen*, que traduce sin demasiada inexactitud por solidaridad de raza.

«This solidarity, implying both a perpetuity and a community of existence, is furthermore identified with the ‘idea of life’, which is an application of the metaphysical principle of the ‘initial cause’ to existing humanity; and it is the transposition of this notion into the social realm, with the continual application of all its practical consequences, that gives to Chinese institutions their exceptional stability.» — parte dos: identifica esa solidaridad con la idea de vida, aplicación del principio metafísico de la causa inicial a la humanidad existente, y de su traslado al orden social hace derivar la estabilidad de las instituciones chinas.

«This same conception also explains why the whole social structure rests on the family, the essential prototype of the race; in the West something of the kind was to be found, to a certain extent, in the ancient city-state, the kernel of which was also the family, and where ‘ancestor worship’ itself, with all that this really implies, played a part the importance of which is not easily appreciated today.» — parte dos: hace descansar toda la estructura social china en la familia, prototipo de la raza, y le pone al lado la ciudad antigua de Occidente con su culto a los antepasados.

«In Chinese society the family plays at least as important a part as caste does in Hindu society, and is comparable to caste in some respects, though its principle is quite a different one.» — parte dos: compara el papel de la familia en la sociedad china con el de la casta en la hindú, con el límite de que el principio es muy distinto.

«Moreover, in China more than anywhere else, the properly metaphysical side of the tradition is sharply divided from the remainder, that is to say from its application to the various orders of relative things; however, it goes without saying that though this separation may be deep, it does not amount to an absolute discontinuity, for this would have the effect of depriving the external forms of the civilization of any real principle.» — parte dos: describe en China una separación nítida entre el lado metafísico de la tradición y sus aplicaciones, y acota que no llega a discontinuidad absoluta, que dejaría sin principio a las formas exteriores.

«Such a state of things is only too apparent in the modern West, where the civil institutions, robbed of all traditional import, but still carrying with them a few relics of the past that no one understands any longer, sometimes present the appearance of a regular parody of ritual, devoid of all real significance, so that their retention really amounts to nothing but a ‘superstition’ in the full force of the etymological meaning of that word.» — parte dos: describe las instituciones civiles del Occidente moderno como parodia de ritual sin significado real, y llama a su conservación superstición en el sentido etimológico.

«We have said enough to show that the unity of each of the great Eastern civilizations is of a very different order from that of the present Western civilization, and rests on far more profound principles, which, being less dependent on historical contingencies, are eminently suited to assure to the civilizations in question both permanence and continuity.» — parte dos: cierra el capítulo poniendo la unidad de cada gran civilización oriental en principios más hondos y menos dependientes de contingencias históricas, aptos para asegurar permanencia y continuidad.

«To obviate one possible misunderstanding, let it be said from the outset that we do not take the word ‘tradition’ in the restricted sense sometimes given to it by Western religious thought, when it opposes ‘tradition’ to the written word, using the former of these two terms exclusively for something that has been the object of oral transmission alone.» — parte dos, capítulo Qué se entiende por tradición: aparta de entrada el sentido restringido que el pensamiento religioso occidental da a *tradición* al oponerla a lo escrito.

«On the contrary, for us tradition, taken in a much more general sense, may be written as well as oral, though it must usually, if not always, have been oral originally.» — parte dos: define tradición en sentido general como escrita o bien oral, con la salvedad de que en origen suele haber sido oral.

«In the present state of things, however, tradition, whether it be religious in form or otherwise, consists everywhere of two complementary branches, written and oral, and we have no hesitation in speaking of ‘traditional writings, which would obviously be contradictory if one only gave to the word ‘tradition’ its more specialized meaning; besides, etymologically, tradition simply means ‘that which is transmitted’ in some way or other.» — parte dos: la describe hoy con dos ramas complementarias, escrita y oral, y remite a la etimología, aquello que se transmite.

«In addition, it is necessary to include in tradition, as secondary and derived elements that are nonetheless important for the purpose of forming a complete picture, the whole series of institutions of various kinds which find their principle in the traditional doctrine itself.» — parte dos: incluye en la tradición, como elementos secundarios y derivados, la serie entera de instituciones cuyo principio está en la doctrina tradicional.

«In truth, we do not think that civilization can be characterized generally by a formula of this type, which will always be either too comprehensive or too narrow in some respects, with the risk that elements common to all civilizations will be omitted or else that elements belonging to certain particular civilizations only will be included.» — parte dos: objeta la definición sociológica de civilización como conjunto de técnicas, instituciones y creencias, por ser siempre demasiado amplia o demasiado estrecha.

«Thus the preceding definition takes no account of the essentially intellectual element to be found in every civilization, for that is something that cannot be made to fit into the category known as ‘techniques, which, as we are told, comprises ‘those classes of practices specially designed to modify the physical environment» — parte dos: el primer reproche, que esa definición deja fuera el elemento intelectual de toda civilización, que no cabe en la categoría de técnicas.

«on the other hand, when these sociologists speak of ‘beliefs’, adding moreover that the word must be ‘taken in its usual sense’, they are referring to something that clearly presupposes the presence of the religious viewpoint, which is really confined to certain civilizations only and is not to be found in others.» — parte dos: el segundo reproche, que hablar de creencias en su sentido usual presupone el punto de vista religioso, que declara propio de ciertas civilizaciones y ausente en otras.

«It was in order to avoid all difficulties of this kind that we were content at the start simply to describe a civilization as the product and expression of a certain mental outlook common to a more or less widespread group of men, thus making it possible to treat each particular case separately as regards the exact determination of its constituent elements.» — parte dos: repite su propia definición, la civilización como producto y expresión de una perspectiva mental común, y dice para qué le sirve, tratar cada caso por separado.

«However that may be, it remains nonetheless true, as far as the East is concerned, that the identification of tradition with the entire civilization is fundamentally justifiable. Every Eastern civilization, taken as a whole, may be seen to be essentially traditional, which follows directly from the explanations given in the last chapter.» — parte dos: declara justificable identificar tradición y civilización entera en el caso del Oriente, y toda civilización oriental esencialmente tradicional.

«As for Western civilization, we have shown that it is on the contrary devoid of any traditional character, with the exception of the religious element, which alone has retained it.» — parte dos: niega carácter tradicional a la civilización occidental salvo en el elemento religioso, el único que dice haberlo conservado.

«Social institutions, to be considered traditional, must be effectively attached in their principle to a doctrine that is itself traditional, whether it be metaphysical or religious or of any other conceivable kind.» — parte dos: fija la condición para llamar tradicional a una institución social, estar atada en su principio a una doctrina ella misma tradicional.

«but this intellectuality may be found either in a pure state, in cases where one is dealing with an entirely metaphysical doctrine, or else it may be found mingled with other heterogeneous elements, as in the case of the religious or other special modes which a traditional doctrine is capable of assuming.» — parte dos: distingue esa intelectualidad en estado puro, en la doctrina enteramente metafísica, y mezclada con elementos heterogéneos en los modos religiosos u otros.

«In a certain measure something of the same sort existed in medieval Europe in the case of the Scholastic doctrine, in which Arab influences moreover made themselves felt to an appreciable extent;» — parte dos: reconoce algo semejante en la Europa medieval con la doctrina escolástica, en la que dice apreciables las influencias árabes.

«but in order not to push the analogy too-far it should be added that metaphysics was never sufficiently clearly distinguished from theology, that is to say from its special application to the religious mode of thought; moreover, the genuinely metaphysical portion to be found in it is incomplete and remains subject to certain limitations that seem inherent in the whole of Western intellectuality;» — parte dos: y el límite que pone a esa analogía, que la metafísica nunca se distinguió allí con claridad de la teología y que la porción metafísica es incompleta.

«doubtless these two imperfections should be looked upon as resulting from the double heritage of the Jewish and the Greek mentalities.» — parte dos: atribuye esas dos imperfecciones de la escolástica a la doble herencia de las mentalidades judía y griega.

«In India we are in the presence of a tradition that is purely metaphysical in its essence; to it are attached, as so many dependent extensions, the diverse applications to which it gives rise, whether in certain secondary branches of the doctrine itself, such as that relating to cosmology, or in the social order, which is moreover strictly governed by the analogical correspondence linking together cosmic existence and human existence.» — parte dos: describe la tradición de la India como puramente metafísica en esencia, con la cosmología y el orden social por extensiones dependientes, regido este por la correspondencia analógica entre existencia cósmica y humana.

«A fact that stands out much more clearly here than in the Islamic tradition, chiefly owing to the absence of the religious point of view and of certain extra intellectual elements that religion necessarily implies, is the complete subordination of the various particular orders relative to metaphysics, that is to say relative to the realm of universal principles.» — parte dos: lo que dice verse en la India con más claridad que en el islam, por faltar el punto de vista religioso: la subordinación completa de los órdenes particulares a la metafísica.

«Nevertheless, we do not believe that men anywhere except in China have gone so far in the direction of a family unity opposed to every kind of individualism, to the point for example of suppressing individual ownership and consequently» — parte dos, capítulo Principios de unidad de las civilizaciones orientales: sitúa a China como el caso extremo de unidad familiar opuesta a todo individualismo, hasta suprimir la propiedad individual. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«individual inheritance, thus making life well-nigh impossible for any man who, whether of his own free will or not, found himself excluded from the community of the family.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: suprimida también la herencia individual, la vida se vuelve casi imposible para quien queda fuera de la comunidad familiar.

«dependence upon a doctrine which, as regards its fundamental nature, is in every case of an intellectual order;» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: esa doctrina es en todos los casos de orden intelectual por su naturaleza fundamental.

«In China, the sharp division we have already spoken of allows us to observe a metaphysical tradition on the one hand and a social» — parte dos, capítulo Qué se entiende por tradición: describe en China una tradición metafísica y otra social. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«tradition on the other, and these may at first sight appear not only distinct, as in fact they are, but even relatively independent of one another, all the more so since the metaphysical tradition always remained well-nigh exclusively the appanage of an intellectual elite, whereas the social tradition, by reason of its very nature, imposed itself upon all without distinction and claimed their effective participation in an equal degree.» — parte dos: las diferencia por su público, la metafísica casi exclusivamente patrimonio de una élite intelectual y la social impuesta a todos por igual.

«It is, however, important to remember that the metaphysical tradition, as constituted under the form of “Taoism, is a development from the principles of a more primordial tradition, formulated in the I Ching, and it is from this primordial tradition that the whole of the social institutions commonly known under the name of ‘ConfucianisnY are entirely derived, though less directly and then only as an application to a contingent sphere.» — parte dos: hace derivar el taoísmo de los principios de una tradición más primordial formulada en el I Ching, y de esa misma tradición, menos directamente, las instituciones sociales del confucianismo. Los nombres salen así del troceo.

«Thus the essential continuity between the two principal aspects of the Far-Eastern civilization is re-established, and their true relationship made clear; but this continuity would almost inevitably be missed if it were not possible to trace them back to their common source, that is to say to the primordial tradition of which the ideographical expression, as fixed from the time of Fu Hsi onward, has been preserved intact for almost fifty centuries.» — parte dos: da por restablecida por esa vía la continuidad entre los dos aspectos de la civilización extremo-oriental, y data la expresión ideográfica de esa tradición primordial desde Fu Hsi, conservada intacta por casi cincuenta siglos.

«We must now follow this general survey with a more detailed consideration of what constitutes that special form of tradition known as religion, and we must also explain how pure metaphysical thought is to be distinguished from theological thought, that is to say from conceptions in religious mode, and furthermore how it differs from philosophical thought in the Western sense of the word. It is in these fundamental distinctions that we shall discover, by contrast with the chief types of intellectual or rather semi-intellectual conceptions current in the Western world, the basic characteristics of the general and essential modes of Eastern intellectuality.» — parte dos: anuncia el plan de los capítulos siguientes, distinguir la religión, el pensamiento teológico y el filosófico del pensamiento metafísico puro, y hallar por contraste los rasgos de la intelectualidad oriental.

«IT APPEARS TO BE rather difficult to arrive at an agreement on an exact and strictly accurate definition of religion and its essential elements; and etymology, which often proves valuable in such cases, affords but little help in this instance, for the indications it has to offer are extremely vague.» — parte dos, capítulo Tradición y religión: declara difícil un acuerdo sobre la definición exacta de religión, y dice que aquí la etimología ayuda poco.

«Religion, according to its verbal derivation, is ‘that which binds’; but is this to be taken in the sense of something that binds man to a superior principle, or something that binds men one to another?» — parte dos: plantea la alternativa etimológica, si lo que la religión ata es al hombre con un principio superior o a los hombres entre sí.

«If we consider Greco-Roman antiquity, from which the word ‘religion’ came down to us, though not everything that the word stands for today, it is practically certain that the notion of religion included both the ideas we have mentioned and that the second more often than not played a preponderant part.» — parte dos: para la antigüedad grecorromana da por casi cierto que la noción incluía las dos ideas y que la del vínculo entre hombres solía predominar.

«In fact religion, or what was understood by that word at the time, was incorporated indissolubly in the body of social institutions, in which recognition of the ‘gods of the city’ and observance of the lawfully established forms of worship played a fundamental part, providing them with a guarantee of stability; and it was this that conferred on these institutions a genuinely traditional character.» — parte dos: describe esa religión antigua incorporada al cuerpo de instituciones sociales, con el reconocimiento de los dioses de la ciudad y las formas legales de culto por garantía de estabilidad.

«Since those times however, at any rate during the classical period, men ceased to be fully aware of the principle on which their tradition should have been based intellectually; in this may be seen one of the earliest manifestations of the metaphysical incapacity common among Westerners, a deficiency that brings a strange confusion of thought as its fatal and unquestionable consequence.» — parte dos: data en el período clásico la pérdida de conciencia del principio intelectual de esa tradición, y la cuenta entre las primeras manifestaciones de la incapacidad metafísica que atribuye a los occidentales.

«Symbols thus degenerated into mere allegories, and through the workings of an invincible tendency toward anthropomorphic personification they turned into ‘myths’, that is to say fables about which everyone could believe what he pleased, provided he continued in practice to maintain the conventional attitude prescribed by the legal ordinances.» — parte dos: traza la degradación del símbolo en alegoría y, por personificación antropomórfica, en mito, con la creencia libre a condición de mantener la actitud prescrita por la ley.

«Under these conditions hardly anything could survive except a formalism that became all the more purely external in proportion as it lost its meaning even for those who were charged to watch over its maintenance in accordance with the prescribed rules; thus religion, having forfeited its deeper significance, could not but become an exclusively social concern.» — parte dos: describe lo que queda de ahí, un formalismo cada vez más externo, con la religión vuelta asunto exclusivamente social por haber perdido su sentido profundo.

«This explains why a man who changed his city had at the same time to change his religion and could do so without the slightest scruple; he was expected to adopt the customs of those among whom he was about to settle, to whose laws he henceforth owed allegiance, and of these laws the established religion formed an integral part on exactly the same basis as governmental, judicial, military, or other institutions.» — parte dos: de ahí explica que cambiar de ciudad obligara a cambiar de religión sin escrúpulo, porque la religión establecida era parte de las leyes como las demás instituciones.

«Over and above this conception of religion as a ‘social bond’ among the inhabitants of the same city, another more general religion was superimposed, standing above local variations and common to all the Hellenic peoples, providing them with their only really effective and permanent connecting link; such a conception, while not corresponding to ‘State religion’ in the sense that those words were to take on at a much later date, already suggests an obvious relationship with the latter idea, and it was certainly destined to contribute something toward its ultimate formation.» — parte dos: describe una religión más general superpuesta a las locales y común a los pueblos helénicos, que distingue de la religión de Estado posterior y a la vez emparenta con ella.

«This rooted insufficiency of the Roman mind, turned as it was almost exclusively toward practical things, is too obvious and also too generally admitted for it to be necessary to dwell on it here; Greek influence, acting upon it later on, was only able to remedy the trouble to a very slight extent.» — parte dos: llama demasiado obvia y admitida esa insuficiencia de la mente romana vuelta a lo práctico, y dice que la influencia griega posterior apenas la remedió.

«However, in Rome also, the ‘gods of the city’ occupied the chief position in public worship, a cult that was superimposed on the family cults that always existed alongside of it, but perhaps without being any better understood as regards their deeper significance; and these ‘gods of the city’, in consequence of successive extensions of their territory, ultimately became the ‘gods of the empire’.» — parte dos: en Roma pone a los dioses de la ciudad en el culto público, superpuesto a los cultos familiares, y traza su paso a dioses del imperio por extensión del territorio.

«It is clear that a cult such as that of the emperors, for example, could apply within the social sphere only, and we know that if Christianity was persecuted while so many other varied elements were incorporated without any difficulty in the Roman religion, it is because Christianity alone entailed, in practice as well as theoretically, a formal rejection of the ‘gods of the empire’, thus striking at the very root of the established institutions.» — parte dos: explica la persecución del cristianismo, entre tantos elementos incorporados sin dificultad, por entrañar el rechazo formal de los dioses del imperio.

«This rejection would however not have been necessary if the proper scope of what were purely social rites had been clearly defined and delimited; but it proved unavoidable on account of the many and various confusions that arose between the most different domains; these confusions, born of the misunderstanding of elements contained in those rites, some of which were derived from very distant sources, conferred on the rites the character of ‘superstitions’, to use the word in the strict sense that we have already had occasion to give to it.» — parte dos: sostiene que ese rechazo no habría hecho falta si se hubiera delimitado el alcance de los ritos puramente sociales, y atribuye a la confusión de dominios el carácter de superstición de esos ritos.

«Our object in offering these comments has not been simply to show what was the conception of religion in the Greco-Roman civilization, which might in itself seem somewhat beside the point; we wished rather to show how profoundly that conception differed from the view held by present-day Western civilization, in spite of the identity of the expression used in both cases.» — parte dos: declara el fin de esas observaciones, mostrar cuánto difiere la concepción grecorromana de religión de la occidental de hoy pese al mismo nombre.

«It may be said that Christianity, or if one prefers it, the Judeo-Christian tradition, when it adopted this word ‘religion’ together with the Latin language from which it is borrowed, imposed an almost entirely new meaning» — parte dos: atribuye al cristianismo, o a la tradición judeocristiana, haber impuesto un sentido casi enteramente nuevo a la palabra religión tomada del latín. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«The idea that will henceforth predominate is that of a link with a superior principle and no longer that of a social bond, though the latter notion will continue to be present to a certain extent, diminished in influence however, and reduced to a rank of secondary importance.» — parte dos: el sentido nuevo que describe, el vínculo con un principio superior y ya no el lazo social, que queda presente en rango secundario.

«It must be said from the outset that most of the definitions, or rather attempts at definition, proposed for the word ‘religion’ suffer from the common defect of being applicable to things of markedly differing character, some of which really have nothing specifically religious about them.» — parte dos: objeta a casi todas las definiciones propuestas de religión el defecto común de aplicarse a cosas de carácter muy distinto y sin nada específicamente religioso.

«Thus for instance, there are certain sociologists who maintain that ‘what characterizes religious phenomena is their force of obligation.» — parte dos: la primera definición sociológica que discute, la que caracteriza los fenómenos religiosos por su fuerza de obligación.

«It might be pointed out that this obligatory character is far from belonging to all religious institutions in an equal degree, and that it can vary in intensity, either as regards practices and beliefs contained within the same religion or in a more general way from one religion to another;» — parte dos: la primera objeción, que ese carácter obligatorio no pertenece por igual a todas las instituciones religiosas y varía en intensidad dentro de una religión y entre religiones.

«but even admitting that this feature is more or less common to all religious phenomena, it is far from being peculiar to them, and the most elementary logic teaches that a definition must fit not only ‘the whole of the thing defined’ but also ‘nothing but that which is defined’.» — parte dos: la segunda objeción, con la regla lógica que invoca, que una definición debe abarcar todo lo definido y nada más que lo definido.

«As a matter of fact, obligation, imposed more or less strictly by an authority or a power of some sort or other, is an element that is to be found wherever there are social institutions properly speaking; for instance, is there anything that sets itself up as more rigorously obligatory than the idea of legality?» — parte dos: sitúa la obligación dondequiera que haya instituciones sociales y pone por caso extremo la idea de legalidad.

«but who would seriously maintain that the juridical institutions of modern Europe are imbued with a religious character? Such a suggestion is plainly absurd,» — parte dos: y la consecuencia con que cierra la objeción, que nadie sostendría en serio que las instituciones jurídicas de la Europa moderna tengan carácter religioso.

«We have not yet finished considering the fantasies of the sociologists: another favorite theory of theirs consists in saying that religion is essentially characterized by the presence of a ritual element; this means in other words that wherever the existence of rites of any kind can be established, it may without further question be inferred that one is for that reason in the presence of religious phenomena.» — parte dos: pasa a la segunda teoría sociológica, la que caracteriza la religión por la presencia de un elemento ritual.

«A ritual element admittedly is to be met with in all religions, but this element is not sufficient by itself to characterize religion as such; in this case, as in the previous one, the suggested definition is far too wide, because there exist rites, of more than one kind, that are in no wise religious.» — parte dos: concede el elemento ritual en toda religión y niega que baste para caracterizarla, porque hay ritos de más de una clase que no son religiosos.

«Among the Greeks especially, rites and symbols inherited from more ancient and already forgotten traditions rapidly lost their original and exact meaning;» — parte dos, capítulo Tradición y religión: adjudica a los griegos la pérdida temprana del sentido original y exacto de ritos y símbolos heredados de tradiciones más antiguas y ya olvidadas.

«Among the Romans there prevailed conditions similar to those found in Greece, with the difference, however, that their incomprehension of the symbolical forms they borrowed from the traditions of the Etruscans and other peoples did not arise as the result of an» — parte dos: para Roma da condiciones semejantes a las de Grecia con una diferencia sobre el origen de su incomprensión de las formas simbólicas tomadas de etruscos y otros pueblos. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«esthetic tendency invading all the realms of thought, even those that should have been most firmly closed to it, but rather from a complete incapacity for anything of a really intellectual order.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: la incomprensión romana no viene de una tendencia estética invasora sino de incapacidad completa para lo intelectual.

«and it must always necessarily do so because it is an indispensable feature of any form of social organization whatsoever;» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: ese carácter obligatorio es rasgo indispensable de toda forma de organización social.

«This was well understood by the Jesuits who settled in China in the seventeenth century, and who felt no objection to taking part in these ceremonies, considering that they implied nothing incompatible with Christianity;» — parte dos: consigna que los jesuitas establecidos en China en el siglo XVII participaron de esas ceremonias por tenerlas por compatibles con el cristianismo.

«they were certainly quite correct in holding this opinion, since Confucianism, in that it takes up a standpoint entirely outside the religious sphere and only concerns itself with those things that must normally be accepted by all members of a social body without distinction, is for that reason perfectly reconcilable with any and every religion, as well as with the absence of all religion.» — parte dos: les da la razón, y funda esa compatibilidad en que el confucianismo se sitúa fuera de la esfera religiosa y solo atiende a lo que todo miembro del cuerpo social debe aceptar.

«The present-day sociologists make exactly the same mistake as the former opponents of the Jesuits, who accused them of submitting to the practices of a religion foreign to Christianity: having observed that rites were involved, they quite naturally believed that such rites were religious in nature, like those they were familiar with in their European environment.» — parte dos: equipara el error de los sociólogos de hoy al de los antiguos adversarios de los jesuitas, tomar por religioso todo rito por serlo los conocidos en el medio europeo.

«The Far-Eastern civilization can also provide us with an example of non-religious rites of quite another kind; Taoism in fact, which is, as we have said, a purely metaphysical doctrine, also possesses certain rites which are peculiar to it; this means that there exist rites of which the character and purpose are essentially metaphysical, however astonishing such a thing may seem to Westerners.» — parte dos: nombra la segunda clase, los ritos del taoísmo, doctrina que declara puramente metafísica, y con ellos ritos de carácter y fin metafísicos.

«Since we do not wish to insist on this point at the moment, we will simply add that without going so far afield as China or India, such rites are to be found in certain branches of Islam, though it must be admitted that the Islamic tradition is almost as much a closed book to Europeans as all the rest of the East, largely by their own fault.» — parte dos: dice hallar ritos de esa clase también en ciertas ramas del islam, y declara la tradición islámica casi tan cerrada a los europeos como el resto del Oriente, en buena parte por culpa suya.

«it is permissible to ask whether the Masonic rites, for instance, partake of a religious character in any degree whatsoever, even though they are quite unmistakably rites?» — parte dos: el ejemplo occidental con que cierra la objeción, preguntar si los ritos masónicos tienen algún carácter religioso siendo inequívocamente ritos.

«A man of China, who feels a great and, so to speak, natural respect for whatever belongs to the traditional order, is always ready, if transported into a foreign environment, to adopt the forms that will seem to him to constitute its tradition; now since in the West religion alone possesses this character he may thus be led to adopt it, but in a manner that is quite superficial and temporary.» — parte dos: describe el malentendido inverso, que el chino, respetuoso del orden tradicional, adopta en el extranjero las formas que le parecen constituir su tradición, y en Occidente solo la religión tiene ese carácter.

«Returning to his native country, which he has never forsaken irrevocably, the ‘solidarity of the race’ being too powerful an influence to allow him to do so, that same man will cease to trouble his head in the very least about the religion the customs which he had provisionally followed; the reason being that this religion, which is a religion to others, could never have been conceived of by him in this fashion, since the religious viewpoint is foreign to his mentality;» — parte dos: de vuelta en su país ese mismo hombre deja de ocuparse de la religión seguida provisionalmente, porque el punto de vista religioso le es ajeno.

«Europeans would thus be quite mistaken in taxing his attitude with hypocrisy, as sometimes happens; for the Chinese it is simply a matter of courtesy, for politeness, as they conceive it, demands from a man that he should conform as far as possible to the customs of the country in which he is living» — parte dos: niega que esa actitud sea hipocresía y la llama cortesía, que para el chino manda conformarse cuanto se pueda a las costumbres del país donde se vive.

«We recall a passage in a manual of religious history which contained the strange comment that ‘in Japan as in China, faith in the doctrines of one religion does not in any way exclude faith in the doctrines of another’; in reality, different doctrines can only be compatible with each other on condition that they do not cover the same ground, which in fact applies in this case, and this should be enough to prove that here there can be no question of religion.» — parte dos: objeta el manual de historia religiosa que da por compatibles las fes de dos religiones en Japón y China, y lee esa compatibilidad como prueba de que ahí no se trata de religión.

«Indeed, apart from foreign importations that can never have had a very deep or extended influence, the religious point of view is as unknown to the Japanese as to the Chinese; in fact this is one of the few traits in common to be observed in the characters of these two peoples.» — parte dos: declara el punto de vista religioso tan desconocido para los japoneses como para los chinos, y lo cuenta entre los pocos rasgos comunes de esos dos pueblos.

«It may be said that religion essentially entails the conjunction of three elements belonging to different orders, a dogma, a moral law, and a cult or form of worship; wherever one or another of these elements happens to be wanting, there can no longer be any question of religion in the proper sense of the word.» — parte dos: da su definición positiva, la religión como conjunción de tres elementos de órdenes distintos, dogma, ley moral y culto, y sin alguno de ellos no hay religión en sentido propio.

«We will add forthwith that the first element forms the intellectual part of religion, the second its social portion, while the third, which is the ritual element, participates in both these functions;» — parte dos: reparte esos tres elementos, el dogma por parte intelectual, la moral por parte social y el rito participando de ambas.

«The word ‘dogma’ applies properly speaking to a religious doctrine; without at present going further into the special characteristics of such a doctrine, we can say that though it is obviously intellectual as regards its profounder meaning, it does not belong to the purely intellectual order, for if it did so, it would not be religious but metaphysical.» — parte dos: acota el dogma, intelectual en su sentido profundo y no del orden puramente intelectual, porque si lo fuera no sería religioso sino metafísico.

«It follows, then, that this doctrine, in taking on the special form that is adapted to its point of view, must undergo the influence of extra-intellectual elements, for the most part of a» — parte dos: deduce que esa doctrina, al tomar la forma adaptada a su punto de vista, sufre la influencia de elementos extraintelectuales. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«sentimental order; the very word ‘beliefs’ which is commonly used to denote religious conceptions clearly reveals this character, for it is an elementary psychological observation that belief, taken in its most exact sense and insofar as it is opposed to certitude—which is an entirely intellectual condition—is a phenomenon wherein sentiment plays an essential part; it amounts to a kind of inclination toward or sympathy for an idea, which moreover necessarily supposes that this idea is itself conceived with a more or less pronounced tinge of sentiment.» — parte dos: nombra ese elemento como sentimental, y lo lee en la palabra misma *creencias*, que opone a la certeza, condición enteramente intelectual.

«The same sentimental factor, though a secondary one in the doctrine, becomes preponderant, and even overwhelmingly so, in morals, the dependence of which upon dogma considered as their principle is largely a theoretical assertion;» — parte dos: hace preponderante ese factor sentimental en la moral, y declara en buena medida teórica la dependencia de la moral respecto del dogma.

«this moral aspect of religion, the justification of which can only be purely social, might be looked upon as a kind of legislation, the only kind that remains within the province of religion once the civil institutions have broken loose from it.» — parte dos: da a la moral religiosa justificación puramente social y la describe como la única legislación que queda a la religión una vez sueltas de ella las instituciones civiles.

«Lastly, the rites, which together constitute the cult or form of worship, possess an intellectual character insofar as they are looked upon as a symbolic and sensible expression of the doctrine, and a social character when considered as ‘practices’ requiring the participation of all the members of the religious community in a manner that can be more or less binding.» — parte dos: reparte el carácter del rito, intelectual como expresión simbólica y sensible de la doctrina, social como práctica que pide la participación de los miembros de la comunidad.

«The name ‘cult’ ought by rights to be reserved for religious rites only; in actual practice, however, it is fairly often used—though this is rather in the nature of an abuse— to denote other rites, for example purely social rites, as when people speak of the ‘cult of ancestors’ in China.» — parte dos: reserva el nombre de culto a los ritos religiosos y llama abuso su uso para otros, como el del culto a los antepasados en China.

«It should be observed that in a religion where the social and sentimental elements preponderate over the intellectual, both the dogma and the cult have their share reduced more and more, so that a religion of this kind tends to degenerate into ‘moralism’ pure and simple, as is well exemplified in the case of Protestantism;» — parte dos: describe la degeneración en moralismo puro de la religión donde lo social y lo sentimental predominan sobre lo intelectual, y pone por ejemplo al protestantismo.

«at the extreme limit, almost reached at the present day by a certain ‘liberal Protestantism’, what remains is no longer a religion at all, since it has preserved only one of the essential factors; it amounts simply to a kind of specialized philosophic thought.» — parte dos: lleva ese límite al protestantismo liberal de su tiempo, que ya no llama religión por conservar un solo factor esencial, sino pensamiento filosófico especializado.

«It will now be understood why we said previously that the term ‘religion’ is difficult to apply strictly outside the group formed by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, which goes to prove the specifically Jewish origin of the idea that the word now expresses.» — parte dos: vuelve a acotar el término religión al grupo de judaísmo, cristianismo e islam, y adjudica origen específicamente judío a la idea que la palabra expresa hoy.

«The reason is that in no other case are the three elements that we have just described found conjoined in one and the same traditional conception; thus in China the intellectual and the social points of view are to be found, being represented moreover by two distinct bodies of tradition, while the moral point of view is totally absent, even in the social tradition.» — parte dos: lo funda en que solo ahí se conjugan los tres elementos, y para China declara presentes el intelectual y el social en dos cuerpos de tradición distintos, y ausente el moral.

«Likewise in India, it is that same moral point of view that is wanting; if legislation here is not religious as in Islam, it is because it is entirely free from the sentimental element that can alone bestow on it the special character of a code of morals;» — parte dos: da por faltante en la India ese mismo punto de vista moral, y dice que su legislación no es religiosa porque está libre del elemento sentimental que haría de ella un código de moral.

«as for the doctrine, this is purely intellectual, that is to say metaphysical, without the least trace of the sentimental form that would be necessary in order to confer on it the character of a religious dogma, and without which the attachment of a moral code to a doctrinal principle would be quite inconceivable.» — parte dos: declara la doctrina de la India puramente intelectual, es decir metafísica, sin el rasgo sentimental que le daría carácter de dogma religioso.

«Thus it may be seen that the moral point of view, as well as the religious point of view, both essentially imply a certain element of sentimentality, which is highly developed among Westerners at the expense of intellectuality.» — parte dos: hace del elemento sentimental lo que implican por igual el punto de vista moral y el religioso, y lo declara muy desarrollado entre los occidentales a costa de la intelectualidad.

«We are therefore concerned with something that is in reality peculiar to Westerners, with whom the Muslims should also be associated, but again with the great difference that in their case morals, kept in the secondary place that belongs to them, have never come to be looked upon as existing for their own sake.» — parte dos: asocia a los musulmanes con los occidentales en eso, con la diferencia de que entre ellos la moral guarda su lugar secundario y no se toma como fin en sí.

«the Islamic mental outlook is incapable of accepting the notion of an ‘autonomous morality’, that is to say a philosophical morality, an idea which formerly arose among the Greeks and Romans, and which has once again become widely accepted in the West at the present time.» — parte dos: declara la perspectiva islámica incapaz de aceptar una moral autónoma o filosófica, idea que data entre griegos y romanos y da por extendida otra vez en el Occidente de su tiempo.

«In the first place, there are rites that partake of a purely and exclusively social character, a civil character one might say.» — parte dos, capítulo Tradición y religión: nombra la primera clase de ritos no religiosos, los de carácter puramente social, que llama civiles. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«it is actually the case in the Chinese civilization, where no such confusion has occurred, and where the ceremonies of Confucianism are in fact social rites, devoid of the slightest religious character;» — parte dos: da por caso de esos ritos civiles las ceremonias del confucianismo en China, donde dice que esa confusión no ocurrió.

«In the same order of ideas, there is a further interesting fact to be noted in the case of Japan, where Shinto in some measure can claim the same character and plays the same part as Confucianism in China; although it possesses other aspects that are less clearly» — parte dos: pone al shinto japonés en el papel que el confucianismo tiene en China. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«defined, it is pre-eminently a ceremonial institution of the State, and its ministers, who are in no wise ‘priests’, are quite at liberty to follow any religion they please or to follow none at all.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: llama al shinto institución ceremonial del Estado, y a sus ministros, que no son sacerdotes, libres de seguir cualquier religión o ninguna.

«It should in fact be pointed out that morals may be conceived in two quite different ways: according to the religious mode, when they are attached to dogma as their principle and» — parte dos: distingue dos modos de concebir la moral, y describe el religioso, donde la moral se ata al dogma como principio. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«are subordinated to it, or else in the philosophic mode, when they are treated as independent; we shall return later to this second form.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: el modo filosófico, donde la moral se trata como independiente, y que anuncia para más adelante.

«One last remark is called for here: we in no wise admit the opinion held by the sociologists that religion is purely and simply a social fact; we merely say that it contains a constituent element» — parte dos, capítulo Tradición y religión: rechaza la opinión sociológica de que la religión sea pura y simplemente un hecho social. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«belonging to the social order, which is clearly not the same thing at all, since this element is normally secondary in relation to the doctrine, belonging as this does to quite a different order; and thus religion, though social on the one side, is at the same time something more.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: le reconoce a la religión un elemento del orden social, secundario respecto de la doctrina, y sostiene que es a la vez algo más.

«Moreover, in practice, there are cases where all that pertains to the social order is bound up with and, as it were, dependent upon religion; such is the case in Islam, as we have already had occasion to explain, and also in Judaism, where legislation is no less essentially religious, but with this special feature that it only applies to a particular people; the same is equally true of a conception of Christianity that might be called ‘integral’ and that formerly found effective realization.» — parte dos: enumera los casos donde el orden social entero depende de la religión, el islam, el judaísmo con la salvedad de aplicarse a un solo pueblo, y una concepción integral del cristianismo que dice antes realizada.

«The sociological opinion only corresponds to the present state of Europe, and even then only by leaving out of account all doctrinal considerations, which however have really only lost their primary importance among the Protestant nations;» — parte dos: acota la opinión sociológica al estado presente de Europa, y aun ahí dejando fuera lo doctrinal, que dice perdido en importancia sobre todo en las naciones protestantes.

«strange to say, this theory has been used to justify the conception of a ‘State religion’, that is to say of a religion that has become more or less completely a department of the State, and which as such is in great danger of being turned into a political instrument.» — parte dos: señala que esa teoría ha servido para justificar la religión de Estado, vuelta departamento del Estado y en peligro de servir de instrumento político.

«Such an idea is evidently diametrically opposed to that of “Christendom: the latter, being anterior to the formation of nations, could neither continue to exist nor be re-established after they had once been constituted, except on condition of being essentially ‘supra-national’;» — parte dos: opone esa idea a la de Cristiandad, anterior a la formación de las naciones y que solo podría subsistir siendo esencialmente supranacional.

«on the other hand, State religion is always looked upon in fact, if not by right, as national, whether it be entirely independent or whether it recognizes an attachment to other similar institutions by a sort of federal bond, which in any case only leaves to the superior and central authority an influence considerably reduced.» — parte dos: describe la religión de Estado como nacional de hecho si no de derecho, sola o federada de modo que la autoridad central quede muy reducida.

«The first of these two conceptions, that of ‘Christendom’ is essentially identified with Catholicism, in the etymological sense of the word; the second conception, that of a ‘State religion’, finds its logical expression, as the case may be, either in a Gallicanism after the style of Louis XIV, or in Anglicanism and in certain forms of the Protestant religion,» — parte dos: identifica la Cristiandad con el catolicismo en sentido etimológico, y la religión de Estado con el galicanismo de Luis XIV, el anglicanismo y ciertas formas del protestantismo.

«In conclusion, it may be added that of these two Western ways of conceiving religion, the first one alone, taking the special features pertaining to the religious mode into account, is capable of fulfilling the conditions of a real tradition, as the Eastern mind has always conceived it.» — parte dos: cierra el capítulo dando solo a la primera de esas dos concepciones occidentales la capacidad de cumplir las condiciones de una tradición real tal como el Oriente la concibe.

«WHILE THE RELIGIOUS POINT OF VIEW necessarily implies the intervention of an element drawn from the sentimental order, the metaphysical point of view is exclusively intellectual;» — parte dos, capítulo Caracteres esenciales de la metafísica: opone el punto de vista religioso, que implica un elemento del orden sentimental, al metafísico, que declara exclusivamente intelectual.

«Science and philosophy, such as they are to be found in the Western world, also in fact have pretensions toward intellectuality; if we do not admit that these claims are well-founded and if we maintain that a gulf separates all speculations of this kind from metaphysics, this is because pure intellectuality, as we understand it, is a very different thing from the rather vague ideas that ordinarily pass under that name.» — parte dos: niega fundamento a las pretensiones de intelectualidad de la ciencia y la filosofía occidentales, y distingue la intelectualidad pura de lo que suele correr con ese nombre.

«It should be explained first of all that in adopting the term ‘metaphysics’ we are not greatly concerned with the historical origin of the word, which is open to some doubt, and which would even have to be regarded as purely accidental if one were prepared to admit the opinion, a decidedly improbable one in our view, according to which the word was first used to denote that which came ‘after physics’ in the collected works of Aristotle.» — parte dos: se desentiende del origen histórico de la palabra metafísica y llama improbable la opinión de que naciera para nombrar lo que venía después de la física en las obras reunidas de Aristóteles.

«In actual fact, taken in its most natural sense, even etymologically, it denotes whatever lies ‘beyond physics’; the word ‘physics’ must here be taken to denote the natural sciences viewed as a whole and considered in quite a general manner, as they always were by the ancients; it must on no account be taken to refer to one of those sciences in particular, according to the restricted meaning in vogue at the present day.» — parte dos: fija el sentido que da al término, lo que está más allá de la física entendida como el conjunto de las ciencias naturales al modo de los antiguos, y no como la ciencia particular de hoy.

«It may now be stated that metaphysics, understood in this way, is essentially the knowledge of the Universal, or, if preferred, the knowledge of principles belonging to the universal order, which moreover alone can validly lay claim to the name of principles;» — parte dos: enuncia qué es la metafísica así entendida, el conocimiento de lo Universal o de los principios del orden universal, únicos que dice merecer el nombre de principios.

«but in making this statement we are not really trying to propose a definition of metaphysics, for such a thing is a sheer impossibility by reason of that very universality which we look upon as the foremost among its characteristics, the one from which all the others are derived.» — parte dos: y niega que eso sea una definición, porque la universalidad, que tiene por su carácter primero y del que derivan los demás, la vuelve indefinible.

«In reality, only something that is limited is capable of definition, whereas metaphysics is on the contrary by its very nature absolutely unlimited, and this plainly does not allow of our enclosing it within a more or less narrow formula; and a definition in this case would be all the more inaccurate the more exact one tried to make it.» — parte dos: el argumento con que lo sostiene, que solo lo limitado se define, y que una definición de la metafísica sería tanto más inexacta cuanto más exacta se la quisiera hacer.

«It is important to note that we have spoken of knowledge and not of science; our purpose in so doing is to emphasize the radical distinction that must be made between metaphysics, on the one hand, and the various sciences in the proper sense of the word, on the other, namely all the particular and specialized sciences which are directed to the study of this or that determinate aspect of individual things.» — parte dos: subraya que habló de conocimiento y no de ciencia, para separar la metafísica de las ciencias particulares, dirigidas a aspectos determinados de las cosas individuales.

«Fundamentally, this distinction is none other than that between the universal and the individual orders, a distinction that must not however be looked upon as an opposition, since there can be no common measure nor any possible relationship of symmetry» — parte dos: identifica esa distinción con la del orden universal y el individual, y advierte que no debe leerse como oposición, porque entre sus términos no hay medida común. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«Indeed, no opposition or conflict of any sort between metaphysics and the sciences is conceivable, precisely because their respective domains are so widely separated; and exactly the same thing applies to the relationship between metaphysics and religion.» — parte dos: niega toda oposición o conflicto concebible entre metafísica y ciencias por la separación de sus dominios, y dice lo mismo de metafísica y religión.

«It must however be understood that the division in question does not so much concern things themselves as the points of view from which they are considered; and this is a specially important point to note in connection with what we shall have to say later on about the different branches of the Hindu doctrine and the precise nature of their inter-relationship.» — parte dos: acota que esa división no toca a las cosas mismas sino a los puntos de vista desde los que se las considera, y anuncia la importancia de ese punto para las ramas de la doctrina hindú.

«It is easy to see that the same subject can be studied by different sciences under different aspects; similarly, anything that may be examined from an individual and particular point of view can, by a suitable transposition, equally well be considered from the universal point of view (which is not to be reckoned as a special point of view at all), and the same applies in the case of things incapable of being considered from any individual standpoint whatsoever.» — parte dos: sostiene que todo lo examinable desde un punto de vista individual puede considerarse por transposición desde el universal, que declara no ser un punto de vista especial.

«In this way, it may be said that the domain of metaphysics embraces all things, which is an indispensable condition of its being truly universal, as it necessarily must be; but the respective domains of the different sciences remain nonetheless distinct from the domain of metaphysics, for the latter, which does not occupy the same plane as the specialized sciences, is in no wise analogous to them, so that there can never be any occasion for making a comparison between the results arrived at by the one and by the others.» — parte dos: hace abarcar al dominio de la metafísica todas las cosas y a la vez lo declara no análogo al de las ciencias, con lo que no cabe comparar sus resultados.

«On the other hand, the metaphysical realm certainly does not consist of those things of which the various sciences have failed to take cognizance simply because their present state of development is more or less incomplete, as is supposed by certain philosophers who can hardly have realized what is in question here; the domain of metaphysics consists of that which, of its very nature, lies outside the range of those sciences and far exceeds in scope all they can legitimately claim to contain.» — parte dos: niega que lo metafísico sea lo que las ciencias aún no alcanzaron por estar poco desarrolladas, y lo sitúa por naturaleza fuera del alcance de ellas.

«The domain of every science is always dependent upon experimentation in one or other of its various» — parte dos: hace depender el dominio de toda ciencia de la experimentación en alguna de sus modalidades. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«modalities, whereas the domain of metaphysics is essentially constituted by that which cannot be investigated externally: being ‘beyond physics’ we are also, by that very fact, beyond experiment.» — parte dos: la continuación: constituye el dominio de la metafísica con lo que no se investiga desde fuera, y de estar más allá de la física deduce estar más allá del experimento.

«Consequently, the field of every separate science can, if it is capable of it, be extended indefinitely without ever finding the slightest point of contact with the metaphysical sphere.» — parte dos, capítulo Caracteres esenciales de la metafísica: sostiene que el campo de cada ciencia puede extenderse indefinidamente sin tocar nunca la esfera metafísica.

«It also follows that the object in question must always be absolutely the same and can in no wise be something that changes or that is subject to the influences of time and place; the contingent, the accidental, and the variable belong essentially to the individual domain;» — parte dos: declara el objeto de la metafísica absolutamente el mismo siempre, no sujeto a tiempo ni lugar, y asigna lo contingente, lo accidental y lo variable al dominio individual.

«Where metaphysics is concerned, all that can alter with time and place is, on the one hand, the manner of expression, that is to say the more or less external forms which metaphysics can assume and which may be varied indefinitely, and on the other hand, the degree of knowledge or ignorance of it to be found among men;» — parte dos: lo único que concede variable con el tiempo y el lugar, la manera de expresión y el grado de conocimiento o ignorancia entre los hombres.

«but metaphysics in itself always remains fundamentally and unalterably the same, for its object is one in its essence, or to be more exact ‘without duality’, as the Hindus put it, and that object, again by the very fact that it lies ‘beyond nature’, is also beyond all change: the Arabs express this by saying that ‘the doctrine of Oneness is one’.» — parte dos: declara la metafísica inalterablemente la misma por ser su objeto uno en esencia, y trae las dos formulaciones que cita, la hindú del sin dualidad y la árabe de que la doctrina de la Unidad es una.

«Following the same line of argument, we may add that it is absolutely impossible to make any ‘discoveries’ in metaphysics, for in a type of knowledge which calls for the use of no specialized or external means of investigation all that is capable of being known may have been known by certain persons at any and every period; and this in fact emerges clearly from a profound study of the traditional metaphysical doctrines.» — parte dos: niega que quepa hacer descubrimientos en metafísica, porque un conocimiento sin medios externos de investigación pudo ser sabido por algunos en cualquier época.

«Moreover, even admitting that the notions of evolution and progress might have a certain relative value in biology and sociology—though this is far from having been proved—it is nonetheless certain that they cannot possibly find a place in metaphysics; besides, such ideas are completely foreign to the Easterners, just as they were foreign even to Westerners until almost the end of the eighteenth century, though people in the West now take it for granted that they are essential to human thought.» — parte dos: aun concediendo valor relativo a evolución y progreso en biología y sociología, los excluye de la metafísica, y data su extrañeza en Occidente hasta finales del siglo XVIII.

«One might say in fact that metaphysics can only be studied metaphysically. No notice must be taken of contingencies such as individual influences, which are strictly non-existent from this point of view and cannot affect the doctrine in any way; the latter, being of the universal order, is thereby essentially supra-individual, and necessarily remains untouched by such influences.» — parte dos: enuncia que la metafísica solo se estudia metafísicamente, y declara a la doctrina, por ser del orden universal, supraindividual y ajena a las influencias individuales.

«moreover there can be no question here, as there is in the relative and contingent order, of ‘beliefs’ or ‘opinions that are more or less variable and changing precisely because they are more or less open to doubt; metaphysical knowledge essentially implies permanent and changeless certitude.» — parte dos: aparta de la metafísica las creencias y opiniones variables por estar abiertas a la duda, y le atribuye certeza permanente e inmutable.

«Indeed, from the very fact that it in no wise shares in the relativity of the sciences, metaphysics is bound to imply absolute certainty as one of its intrinsic characteristics, not only by virtue of its object, which is certitude itself, but also by virtue of its method, if this word can still be used in the present context, for otherwise this method, or whatever else one cares to call it, would not be adequate to its object.» — parte dos: le atribuye certeza absoluta como carácter intrínseco por su objeto y también por su método, con la reserva de si cabe usar esa palabra.

«Metaphysics therefore of necessity excludes every conception of a hypothetical character, whence it follows that metaphysical truths, in themselves, cannot in any way be contestable.» — parte dos: excluye de la metafísica toda concepción hipotética y declara no contestables en sí mismas las verdades metafísicas.

«Consequently, if there sometimes is occasion for discussion and controversy, this only happens as a result of a defect in exposition or of an imperfect comprehension of those truths.» — parte dos: y adjudica toda discusión o controversia a un defecto de exposición o a una comprensión imperfecta.

«Moreover, every exposition possible in this case is necessarily defective, because metaphysical conceptions, by reason of their universality, can never be completely expressed, nor even imagined, since their essence is attainable by the pure and ‘formless’ intelligence alone;» — parte dos: declara necesariamente defectuosa toda exposición, porque las concepciones metafísicas no se expresan ni se imaginan del todo y su esencia solo la alcanza la inteligencia pura y sin forma.

«These formulas, like all symbols, can only serve as a starting-point, a ‘support’ so to speak, which acts as an aid toward understanding that which in itself remains inexpressible; it is for each man to try to conceive it according to the extent of his own intellectual powers, making good, in proportion to his success, the unavoidable deficiencies of formal and limited expression;» — parte dos: da a esas fórmulas, como a todo símbolo, el papel de punto de partida y soporte para entender lo que en sí queda inexpresable.

«it is also evident that these imperfections will be at their maximum when the expression has to be conveyed through the medium of certain languages, such as the European languages and especially the modern ones, which seem particularly ill-adapted to the exposition of metaphysical truths.» — parte dos: sitúa el máximo de esas imperfecciones en ciertas lenguas, y declara las europeas, sobre todo las modernas, mal adaptadas a la exposición de verdades metafísicas.

«Knowledge belonging to the universal order of necessity lies beyond all the distinctions that condition the knowledge of individual things, of which that between subject and object is a general and basic type;» — parte dos: sitúa el conocimiento del orden universal más allá de las distinciones que condicionan el conocimiento individual, y da por tipo básico la de sujeto y objeto.

«Likewise, when one speaks of the means of attaining metaphysical knowledge, it is evident that such means can only be one and the same thing as knowledge itself, in which subject and object are essentially unified; this amounts to saying that the means in question, if indeed it is permissible to describe it by that word, cannot in any way resemble the exercise of a discursive faculty such as individual human reason.» — parte dos: identifica el medio de alcanzar el conocimiento metafísico con el conocimiento mismo, donde sujeto y objeto están unificados, y lo separa del ejercicio de una facultad discursiva como la razón.

«As we have said before, we are dealing with the supra-individual and consequently with the supra-rational order, which does not in any way mean the irrational: metaphysics cannot contradict reason, but it stands above reason,» — parte dos: sitúa la metafísica en el orden suprarracional y acota que eso no quiere decir irracional, porque no contradice a la razón sino que está por encima de ella.

«To be more precise, it should be said that the faculty we are now referring to is intellectual intuition, the reality of which has been consistently denied by modern philosophy, which has failed to grasp its real nature whenever it has not preferred simply to ignore it; this faculty can also be called the pure intellect, following the practice of Aristotle and his Scholastic successors, for to them the intellect was in fact that faculty which possessed a direct knowledge of principles.» — parte dos: nombra esa facultad intuición intelectual o intelecto puro, dice que la filosofía moderna le ha negado realidad, y la remite a Aristóteles y los escolásticos, para quienes el intelecto conocía directamente los principios.

«Aristotle expressly declares! that ‘the intellect is truer than science, which amounts to saying that it is more true than the reason which constructs that science; he also says that ‘nothing is more true than the intellect; for it is necessarily infallible from the fact that its operation is immediate and because, not being really distinct from its object, it is identified with the truth itself.» — parte dos: cita a Aristóteles diciendo que el intelecto es más verdadero que la ciencia y que nada hay más verdadero que el intelecto, e infiere su infalibilidad de que su operación es inmediata y no se distingue de su objeto.

«Such is the essential basis of metaphysical certainty; it may thus be seen that error can only enter in with the use of reason, that is, with the formulation of the truths that the intellect has conceived, and this follows from the fact that reason is obviously fallible in consequence of its discursive and mediate character.» — parte dos: sitúa el error solo en el uso de la razón al formular lo que el intelecto concibió, por el carácter discursivo y mediato de aquella.

«Furthermore, since all expression is bound to be imperfect and limited, error is inevitable in its form, if not in its content: however exact one tries to make the expression, what is left out is always much greater than what is included; but this unavoidable error in expression contains nothing positive as such and simply amounts to a lesser truth, since it resides merely in the partial and incomplete formulation of the integral truth.» — parte dos: declara inevitable el error en la forma y no en el contenido, y lo reduce a una verdad menor por formulación parcial de la verdad íntegra.

«It now becomes possible to grasp the profound significance of the distinction between metaphysical and scientific knowledge: the first is derived from the pure intellect, which has the Universal for its domain; the second is derived from reason, which has the general» — parte dos: separa el conocimiento metafísico, derivado del intelecto puro con lo Universal por dominio, del científico, derivado de la razón. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«for its domain since, as Aristotle has declared, ‘there is no science but that of the general? One must on no account confuse the Universal with the general» — parte dos: cierra la distinción con la sentencia que atribuye a Aristóteles, que no hay ciencia sino de lo general, y advierte contra confundir lo Universal con lo general.

«as often happens among Western logicians, who moreover never really go beyond the general, even when they erroneously apply to it the name of universal.» — parte dos: adjudica esa confusión a los lógicos occidentales, que no pasan de lo general aun cuando le den el nombre de universal.

«The point of view of the sciences, as we have shown, belongs to the individual order; the general is not opposed to the individual, but only to the particular, since it is really nothing else than the individual extended;» — parte dos: sitúa el punto de vista de las ciencias en el orden individual, y define lo general como lo individual extendido, opuesto a lo particular y no a lo individual.

«that is why we say that science could be indefinitely extended without ever joining metaphysics, from which it will always remain as completely separate as ever, because metaphysics alone embraces the knowledge of the Universal.» — parte dos: repite que la ciencia puede extenderse indefinidamente sin unirse a la metafísica, que es la única que abarca el conocimiento de lo Universal.

«All that we have just said can be applied, without reservation, to every one of the traditional doctrines of the East, in spite of great differences in form which might conceal their fundamental identity from the eyes of a casual observer: this conception of metaphysics is equally true of Taoism, of the Hindu doctrine, and also of the inward and extra-religious aspect of Islam.» — parte dos: extiende sin reserva su descripción de la metafísica a todas las doctrinas tradicionales del Oriente, y nombra el taoísmo, la doctrina hindú y el aspecto interior y extrarreligioso del islam.

«‘historical method’ to the metaphysical order; in fact the metaphysical point of view is itself radically opposed to the historical point of view, or what passes for such, and this opposition will be seen to amount not only to a question of method, but also, what is far more important, to a real question of principle, since the metaphysical point of view, in its essential immutability, is the very negation of the notions of evolution and progress.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: opone radicalmente el punto de vista metafísico al histórico, no por método sino por principio, porque su inmutabilidad niega las nociones de evolución y progreso.

«but only on the strict condition that it is not regarded as having anything in common with the faculty which certain contemporary philosophers call intuition, a purely instinctive and vital faculty that is really beneath reason and not above it.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: pone la condición de no confundirla con la intuición de ciertos filósofos contemporáneos, instintiva y vital, que sitúa por debajo de la razón.

«Now, is there anything of the kind to be found in the Western world? If one were only to consider what actually exists at the present time, it would certainly not» — parte dos: se pregunta si hay algo semejante en el mundo occidental. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«be possible to give any but a negative answer to this question, for that which modern philosophical thought is sometimes content to label as metaphysics bears no relation whatsoever to the conception just put forward;» — parte dos: la continuación: responde en negativo para el presente, y niega toda relación entre lo que el pensamiento filosófico moderno llama metafísica y la concepción que expuso.

«Nevertheless, what we said about Aristotle and the Scholastic doctrine at least shows that metaphysics really existed in the West to a certain extent, if incompletely; and in spite of this necessary reservation, one can say that here was something that is without the slightest equivalent in the modern mentality and that seems to be» — parte dos, capítulo Caracteres esenciales de la metafísica: concede que hubo metafísica en Occidente, aunque incompleta, en Aristóteles y la escolástica, y la declara sin equivalente en la mentalidad moderna. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«On the other hand, if the above reservation is unavoidable, it is because, as we said earlier on, there are certain limitations that seem to be innate in the whole of Western intellectuality, at least from the time of classical antiquity onward; we have already noted, in this respect, that the Greeks had no notion of the Infinite.» — parte dos: funda esa reserva en limitaciones que dice innatas en la intelectualidad occidental desde la antigüedad clásica, y recuerda que los griegos no tuvieron noción del Infinito.

«Besides, why do modern Westerners, when they imagine they are conceiving the Infinite, always represent it as a space, which can only be indefinite, and why do they persist in confusing eternity, which abides essentially in the ‘timeless’, if one may so express it, with perpetuity, which is but an indefinite extension of time, whereas such misconceptions do not occur among Easterners?» — parte dos: señala dos confusiones que atribuye a los occidentales, representar el Infinito como espacio, que solo puede ser indefinido, y confundir la eternidad con la perpetuidad.

«The fact is that the Western mind, being almost exclusively inclined to the study of the things of the senses, is constantly led to confuse conceiving with imagining, to the extent that whatever is not capable of sensible representation seems to it to be actually unthinkable for that very reason; even among the Greeks the imaginative faculties were preponderant.» — parte dos: adjudica esas confusiones a una mente vuelta a lo sensible que confunde concebir con imaginar, y extiende el predominio de lo imaginativo hasta los griegos.

«If another common confusion be added as well, namely that of the rational with the intellectual, it becomes evident that the supposed Western intellectuality, especially among the moderns, in reality amounts to no more than the exercising of the exclusively individual and formal faculties of reason and imagination; it can then be understood what a gulf separates it from Eastern intellectuality, which regards no knowledge as real or valuable excepting that knowledge which has its deepest roots in the Universal and the formless.» — parte dos: sumando la confusión de lo racional con lo intelectual, reduce la supuesta intelectualidad occidental al ejercicio de razón e imaginación, facultades individuales y formales.

«THE QUESTION we are now about to consider does not arise in the East, because of the absence of the specifically religious point of view, in which the theological mode of thought is naturally inherent; or rather it could only arise in connection with Islam, where it would assume the form of an inquiry into the proper relationship between the two aspects of the tradition, religious and extra-religious, which could with equal justice be called the theological and metaphysical aspects.» — parte dos, capítulo Relaciones entre la metafísica y la teología: declara que la cuestión no se plantea en Oriente por faltar el punto de vista religioso, salvo en el islam, con sus dos aspectos de la tradición.

«In the West on the other hand, it is the absence of the metaphysical point of view that prevents this question from being generally raised; in actual practice it only affects the Scholastic doctrine, which was in fact both theological and metaphysical, though, as we said before, it was restricted in scope in this second respect; but it does not appear as if a very definite solution of the question was ever arrived at.» — parte dos: en Occidente la cuestión solo afecta a la escolástica, teológica y metafísica a la vez aunque restringida en lo segundo, y dice que nunca se le dio solución definida.

«As we have said, the point of view of metaphysics is alone universal and therefore limitless; accordingly, every other point of view is more or less specialized and by nature subject to certain limitations.» — parte dos: repite que solo el punto de vista metafísico es universal e ilimitado, y declara especializado y limitado a todo otro.

«Now this essential limitation, which may evidently be either more or less narrow, even applies to the theological point of view; in other words, the latter is also a specialized point of view, although not in the same sense as the sciences; neither are its limits such as to enclose it within so narrow a field.» — parte dos: extiende esa limitación al punto de vista teológico, que declara especializado aunque no al modo de las ciencias ni en campo tan estrecho.

«But it is precisely because theology, in one sense, comes closer to metaphysics than do the sciences, that it requires a more subtle perception to distinguish it from metaphysics, so that confusions can arise here more easily than in any other case.» — parte dos: explica por qué la confusión con la teología es la más fácil, porque la teología está más cerca de la metafísica que las ciencias y hace falta más finura para distinguirlas.

«Such confusions indeed have not failed to arise, and they have gone so far as to bring about a reversal of the relations that should normally exist between metaphysics and theology; thus, even in the Middle Ages, which nevertheless was the only period when Western civilization enjoyed a truly intellectual development, metaphysics came to be treated merely as a dependency of theology, besides being insufficiently detached from various considerations of a purely philosophical nature.» — parte dos: consigna la inversión que ve producida, la metafísica tratada como dependencia de la teología aun en la Edad Media, el único período que llama de desarrollo intelectual en Occidente.

«That this should have been possible is due simply to the fact that metaphysics, as conceived by the Scholastic doctrine, had remained incomplete, with the result that its universal character, implying as it does the absence of every limitation, was never fully grasped.» — parte dos: atribuye esa inversión a que la metafísica escolástica quedó incompleta y no se captó del todo su carácter universal.

«This brings us back to what we have already said, namely that Westerners, including even those who were true metaphysicians up to a certain point, have never known metaphysics in its entirety.» — parte dos: sostiene que los occidentales, aun los que fueron metafísicos hasta cierto punto, nunca conocieron la metafísica entera.

«Nevertheless, there may have been individual exceptions, for, as we pointed out before, nothing in principle precludes the existence, at any period or in any country, of men capable of attaining to complete metaphysical knowledge;» — parte dos: y el límite que él mismo pone, que nada impide en principio que en cualquier época y país haya hombres capaces del conocimiento metafísico completo.

«In any case, it is only right to point out that if such exceptions ever did exist, no written evidence has been found to prove it, nor do the generally known facts reveal traces of their influence;» — parte dos: consigna que de esas excepciones no hay prueba escrita ni rastro de influencia en los hechos conocidos.

«this absence of direct evidence however proves nothing in a negative sense, nor should it occasion any surprise, for if cases of this sort did in fact occur, it can only have been thanks to very special circumstances of a nature that we cannot profitably discuss here.» — parte dos: y niega valor negativo a esa ausencia de evidencia, remitiendo a circunstancias muy especiales que no discute.

«To return to the question that chiefly concerns us at present, we shall remind the reader that we have already pointed out the most essential difference between a metaphysical doctrine and a religious dogma; whereas the metaphysical point of view is purely intellectual, the religious point of view implies as a fundamental characteristic the presence of a sentimental element affecting the doctrine itself, which does not allow of its preserving an attitude of entirely disinterested speculation;» — parte dos: repite la diferencia esencial entre doctrina metafísica y dogma religioso, el elemento sentimental que afecta a la doctrina y le impide una especulación enteramente desinteresada.

«This emotional element nowhere plays a bigger part than in the ‘mystical’ form of religious thought; and let us take this opportunity of declaring that, contrary to a far too prevalent opinion, mysticism, from the very fact that it is inconceivable apart from the religious point of view, is quite unknown in the East.» — parte dos: sitúa el máximo de ese elemento emocional en la forma mística del pensamiento religioso, y declara el misticismo desconocido en Oriente por ser inconcebible fuera del punto de vista religioso.

«In the very widespread confusion which consists in lending a mystical interpretation to ideas that have nothing mystical about them, one can observe yet another example of the persistent tendency among Westerners to find all over the world pure and simple equivalents of modes of thought that are in reality peculiar to themselves;» — parte dos: lee en la interpretación mística de ideas que no lo son otro ejemplo de la tendencia occidental a hallar en todo el mundo equivalentes de modos de pensamiento propios.

«The influence of sentimental elements obviously impairs the intellectual purity of the doctrine, and it is only right to say that it does in fact represent a certain falling away from the standpoint of metaphysical thought; this falling away, in the region where it took place generally and extensively, that is to say in the Western world, was in many ways inevitable and in a sense even necessary if the» — parte dos: declara que los elementos sentimentales dañan la pureza intelectual de la doctrina y a la vez llama inevitable y en cierto sentido necesaria esa caída en Occidente. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«doctrine was to be adapted to the mentality of the men for whom it was being specially framed, men in whom feeling was stronger than intelligence in virtue of a predominance that has reached its climax in modern times.» — parte dos: la continuación: esa adaptación se hizo para hombres en quienes el sentimiento pesa más que la inteligencia, predominio que dice culminante en los tiempos modernos.

«Nevertheless, it remains true that feeling is but a relative and contingent thing, so that any doctrine that makes an appeal to it and on which it reacts in its turn is bound to be relative and contingent; and this is especially noticeable in regard to the need for ‘consolations’ with which the religious point of view is closely bound up.» — parte dos: declara el sentimiento relativo y contingente, y con él toda doctrina que lo invoque, y lo liga a la necesidad de consuelos propia del punto de vista religioso.

«Truth, in itself, has no need to be consoling; if anyone finds it so, so much the better for him certainly, though the consolation he feels does not emanate from the doctrine, but purely from himself and from the particular predispositions of his own sentimentality.» — parte dos: niega que la verdad necesite consolar, y atribuye el consuelo no a la doctrina sino a las predisposiciones del que lo siente.

«It follows that a doctrine that adapts itself to the requirements of sentimental beings and that must therefore itself put on a sentimental dress can henceforth no longer be identified with absolute and total truth; the profound change produced in the form of the doctrine by the introduction of a consolatory principle corresponds to an intellectual falling off on the part of the human collectivity to which its message is addressed.» — parte dos: deduce que una doctrina en traje sentimental ya no se identifica con la verdad absoluta y total, y lee en ese cambio una caída intelectual de la colectividad destinataria.

«Looked at from another angle, it is this characteristic that gives birth to the inevitable diversity of religious dogmas; hence their incompatibility, for whereas intelligence is one, and truth, in whatever measure it is understood, can be understood in one way only, the same does not apply to feeling, so that religion, in seeking to satisfy the demands of feeling, cannot avoid trying to adapt its form as far as possible to its multiple modes, which vary largely according to race and period.» — parte dos: de ese rasgo hace nacer la diversidad e incompatibilidad de los dogmas religiosos, porque la inteligencia es una y el sentimiento tiene modos múltiples según raza y época.

«This does not mean, however, that all religious forms, in their doctrinal part, suffer the dissolving action of sentimentalism to an equal degree, with its resultant need for change; a comparison between Catholicism and Protestantism, for example, is particularly instructive in this connection.» — parte dos: acota que no todas las formas religiosas sufren por igual la acción disolvente del sentimentalismo, y remite a la comparación entre catolicismo y protestantismo.

«It can now be seen that the theological point of view is only a particularization of the metaphysical point of view, implying a proportional alteration; it is an application of it to contingent conditions, one might say, the mode of adaptation being determined by the nature of the conditions to which it must respond, since after all» — parte dos: define el punto de vista teológico como particularización del metafísico, con alteración proporcional, aplicado a condiciones contingentes. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«From this it follows that every theological truth, by means of a transposition dissociating it from its specific form, may be conceived in terms of the metaphysical truth corresponding to it, of which it is but a kind of translation, though this does not mean that there is effective equivalence between the two orders of conception:» — parte dos: admite que toda verdad teológica puede concebirse, por transposición, en la verdad metafísica correspondiente, con el límite de que no hay equivalencia efectiva entre los dos órdenes.

«If things are now examined in an inverse sense, it must be said that certain metaphysical truths are capable of being translated into theological language, though not all, for in this case it is important to take into consideration many things that cannot be included under any individual point of view whatsoever, and that therefore belong exclusively to the realm of metaphysics; the Universal in its entirety cannot be compressed within any particular point of view, neither can it be enclosed within any form, which really amounts to saying the same thing.» — parte dos: en sentido inverso solo concede traducción teológica a algunas verdades metafísicas, porque lo Universal entero no cabe en un punto de vista particular ni en forma alguna.

«Even in the case of such truths as are suited to undergo the translation in question, that translation, like every other formulation, cannot but always remain incomplete and partial, and what it omits gives the precise measure of the difference between the points of view of theology and of pure metaphysics.» — parte dos: y el criterio de medida que propone, lo que esa traducción omite da la medida exacta de la diferencia entre teología y metafísica pura.

«one such example, to mention a typical case among many others, may be found in a comparison of the metaphysical conception of ‘deliverance’ in the Hindu doctrine with the theological conception of ‘salvation’ in the Western religions; these two conceptions are essentially different, and it is only the lack of comprehension of some of the orientalists that is responsible for attempts to assimilate them, in a way that remains, however, a mere matter of words.» — parte dos: el ejemplo típico que da, la deliverance metafísica de la doctrina hindú frente a la salvation teológica de las religiones occidentales, que declara esencialmente distintas y asimiladas solo de palabra por orientalistas.

«Let it also be noticed in passing that a case like this should serve as a warning against another very real danger: if a Hindu, to whom Western concepts are foreign, is told that Europeans mean by the word ‘salvation’ exactly what he means by the word moksha, he will certainly have no reason» — parte dos, capítulo Relaciones entre la metafísica y la teología: advierte del peligro de decirle a un hindú que *salvation* equivale a *moksha*. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«for contradicting this assertion or for doubting its accuracy, so that later on, at least until he becomes better informed, he may himself be led into employing this word ‘salvation’ in order to describe a conception that is in no wise theological in character; in that case the misunderstanding will be mutual, and the confusion will thus be rendered still more inextricable.» — parte dos: la continuación: el hindú no tendría razón para dudarlo y acabaría usando esa palabra para una concepción nada teológica, con lo que el malentendido se vuelve mutuo.

«The same applies to the misconceptions that spring from the no less mistaken assimilation of the metaphysical point of view to the points of view of Western philosophy: we have in mind the case of a Muslim who readily accepted, as quite natural, the expression ‘Islamic pantheism’ when applied to the metaphysical doctrine of the ‘Supreme Identity’; but the moment it was explained to him what pantheism really stood for in the true sense of the word, as for example in Spinoza, he rejected such a designation with horror.» — parte dos: el segundo caso que da, el musulmán que aceptaba como natural la etiqueta de panteísmo islámico para la doctrina de la Identidad Suprema y la rechazó al saber qué significa panteísmo en Spinoza.

«To show what is implied by the translation of metaphysical truths into theological language, we will confine ourselves to one extremely simple and elementary example: the immediate metaphysical truth “Being is, when expressed according to the religious or theological mode, will give rise to another proposition, namely that “God exists’; but the two statements would not be strictly equivalent except on the double condition of conceiving God as Universal Being—which is far from always being the case in fact—and of identifying existence with pure Being, which is metaphysically inexact.» — parte dos: el ejemplo elemental de traducción a lenguaje teológico, la verdad *el Ser es* vuelta *Dios existe*, equivalentes solo bajo dos condiciones que declara no siempre dadas.

«Doubtless this example, because of its too great simplicity, does not entirely do justice to the deeper aspects of theological conceptions; but even such as it is, it can be found instructive, because it is precisely out of the misunderstanding of the implications of the two formulas just cited, resulting from a confusion of the two corresponding points of view, that there arose the endless controversies connected with the famous ‘ontological argument’, which is itself but a product of this confusion.» — parte dos: acota que el ejemplo es demasiado simple y lo declara instructivo igual, porque de esa confusión hace nacer las controversias del argumento ontológico.

«Another important point that may be noted concerning the same example is that theological conceptions, not being beyond the reach of individual variations, as are pure metaphysical conceptions, can vary from one individual to another, and these variations are inevitably centered around divergencies concerning the most fundamental conception of all, namely the very conception of Divinity:» — parte dos: sitúa las concepciones teológicas al alcance de las variaciones individuales, a diferencia de las metafísicas puras, y centra esas variaciones en la concepción misma de la Divinidad.

«It is especially in this realm of individual variations, for which official and instructed theology must however in no wise bear the blame, that a pre-eminently anti-metaphysical tendency is revealed, commonly to be found among Westerners, and which properly speaking constitutes ‘anthropomorphism;» — parte dos: sitúa en ese terreno de variaciones individuales, y no en la teología instruida, la tendencia antimetafísica que llama antropomorfismo.

«THE WORD ‘SYMBOL’ in its most general sense, can be applied to every formal expression of a doctrine, whether verbal, visual, or otherwise; a word can have no other function or justification but that of symbolizing an idea, which amounts to saying that it gives, as far as such a thing is possible, a sensible and moreover purely analogical representation of the idea.» — parte dos, capítulo Simbolismo y antropomorfismo: extiende la palabra símbolo a toda expresión formal de una doctrina, verbal o visual, y da a la palabra misma la función de representar analógicamente una idea.

«Taken in this sense, symbolism, which is but the employing of forms or images as signs of ideas or of suprasensible things, is evidently natural to the human mind, and therefore necessary and spontaneous; language provides a simple example of this process.» — parte dos: declara ese simbolismo natural a la mente humana, y por eso necesario y espontáneo, con el lenguaje por ejemplo.

«There exists also, in a more special sense, a deliberate, calculated symbolism, that to some extent crystallizes the doctrinal teachings in figurative representations; and indeed, between these two kinds of symbolism there is in truth no precise dividing line, for it is quite certain that writing, at its origin, was everywhere ideographic, that is to say essentially symbolical, even in the more special sense just referred to, though it is only in China that it can be said to have remained in this state always and exclusively.» — parte dos: distingue un simbolismo deliberado que cristaliza la enseñanza en representaciones figuradas, niega línea divisoria neta entre los dos, y da la escritura por ideográfica en su origen, estado en que solo China se mantuvo.

«Howbeit, symbolism, as usually understood, is in much more constant use for the expression of Eastern than of Western thought; and this is quite understandable when it is realized that it constitutes a much less narrowly limited means of expression than ordinary language; suggesting as it does far more than it expresses, it provides the support that is best adapted to possibilities of conception that lie beyond the power of words.» — parte dos: adjudica al simbolismo un uso más constante en el pensamiento oriental que en el occidental, por ser medio menos limitado que el lenguaje ordinario y sugerir más de lo que expresa.

«moreover, symbols that were originally metaphysical can become religious symbols as well, by a process of secondary adaptation running parallel to that of the doctrine.» — parte dos: admite el paso de símbolos metafísicos a religiosos por una adaptación secundaria paralela a la de la doctrina.

«All rites, for example, possess a pre-eminently symbolical character, whatever realm they may be attached to, and it is always possible to transpose the meaning of religious rites in a metaphysical sense, as well as that of the theological doctrine to which they are linked; even in purely social rites, if one wishes to discover the deeper reasons for their existence, it is necessary to pass from the sphere of applications, which contains their immediate governing conditions, to the sphere of principles, that is, to their traditional source, which is metaphysical in its essence.» — parte dos: atribuye carácter eminentemente simbólico a todo rito, admite transponer en sentido metafísico el sentido de los ritos religiosos, y remite aun los ritos sociales a su fuente tradicional.

«We are not trying to suggest, however, that rites are nothing but pure symbols; they are symbolical no doubt, and they cannot but be so, for they would otherwise be quite devoid of meaning, but they must at the same time be conceived of as possessing an efficacy of their own, as means of realization operating in view of the end for which they have been instituted and to which they are subordinated.» — parte dos: y el límite que pone de inmediato, que los ritos no son puros símbolos sino medios de realización con eficacia propia, subordinados al fin para el que fueron instituidos.

«Here, on the religious plane, may be recognized the Catholic conception of the virtue of the ‘sacraments’, while from the metaphysical point of view one discovers the principle underlying certain ways of realization to which we shall refer later, and it is this that has enabled us to speak of specifically metaphysical rites.» — parte dos: reconoce en el plano religioso la concepción católica de la virtud de los sacramentos, y en el metafísico el principio de ciertas vías de realización, de donde su idea de ritos metafísicos.

«It might be said moreover that every symbol, insofar as it must essentially serve as a support to a conception, is also endowed with a very real efficacy; and the religious sacrament itself, insofar as it is a sensible sign, does indeed play a similar part as support of the ‘spiritual influence’ that will turn the sacrament into an instrument of immediate or deferred psychical regeneration; just as in the parallel case the intellectual potentialities included in the symbol are able to awaken either an effective or simply a virtual conception, according to the receptive capacity of each individual.» — parte dos: atribuye a todo símbolo eficacia real como soporte, y empareja el sacramento, soporte sensible de una influencia espiritual, con las potencialidades intelectuales que el símbolo despierta según la capacidad de cada uno.

«From this point of view, a rite is still only a particular kind of symbol: it is, one might say, a symbol ‘enacted’, but only if the symbol is taken for what it really is and not merely considered in its outward or contingent appearance: here, as in the study of texts, one must learn to look beyond the ‘letter’ in order to discover the ‘spirit.» — parte dos: define el rito como símbolo actuado, con la condición de tomar el símbolo por lo que es, y pide mirar más allá de la letra para hallar el espíritu.

«This, however, is precisely what Westerners usually fail to do: the faulty interpretations of the orientalists provide us with characteristic examples, for they quite frequently take the form of distorting the symbols which are the objects of study, in the same way that the Western mind in general spontaneously distorts any symbols that it happens to come across.» — parte dos: adjudica a los orientalistas la distorsión de los símbolos que estudian, y a la mente occidental esa distorsión como cosa espontánea.

«The determining cause of the error in this case is the predominance of the sensible and imaginative faculties: to mistake the symbol itself for what it represents, through an incapacity to rise to its purely intellectual purport, is the fundamental confusion to be found at the root of all ‘idolatry’, giving to this word its strictest sense such as is brought out with especial clarity by Islam.» — parte dos: sitúa la causa del error en el predominio de lo sensible y lo imaginativo, y llama idolatría a tomar el símbolo por lo que representa, en el sentido estricto que atribuye al islam.

«When nothing of a symbol remains but its outward form, both its justification and its actual virtue have alike disappeared; the symbol has then become nothing but an ‘idol’, that is to say a vain image, and its preservation amounts to mere ‘superstition —so long, that is, as no one appears who is endowed with an understanding capable of effectively restoring to it, either partially or wholly, whatever it had lost, or at least those elements which it no longer contains save in a state of latent possibility.» — parte dos: describe el símbolo reducido a su forma exterior como ídolo y su conservación como superstición, con la salvedad de que alguien con la comprensión necesaria puede restituirle lo perdido.

«This applies to the traces left behind by every tradition the real meaning of which has fallen into oblivion, and especially to any religion that has been reduced by the general incomprehension of its votaries to a mere external formalism; we have already mentioned what is perhaps the most striking example of such a degeneration, in the case of Greek religion.» — parte dos: aplica eso a los rastros de toda tradición cuyo sentido se olvidó y a toda religión reducida a formalismo externo, y da por ejemplo más llamativo la religión griega.

«It is also among the Greeks that a tendency was to be found in its most extreme form, which appears to be inseparable from ‘idolatry’ and the materialization of symbols, namely the tendency toward anthropomorphism: they did not look on their gods as representing certain principles, but they pictured them really as beings with human forms, affected by human feelings and acting after the manner of men;» — parte dos: sitúa entre los griegos la forma extrema del antropomorfismo, con dioses que no representan principios sino seres de forma humana, con sentimientos humanos.

«and these gods, for the Greeks, no longer possessed anything whereby to distinguish them from the forms in which poetry and art had clothed them, so that they were literally nothing apart from the form itself.» — parte dos: y la consecuencia que saca, que esos dioses no se distinguían ya de las formas que el arte y la poesía les dieron y no eran nada fuera de la forma.

«impossible to go further in the direction of gross incomprehension, grosser even than that of certain moderns who refuse to see in the ancient symbols anything more than a figuring or an attempted explanation of various natural phenomena; the all too famous theory of the ‘solar myth’ is the best known example of the latter kind of interpretation.» — parte dos: pone por debajo de esa incomprensión la de los modernos que ven en los símbolos antiguos una explicación de fenómenos naturales, y nombra la teoría del mito solar.

«‘Myths’, like ‘idols’, have never been anything else but symbols misunderstood: the one corresponds in the order of speech to what the other is in the visual order; among the Greeks, poetry gave rise to the first just as art produced the second;» — parte dos: define mitos e ídolos como símbolos mal entendidos, el uno en el orden del habla y el otro en el visual, nacidos entre los griegos de la poesía y del arte.

«but among peoples to whom, as to the Easterners, naturalism and anthropomorphism are equally foreign, neither the one nor the other could arise save in the imagination of Westerners who wished to set themselves up as interpreters of things they quite failed to understand.» — parte dos: declara ajenos el naturalismo y el antropomorfismo a los orientales, y sitúa uno y otro en la imaginación de los occidentales que quisieron interpretarlos.

«The naturalistic interpretation really reverses the normal relationships: a natural phenomenon, like anything else belonging to the sensible order, can be taken to symbolize an idea or a principle, and a symbol has no use or justification except in virtue of the fact that it belongs to an order inferior to the thing symbolized.» — parte dos: llama inversión de la relación normal a la lectura naturalista, y fija la regla, que el símbolo pertenece a un orden inferior a lo simbolizado.

«Similarly, there is doubtless a general and natural tendency in man to employ the human form for symbolical purposes; but the practice, which in itself is not open to objection any more than the use of a geometrical figure or any other method of representation, in no wise constitutes anthropomorphism, so long as man does not become a dupe of the figuration he has adopted.» — parte dos: concede natural el uso de la forma humana como símbolo y lo declara no objetable ni antropomórfico mientras el hombre no se engañe con la figuración adoptada.

«In China and in India there has never been any parallel with what occurred in Greece, and symbols based upon the human figure, though commonly used, were never turned into ‘idols’;» — parte dos: niega en China y en la India paralelo con lo ocurrido en Grecia, y dice que los símbolos de figura humana, de uso común, nunca se volvieron ídolos.

«and in this connection it may also be noted how opposed symbolism is to the Western conception of art: nothing is less symbolical than ‘classical’ Greek art and nothing is more so than. the Eastern arts;» — parte dos: opone el simbolismo a la concepción occidental del arte, con el arte griego clásico por lo menos simbólico y las artes orientales por lo más. El punto a media frase sale así del troceo.

«but where art is regarded solely as a means of expression to serve as the vehicle of certain intellectual conceptions, it obviously could not be taken for an end in itself, as only happens among peoples of a predominantly sentimental turn of mind.» — parte dos: donde el arte es medio de expresión de concepciones intelectuales, niega que pueda tomarse por fin en sí, cosa que atribuye a los pueblos de giro sentimental.

«who discuss such matters as the ‘proofs of God’s existence’, if they hope to understand one another, should first of all make sure that in uttering the same word ‘God’ they really are intending to express an identical conception; they would often discover that this is far from being the case, so that they have no better chances of reaching agreement than if they were speaking different languages.» — parte dos, capítulo Relaciones entre la metafísica y la teología: aconseja a quienes discuten las pruebas de la existencia de Dios asegurarse antes de que con la misma palabra expresan una concepción idéntica, porque a menudo no es así.

«Indeed, symbolism, in which conceptual indefinitude in no wise precludes an absolutely mathematical exactness, thus reconciling» — parte dos, capítulo Simbolismo y antropomorfismo: en el simbolismo la indefinitud conceptual no excluye una exactitud matemática. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«apparently contradictory qualities, is as it were the natural language of metaphysics;» — parte dos: la continuación: llama al simbolismo la lengua natural de la metafísica, que reconcilia cualidades en apariencia contradictorias.

«Such complete reduction to a human perspective could alone serve as a pretext for the theory that has been called ‘Euhemerisn’ after the name of its inventor, according to which the gods were» — parte dos: hace de esa reducción a lo humano el único pretexto posible del evemerismo, llamado así por el nombre de su inventor. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«It is to such peoples that anthropomorphism comes naturally, and it should be noticed that these are the peoples among whom, for the same reason, the religious» — parte dos, capítulo Simbolismo y antropomorfismo: hace del antropomorfismo cosa natural de los pueblos de giro sentimental, los mismos entre los que dice haberse establecido el punto de vista religioso. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«religion, however, has always tried to react against the anthropomorphic tendency and to combat it in principle, even when a more or less garbled conception of religion in the popular mind sometimes helped to develop it in practice.» — parte dos: reconoce que la religión siempre reaccionó en principio contra la tendencia antropomórfica, aun cuando su concepción popular la favoreciera en la práctica.

«The peoples called Semitic, such as the Jews and Arabs, are in this respect akin to the Western peoples: there is in fact no other reason to account for the prohibition of symbols under a human form, which is common both to Judaism and Islam,» — parte dos: acerca a judíos y árabes a los pueblos occidentales en ese punto, y explica por ahí la prohibición de los símbolos de forma humana común al judaísmo y al islam.

«but with the exception that in Islam it was never so strictly applied among the Persians, for whom the employment of symbols of this kind offered fewer dangers because, being more completely Eastern than the Arabs, and moreover of quite a different race, they were much less prone to slip into anthropomorphism.» — parte dos: la excepción persa dentro del islam, donde la prohibición no se aplicó tan estrictamente porque, más orientales que los árabes, corrían menos riesgo de caer en el antropomorfismo.

«This conception, which is as foreign to the Easterners, the Muslims only excepted, as it was to Greco-Roman antiquity, appears to be specifically Jewish in its origin;» — parte dos: declara la idea de creación ajena a los orientales salvo los musulmanes, y también a la antigüedad grecorromana, y le adjudica origen específicamente judío.

«the word denoting it is indeed Latin in form, but it did not originally bear the meaning that Christianity gave to it later, since creare at first meant nothing else but ‘to make’, a sense that the verbal root kri, which is identical with the root of the Latin word, has always preserved in Sanskrit;» — parte dos: señala que *creare* significaba en origen hacer, sentido que dice conservado en sánscrito por la raíz *kri*, idéntica a la raíz latina.

«the change of meaning that took place was a profound one and, as we have pointed out, similar to the alteration undergone by the term ‘religion.» — parte dos: empareja ese cambio de sentido con el que atribuyó antes al término religión.

«It is clearly from Judaism that this idea passed over into Christianity and Islam; and the reason for this is essentially the same as that which gave rise to the prohibition of anthropomorphic symbols.» — parte dos: hace pasar la idea de creación del judaísmo al cristianismo y al islam, por la misma razón que dio origen a la prohibición de los símbolos antropomórficos.

«In practice, a tendency to conceive God as ‘a being, more or less analogous to individual and especially to human beings, wherever it is to be found, is certain to produce as a natural corollary a tendency to attribute to God simply a ‘demiurgic’ function, that is to say an activity exercised upon a ‘matter’ which is looked upon as external to him and which is the mode of action proper to individual beings.» — parte dos: liga la concepción de Dios como un ser análogo a los individuales con la atribución de una función demiúrgica, actividad ejercida sobre una materia externa.

«Under these conditions, in order to safeguard the notion of the divine unity and infinity, it became necessary to declare expressly that God ‘made the world from nothing? which amounts to saying ‘from nothing that was external to Himself? for the other» — parte dos: explica la fórmula de que Dios hizo el mundo de la nada como salvaguarda de la unidad y la infinitud divinas, es decir de nada que le fuera externo. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«supposition would result in limiting him by giving birth to a radical dualism. In this case the theological heresy amounts to the expression of a metaphysical absurdity, which is moreover usually the case; but this danger, quite non-existent as regards pure metaphysics, became a very real one from the religious point of view, because in this derived form the absurdity was no longer immediately apparent.» — parte dos: la continuación: la otra suposición limitaría a Dios y daría un dualismo radical, y la herejía teológica resulta ser la expresión de un absurdo metafísico que ahí ya no se ve de inmediato.

«The theological conception of ‘creation’ is an appropriate translation of the metaphysical conception of ‘universal manifestation’, being the one that is best adapted to the mentality of Western peoples; there is however no real equivalence between these two conceptions, given that they must necessarily be separated by the whole difference that separates the points of view to which they respectively refer: this is a further example illustrating the question we were discussing in the preceding chapter.» — parte dos: hace de la creación teológica la traducción adaptada de la manifestación universal metafísica, sin equivalencia real entre las dos por la distancia entre los puntos de vista.

«WE HAVE STATED THAT METAPHYSICS differs profoundly not only from science, but also from everything that Westerners, and especially the moderns, refer to by the name of philosophy, under which heading moreover many heterogeneous and even quite dissimilar elements are brought together.» — parte dos, capítulo Pensamiento metafísico y pensamiento filosófico: separa la metafísica de la ciencia y de lo que los occidentales llaman filosofía, bajo cuyo nombre dice reunidos elementos heterogéneos.

«First of all, however, it should be noted that whenever true metaphysics has made its appearance in the West, people have always tried to link it up with questions appertaining to special and contingent points of view, in order to include it together with these questions in one whole, bearing the name of philosophy; this goes to prove that in the West the essential characteristics of metaphysics, whereby it is distinguished from every other kind of knowledge, never emerged with sufficient clearness.» — parte dos: consigna que en Occidente, cada vez que apareció metafísica verdadera, se la ligó a cuestiones contingentes bajo el nombre de filosofía, señal de que sus caracteres esenciales nunca se vieron con claridad.

«If modern philosophy be considered as a whole, it may be said, quite generally, that its point of view does not differ in any essential way from that of science: the point of view in either case is a rational one, or at least pretends to be, and all knowledge that is confined to the domain of reason, whether or not it is called philosophical, is strictly speaking scientific knowledge;» — parte dos: iguala el punto de vista de la filosofía moderna con el de la ciencia, racional en ambos casos, y llama científico a todo conocimiento confinado al dominio de la razón.

«if it aspires to being something else, it thereby loses all value, even of a relative kind, through arrogating to itself a scope and importance that do not legitimately belong to it: this is the case of what might be termed pseudo-metaphysics.» — parte dos: y lo que resulta cuando ese conocimiento aspira a más, la pérdida de todo valor aun relativo, que llama pseudometafísica.

«Furthermore, the distinction between the provinces of philosophy and science is all the less justifiable in that the former includes among its numerous constituents certain sciences that are just as special and restricted as any others, and that do not possess characteristics distinguishing them in a way that would entitle them to a privileged position;» — parte dos: niega justificación a la distinción entre filosofía y ciencia, porque la primera incluye ciencias tan especiales y restringidas como cualquier otra.

«sciences of this sort, such as psychology or sociology for example, are only called philosophical as the result of custom not based upon any logical argument; philosophy, in short, possesses only a purely fictitious unity, historical if one wishes, and it is difficult to say why it is no longer customary, as in former times, to include in it various other sciences as well.» — parte dos: nombra la psicología y la sociología como ciencias llamadas filosóficas por costumbre y no por argumento, y declara puramente ficticia, o histórica, la unidad de la filosofía.

«On the other hand, certain sciences at one time classed as philosophical are no longer considered to be so at the present day; the fact that they have received a wider development has proved a sufficient reason for separating them from this ill-defined assemblage, although intrinsically» — parte dos: consigna que ciertas ciencias dejaron de contarse como filosóficas al desarrollarse más. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«their nature has not altered in the very least; if some sciences still remain under the heading of philosophy, no more should be seen in this than a survival of the extended meaning which the Greeks originally had given to philosophy, whereby it in fact included all the sciences.» — parte dos: la continuación: niega que su naturaleza haya cambiado, y lee en las que siguen bajo el rótulo de filosofía una supervivencia del sentido amplio que le dieron los griegos.

«From what we have said it is clear that true metaphysics cannot have a closer or a different relationship with psychology, for example, than it can have with physics or physiology: these are all alike natural sciences, that is to say physical sciences in the primary and general sense of the word.» — parte dos: niega a la psicología relación más estrecha con la metafísica que la física o la fisiología, y las llama a todas ciencias naturales, es decir físicas en el sentido primario.

«Still less can metaphysics be considered as at all dependent upon any such special science: to pretend to give ita psychological basis, as certain philosophers have tried to suggest— having no other excuse for such an attitude but their own complete ignorance of what metaphysics really is—amounts to trying to make the universal depend upon the individual, the principle upon its more or less remote or indirect consequences, and it also inevitably entails ending up with an anthropomorphic, and therefore eminently anti-metaphysical conception.» — parte dos: objeta darle base psicológica a la metafísica, y lee en ello hacer depender lo universal de lo individual y el principio de sus consecuencias, con final antropomórfico.

«Metaphysics must of necessity be self-sufficing since it is the only kind of knowledge that is really direct, and it cannot be based on anything other than itself from the very fact that it consists of the knowledge of universal principles from which all else is derived, including the subject matter of the various sciences.» — parte dos: declara la metafísica autosuficiente por ser el único conocimiento realmente directo y consistir en el conocimiento de los principios universales de los que todo lo demás deriva.

«If the above-mentioned sciences have isolated their subject matter from these principles in order to consider it from their own special points of view, such a procedure is certainly legitimate on their part, for were they to do otherwise and refer their subject matter to universal principles, they could not but go beyond the limits of their own particular fields.» — parte dos: declara legítimo que las ciencias aíslen su materia de los principios, porque referirla a los principios universales las sacaría de sus propios límites.

«This error, which weighs heavily upon all modern philosophy, was in the first instance committed by Descartes, whose metaphysics moreover was really no more than a pseudo-metaphysics, and who only interested himself in it in order to provide an introduction to his physics, to which he thought in this way to give a more solid foundation.» — parte dos: adjudica ese error a Descartes en primer lugar, cuya metafísica llama pseudometafísica y que —dice— se ocupó de ella para dar fundamento a su física.

«One may go even further and say that to treat metaphysics as a branch of philosophy, either by placing it thus on a level with relative sciences of any kind or even by qualifying it as the ‘first philosophy’, as Aristotle did, implies a profound misunderstanding of its real scope and of» — parte dos, capítulo Pensamiento metafísico y pensamiento filosófico: objeta tratar la metafísica como rama de la filosofía o llamarla filosofía primera como hizo Aristóteles. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«This in itself, then, is clear evidence of the incompleteness of Western metaphysics, which furthermore is to all intents and purposes limited to the doctrine of Aristotle and the Scholastics,» — parte dos: reduce la metafísica occidental, a todos los efectos, a la doctrina de Aristóteles y los escolásticos.

«for, with the exception of a few fragments scattered here and there and of certain things about which not enough is known to speak of them with any great degree of certainty, no other doctrine of a truly metaphysical character is to be met with in the West, at least from the time of classical antiquity onward, not even if every allowance is made for the admixture of scientific, theological, or other contingent elements;» — parte dos: y el límite que pone a esa reducción, que fuera de fragmentos dispersos y de cosas poco conocidas no halla otra doctrina de carácter verdaderamente metafísico en Occidente desde la antigüedad clásica.

«we do not include the Alexandrians, however, upon whom Eastern influences came to be exercised in a direct manner.» — parte dos: exceptúa de esa cuenta a los alejandrinos, a quienes atribuye influencias orientales directas.

«assures them of a certain autonomy, and to misunderstand this can only lead to quite unnecessary conflicts.» — parte dos: la continuación: la relatividad de sus puntos de vista les asegura cierta autonomía, y desconocerlo solo lleva a conflictos innecesarios.

«nor can anything else whatsoever enfold or comprise the Universal. This in itself, then, is clear evidence of the incompleteness of Western metaphysics,» — parte dos: y su reverso, que nada puede envolver ni comprender lo Universal, de donde lee la incompletud de la metafísica occidental.

«This last observation also shows that there can be no question of basing these sciences directly upon» — parte dos: niega que quepa fundar las ciencias particulares directamente en la metafísica. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«metaphysics; the very relativity of the points of view that they represent assures them of a certain autonomy, and to misunderstand this can only lead to quite unnecessary conflicts.» — parte dos: la continuación: la relatividad de sus puntos de vista les asegura cierta autonomía, y desconocerlo lleva a conflictos innecesarios.

«If we turn now to logic, we will find that it is not in quite the same position as the sciences we have so far been considering, all of which may be called experimental sciences, since they are based upon the results of observation.» — parte dos: separa la lógica de las ciencias experimentales, que declara basadas en resultados de observación.

«Logic is also a special science, being essentially a study of the conditions properly pertaining to human understanding; but its connection with metaphysics is more direct, in the sense that what are called logical principles are simply applications and specifications in a determinate sphere of the true principles which belong to the universal order: this enables a transposition to be effected in respect of them similar to that which we indicated as possible when speaking of theology.» — parte dos: llama a la lógica ciencia especial que estudia las condiciones del entendimiento humano, y le reconoce conexión más directa con la metafísica, porque sus principios son aplicaciones de los universales.

«The same considerations are equally applicable in the case of mathematics: this science, although necessarily limited in its range by reason of being exclusively confined to the realm of quantity, applies in its own special sphere certain relative principles that may be regarded as constituting a direct particularization of certain universal principles.» — parte dos: extiende lo mismo a las matemáticas, limitadas al reino de la cantidad y a la vez aplicando principios que particularizan directamente ciertos principios universales.

«Thus, taking the field of science as a whole, logic and mathematics may be said to be the two sciences having the most real affinity with metaphysics; but from the very fact that they come within the general definition of scientific knowledge, being confined within the limits of reason and within the category of individual conceptions, it follows that they are still radically separated from pure metaphysics.» — parte dos: declara a lógica y matemáticas las ciencias de mayor afinidad real con la metafísica, y a la vez radicalmente separadas de ella por quedar dentro de los límites de la razón.

«It is this separation that prevents any effective value being attached to points of view represented as being more or less of a blend of logic and metaphysics, such as the ‘theories of knowledge’ that have played such a prominent part in modern philosophy; reduced to what may be considered as their legitimate elements, these theories are only logic pure and simple, and to the extent that they claim to go beyond logic they are merely pseudo-metaphysical fantasies devoid of any substance.» — parte dos: niega valor efectivo a las teorías del conocimiento de la filosofía moderna, que reduce a lógica pura y, en lo que pretenden ir más allá, a fantasías pseudometafísicas.

«In a traditional doctrine logic can only occupy the place of a secondary and dependent branch of knowledge, and it is regarded as such in both China and India; like cosmology, which was studied in the West as well as the East during the Middle Ages, but which is ignored by modern philosophy, it is in fact, as we have seen, only an application of metaphysical principles to a particular point of view and in a determinate sphere; we will however return to this point later when dealing with the Hindu doctrines.» — parte dos: sitúa la lógica en una doctrina tradicional como rama secundaria y dependiente, como dice que se la tiene en China y la India, y la empareja con la cosmología.

«What has just been said concerning the relationship between metaphysics and logic will perhaps seem surprising to those who are accustomed to regard logic as in a sense dominating all possible knowledge, on the grounds that no speculation of any order whatsoever can be valid unless conforming strictly to its laws; nevertheless it is quite evident that metaphysics, always by reason of its universality, can no more be dependent upon logic than upon any other science; the error in that case may be said to consist in conceiving knowledge as lying solely within the sphere of reason.» — parte dos: niega que la metafísica dependa de la lógica más que de otra ciencia, y sitúa el error en concebir el conocimiento como cosa solo de la razón.

«However, it is necessary at this point to make a distinction between metaphysics itself, as purely intellectual conception, and its formal expression; while the former is entirely free from individual limitations, and therefore from those of reason, the latter, in the measure in which it is possible, can at best amount to a sort of translation of metaphysical truths into the discursive and rational mode, for the simple reason that the very constitution of all human language does not permit of its being otherwise.» — parte dos: distingue la metafísica misma, libre de los límites de la razón, de su expresión formal, que a lo sumo traduce las verdades metafísicas al modo discursivo por la constitución del lenguaje.

«Logic, like mathematics, is exclusively a rational science; metaphysical exposition may assume an analogous aspect with regard to its form, but with regard to its form only, and if it must then comply with the laws of logic, that is because these laws themselves rest on an essentially metaphysical basis, without which they would have no validity;» — parte dos: concede que la exposición metafísica cumple las leyes de la lógica en cuanto a su forma, y funda esas leyes a su vez en una base metafísica sin la cual no valdrían.

«As for morality, or ethics as it is now called, we have already partly explained what it implies in the course of our discussion of the constituent elements of religion, but we have yet to refer to its specifically philosophical conception, insofar as this is clearly distinguishable from the religious conception. There is nothing in the entire realm of philosophy more relative and contingent than ethics; indeed, it no longer even represents knowledge of a restricted order, being merely a more or less coherent mass of considerations the aim and scope of which can only be purely practical, notwithstanding the illusions too commonly cherished on this subject.» — parte dos: declara a la ética lo más relativo y contingente del campo filosófico, y no ya conocimiento de orden restringido sino masa de consideraciones de alcance puramente práctico.

«Outside the religious viewpoint, which gives to ethics a legitimate meaning, everything connected with this order of things should logically be reduced purely and simply to a body of conventions, established and obeyed solely with the object of making social life possible and tolerable; but if this conventional character of ethics were frankly recognized and acted upon accordingly, there would no longer be any question of philosophical ethics.» — parte dos: fuera del punto de vista religioso reduce la ética a un cuerpo de convenciones para hacer posible la vida social, y dice que reconocerlo acabaría con la ética filosófica.

«It is sentimentality once again which has stepped in here, and which, in order to find material for the satisfaction of its own special needs, contrives to take these conventions and to cause them to be taken for other than what they really are; hence the development of many different theories, some of which remain clearly sentimental in form as well as in substance, while others are disguised under a more or less rational appearance.» — parte dos: adjudica al sentimentalismo el hacer pasar esas convenciones por otra cosa, de donde nacen teorías unas sentimentales en la forma y otras disfrazadas de racionales.

«Moreover, if ethics, like everything else bound up with social contingencies, vary greatly according to circumstances of time and place, the ethical theories making their appearance in a given society, however opposed they may appear to be on the surface, all alike tend to justify the very same practical rules, which are always those commonly observed in the society in question.» — parte dos: señala que, por opuestas que parezcan, las teorías éticas de una sociedad justifican las mismas reglas prácticas, las que ahí se observan.

«This in itself should suffice to show that these theories are devoid of any real value, being built up by each individual philosopher solely as a belated justification for his own conduct and that of his fellow men—or at least of those who are most in sympathy with him—in accordance with his own views, and above all with his own feelings.» — parte dos: niega valor real a esas teorías y las describe como justificación tardía que cada filósofo hace de su propia conducta y la de sus semejantes.

«It is noticeable that ethical theories of this kind come to light chiefly during periods of intellectual decadence, doubtless because this decadence is itself correlated with or consequent on the expansion of sentimentalism, and perhaps also because, by plunging in this way into illusory speculations, at least a faint semblance of thinking is preserved.» — parte dos: data la aparición de esas teorías en los períodos de decadencia intelectual, correlativos de la expansión del sentimentalismo.

«This phenomenon occurred notably among the Greeks, after their intellectuality had yielded up, with Aristotle, the last contribution of which it was capable; in the later philosophical schools, such as the Epicurean and the Stoic, everything was subordinated to the moral point of view, and it was to this that they owed their success among the Romans, for whom all speculation of a higher order would have been difficult of attainment.» — parte dos: sitúa ese fenómeno entre los griegos después de Aristóteles, con epicúreos y estoicos subordinándolo todo al punto de vista moral, y de ahí su éxito entre los romanos.

«The self-same phenomenon has recurred at the present day, when ‘moralism”’ has become unusually rampant, but this time primarily through a degeneration of religious thought, as is clearly shown by the example of Protestantism;» — parte dos: lo da por repetido en su tiempo con el auge del moralismo, esta vez por degeneración del pensamiento religioso, y pone de ejemplo al protestantismo.

«it is natural, moreover, that those peoples whose mentality is purely practical, and whose civilization is wholly material, should seek to satisfy their sentimental aspirations through that false mysticism which finds one of its expressions in philosophical ethics.» — parte dos: adjudica a los pueblos de mentalidad práctica y civilización material la satisfacción de sus aspiraciones sentimentales en un falso misticismo, del que la ética filosófica sería una expresión.

«We have now passed under review all those branches of philosophy that possess a clearly defined character; but the philosophical field also contains a variety of more or less indeterminate elements that cannot properly be included under any of these headings, and that are not held together by any characteristics inherent in their own nature, but solely by reason of their being grouped within the same systematized conception.» — parte dos: describe el resto del campo filosófico como elementos indeterminados unidos solo por quedar agrupados en una misma concepción sistematizada.

«For this reason, after separating metaphysics completely from the so-called philosophical sciences, there is a further need to distinguish it no less radically from the many philosophical systems which most commonly originate, as we have already seen, from someone’s attempt at intellectual originality; the individualism expressed by such a pretension is manifestly opposed to the traditional spirit, and it is also incompatible with all conceptions of a truly metaphysical order.» — parte dos: separa la metafísica también de los sistemas filosóficos, que hace nacer del intento de originalidad intelectual, individualismo que declara opuesto al espíritu tradicional.

«besides, a philosophical system is always the system of some particular person, that is to say a construction the value of which can only be purely individual.» — parte dos: declara todo sistema filosófico el sistema de alguien, construcción de valor puramente individual.

«Furthermore, every system is necessarily erected upon some more or less special and relative foundation, being really nothing more than the development of an hypothesis, whereas metaphysics, which possesses the character of absolute certainty, cannot admit anything hypothetical.» — parte dos: sitúa todo sistema sobre un fundamento relativo, como desarrollo de una hipótesis, y niega que la metafísica, de certeza absoluta, admita nada hipotético.

«This does not mean to say that a system may not contain a certain element of truth in respect of this or that particular point; but it is illegitimate insofar as it is a system, and it is in the systematic form itself that the radical falsity of the conception taken as a whole is inherent.» — parte dos: concede que un sistema contenga verdad en tal o cual punto, y sitúa en la forma sistemática misma la falsedad del conjunto.

«Leibnitz was right in saying that ‘every system is true in what it affirms and false in what it denies, which really amounts to saying that its falsity is the greater in proportion as it is more narrowly limited—or in other words systematic—since a conception of this kind leads inevitably to the negation of everything lying outside its scope.» — parte dos: recoge la sentencia que atribuye a Leibniz, que todo sistema es verdadero en lo que afirma y falso en lo que niega, y la lee como que la falsedad crece con el estrechamiento del sistema. La grafía del nombre sale así del troceo.

«In all fairness this must be applied to Leibnitz himself no less than to other philosophers, insofar as his own philosophy assumes a systematic character; moreover, such true metaphysics as it contains is borrowed from the Scholastics, and even this he has often distorted by failure to understand it aright.» — parte dos: aplica esa misma sentencia a Leibniz, y dice que la metafísica verdadera de su filosofía está tomada de los escolásticos y a menudo alterada por no entenderla.

«As regards the statement that a system is true in what it affirms, this should not be taken as the expression of any sort of eclecticism; it simply amounts to saying that a system is true to the extent that it leaves the way open for less» — parte dos: acota que esa sentencia no es eclecticismo, y la lee como que un sistema es verdadero en la medida en que deja abierto el camino. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«Metaphysics on the other hand, lying as it does outside and beyond relative things, all of which belong to the individual order, for that very reason eludes all systematization, just as, for the same reason, it cannot be enclosed within any formula.» — parte dos: sitúa la metafísica fuera de las cosas relativas, que asigna todas al orden individual, y por eso la declara ajena a toda sistematización y a toda fórmula.

«It should now be quite clear what we mean by the term pseudo-metaphysics: it includes everything in a philosophical system that lays claim to a metaphysical character, any such pretension being totally unjustified by reason of the systematic form itself, which is sufficient to deprive theories of this kind of all real significance.» — parte dos: define pseudometafísica como toda pretensión metafísica dentro de un sistema filosófico, injustificada por la forma sistemática misma.

«its character of universality: the absolute whole cannot form a part» — parte dos, capítulo Pensamiento metafísico y pensamiento filosófico: el argumento contra tratar la metafísica como rama de la filosofía, que el todo absoluto no puede ser parte de algo. El tramo arranca al otro lado del corte de plana y se corta de nuevo en el límite de chunk.

«In fact, it is solely a matter of formulating rules applicable to human action, the» — parte dos: reduce la ética a formular reglas aplicables a la acción humana. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«need for doing so moreover being found exclusively within the social order, since these rules would have no sense were it not for the fact that human individuals live gregariously, in more or less organized groups; furthermore, these rules, instead of being regarded from the purely social standpoint as is the case with the Easterners, are formulated in conformity with that specifically moral point of view which is foreign to the greater part of mankind.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: sitúa la necesidad de esas reglas solo en el orden social, y declara ajeno a la mayor parte de la humanidad el punto de vista específicamente moral desde el que se las formula, frente al social de los orientales.

«Pure metaphysics necessarily excludes all systematization, for a system cannot avoid being a closed and limited conception» — parte dos: excluye de la metafísica pura toda sistematización, porque un sistema es concepción cerrada y limitada. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«In most cases, therefore, it would in itself be sufficient to set these problems forth correctly in order to cause them to disappear, were it not that philosophy has an interest in keeping them alive, since it thrives largely upon ambiguities.» — parte dos: sostiene que bastaría plantearlos con corrección para que desaparecieran, y adjudica a la filosofía interés en mantenerlos vivos porque prospera de ambigüedades.

«If it happens that among these questions some are of such a nature as to be capable of having a certain metaphysical bearing, they lose this entirely upon inclusion within a system: it is not enough that a question should be of a metaphysical character, it is necessary in addition that, being recognized as such, it should be conceived and treated metaphysically.» — parte dos: acota que no basta que una cuestión sea de carácter metafísico, sino que hace falta concebirla y tratarla metafísicamente, cosa que el sistema impide.

«It is a matter at least for regret that the lack of clarity which is so characteristic of modern Western thought, and which is apparent quite as much in the ideas themselves as in their expression, by permitting as it does indefinite and random discussion without ever solving anything, leaves the way open for a mass of hypotheses, which certainly have the right to be called philosophical but have absolutely nothing in common with true metaphysics.» — parte dos: lamenta la falta de claridad del pensamiento occidental moderno, que permite discutir sin resolver y deja paso a hipótesis filosóficas sin nada en común con la metafísica.

«In this connection, it may also be observed generally that questions which arise as it were accidentally, and only possess a particular and momentary interest, like many of those to be met with in the history of modern philosophy, are thereby clearly deprived of all metaphysical character, or in other words are lacking in the character of universality;» — parte dos: niega carácter metafísico a las cuestiones de interés particular y momentáneo, como muchas de la historia de la filosofía moderna, por faltarles universalidad.

«The truly metaphysical, let us repeat once more, can only be that which is absolutely stable, permanent, and independent of all contingencies and in particular of historical contingencies; that alone is metaphysical which does not change, and it is also this universality of metaphysics that constitutes its essential unity, precluding the multiplicity of philosophical systems and religious dogmas alike, and hence that confers on it its profound immutability.» — parte dos: repite qué tiene por metafísico, lo estable, permanente e independiente de toda contingencia, y hace de esa universalidad la unidad que excluye la multiplicidad de sistemas y de dogmas.

«From all that has been said, it also follows that metaphysics bears no relation to conceptions such as idealism, pantheism, spiritualism, and materialism, which are all stamped with the systematic character of Western philosophical thought; and this point is all the more important to note here since orientalists commonly suffer from the obsession of trying at all costs to force Eastern thought into these narrow frames which were never made for it;» — parte dos: niega relación entre la metafísica y el idealismo, el panteísmo, el espiritualismo y el materialismo, y adjudica a los orientalistas la obsesión de forzar el pensamiento oriental a esos marcos.

«For the moment there is only one point upon which it is necessary to insist, namely that the quarrel between spiritualism and materialism, around which almost all philosophical thought has revolved since the time of Descartes, has nothing to do with pure metaphysics;» — parte dos: aparta de la metafísica pura la disputa entre espiritualismo y materialismo, en torno a la cual dice haber girado casi toda la filosofía desde Descartes.

«Actually the duality ‘spirit-matter’ had never been put forward as absolute and irreconcilable prior to the Cartesian conception; indeed, the notion of matter, in the modern sense of the word, was completely foreign to the ancient peoples, the Greeks included, and it is still equally foreign to the majority of Easterners at the present day; in Sanskrit no word exists even remotely answering to it.» — parte dos: data en la concepción cartesiana la dualidad espíritu-materia como absoluta, declara ajena a los antiguos la noción moderna de materia y dice que en sánscrito no hay palabra que le responda.

«The conception of a duality of this kind has the sole merit of representing in a fairly adequate way the outward appearance of things; but precisely because it stops short at appearances it remains entirely superficial and, being based on a special and purely individual point of view, it leads to the negation of all metaphysics as soon as an attempt is made to attribute an absolute value to it by affirming the irreducibility of its two terms—an affirmation that constitutes dualism in the proper sense of the word.» — parte dos: concede a esa dualidad el mérito de representar la apariencia exterior de las cosas, y dice que afirmar la irreductibilidad de sus dos términos constituye el dualismo propiamente dicho.

«Speaking quite generally, dualism is characterized by the fact that it stops short at the antithesis between two more or less particular terms. This opposition doubtless really does exist from a certain point of view, and herein is to be found the element of truth that dualism contains; but by treating it as irreconcilable and absolute, whereas it is really quite relative and contingent, all possibility of going beyond the two contrasted terms is precluded; thus it is that dualism is seen to be limited by its own systematic nature.» — parte dos: caracteriza el dualismo por detenerse en la antítesis de dos términos particulares, le reconoce verdad desde cierto punto de vista y lo declara limitado por su naturaleza sistemática al tenerla por absoluta.

«It may be said that monism is essentially characterized by a refusal to admit the existence of an absolute irreducibility and a wish to surmount the apparent opposition, leading to an attempt to achieve this result by reducing one of the two terms to the other; we therefore find, in the particular case of the opposition between spirit and matter, spiritualistic monism on the one hand, which claims to reduce matter to spirit, and on the other hand materialistic monism, which claims on the contrary to reduce spirit to matter.» — parte dos: caracteriza el monismo por reducir uno de los dos términos al otro, y distingue el monismo espiritualista del materialista.

«Of whatever kind it may be, monism is right in maintaining that there is no absolute opposition, for in this respect it is less narrowly limited than dualism, and it represents at least an effort to penetrate further to the heart of things; but it ends almost inevitably by falling into another error, through completely neglecting, if not altogether denying, the opposition in question which, even if only an appearance, nonetheless deserves to be recognized as such: here once again it is the exclusiveness of the system that is responsible for its principal defect.» — parte dos: le da la razón al monismo en negar oposición absoluta, lo declara menos limitado que el dualismo, y le objeta descuidar o negar la oposición que, aun aparente, merece reconocerse.

«The fact that spiritualistic monism affirms that everything is spirit, whereas materialistic monism affirms on the contrary that everything is matter, is really of little importance, particularly since each finds itself obliged to attribute to the principle that it retains the most essential properties of the one it suppresses.» — parte dos: rebaja la diferencia entre las dos soluciones monistas, porque cada una atribuye al principio que conserva las propiedades esenciales del que suprime.

«It is evident that discussion between spiritualists and materialists carried out on this basis must rapidly degenerate into a mere battle of words: the two opposed monistic solutions represent in reality but two sides of a double solution, and one moreover that is wholly inadequate.» — parte dos: reduce esa discusión a una batalla de palabras, y llama a las dos soluciones monistas dos caras de una doble solución enteramente inadecuada.

«It is here that a different solution must be propounded. But whereas with dualism and monism we were only concerned with two different types of systematized conception of a purely philosophical order, we shall now be considering a doctrine the viewpoint of which, on the contrary, being a purely metaphysical one, has consequently received no name in Western philosophy, which can but ignore it.» — parte dos: anuncia otra solución, cuyo punto de vista, por ser puramente metafísico, dice que no recibió nombre en la filosofía occidental.

«We will call this doctrine ‘non-dualism’, or better still, the ‘doctrine of non-duality’, in order to translate as exactly as possible the Sanskrit term advaita-vada, which has no recognized equivalent in any European language.» — parte dos: nombra esa doctrina no dualismo o doctrina de la no dualidad, para traducir el término sánscrito *advaita-vada*, que declara sin equivalente reconocido en lengua europea.

«The first of these two expressions has the advantage of being more concise than the second, and for this reason we are quite prepared to adopt it; it is true that it suffers from the presence of the ending ‘ism’, which in philosophical language is ordinarily attached to the names of systems, but it might justifiably be argued that the negation bears upon the word ‘dualism’ in its entirety, including its ending, implying that the negation embraces dualism precisely insofar as it is a systematic conception.» — parte dos: justifica el término no dualismo pese al sufijo propio de los sistemas, leyendo la negación sobre la palabra dualismo entera, terminación incluida.

«Non-dualism, while not admitting an absolute irreducibility any more than monism, differs profoundly from the latter in that it does not for this reason claim that one of the two terms of the opposition is purely and simply reducible to the other;» — parte dos: distingue el no dualismo del monismo, porque tampoco admite irreductibilidad absoluta y no pretende reducir uno de los términos al otro.

«Thus the intervention of the metaphysical point of view has the effect of immediately resolving the apparent opposition, and moreover it alone is able to accomplish this where the philosophical point of view has proved itself impotent to do so;» — parte dos: atribuye al punto de vista metafísico la resolución inmediata de esa oposición aparente, donde el filosófico se declara impotente.

«If it is moreover possible to view simultaneously an indefinite series of such distinctions, all equally true and legitimate from their respective points of view, this is because we are no longer confined within a systematization limited to one of these distinctions to the exclusion of all the others; thus ‘non-dualism is the only type of doctrine that corresponds to the universality of metaphysics.» — parte dos: y la razón de que puedan verse a la vez series indefinidas de distinciones, no estar confinado en una sistematización, de donde hace del no dualismo la única doctrina que corresponde a la universalidad de la metafísica.

«If it has seemed necessary for us to develop these questions at such length, this is on account of the habitual ignorance existing in the West concerning everything connected with true metaphysics, and also because such considerations are directly connected with our subject, whatever some people may choose to think, since it is metaphysics that is at the heart of all the doctrines of the East, so that it is impossible to understand anything at all about them without having acquired a notion of metaphysics sufficient at least to dispel all possible confusion.» — parte dos: justifica la extensión de esos capítulos por la ignorancia occidental de la metafísica verdadera, que sitúa en el corazón de todas las doctrinas del Oriente.

«a host of problems arise resting solely upon some ambiguity or upon a confusion of points of view, problems that only exist in fact because they are badly expressed, and that normally should not arise at all.» — parte dos: hace nacer buena parte de esos problemas de una ambigüedad o de una confusión de puntos de vista, y los declara existentes solo por estar mal planteados.

«Moreover, the opposition between spirit and matter only represents one particular example of dualism, since the» — parte dos: reduce la oposición espíritu-materia a un ejemplo particular de dualismo. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«two terms of the opposition might well be quite other than these two relative principles, and it would be equally possible to imagine in the same manner an indefinite series of pairs of correlative terms besides this one, in reference to other more or less particularized determinations.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: los dos términos podrían ser otros, con una serie indefinida de pares correlativos posibles.

«On the other hand, by wishing to reduce one of the two terms directly to the other, it is never possible to escape completely from the alternative set up by dualism, since nothing is considered outside those two terms, which» — parte dos: objeta al monismo que al reducir un término al otro no escapa de la alternativa del dualismo, porque nada considera fuera de esos dos términos. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«longer as opposites in the ordinary sense of the word, but as complements, by a kind of polarization which in no way affects the essential unity of this common principle.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: los términos quedan no como opuestos sino como complementarios, por una polarización que no afecta la unidad esencial del principio común.

«In tracing the wide difference separating metaphysical thought from philosophical thought, we have shown how the classical problems of philosophy, even those that it regards as most general, have literally no place at all in pure metaphysics; the transposition from one point of view to the other,» — parte dos, capítulo Pensamiento metafísico y pensamiento filosófico: sostiene que los problemas clásicos de la filosofía, aun los más generales, no tienen lugar en la metafísica pura. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«which has moreover the effect of bringing to light the profound meaning of certain truths, causes these pretended problems quite simply to disappear—a clear indication that they possess no deep significance.» — parte dos: la continuación: la transposición de un punto de vista al otro hace desaparecer esos pretendidos problemas, lo que lee como señal de que no tenían hondura.

«On the other hand, these explanations have provided us with an opportunity for bringing out the meaning of ‘non-duality’, an understanding of which, essential for all metaphysics, is not less indispensable in interpreting the Hindu doctrines in particular; this follows naturally from the fact that these doctrines are purely metaphysical in essence.» — parte dos: declara la comprensión de la no dualidad indispensable para interpretar las doctrinas hindúes, por ser puramente metafísicas en esencia.

«There remains one further remark to be made which is of the utmost importance: not only is it impossible to limit metaphysics by the consideration of any duality composed of complementary aspects of Being—whether it be a question of such special aspects as spirit and matter or on the contrary of aspects that are as universal as they can be, such as those represented by the terms ‘essence’ and ‘substance’—but it cannot even be limited by the conception of pure Being in all its universality, since it must not be limited by anything whatsoever.» — parte dos: niega que la metafísica pueda limitarse ni siquiera por la concepción del Ser puro en toda su universalidad, porque nada debe limitarla.

«Metaphysics cannot be defined exclusively as ‘knowledge of Being’, as Aristotle defined it: strictly speaking this is only ontology, which undoubtedly falls within the province of metaphysics but which nevertheless does not constitute the whole of metaphysics; and it is in this respect that the metaphysics of the West has always remained incomplete and insufficient, as also in another respect which will be indicated further on.» — parte dos: objeta la definición aristotélica de la metafísica como conocimiento del Ser, a la que llama ontología, parte y no todo de la metafísica, y de ahí lee la incompletud de la occidental.

«Being is not really the most universal of all principles, as it would have to be for metaphysics to coincide with ontology, because even if Being is the most primordial of all possible determinations, it is nonetheless clearly a determination, and every determination is a limitation at which the metaphysical point of view cannot stop short.» — parte dos: niega que el Ser sea el principio más universal, porque aun siendo la determinación más primordial es una determinación, y toda determinación es limitación.

«A principle obviously possesses proportionately less universality the greater its degree of determination, carrying with it a corresponding degree of relativity; to use the language of mathematics, it may be said that a determinative ‘plus’ is equivalent to a metaphysical ‘minus.» — parte dos: la fórmula con que lo dice en lenguaje matemático, que un más determinativo equivale a un menos metafísico.

«It is thus, for example, that the idea of the Infinite (which in reality is the most positive idea of all, since the Infinite can only be the absolute whole which, being limited by nothing, leaves nothing outside itself) can only be expressed by a term negative in form, because in language every direct affirmation is of necessity the affirmation of something, that is to say a particular and determinate affirmation;» — parte dos: da por ejemplo la idea del Infinito, que declara la más positiva de todas y expresable solo con término negativo, porque toda afirmación directa del lenguaje es afirmación de algo.

«but the negation of a determination or of a limitation is properly the negation of a negation, and therefore a real affirmation, so that the negation of all determination is equivalent in reality to affirmation total and absolute.» — parte dos: y el giro lógico con que lo resuelve, que negar una limitación es negar una negación, con lo que negar toda determinación equivale a afirmación total y absoluta.

«however, it should never he forgotten that pure metaphysics is in itself absolutely independent of all the more or less imperfect terminologies in which we try to clothe it in order to make it more accessible to human understanding.» — parte dos: declara la metafísica pura independiente de toda terminología, que llama imperfecta y puesta para hacerla accesible al entendimiento humano. El *he* por *be* sale así del troceo.

«In the course oF our preliminary remarks we have had occasion to refer to the distinction, which is fairly generally known to have existed in certain philosophical schools of ancient Greece—if not in all of them—between what is called esoterism and exoterism, that is to say between two aspects of a single doctrine, the one more interior and the other relatively exterior: such in fact is the whole literal meaning of these two terms.» — parte dos, capítulo Esoterismo y exoterismo: remite la distinción entre esoterismo y exoterismo a escuelas filosóficas de la Grecia antigua, dos aspectos de una misma doctrina, uno más interior y otro relativamente exterior.

«Exoterism, comprising the more elementary and easily understandable part of the teaching, which was consequently more readily brought within everybody’s reach, is the only aspect to be expressed through the writings that have come down to us in a more or less complete form.» — parte dos: describe el exoterismo como la parte más elemental y accesible de la enseñanza, y la única expresada en los escritos conservados.

«Esoterism, being more profound and of a higher order, addressed itself as such only to regular disciples of the school who were specially prepared to receive it, and was the subject of a purely oral teaching, concerning which it has obviously not been possible to preserve very precise indications.» — parte dos: describe el esoterismo como enseñanza puramente oral dirigida a discípulos regulares preparados, de la que dice imposible conservar indicaciones precisas.

«Moreover, since we are here only concerned with a single doctrine regarded under two different aspects and having as it were two different levels of teaching, it should be clearly understood that these aspects could not in any way be opposed or contradictory, but must rather have been complementary to one another.» — parte dos: niega que esos dos aspectos puedan ser opuestos o contradictorios, y los declara complementarios por ser aspectos de una sola doctrina.

«The esoteric branch, by bringing to light the deeper meaning which the exoteric branch contained only virtually, developed and completed the doctrine which the latter had expounded in a rather vague, over-simplified, and sometimes more or less symbolic form, although with the Greeks the symbol too often came to possess a purely literary and poetical character which caused it to degenerate into mere allegory.» — parte dos: atribuye a la rama esotérica sacar a la luz el sentido profundo que la exotérica contenía en potencia, y señala que entre los griegos el símbolo degeneró a menudo en alegoría.

«On the other hand, it goes without saying that within the school itself esoterism was in its turn capable of being subdivided into several grades of teaching of varying profundity, the disciples passing successively from one grade to another according to their state of preparedness, with the possibility of going just as far as their intellectual aptitudes permitted; but that is about all that can be said for certain.» — parte dos: admite dentro del esoterismo varios grados de enseñanza por los que el discípulo pasa según su preparación, y acota que eso es cuanto puede decirse con certeza.

«This distinction between esoterism and exoterism has in no wise been maintained in modern philosophy, which is really nothing more than it appears to be on the surface, and which assuredly has no need of any sort of esoterism for what it teaches, since everything really profound totally escapes its limited viewpoint.» — parte dos: niega esa distinción en la filosofía moderna, que declara sin necesidad de esoterismo porque lo realmente profundo se le escapa.

«First of all, there are known to have existed in the West, since an early date, certain schools, generally very inaccessible and little known for that reason, which were in no sense philosophical schools; their doctrines only found outward expression under the veil of certain symbols that necessarily remained very obscure to those who did not possess the key to them; and this key was only given to adherents who had taken certain pledges, and who had given sufficient assurance of their discretion as well as of their intellectual capacity.» — parte dos: consigna en Occidente escuelas antiguas que no eran filosóficas, cuya doctrina se expresaba bajo velo de símbolos cuya clave se daba solo a adherentes con compromisos y capacidad probada.

«It might be said that the symbols contained in the alchemical writings constituted in this instance the exoteric aspect of the doctrine, while the interpretations set apart for the use. of the adepts constituted the esoteric aspect; but the part played by exoterism is in that case much reduced, and seeing that it has no real reason for existing except in relation to esoterism, it is even questionable whether these two terms can any longer be applied legitimately.» — parte dos: propone leer los símbolos de los escritos alquímicos como el aspecto exotérico y las interpretaciones de los adeptos como el esotérico, y de inmediato duda de que los dos términos se apliquen ahí con legitimidad.

«In point of fact, esoterism and exoterism, being words comparative in form, are essentially correlatives, so that where there is no exoterism there is no longer any occasion to speak of esoterism either; the latter term, if one wishes to preserve to it its proper meaning, cannot therefore be applied indiscriminately to any and every doctrine that is set apart for the exclusive use of an intellectual elite.» — parte dos: declara correlativos los dos términos, de modo que sin exoterismo no cabe hablar de esoterismo, y niega que el nombre valga para toda doctrina reservada a una élite intelectual.

«It would no doubt be possible, though in a much wider sense, to envisage both an esoteric and an exoteric aspect in any particular doctrine, insofar as the conception is to be distinguished from its expression, the first being wholly interior while the second represents only an exteriorization of it; it may thus be said, though by straining the usual meaning of the words somewhat, that the conception represents the esoteric aspect and the expression the exoteric aspect, necessarily so and in a manner resulting from the very nature of things.» — parte dos: admite en sentido más amplio llamar esotérica a la concepción y exotérica a la expresión de cualquier doctrina, forzando el uso de las palabras.

«Looked at in this way, there is something peculiar to metaphysical doctrines, which must always be esoteric, and this is the inexpressible element that, as we have explained, all conceptions of a truly metaphysical order necessarily contain; it represents something which each person can only conceive for himself, with the aid of words and symbols that simply serve as points of support for his conception, and his understanding of the doctrine will be more or less complete and profound according to the measure in which he will conceive it effectively.» — parte dos: en ese sentido declara siempre esotéricas a las doctrinas metafísicas por el elemento inexpresable que contienen, que cada quien concibe por sí con ayuda de palabras y símbolos que son puntos de apoyo.

«Even in doctrines of a different order, the meaning of which does not extend to what is really inexpressible (which is the ‘mystery’ in the etymological sense of the word), it is equally certain that the expression is never completely adequate to the conception, so that here also something analogous occurs, although on a much reduced scale;» — parte dos: extiende lo mismo, en escala reducida, a las doctrinas cuyo sentido no llega a lo inexpresable, que llama el misterio en sentido etimológico.

«but, instead of seeking to penetrate these meanings, people commonly prefer to devote themselves to barren exegetical researches and ‘textual criticism’, following the methods laboriously worked out by the most modern scholarship; and such work, however wearisome it may be and whatever patience it may demand, is much easier than the other, for it at least lies within the reach of everyone’s intelligence.» — parte dos: objeta que en vez de penetrar esos sentidos se prefieran la exégesis y la crítica textual modernas, que llama más fáciles por estar al alcance de cualquier inteligencia.

«It may be understood from this how the study of the ideograms, the real significance of which so completely escapes Europeans, can serve as the foundation for a truly integrated teaching, by permitting the development and coordination of all possible conceptions in all the different orders; this study can therefore be resumed from different standpoints at all the successive levels of instruction, from the most elementary to the most lofty, giving an opportunity each time for new possibilities of conception; it is therefore an instrument admirably adapted to the exposition of a traditional doctrine.» — parte dos: hace del estudio de los ideogramas el fundamento de una enseñanza integrada, retomable desde distintos niveles, e instrumento adaptado a la exposición de una doctrina tradicional.

«This absolute indetermination of the most universal principles, of those principles which should therefore be considered before all others, is a cause of considerable difficulty, not as regards their» — parte dos, capítulo Pensamiento metafísico y pensamiento filosófico: adjudica a la indeterminación absoluta de los principios más universales una dificultad considerable. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«This state of affairs, which manifestly implies the existence of doctrines sufficiently profound to be completely foreign to the common mentality, seems to have been especially prevalent during the Middle Ages,» — parte dos, capítulo Esoterismo y exoterismo: sitúa sobre todo en la Edad Media esas escuelas con doctrinas ajenas a la mentalidad común.

«and this is one of the reasons why it is always necessary, when speaking of the intellectuality of that period, to make due reservations for anything that may then have existed over and above what is known to us for certain;» — parte dos: y la reserva que pide al hablar de la intelectualidad de ese período, dejar lugar a lo que pudo existir por encima de lo que se sabe con certeza.

«indeed, as in the case of Greek esoterism, it is evident that many things must have been lost through never having been taught otherwise than orally, a circumstance which, as we have already indicated, accounts also for the almost total disappearance of the doctrines of the Druids.» — parte dos: da por perdidas muchas cosas enseñadas solo de viva voz, como en el esoterismo griego, y repite el caso de la desaparición casi total de las doctrinas de los druidas.

«As an example of the schools just referred to we may take the alchemists, whose doctrines were primarily of a cosmological order,» — parte dos: pone a los alquimistas por ejemplo de esas escuelas, con doctrinas que llama primordialmente de orden cosmológico. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«although cosmology must always have for its foundation a more or less extensive body of metaphysical conceptions.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: funda toda cosmología en un cuerpo más o menos amplio de concepciones metafísicas.

«This is notably the case with all the traditional texts, which moreover usually present a plu» — parte dos: atribuye esa pluralidad de sentidos a todos los textos tradicionales. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk, donde la palabra queda partida.

«rality of meanings of varying profundity, corresponding to as many different points of view;» — parte dos: la continuación, al otro lado del corte: esos sentidos son de profundidad distinta y corresponden a otros tantos puntos de vista.

«A noteworthy example of this plurality of meanings is furnished by the interpretation of the ideographic characters that go to make up Chinese writing.» — parte dos: da por ejemplo de esa pluralidad la interpretación de los caracteres ideográficos de la escritura china.

«All the various meanings of which these characters are capable may be grouped around three principal ones, corresponding to the three fundamental degrees of knowledge, the first belonging to the sensory order, the second to the rational order, and the third to the purely intellectual or metaphysical order;» — parte dos: agrupa los sentidos de esos caracteres en torno a tres principales, correspondientes a los tres grados fundamentales del conocimiento, sensorial, racional y puramente intelectual o metafísico.

«thus, to take a very simple case, the same character may be used analogically to represent at one and the same time the sun, light, and the truth, the context alone making it possible to know which of these meanings is to be adopted—whence manifold errors on the part of Western translators.» — parte dos: el caso simple con que lo ilustra, un mismo carácter para el sol, la luz y la verdad, decidido por el contexto, de donde los errores de los traductores occidentales.

«Let us return now to the question of whether the distinction between esoterism and exoterism, understood this time in the precise sense, is applicable to the Eastern doctrines. In the first place, in Islam, the tradition appears under a double form, religious and» — parte dos, capítulo Esoterismo y exoterismo: vuelve a la pregunta de si la distinción se aplica a las doctrinas orientales y empieza por el islam, con su tradición bajo doble forma. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«metaphysical, as we have already explained; the religious side of the doctrine, which is in fact the most exterior side and the one that lies within reach of all, may justly be qualified in this instance as exoteric, while the metaphysical side, which contains its innermost meaning, and which is moreover regarded as the doctrine of an elite, may be qualified as esoteric; the precise force of the distinction is well preserved here, since these are two sides of one and the same doctrine.» — parte dos: llama exotérico al lado religioso del islam, al alcance de todos, y esotérico al metafísico, tenido por doctrina de una élite, y dice que ahí la distinción conserva su fuerza exacta.

«It may also be noted that something analogous is to be found in Judaism, where esoterism is represented by what is called the ‘Kabbalah’, a word the primary meaning of which is simply ‘tradition’, and which is concerned with the study of the more profound meanings of the sacred texts, while the exoteric or popular doctrine is confined to their most exterior and literal meaning.» — parte dos: halla algo análogo en el judaísmo con la cábala, cuyo nombre traduce por tradición, dedicada a los sentidos más profundos de los textos sagrados frente al literal de la doctrina popular.

«However, the Kabbalah is in general less purely metaphysical than Islamic esoterism, and it remains to some extent affected by the influence of the strictly religious point of view, in which respect it is comparable to the metaphysical part of the Scholastic doctrine, which did not keep sufficiently free of theological considerations.» — parte dos: declara la cábala menos puramente metafísica que el esoterismo islámico por seguir afectada por el punto de vista religioso, y la compara con la parte metafísica de la escolástica.

«In Islam, on the contrary, the distinction between the two points of view is usually very sharp, apart from the case of certain schools that are more or less tinged with mysticism, and in which orthodoxy is moreover less strict than that of the other esoteric schools; it is possible to see here more clearly than anywhere else, by reason of the connection between the exoteric and the esoteric side of the tradition, how theological conceptions can receive a deeper meaning through metaphysical transposition.» — parte dos: declara muy nítida en el islam la distinción entre los dos puntos de vista, salvo en escuelas teñidas de misticismo, y ve ahí mejor que en ningún sitio cómo una concepción teológica recibe sentido más hondo por transposición metafísica.

«To pass now to the doctrines of more easterly traditions, the distinction between esoterism and exoterism can no longer be applied in the same fashion; indeed, in some cases it cannot even be applied at all.» — parte dos: niega que la distinción se aplique del mismo modo a las tradiciones más orientales, y en algunos casos que se aplique en absoluto.

«Doubtless, in the case of China it might be said that the social tradition, which is common to all, appears to be exoteric, while the metaphysical tradition, the doctrine of the elite, is esoteric as such.» — parte dos: admite para China llamar exotérica a la tradición social, común a todos, y esotérica a la metafísica, doctrina de la élite.

«However, this would only be strictly exact if one were to consider these two doctrines in relation to the primordial tradition from which both are derived; but notwithstanding this common source, they are in reality too sharply differentiated to be regarded as aspects of one and the same doctrine, which would have to be the» — parte dos: y de inmediato acota que eso solo sería exacto respecto de la tradición primordial de la que ambas derivan, porque están demasiado diferenciadas para ser aspectos de una sola doctrina. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«One of the reasons for this separation lies in the absence of that sort of combined domain associated with the religious viewpoint, in which a union takes place, insofar as this is possible, between the intellectual and the social points of view, always however at the expense of the purity of the former;» — parte dos: adjudica esa separación a la ausencia en China del dominio combinado que da el punto de vista religioso, donde se unen lo intelectual y lo social a costa de la pureza de lo primero.

«but the absence of such a domain does not always entail consequences so clearly marked as in China, and this is shown by the case of India, where there is similarly nothing that can properly be called religious but where all the branches of the tradition form nonetheless a single and indivisible whole.» — parte dos: acota que esa ausencia no siempre trae las mismas consecuencias, y pone por caso la India, sin nada propiamente religioso y con todas las ramas de la tradición en un todo indivisible.

«It is precisely of India that it now remains for us to speak, and there least of all is it possible to make a distinction such as that between esoterism and exoterism, because the tradition is in fact too completely unified to appear either in two separate bodies of doctrine or even under two complementary aspects of this kind.» — parte dos: niega que quepa distinguir esoterismo y exoterismo en la India, porque su tradición está demasiado unificada para aparecer en dos cuerpos ni en dos aspectos complementarios.

«The only distinction that can really be made is between the essential doctrine, which is wholly metaphysical, and its various applications, which constitute so many secondary branches of it; but it is quite clear that this is in no way equivalent to the distinction we have in mind.» — parte dos: la única distinción que admite en la India, entre la doctrina esencial, enteramente metafísica, y sus aplicaciones, ramas secundarias, que declara no equivalente a la de esoterismo y exoterismo.

«The metaphysical doctrine itself provides no esoterism other than that which is inherent in it in the very wide sense we have already alluded to, and this is natural and inevitable in every doctrine of this kind: all may be admitted to the teaching in all its degrees, on the sole condition of being intellectually qualified to derive effective benefit from it.» — parte dos: declara abierta la enseñanza en todos sus grados con la sola condición de estar intelectualmente calificado para aprovecharla.

«We are naturally speaking here only of admission to the different degrees of teaching, and not to the exercise of different functions, since other additional qualifications may be required in that respect; but it necessarily happens that among those who receive the same doctrinal teaching, as among those who read the same text, each one understands it and assimilates it more or less completely and more or less profoundly according to the extent of his own intellectual possibilities.» — parte dos: acota que habla de la admisión a los grados de enseñanza y no al ejercicio de funciones, y añade que cada quien asimila la misma enseñanza según sus posibilidades intelectuales.

«For these reasons it is quite incorrect to speak of ‘esoteric Brahmanism’, as certain people have done, applying this denomination principally to the teaching contained in the Upanishads;» — parte dos: niega que quepa hablar de brahmanismo esotérico, nombre que dice aplicado sobre todo a la enseñanza contenida en los Upanishads.

«In a textbook on the history of religions, which we have already referred to, and which, although distinguished from other works of the same kind by the spirit in which it is written, contains nevertheless many of the usual confusions and in particular that which consists in treating things as religious that cannot in any way be regarded as such, we have come across the following observation: ‘An Indian conception rarely finds its exact equivalent outside India; or, to put it less broadly, ways of regarding things which elsewhere are esoteric, individual, and extraordinary, are in Brahmanism and in India, common, general, and normal?» — parte dos: recoge del manual de historia de las religiones la observación de que lo que fuera de la India es esotérico, individual y extraordinario, en el brahmanismo es común, general y normal.

«This is fundamentally correct, but it calls nevertheless for certain reservations, since one can by no means qualify as individual, whether in India or elsewhere, conceptions which, being of a metaphysical order, are on the contrary essentially supra-individual.» — parte dos: da por fundamentalmente correcta esa observación y le pone una reserva, que no cabe llamar individuales a concepciones de orden metafísico, esencialmente supraindividuales.

«Moreover, these conceptions find their equivalent, although under different forms, wherever a truly metaphysical doctrine exists, that is to say in all Eastern countries, and it is only in the West that there is nothing to be found corresponding to them even remotely.» — parte dos: sostiene que esas concepciones tienen equivalente dondequiera que haya doctrina metafísica verdadera, es decir en todo el Oriente, y solo en Occidente nada que se les parezca.

«The truth is that conceptions of this kind are nowhere so widespread as in India, because nowhere else does a people exist endowed so generally and to such an extent with the requisite aptitudes, although these aptitudes are also commonly met with among all Easterners, notably among the Chinese, whose metaphysical tradition has nevertheless remained much more inaccessible.» — parte dos: sitúa en la India la mayor difusión de esas concepciones por las aptitudes del pueblo, y reconoce aptitudes semejantes entre los orientales, notablemente los chinos, con tradición metafísica más inaccesible.

«It is the purely traditional character of Hindu unity that has contributed more than anything else to the development of such a mentality; it is impossible really and effectively to participate in this unity without assimilating the tradition, and since the tradition is metaphysical in essence, it may be said that if every Hindu is naturally a metaphysician, he must be one almost by definition.» — parte dos: atribuye esa mentalidad al carácter puramente tradicional de la unidad hindú, y de ahí la frase con que cierra, que si todo hindú es metafísico por naturaleza lo es casi por definición.

«WHEN DESCRIBING the essential features of metaphysics, we said that it constitutes an intuitive, or in other words, immediate knowledge, as opposed to the discursive and mediate knowledge that belongs to the rational order.» — parte dos, capítulo Realización metafísica: repite que la metafísica es conocimiento intuitivo, es decir inmediato, opuesto al discursivo y mediato del orden racional.

«Intellectual intuition is even more immediate than sensory intuition, for it is beyond the distinction between subject and object which the latter allows to subsist; it is at once the means of knowledge and the knowledge itself, and in it subject and object are identified.» — parte dos: declara la intuición intelectual más inmediata que la sensible por estar más allá de la distinción de sujeto y objeto, y a la vez medio del conocimiento y conocimiento mismo.

«Indeed, no knowledge is really worthy of the name except insofar as it has the effect of bringing about such an identification, although in all cases other than that of intellectual intuition this identification always remains incomplete and imperfect; in other words, there is no true knowledge except that which participates to a greater or less extent in the nature of pure intellectual knowledge, which is the supreme knowledge.» — parte dos: mide todo conocimiento por su participación en el conocimiento intelectual puro, al que llama supremo, e identificación de sujeto y objeto.

«All other knowledge, being more or less indirect, has at best only a symbolic or representative value; the only genuinely effective knowledge is that which permits us to penetrate into the very nature of things, and if such a penetration may be effected up to a certain point in the inferior degrees of knowledge, it is only in metaphysical knowledge that it is fully and totally realizable.» — parte dos: concede al resto del conocimiento valor a lo sumo simbólico o representativo, y reserva al metafísico la penetración plena en la naturaleza de las cosas.

«The immediate consequence of this is that knowing and being are fundamentally but one and the same thing; they are, so to speak, two inseparable aspects of a single reality, being no longer even really distinguishable in that sphere where all is ‘without duality’.» — parte dos: deduce de ahí la identidad de conocer y ser, dos aspectos inseparables de una sola realidad, ya indistinguibles en la esfera del sin dualidad.

«The only reason for the existence of such theories arises from an attitude of mind shared by almost all modern philosophers and originating in the Cartesian dualism; this way of thinking consists in artificially opposing knowing and being, an opposition that is the negation of all true metaphysics.» — parte dos: hace nacer esas teorías del dualismo cartesiano, que opone artificialmente conocer y ser, oposición que llama negación de toda metafísica verdadera.

«Modern philosophy thus ends by wishing to substitute the theory of knowledge for knowledge itself, which amounts to an open confession of impotence on its part; nothing is more characteristic in this respect than the following declaration of Kant: ‘The chief and perhaps the only use of all philosophy of pure reason is, after all, exclusively negative, since it is not an instrument for extending knowledge, but a discipline for limiting it?» — parte dos: lee en la sustitución del conocimiento por la teoría del conocimiento una confesión de impotencia, y cita a Kant diciendo que el uso de toda filosofía de la razón pura es exclusivamente negativo, disciplina para limitar y no instrumento para extender.

«Do not such words amount purely and simply to saying that the only aim of philosophers should be to impose upon everyone else the narrow limits» — parte dos: y la lectura que hace de esa frase, que el único fin del filósofo sería imponer a los demás los límites estrechos de su propio entendimiento. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«of their own understanding? Here we see an inevitable consequence of the systematic outlook, which, let it be repeated once more, is anti-metaphysical in the highest degree.» — parte dos: la continuación: ve en eso una consecuencia inevitable de la perspectiva sistemática, que repite antimetafísica en grado sumo.

«Metaphysics affirms the fundamental identity of knowing and being, which can only be questioned by those who are ignorant of the most elementary metaphysical principles; and since this identity is essentially implied in the very nature of intellectual intuition, it not merely affirms it but realizes it as well.» — parte dos: atribuye a la metafísica no solo afirmar la identidad de conocer y ser sino realizarla, por estar implicada en la naturaleza de la intuición intelectual.

«This is true at least of integral metaphysics; but it must be added that such metaphysics as there has been in the West seems always to have remained incomplete in this respect.» — parte dos: acota que eso vale de la metafísica íntegra, y declara incompleta en ese punto a la que hubo en Occidente.

«Nevertheless, Aristotle clearly laid down the principle of identification by knowledge, when he expressly declared that ‘the soul is all that it knows.» — parte dos: reconoce a Aristóteles haber enunciado el principio de identificación por el conocimiento, que el alma es todo lo que conoce.

«But neither he himself nor his successors ever seem to have given this affirmation its full significance, or to have extracted all the consequences implied in it, so that for them it has remained something purely theoretical.» — parte dos: y el límite que le pone, que ni él ni sus sucesores sacaron las consecuencias de esa afirmación, que quedó en lo puramente teórico.

«it is true that others, speaking in their turn of an ‘esoteric Buddhism’, have made matters still worse, for under this label they have merely presented quite» — parte dos, capítulo Esoterismo y exoterismo: de quienes hablan de un budismo esotérico dice que empeoraron las cosas. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«imaginary conceptions, derived neither from authentic Buddhism nor from any real esoteric doctrine.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: llama imaginarias a esas concepciones y las declara no derivadas del budismo auténtico ni de doctrina esotérica real alguna.

«This in itself is enough to show how purposeless are all the various ‘theories of knowledge’ with metaphysical pretensions which occupy» — parte dos, capítulo Realización metafísica: declara sin objeto las teorías del conocimiento con pretensión metafísica de la filosofía occidental moderna. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«such a prominent place in modern Western philosophy, sometimes even going so far, as in the case of Kant for example, as to absorb, or at least to dominate, everything else.» — parte dos: la continuación: esas teorías ocupan un lugar prominente y en Kant llegan a absorber o al menos a dominar todo lo demás.

«in that it does not proceed beyond Being; on the other hand it only considers things, to the extent that it does consider them, in a purely theoretical light.» — parte dos: las dos incompletudes que le adjudica, no pasar del Ser y considerar las cosas solo en una luz teórica.

«Theory is regarded as if it were in some way self-sufficient, an end in itself, whereas it should normally be looked upon as nothing more than a preparation, indispensable as such we admit, leading to a corresponding realization.» — parte dos: objeta que la teoría se tome por fin en sí, y la declara preparación indispensable que conduce a una realización correspondiente.

«It is necessary to say something at this point about the way in which we use the word ‘theory: etymologically, its primary meaning is ‘contemplation’, and if it is taken thus, it might be said that metaphysics in its entirety, including the realization which it implies, is theory in the fullest sense; but usage has given the word a rather different and above all a much narrower meaning.» — parte dos: remite la palabra teoría a su sentido etimológico de contemplación, en el que diría teórica a la metafísica entera, y consigna que el uso la estrechó.

«In the first place, it has become usual to oppose theory and practice, and in its original sense, this antithesis, which meant the opposition of contemplation to action, would still be justifiable here, since metaphysics is essentially beyond the sphere of action, which is the sphere of individual contingencies;» — parte dos: admite la oposición de teoría y práctica en su sentido original, contemplación contra acción, porque sitúa la metafísica más allá de la esfera de la acción.

«but the Western mentality, being turned almost exclusively toward action and being unable to conceive of any realization outside the sphere of action, has come to oppose theory and realization in a general sense.» — parte dos: adjudica a la mentalidad occidental, vuelta a la acción e incapaz de concebir realización fuera de ella, el haber opuesto teoría y realización.

«we will not go so far however as to qualify metaphysical realization as ‘practical’, for in current speech this word has remained inseparable from the idea of action which it originally expressed, and which is in no wise applicable here.» — parte dos: se niega a llamar práctica a la realización metafísica, porque esa palabra quedó inseparable de la idea de acción, que declara no aplicable.

«In all doctrines that are metaphysically complete, as are those of the East, theory is invariably accompanied or followed by an effective realization, for which it merely provides the necessary basis; no realization can be embarked upon without a sufficient theoretical preparation, but theory is ordained entirely with a view to this realization as the means toward the end, and this point of view is presupposed, or at least is tacitly implied, even in the exterior expression of the doctrine.» — parte dos: en las doctrinas metafísicamente completas hace acompañar siempre la teoría de una realización efectiva, con la teoría por base necesaria y ordenada a ese fin.

«However, these rites, unlike theoretical preparation, are never regarded as an indispensable means, since they are only accessory and not essential, and the Hindu tradition, where they nevertheless hold an important place, is quite explicit in this respect;» — parte dos: acota que esos ritos nunca se tienen por medio indispensable sino accesorio, y dice que la tradición hindú, donde ocupan lugar importante, es explícita en ello.

«but they are capable nonetheless, by virtue of their own efficacy, of markedly facilitating metaphysical realization, that is to say the transformation of this virtual knowledge, which is all that theory amounts to, into effective knowledge.» — parte dos: y lo que sí les concede, facilitar por su propia eficacia la transformación del conocimiento virtual que es la teoría en conocimiento efectivo.

«Certainly, these considerations are likely to appear very strange to Western people, who have never even considered the possibility of anything of this kind; and yet, to be exact, a partial, though rather distant, analogy with metaphysical realization is to be found in the West in what may be called mystical realization.» — parte dos: admite en Occidente una analogía parcial y lejana con la realización metafísica, la que llama realización mística.

«What we mean is that in the mystical states—taking the word ‘mystical’ in its current sense—there is present an effective element which makes of them something more than purely theoretical knowledge, although a realization of this nature is always inevitably limited.» — parte dos: reconoce en los estados místicos un elemento efectivo que los hace más que conocimiento teórico, con el límite de que esa realización es siempre limitada.

«The very fact that such realization is of a purely religious character shows thereby that it is confined entirely to the individual domain; the mystical states are in no way supra-individual, since they only imply a more or less indefinite extension of purely individual possibilities;» — parte dos: confina la realización mística al dominio individual por su carácter religioso, y niega que los estados místicos sean supraindividuales.

«nevertheless, these possibilities are incomparably greater than is commonly supposed, going far beyond anything that the psychologists in particular are capable of conceiving, notwithstanding all that they try to force into their idea of the ‘subconscious’.» — parte dos: y a la vez declara esas posibilidades individuales incomparablemente mayores de lo que se supone, más allá de lo que los psicólogos fuerzan en su idea de lo subconsciente.

«Realization of this kind cannot have a universal or metaphysical bearing, and it always remains subject to the influence of individual elements, chiefly of a sentimental order; this indeed is the essential characteristic of the religious point of view, only here it is more accentuated than anywhere else;» — parte dos: niega alcance universal o metafísico a esa realización y la declara sujeta a elementos individuales de orden sentimental, acentuados ahí más que en ninguna parte.

«Finally, it should be noted that this realization, always fragmentary and rarely controlled, does not presuppose any theoretical preparation: religious rites certainly do play the same part of ‘supports’ in relation to it as is played elsewhere by the metaphysical rites, but in itself it is independent of religious theory, that is to say of theology;» — parte dos: declara la realización mística fragmentaria y rara vez controlada, y no supuesta por preparación teórica alguna, independiente de la teología.

«nevertheless, it can be said that those mystics who possess some theological knowledge are able to avoid many of the errors committed by others who lack it, and they are also to some extent more capable of controlling their imagination and sentimentality.» — parte dos: y el matiz que concede, que los místicos con algún saber teológico evitan errores y controlan mejor su imaginación y su sentimentalidad.

«Such as it is, mystical or religious realization, with its essential limitations, is the only mode of realization now known to the West; as we have just said, this is by no means negligible, though nevertheless still far removed from true metaphysical realization.» — parte dos: declara la realización mística o religiosa el único modo de realización conocido hoy en Occidente, no desdeñable y lejos de la realización metafísica verdadera.

«It was necessary to give some description of the point of view of metaphysical realization, because it is essential to all Eastern thought and common to the three great civilizations of which we have spoken: nevertheless, we do not wish to dwell upon it to any great extent in the present work, which must necessarily remain rather elementary.» — parte dos: justifica haber descrito la realización metafísica por ser esencial a todo el pensamiento oriental y común a las tres grandes civilizaciones, y anuncia no extenderse en ella.

«Furtherrnore, it should be added that if theory may always be expounded without reserve, or at least up to the point of meeting the truly inexpressible, the same cannot be said in respect of matters touching on realization.» — parte dos: cierra la parte dos con una reserva, que la teoría puede exponerse sin reserva hasta topar con lo inexpresable y que no ocurre lo mismo con lo tocante a la realización. La grafía *Furtherrnore* sale así del troceo.

«and thus Western metaphysics appears to have been doubly» — parte dos, capítulo Realización metafísica: declara doblemente incompleta a la metafísica occidental. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana, con la nota al pie de por medio.

«but these means also are destined simply to furnish a support or a point of departure, playing the part of ‘aids’ only, however important they may be in actual practice: this is indeed the reason for the existence of rites possessing a genuinely metaphysical character and import, to which we have already alluded.» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: esos medios son soporte y punto de partida, ayudas, y ahí sitúa la razón de ser de los ritos de carácter metafísico.

«and it must furthermore be pointed out that the confusing of the intellectual and the sentimental orders is likely to prove a» — parte dos: señala la confusión de lo intelectual con lo sentimental. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«frequent source of illusions. Finally, it should be noted that this realization, always fragmentary and rarely controlled, does not presuppose any theoretical preparation: religious rites certainly do play the same part of ‘supports’ in relation to it as is played elsewhere by the metaphysical rites, but in itself it is independent of religious theory, that is to say of theology;» — parte dos: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: llama a esa confusión fuente frecuente de ilusiones, y declara la realización mística fragmentaria, rara vez controlada e independiente de la teología.

«EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SAID up to now might serve as a general introduction to the study of all Eastern doctrines; what follows will relate more closely to the Hindu doctrines in particular, adapted as they are to modes of thought which, while retaining those characteristics common to Eastern thought as a whole, also exhibit certain distinctive features of their own, with corresponding differences in the forms of expression.» — parte tres, capítulo Sobre el sentido exacto de la palabra hindú: cierra la introducción general y anuncia lo que sigue sobre las doctrinas hindúes, con rasgos distintivos propios dentro de lo común al pensamiento oriental.

«These differences arise even when strict identity exists with other traditions as regards the basis of the doctrine, which in fact must always remain the same when it is a question of pure metaphysics, for reasons we have already explained.» — parte tres: acota que esas diferencias son de forma, porque en pura metafísica el fondo de la doctrina es siempre el mismo.

«At this point in our treatise it is important, before passing on to anything else, to indicate the exact meaning of the word ‘Hindu’, for the more or less haphazard manner in which it has been used has given rise to frequent misunderstandings in the West.» — parte tres: fija la tarea del capítulo, precisar el sentido de la palabra hindú, cuyo uso azaroso adjudica malentendidos frecuentes en Occidente.

«In the first place, this word cannot denote a race, since it is applied without distinction to persons belonging to various races; still less can it denote a nationality, since nothing of the kind exists in the East.» — parte tres: niega que la palabra hindú denote una raza, porque se aplica a personas de razas distintas, y menos aún una nacionalidad, que declara inexistente en el Oriente.

«India considered as a whole is more comparable to the whole continent of Europe than to any single European state, not only because of its size or the numerical strength of its population, but also because of the variety of ethnic types to be found there; from the north to the south of India the differences are» — parte tres: compara a la India entera con el continente europeo antes que con un solo Estado, por extensión, población y variedad de tipos étnicos. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«Moreover, no governmental or administrative bond exists between the various regions, other than that recently established in an entirely artificial way by the Europeans.» — parte tres: niega vínculo gubernamental o administrativo entre las regiones de la India fuera del establecido de modo artificial por los europeos.

«This administrative unity, it is true, had already been achieved before them by the Mogul emperors, and perhaps even before that by others, but it never had a more than transitory existence in relation to the permanence of Hindu civilization, and it is noteworthy that it was nearly always the result of a foreign domination, or in any case the work of non-Hindu influences; furthermore, it never went so far as completely to suppress the autonomy of the separate states, the intention being rather to include them in a federal organization.» — parte tres: concede que los emperadores mogoles y quizá otros lograron antes esa unidad administrativa, y la declara transitoria, casi siempre obra de dominación o influencia no hindú, y nunca supresora de la autonomía de los Estados.

«On the other hand, there exists nothing in India comparable to the kind of unity that is achieved elsewhere by the recognition of a common religious authority, which may either be represented by a single individual, as in Catholicism, or by a plurality of distinct functions, as in Islam.» — parte tres: niega en la India una unidad por autoridad religiosa común, sea de un individuo como en el catolicismo o de funciones distintas como en el islam.

«Though the Hindu tradition in no wise partakes of a religious character, there is yet no reason why it should not possess a more or less analogous organization, but such is not actually the case despite the gratuitous assumptions certain people make in this respect because they are unable to understand how unity can be effectively achieved simply by the inherent power of the traditional doctrine itself.» — parte tres: declara que la tradición hindú no tiene carácter religioso y que tampoco tiene una organización análoga, y adjudica los supuestos gratuitos sobre el punto a no entender que la unidad se logre por la fuerza de la doctrina.

«That is certainly very different from anything obtaining in the West, but nevertheless it is a fact: Hindu unity, as we have already emphasized, is a unity of a traditional order purely and exclusively and has no need to depend upon any more or less exterior form of organization, or upon the support of any authority» — parte tres: declara la unidad hindú de orden puramente tradicional, sin necesidad de organización exterior ni de autoridad. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk.

«From these facts the following conclusions may be drawn: Hindus are those who adhere to the Hindu tradition, on the understanding that they are duly qualified to do so really effectively, and not simply in an exterior and illusory way; non-Hindus, on the contrary, are those who, for any reason whatsoever, do not participate in the tradition in question.» — parte tres: da su definición, hindúes son quienes se adhieren efectivamente a la tradición hindú, y no hindúes quienes por cualquier razón no participan de ella.

«This is, for example, the case of the Jains and the Buddhists; it is also, in more modern times, the case of the Sikhs, who moreover were subject to Muslim influences, the mark of which is clearly to be seen in their particular doctrine.» — parte tres: cuenta por no hindúes a jainas y budistas, y a los sikhs, en quienes señala influencias musulmanas visibles en su doctrina.

«Under these circumstances it is absurd to speak, for example, of ‘Hindu Buddhism’, as has actually been known to occur; if one wishes to refer to Buddhism as it formerly existed in India, the only appropriate expression is ‘Indian Buddhism’, just as one speaks of ‘Indian Muslims’, that is to say the Muslims of India, who are in no sense Hindus.» — parte tres: llama absurda la expresión budismo hindú y propone budismo indio, como se dice musulmanes indios, que declara en ningún sentido hindúes.

«The true gravity of an error of the kind indicated above, and the reason why we look upon it as something more than a mere fault of detail, lies in the fact that it implies a profound misunderstanding of the essential nature of Hindu civilization; but the remarkable thing is not that such ignorance should be widespread in the West, but that it should even have been known to occur among professional orientalists.» — parte tres: mide la gravedad de ese error por implicar una incomprensión de la naturaleza de la civilización hindú, y señala que se da también entre orientalistas profesionales.

«Certain evidences that we have already mentioned go to show that the tradition in question was brought to the country now known as India, at a comparatively remote date which it would be very difficult to determine exactly, by men who came from the North; nevertheless, it has never been proved that these men, who must have settled successively in various regions, ever formed what could properly be called a people, in the beginning at least, or that they belonged originally to a single race.» — parte tres: sitúa la llegada de la tradición a la India en fecha remota y difícil de fijar, traída por hombres venidos del Norte, y niega que se haya probado que formaran un pueblo ni que fueran de una sola raza.

«At some period or other therefore a rupture must have occurred not unlike that brought about by Buddhism at a later date, and the separated branch, constituting a deviation from the primordial tradition, then became what is known as ‘Tranism, eventually destined to form the basis of the Persian tradition, known also as Mazdaism.» — parte tres: sitúa una ruptura semejante a la que después hizo el budismo, con la rama separada por desviación de la tradición primordial, que llama iranismo y base de la tradición persa o mazdeísmo.

«We have already drawn attention to the tendency, often met with in the East, for such doctrines as were at first opposed to the regular tradition to become established in their turn as independent traditions; and there is no doubt that this happened in the case under consideration long before the tradition was codified in the Avesta under the name of Zarathustra or Zoroaster» — parte tres: repite la tendencia oriental de que una doctrina opuesta a la tradición regular se constituya en tradición independiente, y la da por ocurrida antes de la codificación del Avesta.

«which moreover should not be taken for the name of a man but rather as denoting a collectivity, as is often the way in such cases: the examples of Fu Hsi in China, Vyasa in India and Thoth or Hermes in Egypt show this very clearly.» — parte tres: niega que Zoroastro sea nombre de un hombre y lo lee como nombre de una colectividad, con Fu Hsi en China, Vyasa en la India y Thoth o Hermes en Egipto por ejemplos.

«On the other hand, a very distinct mark of the deviation has survived in the Persian language itself, where certain words have taken on an exactly contrary meaning to the one they bore originally and which is the meaning they still preserve in Sanskrit; the word deva is the best known example, but it would be possible to cite others (such as the name Indra) that cannot be due to pure accident.» — parte tres: halla la marca de esa desviación en la lengua persa, donde ciertas palabras tomaron sentido contrario al que conservan en sánscrito, con *deva* por ejemplo más conocido y el nombre Indra por otro.

«The dualistic character usually attributed to the Persian tradition, if it were a fact, would also be a manifest proof of an alteration in the doctrine, though it must be stated that this character appears to have become attached to it only as the result of a false or incomplete interpretation; another more serious proof consists in the presence of certain sentimental elements, but there is no need to insist upon this point here.» — parte tres: sobre el carácter dualista que se le suele atribuir a la tradición persa dice que parece venir de una interpretación falsa o incompleta, y da por prueba más seria de alteración la presencia de elementos sentimentales.

«Starting from the moment when the separation of which we have just been speaking occurred, the regular tradition may properly be called Hindu, wherever the region may have lain in which it was first established and whether or not this name was actually given to it at that time.» — parte tres: data desde esa separación el nombre de hindú para la tradición regular, sin importar dónde se estableciera primero ni si entonces se llamaba así.

«At all events, the Hindu tradition, or at least the tradition now bearing this name—since it may at that time have had a different name or even have had no name at all—when it became established in India, was adopted sooner or later by the majority of the descendants of the indigenous populations;» — parte tres, capítulo Sobre el sentido exacto de la palabra hindú: dice que la tradición, al establecerse en la India, fue adoptada por la mayoría de los descendientes de las poblaciones indígenas.

«the latter, the Dravidians for example, consequently became Hindus as it were by adoption, but once they had been admitted into the unity of the traditional civilization, they were just as genuinely Hindus as those who had always been so, even though some traces of their origin may still have persisted in the form of particular modes of thought and action, always provided that these were compatible with the spirit of the tradition.» — parte tres: llama hindúes por adopción a esos pueblos, los dravidianos entre ellos, y los declara tan genuinos como los demás, con las huellas de su origen admitidas mientras fueran compatibles con el espíritu de la tradición.

«Prior to its establishment in India, this particular tradition belonged to a civilization we do not intend to call Aryan, having already explained why this word is devoid of meaning, but for» — parte tres: rechaza llamar aria a la civilización anterior al establecimiento en la India, por ser palabra que declara sin sentido. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«which, in the absence of a better term, the name Indo-Iranian may be accepted, not because the place of development of the tradition is any more likely to have been in Iran than in India, but simply to indicate that it subsequently gave birth to two civilizations, distinct and even opposed in certain respects, namely the Hindu and the Persian civilizations.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: acepta indoiraní a falta de mejor término, no por situar el desarrollo en Irán antes que en la India sino por indicar que de ahí nacieron las civilizaciones hindú y persa.

«This leads us to point out another error committed by orientalists, who, understanding nothing of the essential immutability of the doctrine, have imagined the existence, subsequent to the Indo-Iranian period, of three successive and supposedly distinct doctrines, to which they give the names of Vedism, Brahmanism, and Hinduism respectively.» — parte tres: objeta a los orientalistas haber imaginado tres doctrinas sucesivas y distintas después del período indoiraní, a las que dan los nombres de vedismo, brahmanismo e hinduismo.

«If this classification were only intended to refer to three periods in the history of Hindu civilization, it would no doubt be admissible, notwithstanding the fact that the names are very inappropriate and that it is extremely difficult to fix the limits of these periods and to relate them chronologically.» — parte tres: admitiría esa clasificación si solo nombrara tres períodos de la historia de la civilización hindú, con la reserva de que los nombres son impropios y los límites difíciles de fijar.

«Even if it were only intended to state that the traditional doctrine, while always remaining fundamentally the same, received successively several more or less different forms of expression in order to adapt itself to the particular mental and social conditions of such and such a period, this again, with similar reservations, would be admissible.» — parte tres: y admitiría también que la doctrina, siendo la misma, recibiera formas de expresión distintas según las condiciones mentales y sociales de cada período.

«But this is not the sole contention of the orientalists: in using a plurality of denominations, they expressly assume a series of deviations or alterations, which are not only incompatible with traditional regularity, but have never existed save in their own imaginations.» — parte tres: lo que sí objeta, que la pluralidad de nombres da por supuesta una serie de desviaciones incompatibles con la regularidad tradicional, que declara existentes solo en la imaginación de los orientalistas.

«In reality, the entire Hindu tradition is founded upon the Veda; it always was so and has never ceased to be so; it might therefore quite legitimately be called Vedism, and the name Brahmanism also would be equally applicable to it at all periods.» — parte tres: funda la tradición hindú entera en el Veda, en todo tiempo, y declara igualmente aplicables en todos los períodos los nombres de vedismo y brahmanismo.

«The name actually preferred is really a matter of little importance, provided one clearly understands that, under one or several names, it is always the same thing that is being referred to; and this can only be the development of the doctrine contained in principle in the Veda, a word which literally means traditional knowledge without further qualification.» — parte tres: da por indiferente el nombre que se prefiera, y traduce *Veda* literalmente por conocimiento tradicional sin más calificación.

«There is therefore no such thing as Hinduism in the sense of a deviation from traditional thought, since that which is correctly and purely Hindu is just that which, by definition, admits of no such deviation;» — parte tres: niega que exista un hinduismo en el sentido de desviación del pensamiento tradicional, porque lo que es propiamente hindú no admite por definición tal desviación.

«THE NAME Veda, the proper meaning of which has just been explained, is applied in a general way to all the basic scriptures of the Hindu tradition; these are divided into four collections known respectively as the Rig-Veda the Yajur- Veda, the Sama-Veda and the Atharva- Veda.» — parte tres, capítulo Perpetuidad del Veda: aplica el nombre Veda a todas las escrituras básicas de la tradición hindú y las reparte en cuatro colecciones, Rig-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sama-Veda y Atharva-Veda. Los espacios dentro de los títulos salen así del troceo.

«The question of the date when these collections were composed is one of those that worry orientalists the most, and they have never managed to agree on its solution, even when confining themselves to a very approximate computation of their antiquity.» — parte tres: da la fecha de composición de esas colecciones por cuestión que desvela a los orientalistas sin que lleguen a acuerdo ni en un cálculo aproximado.

«Here as everywhere else may be observed the usual tendency to refer everything to a period as little remote in time as possible, and likewise to contest the authenticity of such and such parts of the traditional writings, the whole argument being based on a minute analysis of texts, accompanied by dissertations that are as endless as they are superfluous on the use of a word or of a certain grammatical form.» — parte tres: adjudica a los orientalistas la tendencia a acercar las fechas y a disputar la autenticidad de partes de los escritos tradicionales por análisis minucioso de textos.

«These are in fact the habitual preoccupations of orientalists, and the general purpose, in the minds of those who occupy themselves with such things, is to show that the text under discussion is not as old as was believed, that it cannot be the work of the author to whom it had hitherto been ascribed (if indeed it ever had an author), or at least that it has been ‘interpolated’ or has suffered some alteration or other at a comparatively recent date; anyone acquainted with the products of ‘biblical criticism’ can form a clear enough idea of the nature of these proceedings.» — parte tres: describe el propósito que atribuye a esos trabajos, mostrar que el texto no es tan viejo, que no es del autor a quien se le adscribía o que está interpolado, y lo empareja con la crítica bíblica.

«In fact, it is always questions of principle that escape the orientalists, and as it is precisely this knowledge which is essential to a proper understanding (seeing that everything else is derived from it and should logically be deduced from it), these scholars are led to neglect the one essential thing through their inability to grasp its primary importance; the consequence is that they lose their way hopelessly in a maze of the most insignificant details or in a tangle of quite arbitrary theorizing.» — parte tres: sitúa lo que se les escapa en las cuestiones de principio, de las que dice que todo lo demás se deriva, y de ahí el extravío en detalles insignificantes y teorías arbitrarias.

«The question of the date when the different portions of the Veda may have been composed appears to be truly insoluble; it is not however a matter of any real importance because, prior to the more or less distant epoch when the text was written down for the first time, it is necessary to consider a period of oral transmission of indeterminate length, as we have already pointed out.» — parte tres: declara insoluble la fecha de composición del Veda y le quita importancia, porque antes de ponerse por escrito hay que contar un período de transmisión oral de duración indeterminada.

«It is probable that the origin of writing in India in fact dates from considerably earlier than is usually admitted; furthermore, it is most unlikely that the Sanskrit characters have been derived from a Phoenician alphabet, which they resemble neither in shape nor arrangement.» — parte tres: sitúa el origen de la escritura en la India bastante antes de lo admitido, y declara muy improbable que los caracteres sánscritos deriven de un alfabeto fenicio, al que no se parecen en forma ni en orden.

«However that may be, one thing is certain, namely that nothing more than an ordering and final codifying of pre-existing traditional texts is to be seen in the work attributed to Vyasa,» — parte tres: reduce la obra atribuida a Vyasa a un ordenamiento y codificación final de textos tradicionales preexistentes.

«does not refer to an historical person, still less to a ‘myth, but denotes an intellectual collectivity, as we mentioned before.» — parte tres: repite que Vyasa no nombra a una persona histórica ni a un mito, sino a una colectividad intelectual. El tramo arranca al otro lado del corte de chunk.

«This being the case, the determining of the epoch of Vyasa, even admitting that such a thing were possible, is only of interest as a simple historical fact, devoid of any doctrinal implication;» — parte tres: declara la época de Vyasa, aun de poder fijarse, un simple hecho histórico sin implicación doctrinal.

«moreover, it is obvious that this epoch may comprise a period of several centuries, or may even never have been completed, so that the question of its starting-point alone is open to discussion; this however does not mean that it can of necessity be answered, least of all by resorting to the methods favored by Western scholarship.» — parte tres: añade que esa época puede abarcar varios siglos o no haber concluido, con lo que solo cabe discutir su punto de partida, y aun eso no por los métodos de la erudición occidental.

«The preceding oral transmission is often indicated in a text, though without the addition of any chronological data, by what is called the vansha or traditional filiation; this is the case, for example, in most of the Upanishads.» — parte tres: consigna que la transmisión oral previa se indica en el texto por lo que llama *vansha* o filiación tradicional, sin datos cronológicos, como en la mayoría de los Upanishads.

«found and essential change; any modifications that may from time to time have taken place are attributable merely to a natural and normal development of the primordial tradition.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: atribuye toda modificación a un desarrollo natural y normal de la tradición primordial.

«and if nonetheless certain more or less grave irregularities have sometimes occurred, the power of the tradition has always» — parte tres: concede que ocurrieron irregularidades a veces graves y les opone la fuerza de la tradición. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«kept them within certain limits, or else has rejected them entirely from the unity of Hindu civilization, and in any case has prevented them from acquiring any real authority;» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: la tradición las contuvo dentro de ciertos límites, o las expulsó de la unidad de la civilización hindú, y les impidió adquirir autoridad real.

«It is hardly surprising that researches undertaken in such a spirit only lead to the piling up of volumes of tedious discussions, and that the pitiful results of this undermining ‘criticism’, when they come to the knowledge of» — parte tres, capítulo Perpetuidad del Veda: describe esas investigaciones como acumulación de discusiones tediosas de resultados lastimosos. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«Easterners, contribute substantially to inspiring them with a contempt for the West.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: liga esos resultados al desprecio por Occidente que atribuye a los orientales cuando llegan a conocerlos.

«it makes little difference that the tradition has been expressed or formulated by such and such an individual, for this does not make him its author, given that the tradition belongs essentially to the supra-individual order.» — parte tres: niega que expresar o formular la tradición vuelva autor a nadie, porque la tradición es del orden supraindividual.

«That is why the origin of the Veda is said to be apaurushéya or ‘non-human’: historical circumstances exert no more influence on the essence of the doctrine than any other contingent factor, since it is endowed with an immutable and entirely timeless character, and it is moreover clear that the inspiration just referred to can manifest itself at any period.» — parte tres: da la fórmula hindú sobre el origen del Veda, *apaurushéya* o no humano, y de su carácter intemporal deduce que la inspiración puede manifestarse en cualquier época.

«Perhaps the only difficulty here is to get Westerners to accept the theory of inspiration and especially to make them understand that this theory is neither mystical nor psychological, but can only be purely metaphysical;» — parte tres: sitúa la dificultad occidental en aceptar la teoría de la inspiración, y acota que no es ni mística ni psicológica sino puramente metafísica.

«These few explanations should suffice to give at least some idea of what the Hindus mean when they speak of the perpetuity of the Veda.» — parte tres: cierra con lo que dice significar la perpetuidad del Veda para los hindúes.

«From another point of view this doctrine is also correlated with the cosmological theory of the primordial place of sound among the sensory qualities, though we cannot undertake to expound this theory here; this last point may provide a clue to the fact that even after the adoption of writing the oral transmission of the doctrine has always continued to play a preponderant part in India.» — parte tres: correlaciona esa doctrina con la teoría cosmológica del lugar primordial del sonido entre las cualidades sensibles, y de ahí el papel preponderante que la transmisión oral conservó en la India.

«Since the Veda represents traditional knowledge unqualified, it therefore constitutes the principle and common basis of all the more or less secondary and derived branches of the doctrine; and even in their case the question of chronological development is of small importance.» — parte tres: hace del Veda el principio y la base común de todas las ramas derivadas de la doctrina, y quita importancia también ahí al desarrollo cronológico.

«The tradition has to be considered in its entirety, and there is no point in asking which part of it is or is not primitive, since we are dealing with a perfectly coherent whole (which does not mean a systematic whole), and since all the points of view included in it can be considered simultaneously just as well as successively; consequently it is of no great interest to ascertain the historical order in which they were actually unfolded.» — parte tres: pide considerar la tradición entera y no preguntar qué parte es primitiva, porque el conjunto es coherente y sus puntos de vista pueden considerarse a la vez.

«It is not possible to assign a definite author to this or that portion of the doctrine any more than to the Vedic texts themselves, in which the doctrine in its entirety is contained synthetically, at least insofar as it is capable of expression;» — parte tres: niega que se pueda asignar autor definido a una porción de la doctrina ni a los textos védicos, en los que dice contenida sintéticamente la doctrina entera.

«and if such and such a known author or commentator has expounded a certain more or less special point, that certainly does not imply that no one else had done so before him, and still less that no one had previously thought about it, even if until then it had not been formulated in a definite text.» — parte tres: y el límite que pone al dato del comentarista conocido, que haber expuesto un punto no implica que nadie lo hubiera hecho ni pensado antes.

«Undoubtedly the exposition can be modified in its external form in order to be adapted to circumstances; but—and we can never repeat it too often—the foundation always remains absolutely identical and its outward modifications in no wise touch or affect the essence of the doctrine.» — parte tres: concede la modificación de la exposición en su forma externa y niega que toque la esencia de la doctrina.

«These considerations, by raising the question to the plane of principles, serve to show the chief reasons for the embarrassment of the chronologists, as well as the pointlessness of their researches; and since these reasons, which they are unfortunately unaware of, are inherent in the very nature of things, it would assuredly be better if they resigned themselves to the inevitable and stopped debating insoluble questions;» — parte tres: adjudica a esas razones de principio el aprieto de los cronólogos y lo inútil de sus investigaciones, y les aconseja resignarse.

«ORTHODOXY AND HETERODOxy may be considered not only from the religious standpoint, as is usually the case in the West, but also from the much more general standpoint of tradition in all its modes; indeed, with regard to India it is only in the latter way that it is possible to understand these terms, since nothing of a properly religious nature exists there, whereas in the West on the contrary there is nothing genuinely traditional outside religion.» — parte tres, capítulo Ortodoxia y heterodoxia: saca los dos términos del terreno religioso y los pone en el de la tradición en todos sus modos, único modo de entenderlos para la India.

«So far as metaphysics and everything that derives more or less directly from it is concerned, the heterodoxy of a conception is at bottom nothing more or less than its falsity, resulting from its disagreement with fundamental principles;» — parte tres: iguala la heterodoxia de una concepción metafísica con su falsedad, que hace resultar de su desacuerdo con los principios fundamentales.

«more often than not this falsity even appears as a manifest absurdity, once the question is reduced to essentials: it could hardly be otherwise, since metaphysics, as we have already explained, excludes everything of a hypothetical character, only admitting those things the comprehension of which involves immediate certitude.» — parte tres: dice que esa falsedad suele aparecer como absurdo manifiesto, y lo funda en que la metafísica excluye lo hipotético y solo admite lo de certeza inmediata.

«Under these circumstances, orthodoxy becomes one with true knowledge, since it consists in an unbroken accord with the principles; and since these principles, in the case of the Hindu tradition, are contained in essence in the Veda, it is evidently agreement with the Veda that is here the criterion of orthodoxy.» — parte tres: identifica la ortodoxia con el conocimiento verdadero como acuerdo ininterrumpido con los principios, y pone el acuerdo con el Veda por criterio de ortodoxia en la tradición hindú.

«Only it should be understood that it is not so much a question of having recourse to the authority of the written texts as of observing the perfect coherence of the traditional teaching as a whole; agreement or disagreement with the Vedic texts is after all only an exterior sign of the intrinsic truth or falseness of a conception; it is this truth or falseness which really constitutes its» — parte tres: acota que no se trata tanto de la autoridad de los textos escritos como de la coherencia del conjunto de la enseñanza, y llama al acuerdo con los textos védicos signo exterior de la verdad o falsedad intrínseca. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«It will be objected perhaps that if this is so, then why is it not sufficient to speak quite simply of truth or falsity? The reason is that the unity of the traditional doctrine, with all the power inherent in it, furnishes the most trustworthy guide for preventing individual aberrations from being carried too far;» — parte tres: se plantea la objeción de por qué no hablar simplemente de verdad o falsedad, y responde que la unidad de la doctrina tradicional es la guía más segura contra las aberraciones individuales.

«moreover, the influence diffused by the tradition itself is sufficient for this purpose without there being a need for the restraining influence of any authority more or less analogous to a religious authority: this follows from what has been said on the subject of the real nature of Hindu unity.» — parte tres: declara suficiente la influencia difundida por la tradición misma, sin necesidad de una autoridad análoga a la religiosa.

«The confusion brought about by an unbridled development and expansion of the most hazardous and contradictory opinions, in circumstances where this power of the tradition is lacking and where there is not even an external authority able in some measure to take its place, is illustrated only too well by the example of modern Western philosophy;» — parte tres: pone a la filosofía occidental moderna por ejemplo de la confusión que sobreviene donde falta esa fuerza de la tradición y ni siquiera hay autoridad externa que la supla.

«if false conceptions arise so easily in the West and even succeed in forcing themselves upon the minds of the people in general, it is because a reference to principles is no longer possible, since no principles in the true sense of the word are recognized any longer.» — parte tres: explica la facilidad de las concepciones falsas en Occidente por la imposibilidad de remitirse a principios, que dice ya no reconocidos.

«On the contrary, in an essentially traditional civilization, the principles are never lost sight of and it only remains to apply them, directly or indirectly, in whatever sphere it is desired to do so.» — parte tres: en una civilización tradicional los principios nunca se pierden de vista y solo resta aplicarlos en la esfera que se quiera.

«Consequently, deviations occur much more rarely and are even exceptional; if they do nevertheless arise sometimes, they are never very widely accredited: they always remain the anomalies they were in the first instance, and if they become serious to the point of incompatibility with the most essential principles of the tradition, they finish by being rejected on this account from the civilization in which they arose.» — parte tres: da las desviaciones por raras y excepcionales ahí, nunca muy acreditadas, y expulsadas de la civilización si llegan a ser incompatibles con los principios esenciales.

«To illustrate the point just mentioned we will take the case of atomism, to which we shall also have to refer again later: this conception is clearly heterodox, since it is in formal disagreement with the Veda, and furthermore its falsity may easily be demonstrated since it contains certain self-contradictory elements; fundamentally, therefore, heterodoxy and absurdity are really synonymous.» — parte tres: toma el atomismo por ejemplo de concepción heterodoxa por estar en desacuerdo formal con el Veda, e iguala heterodoxia y absurdo.

«So far as the Hindus are concerned this atomist theory never represented anything but a simple anomaly of no great importance, so long at least as nothing more serious came to be added to it; thus it only enjoyed a very limited success, especially in comparison with the influence it was to acquire later with the Greeks, where, because the traditional principles were already in default, it was readily accepted by various schools of ‘physical philosophy’; Epicureanism, in particular, gained for it a widespread recognition, giving it an influence still to be felt in the modern West.» — parte tres: da al atomismo poca fortuna entre los hindúes y mucha entre los griegos, donde lo acogieron escuelas de filosofía física, y por el epicureísmo lo hace llegar hasta el Occidente moderno.

«To return to India, atomism was at first only put forward as a special cosmological theory, therefore quite limited in its scope; but for those who accepted this theory, heterodoxy on that particular point logically entailed heterodoxy on many other points also, since everything is closely linked together in a traditional doctrine.» — parte tres: sostiene que la heterodoxia en un punto arrastra la heterodoxia en otros, porque en una doctrina tradicional todo está trabado.

«Thus, the conception of atoms as constitutive elements of things has as its corollary the idea of a void in which these atoms can move; there was therefore a likelihood of a theory of ‘the universal void’ arising sooner or later, this expression being taken not in a metaphysical sense as referring to the ‘non-manifest’, but on the contrary in a physical or cosmological sense.» — parte tres: deriva del atomismo la idea de un vacío en que los átomos se mueven, y de ahí una teoría del vacío universal en sentido físico o cosmológico y no metafísico.

«That is what actually happened in certain Buddhist schools, which came to identify this void with akasha or ether. Thence they were naturally led on to a denial of the existence of ether as a corporeal element, so that they no longer admitted five, but only four such elements.» — parte tres: adjudica a ciertas escuelas budistas la identificación de ese vacío con *akasha* o éter, y con ella la negación del éter como elemento corpóreo y la reducción de cinco elementos a cuatro.

«It must also be noted in this connection that the majority of the Greek philosophers also admitted only four elements, like the Buddhist schools in question; if, nevertheless, some of them spoke of ether, they only did so in a rather restricted sense, giving it a much more special and also much less clear meaning than the Hindus.» — parte tres: señala que la mayoría de los filósofos griegos admitían cuatro elementos como esas escuelas budistas, y que los que hablaron de éter le dieron sentido más restringido y menos claro que los hindúes.

«As regards the origin, however, it is always necessary to refer back to a direct inspiration, likewise» — parte tres, capítulo Perpetuidad del Veda: remite el origen del texto tradicional a una inspiración directa. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«implied in the vansha, for here there is no question of an individual work; it makes little difference that the tradition has been expressed or formulated by such and such an individual, for this does not make him its author, given that the tradition belongs essentially to the supra-individual order.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: esa inspiración va implicada en la *vansha*, no hay obra individual, y expresar la tradición no vuelve autor a nadie porque es del orden supraindividual.

«points of view have always been conceived as co-existing simultaneously in the unity of their principle; that is why a traditional text is capable of manifold interpretations or applications corresponding to these different points of view.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: los puntos de vista se concibieron siempre como coexistentes en la unidad de su principio, de donde las interpretaciones múltiples de un texto tradicional.

«In India, atomism appeared first of all in the cosmological school of Kanada, and it may be noted here that it would hardly be possible for heterodox conceptions to arise in the schools devoted to purely» — parte tres, capítulo Ortodoxia y heterodoxia: sitúa la aparición del atomismo en la escuela cosmológica de Kanada, y dice que las heterodoxias difícilmente nacen en las escuelas de especulación puramente metafísica. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«metaphysical speculation, because in the realm of principles absurdity is much more immediately apparent than in the realm of secondary applications.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: en el reino de los principios el absurdo se ve de inmediato, y no así en el de las aplicaciones secundarias.

«moreover, as we have already explained, there is no such thing as an ‘evolution’ of traditional conceptions, and the testimony of the Vedic texts is in fact just as explicit on the subject of ether as of the four remaining corporeal elements.» — parte tres: repite que no hay evolución de las concepciones tradicionales, y declara el testimonio de los textos védicos igual de explícito sobre el éter que sobre los otros cuatro elementos corpóreos.

«It seems therefore that the Greeks, when they came into contact with Hindu thought, in many cases only received that thought deformed and mutilated, and moreover it is probable that they did not always expound it exactly as they had received it;» — parte tres: sostiene que los griegos recibieron a menudo deformado y mutilado el pensamiento hindú, y que no siempre lo expusieron como lo recibieron.

«However that may be, it must be understood, as regards atomism, that its principal danger lies in the fact that it can easily be made to serve as the foundation of a ‘naturalism that is in general as contrary to the ways of Eastern thought as it is frequent, under more or less explicit forms, in Western conceptions; in fact it can be said that if all naturalistic theories are not necessarily atomic, atomism is always more or less naturalistic, at least in tendency.» — parte tres: sitúa el peligro principal del atomismo en servir de fundamento a un naturalismo, y aunque no toda teoría naturalista sea atómica, declara al atomismo siempre más o menos naturalista.

«When it is incorporated in a philosophical system, as it was with the Greeks, it even becomes mechanistic, which does not necessarily mean materialistic, for materialism is something entirely modern.» — parte tres: dice que incorporado a un sistema filosófico el atomismo se vuelve mecanicista, y acota que eso no es lo mismo que materialista, porque el materialismo lo data como enteramente moderno.

«This is of little importance here, however, since in India there is no question of philosophical systems any more than of religious dogmas; even the deviations of Hindu thought have never been either philosophical or religious in nature, and this also holds good of Buddhism, even though, in all the East, its doctrine is the one which at first sight might appear to approach closest to Western points of view in certain respects; and that is the very reason why it lends itself all the more easily to those false assimilations that are so dear to orientalists.» — parte tres: niega que en la India haya sistemas filosóficos ni dogmas religiosos, y dice que ni las desviaciones del pensamiento hindú ni el budismo fueron filosóficas ni religiosas.

«For the sake of those readers familiar with this book’s first edition, we deem it opportune to briefly point out the reasons which prompted us to modify the present chapter:» — parte tres, nota del autor a la apertura del capítulo Acerca del budismo: anuncia que va a dar las razones por las que modificó ese capítulo respecto de la primera edición.

«when the first edition was published, we had no reason to doubt that, as is usually claimed, the most restricted and the mest clearly anti-metaphysical forms of Hinayana Buddhism represented the actual teachings of Shakyamuni; we had no time to undertake the lengthy research needed to delve further into this question, and, besides, what we knew of Buddhism at that time was unpromising in nature.» — parte tres, nota del autor: declara qué creía al publicar la primera edición, que las formas más restringidas y antimetafísicas del budismo hinayana representaban la enseñanza de Shakyamuni, y dice que no tuvo tiempo de investigar más.

«But, since then, matters have assumed an entirely different aspect following on the works of A.K. Coomaraswamy (who was not himself a Buddhist, but a Hindu, which sufficiently guarantees his impartiality) and his reinterpretation of original Buddhism, from which it is so difficult to extract the true meaning out of all the heresies which were grafted onto it later and which we of course had in view when we initially wrote the book;» — parte tres, nota del autor: atribuye el cambio a los trabajos de A. K. Coomaraswamy, a quien llama hindú y no budista para garantizar su imparcialidad, y a su reinterpretación del budismo original frente a las herejías injertadas después.

«it goes without saying, as far as these deviated forms are concerned, that what we had first written remains completely valid.» — parte tres, nota del autor: acota el alcance de la rectificación, que lo escrito antes sigue valiendo enteramente para las formas desviadas.

«On this occasion we should add that we are always prepared to recognize the traditional value of every doctrine, wherever it is to be found, once we have sufficient proof;» — parte tres, nota del autor: declara su disposición a reconocer el valor tradicional de toda doctrina dondequiera que esté, con la condición de tener prueba suficiente.

«but, unfortunately, although the new information we have has been entirely favorable to Shakyamuni’s doctrine (which does not mean favorable to all schools of Buddhism without distinction), it is quite otherwise with all those other things whose anti-traditional character we have denounced.» — parte tres, nota del autor: acota el alcance de lo favorable, que la información nueva favorece a la doctrina de Shakyamuni y no a todas las escuelas budistas sin distinción.

«COMPARED WITH OTHER DOCTRINES Of the East, Buddhism, as we have just explained, in some ways appears to be nearer to, or shall we say less remote from Western conceptions, and causes it to be regarded as an easier field of study for Westerners; this also probably accounts for the marked preference displayed toward it by orientalists.» — parte tres, capítulo Acerca del budismo: sitúa al budismo como la doctrina oriental menos remota de las concepciones occidentales, y de ahí explica la preferencia de los orientalistas.

«At least this is the feeling they experience when studying certain forms of Buddhism, for, as we shall show presently, there are many distinctions to be made even in this respect; and it is perhaps natural that they should be at pains to prove that those forms which they find most accessible represent the original and true Buddhism, whereas the remaining forms, according to them, are but comparatively late corruptions.» — parte tres: señala que esa impresión vale de ciertas formas del budismo, y que a los orientalistas les conviene probar que las más accesibles son el budismo original y las demás corrupciones tardías.

«But Buddhism, of whatever kind it be and even under the most ‘simplified’ aspects that may have been displayed by certain of its subdivisions, remains nonetheless an Eastern doctrine;» — parte tres: declara al budismo doctrina oriental aun en sus formas más simplificadas.

«besides, the orientalists go much too far in discovering assimilations with Western points of view, for example when they wish to turn Buddhism into the equivalent of a religion in the European sense of the word, an intention which furthermore sometimes lands them in a strange embarrassment: for have not some of them, without recoiling from a contradiction in terms, declared Buddhism to be ‘an atheistic religior?» — parte tres: objeta a los orientalistas volver el budismo equivalente de una religión europea, y recoge la fórmula contradictoria de religión atea con que algunos lo describieron. La grafía final sale así del troceo.

«In reality however, it is no more ‘atheistic’ than it is ‘theistic or ‘pantheistic’; all that need be said of it is that it does not adopt a point of view where these various terms have any meaning; but if it does not do so, it is precisely because it is not a religion.» — parte tres: niega que el budismo sea ateo, teísta o panteísta, y dice que no adopta el punto de vista donde esos términos significan algo, porque no es una religión.

«Thus by their interpretations the orientalists succeed in distorting even those features that might appear to be least foreign to their mentality and this they do in more ways than one, for when they would make a philosophy of Buddhism they scarcely denature it more than when they attempt to turn it into a religion;» — parte tres: sostiene que hacer del budismo una filosofía lo desnaturaliza tanto como hacerlo religión.

«for instance, when they speak of ‘pessimism, as often happens, it is not Buddhism that is thus qualified, or rather it is only Buddhism as viewed through the philosophy of Schopenhauer; authentic Buddhism is neither pessimistic nor optimistic, for things are not really regarded by it in this fashion;» — parte tres: declara que el pesimismo que se le atribuye es el budismo visto por la filosofía de Schopenhauer, y al budismo auténtico ni pesimista ni optimista.

«The truth is that Buddhism is neither a religion nor a philosophy, although, in comparison with the Hindu traditional doctrines, it comes closer to both in some respects, especially in the case of those forms of it that find most favor with orientalists.» — parte tres: lo declara ni religión ni filosofía, y a la vez más cercano a ambas que las doctrinas tradicionales hindúes, sobre todo en las formas que prefieren los orientalistas.

«One may even occasionally come across speculations which, if examined superficially, might seem to suggest psychology; but, quite clearly, they do not belong to psychology as we know it, for the latter is an entirely Western invention and even in the West it is quite recent, since it actually goes no further back than Locke; it would be wrong to attribute to the Buddhists an outlook which arose specifically out of the modern empiricism of the Anglo-Saxons.» — parte tres: niega que quepa leer psicología en esas especulaciones, porque la psicología es invención occidental reciente que no se remonta más allá de Locke.

«For the comparison to be legitimate it must not proceed as far as an assimilation; and likewise, where religion is concerned, Buddhism is not effectively comparable to it except as regards a single feature, of importance no doubt, but not sufficiently so to establish an identity of thought: the feature referred to is the appearance in it of a sentimental element,» — parte tres: limita la comparación con la religión a un solo rasgo, la aparición de un elemento sentimental.

«which however can in any case be explained by the need for adaptation to the special conditions of the period that saw the birth of those doctrines that were affected by it; this fact is therefore far from implying that all doctrines of this kind necessarily fall into one and the same category.» — parte tres: explica ese elemento sentimental por la adaptación a las condiciones de la época en que nacieron esas doctrinas, y niega que ello meta a todas en una misma categoría.

«A real difference of points of view can be much more essential than a resemblance which, after all, chiefly affects the forms of expression of the doctrines concerned; this is the point that is missed by those who speak of ‘Buddhist morality’:» — parte tres: declara más esencial la diferencia de puntos de vista que la semejanza de formas de expresión, y ahí sitúa el error de quienes hablan de moral budista.

«what they mistake for a moral code, all the more easily since its sentimental side might render such a confusion plausible, is really viewed from a totally different angle and springs from quite other causes that are not even of an equivalent order: the well-known formula ‘may beings be happy’ concerns the universality of beings without any restriction, and not human beings alone; this is an extension which the moral point of view, even by definition, in no wise admits of.» — parte tres: lee la fórmula de que los seres sean felices como referida a la universalidad de los seres y no solo a los humanos, extensión que el punto de vista moral no admite por definición.

«The Buddhist ‘compassion’ is not the same thing as Schopenhauer’s ‘pity’; rather should it be compared to the ‘cosmic charity’ of the Muslims, which is moreover quite capable of being transposed outside all sentimentalism.» — parte tres: distingue la compasión budista de la piedad de Schopenhauer y la empareja con la caridad cósmica de los musulmanes, transponible fuera de todo sentimentalismo.

«Another useful point to be noted in the same connection is that there is a fairly close link between the sentimental form of a doctrine and its tendency to wide diffusion, a tendency to be found both in the religions and in Buddhism, as is proved by its expansion over the greater part of Asia;» — parte tres: liga la forma sentimental de una doctrina con su tendencia a la difusión amplia, presente en las religiones y en el budismo.

«but here again, likenesses should not be overstressed, and it is perhaps not quite accurate to speak of Buddhist ‘missionaries’ who went out from India at certain periods, for apart from the fact that here one is only dealing with a small number of isolated individuals, the word ‘missionary is almost bound to call to mind methods of propaganda and proselytism peculiar to Westerners.» — parte tres: pone reparo a hablar de misioneros budistas salidos de la India, porque eran individuos aislados y la palabra evoca métodos de propaganda occidentales. El troceo parte *over-stressed* por el guion de fin de renglón y la extracción lo une en *overstressed*.

«We have already indicated to which side borrowing must be» — parte tres, capítulo Ortodoxia y heterodoxia: repite de qué lado sitúa el préstamo cuando aparecen concordancias como la del éter. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk.

«It cannot be objected that the Hindus ‘invented’ ether at a subsequent date for more or less plausible reasons analogous to those which cause it to» — parte tres: rechaza la objeción de que los hindúes inventaran el éter después por razones análogas a las de los físicos modernos. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«be fairly generally accepted by modern physicists. In the first place, their reasons are of quite another order and are not the result of experiment;» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: las razones de los hindúes son de otro orden y no salen del experimento.

«The latter do in fact believe that there is to be found in Buddhism something that can be made to fit into the framework of their own outlook, or at any rate something that does not lie entirely outside it, since here they do not encounter a barrier of» — parte tres, capítulo Acerca del budismo: adjudica a los orientalistas la creencia de hallar en el budismo algo que cabe en su marco. El tramo se corta donde el troceo mete la nota al pie del autor.

«utter incomprehensibility as happens with the other doctrines, an obstacle which they must sense vaguely even if they do not admit it openly.» — parte tres: la continuación, al otro lado de la nota: en las demás doctrinas topan con una barrera de incomprensibilidad que dice que sienten aun sin admitirla.

«However, it must be recognized that Buddhism is beyond question invested with a certain sentimental form» — parte tres: reconoce en el budismo una forma sentimental innegable. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«which, though it does not go to the point of ‘moralism’, nevertheless constitutes one of the characteristic elements of the Buddhist doctrines; this should be borne in mind, especially as it is one of the features that sharply distinguish Buddhism from the Hindu doctrines; it is the presence of this element which also goes to show that Buddhism is further removed than Hinduism from the tradition in its ‘primordial’ state.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: esa forma sentimental no llega al moralismo, la cuenta entre los rasgos que distinguen al budismo de las doctrinas hindúes, y de ahí lo sitúa más lejos del estado primordial de la tradición.

«What is furthermore remarkable is the fact that alongside this process of distant diffusion, Buddhism was losing ground in India itself, till it finally disappeared from that country altogether,» — parte tres: consigna que mientras el budismo se difundía a lo lejos perdía terreno en la India hasta desaparecer del país.

«after having in its last stages given birth, incidentally, to certain degenerate and clearly heterodox schools which are frequently referred to in Hindu works contemporary with this closing phase of Indian Bud» — parte tres: sitúa en esa última fase el nacimiento de escuelas degeneradas y heterodoxas, referidas en obras hindúes contemporáneas. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«the writings of Shankaracharya, for example, never mention these schools except in order to refute their theories in the name of the traditional doctrine, without however ascribing any of their errors to the founder of Buddhism himself, which goes to prove that it was nothing more than a case of degeneration.» — parte tres: consigna que los escritos de Shankaracharya solo nombran esas escuelas para objetar sus teorías en nombre de la doctrina tradicional, sin adjudicar sus errores al fundador del budismo.

«Oddly, it is precisely such shrunken and aberrant forms which, in the opinion of a» — parte tres: la paradoja con que cierra, que son esas formas encogidas y aberrantes las que muchos orientalistas dan por lo más cercano al budismo original. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk.

«these forms belong to schools which, having cut adrift from the regular tradition and having in consequence lost sight of the real metaphysics, were inevitably led into substituting for it something resembling the philosophical point of view in a certain measure— but only in a certain measure.» — parte tres, capítulo Acerca del budismo: adjudica las formas más accesibles del budismo a escuelas desprendidas de la tradición regular que, perdida de vista la metafísica real, sustituyeron por algo parecido al punto de vista filosófico. El tramo cruza el cambio de plana.

«considerable number of orientalists, are supposed to represent as nearly as possible the true original Buddhism.» — parte tres: el final de la paradoja, que muchos orientalistas dan esas formas por lo más cercano al budismo original. El tramo arranca al otro lado del corte de chunk.

«We shall return to this point later; but before proceeding further it is important to state quite plainly that India never was really Buddhist, contrary to a commonly expressed opinion, which would make of Buddhism the very pivot of all that affects India and its history:» — parte tres: niega que la India fuera nunca realmente budista, contra la opinión que hace del budismo el eje de la historia de la India.

«India before Buddhism, India after Buddhism—such is the clear division that orientalists believe themselves to have established, implying by this statement moreover that Buddhism, even» — parte tres: describe la división que atribuye a los orientalistas, la India antes y después del budismo. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk.

«It is true that these writers, who fancy that the Hindus must have borrowed from Greek philosophy, are equally capable of maintaining, with no greater degree of probability, that they also are indebted to Buddhism; and we are not quite sure whether such is not perhaps the substance of their thought.» — parte tres: señala que los mismos que suponen préstamos hindúes de la filosofía griega pueden sostener con igual probabilidad la deuda con el budismo.

«It must however be admitted that there have been some honorable exceptions; thus Barth declared that ‘Buddhism only had the importance of an episode, a statement that is strictly accurate as far as India is concerned;» — parte tres: cita como excepción honorable a Barth, que declaró que el budismo solo tuvo la importancia de un episodio, y da esa frase por estrictamente exacta para la India.

«but nevertheless, contrary opinions have not ceased to prevail among scholars, not to mention the complete ignorance of the European public, which is even sometimes led to believe that Buddhism still actually reigns in India.» — parte tres: consigna que entre los eruditos siguen prevaleciendo las opiniones contrarias, y que el público europeo llega a creer que el budismo reina todavía en la India.

«The truth of the matter is that about the time of King Ashoka, that is to say toward the third century Bc, Buddhism in India enjoyed a period of wide extension, while at the same time it was beginning to overflow outside India, this period being moreover quickly followed by that of its decline;» — parte tres: data hacia el tiempo del rey Ashoka, siglo III antes de Cristo, la extensión amplia del budismo en la India y su desbordamiento fuera de ella, seguidos pronto de su declive.

«but even during that period, if one wished to discover some parallel in the Western world, one would have to say that this extension was rather comparable to the spread of a monastic order than to the propagation of a religion addressing its message to the whole body of a population; this comparison, though not perfect, is probably the least inexact of all.» — parte tres: compara esa extensión con la difusión de una orden monástica antes que con la propagación de una religión dirigida a toda una población, y llama a la comparación imperfecta y la menos inexacta.

«But we have not yet done with all the fantasies of the orientalists; we find some of them, like Max Miiller, claiming to discern the germs of a Buddhism imagined after their own fashion, that is to say the germs of heterodoxy, even in the Upanishads,! which, forming as they do an integral portion of the Veda, are therefore among the essential foundations of Hindu orthodoxy; it would indeed be difficult to push absurdity further or to give proof of greater incomprehension.» — parte tres: objeta a Max Müller discernir gérmenes de heterodoxia budista en los Upanishads, que declara parte integrante del Veda y fundamento de la ortodoxia hindú. La grafía del apellido sale así del troceo.

«Whatever picture may be formed of Buddhism, it is nevertheless quite easy to understand that it must always have shared many features with Hinduism, even after it had separated from it, given the fact that it arose in a Hindu environment and was in a way an offshoot of Hinduism, and it is this fact that fully» — parte tres: explica los rasgos comunes de budismo e hinduismo por haber nacido el primero en medio hindú y ser un vástago suyo. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«explains whatever is found to be common to both; Roussel has doubtless exaggerated in an opposite direction by insisting on the complete lack of originality of the Buddhist doctrine, though his opinion is more plausible than Max Miiller’s and at least expresses no contradiction;» — parte tres: sitúa a Roussel en el extremo contrario por insistir en la falta completa de originalidad de la doctrina budista, y declara esa opinión más plausible que la de Max Müller y sin contradicción.

«and it should be added that this opinion would express praise rather than criticism for those who, like ourselves, take up the traditional standpoint, since differences between doctrines, in order to be legitimate, can only be a mere matter of adaptation, modifying the more or less external forms of expression but in no wise touching the principles themselves;» — parte tres: dice que desde el punto de vista tradicional esa falta de originalidad sería elogio, porque las diferencias legítimas entre doctrinas son de adaptación y no tocan los principios.

«the introduction of the sentimental form is itself only a case in point, always provided that it allows metaphysics to be preserved intact at the center of the doctrine.» — parte tres: cuenta la forma sentimental entre esas adaptaciones, con la condición de que deje intacta la metafísica en el centro de la doctrina.

«Having said this much, we must now ask ourselves how far it is justifiable to refer to Buddhism in general terms, as is customary, without incurring the danger of various misunderstandings; in order to avoid them, it is on the contrary necessary to make clear which Buddhism is being referred to, for in point of fact it included and still does include a large variety of branches and schools, and one must beware of attributing to all indiscriminately features that are really confined to one or other among them.» — parte tres: pide precisar de qué budismo se habla, porque incluye ramas y escuelas muy variadas y no cabe atribuirles en bloque rasgos de una sola.

«These schools, viewed as a whole, can be made to fall under the two main headings of Mahayana and Hinayana, titles that are usually translated by ‘Greater Vehicle’ and ‘Lesser Vehicle’, but which would perhaps both more exactly and more clearly be rendered by the names ‘Great Way’ and ‘Little Way’; it is much better to keep these names, which are the ones they bear authentically, than to replace them by epithets such as ‘Northern’ or ‘Southern’ Buddhism, which have only a geographical bearing, rather vague at that, and which do not in any way describe the doctrines concerned.» — parte tres: reparte las escuelas en Mahayana e Hinayana, que prefiere traducir Gran Vía y Pequeña Vía antes que Gran Vehículo y Pequeño Vehículo, y rechaza los rótulos geográficos de budismo del norte y del sur.

«It is the Mahayana which can unquestionably be regarded as constituting a complete doctrine in the fullest sense, including the properly metaphysical elements that go to form its higher or central part; on the other hand, the Hinayana appears to be a doctrine that in some ways stops short at comparatively external aspects without proceeding beyond those things that are accessible to the ordinary run of people, and this accounts for the name it has been given;» — parte tres: tiene al Mahayana por doctrina completa, con los elementos propiamente metafísicos en su parte central, y al Hinayana por doctrina que se detiene en aspectos externos accesibles a la generalidad.

«It is here that the orientalists really reverse the normal relations, for they will insist that the most aberrant schools, those that have carried heterodoxy furthest, are the most authentic expressions of the Hinayana and that the Hinayana itself is really the original form of Buddhism or at least its regular continuation, to the exclusion of the Mahdyana which, according to them, is but the product of a series of alterations and borrowings.» — parte tres: consigna la inversión que atribuye a los orientalistas, tener las escuelas más aberrantes por las expresiones más auténticas del Hinayana y a este por la forma original del budismo, con el Mahayana por alteración.

«In upholding this opinion they do no more than obey the anti-traditional trend of their own mentality, which prompts them naturally to sympathize with all that is heterodox;» — parte tres: adjudica esa opinión a la tendencia antitradicional de su propia mentalidad, que los inclina a simpatizar con lo heterodoxo.

«more particularly they conform to the false conception, held pretty generally by modern Westerners, that whatever is simplest, one might even say most rudimentary, must always for that reason pass for being most ancient; with such prejudices, it does not so much as cross their minds that the truth might be the exact opposite.» — parte tres: nombra la concepción falsa que les atribuye, que lo más simple o rudimentario ha de ser lo más antiguo, sin que se les ocurra que la verdad pudiera ser la contraria.

«Under the circumstances one might well ask what sort of a weird caricature has been represented to Westerners as being the real Buddhism, such as its founder preached, and one can almost smile at the idea that this travesty has become an object of admiration for many people in the West, who have been so fascinated by it that some have not even hesitated to proclaim their conversion—a conversion moreover that remains quite theoretical and ‘ideal’—to this Buddhism which they discover to be so extraordinarily similar to their own ‘rationalist’ and ‘positivist’ outlook!» — parte tres: llama caricatura a lo que se presentó en Occidente como el budismo real, y consigna las conversiones teóricas de quienes lo hallaron semejante a su propia perspectiva racionalista y positivista.

«Of course, when one says that the Mahayana should be included in Buddhism from the beginning, this must only be taken as referring to what might be called its essence, independently of the more or less special forms belonging to its various schools;» — parte tres: acota que incluir el Mahayana en el budismo desde el principio se refiere a lo que llama su esencia, no a las formas particulares de sus escuelas.

«these forms are only secondary, but they are all that the ‘historical method’ allows itself to take into account, and it is this fact that lends an appearance of justification to the statement of the orientalists when they try to argue that the Mahayana is ‘late’ or that it only represents an ‘altered’ form of Buddhism.» — parte tres: dice que el método histórico solo toma en cuenta esas formas secundarias, y de ahí la apariencia de justificación de que el Mahayana sea tardío o alterado.

«all that is important is to know how far these modifications go, a question that does not seem very easy to decide, especially for those who have practically no idea of the traditional doctrines with which it came into contact.» — parte tres: sitúa la cuestión en hasta dónde llegan esas modificaciones, y la declara difícil sobre todo para quien no conoce las doctrinas tradicionales con las que el budismo topó.

«This applies especially to the Far East, where Taoism clearly has influenced certain branches of the Mahayana, at least as regards their modes of expression; the school of Zen, in particular, adopted methods that are quite plainly of Taoist inspiration.» — parte tres: adjudica al taoísmo influencia sobre ciertas ramas del Mahayana, al menos en sus modos de expresión, y a la escuela zen métodos de inspiración taoísta.

«This fact finds its explanation in the special character of the Far-Eastern tradition, with the sharp cleavage existing between its two portions, inner and outer, that is to say between Taoism and Confucianism; under these conditions Buddhism appears to have been called upon to occupy a realm intermediate between the two;» — parte tres: explica esa influencia por la escisión entre taoísmo y confucianismo, con el budismo llamado a ocupar un terreno intermedio entre los dos.

«in certain cases it even seems to have provided what was really an ‘outer covering for Taoism, thus allowing the latter to remain a very closed preserve much more easily than would otherwise have been the case.» — parte tres: sostiene que en ciertos casos el budismo sirvió de cubierta exterior al taoísmo, y así le permitió permanecer más cerrado.

«This also explains how Far-Eastern Buddhism came to assimilate certain symbols of Taoist origin, as for example when it identified Kwan-yin with a Bodhisattva or, to be more exact, with a feminine aspect of Avalokiteshvara, by reason of the ‘providential’ function common to both;» — parte tres: explica por ahí la asimilación de símbolos de origen taoísta, con Kwan-yin identificada con un bodhisattva o con un aspecto femenino de Avalokiteshvara por la función providencial común.

«and this, be it noted, has been the occasion of a further mistake on the part of some orientalists, who as regards Taoism as often as not know little more than its bare name; they were led into believing that Kwan-yin properly belonged to Buddhism, and they seemed to ignore her essentially Taoist origin completely.» — parte tres: adjudica a los orientalistas, que del taoísmo dice que apenas conocen el nombre, la creencia de que Kwan-yin pertenece propiamente al budismo.

«In a manual of the history of religions that we have already quoted, containing a chapter on China that in very many ways reveals a most regrettable lack of understanding, it is stated that ‘of primitive Buddhism there is no longer a trace in China’ and that the doctrine now to be found there ‘retains nothing of Buddhism but the name’; if by this ‘primitive Buddhism’ is meant that which orientalists put forward as such, the statement is quite correct, but first of all it would be necessary to decide whether their conception of it is acceptable or whether, on the contrary, it is that conception which in actual practice represents nothing but a corrupted Buddhism.» — parte tres: recoge del manual de historia de las religiones que del budismo primitivo no queda rastro en China, concede que la frase es exacta si se toma el budismo primitivo de los orientalistas, y devuelve la pregunta sobre esa concepción.

«The question of the relations of Buddhism and Taoism is comparatively easy to settle, provided of course that one knows something about Taoism; but it must be admitted that there are also other and more difficult problems: this is especially true when one is no longer dealing with elements belonging to traditions foreign to India, but actually with Hindu elements, concerning which it may be hard to tell whether they were always more or less clearly associated with Buddhism in virtue of its Indian origin, or whether» — parte tres: declara relativamente fácil la cuestión de las relaciones entre budismo y taoísmo, y más difícil la de los elementos hindúes integrados en el budismo. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk.

«they came to be integrated into certain of its forms after the event. This applies, for instance, to the Shaivite elements that occupy so large a place in Tibetan Buddhism, the form commonly known by the rather misleading name of ‘Lamaism’; this feature is moreover not confined exclusively to Tibet, since in Java a Shiva-Buddha is to be met with, exemplifying a similar association but carried this time to the furthest possible limit.» — parte tres: pone por caso los elementos shivaítas del budismo tibetano, al que llama lamaísmo con el nombre por engañoso, y el Shiva-Buddha de Java como el límite extremo de esa asociación.

«In fact, a solution of this question might be arrived at through a study of the relations between Buddhism, even at the outset, with the Tantric doctrines; but the latter are so little known in the West that it would be almost impossible to consider them without being led off into lengthy discussions than can find no place here; we will therefore stop short at the mere suggestion,» — parte tres: propone buscar la solución en el estudio de las relaciones del budismo con las doctrinas tántricas, y se detiene en la sugerencia por lo poco conocidas que son en Occidente.

«Ceylon is the most typical present-day representative, should have given rise to the deviations we referred to earlier on.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: de esa rama hace nacer las desviaciones mencionadas antes.

«The question is further complicated by the fact that Buddhism, when it came out of India, was modified considerably and in several different ways, as indeed it was bound to» — parte tres: consigna que al salir de la India el budismo se modificó considerablemente y de varios modos. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«be modified in order to adapt itself to quite different surroundings; all that is important is to know how far these modifications go, a question that does not seem very easy to decide, especially for those who have practically no idea of the traditional doctrines with which it came into contact.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: esas modificaciones son de adaptación a medios muy distintos, y medir hasta dónde llegan es difícil para quien no conoce las doctrinas tradicionales con las que el budismo topó.

«Furthermore, whenever they come across something of which the character or the origin cannot be exactly determined by them, it is quite in accordance with their mental habits to settle the difficulty by attaching to it a Buddhist label;» — parte tres: atribuye a los orientalistas el hábito de resolver lo que no saben determinar poniéndole rótulo budista.

«this provides a rather convenient means of disguising their conscious or unconscious embarrassment and they have recourse to it all the more readily because, in virtue of the practical monopoly of information that they have succeeded in acquiring, they are quite sure that no one is going to contradict them; what fear of criticism can people feel who start off by laying down the principle that, in the line of study concerned, no real competence is admissible except such as is to be gained in their own school?» — parte tres: explica ese hábito como modo de disfrazar el apuro, amparados en el monopolio de la información y en no admitir competencia fuera de su escuela.

«Moreover, it goes without saying that all those things that» — parte tres: consigna que lo rotulado como budista queda a sus ojos por budismo corrompido. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«they thus label as Buddhist to their heart’s content, as well as those things that really are Buddhist, represent in their eyes nothing but a ‘corrupted Buddhism’.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: tanto lo rotulado a su gusto como lo realmente budista representa a sus ojos un budismo corrompido.

«One last point now remains to be discussed, at least in brief: why did Buddhism expand so far and with such success outside its original country, whereas in that same country it declined so rapidly till it disappeared entirely?» — parte tres: plantea la última cuestión del capítulo, por qué el budismo se expandió fuera de su país de origen y en él declinó hasta desaparecer.

«What we mean to say is that Buddhism seems to have been really destined for non-Indian peoples; nevertheless, it was necessary for it to arise out of Hinduism itself, in order that it might be the recipient of those elements that were to be carried elsewhere after undergoing the required process of adaptation;» — parte tres: su respuesta, que el budismo estaba destinado a pueblos no indios y que necesitaba nacer del hinduismo para recibir los elementos que llevaría fuera.

«but this task once accomplished, it was but natural for it to disappear from India where it had no enduring task to fulfill: in this particular respect, but in this respect only, it would not be altogether unreasonable to compare the situation of Buddhism with regard to Hinduism, with that of Christianity in relation to Judaism, on condition of course of constantly bearing in mind those differences of points of view that we stressed earlier on.» — parte tres: cumplida esa tarea, da por natural su desaparición de la India, y compara esa relación con la del cristianismo respecto del judaísmo, con la condición de tener presentes las diferencias de puntos de vista.

«In any case, this consideration is the only one that permits of recognizing in Buddhism, without falling into an illogicality, the character of a traditional doctrine, a character that the Mahayana at least undeniably possesses—for one must equally be ready to admit the heterodoxy of certain late and deviated forms of the Hinayana;» — parte tres: hace de esa consideración la única que permite reconocer carácter tradicional al budismo, que atribuye sin duda al Mahayana, y a la vez admitir la heterodoxia de formas tardías del Hinayana.

«Had he taught the heterodox doctrines attributed to him by orientalists it would be impossible to explain the fact that a large number of orthodox Hindus do not hesitate to look on him as an Avatara, that is to say as a ‘divine manifestation’, a function of which the records of his life in fact reveal all the characteristic features;» — parte tres: sostiene que si el Buda hubiera enseñado las doctrinas heterodoxas que le atribuyen los orientalistas no se explicaría que hindúes ortodoxos lo tengan por *Avatara*, manifestación divina.

«it is true that the orientalists, who make a point of excluding whatever belongs to the ‘non-human’ order, maintain that the events of his life are only part of ‘a legend’, that is to say a story devoid of any historical value, and that these legendary features are also foreign to ‘primitive Buddhism’; but if these features are done away with, what after all remains of the founder of Buddhism in the sense of a purely human individuality?» — parte tres: consigna que los orientalistas dan por leyenda los episodios de esa vida, y pregunta qué queda del fundador del budismo como individualidad puramente humana una vez suprimidos.

«This so-called ‘historical reconstruction’ of the Buddha’s life is worth about as much as that of his ‘primitive’ doctrine, and is entirely a product of the same prejudices; in either case the principal aim is the suppression of anything that offends the modern outlook, and it is by means of this eminently naive proceeding that these people hope to arrive at the truth.» — parte tres: empareja esa reconstrucción de la vida con la de la doctrina primitiva, y adjudica a ambas el fin de suprimir lo que ofende a la perspectiva moderna.

«We will say no more on the subject, since Buddhism is not the object of our present study; it is sufficient to have ‘situated’ it on the one hand with regard to the Hindu doctrine and on the other in relation to those Western theories that people have tried to assimilate to it with greater or less abuse.» — parte tres: cierra el capítulo diciendo que bastaba situar el budismo respecto de la doctrina hindú y de las teorías occidentales que se le asimilan.

«Having digressed thus far we can now return to the examination of properly Hindu conceptions, but before doing so we will permit ourselves one last comment which can serve as a conclusion to all that has been said above: if orientalists have fallen into such grave errors on the subject of Buddhism, in which they have so to speak ‘specialized’, what value is to be attached to their statements concerning other doctrines that, compared with Buddhism, have been regarded by them as secondary and almost incidental objects of study?» — parte tres: y la pregunta con que remata, qué valor tienen las afirmaciones de los orientalistas sobre otras doctrinas si erraron tan gravemente sobre el budismo, en el que se especializaron.

«AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF IDEA that is apt to cause confusion in the minds of Western people, through the absence of any equivalent term in their own vocabulary, one might cite the conception denoted by the Sanskrit word dharma;! orientalists have certainly proposed any number of translations for the word, but most of these are only rough approximations or even completely erroneous, owing as usual to the confusion of points of view we have alluded to before.» — parte tres, capítulo La ley de Manu: pone por ejemplo de idea sin equivalente occidental la que denota la palabra sánscrita *dharma*, y declara aproximadas o erróneas las traducciones propuestas por los orientalistas.

«Thus, attempts are sometimes made to translate dharma by ‘religion’, though the religious point of view is here quite inapplicable; furthermore, it should at the same time be realized that it is not the conception of a doctrine, wrongly supposed to be religious, that this word properly designates.» — parte tres: rechaza traducir *dharma* por religión, porque el punto de vista religioso no se aplica ahí.

«On the other hand, if it be a question of the accomplishment of rites, which likewise are not religious in character, these are described in their entirety by the word karma, the general meaning of which is ‘action’, but which is here taken in a special and, as it were, technical sense.» — parte tres: reserva para el cumplimiento de los ritos, que tampoco llama religiosos, la palabra *karma*, cuyo sentido general da por acción, ahí en sentido técnico.

«For those who wish at all costs to see a religion in the Hindu tradition, there would still remain what they believe to be a moral aspect, and it is this more especially that they would call dharma; hence, according to circumstances, several more or less secondary interpretations have arisen, such as ‘virtue’, ‘justice’, ‘merit’, and ‘duty’, all of which are in fact exclusively moral ideas and for this very reason do not in any way express the idea in question.» — parte tres: rechaza las traducciones morales de *dharma* por virtud, justicia, mérito y deber, por ser ideas exclusivamente morales.

«Furthermore, we may note in passing that these same ideas are not all equally essential to the moral point of view itself; that is to say, there are some of them which are not common to all moral conceptions: for example, the idea of duty or obligation is absent from most ancient codes of morality, among others from that of the Stoics, and it is only recently, and especially since Kant, that it has come to play such a preponderant part.» — parte tres: señala que esas ideas no son todas esenciales al punto de vista moral, y data en Kant el peso preponderante de la idea de deber, ausente de los códigos antiguos y de los estoicos.

«An important thing to notice in this connection, since it is one of the most frequent sources of error, is that ideas or points of view which have become habitual tend for that very reason to appear essential; that is why attempts are made to introduce them into the interpretation of every kind of conception, even those most remote in time or space, although there would often be no need to go back very far to discover their real source.» — parte tres: nombra una fuente frecuente de error, que las ideas vueltas habituales parecen por eso esenciales y se introducen en la interpretación de concepciones remotas.

«Having said this much by way of dealing with the false interpretations most commonly met with, we will try to show as clearly as possible what should really be understood by dharma. As the meaning of the verbal root dhri, from which it is derived, indicates, this word, in its most general sense, simply denotes ‘manner of being’; it is, so to speak, the essential nature of a being, comprising the sum of its particular qualities or characteristics, and determining, by virtue of the tendencies or dispositions it implies, the manner in which this being will conduct itself, either in a general way or in relation to each particular circumstance.» — parte tres: da su lectura de *dharma* desde la raíz *dhri*, manera de ser, naturaleza esencial de un ser con sus cualidades y las tendencias que determinan su conducta.

«The same idea may be applied, not only to a single being, but also to an organized collectivity, to a species, to all the beings included in a cosmic cycle or state of existence, or even to the whole order of the Universe; at one level or another, then, it signifies conformity with the essential nature of beings, which is realized in the ordered hierarchy where all beings have their place, and it is also, in consequence, the fundamental equilibrium or integral harmony resulting from this hierarchical disposition, which is moreover precisely what the idea of ‘justice’ amounts to when stripped of its specifically moral character.» — parte tres: extiende esa idea de un ser a una colectividad, una especie, un ciclo cósmico o el orden entero del Universo, y la define como conformidad con la naturaleza esencial de los seres dentro de una jerarquía ordenada.

«Considered in this way, as a principle of order and therefore as an inherent organization and disposition either of a being or group of beings, dharma may in one sense be regarded as opposed to karma, which is simply the action by which this disposition will be manifested outwardly, always provided the action is normal, or in other words provided it conforms to the nature of beings and the states of existence to which they belong, and to the relationships arising in consequence.» — parte tres: opone en cierto sentido *dharma* a *karma*, siendo este la acción por la que esa disposición se manifiesta hacia fuera, con la condición de ser acción normal.

«Under these circumstances, that which is adharma, or contrary to dharma, is not ‘sin’ in the theological sense of the word, neither is it ‘evil’ in the moral sense, since both these ideas are equally foreign to the Hindu mind; it is simply ‘non-conformity’ with the nature of beings, disequilibrium, a rupture of harmony, a destruction or upsetting of hierarchical relations.» — parte tres: niega que *adharma* sea pecado en sentido teológico ni mal en sentido moral, y lo define como no conformidad con la naturaleza de los seres, desequilibrio y ruptura de armonía.

«Without doubt, in the universal order, the sum total of all particular disequilibriums always goes to make up the total equilibrium, which nothing can destroy; but at each point regarded separately and by itself, disequilibrium is both possible and conceivable, and whether it occurs in the social sphere or elsewhere, there is absolutely no need to attribute to it anything of a moral character when defining it as something that is contrary, within its own sphere, to the ‘law of harmony that governs at the same time both the cosmic and the human orders.» — parte tres: sostiene que la suma de los desequilibrios particulares compone el equilibrio total, y que el desequilibrio en cada punto no tiene por qué leerse en clave moral.

«The meaning of ‘law being thus defined, and, care being taken to distinguish it from all the particular and derivative applications to which it can give rise, we may accept the word ‘law’ as a translation of dharma, no doubt an imperfect one, but less inexact than other terms borrowed from Western languages; it must be emphasized once more, however, that it is not a moral law that is here in question; while the notions of scientific law and social or juridical law, even by definition, only refer to special cases.» — parte tres: acepta ley como traducción imperfecta de *dharma* y menos inexacta que otras, con la advertencia de que no es ley moral ni ley científica ni jurídica.

«The ‘law’ may by an analogical transposition be regarded in principle as a ‘universal will’, which however does not allow anything personal to subsist in the conception, nor, for still stronger reasons, anything anthropomorphic.» — parte tres: admite por transposición analógica leer la ley como voluntad universal, sin dejar subsistir nada personal ni antropomórfico en la concepción.

«The expression of this will in each state of manifested existence is called Prajapati or the ‘Lord of produced beings’; and in each particular cosmic cycle this same will manifests itself as the Manu who gives the cycle its proper law.» — parte tres: nombra Prajapati, señor de los seres producidos, a la expresión de esa voluntad en cada estado de existencia manifestada, y Manu a su manifestación en cada ciclo cósmico, que le da su ley propia.

«It would indeed be hard to say; but Western ‘criticism’ makes no bones over so small a matter, and in compiling» — parte tres, capítulo Acerca del budismo: dice que costaría responder qué queda del fundador como individualidad humana, y que la crítica occidental no se detiene por eso. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«a life of the Buddha according to its own views, it goes so far as to lay it down as a principle, following Oldenberg, that the ‘Indo-Germans’ do not admit miracles; it is difficult to keep serious in the face of such assertions.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: al componer una vida del Buda a su modo, sienta con Oldenberg el principio de que los indogermanos no admiten milagros, ante lo cual dice que cuesta mantenerse serio.

«The moral point of view, apart from which these ideas have no» — parte tres, capítulo La ley de Manu: el punto de vista moral, fuera del cual esas ideas no tienen sentido. El tramo se corta donde entra la nota del editor.

«meaning, does not belong to India; we have already sufficiently insisted on this point, and we have even observed that Buddhism, which alone might perhaps have been thought likely to introduce it, never made any such advance along the path of sentimentality.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: repite que el punto de vista moral no pertenece a la India, y que ni el budismo avanzó por la vía de la sentimentalidad.

«it is properly speaking the name of a principle, which can be defined, in accordance with the meaning of the verbal root manas, as ‘cosmic intelligence’ or ‘thought reflecting the universal order’.» — parte tres: define Manu como nombre de un principio, y desde la raíz *manas* lo traduce por inteligencia cósmica o pensamiento que refleja el orden universal.

«On the other hand, this principle is also regarded as the prototype of man, who is called manava insofar as he is considered essentially as a ‘thinking being’, characterized by the possession of manas, the mental or rational faculty; the concept of Manu is therefore equivalent, at least in certain respects, to what other traditions, notably the Hebrew Kabbalah and Islamic esoterism, refer to as Universal Man, or what Taoism calls ‘the King’.» — parte tres: hace de ese principio el prototipo del hombre, llamado *manava* como ser pensante, y empareja la noción de Manu con el Hombre Universal de la cábala hebrea y del esoterismo islámico y con el Rey del taoísmo.

«We have seen previously that the name Vyasa does not denote a man but a function; in that case, however, the function is in a general way an historical one, while Manu represents a cosmic function which can only become historical when specially applied to the social order, but without this in itself presupposing any kind of ‘personification’.» — parte tres: distingue la función de Vyasa, histórica en general, de la de Manu, cósmica y solo histórica al aplicarse al orden social, sin personificación.

«In fact, the law of Manu, for any cycle or collectivity whatsoever, is nothing else but the observance of the natural hierarchical relations existing between the beings subject to the special conditions of that cycle or collectivity, together with the whole body of precepts normally pertaining thereunto.» — parte tres: define la ley de Manu para cualquier ciclo o colectividad como la observancia de las relaciones jerárquicas naturales entre los seres sujetos a sus condiciones.

«we will simply point out that the connection between them is not chronological but logical and causal, each cycle being determined in its entirety by the preceding cycle and determining in its turn the following one, through a continuous production governed by the ‘law of harmony’ which establishes the fundamental analogy between all the modes of universal manifestation.» — parte tres: declara la conexión entre los ciclos cósmicos no cronológica sino lógica y causal, con cada ciclo determinado por el anterior bajo la ley de armonía.

«When it comes to applying it to the social sphere, the ‘law’, which then takes on its specifically juridical sense, may be formulated in a shastra or code, which, insofar as it expresses the ‘cosmic will’ at that particular level, is referred to Manu, or, more precisely, to the Manu of the actual cycle;» — parte tres: aplicada al orden social la ley toma sentido jurídico y se formula en un *shastra* o código, referido a Manu, o más precisamente al Manu del ciclo en curso.

«at least not in the ordinary sense in which something purely human is said to be the work of such or such an author. Here again, as in the case of the Vedic texts, there is no definitely assignable historical origin, and indeed, as we have already explained, the question of such an origin is of no consequence from the doctrinal point of view.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: no hay origen histórico asignable, como con los textos védicos, y la cuestión no tiene consecuencia doctrinal.

«However, an important distinction is to be noted between the two cases: while the Vedic texts are described by the term shruti, as being the fruit of direct inspiration, the dharma-shastra only belongs to the class of traditional writings called smriti, the authority of which is of a less fundamental character;» — parte tres: distingue los textos védicos, llamados *shruti* por ser fruto de inspiración directa, del *dharma-shastra*, que cuenta entre los escritos llamados *smriti*, de autoridad menos fundamental.

«among the writings of this class are also included the Puranas and the Itihasas, which Western scholars take to be mythological or epic poems only, having failed to grasp the profound symbolism that makes of them something quite other than ‘literature’ in the ordinary sense of the word.» — parte tres: cuenta entre los *smriti* a los Puranas y los Itihasas, que los eruditos occidentales toman por poemas mitológicos o épicos sin ver el simbolismo que los hace otra cosa que literatura.

«Fundamentally, the distinction between shruti and smriti is equivalent to that between pure and direct intellectual intuition on the one hand, and reflected consciousness of the rational order on the other hand, the former applying exclusively to the domain of metaphysical principles, the latter exercising itself upon objects of knowledge in the individual sphere, as must necessarily be the case where social or other applications are in question.» — parte tres: hace corresponder la distinción de *shruti* y *smriti* con la de la intuición intelectual pura y la consciencia refleja del orden racional.

«Despite this, the traditional authority of the dharma-shastra does not in any way derive from the human authors whose task it has been to formulate it, doubtless orally at first and later on in writing, and that is why these writers have remained unknown and unidentified; its authority derives exclusively from the fact that it represents a true expression of the law of Manu, that is to say from its conformity with the natural order of the existences it is destined to govern.» — parte tres: niega que la autoridad del *dharma-shastra* derive de sus redactores humanos, que dice desconocidos, y la funda en su conformidad con el orden natural de las existencias que rige.

«In order TO COMPLETE what has just been said, we may usefully add a few explanations on the subject of caste, which is of primary importance in the law of Manu and which has been persistently misunderstood by Europeans in general. First of all we will give the following definition: caste, which the Hindus describe indifferently by one or other of the two words jati and varna, is a social function determined by the particular nature of each human being.» — parte tres, capítulo Principios que rigen la institución de la casta: define la casta, que los hindúes llaman *jati* o *varna*, como función social determinada por la naturaleza particular de cada ser humano.

«The word varna in its original sense means ‘color’, and some people have attempted to see in this a proof, or at least an indication, of the supposed fact that the distinction between the castes was originally founded upon racial differences; but this is not a tenable view,» — parte tres: recoge la lectura de *varna* como color que se toma por indicio de un origen racial de las castas, y la declara insostenible.

«for the same word bears by extension the meaning of ‘quality’ in general, whence its analogical use to denote the particular nature of a being, or what might be called its “individual essence’; and it is in fact the latter that determines caste, racial considerations intervening merely as one of the elements capable of exercising an influence upon the constitution of the individual nature.» — parte tres: extiende *varna* al sentido de cualidad y de esencia individual, con la raza como uno de los elementos que influyen en la constitución de la naturaleza individual.

«As for the word jati, its proper meaning is ‘birth’, and some have therefore concluded from this that caste is essentially hereditary, but this again is an error.» — parte tres: recoge la lectura de *jati* como nacimiento, de la que se concluye que la casta es hereditaria, y la llama error.

«If it is most often hereditary in actual practice, it is not strictly so in principle, for although the part played by heredity in the formation of the individual nature may be preponderant in the majority of cases, it is by no means exclusive;» — parte tres: concede que en la práctica la casta suele ser hereditaria y niega que lo sea en principio, porque la herencia, aun preponderante, no es exclusiva.

«The individual being is regarded in its totality as a compound of two elements, called respectively nama, ‘name’, and rapa, ‘form, which in effect represent the ‘essence’ and the ‘substance’ of the individuality, or what the Aristotelian school calls ‘form’ and ‘matter’;» — parte tres: describe al ser individual como compuesto de *nama*, nombre, y *rapa*, forma, que hace corresponder a la esencia y la sustancia de la individualidad y a la forma y la materia aristotélicas. La transliteración *rapa* sale así del troceo, por *rupa*.

«these last two terms however have a technical meaning very different from their ordinary ones, and it should be observed in particular that the word ‘form’, instead of denoting the element we have so named to translate the Sanskrit rapa, denotes on the contrary the other element, which is properly speaking the ‘individual essence’.» — parte tres: advierte que los términos aristotélicos tienen ahí sentido técnico y que forma nombra no lo que traduce *rapa* sino el otro elemento, la esencia individual.

«It should be added that the distinction we have just pointed out, although analogous to that made in the West between soul and body, is far from being its exact equivalent: the form referred to is not an exclusively corporeal form, although we cannot at present insist on this point; as for the name, it represents the sum of all the being’s characteristic qualities or attributes.» — parte tres: niega que esa distinción equivalga a la occidental de alma y cuerpo, dice que la forma no es exclusivamente corpórea y define el nombre como la suma de las cualidades características del ser.

«A further distinction is to be made within the individual essence itself: namika, that which refers to the name in a more restricted sense, or ‘that which the particular name of each individual should express’, is the sum of the qualities properly belonging to the individual, without his deriving them from anything other than himself; gotrika, ‘that which belongs to the race or family’, is the sum of the qualities which the being derives from his heredity.» — parte tres: distingue dentro de la esencia individual lo *namika*, las cualidades propias del individuo, y lo *gotrika*, las que recibe de su herencia.

«An analogical representation of this second distinction may be observed in the attribution to an individual, on the one hand, of a prenomen belonging exclusively to himself and, on the other hand, of a family name.» — parte tres: halla la representación analógica de esa distinción en el nombre propio y el apellido.

«Much might be said about the original significance of names and what they should normally be intended to express; but since questions of this kind do not fall within the scope of the present work, we will only point out that the determination of the true name is bound up in principle with the determination of the individual nature itself.» — parte tres: liga en principio la determinación del nombre verdadero con la de la naturaleza individual.

«Birth, within the meaning of the Sanskrit word jati, is properly speaking the resultant of the two elements namika and gotrika: allowance must therefore be made for the part played by heredity, and this may be considerable, but account has also to be taken of those qualities by which the individual is distinguished from his parents and other members of his family.» — parte tres: define el nacimiento en el sentido de *jati* como resultante de *namika* y *gotrika*, con su parte de herencia y su parte de lo que distingue al individuo de su familia.

«The particular nature of each individual necessarily comprises from the beginning all the tendencies and aptitudes which will be developed and manifested in the course of his existence, and which, for instance, will determine his qualification for this or that social function, this being the point that more especially concerns us here.» — parte tres: hace que la naturaleza particular comprenda desde el principio las tendencias y aptitudes que determinarán la calificación para una función social.

«Knowledge of the individual nature should therefore make it possible to assign to each human being the function for which his nature fits him, or in other words to assign him the place that he should normally occupy in the social organization.» — parte tres: deduce de ahí que conocer la naturaleza individual permite asignar a cada quien la función y el lugar que le corresponden en la organización social.

«It will be easily understood that we have here the basis of an organization that is truly hierarchical, that is to say in conformity with the nature of beings, following the interpretation we have given of the notion of dharma.» — parte tres: hace de eso la base de una organización verdaderamente jerárquica, conforme a la naturaleza de los seres, según su lectura del *dharma*.

«Errors of application are no doubt always possible, especially in periods when the light of tradition has grown dim, but they do not in any way affect the validity of the principle, and it can be said that to deny it implies theoretically, if not always in practice, the overturning of every legitimate hierarchy.» — parte tres: concede posibles los errores de aplicación, sobre todo cuando la luz de la tradición se oscurece, y niega que afecten la validez del principio.

«At the same time it can be seen how absurd is the attitude of those Europeans who feel indignant because a man cannot pass from his own caste into a higher one: in effect this would imply nothing more nor less than a change of individual nature, or in other words a man would have to cease being himself in order to become another man, which is obviously absurd;» — parte tres: llama absurda la indignación europea por que un hombre no pueda pasar a una casta más alta, porque eso supondría un cambio de naturaleza individual.

«a being will remain throughout the whole of his individual existence what he is potentially at the time of his birth. The question why a being is himself and not another is a pointless one; the truth is that every being, each according to his own nature, is a necessary element in the total and universal harmony.» — parte tres: sostiene que el ser será toda su existencia lo que es en potencia al nacer, y declara ociosa la pregunta de por qué un ser es él y no otro.

«not therefore be taken for the name of a mythical, legendary, or historical personage; it is properly speaking the name of a principle, which can be defined, in accordance with the meaning of the verbal root manas, as ‘cosmic intelligence’ or ‘thought reflecting the universal order’.» — parte tres, capítulo La ley de Manu: niega que Manu sea nombre de personaje mítico, legendario o histórico, y lo define como nombre de un principio, inteligencia cósmica o pensamiento que refleja el orden universal. El tramo arranca al otro lado del corte de chunk.

«but it is evident that this attribution does not» — parte tres: acota que esa atribución no hace de Manu el autor del código. El tramo se corta donde entra la nota del editor.

«make Manu the author of the shastra, at least not in the ordinary sense in which something purely human is said to be the work of such or such an author. Here again, as in the case of the Vedic texts, there is no definitely assignable historical origin, and indeed, as we have already explained, the question of such an origin is of no consequence from the doctrinal point of view.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: Manu no es autor del *shastra* en el sentido ordinario, no hay origen histórico asignable y la cuestión no tiene consecuencia doctrinal.

«It is clear, in fact, that no two beings possess exactly the same qualities, either physical or psychic: apart from what they have» — parte tres, capítulo Principios que rigen la institución de la casta: sostiene que no hay dos seres con exactamente las mismas cualidades, físicas o psíquicas. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«in common, there are also certain distinguishing characteristics, and those people who try to ascribe everything in the individual to the influence of heredity would undoubtedly have considerable difficulty in applying their theory to any particular case; this influence is undeniable, but there are other elements that must be taken into account, and allowance is in fact made for them in the theory we are explaining.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: objeta a quienes lo atribuyen todo a la herencia que hay características distintivas y otros elementos que contar.

«It is only too clear, however, that considerations of this kind are completely foreign to people living in societies such as are to be found in the West today, the constitution of which is without principle and does not rest» — parte tres: declara esas consideraciones ajenas a las sociedades occidentales de hoy, cuya constitución dice sin principio. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«upon any hierarchy; in these societies any man may exercise almost indifferently the most diverse functions, including those for which he is not in the least fitted, while material riches are generally accepted as the only real mark of superiority.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: en sociedades sin jerarquía cualquiera ejerce las funciones más diversas, incluso aquellas para las que no está hecho, y la riqueza material pasa por única marca de superioridad.

«From what has been said about the meaning of dharma, it follows that the social hierarchy ought to reproduce analogically, in accordance with its own conditions, the constitution of ‘Universal Man’; by this we mean that there is a correspondence between the cosmic and the human orders, and that this correspondence, which finds natural expression in the organization of the individual, whether the latter is regarded integrally or even simply corporeally, should also be realized in an appropriate manner in the organization of» — parte tres, capítulo Principios que rigen la institución de la casta: hace que la jerarquía social reproduzca analógicamente la constitución del Hombre Universal, por correspondencia entre el orden cósmico y el humano. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk.

«society. The conception of a ‘social organism’, with organs and functions comparable to those of a living being, is already familiar to modern sociologists;» — parte tres: consigna que la idea de un organismo social con órganos y funciones ya es familiar a los sociólogos modernos.

«but the latter have gone much too far in this direction, forgetting that correspondence and analogy do not mean assimilation and identity, and that in any legitimate comparison between the two cases allowance would necessarily have to be made for differences in the respective modes of application;» — parte tres: les objeta haber ido demasiado lejos, olvidando que correspondencia y analogía no son asimilación e identidad.

«furthermore, being ignorant of the profound reasons for the analogy, they have never been able to draw any valid conclusions concerning the establishment of a true hierarchy.» — parte tres: y la segunda objeción, que por ignorar las razones profundas de la analogía no sacaron conclusiones válidas sobre el establecimiento de una jerarquía verdadera.

«These indications will suffice to explain the meaning of the symbolical description of the origin of castes, as it is to be found in numerous texts, notably in the Purusha-sukta of the Rig-Veda, from which the following quotation is taken: ‘of Purusha, the Brahmin was the mouth, the Kshatriya the arms, the Vaishya the thighs; the Shiidra was born under his feet?» — parte tres: cita el Purusha-sukta del Rig-Veda sobre el origen de las castas, el brahmán por boca de Purusha, el kshatriya por brazos, el vaishya por muslos y el shudra nacido bajo sus pies. Las transliteraciones y la puntuación final salen así del troceo.

«Here we find the enumeration of the four castes the differentiation of which constitutes the basis of the social order, and which are susceptible of more or less numerous secondary subdivisions:» — parte tres: lee en ese pasaje la enumeración de las cuatro castas cuya diferenciación constituye la base del orden social, con subdivisiones secundarias.

«to the Vaishyas belongs the whole varied range of economic functions in the widest sense of the word, including the agricultural, industrial, commercial, and financial functions; as for the Shadras, they carry out the tasks necessary to assure the purely material subsistence of the community.» — parte tres: y las dos restantes, a los vaishyas las funciones económicas en sentido amplio y a los shudras las tareas de la subsistencia material de la comunidad.

«It should be added that the Brahmins are not ‘priests’ in the Western and religious sense of the word: no doubt their functions include the accomplishment of various kinds of rites, because they must possess the knowledge necessary to make them fully effective; but they also include, above everything else, the conservation and regular transmission of the traditional doctrine.» — parte tres: niega que los brahmanes sean sacerdotes en el sentido occidental y religioso, y pone por encima de los ritos la conservación y transmisión regular de la doctrina tradicional.

«Indeed, the function of teaching, represented by the mouth in the symbolism we have just mentioned, was regarded by nearly all ancient peoples as the highest priestly function, because their civilizations were based in their entirety upon a doctrinal principle.» — parte tres: da la función de enseñanza, figurada por la boca en ese simbolismo, por la más alta función sacerdotal entre casi todos los pueblos antiguos.

«For the same reason deviations from the doctrine were generally bound up with a subversion of the social hierarchy, as can be seen for example in the repeated attempts made by the Kshatriyas to throw off the overlordship of the Brahmins, an overlordship the justification of which will be apparent from all that has been said concerning the real nature of Hindu civilization.» — parte tres: liga las desviaciones doctrinales con la subversión de la jerarquía social, y pone por caso los intentos repetidos de los kshatriyas de sacudirse la primacía de los brahmanes.

«These summary remarks would not be complete without some reference to the traces which these traditional and primordial conceptions have left in the ancient institutions of Europe, notably in connection with the conferring of the divine right upon kings, whose function was originally regarded as being essentially that of regulators of the social order, as the root of the word rex indicates;» — parte tres: señala las huellas de esas concepciones en las instituciones europeas antiguas, con el derecho divino de los reyes y la función real como reguladora del orden social, según la raíz de *rex*.

«Participation in the tradition is only fully effective for the members of the first three castes; this finds expression in the various designations exclusively reserved for them, such as arya, of which» — parte tres: reserva la participación plena en la tradición a los miembros de las tres primeras castas, con designaciones exclusivas como *arya*. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«mention has already been made, and dvija or ‘twice born’; the idea of a ‘second birth’, understood in a purely spiritual sense, is indeed common to all traditional doctrines, and Christianity itself provides an equivalent in religious mode in the rite of Baptism.» — parte tres: nombra *dvija*, dos veces nacido, y declara común a todas las doctrinas tradicionales la idea de un segundo nacimiento espiritual, con el bautismo cristiano por equivalente en modo religioso.

«For the Shiadras, participation is primarily indirect and as it were virtual, for in a general way it only results from their relations with the superior castes; moreover, to revert to the analogy of the ‘social organism’, the part they play does not properly speaking constitute a vital function, but an activity that is in some sense mechanical, and this is why they are represented as springing, not from a part of the body of Purusha or ‘Universal Man’, but from the earth beneath his feet, which is the element in which the substances of bodily nourishment are compounded.» — parte tres: describe la participación de los shudras como indirecta y virtual, y explica por qué se los hace nacer no de una parte del cuerpo de Purusha sino de la tierra bajo sus pies.

«In connection with this same representation, it may also be noted that the distinction between the castes is sometimes applied by analogical transposition not merely to the whole human collectivity, but to the totality of beings, both animate and inanimate, as comprised within nature in its entirety, since all these beings are likewise said to be sprung from Purusha: it is thus that the Brahmin is regarded as the type of immutable beings, that is to say of those which are above change, and the Kshatriya as the type of beings subject to change, because their functions refer respectively to the sphere of contemplation and the sphere of action.» — parte tres: extiende por transposición analógica la distinción de castas a la totalidad de los seres, con el brahmán por tipo de los seres inmutables y el kshatriya por tipo de los sujetos al cambio.

«That is clear enough evidence of the questions of principle involved in all this, for they are of a kind that contain implications going far beyond the limits of the social sphere, in relation to which they have more particularly been considered here. Having shown how these principles are applied in the traditional organization of the Hindu civilization, we will not dwell any further upon the question of social institutions, which does not form the principal theme of the present book.» — parte tres: cierra el capítulo señalando que esas cuestiones de principio van mucho más allá de la esfera social, y declara que las instituciones sociales no son el tema del libro.

«SHOULD THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE, total and universal, which the religious doctrines of the West call ‘God’, be conceived of as impersonal or as personal? This question has given rise to interminable and moreover quite pointless discussions, because it originates from partial and incomplete conceptions which it would be useless to attempt to reconcile without going beyond the special domain— theological or philosophical—where they belong.» — parte tres, capítulo Shivaísmo y vishnuismo: plantea la pregunta de si el Principio supremo debe concebirse impersonal o personal, y declara vanas las discusiones por nacer de concepciones parciales.

«Metaphysically, it must be said that the Principle is at once both impersonal and personal, according to the aspect under which it is viewed: impersonal, or, if preferred, ‘supra-personal’ in itself; personal in relation to universal manifestation, without however this ‘Divine Personality’ partaking in the least degree of an anthropomorphic character, for ‘personality must not be confused with ‘individuality’.» — parte tres: responde que el Principio es a la vez impersonal y personal según el aspecto, suprapersonal en sí y personal respecto de la manifestación universal, sin nada antropomórfico.

«The fundamental distinction just formulated, by means of which the apparent contradictions between secondary and multiple points of view are resolved in the unity of a superior synthesis, is known in the language of Far-Eastern metaphysics as the distinction between “Non-Being’ and ‘Being’;» — parte tres: nombra esa distinción con el lenguaje de la metafísica extremo-oriental, la de No Ser y Ser, y la declara igualmente reconocida en la doctrina hindú.

«The impersonal and therefore absolutely universal Principle is called Brahma; the Divine Personality, which is a determination or a specification of this Supreme Principle, implying a lesser degree of universality, is generally known by the name of Ishvara.» — parte tres: nombra Brahma al Principio impersonal y absolutamente universal, e Ishvara a la Personalidad Divina, determinación suya de universalidad menor.

«It is evident that an indefinite number of ‘divine attributes’ may be conceived of in this manner, and indeed every quality enjoying a positive existence may thus be transposed by being envisaged in its principle; each of these attributes, however, should be considered in reality only as a basis or support for meditation on a certain aspect of Universal Being.» — parte tres: admite un número indefinido de atributos divinos por transposición de toda cualidad positiva, y reduce cada uno a soporte de meditación sobre un aspecto del Ser Universal.

«It will be apparent from what we have said on the subject of symbolism how that same incomprehension which gives rise to anthropomorphism could have the result of turning the divine attributes into so many ‘gods’, that is to say into entities conceived after the pattern of individual beings and endowed with an independent existence.» — parte tres: explica por la incomprensión antropomórfica el vuelco de los atributos divinos en dioses, entidades concebidas al modo de los seres individuales.

«This is one of the most obvious examples of idolatry, which takes the symbol for the thing symbolized, and which here assumes the form of polytheism; but it is clear that no doctrine was ever polytheistic in itself and in essence, since it could only become so as the result of a profound corruption, which moreover happens on a large scale much more rarely than is commonly supposed; in fact only one example of the generalization of this error is known for certain, in the Greco-Roman civilization, and even here there were at least some exceptions among its intellectual elite.» — parte tres: llama a eso idolatría en forma de politeísmo, niega que doctrina alguna sea politeísta en esencia, y da por único ejemplo cierto de esa corrupción generalizada la civilización grecorromana.

«In the East, where the tendency toward anthropomorphism is non-existent apart from individual aberrations that are always possible though rare and abnormal, nothing of the kind has ever succeeded in coming to light.» — parte tres: declara inexistente en Oriente la tendencia antropomórfica salvo por aberraciones individuales raras y anormales.

«Ishvara is conceived under a triplicity of principal aspects, together constituting the Trimarti or ‘triple manifestation’, from each of which are derived other aspects, more particular and secondary in relation to the three principal ones.» — parte tres: describe a Ishvara bajo tres aspectos principales que constituyen el *Trimarti* o triple manifestación, de los que derivan otros secundarios. La transliteración sale así del troceo, por *Trimurti*.

«Brahma is Ishvara considered as the productive principle of manifested beings; he is so named because he is considered as the direct reflection in the realm of manifestation of Brahma, the Supreme Principle.» — parte tres: define a Brahma como Ishvara en cuanto principio productor de los seres manifestados, reflejo directo del Principio Supremo en el dominio de la manifestación.

«In order to avoid all confusion it should be observed that the word Brahma, without an accent, is neuter while the word Brahma is masculine; the use, current among orientalists, of the single form Brahman, which is common to both genders, has the serious disadvantage of obscuring this essential distinction, which is sometimes further marked by expressions such as Para-Brahma or the ‘Supreme Brahma’, and Apara-Brahma or the ‘non-supreme Brahma’.» — parte tres: distingue el neutro Brahma del masculino Brahma y objeta a los orientalistas la forma única Brahman, que oscurece esa distinción, marcada también por Para-Brahma y Apara-Brahma. Los acentos que el propio texto anuncia no salen en el troceo.

«The two other aspects constituting the Trimiirti, which are complementary to each other, are Vishnu, who is Ishvara considered as the animating and preserving principle of beings, and Shiva, who is Ishvara considered, not as the destructive principle, as he is commonly described, but as the transforming principle; these then, are truly universal functions, and not separate and more or less individualized entities.» — parte tres: define a Vishnu como Ishvara en cuanto principio animador y conservador, y a Shiva no como principio destructor, según dice que se lo describe, sino como transformador, y a los dos como funciones universales.

«Each person, with a view to placing himself at the standpoint best adapted to his own possibilities, will naturally be able to give precedence to any one of these functions, and in particular, because of their apparent symmetry, to one or other of the two complementary functions represented by Vishnu and Shiva: hence the distinction between Vaishnavism and Shaivism, which are not sects as Westerners suppose them to be, but simply different ways of realization, both equally legitimate and orthodox.» — parte tres: niega que vishnuismo y shivaísmo sean sectas, como suponen los occidentales, y los declara vías de realización distintas, igualmente legítimas y ortodoxas.

«the Brahmins represent essentially the» — parte tres, capítulo Principios que rigen la institución de la casta: abre el reparto de funciones por casta. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«spiritual and intellectual authority; the Kshatriyas, the administrative prerogative comprising both the judicial and the military offices, of which the royal function is simply the highest degree;» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: a los brahmanes la autoridad espiritual e intelectual, a los kshatriyas la prerrogativa administrativa, judicial y militar, con la función real por grado más alto.

«all qualification’, and again nirvishesha or ‘beyond all distinction’; on the other hand, Ishvara is called saguna or ‘qualified’, and savishesha or ‘conceived distinctively’, because he is capable of receiving such attributions, which are obtained by an analogical transference into the universal of the diverse qualities or properties of the beings of which he is the Principle.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: a Brahma *nirvishesha*, más allá de toda distinción, y a Ishvara *saguna* y *savishesha*, capaz de recibir atributos por transferencia analógica.

«So far as India is concerned, the symbolical image representing one or other of the divine attributes, and which is called pratika, is most certainly not an ‘idol’, for it has never been taken for anything other than what it really is, namely a support for meditation and an» — parte tres: niega que el *pratika*, imagen simbólica de un atributo divino, sea un ídolo, y lo declara soporte de meditación. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«auxiliary means of realization, each person moreover being free to attach himself according to preference to those symbols which are most in conformity with his personal tendencies.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: el *pratika* es medio auxiliar de realización, y cada quien queda libre de atenerse a los símbolos más conformes con sus tendencias.

«It should however be added that Shaivism, which is less widely diffused than Vaishnavism and attaches less importance to exterior rites, is at the same time more elevated in a certain sense and leads more directly to pure metaphysical realization: this may easily be inferred from» — parte tres: sitúa al shivaísmo, menos difundido y con menos peso de los ritos exteriores, como más elevado en cierto sentido y de acceso más directo a la realización metafísica pura. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk.

«The ‘divine aspects’ are each regarded as being endowed with a power or energy of their own, called Shakti, which is represented symbolically under a feminine form: the Shakti of Brahma is Sarasvati, that of Vishnu is Lakshmi, and that of Shiva is Parvati.» — parte tres: atribuye a cada aspecto divino una potencia o energía propia llamada *Shakti*, representada en forma femenina, y nombra a Sarasvati, Lakshmi y Parvati.

«Among both Shaivas and Vaishnavas, certain persons devote themselves more especially to the consideration of the Shaktis, and are for this reason called Shaktas.» — parte tres: nombra *shaktas* a quienes, tanto entre shivaítas como entre vishnuitas, se dedican más especialmente a la consideración de las *Shaktis*.

«Furthermore, each of the principles we are discussing can be envisaged under a plurality of more particularized aspects, and from each of them also are derived other secondary aspects, this process of derivation being most often described as a symbolic filiation.» — parte tres: admite para cada principio una pluralidad de aspectos más particularizados, con la derivación descrita casi siempre como filiación simbólica.

«We naturally cannot develop all these conceptions here, particularly as it is not our aim to expound the doctrines themselves but only to indicate the spirit in which they should be studied if they are to be really understood.» — parte tres: declara que no expone las doctrinas mismas sino el espíritu con que deben estudiarse para entenderlas.

«The Shaivas and Vaishnavas each possess their own special books, the Tantras and the Puranas, which form part of the body of traditional writings known collectively as smriti and which correspond more particularly to their respective tendencies.» — parte tres: adscribe los Tantras a los shivaítas y los Puranas a los vishnuitas, y los cuenta entre los escritos tradicionales llamados *smriti*.

«These tendencies nowhere appear more clearly than in the way in which they respectively interpret the doctrine of Avataras or ‘divine manifestations’; this doctrine, which is closely bound up with the conception of cosmic cycles, deserves to be studied separately, but we cannot think of going into the subject at present.» — parte tres: señala que esas tendencias se ven mejor en cómo cada una interpreta la doctrina de los *Avataras* o manifestaciones divinas, ligada a la concepción de los ciclos cósmicos.

«To conclude these remarks on the question of Shaivism and Vaishnavism, we will simply add that, whatever the way each man may choose as being most in conformity with his own nature, the final end to which it leads, provided it be strictly orthodox, is always the same: the end in every case is» — parte tres: declara idéntico el fin al que lleva cada vía, siempre que sea estrictamente ortodoxa. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«effective realization of a metaphysical order, which will be more or less direct and more or less complete according to the circumstances in which it is undertaken and the extent of the intellectual possibilities of each human being.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: ese fin es la realización efectiva de orden metafísico, más o menos directa y completa según las circunstancias y las posibilidades intelectuales de cada quien.

«THE FOREGOING EXPLANATIONS show how a multiplicity of points of view can exist together within the essential unity of the same traditional doctrine without this unity being in any way affected thereby.» — parte tres, capítulo Puntos de vista dentro de la doctrina: sostiene que una multiplicidad de puntos de vista coexiste dentro de la unidad esencial de una misma doctrina tradicional sin afectarla.

«Moreover, since each person brings with him a way of looking at things that is peculiarly his own, it may consequently be said that there are as many different ways of understanding as there are individuals; but this is only true insofar as the point of departure is concerned, for once the individual domain has been left behind, all these differences, which are not in any way incompatible, necessarily disappear.» — parte tres: concede tantas maneras de entender como individuos, y acota que eso vale solo del punto de partida, porque dejado atrás el dominio individual esas diferencias desaparecen.

«Apart from the differences inherent in the particular natures of the various human beings, each one may also choose to place himself at any one of a variety of points of view in order to study the doctrine under some more or less well-defined aspect, which will be the more closely defined the greater its degree of particularization, or in other words the further removed it is, in descending order of application, from the sphere of universal principles.» — parte tres: describe la elección de un punto de vista para estudiar la doctrina bajo un aspecto, tanto más definido cuanto más particularizado y más lejos de los principios universales.

«The entire range of possible and legitimate points of view is always contained, synthetically and in principle, within the doctrine itself, and what we have already said on the subject of the plurality of meanings comprised within traditional texts will be a sufficient indication of the nature of this synthesis; in every case, therefore, it is solely a matter of a strict interpretation of the basic doctrine developed in accordance with the particular point of view in question.» — parte tres: contiene sintéticamente en la doctrina misma el conjunto de los puntos de vista legítimos, y reduce cada uno a una interpretación estricta de la doctrina básica.

«The darshanas are really therefore ‘points of view’ within the doctrine, and not, as most orientalists imagine, competing or conflicting philosophical systems; insofar as these points of view are strictly orthodox, they naturally cannot enter either into conflict or into contradiction with one another.» — parte tres: niega que los *darshanas* sean sistemas filosóficos rivales, como suponen los orientalistas, y declara imposible el conflicto entre ellos mientras sean estrictamente ortodoxos.

«There is no such thing, then, as ‘Hindu philosophy’, any more than there is a “Chinese philosophy’, at all events not so long as it is intended to retain for ‘philosophy’ the more or less well-defined meaning imposed upon it by the line of thought issuing from the Greeks; but it must be confessed, especially when one considers what philosophy has become in modern times, that the absence of this mode of thought in a civilization is not particularly to be regretted.» — parte tres: niega que haya una filosofía hindú ni una filosofía china si se guarda a la palabra el sentido venido de los griegos, y dice que la ausencia de ese modo de pensamiento no es de lamentar.

«Nevertheless, orientalists are either unable or unwilling to see in the darshanas anything but philosophies and systems, to which they even pretend to attach Western labels: this they do simply because they are incapable of escaping from the ‘classical’ framework, and because they ignore entirely the most characteristic differences between the Eastern and Western mentalities.» — parte tres: adjudica a los orientalistas ver en los *darshanas* filosofías y sistemas con etiquetas occidentales, por no poder salir del marco clásico.

«Their attitude in this respect might be compared to that of a man who, knowing nothing of present-day European civilization and chancing to come across a syllabus of university lectures, jumped to the singular conclusion that the scholars of Europe are divided into several rival schools, each with its own particular philosophical system, the principal ones being those of the mathematicians, the physicists, the chemists, the biologists, the logicians, and the psychologists;» — parte tres: la comparación con que mide ese error, un hombre que ante un programa de cursos universitarios concluyera que los sabios de Europa se dividen en escuelas rivales de matemáticos, físicos, químicos, biólogos, lógicos y psicólogos.

«such a misunderstanding may sound quite ridiculous, but it is hardly more so than the present conception of the orientalists, who ought not even to have the excuse of ignorance, or rather it is their very ignorance which is inexcusable.» — parte tres: declara ese malentendido apenas más ridículo que la concepción de los orientalistas, a quienes niega la excusa de la ignorancia.

«Looking at things once again in their correct perspective, it may be said that the points of view from which the doctrine may be considered are obviously capable of being multiplied almost indefinitely; on the other hand not all are equally irreducible, and there are some, more fundamental in certain respects, to which the others may be subordinated.» — parte tres: admite multiplicar los puntos de vista casi indefinidamente, y distingue algunos más fundamentales a los que los demás se subordinan.

«It is the main divisions or principal branches that properly speaking constitute the darshanas in the accepted meaning of the word. Following the classification generally admitted in India, there are six of these main divisions, which should not be confused, owing to their number being the same, with what are called the six Vedangas.» — parte tres: fija en seis las divisiones principales que llama *darshanas* según la clasificación admitida en la India, y advierte no confundirlas con los seis *Vedangas*.

«The word Vedanga literally means ‘limb of the Veda’, and this name is applied to certain auxiliary sciences of the Veda, which are compared to the bodily limbs by means of which a being acts outwardly; the fundamental treatises relating to these sciences, which we are about to enumerate, form part of smriti, in which indeed they occupy the first place by reason of their direct relationship with the Veda.» — parte tres: traduce *Vedanga* por miembro del Veda y lo aplica a ciertas ciencias auxiliares, cuyos tratados fundamentales cuenta entre los *smriti*.

«Shiksha is the science of correct articulation and exact pronunciation, implying a knowledge of the symbolical value of letters, as also of the laws of euphony which are more important and more developed in Sanskrit than in any other language; in a traditional language, in fact, the use of a phonetic method of writing is in no» — parte tres: define *Shiksha* como la ciencia de la articulación y la pronunciación exactas, con el valor simbólico de las letras y las leyes de eufonía. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«Chhandas is the science of prosody, which determines the application of the various metres in correspondence with the vibrations of the cosmic order which they serve to express, thus setting them in quite a different category to that of ‘poetical’ forms in the purely literary sense of the word: moreover, the profound knowledge of rhythm and its cosmic correspondences, which leads to its use in certain preparatory methods of metaphysical realization, is common to all Eastern civilizations, totally strange though it is to Western peoples.» — parte tres: define *Chhandas* como ciencia de la prosodia, que hace corresponder los metros con vibraciones del orden cósmico, y declara común a todas las civilizaciones orientales el uso del ritmo en métodos preparatorios de realización.

«Vyakarana is grammar, but instead of being presented simply as a body of rules that appear more or less arbitrary because the reasons for them are unknown, as commonly happens in Western languages, it is on the contrary based upon conceptions and classifications that are always in strict relationship with the logical meaning of language.» — parte tres: define *Vyakarana* como gramática fundada en concepciones y clasificaciones ligadas al sentido lógico de la lengua, y no en reglas arbitrarias.

«Nirukta is the explanation of important or difficult terms which are found in the Vedic texts; these explanations do not rest solely upon etymology, but also, and more often, upon the symbolic value of the letters and syllables of which the words are composed.» — parte tres: define *Nirukta* como explicación de los términos difíciles de los textos védicos, no solo por etimología sino por el valor simbólico de letras y sílabas.

«This is a source of innumerable errors on the part of orientalists, who can neither understand nor even conceive of this last method of explanation, which is perfectly natural to the traditional languages and very similar to that found in the Hebrew Kabbalah; the result is that they are unwilling or unable to see anything but fanciful etymologies, or even a common play upon words, in what is obviously something very different.» — parte tres: adjudica a ese método, que empareja con el de la cábala hebrea, innumerables errores de los orientalistas, que solo ven ahí etimologías fantasiosas o juegos de palabras.

«Jyotisha is astronomy, or more exactly it is both astronomy and astrology, which have never been separated in India, any more than they were by any of the ancient peoples, not even by the Greeks themselves, who employed these two words indifferently to describe one and the same thing.» — parte tres: define *Jyotisha* como astronomía y astrología a la vez, nunca separadas en la India ni entre los antiguos, ni siquiera entre los griegos.

«The distinction between astronomy and astrology is in fact quite modern, and it should also be added that the real traditional astrology, such as is still to be found in the East, has practically nothing in common with the divinatory speculations to which certain people wish to attach the same name in contemporary Europe.» — parte tres: data como muy moderna la separación de astronomía y astrología, y niega que la astrología tradicional que dice viva en Oriente tenga que ver con las especulaciones adivinatorias que llevan ese nombre en Europa.

«‘transformation’, which should be understood here in its strictly etymological sense, implies a passing ‘beyond form’, which only appears as a destruction from the special and contingent point of view of manifestation; it is a passing from the manifested to the unmanifested, representing the return of the being to the eternal immutability of the Supreme Principle, outside which nothing can exist save in an illusory manner.» — parte tres, capítulo Shivaísmo y vishnuismo: lee la transformación en sentido etimológico como paso más allá de la forma, que solo desde la manifestación parece destrucción, y como retorno del ser a la inmutabilidad del Principio Supremo. El tramo arranca al otro lado del corte de plana.

«This is exactly what is expressed in India by the Sanskrit word darshana, which properly speaking denotes nothing more or less» — parte tres, capítulo Puntos de vista dentro de la doctrina: introduce la palabra sánscrita *darshana*. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«than ‘sight or ‘point of view, for the principal meaning of the verbal root drish, from which it is derived, is ‘to see’.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: traduce *darshana* por vista o punto de vista, desde la raíz *drish*, ver.

«This is indeed a remarkable case of extreme ‘intellectual myopia’ and one may be quite sure that, handicapped by such a disposition, they will never succeed in discerning the true meaning of the smallest fragment of any one of the Eastern doctrines which they have taken upon themselves to interpret after their own fashion, in conformity with their completely Western outlook.» — parte tres: llama a eso un caso notable de miopía intelectual, y niega que con esa disposición lleguen a discernir el sentido del menor fragmento de las doctrinas orientales que interpretan.

«Lastly comes kalpa, a word which actually bears many different meanings, but which here stands for the whole body of precepts relating to the» — parte tres: define *kalpa*, palabra de muchos sentidos, como el cuerpo de preceptos sobre el cumplimiento de los ritos. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«accomplishment of rites, knowledge of which is indispensable to give the latter their full efficacy; in the sitras where they are set forth, these precepts are condensed by means of a special symbolical notation into formulas which are in appearance not unlike those» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: declara indispensable ese conocimiento para la eficacia plena de los ritos, condensados en fórmulas de notación simbólica parecidas en apariencia a las del álgebra.

«In addition to the Vedangas, mention must also be made of the Upavedas, a word designating branches of knowledge of an inferior kind, but which nevertheless rest upon a strictly traditional basis; these branches of knowledge refer to the domain of practical application.» — parte tres: nombra los *Upavedas* como ramas de conocimiento inferior y de base estrictamente tradicional, referidas al dominio de la aplicación práctica.

«There are four Upavedas, which are attached to the four Vedas in which they find their respective principles: Ayur-Veda is the science of medicine, related thus to the Rig Veda; Dhanur-Veda is military science, related to the Yajur-Veda; Gandharva-Veda is music, related to the Sama- Veda; Sthapatya-Veda includes mechanics and architecture, and is related to the Atharva-Veda.» — parte tres: enumera los cuatro *Upavedas*, medicina con el Rig-Veda, ciencia militar con el Yajur-Veda, música con el Sama-Veda, y mecánica y arquitectura con el Atharva-Veda.

«According to Western ideas these are arts rather than sciences properly so called; but the traditional principle given to them here confers a rather different character upon them.» — parte tres: concede que según las ideas occidentales serían artes antes que ciencias, y dice que el principio tradicional que se les da les confiere otro carácter.

«Naturally, the foregoing enumeration of the Vedangas and Upavedas in no way excludes other sciences not mentioned in this list, of which some at least have also been cultivated in India since ancient times; it is known that mathematics in particular, comprising, under the general name of ganita, pati-ganita or vyakta-ganita, ‘arithmetic, bija-ganita, ‘algebra, and rekha-ganita, ‘geometry’, received a remarkable development, especially as regards the first two of its three branches, from which Europe, through the mediation of the Arabs, was to benefit later on.» — parte tres: acota que esa enumeración no excluye otras ciencias, y consigna el desarrollo de las matemáticas en la India, con aritmética, álgebra y geometría, de las que Europa se benefició por mediación de los árabes.

«It ought never to be forgotten that in India, as well as in China, one of the gravest insults one can offer to a thinker is to praise the novelty and originality of his ideas; in civilizations that are essentially traditional, this characteristic suffices to deprive such ideas of all real significance.» — parte tres: consigna que en la India y en China elogiar la novedad y la originalidad de las ideas de un pensador cuenta entre los mayores insultos.

«Besides, it is obvious that a ‘point of view’ can never have been the exclusive property of any particular school, although to those who are content to regard things superficially it may sometimes appear to be identified with the conceptions of the school that has chiefly developed it; confusions of this kind seem to come naturally to Westerners, who are accustomed to attribute to particular individuals, as actual ‘inventions’, all the conceptions they have ever heard of.» — parte tres: niega que un punto de vista sea propiedad exclusiva de una escuela, y adjudica a los occidentales el hábito de atribuir toda concepción a un individuo como invención.

«This postulate is to a large extent implicit in their ‘historical method’, and at the present time even the religious point of view does not escape the consequences of this special turn of mind, which directs against it all the resources of that anti-traditional exegesis to which we have already referred.» — parte tres: sitúa ese postulado en el método histórico, y dice que ni el punto de vista religioso escapa hoy a la exégesis antitradicional que de ahí sale.

«The six darshanas are Nyaya and Vaisheshika, Sankhya and Yoga, Mimansa and Vedanta; they are usually enumerated in this order and in pairs in order to mark their affinities;» — parte tres: enumera los seis *darshanas*, Nyaya y Vaisheshika, Sankhya y Yoga, Mimansa y Vedanta, apareados para marcar sus afinidades.

«as for wishing to assign a chronological order of succession to their development, this is a vain question without any real interest for reasons already stated, since we are concerned with points of view which from the very beginning were implicitly contained in perfect simultaneity within the primordial doctrine.» — parte tres: declara vana la pregunta por el orden cronológico de los *darshanas*, por tratarse de puntos de vista contenidos desde el principio en simultaneidad dentro de la doctrina primordial.

«To characterize them briefly, it may be said that the first two points of view are analytical, while the four others are synthetic; on the other hand, the two last stand out from the others as being in a direct and immediate way interpretations of the Veda itself, from which the rest are derived more remotely;» — parte tres: caracteriza los dos primeros *darshanas* como analíticos y los otros cuatro como sintéticos, y destaca los dos últimos por ser interpretaciones directas del Veda.

«also, no heterodox opinions, be they even partially so, have ever been able to take root in these last two darshanas, while some have arisen in schools dedicated to the study of the four others.» — parte tres: consigna que en esos dos últimos *darshanas* nunca arraigaron opiniones heterodoxas, ni siquiera parcialmente, y que sí surgieron en escuelas de los otros cuatro.

«THE MEANING OF Nyaya should properly be given as ‘logic’ or even ‘method’: to maintain, as some people do, that this word began by denoting a school and subsequently became a synonym for logic, is to reverse the natural order of things; clearly, a school must be given a name bearing some previous meaning, and this view of the origin of Nyaya, by suggesting the exact opposite, contradicts this obvious fact;» — parte tres, capítulo Nyaya: traduce *Nyaya* por lógica o método, y objeta la tesis de que la palabra nombrara primero a una escuela y después a la lógica, por invertir el orden natural.

«besides, it is not possible to admit that a darshana could become the monopoly of a particular school. In actual fact it is certainly logic which is and always has been the concern of the darshana in question, the development of which is ascribed to Gautama:» — parte tres: niega que un *darshana* pueda ser monopolio de una escuela, y adscribe a Gautama el desarrollo del de la lógica.

«this name, however, should not be taken as referring to any single individual; it was in common use both as a personal and family name in ancient India and it is not accompanied in this case by any biographical details even of the vaguest kind. This is typical of what always occurs in the East in such a case, for individualities do not count where the doctrine is concerned.» — parte tres: niega que Gautama nombre a un individuo, por ser nombre común en la India antigua y venir sin dato biográfico, y repite que las individualidades no cuentan en lo tocante a la doctrina.

«It is indeed quite possible that there may have existed a man called Gautama at some remote and indeterminate date, who devoted himself to the study and teaching of the branch of knowledge that constitutes logic; but this probable fact is not of any particular interest, and the name has only been handed on for a purely symbolical purpose, in order to denote what is really an ‘intellectual aggregate’ made up of all those who, over a period the duration of which is no less indeterminate than its beginning, devoted themselves to one and the same study.» — parte tres: admite posible que existiera un hombre llamado Gautama dedicado a la lógica, declara ese hecho sin interés, y lee el nombre como agregado intelectual de cuantos se dedicaron a ese estudio.

«We have said then that Nyaya is essentially logic; but it must be added that the term should in this case be understood in a much less restricted sense than Westerners give to it, because what it deals with is looked upon, not as a mere branch of philosophy, but as a point of view pertaining to the whole doctrine.» — parte tres: acota que ahí lógica se entiende en sentido mucho menos restringido que en Occidente, no como rama de la filosofía sino como punto de vista sobre la doctrina entera.

«Hindu logic escapes that narrow specialization which is unavoidable when logic is considered in its philosophic mode, nor can it be compressed within the limits of any system, so that it enjoys a much wider scope than Western logic.» — parte tres: declara a la lógica hindú libre de la especialización estrecha del modo filosófico y no comprimible en un sistema, con alcance más amplio que la occidental.

«Logic, as was pointed out before, is concerned with the conditions of human understanding: that which can be considered logically is therefore everything that is capable of being the object of human understanding, insofar as it is actually considered under this relationship.» — parte tres: define el objeto de la lógica por el ángulo y no por las cosas, todo lo que puede ser objeto del entendimiento humano en cuanto tal.

«Consequently, logic comprises within its point of view things treated as ‘objects of proof’, that is to say as objects of reasoned or discursive knowledge: in Nyaya this is the sense of the term padartha, and in spite of certain differences it is also, in the earlier logic of the West, the correct meaning of the ‘categories’ or ‘predicaments.» — parte tres: nombra *padartha* en el Nyaya a las cosas tratadas como objetos de prueba o de conocimiento discursivo, y lo empareja con las categorías o predicamentos de la lógica occidental antigua.

«If the divisions and classifications established by logic possess at the same time a real ontological value, this arises from the fact that there must necessarily be a correspondence between the points of view of logic and ontology, provided that no radical and artificial opposition is set up between subject and object, such as occurs in modern philosophy.» — parte tres: funda el valor ontológico de las divisiones lógicas en la correspondencia entre lógica y ontología, con la condición de no oponer artificialmente sujeto y objeto.

«Furthermore, the logical point of view is analytical, because it is individual and rational: it is only as representing a simple application to the individual order that logical principles, even the most general ones, can claim to be derived from metaphysical or universal principles.» — parte tres: declara analítico el punto de vista lógico por individual y racional, y deriva los principios lógicos de los metafísicos solo como aplicación al orden individual.

«In order to fix the correct meaning of the word pramana it must be pointed out that its primitive sense is that of ‘measure’; it denotes here the legitimate means of knowledge within the rational order, each of these means being in fact only applicable in a certain measure and under specified conditions, or in other words within a particular domain, the extent of which defines their scope; the enumeration of these means of knowledge or proof goes to make up the subdivisions of the first padartha.» — parte tres: da a *pramana* el sentido primitivo de medida y lo define como los medios legítimos de conocimiento en el orden racional, aplicables cada uno en cierta medida y dominio.

«The second is prameya or ‘that which is to be proved’, namely that which can be known by one or another of the means just mentioned; it includes as its subdivisions a classification of everything that human understanding in its individual state can reach.» — parte tres: define *prameya* como lo que ha de probarse, con una clasificación de todo lo alcanzable por el entendimiento humano en su estado individual.

«The remaining padarthas are less important and refer chiefly to the various modalities of reasoning or demonstration; we shall not try to give the complete list here, but we will content ourselves with mentioning in particular the one that is concerned with the terms of a regular argument.» — parte tres: declara menos importantes los demás *padarthas*, referidos a las modalidades del razonamiento, y destaca el de los términos de un argumento regular.

«Such is the complete form of the demonstrative argument, but it is often set out in simplified or abridged forms, consisting either of the first three or the last three terms only: in the latter form especially there is a marked likeness to the syllogism as established theoretically by Aristotle.» — parte tres: consigna formas abreviadas de ese argumento, de tres términos, y señala en la última un parecido marcado con el silogismo de Aristóteles.

«Furthermore, the equivalents of the greater and the lesser term are to be found here, called respectively by the name of vyapaka or ‘container’ and vyapya or ‘content, which refer to the same» — parte tres: halla los equivalentes del término mayor y el menor en *vyapaka*, continente, y *vyapya*, contenido. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«bearing usually only upon secondary points, they are in fact more apparent than real, amounting rather to differences of expression, and moreover having their uses through their being adapted to differing types of intelligence.» — parte tres: declara esas divergencias secundarias, más aparentes que reales, diferencias de expresión útiles por adaptarse a inteligencias distintas.

«Moreover, this kind of ‘collective entity’, an example of which we have already cited in the case of Vyasa, does not constitute a school in the usual sense of the word but rather a genuine intellectual function;» — parte tres, capítulo Nyaya: describe esa entidad colectiva, como la de Vyasa, no como escuela sino como función intelectual genuina. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«Nyaya recognizes sixteen padarthas, the first of which is called pramana. The ordinary meaning of this word is ‘proof’, and it is also often translated as ‘evidence’;» — parte tres: consigna dieciséis *padarthas* en el Nyaya, con *pramana* por primero, cuyo sentido ordinario es prueba y que suele traducirse por evidencia.

«pratijna, the proposition or assertion requiring to be proved; hetu, the reason justifying this proposition; udaharana, the example cited in support of the reason, and serving, so to speak, as an illustration of it by recalling a well-known case; upanaya, the application to the particular case in question, namely to the first-mentioned proposition; and lastly nigamana, the result or conclusion, which is a definite affirmation of that same proposition as proven.» — parte tres: enumera esos cinco términos, *pratijna* la proposición por probar, *hetu* la razón, *udaharana* el ejemplo, *upanaya* la aplicación al caso y *nigamana* la conclusión.

«who attach themselves specially to the study of one or another of the darshanas, schools may sometimes be formed differing from each other on certain points of interpretation, but these divergencies have never been able to proceed very far without overstepping the bounds of orthodoxy;» — parte tres, capítulo Puntos de vista dentro de la doctrina: admite escuelas que difieren en puntos de interpretación de un *darshana*, con divergencias que nunca fueron lejos sin salirse de los límites de la ortodoxia.

«and the same could be said of the proper names that we find» — parte tres, capítulo Nyaya: extiende esa lectura de entidad colectiva a los nombres propios ligados a los demás *darshanas*. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«associated in a similar way with each of the other darshanas. These remarks, made once for all, will relieve us of the need to refer again to this question.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: cierra esa observación sobre los nombres propios de los *darshanas* para no volver sobre ella.

«and there is the further drawback that it calls to mind the Cartesian conception of evidence, which is really only of value in the mathematical sphere.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: el segundo reparo, que esa traducción evoca la evidencia cartesiana, de valor solo en la esfera matemática.

«The argument in question, which is also called Nyaya, but in a secondary and more restricted use of the term, and which is in fact the type of a methodical demonstration, includes, in its fully developed form, five avayavas or constituent members or terms:» — parte tres: describe el argumento llamado también *Nyaya* en sentido restringido, tipo del razonamiento metódico, con cinco *avayavas* en su forma plena.

«cases misleading, and there is the further drawback that it calls to mind the Cartesian conception of evidence, which is really only of value in the mathematical sphere.» — parte tres, capítulo Nyaya: los dos reparos que pone a traducir *pramana* por evidencia, que es engañosa y que evoca la evidencia cartesiana, de valor solo en la esfera matemática.

«Nevertheless, these undeniable points of likeness, which suggest as at least a probable hypothesis that Aristotle may have possessed some knowledge of Nyaya, must not cause us to forget that there are essential differences between the two viewpoints; for whereas the Greek syllogism, when all is said and done, bears only on the concepts or notions of things, the Hindu argument has a more direct bearing on things in themselves.» — parte tres: admite como hipótesis probable que Aristóteles conociera el Nyaya, y a la vez fija la diferencia esencial, que el silogismo griego versa sobre los conceptos y el argumento hindú sobre las cosas mismas.

«This last remark calls for a few further comments; in the first place, it obviously concerns the very core of what is implied in the reasoning, and not merely the outward form, which might be practically the same in both cases.» — parte tres: acota que esa diferencia toca al núcleo del razonamiento y no a la forma exterior, que podría ser casi la misma.

«We have said that the separation and opposition of subject and object is a special feature of modern philosophy; but already, among the Greeks, the distinction between a thing and its notion had gone a little too far, in the sense that logic dealt exclusively with the relations between notions, as if it were only through notions that things could be known to us.» — parte tres: data ya entre los griegos un exceso en la distinción entre la cosa y su noción, con una lógica que solo trata de relaciones entre nociones.

«Doubtless, rational knowledge is only indirect knowledge, and for that reason open to error; yet, if it could not reach things themselves to a certain extent, it would be entirely illusory and could not be called knowledge in any sense of the word.» — parte tres: concede que el conocimiento racional es indirecto y sujeto a error, y sostiene que si no alcanzara en algo las cosas mismas no sería conocimiento.

«If, then, it may be said that under the rational mode an object can only be known through the intermediary of its notion, this can only be because the notion possesses something of the object itself, and shares in its nature by expressing it in relation to ourselves.» — parte tres: deduce que si el objeto se conoce por su noción es porque la noción tiene algo del objeto y participa de su naturaleza.

«For this reason, Hindu logic considers not only the manner in which we conceive of things, but also the things themselves insofar as they are conceived by us, since our conception would have no reality if it were entirely separate and distinct from its object;» — parte tres: atribuye a la lógica hindú considerar no solo cómo concebimos las cosas sino las cosas mismas en cuanto concebidas por nosotros.

«in this respect, the Scholastic definition of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus, in all the degrees of knowledge, is that which comes nearest, in the West, to the point of view of the Eastern traditional doctrines, because it conforms most nearly to the purely metaphysical conception.» — parte tres: declara la definición escolástica de la verdad como *adaequatio rei et intellectus* lo más cercano en Occidente al punto de vista de las doctrinas tradicionales orientales.

«it is also to be regretted that the Scholastics never quite seem to have grasped the profound consequences implied in the principle, already laid down by Aristotle, of identification through knowledge.» — parte tres: y el segundo reproche, que los escolásticos no captaron las consecuencias profundas del principio aristotélico de la identificación por el conocimiento.

«It is precisely in virtue of this principle that from the moment the subject knows an object, however fragmentary or superficial that knowledge may be, something of the object is present in the subject, and has become part of its being; from whatever angle we consider things, it is always the things themselves that we reach, at least under a certain aspect, forming in every case one of their attributes, that is to say one of the elements that constitute their essence.» — parte tres: enuncia el principio, que al conocer un objeto algo de él está en el sujeto y pasa a ser parte de su ser, y que siempre se alcanzan las cosas mismas bajo algún aspecto.

«Let it be admitted, if need be, that this is ‘realism’; the truth is that such is the nature of things, and words make no difference; but strictly speaking, the special viewpoints of ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’, with the systematic opposition implied in their correlation, are inapplicable here, since we have traveled far beyond the narrow province of philosophical thought.» — parte tres: acepta que se llame realismo a eso y declara inaplicables los puntos de vista de realismo e idealismo, por estar fuera de la provincia del pensamiento filosófico.

«Nor must it be forgotten that the act of knowledge presents two inseparable facets; if it is an identification of the subject with the object, it is also, for the self-same reason, an assimilation of the object by the subject: by reaching things in their essence, we ‘realize’ them, in all the force of that word, as states or modalities of our own being;» — parte tres: describe las dos caras inseparables del acto de conocimiento, identificación del sujeto con el objeto y asimilación del objeto por el sujeto.

«and if the idea, in the measure in which it is true and adequate, shares in the nature of the thing, it is because, conversely, the thing itself shares also in the nature of the idea.» — parte tres: y la reciprocidad que enuncia, que si la idea participa de la naturaleza de la cosa, la cosa participa también de la naturaleza de la idea.

«Fundamentally, there are not two separate and radically different worlds, as modern philosophy suggests when it qualifies them with the names of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, nor two superimposed worlds, like the ‘intelligible world’ and the ‘sensible world’ of Plato; but, as the Arabs say, ‘existence is one’ and all that it contains is but a manifestation, in multiple modes, of one and the same principle, which is Universal Being.» — parte tres: niega dos mundos separados, subjetivo y objetivo, y los dos mundos superpuestos de Platón, y trae la fórmula árabe de que la existencia es una, manifestación en modos múltiples del Ser Universal.

«THE NAME Vaisheshika derives from the word vishesha, which means ‘distinctive character’ and consequently ‘individual thing’; this darshana is therefore concerned with the knowledge of individual things as such, considered in distinctive mode, that is, in their contingent existence.» — parte tres, capítulo Vaisheshika: deriva el nombre de *vishesha*, carácter distintivo y por ello cosa individual, y sitúa ese *darshana* en el conocimiento de las cosas individuales en su existencia contingente.

«While Nydaya treats of things in their relationship with the human understanding, Vaisheshika considers them more directly for what they are in themselves.» — parte tres: distingue los dos primeros *darshanas*, el Nyaya trata de las cosas en su relación con el entendimiento humano y el Vaisheshika de lo que son en sí mismas. La grafía *Nydaya* sale así del troceo.

«It is easy to see the difference between these two points of view, though at the same time their connection also is apparent, since in the final analysis knowledge of a thing is one with the thing itself; however, the difference between the two points of view only disappears when both have been transcended, so that their distinction is always maintained within the frontiers of the domain to which they can properly be applied.» — parte tres: dice que la diferencia entre esos dos puntos de vista solo desaparece al trascender los dos, y que dentro de su dominio se mantiene.

«This domain is plainly that of manifested nature, outside which the individual point of view, of which these two darshanas represent modalities, is devoid of meaning.» — parte tres: sitúa ese dominio en la naturaleza manifestada, fuera de la cual el punto de vista individual carece de sentido.

«But universal manifestation can be looked at in two different ways; either synthetically, starting from the principles out of which it proceeds and which determine it in its every mode—this is the point of view of Sankhya, as will be shown further on—or else analytically, in the distinguishing of its manifold constituent elements, and this is the line of approach of Vaisheshika.» — parte tres: reparte dos miradas sobre la manifestación universal, la sintética del Sankhya desde los principios y la analítica del Vaisheshika por sus elementos constitutivos.

«The latter point of view may even confine itself to the special consideration of a single mode of universal manifestation, such as that constituted by the sensible world; and in fact, it is bound to limit itself to this world almost entirely, since the conditions of the other modes necessarily lie beyond the grasp of the individual faculties of the human being; such modes can only be reached, as it were, from above, namely through that» — parte tres: acota que el punto de vista del Vaisheshika se confina casi por entero al mundo sensible, porque los otros modos quedan fuera de las facultades individuales y solo se alcanzan desde arriba. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«element in man which transcends the limitations and relativities inherent in the individual. This clearly goes beyond the distinctive and analytical point of view that we now have to describe;» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: ese acceso viene del elemento del hombre que trasciende las limitaciones del individuo, y ya excede el punto de vista analítico.

«but, a particular point of view cannot be fully understood save by transcending it, given that it is not represented as being independent and as carrying its own justification wholly within itself but is recognized to be dependent on certain principles whence it is derived, being but an application, to a contingent order, of something belonging to a different and superior order.» — parte tres: sostiene que un punto de vista particular solo se entiende del todo trascendiéndolo, por ser aplicación a un orden contingente de algo de orden superior.

«We have seen that this reference to principles, which ensures the essential unity of the doctrine throughout its branches, is a feature common to every form of Indian traditional knowledge; it marks the profound difference that separates Vaisheshika from the scientific point of view as understood by Westerners, though it remains true to say that it is less remote from the latter than any of the other branches.» — parte tres: hace de la referencia a los principios lo común a todo saber tradicional indio, y ahí sitúa la diferencia con el punto de vista científico occidental, del que declara al Vaisheshika el menos remoto.

«In reality Vaisheshika approaches nearer to the point of view known among the Greeks as ‘physical philosophy’; though analytical, it is less so than modern science, and is therefore less subject to the narrow specialization which causes the latter to lose its way in an endless maze of experimentation.» — parte tres: acerca el Vaisheshika a lo que los griegos llamaron filosofía física, y lo declara menos analítico que la ciencia moderna y por eso menos especializado.

«The Vaisheshika dar-shana implies something that is fundamentally more rational and even, in a certain measure, more intellectual in the strict sense of the word than modern science: more rational, because, though it remains within the individual field, it is free from all empiricism; more intellectual, because it never loses sight of the fact that the entire individual order depends on universal principles, from which it derives all the reality it is capable of possessing.» — parte tres: declara al Vaisheshika más racional que la ciencia moderna por estar libre de empirismo, y más intelectual por no perder de vista la dependencia del orden individual respecto de los principios universales.

«We have said that by the term ‘physics’ the ancients meant the science of nature in the widest sense of the word; the same term would then be suitable here also, but as against this it must be borne in mind how narrow its meaning has become in modern usage, following on the general narrowing of the corresponding point of view.» — parte tres: recuerda que los antiguos llamaban física a la ciencia de la naturaleza en sentido amplio, y advierte cuánto se estrechó esa palabra en el uso moderno.

«Nevertheless, owing to the nature of its subject matter, Vaisheshika finished by producing a somewhat ‘naturalistic’ tendency in certain quarters among those who specially devoted themselves to its study; but this tendency, being generally foreign to the Eastern mind, never became as widely developed in India as it did in Greece through the influence of the ‘physical philosophers’; at least, only certain schools belonging to the most degenerate forms of Buddhism were destined to push it to its furthest logical conclusion, and this was only possible for them because they were openly outside the traditional unity of Hinduism.» — parte tres: consigna una tendencia naturalista surgida entre algunos estudiosos del Vaisheshika, que dice nunca tan desarrollada en la India como en Grecia, y llevada al extremo solo por escuelas budistas degeneradas fuera de la unidad hindú.

«Nevertheless, it is true to say that this tendency, which asserts itself plainly in the atomist conception, was already to be found in the ordinary teaching of Vaisheshika, since the origin of atomism, its heterodox character notwithstanding, is ascribed to Kanada simultaneously with the development of Vaisheshika itself, though the two need not necessarily go together.» — parte tres: adscribe a Kanada el origen del atomismo junto con el desarrollo del Vaisheshika, y acota que las dos cosas no van necesariamente juntas.

«The name of Kanada seems moreover to contain some allusion to this theory, and if it belonged in the first instance to an individual, it can only have been as a mere surname; the fact that it alone has been handed down again shows the small importance attributed by the Hindus to individualities.» — parte tres: lee en el nombre de Kanada una alusión a esa teoría y, de haber sido de un individuo, un mero apodo, y vuelve a la poca importancia que los hindúes dan a las individualidades.

«Like Nyaya, Vaisheshika distinguishes a certain number of padarthas, but naturally it determines them from a different point of view; these padarthas do not therefore coincide in any way with those of Nyaya and they might even be included among the subdivisions of the second one, the prameya or ‘object of proof’.» — parte tres: consigna que el Vaisheshika distingue sus propios *padarthas*, que no coinciden con los del Nyaya y podrían contarse entre las subdivisiones del *prameya*.

«as for the intermediary term, its function is fulfilled by the reason, hetu, which is also called linga or the sign by which vyapti can be recognized, that is to say the invari» — parte tres, capítulo Nyaya: hace cumplir la función del término intermedio a la razón, *hetu*, llamada también *linga*, el signo por el que se reconoce *vyapti*. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk, con la palabra partida.

«able connection uniting the container to the content.» — parte tres: la continuación, al otro lado del corte: *vyapti* es la conexión invariable que une el continente al contenido.

«Besides, the Scholastic doctrine, while carrying on the teaching of Aristotle in its main lines, corrected and» — parte tres: reconoce a la escolástica haber continuado la enseñanza de Aristóteles en sus líneas principales. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«completed it on many points; unfortunately it did not quite succeed in breaking loose from the limitations which were its inheritance from the Hellenic mode of thought;» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: la escolástica enmendó y completó a Aristóteles en muchos puntos y no se soltó de las limitaciones heredadas del modo de pensamiento helénico.

«So that, if a Western term is to be applied to a Hindu point of view, it seems preferable to speak of Vaisheshika as ‘cosmology’; and indeed, the cosmology of the Middle Ages, which was clearly regarded as an application of metaphysics to the contingencies of the sensible world, comes still closer to this darshana than the ‘physical philosophy’ of the Greeks,» — parte tres, capítulo Vaisheshika: prefiere llamar cosmología al Vaisheshika, y acerca a él la cosmología medieval más que la filosofía física griega. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«which almost always finds its principles in the contingent order alone, or at best seeks them within the limits of the immediately superior but still particular point of view considered by the Sankhya.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: la filosofía física griega halla sus principios en el orden contingente o, a lo sumo, en el punto de vista del Sankhya.

«The first of these padarthas, which are six in number, is called dravya; this word is usually translated as ‘substance’, quite an admissible rendering provided the term be taken, not in its metaphysical or universal sense, but in a relative sense only, in order to indicate the function of the» — parte tres: nombra *dravya* al primero de los seis *padarthas*, traducible por sustancia en sentido relativo y no metafísico. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«logical subject; this is also the meaning that it bears according to Aristotle’s conception of the categories.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: *dravya* indica la función del sujeto lógico, sentido que empareja con la concepción aristotélica de las categorías.

«The second padartha is ‘quality’, called guna, a word we shall meet with again in Sankhya, but differently applied; here the qualities in question are the attributes of manifested beings, or what the Scholastics called ‘accidents’ when considering them in relation to the substance or subject serving as their support in the order of manifestation in individual mode.» — parte tres, capítulo Vaisheshika: nombra *guna* al segundo *padartha*, la cualidad, atributo de los seres manifestados, que empareja con lo que los escolásticos llamaban accidentes.

«but essence, even individual! essence, the attributes of which reside in it ‘eminently’ and not ‘formally’, lies outside the point of view of Vaisheshika, which is concerned with existence taken in its strictest sense, which is why attributes are really nothing more for it than ‘accidents’.» — parte tres: deja la esencia fuera del punto de vista del Vaisheshika, ocupado de la existencia en sentido estricto, y por eso sus atributos no son ahí más que accidentes.

«We have intentionally worded these last comments in a language that will make them readily comprehensible to those versed in the doctrine of Aristotle and the Scholastics; this language is, moreover, in the present context, the least inadequate that Western usage has to offer.» — parte tres: declara deliberado el lenguaje aristotélico y escolástico de esas observaciones, por ser el menos inadecuado que ofrece el uso occidental.

«Substance, in both the senses that the word admits of, is the root of manifestation, but it is not itself manifested, becoming so only in and through its attributes, which are its modalities and which, conversely, enjoy no real existence in the contingent order of manifestation except in and through substance; it is in the latter that qualities reside and it is through the latter that action is produced.» — parte tres: describe la sustancia como raíz de la manifestación, no manifestada ella misma sino en sus atributos, que a su vez no existen en el orden contingente sino en ella y por ella.

«The third padartha is in fact karma or action; and action, however it may differ in relation to quality, is included with the latter in the general notion of attributes, for it is nothing else but a ‘manner of being’ of substance; this is indicated by the fact that in the constitution of language, both quality and action are expressed by the common form of attributive verbs.» — parte tres: nombra *karma* al tercer *padartha*, la acción, que cuenta con la cualidad entre los atributos por ser manera de ser de la sustancia, como muestra la forma del verbo atributivo.

«Action is taken as consisting essentially in movement, or rather in change, for this much more far-reaching notion, in which movement constitutes but one species, applies most aptly here, as well as to the analogous conception in Greek physics.» — parte tres: define la acción por el cambio antes que por el movimiento, que declara una sola especie de aquel.

«but if action were to be considered in the integrality of its temporal, and even non-temporal, consequences, this distinction also would disappear, as might indeed be foreseen when it is remembered that all attributes whatsoever issue alike from one and the same principle, and this may be said both under the heading of substance and of essence.» — parte tres: y acota que esa distinción también desaparecería si la acción se considerara en la integralidad de sus consecuencias, porque todos los atributos salen de un mismo principio.

«It is permissible to be more brief in speaking of the following three padarthas, which in short represent categories of relationships, that is to say certain other attributes of individual substances and of the relative principles that provide the conditions immediately determining their manifestation.» — parte tres: reúne los tres *padarthas* siguientes como categorías de relaciones, atributos de las sustancias individuales y de los principios que condicionan su manifestación.

«The fourth padartha is samanya, namely the association of qualities which, in all the various degrees that are possible, gives rise to the gradation of genera; the fifth is particularity or difference, more specially called vishesha, meaning whatever belongs exclusively to a given substance, that by which it is differentiated from all other substances; lastly, the sixth is samavaya or aggregation, that is to say the intimate relationship uniting a substance with the attributes inherent in it, and which is moreover itself an attribute of that substance.» — parte tres: define *samanya* como asociación de cualidades que da la gradación de los géneros, *vishesha* como lo exclusivo de una sustancia y *samavaya* como agregación, la relación íntima entre sustancia y atributos.

«The association of these six padarthas, comprising in this way substances with all their attributes, makes up bhava or existence; opposed to it correlatively is abhava or non-existence, which is commonly counted as a seventh padartha, though it is a purely negative conception: it is indeed the same thing as ‘privation’ taken in its Aristotelian sense.» — parte tres: hace de la asociación de esos seis *padarthas* el *bhava* o existencia, y le opone *abhava* o no existencia, contada a veces como séptimo *padartha* y equiparada a la privación aristotélica.

«As for the subdivisions of these categories, time need not be spent on any except those of the first padartha: these are the modalities and general conditions of individual substances. Here are to be found, in the first place, the five bhittas or elements that go to make up corporeal things, namely prithvi or ‘earth’, ap or ‘water’, tejas or ‘fire’, vayu or ‘air’ and akasha or ‘ether’;» — parte tres: enumera entre las subdivisiones del primer *padartha* los cinco *bhutas* o elementos de las cosas corpóreas, *prithvi*, *ap*, *tejas*, *vayu* y *akasha*. La transliteración *bhittas* sale así del troceo.

«they are numbered consecutively, beginning with the one that corresponds to the final term of this mode of manifestation, that is to say according to the order that correctly corresponds to the analytical point of view of Vaisheshika: Sankhya, on the other hand, takes these elements in the contrary order, namely the order of their production or derivation.» — parte tres: explica el orden en que el Vaisheshika numera los elementos, desde el término final de ese modo de manifestación, e invierte ese orden para el Sankhya, que los toma por el de su producción.

«These qualities are substantial determinations, constitutive of all that belongs to the sensory world; it would be a great mistake to look on them as more or less analogous to the quite hypothetical ‘simple bodies’ of modern chemistry, or even to assimilate them to ‘physical states’, following a fairly common though inadequate interpretation of the cosmological theories of the Greeks.» — parte tres: niega que esas cualidades sean análogas a los cuerpos simples de la química moderna ni asimilables a estados físicos, y llama inadecuada esa lectura de las teorías cosmológicas griegas.

«Besides the elements, the category of the dravya comprises kala, ‘time’, and dish, ‘space’: these are the fundamental conditions of corporeal existence, and it may be added in passing that they represent respectively, in the special mode of manifestation constituted by the sensory world, the activity of the two principles which are called Shiva and Vishnu in the realm of universal manifestation.» — parte tres: añade al *dravya* el tiempo y el espacio como condiciones fundamentales de la existencia corpórea, y los hace representar en el mundo sensible la actividad de Shiva y de Vishnu.

«These seven subdivisions concern corporeal existence exclusively; but if an individual being (such as a human being) be considered as a whole, it includes, besides its bodily modality, constituent elements belonging to another order, and these elements are here represented by the two last subdivisions of the same category, atma and manas.» — parte tres: acota que esas siete subdivisiones tocan solo la existencia corpórea, y añade para el ser individual entero los elementos *atma* y *manas*.

«Manas, or to translate this word by another derived from the self-same root, ‘mind’, comprises the whole of the psychic faculties belonging to the individual being as such, reason being the faculty among them that properly characterizes man.» — parte tres: traduce *manas* por mente y lo define como el conjunto de las facultades psíquicas del ser individual, con la razón por la que caracteriza al hombre.

«As for dtma, a term that the word ‘soul’ renders most imperfectly, it is properly the transcendent principle to which individuality is attached and which stands superior to it, a principle to which pure intellect must here be referred.» — parte tres: define *atma* como el principio trascendente al que la individualidad se une y que le es superior, al que se refiere el intelecto puro. La transliteración *dtma* sale así del troceo.

«It is distinguished from manas, or rather from the composite whole formed by manas and the bodily organism, in the same way that personality, in its metaphysical sense, is distinguished from individuality.» — parte tres: distingue *atma* de *manas* y del compuesto de mente y organismo como la personalidad en sentido metafísico se distingue de la individualidad.

«It is in the theory of the corporeal elements especially that the atomist conception makes its appearance. According to this theory an atom, or anu, partakes, potentially at least, of the nature of one or other of the elements, and it is from the grouping together of atoms of various kinds, under the action of a force said to be ‘non-perceptible’ or adrishta, that all bodies are supposed to be formed.» — parte tres: sitúa en la teoría de los elementos corpóreos la aparición del atomismo, con el átomo o *anu* partícipe de la naturaleza de un elemento y los cuerpos formados por agrupación bajo una fuerza llamada *adrishta*.

«Besides, it is quite easy to expose the contradiction inherent in atomism, the basic error of which lies in supposing that simple elements can exist in the corporeal order, whereas all that is bodily is necessarily composite, being always divisible from the very fact that it is extended, that is to say subject to the spatial condition; in order to find something simple or indivisible it is necessary to pass outside space, and therefore outside that special modality of manifestation which constitutes corporeal existence.» — parte tres: sitúa el error básico del atomismo en suponer elementos simples en el orden corpóreo, siendo todo cuerpo compuesto y divisible por extenso, y remite lo simple fuera del espacio.

«If, as must be done in this instance, the word atom be taken in its true sense of ‘indivisible’, a sense which modern physicists no longer give to it, it may be said that an atom, since it cannot have parts, must also be without extension; now the sum of elements devoid of extension can never form an extension; if atoms fulfill their own definition, it is then impossible for them to make up bodies.» — parte tres: toma átomo en su sentido de indivisible, deduce que ha de carecer de extensión, y de ahí que una suma de elementos inextensos no forme extensión.

«To this well-known and moreover decisive chain of reasoning, another may also be added, employed by Shankaracharya in order to refute atomism:» — parte tres: recoge además el razonamiento que atribuye a Shankaracharya contra el atomismo.

«two things can come into contact with one another either by a part of themselves or by the whole; for atoms, devoid as they are of parts, the first hypothesis is inadmissible; thus only the second hypothesis remains, which amounts to saying that the aggregation of two atoms can only be realized by their coincidence purely and simply, whence it clearly follows that two atoms when joined occupy no more space than a single atom and so forth indefinitely; so, as before, atoms, whatever their number, will never form a body.» — parte tres, voz de Shankaracharya según Guénon: dos cosas se tocan por una parte o por el todo, y como los átomos no tienen partes solo cabe la coincidencia, con lo que dos átomos unidos no ocupan más espacio que uno.

«Thus atomism represents nothing but sheer impossibility, as we pointed out when explaining the sense in which heterodoxy is to be understood; but, atomism excepted, the point of view of Vaisheshika, reduced to essentials, is a perfectly legitimate one, and the foregoing exposition has sufficiently defined its range and meaning.» — parte tres: declara al atomismo pura imposibilidad y, quitado este, al punto de vista del Vaisheshika perfectamente legítimo.

«If these same qualities were to be transposed beyond this particular mode and considered in the very principle of their manifestation, they would have to be regarded as constituents of ‘essence’, taken in the sense of a principle correlative and complementary to» — parte tres, capítulo Vaisheshika: acota que esas cualidades, transpuestas al principio de su manifestación, se leerían como constituyentes de la esencia. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk.

«‘substance’, either in the universal order, or even, relatively and by analogy, in the individual order; but essence, even individual! essence, the attributes of which reside in it ‘eminently’ and not ‘formally’, lies outside the point of view of Vaisheshika, which is concerned with existence taken in its strictest sense, which is why attributes are really nothing more for it than ‘accidents’.» — parte tres: la continuación, al otro lado del corte: la esencia, cuyos atributos residen en ella eminentemente y no formalmente, queda fuera del punto de vista del Vaisheshika, ocupado de la existencia en sentido estricto.

«It may be said in consequence that action is a» — parte tres: introduce la distinción entre acción y cualidad. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«passing and momentary mode of being, whereas quality is a relatively permanent and in some measure a stable mode;» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: la acción es modo pasajero y momentáneo del ser y la cualidad modo relativamente permanente y estable.

«The five elements manifest themselves respectively through the five sensible» — parte tres: hace manifestarse los cinco elementos por las cinco cualidades sensibles. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«qualities which correspond to them and are inherent in them, and which belong to the subdivisions of the second category.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: esas cualidades les corresponden y les son inherentes, y se cuentan entre las subdivisiones de la segunda categoría.

«We have already said that this conception is formally opposed to the Veda, which asserts on the contrary the existence of the five» — parte tres: repite que el atomismo se opone formalmente al Veda, que afirma la existencia de los cinco elementos. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«elements with all that this implies: the two views therefore have really nothing in common.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: las dos visiones no tienen nada en común.

«Sankhya also is concerned with the domain of nature, that is to say of Universal Manifestation, but, as we have already pointed out, this time nature is considered synthetically, starting from the principles that govern its production and from which it draws all its reality.» — parte tres, capítulo Sankhya: sitúa al Sankhya en el dominio de la naturaleza o manifestación universal, considerada sintéticamente desde los principios que la producen.

«The expounding of this point of view, which is in a way intermediate between the cosmology of Vaisheshika and metaphysics, is ascribed to the ancient sage Kapila; but, once again, this name does not stand for a person, and all references to it are of a purely symbolic character.» — parte tres: sitúa ese punto de vista entre la cosmología del Vaisheshika y la metafísica, lo adscribe al antiguo sabio Kapila y niega que ese nombre designe a una persona.

«As for the title Sankhya, it is variously interpreted. It derives from sankhya, which means ‘enumeration’ or ‘catalogue’, also occasionally ‘reasoning’. It denotes especially a doctrine that devotes itself to the regular enumeration of the different degrees of manifested being, and this is indeed the character of Sankhya, the whole teaching of which can be summed up in the distinction and consideration of the twenty-five tattvas, or true principles and elements, which correspond to those degrees revealed in their hierarchical order.» — parte tres: deriva *Sankhya* de enumeración o catálogo y a veces razonamiento, y resume esa doctrina en la consideración de los veinticinco *tattvas*.

«Having placed itself at the point of view of manifestation, Sankhya takes as its starting-point Prakriti or Pradhana, which is Universal Substance, undifferentiated and unmanifested in itself, but from which all things proceed by modification; this first tattva is the ‘root’ or mila of manifestation, and the tattvas that follow represent its modifications at different stages.» — parte tres: toma por punto de partida a *Prakriti* o *Pradhana*, la Sustancia Universal indiferenciada y no manifestada, raíz de la manifestación de la que todo procede por modificación.

«At the first stage comes Buddhi, which is also called Mahat or the ‘great principle’. This is the pure intellect, transcendent relatively to the individual; here we are already situated in manifestation, but we still remain in the universal order.» — parte tres: nombra *Buddhi* o *Mahat* al primer estadio, el intelecto puro, trascendente respecto del individuo y ya dentro de la manifestación aunque en el orden universal.

«These include first of all the five tanmatras, elementary incorporeal and non-perceptible determinations, which will be the respective principles of the five bhiitas or corporeal elements; Vaisheshika had only to take the latter into account, and not the tanmatras, which need only be conceived when one’s intention is to refer the notion of the elements or of the conditions governing the corporeal modality to the principles of universal existence.» — parte tres: nombra los cinco *tanmatras*, determinaciones incorpóreas y no perceptibles, principios de los cinco *bhutas*, y dice por qué el Vaisheshika no tenía que contarlos.

«Next follow the individual faculties, produced by differentiation of the individual consciousness of which they may be said to represent so many functions, and these are reckoned to be eleven in number, ten external and one internal; the ten external faculties include five faculties of knowledge, which, in the bodily sphere, are faculties of sensation, and five faculties of action; the internal faculty is manas, which is a faculty both of knowledge and of action, and which is directly bound up with individual consciousness.» — parte tres: enumera once facultades individuales, diez externas de conocimiento y de acción y una interna, *manas*, facultad a la vez de conocimiento y de acción.

«Lastly, we come back to the five corporeal elements, numbered this time in the order of their production or manifestation: ether, air, fire, water, and earth; and so we get the twenty-four tattvas comprising Prakriti and all its modifications.» — parte tres: cierra la serie con los cinco elementos corpóreos en el orden de su producción, éter, aire, fuego, agua y tierra, con lo que suma veinticuatro *tattvas*.

«Up to this point, Sankhya considers things only in relation to ‘substance’, taken in its universal sense; but as was shown earlier, it is» — parte tres: acota que hasta ahí el Sankhya solo considera las cosas respecto de la sustancia en sentido universal. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk.

«necessary to take into consideration, correlatively, as the other pole of manifestation, a complementary principle that can be called ‘essence. This is the principle to which Sankhya gives the name of Purusha or Pumas, and which it looks upon as a twenty-fifth tattva, entirely independent of the preceding ones;» — parte tres: nombra *Purusha* o *Pumas* al principio complementario, la esencia, contado como vigesimoquinto *tattva* e independiente de los anteriores.

«all manifested things are produced by Prakriti, yet, but for the presence of Purusha these productions could only enjoy a purely illusory existence.» — parte tres: hace producir todas las cosas manifestadas por *Prakriti*, con la condición de la presencia de *Purusha*, sin la cual esas producciones serían puramente ilusorias.

«Contrary to some people’s opinion, the consideration of these two principles does not imply the least suggestion of dualism: they are not derived from nor reducible to one another, but they both proceed from Universal Being, in which they constitute the first of all distinctions.» — parte tres: niega que la consideración de esos dos principios implique dualismo, porque no se derivan uno de otro y ambos proceden del Ser Universal, donde constituyen la primera de las distinciones.

«However, Sankhya is not called upon to go beyond this particular distinction, and the consideration of pure Being does not enter into its point of view: but, not being systematic, it admits the possibility of all that transcends it, and this is the reason why it is in no wise dualistic.» — parte tres: acota que el Sankhya no va más allá de esa distinción y no considera el Ser puro, y que por no ser sistemático admite la posibilidad de lo que lo trasciende.

«It can thus be seen how far behind we have left the limitations of philosophic thought, even though we have not yet entered the realm of pure metaphysics.» — parte tres: mide cuánto se han dejado atrás las limitaciones del pensamiento filosófico sin haber entrado aún en el reino de la metafísica pura.

«It is necessary to return for a little to the conception of Prakriti: it is endowed with three gunas or constituent qualities, which, in its primordial indifferentiation, are in perfect equilibrium;» — parte tres: atribuye a *Prakriti* tres *gunas* o cualidades constituyentes, en equilibrio perfecto en su indiferenciación primordial.

«every manifestation or modification of substance represents a rupture of this equilibrium, and all beings, in their various states of manifestation, participate in varying degrees in the three gunas, in indefinitely varying proportions.» — parte tres: lee toda manifestación o modificación de la sustancia como ruptura de ese equilibrio, con los seres participando de los tres *gunas* en proporciones indefinidamente variables.

«They are not therefore states, but conditions of universal existence to which all manifested beings are subjected, and it is important to distinguish them from the special conditions determining this or that state or mode of manifestation—such as space or time, which govern the corporeal state to the exclusion of others.» — parte tres: niega que los *gunas* sean estados y los declara condiciones de la existencia universal, distintas de las condiciones especiales como el espacio o el tiempo.

«The three gunas are sattva, conformity to the pure essence of Being, or Sat, which is identified with intelligible light or knowledge and is represented as an ascending tendency; rajas, the expansive impulse, in obedience to which a being develops in a certain state and, as it were, at a determined level of existence; and lastly, tamas, or obscurity, assimilated to ignorance, and described as a downward tendency.» — parte tres: define los tres *gunas*, *sattva* como conformidad con la esencia pura del Ser y luz inteligible, *rajas* como impulso expansivo y *tamas* como oscuridad asimilada a la ignorancia.

«It is easy to see how inadequate and even false are the interpretations current among orientalists, especially in regard to the first two gunas, which they try to designate respectively by ‘goodness’ and ‘passion’, whereas quite clearly they do not imply anything of a moral or psychological nature.» — parte tres: declara inadecuadas y falsas las traducciones corrientes de los dos primeros *gunas* por bondad y pasión, por no implicar nada moral ni psicológico.

«Furthermore, as regards Sankhya in general, we do not need to discuss it at such length as would have been necessary had we not already described many of its essential characteristics when comparing the point of view it adopts with that of Vaisheshika; but there are still a few confusions to be dispelled.» — parte tres: acota que no extenderá el tratamiento del Sankhya por haber descrito ya sus rasgos al compararlo con el Vaisheshika.

«The orientalists, who mistake Sankhya for a system of philosophy, readily represent it as a ‘materialistic’ or ‘atheistic’ doctrine: it goes without saying that it is the conception of Prakriti which they identify with their own notion of matter, an utterly false assimilation, while in addition they take no account of Purusha in their distorted interpretation.» — parte tres: adjudica a los orientalistas leer el Sankhya como doctrina materialista o atea identificando *Prakriti* con la materia y dejando fuera a *Purusha*.

«Universal substance is quite another thing from matter, which is at most but one restrictive and specialized determination of it; and we have already had occasion to point out that the very notion of matter, as it exists among Westerners today, is no more known to the Hindus than it was to the Greeks themselves.» — parte tres: distingue la sustancia universal de la materia, que declara a lo sumo una determinación restrictiva suya, y repite que la noción moderna de materia es ajena a hindúes y griegos.

«It is not easy to imagine how there could be materialism without matter; the atomism of the ancients, even in the West, cannot for that reason be reckoned materialistic, even if it was ‘mechanistic’; modern philosophy can safely be left the monopoly of labels which were only invented for its own use, and cannot validly be employed elsewhere.» — parte tres: niega que el atomismo antiguo, aun mecanicista, pueda llamarse materialista, y deja a la filosofía moderna el monopolio de etiquetas hechas para su propio uso.

«Moreover, though it relates to nature, Sankhya, owing to its manner of approach, is never in danger of provoking a tendency toward naturalism, such as was noticeable in the atomist form of Vaisheshika; all the more reason why it can in no wise be ‘evolutionary’, as some have fancied, and this is true even if one takes evolutionism in its most general sense and without making it synonymous with a crude ‘transformism’; such a confusing of points of view is too obviously absurd to merit further attention.» — parte tres: niega que el Sankhya provoque tendencia naturalista como el Vaisheshika atomista, y rechaza llamarlo evolucionista aun en el sentido más general.

«As for the reproach of atheism, this is what it amounts to: Sankhya is nirishvara, that is to say it does not introduce the conception of Ishvara or the Divine Personality; but, if this conception is absent from it, that is because it has no place there, given the point of view in question, any more than it has in Nyaya or Vaisheshika.» — parte tres: explica que el Sankhya es *nirishvara*, no introduce la concepción de Ishvara, y dice que no la tiene porque no le corresponde a ese punto de vista, como tampoco al Nyaya ni al Vaisheshika.

«The non-inclusion of something in a more or less specialized point of view only becomes denial when that point of view is declared to be exclusive, that is to say when it turns into a system, which is not the case here;» — parte tres: fija la regla, que no incluir algo en un punto de vista especializado solo es negación cuando ese punto de vista se declara exclusivo y se vuelve sistema.

«Moreover, side by side with Sankhya as we have just described it, there exists another darshana that is sometimes looked upon as a second branch of Sankhya, complementary to the first, and that is then qualified, in order to distinguish it, as Seshvara, because on the contrary it does introduce the conception of Ishvara; this darshana, which must now be examined, is the one usually called Yoga, thus identifying the doctrine with the goal that it expressly sets before itself.» — parte tres: nombra el *darshana* llamado *Seshvara*, que sí introduce la concepción de Ishvara, tenido a veces por segunda rama del Sankhya, y que es el Yoga.

«THE worD Yoga properly means ‘union’;! it should be mentioned in passing, though it is really a matter of small importance, that we do not know why numerous European authors make this a feminine word, whereas in Sanskrit it is masculine.» — parte tres, capítulo Yoga: traduce *Yoga* por unión, y consigna de paso que no sabe por qué numerosos autores europeos lo hacen femenino siendo masculino en sánscrito.

«The principal meaning of the term is the effective union of the human being with the Universal; applied to a darshana, of which the formulation in satras is attributed to Patanjali, it signifies that the darshana in question has as its goal the realization of this union and provides the means of attaining it.» — parte tres: define el sentido principal del término como unión efectiva del ser humano con lo Universal, y adscribe la formulación del *darshana* en *sutras* a Patanjali.

«While the Sankhya viewpoint remains a theoretical one, we are here essentially concerned with realization in the metaphysical sense that we have already explained, notwithstanding the opinions of the professional orientalists, who imagine that they are concerned with a ‘philosophy’, or of the would-be ‘esoterists’ who, attempting to make up for their own lack of doctrine by fanciful inventions, look upon Yoga as a ‘method for developing the latent powers of the human organism.» — parte tres: sitúa el Yoga en la realización metafísica y no en la teoría, y objeta a la vez a los orientalistas que lo toman por filosofía y a los que se dicen esoteristas y lo toman por método para desarrollar poderes latentes.

«The point of view in question refers to a totally different order of things, incomparably superior to anything that is implied in such interpretations, and it escapes the comprehension of both orientalists and occultists alike; this is natural enough, however, since nothing of the kind is to be met with in the West.» — parte tres: declara ese punto de vista de otro orden, superior a esas interpretaciones, y fuera de la comprensión de orientalistas y ocultistas por no haber nada semejante en Occidente.

«At the next stage, on the contrary, we find ahankara, or ‘individual consciousness, which proceeds from the intellectual» — parte tres, capítulo Sankhya: nombra *ahankara* o consciencia individual al estadio siguiente, que procede del principio intelectual. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«principle by a ‘particularizing’ determination, if one may so express it, and which produces in its turn the elements that follow.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: esa consciencia individual procede por determinación particularizante y produce a su vez los elementos siguientes.

«To connect this statement with our previous remarks on» — parte tres: enlaza la cuestión con lo dicho sobre el dualismo. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«the subject of dualism, it must be added that the Western conception of spirit and matter only corresponds to the distinction of essence and substance under very special conditions and as a simple and particular application of that distinction, one among an indefinite number of other analogous distinctions all equally possible.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: reduce la distinción occidental de espíritu y materia a una aplicación particular de la de esencia y sustancia, entre un número indefinido de distinciones análogas.

«the orientalists might well be asked whether European» — parte tres: devuelve la pregunta a los orientalistas sobre la ciencia europea. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«science, in its present form, should be labelled as essentially atheistic because it does not introduce the idea of God into its particular province (which indeed it is no more qualified to do than Sankhya), since that is something which lies outside its purview.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: pregunta si la ciencia europea habría de llamarse atea por no introducir la idea de Dios en su terreno, cosa para la que dice que no está más calificada que el Sankhya.

«Yoga again admits the development of nature or manifestation as described in Sankhya, but since it is here taken as the basis of a realization that is destined to lead beyond its own contingent sphere, it is considered, so to speak, in an order inverse to that of its development, namely, from the standpoint of return to its final end, which is identical with its initial principle.» — parte tres: consigna que el Yoga admite el desarrollo de la naturaleza descrito por el Sankhya y lo considera en orden inverso, desde el retorno a su fin último, idéntico a su principio inicial.

«In relation to manifestation, the first principle is Ishvara or Universal Being; that is not to say that this principle is absolutely first in the universal order, since we have explained the fundamental distinction to be made between Ishvara, who is Being, and Brahma, which is beyond Being;» — parte tres: sitúa a Ishvara como primer principio respecto de la manifestación y no en absoluto, por la distinción entre Ishvara, que es el Ser, y Brahma, que está más allá del Ser.

«but for the manifested being, union with Universal Being may be looked upon as constituting a necessary stage on the way toward ultimate union with the supreme Brahma.» — parte tres: hace de la unión con el Ser Universal una etapa necesaria del ser manifestado hacia la unión última con el Brahma supremo.

«Besides, the possibility of going beyond Being, either theoretically or from the point of view of realization, implies a complete metaphysical doctrine, which the Yoga-Shastra of Pataii» — parte tres: acota que ir más allá del Ser exige una doctrina metafísica completa, que el *Yoga-Shastra* de Patanjali no pretende representar por sí solo. El nombre queda partido por el corte de renglón.

«Since metaphysical realization essentially consists in identification through knowledge, whatever is not itself knowledge has value only as an accessory means; accordingly, Yoga takes as its starting-point and fundamental means what is called ekagrya, that is to say ‘concentration.» — parte tres: hace consistir la realización metafísica en la identificación por el conocimiento, con lo demás por medio accesorio, y toma por punto de partida el *ekagrya* o concentración.

«This concentration, as Max Miller admitted,” is something quite foreign to the Western mind, accustomed as it is to direct all its attention upon externals and to disperse itself amid their indefinitely changing multiplicity; it has indeed become almost an impossibility for this type of mind, and yet it is the first and most important of all the conditions of effective realization.» — parte tres: recoge la admisión de Max Müller de que la concentración es ajena a la mente occidental, vuelta a lo externo, y la declara la primera y más importante condición de la realización efectiva. La grafía del apellido sale así del troceo.

«Concentration, especially at the outset, can take for its support either a thought or else a symbol such as a word or an image; subsequently, however, these auxiliary means become needless, along with the rites and other ‘aids’ that may be employed concurrently in» — parte tres: admite como soporte de la concentración un pensamiento o un símbolo, palabra o imagen, y declara esos medios prescindibles después. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana.

«On the theoretical side, Yoga completes Sankhya by introducing the conception of Ishvara or Universal Being; and this conception» — parte tres, capítulo Yoga: hace que el Yoga complete al Sankhya introduciendo la concepción de Ishvara o Ser Universal. El tramo se corta en el cambio de plana, con la nota del editor de por medio.

«permits of the unification, first of Purusha, a multiple principle only so long as it is considered in relation to separate existences, and next of Purusha and Prakriti, since Universal Being, as their common principle, is beyond the distinction between them.» — parte tres: la continuación, ya en la plana siguiente: esa concepción unifica a *Purusha*, múltiple solo respecto de las existencias separadas, y después a *Purusha* y *Prakriti*, porque el Ser Universal está más allá de su distinción.

«It is evident, moreover, that this end could not be attained solely by use of the accessory means we have just mentioned, which are extraneous to knowledge; but it is nonetheless true that these means, though in no wise essential, are not to be despised, for they can possess a large measure of efficacy in assisting realization, and in leading, if not to its final goal, at least to its earlier stages.» — parte tres: niega que el fin se alcance solo por esos medios ajenos al conocimiento, y a la vez no los desdeña por su eficacia para asistir a la realización.

«Such is the real utility of everything that is covered by the term hatha-yoga, which is designed, on the one hand, to destroy or, rather, to ‘transform those elements in the human being which pose an obstacle to union with the Universal, and, on the other hand, to prepare for that union by the assimilation of certain rhythms, connected chiefly with the control of the breath;» — parte tres: fija la utilidad del *hatha-yoga* en transformar lo que estorba a la unión con lo Universal y preparar esa unión por la asimilación de ciertos ritmos, ligados sobre todo al control del aliento.

«In any case, it must always be borne in mind that, of all preliminary means, theoretical knowledge alone is really indispensable, and that later, when one passes to actual realization, it is concentration that matters most and that leads to it in the most immediate way, for it is directly bound up with knowledge.» — parte tres: declara indispensable entre los medios preliminares solo el conocimiento teórico, y en la realización la concentración por ser la que va ligada directamente al conocimiento.

«moreover, action cannot bring about deliverance from the realm of action, a result that is implicit in the final aim of metaphysical realization.» — parte tres: niega que la acción pueda librar del reino de la acción, resultado que da por implícito en el fin de la realización metafísica.

«However, this realization may not always be complete, and it is possible for it to stop short at the attainment of states that are of a higher order but not final; it is to these lesser degrees of realization that the special observances prescribed by the Yoga-Shastra refer;» — parte tres: admite que la realización pueda no ser completa y detenerse en estados superiores pero no finales, a los que refiere las observancias del *Yoga-Shastra*.

«but instead of traversing them in succession, it is also possible, though doubtless more difficult, to pass them over in one leap in order to arrive directly at the final goal, and it is this last way which is often referred to by the term raja-yoga.» — parte tres: admite recorrer esos grados en sucesión o pasarlos de un salto para llegar directo al fin, vía que dice referida a menudo con el término *raja-yoga*.

«Actually, this last expression should be taken to refer also, in a stricter sense, to the goal of realization itself, whatever may be the means or particular modes employed, which should naturally be those best adapted to the mental and even to the physiological conditions of each person;» — parte tres: en sentido más estricto refiere *raja-yoga* al fin mismo de la realización, con los medios adaptados a las condiciones mentales y aun fisiológicas de cada quien.

«in this case the chief purpose of hatha-yoga, at all its stages, will be to lead up to raja-yoga.» — parte tres: en ese caso pone al *hatha-yoga*, en todas sus etapas, por camino hacia el *raja-yoga*.

«An action is always separated from its results, but meditation or intel» — parte tres: opone la acción, siempre separada de sus resultados, a la meditación o contemplación intelectual. El tramo se corta en el límite de chunk, con la palabra partida.

«The yogi, in the strict sense of the word, is he who has realized perfect and final union. The name cannot therefore be applied without abuse to the man who simply gives himself up to the study of Yoga as a darshana, nor even to one who in fact follows the path of realization indicated in it but without having yet reached the supreme goal toward which it leads.» — parte tres: reserva el nombre de *yogi* a quien realizó la unión perfecta y final, y lo niega a quien solo estudia el Yoga como *darshana* o aún no llegó a esa meta.

«The state of a true yogi is that of a being who has attained and possesses the highest possibilities in their fullest development; all the secondary states we have mentioned belong to him as well, automatically so, but as it were by superaddition, and without being given greater importance than is their due, each according to its rank, in the complete hierarchy of existence of which they form so many constituent elements.» — parte tres: describe el estado del *yogi* verdadero como posesión de las posibilidades más altas en su desarrollo pleno, con los estados secundarios por añadidura y en su rango.

«The same can be said of the possession of certain special and more or less extraordinary powers, such as those called siddhis or vibhiitis: far from being worth pursuing for their own sake, these powers amount to no more than simple accidents, derived from the realm of the ‘great illusion’, as does all that belongs to the phenomenal order, and the yogi only exercises them in quite exceptional circumstances; regarded otherwise, they can only form obstacles to complete realization.» — parte tres: declara los poderes llamados *siddhis* o *vibhutis* simples accidentes del reino de la gran ilusión, que el *yogi* ejerce en circunstancias excepcionales y que de otro modo estorban la realización completa.