The Enneads

«Plotinus, the philosopher active during our 1 own lifetime, gave the impression of being embarrassed about having a body; this disposition meant that he could not stand talking about his race, his parents, or his» — Porfirio abre la Vida, §1, con el rasgo que lo explica todo en su retrato: Plotino parecía avergonzado de tener cuerpo, y por eso no soportaba que se hablara de su raza, de sus padres ni de su tierra. El tramo corta donde el troceo mete la columna de números de línea del margen; sigue *original homeland*, y la cifra 1 después de *our* es una llamada de nota.

«He so disliked the idea of being painted or sculpted that when Amelius asked him to allow an image to be made, he even said: ‘Isn’t it enough to carry around the image that nature has clothed me with?’» — la negativa de Plotino a dejarse retratar, en boca suya según Porfirio: la imagen con que la naturaleza lo vistió ya le basta.

«Did he have to consent to leave behind a longer-lasting image of this image as if it were something worth looking at?» — Porfirio remata el argumento de Plotino: el cuerpo ya es imagen, y un retrato sería imagen de esa imagen.

«Since he forbade it for this reason and refused to sit for a portrait, Amelius got Carterius – the best painter of his generation and a friend of his – to come to Plotinus’ seminar and meet him. (Anyone who wanted was allowed to attend these seminars.) Amelius had him concentrate on looking at Plotinus so that, over time, he acquired a vivid mental impression of him; he then drew a picture from the image thus laid down in his memory. Amelius corrected the sketch to make it as true to life as possible; and in this way, the skill of Carterius furnished us with a very close likeness of Plotinus and Plotinus knew nothing about it.» — y cómo Amelio burló la negativa, según Porfirio: llevó al pintor Carterio al seminario a mirar a Plotino hasta retenerlo de memoria, retocó el boceto y sacó un parecido muy fiel sin que Plotino lo supiera.

«He often suffered from bowel trouble but would not tolerate having an enema; he said it was not appropriate for an old man to undergo that sort of therapy.» — §2 de la Vida: Porfirio consigna la negativa de Plotino a los lavativas, dicha por él como impropia de un viejo.

«He would not agree to take medicines derived from wild animals either; he did not, he said, want to derive nourishment from the bodies even of domesticated animals.» — y la segunda negativa: ni remedios de animales salvajes, por no alimentarse del cuerpo ni siquiera de los domésticos.

«He stayed away from the baths but used to be rubbed down daily at home until, during a severe outbreak of plague, the people who rubbed him down were among those who died. He gave up such treatment then, but soon afterwards became afflicted with terrible throat infections.» — el régimen de Plotino según Porfirio: sin baños públicos y con fricciones diarias en casa, hasta que la peste se llevó a quienes lo frotaban.

«This meant that his friends, of whom he always wanted to ask questions,3 had to be turned away, so he left the city for Zethus’ estate in Campania.» — la consecuencia de la enfermedad: Plotino deja Roma por la finca de Zeto en Campania.

«When he was on the verge of death, Eustochius was slow in getting to him (as he told us) because he was staying in Puteoli: ‘I have been hanging on for you,’ said Plotinus.» — la escena de la muerte, con la frase que Porfirio pone en boca de Plotino al ver llegar tarde a Eustoquio.

«He breathed his last with the words ‘Try to elevate the god within you to the divine in the universe’; and a snake slid under the bed in which he lay and disappeared into a hole that happened to be there in the wall.» — las últimas palabras que Porfirio le adjudica a Plotino —elevar el dios de uno mismo a lo divino del universo— y el prodigio de la serpiente que se desliza bajo el lecho y desaparece en un agujero del muro.

«It was towards the end of the second year of Claudius’ reign, and he was sixty-six, so Eustochius said.» — la fecha y la edad de la muerte, y Porfirio nombra a quien se las dio.

«When he died, I, Porphyry, happened to be staying in Lilybaeus; Amelius was in Apamea, in Syria, and Castricius was in Rome. Only Eustochius was with him.» — Porfirio consigna dónde estaba cada uno del círculo cuando Plotino murió, y que solo Eustoquio estuvo presente.

«Counting backwards sixty-six years from the second year of Claudius’ reign [ce 270], Plotinus’ birth falls in the thirteenth year of the reign of Severus [ce 204]; but he never revealed to anyone the month of his birth, or when his birthday was, since he did not think that anyone should sacrifice or hold a feast for his birthday – although he would himself sacrifice and hold feasts for his companions on the traditional birthdays of Plato and Socrates, when he would require those who could to read out a discourse in front of everyone present.» — de la edad Porfirio deduce el año del nacimiento, y a la vez consigna que Plotino nunca dijo el mes ni el día: no quería sacrificios ni fiesta por su cumpleaños, aunque él sacrificaba y daba banquete en los de Platón y Sócrates, con lectura de un discurso.

«He, however, often quite spontaneously offered information about himself when he was in our company, such as the fact that he used to go to his nurse, bare her breasts, and ask to suckle even when he was seven years old and going to school. He was, however, shamed into stopping when he once heard himself called an obnoxious brat.» — §3: el dato que Plotino contaba de sí mismo, que a los siete años seguía pidiéndole el pecho a su nodriza hasta que lo avergonzó oírse llamar así.

«He was attracted to philosophy at the age of twenty-seven, and went to the best regarded philosophers in Alexandria, but he came away from their lectures depressed and miserable.» — la edad en que Plotino se volvió a la filosofía y el resultado de oír a los filósofos mejor reputados de Alejandría.

«He told one of his friends what was wrong, and the friend, who understood what his soul was yearning for, took him off to hear Ammonius, whom he had not yet tried. When Plotinus went and heard him, he said to his friend: ‘This is the man I was looking for!’» — el encuentro con Amonio, que Porfirio cuenta como reconocimiento: el amigo entendió lo que el alma de Plotino buscaba, y al oírlo Plotino lo dijo con esa frase.

«When the emperor Gordian was about to lead a campaign against the Persians, he signed up for it and went with him. He was thirty-eight then, having been studying with Ammonius for eleven years. Gordian was wiped out in Mesopotamia, and Plotinus only just escaped to safety in Antioch. Philip took power, and Plotinus, then aged forty, went up to Rome.» — el episodio militar: Plotino se enrola en la campaña de Gordiano contra los persas a los treinta y ocho años, escapa a duras penas a Antioquía tras el desastre de Mesopotamia y a los cuarenta sube a Roma.

«Erennius, Origen, and Plotinus had made pacts not to reveal the doctrines that Ammonius expounded in his lectures, and Plotinus, although he took pupils of his own, took care to keep the doctrines of Ammonius to himself. Erennius was the first to violate the pact, and once he had done so Origen followed suit – though Origen wrote nothing except the treatise On Daemons, and a treatise dedicated to Gallienus called That the King Is the Only Creator.» — el pacto de silencio sobre las doctrinas de Amonio y su ruptura: Erennio primero, Orígenes después. Porfirio le adjudica a ese Orígenes solo dos escritos, uno sobre los daimones y otro dedicado a Galieno.

«Plotinus wrote nothing for a long time, though he gave talks based on his seminars with Ammonius. And so, he spent ten whole years running seminars of his own, but writing nothing.» — los diez años de seminario sin escribir nada, apoyado en lo oído a Amonio.

«Since he encouraged those who attended to ask questions, his talks were, as Amelius told us, very disorderly and unstructured.» — cómo eran esos seminarios según Amelio, citado por Porfirio: desordenados y sin estructura, porque Plotino animaba a preguntar.

«Amelius went to Plotinus during his third year in Rome, in the third year of Philip’s reign [ce 245/6] and stayed until the first year of Claudius’ [ce 268/9] so that he was with him for twenty-four whole years.» — el censo cronológico de la estancia de Amelio con Plotino, con los años de reinado como referencia.

«When he arrived, he had a disposition shaped by the seminars he had taken with Lysimachus; but he was more hard-working than any of his contemporaries, shown by the fact that he had written out and assembled pretty well the whole of Numenius – and learnt most of it by heart.» — de dónde venía Amelio y qué medida da Porfirio de su aplicación: había copiado casi todo Numenio y se lo sabía de memoria.

«He wrote commentaries based on Plotinus’ seminars, and composed a hundred or so books of notes, which he bestowed upon Hostilianus Hesychius of Apamea, his adopted son.» — la obra de Amelio según Porfirio: comentarios sobre los seminarios y unos cien libros de notas, legados a su hijo adoptivo.

«In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus [ce 262/3], I, Porphyry, came from Greece with Antony of Rhodes, and got to know Amelius, who was by then in his eighteenth year with Plotinus. (He had not yet found the ambition to write anything except the notes, and they did not yet extend to 100 books.» — §4: Porfirio fecha su propia llegada y dice con quién vino, y de paso rebaja las notas de Amelio en ese momento.

«In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, Plotinus was around fifty-nine. When I, Porphyry, first met him, I was thirty. Plotinus had turned to writing on topics that occurred to him in the first year of Gallienus’ reign; by the tenth year of Gallienus’ reign, when I, Porphyry, first got to know him, he had written twenty-one books. I found out that even they had not been circulated widely.» — las tres edades que Porfirio pone una junto a otra: Plotino cerca de los cincuenta y nueve, él mismo de treinta, y veintiún libros ya escritos que casi no circulaban.

«While I was with him, he never showed symptoms of anything of the sort, but after I went away he got the illness so badly that, when I got back, Eustochius – a friend who was with him until he died – told me that he lost the clarity and depth of his voice, his sight» — Porfirio declara el límite de su propio testimonio: la enfermedad grave le llegó a Plotino cuando él ya no estaba, y lo que cuenta se lo dijo Eustoquio. El tramo termina donde la plana cambia; sigue *was blurred, and his feet and hands ulcerated*.

«a philosophical disposition that he became keen to try and learn the philosophy practised among the Persians, too, and the system perfected by the Indians.» — de la permanencia con Amonio Porfirio deriva el impulso siguiente: querer conocer también la filosofía de los persas y el sistema de los indios. El tramo arranca después de la columna de números de línea que el troceo mete a media frase; lo que precede es *He acquired such*.

«time, he did not find it an easy matter to give out copies. He felt a sense of responsibility, and would not do it just like that, without a second thought, but only after a careful assessment of the recipients.» — Porfirio consigna la reserva de Plotino al repartir copias de sus escritos: solo tras valorar a quién iban. El tramo arranca donde la frase viene cortada de la plana anterior: *At this*.

«He did not give these works titles, and they were known by various titles given by different people. The following are the generally accepted titles (I shall also give the opening words of the books, so that each of the books listed here will be easily recognized from its opening):» — el dato de atribución mayor de la Vida: Plotino no puso título a sus obras, y los títulos corrientes se los pusieron otros. Por eso Porfirio añade el íncipit de cada libro, para que se reconozca.

«1. On Beauty (1.6): Beauty is found for the most part in what is seen . . . 2. On the Immortality of the Soul (4.7)» — arranca el catálogo cronológico de Porfirio: el primero que Plotino escribió es el que la ordenación porfiriana coloca como 1.6, On Beauty, con su íncipit.

«3. On Fate (3.1): All things that come into being . . . 4. On the Substantiality of the Soul (4.2)» — el tercero del orden de composición es el que la ordenación coloca como 3.1, On Fate.

«9. On the Good or the One (6.9): All beings are beings due to unity . . . 10. On the Three Primary Hypostases (5.1)» — el noveno tratado en orden de composición es el que cierra la colección entera en el orden de Porfirio, 6.9, y su íncipit enuncia la tesis de que todo ser lo es por unidad.

«12. On the Two Kinds of Matter (2.4):6 All who have arrived at a conception of so-called matter . . . 13. Various Considerations (3.9)» — una de las entradas donde el título del catálogo de Porfirio no coincide con el del cuerpo del volumen: aquí On the Two Kinds of Matter, con llamada de nota; el cuerpo imprime On Matter.

«6 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On Matter’. 7 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On the Motion of Heaven’.» — dos de las notas con que el traductor de la Vida, George Boys-Stones, avisa de esas discrepancias de título entre el catálogo de Porfirio y el cuerpo del volumen.

«These are the twenty-one works that he was found to have written when Porphyry first came to him. Plotinus was then fifty-nine.» — Porfirio cierra el primer bloque del catálogo con la cuenta de lo escrito antes de su llegada.

«I, Porphyry, was with him for this year and the following five years without a break – for I came to Rome a little before the end of Gallienus’ first ten years in power. (It was summer, and Plotinus was not working; but he still held gatherings.) In these six years, we explored many topics in our seminars. Amelius and I asked him to write, and he wrote:» — §5: Porfirio fecha sus seis años continuos con Plotino y declara que lo que sigue se escribió a petición de Amelio y suya.

«These works, twenty-four of them, he wrote in the six-year period when I, Porphyry, was with him, taking his topics from questions he was engaged with at the time, something I made clear in my key-point summaries for each work. Added to the twenty-one works he wrote before we arrived, that makes forty-five in all.» — la cuenta del segundo bloque y su suma con el primero; Porfirio adjudica los temas a las cuestiones que Plotino traía entre manos y remite a sus propios sumarios.

«While I spent time in Sicily (I went there around the fifteenth year of Gallienus’ reign [ce 267/8]), Plotinus wrote these five works [1.4; 3.2; 3.3; 3.5; 5.3], and sent them to me:» — §6: Porfirio fecha su estancia en Sicilia y dice que Plotino le mandó allí cinco obras.

«So he sent me these in the first year of the reign of Claudius. At the beginning of the second, shortly before he was to die, he sent these» — la última remesa, poco antes de la muerte de Plotino.

«The first two blocks make up forty-five works, bringing the number to fifty-four. Some of them, then, were written when he was young, others when he was at the height of his powers, and others when he was physically unwell.» — la cuenta total de la obra de Plotino según Porfirio, cincuenta y cuatro tratados, repartidos en tres momentos de su vida.

«The power of the books reflects this. The first twenty-one show a weaker power that has not yet grown to its full strength. But the middle period of published works clearly reveals the height of his power. These twenty-four works could not (apart from the short ones) be better.» — Porfirio adjudica un valor distinto a cada bloque: los primeros veintiuno muestran una potencia todavía no crecida, y los veinticuatro del medio no podrían ser mejores.

«The last nine were written when his power was already on the wane – and more so the final four than the five before them.» — y el juicio sobre el último bloque, con su gradación interna.

«He had a large following, and people with a thirst for philosophy gathered around him. They included Amelius of Tuscany, whose family name was Gentilianus. Plotinus preferred to call him Amerius, with an ‘r’: he said that it was more appropriate for him to be called partless [amerios] than careless [amelios].» — §7 abre el censo del círculo con Amelio de Toscana, y con el juego de palabras por el que Plotino prefería llamarlo Amerio, de *ameros*, sin partes.

«There was a doctor from Scythopolis called Paulinus, whom Amelius nicknamed Mikkalos, because he always struck the wrong 17 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On What Evils Are and Where They Come From’. 18 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On What is the Living Being and What is the Human Being’. 19 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On the Primary Good and the Other Goods’. 24» — el segundo del círculo, el médico Paulino, con el apodo que le puso Amelio. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«There was also with him Zoticus, the critic and poet, who edited the text of Antimachus, and rendered the story of Atlantis into verse, very poetically.» — Zótico, crítico y poeta, que editó a Antímaco y puso la historia de la Atlántida en verso.

«One of his companions was Zethus, an Arab by extraction. He had married the daughter of Theodosius, who was friends with Ammonius. He, too, was a doctor, and devoted to Plotinus. He was interested in politics, and had political inclinations, which Plotinus tried to check.» — Zeto, de estirpe árabe, médico y con inclinaciones políticas que Plotino procuraba frenar.

«Quite a few Senators attended his lectures: Marcellus Orrontius and Sabinillus in particular worked at philosophy.» — el dato social: varios senadores oían a Plotino.

«Another Senator was Rogantianus who came to reject this life to such an extent that he gave up his possessions, dismissed his slaves, and resigned his position. He was due to be inducted into the office of Praetor – the Lictors were even there. But he not only refused to go on, he resigned all public office.» — el caso de Rogantiano, que renuncia a bienes, esclavos y cargo cuando ya estaban ahí los lictores para investirlo pretor.

«After he relinquished the management of his own household as well, he would dine and sleep at the houses of various friends and acquaintances, only eating every other day. As a result of his renunciation and abstinence he recovered from his gout, which had been so severe that he used to be carried about in a chair; and whereas before he could not stretch out his fingers, he became more agile than craftsmen used to working with their hands.» — y la consecuencia física que Porfirio le adjudica a esa renuncia y a la abstinencia: la gota curada y las manos recobradas.

«Plotinus welcomed him and heaped more praise on him than anyone else – eventually adducing him as a good example for philosophers.» — cómo respondió Plotino a esa renuncia según Porfirio: alabándolo más que a nadie y poniéndolo de ejemplo.

«Serapion of Alexander was with him, too – originally an orator, but afterwards also interested in philosophical argument. But he did not stay 20 The name seems to be chosen partly for a pun between the Latin paulus and Greek μικ ός (both meaning ‘small’). The name might suggest his hitting the ‘wrong note’ either through a further pun on the Greek μὴ καλῶς (‘not well [said]’), or perhaps in oblique reference to the musical Mikkalos who appears in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (47b30ff.). 21 It may be relevant to note that in recounting the story of Atlantis, Plato tells us that Solon had intended to write such a poem, but never found the time. See Pl., Tim. 21C. 25» — el contraejemplo, Serapión, que no pudo renunciar a sus bienes ni a la usura. La capa de texto imprime *Alexander* donde se esperaría Alejandría.

«I, Porphyry of Tyre, was also a friend of Plotinus, admitted to his inner circle. He asked me to edit his writings,» — Porfirio declara su propio lugar y el encargo del que sale este volumen: Plotino le pidió editar sus escritos.

«for he himself, once he had written something, could not bear to revisit it a second time. Indeed, he could not even read it through once, since his eyesight made reading difficult. He wrote without aiming for beauty in the individual letters, without keeping syllables distinct, and without any concern for spelling. All he minded about was the meaning.» — §8: la razón del encargo y el retrato del modo de escribir de Plotino, que no cuidaba letra, sílabas ni ortografía, solo el sentido.

«And he kept writing until his death, which amazed us all. He would go through the whole issue by himself, from beginning to end, then he would commit his argument to writing, getting down what he had worked out in his soul without hesitation, as if he were copying the writing out of a book.» — cómo componía Plotino según Porfirio: resolvía el asunto entero en su interior y luego lo escribía de corrido, como copiando de un libro.

«He could conduct a conversation with someone about another issue and keep on top of the conversation without ever taking his mind from the matter he was thinking about. When the person he was talking to left, he would not read over what he had already written – as I said, his sight was» — y el rasgo que más asombraba al círculo: conversar de otra cosa sin soltar el asunto pensado, y retomar el escrito como si no hubiera habido interrupción.

«So, he kept his own company at the same time as being with others, and never relaxed his attention to himself, or his constant reversion to intellect. (If he did so it was only when he slept; and he did that very little thanks to his modest diet – often he would not eat any bread.» — Porfirio resume ese modo con dos términos que son doctrina: la atención a sí mismo nunca relajada y la reversión constante al intelecto.

«Plotinus also attracted women who were devoted to philosophy. There was Gemina, in whose house he lived, and her daughter, who like her mother was called Gemina, and there was Amphicleia, who was the wife of Ariston, son of Iamblichus, all devoted to philosophy.» — §9: las mujeres del círculo, entre ellas Anficlea, casada con Aristón hijo de Jámblico.

«Furthermore, a number of men and women of the highest social order brought their male and female offspring to him when they were about to die. They would entrust them to him along with what remained of their property, treating his protection as sacred and god-like. For this reason, Plotinus’ house was full of boys and girls» — la función tutelar de Plotino: familias de alto rango le encomendaban sus hijos y sus bienes al morir, tratando su amparo como sagrado y divino.

«He would minutely scrutinize the accounts submitted by their trustees and insisted that as long as they did not take up philosophy their possessions and revenues should remain untouched and secure.» — y cómo ejercía esa tutela: revisando cuentas y dejando intactos los bienes de los pupilos mientras no se dedicaran a la filosofía.

«Plotinus, then, although he never relaxed his mental concentration so long as he was awake, undertook his share of responsibility for the lives and concerns of other people – many of them. He was, to those who had any dealings with him, kind and accessible.» — Porfirio junta las dos cosas que en Plotino no se estorban: la concentración nunca relajada y el cuidado de las vidas ajenas.

«There was another doctor, Eustochius of Alexandria, who got to know him towards the end of his life and stayed in his service until» — Eustoquio de Alejandría, el médico que se acercó a Plotino al final de su vida y que es la fuente de Porfirio para la muerte. El tramo corta donde el troceo mete la columna de números de línea del margen; sigue *his death, studying only with Plotinus’ circle*.

«he lived for twenty-six whole years in Rome, and acted as arbiter in many cases of personal dispute, he never made a single enemy in his public life.» — el remate del §9 de la Vida: veintiséis años en Roma arbitrando pleitos ajenos y ni un solo enemigo en la vida pública. El tramo arranca al pasar la plana; lo precede *For this reason, although*.

«Among those with pretensions to philosophy it was different: Olympius of Alexandria, who had studied with Ammonius for a while, wanted to be pre-eminent as a philosopher and hated him. He used magic to attack him, trying to get him star-struck. When he realized that the attempt had only rebounded on himself, he said to his acquaintances that the power of Plotinus’ soul was so great that he could deflect attacks made against him on to those who were trying to do him harm. Plotinus for his part was aware of Olympius’ efforts and said that his body then felt like ‘a purse being drawn shut’ [Symp. 190D], his limbs being pressed together. Olympius saw that he would suffer much worse things himself than anything he could hope to do to Plotinus and gave up trying.» — §10 de la Vida: el episodio de Olimpio de Alejandría, que ataca a Plotino con magia para volverlo herido de estrella, y descubre que el golpe rebota. Porfirio consigna el síntoma que Plotino dijo sentir, el cuerpo como una bolsa que se cierra, con la referencia al Banquete de Platón. Tramo largo de relato, releído entero en el crudo.

«Plotinus did indeed have some natural endowment that set him apart. An Egyptian priest once came to Rome and met him through a mutual friend. Wanting to give a demonstration of his wisdom, he invited Plotinus to come and see him summon his guardian daemon. Plotinus readily agreed, and the invocation took place in the temple of Isis, since the Egyptian said that this was the only pure place he could find in Rome.» — el segundo episodio del §10: un sacerdote egipcio invita a Plotino a ver cómo convoca a su daimon guardián, y elige el templo de Isis por ser el único lugar puro que halla en Roma.

«When he called upon Plotinus’ daemon to appear, it was a god that came, rather than a member of the genus of daemons. As the Egyptian said: ‘You are blessed, since you have a god as your daemon, and are not accompanied by a member of the lower genus.’» — lo que Porfirio dice que apareció: no un daimon sino un dios, y la frase con que el egipcio lo declara.

«They were not able to ask or learn more while it was there, since one of their friends, who was watching with them, strangled the birds he was holding as protection – whether deliberately, through envy, or in a moment of panic.» — por qué se cortó la operación: un amigo que miraba estranguló las aves que sostenía como protección, y Porfirio deja sin arbitrar si fue a propósito, por envidia o por pánico.

«In any case, the fact that Plotinus was accompanied by a daemon of superior divinity led him to raise his god-like vision towards it. This is why he wrote the book On Our Allotted Daemon [3.4], in which he tries to explain why different people have different guardians.» — y qué deriva Porfirio del episodio: de ahí sale el tratado sobre el daimon que a cada quien le toca, el que la ordenación coloca como 3.4.

«Amelius was fond of sacrifices and used to busy himself with rites of the new moon, and to go around to festivals. He once tried to get Plotinus to participate with him, but Plotinus said: ‘They must come to me, not I to them.’» — el tercer episodio del §10, con la frase de Plotino ante la invitación de Amelio a los ritos de luna nueva.

«We did not know what consideration led him to make such a grand pronouncement, and did not have the nerve to ask him.» — y lo que Porfirio consigna a continuación sin resolverlo: el círculo no supo qué quiso decir con eso y no se atrevió a preguntarlo.

«He was possessed of an extraordinary degree of insight. Once, when Chione had a very valuable necklace stolen (Chione was a pious widow who lived with him along with her children), the slaves were brought before his view. He looked at them all: ‘This is the thief!’ he said, pointing to one of them.» — §11: el episodio del collar robado a Quíone, donde Plotino señala al ladrón entre los esclavos con solo mirarlos.

«Plotinus would foretell how each of the children living with him would turn out. For example, he said what Polemo would be like: amorous and short-lived; and so he was.» — §11 de la Vida sigue con la previsión: Porfirio le adjudica a Plotino haber dicho de antemano cómo saldría cada uno de los niños de la casa, y pone el caso de Polemón.

«And once he saw me, Porphyry, when I was thinking about ending my life. He suddenly presented himself to me while I was spending time at home and said that this desire of mine was not the product of considered thought, but of pathological melancholy; and he told me to leave town.» — el episodio que Porfirio cuenta de sí: Plotino se le presentó de pronto, le dijo que su deseo de morir no venía de pensamiento sino de melancolía patológica, y lo mandó fuera de la ciudad.

«I obeyed him, and went to Sicily, since I had heard that a well-known man called Probus was staying near Lilybaeum. I was cured of my urge but was prevented from being with Plotinus for the rest of his life.» — y lo que le costó obedecer: curado del impulso, se perdió los últimos años con Plotino.

«Gallienus the emperor and his wife Salonina honoured and revered Plotinus greatly. On the strength of his friendship with them, Plotinus asked them to rebuild a certain city in Campania, once said to have been a city of philosophers, which had fallen into ruins. He asked them to bestow the surrounding countryside on the city once it had been repopulated. The idea was that the inhabitants would live according to Plato’s laws, and the city would be called Platonopolis.» — §12: el proyecto de Platonópolis, la ciudad de Campania que Plotino pidió al emperador Galieno reconstruir para vivir en ella según las leyes de Platón.

«Plotinus promised that he and his companions would move there. And the philosopher would very easily have had his wish, were it not that some of the emperor’s court stood in his way – whether through envy or resentment or some other unworthy cause.» — y en qué quedó: Porfirio adjudica el fracaso a gente de la corte y deja sin arbitrar el motivo, entre la envidia, el resentimiento u otra causa indigna.

«In our seminars, Plotinus was a fluent speaker, and very good at thinking through problems and finding ways through them, but sometimes he got words wrong. He would not say ‘remember’ but ‘merember’ – and there were other oddities of pronunciation which he replicated in his writing, too.» — §13: el retrato del Plotino que habla, con el defecto de pronunciación que Porfirio consigna y que pasaba también a lo escrito.

«When he spoke, his intellect was manifest even in the way it lit up his face. He was handsome to look at, but even more beautiful in those moments. He perspired a bit; he exuded kindliness; his face looked gentle but also intellectually rigorous when he was questioned.» — cómo se le veía el intelecto en la cara mientras hablaba, según Porfirio.

«For three days I, Porphyry, questioned his account of the sense in which the soul is present to the body, and he patiently went through the arguments.» — el episodio de los tres días de preguntas sobre en qué sentido el alma está presente al cuerpo.

«Someone called Thaumasius, who was studying universal propositions, joined the seminar and wanted to hear Plotinus speaking on texts: he could not stand Porphyry’s responding and questioning. However, Plotinus said: ‘But if we cannot solve Porphyry’s difficulties when he asks them, how will we be able to say anything at all when faced with a text?’» — y la respuesta de Plotino a quien prefería oírlo comentar textos antes que responder preguntas: si no se resuelve la dificultad de quien pregunta, nada podrá decirse ante un texto.

«Plotinus’ writing is concise but packed with meaning; brief and more abundant in ideas than in words, inspiring and passionate about almost everything; a combination of personal insight and respect for tradition.» — §14 abre con el juicio de Porfirio sobre la escritura de Plotino: concisa, más abundante en ideas que en palabras, y a la vez visión propia y respeto por la tradición.

«No so-called ‘geometrical’ or ‘arithmetical’ theorem evaded him, nor those of mechanics, optics, or music – though he himself was not specially trained to work in these areas.» — el alcance técnico que Porfirio le adjudica, con su límite dicho en la misma frase: ningún teorema se le escapaba, y no estaba entrenado en esas materias.

«In our seminars, he would have commentaries read out, those of Severus, Cronius, Numenius, Gaius or Atticus; or (from the Peripatetics) those of Aspasius, Alexander, and Adrastus – and whoever was to hand.» — qué se leía en el seminario de Plotino según Porfirio: comentarios de Severo, Cronio, Numenio, Gayo o Ático, y de los peripatéticos Aspasio, Alejandro y Adrasto.

«None of these was given the last word: he always had his own view. His way of thinking was distinctive, and he adopted Ammonius’ mind-set in his enquiries.» — y cómo los usaba: ninguno tenía la última palabra, y Porfirio le adjudica a Plotino el modo de investigar de Amonio.

«Once Longinus’ On First Principles was read for him, and his Antiquity Lover: ‘Longinus is a philologist,’ he said, ‘but not at all a philosopher.’» — la frase de Plotino sobre Longino, que Porfirio consigna sin suavizar: filólogo, no filósofo.

«On another occasion, Origen appeared at a seminar. Plotinus blushed deeply and wanted to leave. Origen asked him to keep speaking, but he said that all desire to do so is crushed when the speaker sees that he is speaking to those who know what he is going to say. And so, he said a little, and left.» — el episodio con Orígenes, el condiscípulo de Amonio: Plotino se ruboriza y dice que se aplasta todo deseo de hablar cuando se habla ante quien ya sabe lo que se va a decir.

«I read a poem called The Holy Marriage at the Feast for Plato, and because a lot of it was expressed obliquely, in the mystical language of inspiration, someone said ‘Porphyry is mad!’ In everyone’s hearing, he said to me: ‘You proved yourself to be at once poet, philosopher, and priest.’» — §15: Porfirio lee su poema en la fiesta de Platón, alguien lo llama loco, y Plotino lo declara a la vez poeta, filósofo y sacerdote.

«The rhetor Diophanes read out a piece justifying Alcibiades as he appears in Plato’s Symposium, arguing that as a price for an education in virtue, a pupil should make himself sexually available if his teacher wanted it.» — la tesis que el rétor Diófanes defendió en el seminario a partir del Banquete de Platón: que el discípulo se preste sexualmente como precio de la educación en la virtud.

«Plotinus kept starting up to leave the gathering but refrained from doing so. After the lecture broke up, he charged me, Porphyry, to write a counter-argument.» — cómo reaccionó Plotino y qué encargó: la respuesta se la encomendó a Porfirio.

«Diophanes did not want to give me his text, so I based my response on my memory of his lines of argument. When I read it to a gathering of the same audience, Plotinus was so happy with me that in our seminars he would constantly add: ‘Shoot like this, if you want to illuminate men.’» — y con qué verso de Homero celebró Plotino la respuesta, que luego repetía en los seminarios.

«Eubulus, Plato’s successor in Athens, sent Plotinus treatises concerning certain questions of Platonic interpretation. He caused them to be interlocutor (the point with which this passage concludes in the translation), see Pl., Phdr. 275D. 24 The danger of slipping from one into the other is already remarked by Seneca, Ep. 108.35. 25 See Homer, Il. 7.282. 29» — la correspondencia con Eubulo, sucesor de Platón en Atenas, y el encargo que Plotino le pasó otra vez a Porfirio.

«Plotinus dealt with astronomical tables, though not in great technical detail. He addressed the efficacy of horoscopes more closely, and in the many places where he saw something unwarranted in what the treatises claimed he did not hold back from refutation.» — el lugar que la Vida le da a la astrología en la obra de Plotino: trató las tablas sin gran detalle técnico y se ocupó de cerca de la eficacia de los horóscopos, objetando lo que hallaba sin garantía.

«During his lifetime, Christianity attracted a diverse popular following, as did movements which drew on ancient philosophy. Followers of Adelphius and Aquilinus got hold of most of the writings of Alexander of Libya, Philocomus, Demostratus, and Lydus, and published the revelations of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nicotheus, Allogenes, and Messus. There were others of the sort.» — §16 sitúa a los adversarios del tratado 2.9 en su medio: seguidores de Adelfio y Aquilino que publicaron revelaciones de Zoroastro, Zostriano, Nicoteo, Alógenes y Meso. Los nombres van tal cual los imprime el volumen.

«They deceived many people – indeed, they were themselves deluded. As if Plato had not come to grips with the profundity of intelligible substance! Plotinus himself refuted them on many points in the course of our seminars, and he wrote a book which we called Against the Gnostics [2.9]; but he left it to us to judge the rest.» — lo que Porfirio dice de ellos y de la respuesta de Plotino: de esas discusiones de seminario salió el libro que el círculo llamó Against the Gnostics, y el resto quedó a cargo de los discípulos.

«Amelius managed to write forty books against the Book of Zostrianus. I, Porphyry, composed a continuous series of arguments against the» — el reparto de esa tarea y la tesis de atribución que Porfirio sostiene sobre el Libro de Zoroastro: falsificación reciente hecha por la propia secta para dar por antiguas sus doctrinas.

«Some people from Greece said that Plotinus had been presenting as his own the doctrines of Numenius. Trypho, the Stoic and Platonist, told Amelius this and Amelius wrote a book which he called On Plotinus’ Doctrinal Distance from Numenius.» — §17: el cargo de plagio de Numenio que circuló en vida de Plotino y el libro con que Amelio respondió.

«‘Basileus’ is another way of referring to me, instead of ‘Porphyry’. In my native language I am called Malkus, which was also the name my father had; but malkus translated into Greek is basileus [‘king’]. This is why Longinus, when he dedicated his On Impulse to Cleodamus and me, Porphyry, wrote ‘To Cleodamus and Malkus’. So Amelius translated my name, and just as Numenius changed Maximus [‘Greatest’] to Megalos [‘Great’], so he changed Malkus to Basileus.» — el excurso onomástico de Porfirio sobre su propio nombre: Malco en su lengua, Basileo traducido al griego.

«Amelius to Basileus: greetings. You know very well that I would not have said a word just because certain fine gentlemen have been spreading the view that the doctrines of our friend derive from Numenius of Apamea – a view which you say has reached your own hearing. It is too obvious that it is an example of the sort of glib and specious position they revere so much. First of all, they say that he is a complete fool, then they say that he is a plagiarist, and finally they accuse him of dealing with trivialities. It is obvious that their attacks are just satire.» — arranque de la carta de Amelio que Porfirio copia entera: los que atribuyen a Numenio las doctrinas de Plotino lo llaman a la vez necio, plagiario y trivial, y Amelio lo llama sátira.

«You must forgive me for the fact that I have not been guided by his own writings in my composition or in the selection of topics, but went back to when we used to meet, and put things down in the order they happened to arise. The main reason I did this was that Plotinus has been brought to trial here by certain people for an outlook which he shares with us, an outlook which it is not easy to pick up from his published work because of his tendency to treat of the same topics in different ways in different places, as he sees fit.» — Amelio declara su método y su razón: no se guio por los escritos de Plotino sino por lo que recordaba de las reuniones, porque Plotino trata un mismo asunto de maneras distintas en lugares distintos.

«I decided to set out this letter to substantiate the claim that there were those who, during his lifetime, thought that Plotinus made his reputation by passing off Numenius’ doctrines as his own. I also did it to show that they thought him a ‘complete fool’, being contemptuous of him because they did not understand what he said, and because he avoided boastful rhetorical displays.» — §18: por qué Porfirio copia esa carta, y qué pensaban de Plotino quienes no lo entendían.

«I, Porphyry, got a similar impression when I first heard him – that is why I published a work against him in which I tried to show that the intelligible lies outside the intellect.» — Porfirio consigna su propio malentendido inicial y el escrito en que lo publicó, contra Plotino.

«Plotinus made Amelius read it out and, when he had done so, laughed and said: ‘Your job is to solve the problems into which he has fallen because he does not know what we think.’» — la respuesta de Plotino a ese escrito, dicha con risa y pasada como tarea a Amelio.

«Amelius wrote quite a large work Against the Difficulties Raised by Porphyry; I replied to this, and Amelius responded in his turn. At the third go, I, Porphyry, finally managed to understand what he was saying, and wrote a retraction, which I read out in a lecture.» — el ida y vuelta que siguió, hasta que Porfirio dice haber entendido al tercer intento y haber escrito una retractación.

«From then on, I put my faith in Plotinus’ books, and encouraged a desire in him, as my teacher, to set out his views in writing at greater length. I made Amelius keen to write as well.» — y la consecuencia de esa retractación: Porfirio se vuelve el que empuja a Plotino a escribir más.

«though they are not obvious; and it contains the concentrated essence of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.» — lo que Porfirio dice que hay dentro de esos escritos sin que se note: doctrina estoica y peripatética mezcladas, y la esencia concentrada de la Metafísica de Aristóteles. El tramo arranca después de la columna de números de línea del margen; lo precede *Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines are blended into his writings*.

«Longinus’ opinion of Plotinus, which was largely based on what I told him myself in my letters to him, can be seen from the following 26 The origin of this quotation is unknown. 31» — §19: Porfirio introduce la carta de Longino y declara de dónde venía la opinión que ahí se lee, de sus propias cartas.

«Send them, as soon as you think best; or, better still, bring them – for I am not going to stop asking you again and again to take the road that leads to me rather than the road that leads away.» — arranque de la carta de Longino a Porfirio, pidiéndole que le lleve él mismo los libros de Plotino.

«There is such a scarcity of writers here that I have, by the gods, only just managed to get hold of the remaining works of Plotinus by taking my copyist away from his usual work and setting him to work on this single task. And I have acquired what appears to be everything, including everything that you have been sending; but what I have is half-finished, for it has more than the usual number of errors.» — el estado en que Longino dice tener los textos de Plotino: conseguidos poniendo a su copista a esa sola tarea, y con más erratas de lo corriente.

«I thought our friend Amelius would remove the scribal errors, but he had other more urgent matters to attend to. So, I do not know how I can get to grips with them. I am very keen to examine On the Soul and On Being, 27 but these are more corrupt than any.» — y qué dos obras le urgían a Longino, las que el traductor identifica en nota con los tratados del alma y los del ser.

«I have been careful to acquire everything he brought: would I not want to keep his commentaries, worthy as they are of all reverence and honour? I told you, when you were here, and a long way away, and spending time around Tyre, that I have not been able to go along with many of his suggestions; but I am impressed by the character of the writing, by the density of the man’s thoughts, and by the extraordinarily philosophical disposition of the enquiries. I love them, and I would say that seekers ought to consider his books among the most outstanding.’» — el juicio con que Longino cierra la carta: no comparte muchas de las propuestas de Plotino, y a la vez alaba el carácter de la escritura, la densidad del pensamiento y la disposición filosófica de las indagaciones.

«These things I repeat at length from the greatest critic of our lifetime, a man who discussed almost everything written by all of his other contemporaries. It shows how he came to view Plotinus – although at first, influenced by the ignorance of others, he had been disdainful of him.» — §20: Porfirio dice por qué copia a Longino, a quien llama el mayor crítico de su tiempo, y consigna que antes lo había despreciado por oídas.

«He thought that the books he had got from Amelius were corrupt because he did not understand the man’s usual form of expression. (Amelius’ copies of Plotinus had certainly been corrected by comparison with the autographs.» — y la enmienda que Porfirio le hace: los ejemplares de Amelio estaban cotejados con los autógrafos, y lo que Longino no entendía era el modo de expresarse de Plotino.

«To give a full picture of Longinus’ assessment of Plotinus, Amelius, and his other contemporaries, so that one can see what one of the bestknown and leading critics thought of them, it is necessary to quote from his book. The book is called Longinus against Plotinus and Gentilianus Amelius: On the End, and this is the preface:» — Porfirio anuncia la segunda pieza de Longino que va a copiar y da su título completo. El impreso separa *best-known* por el corte de renglón y span() lo devuelve unido.

«There have, Marcellus, been many philosophers in my time, not least in the early days of my youth. It is impossible to describe their rarity in this field now, but when I was still a boy there were quite a few outstanding philosophers – all of whom, it so happens, I got to see because from a very young age I travelled widely with my parents; and I got to know those who lived long enough by having a lot to do with their tribes and cities. Some of them tried to treat of their views in books, leaving to their successors something from which they could derive their help; but others thought it enough to lead their pupils to grasp them for themselves.» — arranque del prefacio de Longino: el censo de filósofos de su juventud y el reparto entre los que escribieron y los que se conformaron con enseñar.

«The first group includes the Platonists Euclides, Democritus, the Proclinus who spent time in the Troad and, among those still living in Rome, Plotinus and Gentilianus Amelius his friend; the Stoics Themistocles and Phoebio, and Annius and Medius, who flourished until recently; and the Peripatetic Heliodorus of Alexandria. The second group includes the Platonists Ammonius and Origen, with whom we spent most of our time, men who were more than a little superior to their contemporaries in understanding, and the successors in Athens, Theodotus and Eubulus.» — el censo nominal de Longino por escuelas: platónicos, estoicos y peripatéticos, con Plotino y Amelio entre los vivos en Roma, y Amonio y Orígenes entre aquellos con quienes Longino más trató. Aquí la palabra que la obra usa para la escuela de Plotino es *Platonists*.

«There were things written by these men – Origen wrote On Daemons, and Eubulus On the Philebus and the Gorgias and Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato’s Republic – but not enough to make them count as writers: it was an occasional activity for them, and not their principal interest.» — lo que Longino adjudica al segundo grupo: escritos ocasionales, no bastantes para contarlos como escritores.

«Peripatetics include Ammonius and Ptolemy, outstanding in their day as philologists, especially Ammonius (no one as learned as him was ever born). They didn’t write any technical manuals, but poems and epideictic speeches – and I don’t think any of those would have survived if it had been a matter of their own wishes, for they would not have been able to bear the idea of finding fame later on for books like this, when they had not gone to the trouble of preserving their views in more serious writings.» — y el juicio de Longino sobre los peripatéticos de ese grupo, filólogos sobresalientes que no dejaron manuales sino poemas y discursos de aparato.

«Among this group of writers, some wrote little more than compilations and transcriptions from the writings of their predecessors – so Euclides, Democritus, and Proclinus. Others tried to write on the same topics as the ancients but focused on very minor aspects of their enquiries. They include Annius, Medius, and Phoebio – the latter preferring to be known for the words he used rather than the 33» — el reparto que Longino hace dentro de los que sí escribieron: compiladores por un lado, y por otro quienes trataron los temas antiguos ciñéndose a aspectos menores.

«But there were others who manifested their eagerness to write, both in the number of questions which they tackled and their individual manner of thinking about them. They include Plotinus and Gentilianus Amelius, whose account of what seemed to be Pythagorean and Platonic principles made for clearer exegesis than any of their predecessors.» — el lugar que Longino da a Plotino y a Amelio: exposición más clara de los principios pitagóricos y platónicos que la de cualquier predecesor.

«The writings of Numenius and Cronius and Moderatus and Thrasyllus could not touch those of Plotinus for clarity. Amelius chose to follow in his footsteps and held most of the same beliefs but was his antithesis in the expansive way in which he worked through them and in the roundabout style of his expression.» — la comparación de Longino, que es la respuesta al cargo de plagio: ni Numenio ni Cronio ni Moderato ni Trasilo alcanzan a Plotino en claridad.

«These are the only people whose writings I think are worth considering. As to the rest: why should one be bothered with them at the expense of those works on which they rely, and to which they add nothing – not a single line of argument, let alone any substantive point. They simply collect the opinions of the majority, or the judgements of the superior.» — la poda de Longino: los demás no añaden ni una línea de argumento y solo recogen opiniones ajenas.

«Our mutual Tyrian friend Basileus, who has himself written a few works in the manner of Plotinus, for whom he left our school, wrote a work in which he tried to show that Plotinus held a better view about the ideas than the one I hold. I think I wrote a suitable response, showing the flaws in his decision to leave my school, and at the same time dispatching many views held by these men.» — Longino habla del propio Porfirio en tercera persona, por el nombre traducido, y consigna que dejó su escuela por la de Plotino.

«So, when he wrote this, he agreed that of all those active during his lifetime, Plotinus and Amelius most ‘manifested their eagerness to write, both in the number of questions which they tackled, and their individual manner of thinking about them’; that Plotinus did not pass off Numenius’ doctrines as his own, and that rather than having most regard for the doctrines of Numenius he actually pursued and took up the doctrines of the Pythagoreans;» — §21: lo que Porfirio saca del prefacio de Longino como respuesta al cargo de plagio, y a qué linaje adjudica Longino la doctrina de Plotino, el de los pitagóricos.

«He wrote this correctly perceiving that I was careful to avoid the unphilosophical prolixity of Amelius’ writings and was keen to write in the style of Plotinus.» — Porfirio lee en su favor la frase de Longino sobre él: evitaba la prolijidad no filosófica de Amelio y buscaba escribir al modo de Plotino.

«What this great man, still unsurpassed for his work as a critic and commentator, wrote about Plotinus is impressive enough; and he would have had nothing at all to say against him if I, Porphyry, had been able to go and see him when he asked me to and put him right about the doctrine of Plotinus.» — y lo que Porfirio deja dicho como pendiente suyo: si hubiera ido a ver a Longino cuando este lo llamó, no habría quedado nada en contra de Plotino.

«But what is all this about oak and rock,’ as Hesiod says?29 If we are looking for witnesses from among the number of the wise, no one could be wiser than god, the god who said: ‘I know the number of the sand and the measure of the sea, and I understand the mute and hear the dumb.’» — §22 abre con Hesíodo y pasa el testimonio a la instancia más alta que Porfirio admite: el dios, con el verso de la respuesta de Delfos que Heródoto transmite.

«Amelius asked Apollo where the soul of Plotinus had gone – Apollo who simply said of Socrates: ‘Socrates is the wisest of all men.’31 Listen to what he said, and at what great length, about Plotinus:» — el marco del oráculo: Amelio pregunta a Apolo adónde fue el alma de Plotino, y Porfirio subraya que del mismo dios solo se conserva una línea sobre Sócrates.

«The hymn I shall play is fit for the gods: its subject is a kindly friend; its tune a tapestry of honey-hues; it is played on a lyre with a golden pick. And I summon the Muses to join my song, to cry Iachae! with all their might and overwhelm with their music – as they did when summoned to start up the dance for Aiacides, with the frenzy of the gods and the songs of Homer. Muses come to the sacred dance! Together we’ll sing to the limits of song: you, and I surrounded by you: I, with my hair flowing, Phoebus.» — arranque del oráculo en hexámetros que Porfirio copia entero, con Febo hablando en primera persona y convocando a las Musas.

«Daemon, that were a man before, entering now a diviner rank: you became a daemon, when you loosed the chain of necessity that is the human being’s lot; and from the tempestuous waves of embodiment had strength to swim, to reach the headland’s shores, far from the shoals of the sinful.» — el núcleo doctrinal del oráculo: Plotino, hombre antes, pasa a daimon al soltar la cadena de la necesidad que toca al ser humano, y nada desde el oleaje de la encarnación hasta la orilla.

«While twisting to flee the bitter waves, where blood sustains and whirlpools menace, mid-torrent, amid deafening confusion, the godsent goal would often be made to seem near. Often the darts which your intellect fired were borne by their very strength along deviant paths:» — el oráculo describe el esfuerzo en medio del torrente y dice que a menudo los dardos que disparaba el intelecto de Plotino se iban por caminos desviados. El impreso separa *god-sent* por el corte de renglón y span() lo devuelve unido.

«gods then, shone focused rays of light which helped you to see from the gloomy shade, and raised you straight to the circling, the deathless path.» — y lo que el oráculo adjudica a los dioses en ese punto: rayos de luz enfocados que lo enderezaron al camino inmortal. El tramo arranca al pasar la plana; lo precede *the*.

«The pleasure of sleep never wholly took hold of your eyes, the heavy bolt of its mist not allowed to seal your lids, so that, borne through the whirlpools, your eyes remained open to many and joyful things, things sought with difficulty by men who go after wisdom.» — el rasgo que el oráculo convierte en signo: los ojos que el sueño nunca sella del todo y por eso ven lo que a los buscadores de sabiduría les cuesta.

«But now that you have struck your tent, and left the grave of a daemon-soul, you come among the assembly of daemons refreshed by the lovely breezes: where love is, where beautiful yearning is, full of pure joy, always replenished by deathless streams from god.» — adónde dice el oráculo que fue Plotino al morir: a la asamblea de los daimones, donde está el amor y el anhelo hermoso.

«Here live the brothers of the golden generation of great Zeus: Minos and Rhadamanthus. Here lives the just Aeacus; here are Plato’s holy strength, and the beautiful Pythagoras, and those who started the dance of immortal love and won for themselves a common lineage with the most blessed daemons.» — el censo de quienes están allí según el oráculo: Minos, Radamanto, Éaco, y con ellos Platón y Pitágoras, que iniciaron la danza del amor inmortal. Es el linaje que el texto se adjudica.

«Let us start the song, and the wheeling dance, for Plotinus, O Muses, who pleases us: no less for the blessed from my golden lyre!’» — cierre del oráculo de Apolo.

«These verses say that he was ‘kindly’: gentle, very kind, and charming, which we knew him to be.» — §23: Porfirio empieza a glosar el oráculo verso por verso, y da fe del primer rasgo con su propio trato.

«And they say that he did not sleep, kept his soul pure, and was always striving for the divine which he loved with his whole soul, and that he did everything to transform himself, to ‘flee the bitter waves’ of life here ‘where blood sustains’.» — la glosa de Porfirio a los versos del insomnio y de la huida: Plotino hacía todo por transformarse a sí mismo.

«So it is that this divine ‘daemon’ of a man ascended in his thought to the first, transcendent god many times, travelling the roads described by Plato in the Symposium;32 and to him appeared that god who has neither shape nor form, who has his seat above Intellect and every intelligible thing.» — la tesis central que Porfirio saca del oráculo: Plotino ascendió muchas veces en su pensamiento al dios primero y trascendente, por los caminos del Banquete de Platón, y se le apareció el dios sin figura ni forma, asentado sobre el Intelecto y sobre todo inteligible.

«I, Porphyry, now sixty-seven years old, once drew near this god and was unified with him.» — y el testimonio que Porfirio da de sí mismo entre paréntesis, con su edad al escribir: una sola vez.

«his aim or goal was to be unified and to be present to the god that is set over all things. This goal, an indescribable state of perfection, he achieved some four times while I was with him.» — la cifra que Porfirio da del logro de Plotino: cuatro veces en los seis años que estuvo con él.

«Because he was borne along ‘deviant’ paths, the gods often put him straight by sending ‘focused rays of light’: so, one might consider what he wrote as written under their protection and supervision.» — y la consecuencia que Porfirio saca para los escritos mismos: pueden tenerse por escritos bajo protección y vigilancia de los dioses.

«As Plotinus watched the world sleeplessly, so his inner eye never slept, and this is why Apollo says ‘your eyes remained open to many and joyful things, things sought with difficulty’ by men who apply themselves to philosophy. Human contemplation can transcend the merely human, but when it is compared to the knowledge of the gods it is graceful, perhaps, but not able to plumb the depths as they do.» — el límite que Porfirio pone a la contemplación humana frente al conocimiento de los dioses: puede trascender lo humano y aun así no sondea el fondo como ellos.

«So much, then, for what the oracle shows about Plotinus’ actions and achievements while still in the body. After being freed from the body, it says that he came to the ‘assembly of daemons’, where ‘love’ and ‘yearning’ are citizens, and that love which is kindled by god; as well as the so-called ‘soul judges’, those children of god, Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus. He passes before them, not to have judgement passed on him, but in order to join them in the company of all the other great men.» — la lectura de Porfirio sobre el destino póstumo: Plotino pasa ante los jueces de las almas no para ser juzgado sino para juntarse con ellos.

«Plato and Pythagoras are among the sort of people there, and others who started the dance of immortal love: and there the ‘most blessed of the daemons’ have their birth, and enter a life characterized by fulfilment and joy. They live out this life being made happy by the gods.» — el remate de esa lectura, con Platón y Pitágoras nombrados como los de allí.

«Such is our account of the life of Plotinus. He turned over to us the task of arranging and correcting his books, and I promised him while he was alive that I would do this and gave undertakings to his other associates, too.» — §24 abre la segunda mitad de la pieza, la del orden de los libros: Plotino le encargó a Porfirio arreglarlos y corregirlos, y Porfirio se comprometió ante él y ante el círculo.

«So, I decided first of all not to leave his books as they were, in the chronological order of their publication. In this I followed the example of Apollodorus of Athens and Andronicus the Peripatetic: the former collected the works of Epicharmus the comic poet in ten volumes; the latter divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises, bringing related topics together.» — la primera decisión editorial de Porfirio, dicha con sus modelos: no dejar los libros en orden cronológico, como hicieron Apolodoro de Atenas con Epicarmo y Andrónico el peripatético con Aristóteles y Teofrasto.

«For my part, I hit on the pleasing idea of dividing the fifty-four books of Plotinus into six ‘enneads’ – groups of nine multiplied by the perfect number six. I collected related topics together in each ennead, putting the less weighty questions first in the final order.» — la decisión que da nombre a la obra entera: repartir los cincuenta y cuatro libros en seis enéadas, grupos de nueve por el número perfecto seis, juntando por materia y poniendo delante las cuestiones menos graves.

«The first ennead, then, contains the following treatises, dealing with more ethical matters.» — el criterio de la primera Enéada según Porfirio: lo más ético.

«The second is a collection of physics, embracing works concerned with the cosmos and things pertaining to the cosmos.» — el criterio de la segunda Enéada: física, lo que toca al cosmos.

«The third ennead, which also deals with works on the cosmos, encompasses the following works, dealing with enquiries about the cosmos» — el de la tercera, también sobre el cosmos.

«These three enneads were put together and organized in one volume. We included On Our Allotted Daemon in the third ennead because it deals with matters concerning daemon in general, and the question is related to those he addresses concerning the birth of human beings. Similarly, with On Love. On Eternity and Time we included here because time is a topic discussed here. On Nature, Contemplation, and the One is put here because of its treatment of ‘nature’, indicated by its title.» — §25: Porfirio justifica una por una las colocaciones discutibles de la tercera Enéada, el daimon, el amor, la eternidad y el tiempo, y la naturaleza.

«The fourth ennead follows the works on the cosmos with writings on the soul. It contains the following [here follows a list of the titles and first lines of Ennead 4]: <> So the fourth ennead contains all these topics, which concern the soul itself.» — el criterio de la cuarta Enéada: el alma.

«The fifth contains those dealing with the intellect, and includes all those books which deal with what lies beyond, with the intellect in the soul, and with the ideas.» — el de la quinta: el intelecto, lo que está más allá, el intelecto en el alma y las ideas.

«We put the fourth and fifth enneads together as a single volume. The final, sixth, ennead makes another volume, so that Plotinus’ works amount to three volumes, of which the first contains three enneads, the second two, the third one.» — §26: cómo quedaron repartidas las seis enéadas en tres volúmenes.

«This, then, is how we disposed Plotinus’ fifty-four books in six enneads. We set down notes for some of them – not systematically, but just as and when friends asked for something written down to help them understand a point.» — Porfirio declara el alcance de sus propias notas: no sistemáticas, escritas cuando un amigo pedía algo por escrito.

«We also wrote key-point summaries of all of the books (except On Beauty, which we did not possess), based on the chronological order of their publication.» — y el otro aparato que Porfirio dice haber hecho, con su hueco declarado: sumarios de todos los libros salvo On Beauty, que no tenía.

«But it is not only the substantive points of each book that are included in this, 38» — qué llevaban esos sumarios además de los puntos de fondo: las líneas de argumento, numeradas igual.

«But now it is our task to go through each of the books with an eye to establishing punctuation and correcting any mistakes there might be in the language. The work itself will show what has been done.» — la última frase de la Vida, que es la declaración de la tarea editorial de Porfirio: puntuación y corrección de la lengua, y que la obra misma muestre lo hecho.

«Pleasures and mental pains, feelings of fear and boldness, appetites and aversions and feelings of physical distress – to what do these belong?» — 1.1.1 abre el tratado con la pregunta que lo ordena todo: de qué son los placeres, los dolores, los miedos, los apetitos y las aversiones. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«They belong either to the soul or to a soul using a body2 or to some third thing that arises from a combination of these. And this can be understood in two ways: either as a mixture or as something different that arises from the mixture.» — las tres respuestas posibles que Plotino pone sobre la mesa en 1.1.1, y el desdoblamiento de la tercera entre mezcla y algo distinto que surge de la mezcla. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«So, then, we must investigate discursive thinking and belief to determine whether they belong to that to which the states belong or whether some of them are like this and some are not.» — el programa del tratado según lo enuncia Plotino en 1.1.1.

«And we should also reflect on how acts of intellection occur and to what they belong, and indeed what is the thing which is itself considering the investigation of these questions and making the judgement.» — y la pregunta que Plotino mete dentro del programa: qué es eso mismo que considera la investigación y juzga.

«First, we need to understand if it is the case that soul is one thing and the essence of soul another.» — 1.1.2 plantea la disyuntiva de la que cuelga todo: si el alma y la esencia del alma son dos cosas o una.

«In fact, however, if soul and the essence of soul are identical, soul would be a certain form incapable of being the subject of all these activities that it imparts to something else but would have the activity that is natural to itself in itself, whatever the argument reveals this to be.» — la rama que Plotino toma: si son idénticas, el alma es una forma que no puede ser sujeto de esas actividades sino que las imparte a otro.

«But that which is simple in substantiality is self-sufficient inasmuch as it is stable in its own substantiality.» — la razón por la que lo simple no admite estados: se basta a sí mismo por estar estable en su propia sustancialidad.

«Further, it will perceive nothing nor will there be discursive thinking or belief in it. For sense-perception is taking on a form or also a corporeal state,9 and discursive thinking and belief supervene on sense-perception.» — la consecuencia que Plotino saca en 1.1.2: la percepción es tomar una forma o un estado corpóreo, y el pensamiento discursivo y la creencia vienen después de ella. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«On the other hand, perhaps it would necessarily be a subject of sense-perception, if indeed it must use this instrument for cognizing the states arising from sense-perception of what is external.» — la objeción que Plotino se plantea a sí mismo: quizá el alma sí sea sujeto de percepción, si necesita ese instrumento para conocer lo externo.

«But if they were mixed, it was either like a blend or like an ‘interweaving’,16 or like a form not separated from the body;» — el reparto de las maneras de concebir la mezcla del alma con el cuerpo que Plotino examina en 1.1.3, tomadas de sus predecesores. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«It is possible for that which is interwoven to be unaffected, that is, for the soul to pass through and not have the states of the body, just like light, especially if it is in this way woven through the whole.» — la primera de esas maneras, examinada en 1.1.4 con la comparación de la luz: lo entretejido puede atravesar sin padecer los estados del cuerpo.

«But if we assume it to be like the shape of an axe that is imposed on the iron, and the complex that the axe is will do what iron so shaped will do, because of its shape,» — la comparación aristotélica del hacha, que Plotino usa en 1.1.4 para mostrar adónde lleva: a atribuir al cuerpo los estados.

«For Aristotle says that it is absurd to claim that ‘the soul is doing the weaving’24 so that it is also absurd to claim that it has appetites and is in pain; these belong rather to the living being.» — y el apoyo que Plotino toma de Aristóteles en 1.1.4: si es absurdo decir que el alma teje, lo es también decir que apetece y sufre.

«But it is not yet clear how sense-perception works.» — el resto que Plotino deja abierto al final de 1.1.4.

«Let us agree that the desire for the Good is not a common state but belongs to the soul [alone],» — la excepción que Plotino pide conceder en 1.1.5: el deseo del Bien no es estado común de alma y cuerpo.

«In fact, the life of the complex will not be that of the soul. And the power of sense-perception will not perceive, but rather that which has the power.» — la distinción de 1.1.6 entre la potencia y lo que la tiene: no percibe la facultad de percibir sino aquello que la posee.

«But if this is so, when the living being is affected, the cause that endows the complex with life is itself unaffected by» — la tesis de la impasibilidad que Plotino sostiene en 1.1.6: lo que da vida al compuesto no padece lo que el compuesto padece.

«Seeing is, after all, the use of the eyes. But there are injuries associated with seeing, so that there are also pains and distress, as is generally the» — el argumento del instrumento en 1.1.3: si ver es usar los ojos, del ver vienen daños, y con ellos dolores y penas. El tramo corta donde el troceo mete la columna de números de línea del margen; sigue *case for everything that happens to the body*.

«So, too, there are appetites in the soul seeking care for this instrument.» — y lo que Plotino añade en la misma línea: también hay apetitos en el alma que buscan el cuidado de ese instrumento.

«For so long as what uses the instrument is one thing and the instrument it uses is something else, each is separate.» — la consecuencia que Plotino saca de la fórmula del alma que usa el cuerpo. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota pegada a la palabra.

«At least, anyone who posits the soul as using the body separates them.» — y el remate: quien sostiene esa fórmula ya los está separando.

«In fact, it is the case that appetite belongs to the soul’s faculty of appetite, and spiritedness belongs to the soul’s faculty of spiritedness, and, generally,» — 1.1.5 reparte las funciones entre las facultades del alma. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«In fact, they belong to the body as well, because blood and bile must boil, and somehow the body must be disposed to mov» — y lo que Plotino no le quita al cuerpo en 1.1.5: la sangre y la bilis tienen que hervir para que haya ánimo.

«But the soul’s power of sense-perception should not be understood as being of sensibles, but rather as receptive of the impressions that arise from se» — 1.1.7 precisa qué percibe la facultad perceptiva del alma: no los sensibles mismos sino las impresiones que surgen de la percepción del animal.

«Given that the human being coincides with the rational soul, whenever human beings engage in calculative reasoning, it is we who are reasoning because» — la identificación que Plotino hace en 1.1.7: el ser humano coincide con el alma racional, y por eso al razonar somos nosotros los que razonamos.

«But there is nothing against calling the whole a ‘living being’, with the lower parts being mixed in, although the true human being begins approximate» — y la concesión que la acompaña: se puede llamar animal al conjunto, aunque el ser humano verdadero empiece más arriba.

«We should actually think of [souls] as divided within bodies because soul gives itself to corporeal magnitudes, however large each living being may be» — en qué sentido admite Plotino que las almas estén divididas en los cuerpos: porque el alma se da a magnitudes corpóreas.

«In fact, evils are done when we are overcome by what is inferior in us – for we are many53 – either appetite or spiritedness or an evil mental image.» — 1.1.9 localiza el mal moral: se obra mal cuando nos vence lo inferior de nosotros, y Plotino intercala la fórmula de que somos muchos.

«But the intellect has either been in contact with its object or not, so that it is inerrant.» — la razón por la que el intelecto no yerra según 1.1.9: o está en contacto con su objeto o no lo está.

«We have indeed distinguished what belongs to the composite and what are properties of soul;57 what belongs to the composite are the things that are co» — 1.1.10 recapitula el reparto entre lo del compuesto y lo propio del alma.

«In fact, we said that the composite belongs to us, especially when we are not yet separated from it, since we say that we experience the states of our» — y la salvedad con que Plotino lo matiza: el compuesto es nuestro sobre todo mientras no estemos separados de él.

«But the virtues that do not belong to thought apply to the custom and training of the composite.» — el lugar que 1.1.10 da a las virtudes que no son del pensamiento: la costumbre y el entrenamiento del compuesto.

«In fact, if the souls in them are, as it is said, 67 human souls which have erred, the separable68 part of the soul does not belong to the beasts.» — 1.1.11 sobre las almas humanas caídas en bestias: la parte separable no les pertenece. El tramo corta antes de las llamadas de nota.

«It is there, but it is not there for them.» — la fórmula con que Plotino resuelve esa presencia sin pertenencia.

«The line of reasoning that makes the soul inerrant assumes that it is one and totally simple, claiming that soul and the essence of soul are identical» — 1.1.12 nombra el supuesto del que colgaba la tesis del alma que no yerra.

«Hence, Plato says, ‘we have gazed upon soul like those who have seen the sea-god Glaucus’.» — la imagen de Platón que Plotino cita en 1.1.12 para decir en qué estado se ve el alma: como al dios marino Glauco incrustado de conchas.

«For if the declination is an illumination of what is below, it is not a moral error, any more than is a shadow.» — la tesis que exime de culpa a la declinación del alma: iluminar lo de abajo no es falta moral, como no lo es una sombra.

«But it abandons it not by being cut off, but because the reflection no longer exists.» — y cómo abandona el alma al cuerpo según 1.1.12: no por corte sino porque el reflejo deja de existir.

«In fact, we should attribute to it the sort of motion that is not corporeal but belongs to its life.» — 1.1.13 cierra el tratado fijando qué movimiento cabe atribuirle al alma: no el corpóreo sino el que es propio de su vida.

«First, however, it is questionable if all the virtues exist in this god, for example, whether it has self-control or» — 1.2.1 abre con la dificultad: si la meta es asemejarse al dios, hay que preguntar si todas las virtudes están en ese dios. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But if it is in a state of desiring the intelligibles which our souls desire, too, it is also clear that the order and the virtues in us come from the» — la disyuntiva de 1.2.1 sobre de dónde nos vienen el orden y las virtudes.

«In fact, it would be irrational to maintain that we are not in any way assimilated according to these – legend at least has it that those who practise» — Plotino niega en 1.2.1 que las virtudes no asemejen en nada, y trae la leyenda de los que las practican.

«We, though, judge it to be greater than virtue.» — el juicio con que Plotino coloca a lo divino por encima de la virtud.

«And the sensible house participates in order and arrangement, whereas in the intelligible world, in the house’s expressed principle, there is not orde» — la comparación de la casa en 1.2.1: la sensible participa del orden, y en el principio expresado de la casa no hay orden ni disposición.

«But one should add persuasion to the argument and not rely on its force alone.» — la regla de método que Plotino enuncia en 1.2.1: al argumento hay que añadirle persuasión y no fiarlo todo a su fuerza.

«This will show how there are two types of assimilation: the first requires that there be something identical in the things that are the same, such that their sameness derived equally from that which is identical. But in cases where one thing is assimilated to another, but that other is primary, the relationship is not reciprocated, and the primary thing is not» — 1.2.2 distingue dos maneras de asemejarse: la recíproca, que exige algo idéntico en los dos, y la que va hacia un primario y no se devuelve.

«For matter, being in every way unmeasured, is unassimilated to everything. But insofar as it participates in form, to that extent is it assimilated to that formless reality [the Good].» — el caso límite de esa segunda asimilación: la materia, sin medida, no se asemeja a nada, y en la medida en que participa de forma se asemeja a lo que no tiene forma.

«But since Plato reveals the other type of assimilation as belonging to a greater virtue,13 we should speak about that.» — el giro de 1.2.3: Plotino pasa a la asimilación que corresponde a la virtud mayor, adjudicándosela a Platón.

«For as a spoken word is an imitation of a word in the soul, so a word in the soul is an imitation of something in something different.» — la escala de imitaciones con que 1.2.3 ordena los sentidos de pensar: la palabra hablada imita a la del alma, y esta a algo de otro orden.

«Virtue belongs to soul, not to Intellect nor to that which transcends it.» — la tesis que 1.2.3 fija sobre el lugar de la virtud.

«In fact, if the good were there prior to the impure state, then the purification would do the job; but if the purification will do the job, what remai» — la objeción que Plotino se plantea en 1.2.4 sobre la purificación: si el bien ya estaba antes de lo impuro, purificar basta.

«It will be associating, then, once it has been purified, but it will be doing so having turned itself around.» — y su respuesta: el alma purificada se asocia a lo de arriba, pero por haberse vuelto ella misma.

«It would also eliminate anger as much as possible and, if possible, entirely, but if not, at least not letting itself get worked up along with the bod» — 1.2.5 describe qué queda del ánimo en el alma purificada, con el límite dicho en la misma frase.

«For it will be fearful of nothing – though the involuntary is here, too – except when fear serves as a warning.» — y el límite del miedo: ninguno, salvo el que sirve de aviso.

«There is, then, no moral error in anything of this sort for a human being, but only [the occasion for] morally perfect acting.» — el giro de 1.2.6: en ese estado no hay falta moral sino ocasión de obrar perfectamente.

«The focus is not on being exempt from moral error, but on being god.» — la fórmula con que Plotino enmienda la meta de la virtud: no quedar exento de falta sino ser dios.

«If then, there were to remain anything involuntary in their actions, a human being in this state would be a god or a daemon by being double, or rather» — y la gradación que sigue: quien conserve algo involuntario sería dios o daimon por ser doble.

«In fact, we have this even though it transcends us. But we have it either collectively or individually, or both collectively and individually.» — 1.1.8 sobre la relación con el Intelecto: lo tenemos aunque nos trascienda, y el modo queda planteado como disyuntiva. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«We have it collectively, because it is indivisible and one, that is, everywhere identical; we have it individually, because each one of us has the who» — y la respuesta: en común porque es indivisible y uno, e individualmente porque cada quien lo tiene entero.

«In fact, theoretical and practical wisdom consist in the contemplation of that which Intellect possesses, though Intellect has them by» — 1.2.6 sitúa la sabiduría teórica y la práctica en la contemplación de lo que el Intelecto posee.

«And in the intelligible world, there is no virtue; virtue is in the soul.» — la tesis que Plotino repite en 1.2.6, y que separa la virtud de su paradigma.

«For neither Justice itself, nor any of the others, is a virtue, but rather a paradigm.» — cómo llama Plotino a las Formas de las virtudes: paradigmas, no virtudes.

«Indeed, true Justice itself belongs to a self-related unity in which there are no parts.» — y en qué se distingue la Justicia misma de la virtud de justicia: pertenece a una unidad sin partes.

«The virtues themselves in the soul are, then, mutually implicating just as are their paradigms prior to virtue in Intellect.» — la implicación mutua de las virtudes en el alma, calcada de sus paradigmas en el Intelecto.

«For intellection in the intelligible world is scientific understanding or theoretical wisdom, and being self-related is self-control, a» — la traducción que Plotino hace de cada virtud a su modo de ser allá: la intelección es comprensión científica y el estar vuelto sobre sí es dominio de sí.

«Whoever has the greater ones will have the lesser in potency, too, necessarily, though one who has the lesser will not necessarily have» — la asimetría entre las virtudes mayores y las menores que 1.2.7 fija.

«Must he not be at least, as Plato says, ‘one who has seen all or most Beings, who in his first birth as a human child will be a philoso» — 1.3.1 abre con la condición que Plotino toma de Platón para quien puede ascender: haber visto todos o casi todos los Seres.

«The philosopher certainly ascends by his nature, while the musician and the lover must be led.» — el reparto de los tres tipos de 1.3.1: el filósofo sube por naturaleza, al músico y al enamorado hay que llevarlos.

«The journey is really twofold for everyone, whether they are ascending or already arrived. For the first journey starts at things here below, whereas the second is for those who have already arrived in the intelligible world a» — y el doble camino que Plotino distingue: el que empieza aquí abajo y el de quienes ya llegaron.

«He is, though, ready to respond to what are in a way impressions of Beauty that he encounters, and just as the fearful are towards nois» — el retrato del músico en 1.3.1: pronto a responder a lo que son como impresiones de la Belleza.

«He should be instructed, then, not to fall for one body and be transported by it, but he should be led on to all bodies by an argument» — la pedagogía que 1.3.2 prescribe para el enamorado: no quedarse en un cuerpo sino pasar por argumento a todos.

«The philosopher is he who is ready by nature and who is in a way ‘winged’7 and is not in need of separation like these others.» — el filósofo según 1.3.3, que ya viene alado y no necesita ese desprendimiento.

«The mathematical studies should actually be given to him that will accustom him to having a grasp of and confidence in the incorporeal» — para qué sirven los estudios matemáticos según 1.3.3: acostumbrar a asir lo incorpóreo y a confiar en ello.

«Dialectic converses about what is good and not good, and such things as are classified» — de qué trata la dialéctica según 1.3.4.

«It does this by means of scientific understanding about everything, not belief.» — y con qué lo hace: comprensión científica, no creencia.

«It ceases to wander in the sensible world and is ensconced in the intelligible world and there it has its business, letting go of false» — el efecto que 1.3.4 le adjudica a la dialéctica: dejar de errar por lo sensible y asentarse en lo inteligible.

«It gives over the so-called logical technique regarding premises and syllogisms to another craft, just as it would leave knowing how to» — el lugar que Plotino le da a la lógica formal en 1.3.5: se la cede a otro arte, como el arte de escribir.

«But where does this scientific understanding get its principles from? In fact, Intellect gives clear principles, if one had the ability» — de dónde saca la dialéctica sus principios según 1.3.5: del Intelecto.

«For, Plato says, dialectic is ‘the purest part of the activity of intellect and wisdom’.» — la fórmula de Platón con que Plotino define la dialéctica en 1.3.5.

«For it is not concerned with bare theorems and rules, but it is concerned with real things and, in a way, has Beings as its material.» — la diferencia que 1.3.5 fija entre la dialéctica y la lógica: aquella trata cosas reales y tiene a los Seres por materia.

«It does not, then, know a proposition – for it is just letters – but in knowing that which is true, it knows what they call a propositi» — y cómo conoce la dialéctica una proposición según Plotino: conociendo lo verdadero, no las letras.

«Is it possible for the lower virtues to be present without dialectic and theoretical wisdom? Yes, but imperfectly and deficiently.» — la respuesta de 1.3.6 sobre si caben las virtudes menores sin dialéctica, con su límite dentro.

«Theoretical wisdom comes, then, after the natural virtues.» — el orden que 1.3.6 fija entre las virtudes naturales y la sabiduría teórica.

«And one would not be forced to attribute to plants that which one attributes to living beings in general, because they have no sense-pe» — 1.4.1 examina si vivir bien alcanza a las plantas, apoyándose en que no perciben.

«But if they say this, they will be saying that it is the sense-perception itself that is good, that is, the actuality of the perceptual» — la objeción que Plotino corre contra quien pone el bien en la percepción.

«But then the cause of living well will actually not be pleasure, but being able to discern that pleasure is good.» — y el desplazamiento que resulta: la causa de vivir bien no sería el placer sino poder discernir que el placer es bueno.

«But it is appropriate to ask them why they thus place happiness only in the rational living being: ‘Do you add» — la pregunta que 1.4.2 dirige a quienes reservan la felicidad al viviente racional. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But as for us, let us state from the beginning what we take happiness to be.» — el giro con que Plotino pasa de las objeciones a su propia posición en 1.4.3.

«So, the term ‘life’ is spoken of in many ways, differentiated according to the primary way, the secondary way, and so on in order.» — la distinción de 1.4.3 que sostiene todo el tratado: vida se dice de muchas maneras, en orden de primaria a derivadas.

«And if he is virtuous, he has what he needs to be happy and to possess the good, for there is no good that he does not have.» — la tesis de la autosuficiencia en 1.4.4.

«What he seeks he seeks as something necessary, and not for himself but for one of the things that belong to him, for he is seeking some» — y el matiz que la sostiene: lo que el virtuoso busca lo busca como necesario y no para sí.

«But the happy life should be willed.» — la exigencia que 1.4.6 le pone a la vida feliz.

«If, however, happiness consists in the possession of the true good, why should we set this aside and not look to this in judging the ha» — la pregunta con que 1.4.6 defiende su criterio frente a quien suma bienes y necesidades.

«But if the goal is some one thing and must not be many – for in that case, one would be seeking not a goal but several goals – one must» — el argumento de la unidad del fin en 1.4.6.

«The soul’s desire is for that which is better than itself, by which, when it arrives, the soul is satisfied and at rest, and this is re» — adónde va el deseo del alma según 1.4.6 y qué lo aquieta.

«Why, then, does the happy person want these things to be present and avoid their opposites? In fact, we will say that it is not because of their contribution to being happy, but because of their contribution to existence.» — la distinción con que 1.4.7 salva los bienes corporales sin meterlos en la felicidad: contribuyen a existir, no a ser feliz.

«And his suffering will not be pitiable, but the light in him will continue to shine like the light of a lantern when the wind» — 1.4.8 responde a la desgracia con una imagen: la luz del virtuoso sigue ardiendo como la de un farol cuando el viento sopla fuera.

«If someone were to say that it is our nature to be like this, so as to be pained at the upheavals of our family, let it be ac» — la concesión que Plotino hace a quien alega la naturaleza para justificar el dolor por los suyos.

«And it is more beautiful not to give in to those things commonly considered to be fearful.» — y lo que contrapone a esa concesión.

«In fact, even when things he does not want are present, he faces them with virtue, which makes his soul hard to be moved or a» — el efecto que 1.4.8 le adjudica a la virtud: vuelve al alma difícil de mover.

«Well, they do not deny him happiness when he is asleep or argue away this time and say that he was not happy for his entire l» — el argumento del sueño en 1.4.9, con el que Plotino separa la felicidad de la conciencia actual de ella.

«He would be, I suppose, unless someone were to say that perceiving must be part of wisdom, and that conscious awareness must» — la objeción que Plotino se plantea: que percibir sea parte de la sabiduría.

«The very activity of the substance is in him, and since such activity has nothing to do with sleeping, he would be active and» — y su respuesta en 1.4.9: la actividad de la sustancia está en él y no tiene que ver con dormir.

«For it is not necessary for one who is reading to be consciously aware that he is reading – indeed, it is especially then tha» — la analogía de la lectura con que 1.4.10 separa el acto de la conciencia del acto.

«The virtuous person is always content and his state is one of tranquillity, his disposition is lovable, and no one of the thi» — el retrato del virtuoso en 1.4.12.

«Nor would the activities of the virtuous be impeded by fortune, but they change as fortunes change, though they are all, neve» — y el lugar que 1.4.12 le deja a la fortuna: cambia las acciones, no las impide.

«Evidence that the human being, especially the virtuous human being, is not the complex [of body and soul] is found in his sep» — el argumento de 1.4.14 sobre la identidad: el ser humano virtuoso no es el compuesto de cuerpo y alma.

«Let the human being who lives in the world of corporeal goods be beautiful and tall and wealthy and the sort of ruler over pe» — la concesión retórica con que 1.4.14 concede todos los bienes corporales para quitarles peso.

«Although he will protect the health of his body, he will not wish to be altogether inexperienced with sickness, nor indeed in» — el matiz que 1.4.14 le pone al cuidado del cuerpo: el sabio no querrá ser del todo inexperto en la enfermedad.

«For since one contrary does not add to his happiness, how can the other remove it?» — la simetría con que Plotino cierra ese punto en 1.4.14.

«In fact, if he is afraid at all, he is not perfect in virtue but will only be halfway there.» — el criterio de 1.4.15 sobre el miedo.

«It is not possible, then, to live happily in the composite of body and soul.» — la tesis que 1.4.16 fija como conclusión.

«For Plato, too, rightly judged it appropriate that one who intends to be wise and happy should receive his good from the inte» — y a quién se la adjudica Plotino: a Platón.

«He must give to this embodied life what it needs, insofar as he can, he himself being other than it, and not be prevented eve» — el deber que 1.4.16 le deja al sabio con su vida encarnada, con la distancia dicha en la misma frase.

«Indeed, he will abandon it at the right natural moment, being sovereign, too, in deliberating over this.» — y la soberanía que le reconoce sobre el momento de dejarla.

«For it is not the memory of having been happy that would make a difference, nor is it in talking about it, but rather being h» — 1.5.1 fija el punto del tratado: la felicidad no está en el recuerdo de haberla tenido.

«Next, even the gods will now be happier than before, and still not perfectly happy nor will they ever be so.» — el absurdo con que Plotino reduce la tesis contraria en 1.5.1: los dioses serían cada vez más felices y nunca perfectamente felices.

«And even the pleasure which is greater is only in the present; its past has gone.» — la razón que 1.5.3 da contra la acumulación: aun el placer mayor está solo en el presente.

«But if these cause the evil to increase with time in this way, why do not their opposites do the same for being happy, too?» — la objeción que Plotino se plantea desde la simetría con el mal.

«In fact, one could say with sorrows and pains that time increases them, for example, when sickness lingers.» — y la concede para el dolor, con su ejemplo.

«The extent of happiness has a boundary or limit and that is always identical.» — la tesis de 1.5.6: la medida de la felicidad tiene un límite y es siempre el mismo.

«But it is absurd to say that when happiness exists no longer, it still is, and there is more of it than there is at present.» — el absurdo que 1.5.7 le encuentra a contar el tiempo pasado dentro de la felicidad.

«It follows that if the image removed the stability from eternity and made it its own, it would destroy it; the image is prese» — la relación de imagen entre el tiempo y la eternidad, enunciada en 1.5.7.

«If indeed, then, being happy is found in a good life, it is clear that it should be located in the life of something that exi» — la consecuencia que 1.5.7 saca: la felicidad va en la vida de lo que existe de veras.

«But this does not admit of the more nor less, nor does it have any extension, but rather it is non-dimensional and not tempor» — y cómo es esa vida: sin más ni menos, sin extensión, no temporal.

«Next, the actions do not by themselves endow one with happiness, but one’s dispositions make the actions beautiful, and the p» — y la inversión que Plotino propone: no son las acciones las que dan felicidad, sino las disposiciones las que hacen bellas las acciones.

«For some things, such as bodies, are not beautiful due to their substrates, but rather by participation, whereas some things» — 1.6.1 abre el tratado de la belleza repartiendo: los cuerpos no son bellos por su sustrato sino por participación.

«It is actually said by everyone that the symmetry of parts in relation to each other and to the whole added to fine coloratio» — la definición corriente de la belleza que 1.6.1 pone sobre la mesa para examinarla: simetría de las partes más buen color.

«For those who hold this view, no simple thing will be beautiful; necessarily, beauty will exist only in the composite.» — la primera consecuencia que Plotino le encuentra a esa definición.

«For beauty is certainly not made up of ugly things; all its parts are beautiful.» — el principio con que Plotino objeta esa definición en 1.6.1.

«For these people, the beauty of colours, for example, and the light of the sun, since they are simple, do not have proportion» — el contraejemplo de los colores y de la luz del sol, que son simples.

«Further, when the identical face sometimes actually appears beautiful and sometimes not, though the symmetry remains identica» — y el contraejemplo del mismo rostro que unas veces parece bello y otras no, con la simetría intacta.

«If it is because they are in concord, it is also the case that there is agreement or concord among bad theorems.» — la objeción de 1.6.1 a extender la simetría a las conductas y los discursos: también hay concordancia entre teoremas malos.

«For example, to say, ‘self-control is stupidity’ and ‘justice is laughable nobility’ is to say two things that are in concord» — el par de sentencias con que Plotino ilustra esa concordancia de lo malo.

«Further, then, the beauty of soul just is its virtues and a beauty that is truer than the previous ones.» — y adónde lleva el argumento: la belleza del alma son sus virtudes, y es más verdadera que las anteriores.

«But when it encounters the ugly, it holds back and rejects it and recoils from it as something with which it is not in harmon» — 1.6.2 describe la reacción del alma ante lo feo como falta de armonía.

«We say that these are beautiful by participation in Form.» — la tesis que Plotino opone a la simetría en 1.6.2.

«For everything that is shapeless but is by nature capable of receiving shape or form, having no share in an expressed princip» — cómo define 1.6.2 lo feo: lo sin forma que podría recibirla y no participa del principio expresado.

«Beauty is, then, situated over that which is shaped at the moment when, the parts having been arranged into one whole, it giv» — y dónde se sitúa la belleza según 1.6.2: sobre lo conformado, cuando las partes quedan ordenadas en un todo.

«This is the reason why fire, above all the other bodies, is beautiful;20 it has the role of form in relation to the other ele» — por qué el fuego es el más bello de los cuerpos según 1.6.3: hace de forma frente a los demás elementos. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«For it heats them, but is itself not cooled, and is primarily coloured, whereas the others get the form of colour from it.» — y los rasgos con que Plotino lo sostiene: calienta sin enfriarse y es coloreado de manera primaria.

«It is necessary to realize that such things do not appear to the virtuous person as they appear to 10 15 20 25 30 5 others, a» — la tesis de 1.4.8 sobre por qué la desgracia no lo toca igual: al virtuoso esas cosas no se le aparecen como a los demás. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea de Henry-Schwyzer que el volumen imprime al margen y que el troceo deja caer a media frase; se conserva tal cual.

«In fact, one who says that being happy comes after much time and 5 10 15 20 many actions is constructing happiness from thing» — la objeción de 1.5.10 a quien pone la felicidad al cabo de mucho tiempo y muchas acciones. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen, que se conserva tal cual.

«It is logical that sensible harmonies be measured by numbers, though not by every formula but only by one that serves in» — 1.6.3 admite la medida numérica para las armonías sensibles, y la acota en la misma frase.

«Regarding the more elevated beauties not given to sense-perception to see, soul sees them and speaks about them without» — el paso de 1.6.4 a las bellezas que no se ven con los sentidos: el alma las ve y habla de ellas sin órganos.

«But just as in the case of the beauties perceived by the senses it is not possible to speak about them to those who have» — el límite de comunicación que Plotino enuncia en 1.6.4: de lo bello sensible no se puede hablar a quien no lo ha visto.

«Nor can one speak about the ‘splendour’25 of virtue to those who have not even imagined for themselves the beauty of the» — y su extensión a la virtud: del esplendor de la virtud no se le puede hablar a quien no lo ha imaginado.

«For these are the states one should be in regarding something which is beautiful: astonishment, and sweet shock, and lon» — el catálogo de estados con que 1.6.4 reconoce lo bello: asombro, sacudida dulce y anhelo.

«You feel this way whenever you see in yourselves or someone else greatness of soul or a just character or sheer self-con» — y dónde dice Plotino que se sienten esos estados: ante la grandeza de alma, el carácter justo, el dominio de sí.

«It is not shapes or colours or some magnitude, but rather they feel this way about soul, it being itself ‘without colour» — la razón por la que esos estados no vienen de lo visible: van al alma, que el texto llama sin color.

«This is indeed what I regard as an impure soul, dragged in every direction by its chains towards whatever it happens to» — la definición de alma impura en 1.6.5: la arrastrada en todas direcciones por sus cadenas.

«It is as if someone fell into mud or slime and the beauty he had is no longer evident, whereas what is seen is what he s» — la imagen del lodo con que 1.6.5 explica la fealdad del alma: lo que se ve es lo que se le pegó encima.

«We would be speaking correctly in saying that the soul indeed becomes ugly by a mixture or adulteration and by an inclin» — cómo se vuelve fea el alma según 1.6.5: por mezcla, por adulteración y por inclinación.

«For it is indeed the case, as the ancient doctrine40 has it, that self-control and courage and every virtue is a purific» — la doctrina antigua que Plotino invoca en 1.6.6: el dominio de sí, el valor y toda virtud son purificación. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«The soul, then, when it is purified, becomes form,44 and an expressed principle, and entirely incorporeal and intellectu» — en qué queda el alma purificada según 1.6.6: forma, principio expresado, enteramente incorpórea. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Soul, then, being borne up to Intellect, becomes even more beautiful.» — el escalón siguiente del ascenso en 1.6.6.

«For this reason, it is correctly said that goodness and being beautiful for the soul consist in ‘being assimilated to go» — la fórmula con que 1.6.6 hace coincidir la bondad y la belleza del alma con la asimilación a lo divino.

«Or rather, Beings are what Beauty is and ugliness is the other nature, primary evil itself, so that for god ‘good’ and» — la identificación de 1.6.6: los Seres son lo que la Belleza es, y la fealdad es la otra naturaleza, el mal primario.

«And first we should posit [primary] Beauty,47 which is the Good from which Intellect comes, which is itself identical wi» — el orden que 1.6.6 fija: primero la Belleza primaria, que es el Bien, del cual viene el Intelecto. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«And Soul is beautiful by Intellect.» — la cadena de la belleza según 1.6.6: el Alma lo es por el Intelecto.

«Other things are beautiful as soon as they are shaped by Soul, including examples of beauty in actions and in practices.» — y el escalón siguiente: lo demás lo es en cuanto el Alma lo conforma, incluidas las acciones y las prácticas.

«For inasmuch as it is divine and, in a way, a part of Beauty, it makes all that it grasps and masters beautiful insofar» — la razón por la que el Alma embellece lo que toca: es divina y, de algún modo, parte de la Belleza.

«We must, then, ascend to the Good, which every soul desires.» — el imperativo con que 1.6.7 vuelve el tratado un camino.

«For it is desired as good, and the desire is directed to it as this, though the attainment of it is for those who ascend» — y la condición que Plotino pone al deseo del Bien: alcanzarlo es de los que suben.

«One proceeds in the ascent, passing by all that is alien to the god until one sees by oneself alone that which is itself» — cómo se sube según 1.6.7: dejando atrás todo lo ajeno al dios hasta ver a solas lo que es por sí.

«And he laughs at other loves and is disdainful of the things he previously regarded as beautiful.» — el efecto que 1.6.7 le adjudica a esa visión sobre los amores anteriores.

«What, then, should we think if someone sees pure Beauty itself by itself, not contaminated by flesh or bodies, not on th» — la pregunta con que 1.6.7 sube todavía un escalón, hacia la Belleza pura por sí misma.

«And with the Good as the prize the greatest and ‘ultimate battle is indeed set before souls’,54 a battle in which our en» — la fórmula agonística con que 1.6.7 nombra lo que está en juego, tomada de Platón. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Indeed, let him who is able go and follow it inside, 5 10 15 20 25 5 leaving outside the sight of his eyes, not allowing» — el giro decisivo de 1.6.8: la vía es hacia dentro, dejando fuera la vista de los ojos. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen, conservada tal cual.

«For when he does see beauty in bodies, he should not run after them, but realize that they are images and traces and sha» — y qué hacer con la belleza de los cuerpos según 1.6.8: no correr tras ella, sino saberla imagen, huella y sombra.

«Someone would be better advised to say, ‘let us flee to our beloved fatherland’.» — la fórmula homérica con que 1.6.8 nombra la meta del ascenso.

«We should not rely on our feet to get us there, for our feet just take us everywhere on earth, one place after another.» — y la advertencia que la acompaña: los pies no llevan allá.

«Everyone has this ability, but few use it.» — lo que Plotino dice del órgano interior con que se ve: todos lo tienen y pocos lo usan.

«If you do not yet see yourself as beautiful, then be like a sculptor who, making a statue that is supposed to be» — la imagen del escultor en 1.6.9, que es la instrucción práctica del tratado: quitar, alisar, pulir la propia estatua. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen.

«If you have become this and have seen it and find yourself in a purified state, you have no impediment to becoming one» — y la condición que 1.6.9 pone para la unión: haberse vuelto eso mismo.

«But if the eye approaches that sight bleary with vices and not having been purified, or weak and, due to cowardice, is n» — el reverso de esa condición: el ojo empañado de vicios no ve.

«For first, the soul in its ascent will reach Intellect, and in the intelligible world it will see all the beautiful Form» — el itinerario que 1.6.9 fija: primero el Intelecto y las Formas bellas.

«Yes, the activity of soul is its natural good.» — 1.7.1 fija el bien del alma en su actividad natural.

«If then, desire and activity towards that which is best is good, the Good must not look to something else nor be desirou» — y la consecuencia sobre el Bien mismo: no mira a otra cosa ni desea nada.

«It is not due to activity or thinking that it is the Good, but by remaining in itself.» — la fórmula con que 1.7.1 niega actividad y pensamiento al Bien.

«For, once more, we must posit the Good to be that upon which all things depend,9 whereas it depends on nothing.» — la definición con que 1.7.1 lo sostiene. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«It must, then, remain, and all things must revert to it, like the centre 25 5 10 5 10 15 of a circle from which all the» — la imagen del centro del círculo con que 1.7.1 describe la permanencia del Bien y la reversión de todo hacia él. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen.

«And the sun is also a paradigm of this, like the centre of the circle in relation to the light coming from it, and depen» — el segundo paradigma, el sol y su luz.

«In fact, things without soul are related to Soul, and Soul is related to it through Intellect.» — la cadena de dependencias que 1.7.2 traza hasta el Bien.

«And as they, then, partake of unity, being, and form, so they partake of the Good.» — la equivalencia que 1.7.2 fija entre participar de unidad, de ser y de forma, y participar del Bien.

«But Intellect comes immediately after the Good.» — el orden que 1.7.2 fija para el Intelecto.

«And in fact, it should be said that the evil comes from life in a body, whereas the soul comes to its good by virtue, no» — cómo reparte 1.7.3 el mal y el bien: el mal viene de la vida en un cuerpo, el bien le llega al alma por la virtud.

«Yet how could one imagine that evil is a Form, when it is situated in the absence of every good?» — la objeción de 1.8.1 contra hacer del mal una Forma.

«If, however, the scientific understanding of one contrary is identical to the scientific understanding of what is contra» — y el principio con que 1.8.1 abre paso al conocimiento del mal: de dos contrarios hay una sola comprensión.

«And ‘this is the life of the gods’,9 carefree and blessed, and evil is nowhere here.» — 1.8.2 describe la vida de los dioses y niega que haya mal en ella. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«So, it remains that if indeed evil does exist, it exists among non-beings as a sort of form of non-being and is involved» — y dónde queda el mal según 1.8.3: entre los no seres, como una especie de forma del no ser.

«On this basis, someone might immediately arrive at a conception of evil as a sort of absence of measure as opposed to me» — la definición del mal que 1.8.3 propone por contraste: ausencia de medida frente a la medida.

«And these properties are not accidental to it, but in a way its substantiality.» — y el rango que Plotino le da a esas propiedades en lo que llama mal: no accidentes sino, en cierto modo, su sustancialidad.

«All other things that partake of evil and are assimilated to it become evil, though they are not essentially evil.» — el límite que 1.8.3 le pone al mal de las demás cosas: lo son por participación, no por esencia.

«So, the substrate of figures and forms and shapes and measures and limits and whatever is ordered by an ordering alien t» — cómo nombra 1.8.3 aquello a lo que adjudica el mal primario: el sustrato de figuras, formas, medidas y límites.

«It is the nature of bodies, insofar as they partake of matter, to be evil, but not to be primary evil.» — el lugar de los cuerpos en esa escala, según 1.8.4, con la acotación en la misma frase.

«But soul in itself is not evil nor, again, is all soul evil.» — la doble negativa con que 1.8.4 protege al alma.

«The soul, then, that is perfect and inclines towards Intellect is always pure and turns away from matter and all that is» — y qué alma queda pura según 1.8.4: la que se inclina al Intelecto.

«In fact, evil consists not in any particular type of lack but in absolute lack.» — 1.8.5 define el mal por la carencia absoluta y no por una carencia cualquiera.

«At least, that which is slightly lacking with respect to that which is good is not evil, for it is still able to be perf» — la gradación con que Plotino lo sostiene: lo poco carente todavía puede perfeccionarse.

«But when something is absolutely lacking – which is what matter is – this is really evil, having no share of good.» — y a qué adjudica Plotino esa carencia absoluta: a la materia.

«Accordingly, it is necessary to think of evil not as a particular evil, such as injustice or some other kind of vice, bu» — el desplazamiento que 1.8.5 pide al lector: pensar el mal no como una injusticia o un vicio.

«In fact, sickness is a lack or excess in the materialized bodies that do not maintain order or measure.» — cómo reduce 1.8.5 la enfermedad, la fealdad y la pobreza a la misma raíz de falta de medida.

«Ugliness is matter not conquered by form, and poverty is a lack or privation of that which we need due to the matter to» — la definición de fealdad en 1.8.5: materia no vencida por la forma.

«Whatever evils take hold of human beings, they take hold of us unwillingly.» — la tesis de 1.8.5 sobre la involuntariedad del mal.

«Indeed, there is a ‘flight from evils in the soul’23 for those who are able, though not all are able.» — la fuga de los males de que habla Platón, citada en 1.8.5 con su límite: no todos pueden. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But when he says, ‘fleeing from here’,26 he must no longer mean ‘fleeing from things on earth’. For the flight, he says, is not the removal of oneself from earth, but, being on earth, to be just and pious with wisdom» — cómo lee Plotino esa fuga en 1.8.6: no salir de la tierra sino ser justo y piadoso con sabiduría estando en ella. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«For this is actually contrary to virtue, whereas virtue is not the Good, but a good, which allows us to master matter.» — y el lugar que 1.8.6 le da a la virtud: no el Bien, sino un bien que permite dominar la materia.

«In fact, it is non-substance that is contrary to substance, and it is the nature and principle of evil that is contrary» — la tesis de 1.8.6 sobre el contrario de la sustancia.

«Indeed, for limit and measure and everything else that is in divine nature, these are contraries of lack of limit and la» — la tabla de contrarios que 1.8.6 traza entre la naturaleza divina y el mal.

«And evil’s existence contains something false, which is primarily and really false; but the existence of the divine is t» — y el par verdad y falsedad que 1.8.6 monta sobre esa tabla.

«For ‘the nature of this universe is a mixture of Intellect and of necessity’,31 and the things that come into it from go» — la fórmula del Timeo que 1.8.7 adopta para el universo: mezcla de Intelecto y de necesidad. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Since the Good is not alone, there is necessarily in the procession which comes from it – or, if one wants, in the etern» — de dónde saca 1.8.7 la necesidad del mal: de que el Bien no está solo, y de la procesión que de él viene.

«Indeed, if the body is the [proximate] cause of evils, matter would be the [ultimate] cause of evils.» — la cadena causal que 1.8.8 traza del cuerpo a la materia.

«However, that which can dominate does not do so perfectly if one does not flee.» — el límite que 1.8.8 le pone al dominio de la materia.

«Indeed, vice, being ignorance and lack of measure in the soul, is a secondary evil and not evil itself.» — el rango que 1.8.8 le da al vicio: mal segundo, no el mal mismo.

«For virtue is not the primary Good, but something which is assimilated to or participates in it.» — y la simetría del lado del bien: la virtud tampoco es el Bien primario.

«In fact, just as we know the straight and the not straight with a ruler, thus we know that which does not harmonize with» — la imagen de la regla con que 1.8.9 explica cómo se conoce lo que no armoniza.

«In fact, we know it by taking away all form; that in which this is not present, we call matter, and we grasp it in ourse» — cómo se conoce la materia según 1.8.9: quitando toda forma.

«Just as an eye removes itself from light in order that it might see the darkness – though it does not see; it leaves the» — la comparación del ojo que se retira de la luz para ver la oscuridad, con la que 1.8.9 describe ese conocimiento por privación.

«If it actually has some nature, what prevents this nature from being evil, but not evil in the sense of being qualified,» — la distinción con que 1.8.10 llama mala a la materia sin hacerla cualificada.

«It is, therefore, rightly said to be without quality and evil.» — la conclusión de 1.8.10 sobre la materia.

«We should not, then, seek evil elsewhere but, being posited in the soul, to posit it thus as the absence of good.» — el giro de 1.8.11: el mal como ausencia de bien puesta en el alma.

«If then, vice is an impediment to soul, it is productive of evil, but vice will not be evil.» — la distinción que 1.8.12 hace entre producir el mal y ser el mal.

«As, then, one ascends from virtue to Beauty and to the Good, so one descends from vice to that which is evil itself, sta» — la simetría de las dos escalas en 1.8.13.

«If someone should say that vice is a weakness in the soul54 – at least, that the bad soul is easily affected and easily» — la definición de vicio como debilidad del alma que 1.8.14 pone a examen. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«And this is the fall of the soul; to come in this way into matter and to be weakened, because all of its faculties are n» — la definición de caída del alma en 1.8.14: venir así a la materia y quedar debilitada.

«So, matter is the cause of weakness in the soul and the cause of vice.» — la adjudicación con que 1.8.14 cierra ese punto.

«Because of the power and nature of Good, evil is not just evil; since it appeared of necessity, it is bound with certain» — el matiz final de 1.8.15: por la potencia del Bien, el mal no queda siendo solo mal.

«You shall not expel your soul from the body, so that it does not exit [bearing a burden].» — el tratado 1.9 abre con la prohibición, y el corchete es del traductor.

«For if it is expelled, it will have something with it in order that it may exit, and the exit means transferring into an» — la razón que Plotino da: la salida forzada se lleva algo consigo.

«For departure by means of drugs designed for the soul’s exit is perhaps not beneficial for the soul.» — la reserva de 1.9 sobre las drogas para la salida del alma.

«And if there is an allotted time that is given to each person, it is not a good idea to go before this, unless, as we sa» — el argumento del tiempo asignado, con su excepción dicha en la misma frase.

«Plotinus writes a treatise in one book on the reasonableness of exiting from life and does not accept any one of the fiv» — arranca el fragmento que el volumen imprime tras la primera Enéada, atribuido a Elías, que habla de Plotino en tercera persona.

«For he says that just as god does not stop being providential for us, but we make ourselves unfit and believe that god i» — lo que ese fragmento le adjudica a Plotino sobre la providencia: no cesa, y somos nosotros los que nos volvemos ineptos.

«and just as the sun shines its light equally to all, although bats, unfit for the light, flee it and are not illuminated» — y la comparación de los murciélagos con que el fragmento lo ilustra.

«For it is absurd to exit before one’s time, which is when the one who joined the body and soul together loosens the bond» — el argumento con que el fragmento cierra contra la salida anticipada.

«When we say that the cosmos, although it has a body, has both always existed and always will exist, if we should refer t» — 2.1.1 abre el tratado del cosmos con la pregunta por el sentido de decir que siempre existió y siempre existirá.

«For even if the cosmos is not being destroyed by anything outside itself, there is no reason why it could not destroy it» — la dificultad que Plotino se plantea en 2.1.2: aunque nada externo lo destruya, podría destruirse a sí mismo.

«For human beings and horses always exist, but not the identical ones.» — la distinción de 2.1.2 entre la permanencia de la especie y la del individuo.

«We might, though, get completely clear of this difficulty, if the will of god could be shown to be sufficient to hold th» — la salida que 2.1.2 examina y que el sumario declara insuficiente: la voluntad del dios.

«For this seems right both to others who have discussed nature and especially to Plato himself, and not only concerning t» — a quiénes adjudica Plotino la tesis que adopta en 2.1.2, con Platón nombrado en primer lugar.

«Fire is piercing and swift18 because it does» — 2.1.3 explica las cualidades del fuego por su lugar. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«For if anyone fears that heaven might fall, he should be of good courage.» — la tranquilización que 2.1.4 ofrece.

«For the revolution that its soul leads it in outstrips every downward tendency20 so that the soul masters the heavenly f» — y la razón: la revolución que el alma imprime vence toda tendencia hacia abajo. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But if there is no external flux from heaven, it has no need of nourishment.» — la consecuencia que 2.1.4 saca de negar el flujo externo del cielo.

«And thinking that soul, which has been set in motion by god, is not mightier than any bond, is a fallacy» — 2.1.4 objeta que el alma movida por el dios sea menos fuerte que cualquier atadura.

«In fact, Plato says28 that the former have come to be from god, but the sublunary living beings from the» — el reparto que 2.1.5 adjudica a Platón entre lo que viene del dios y lo sublunar. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Although this sort of soul, then, is imitating the heavenly soul, it lacks power because it is using wors» — por qué el alma de aquí abajo no alcanza a la celeste según 2.1.5: imita, y trabaja con material peor.

«Since, however, the whole of heaven had to persist, its parts – the stars in it – had to persist as well.» — la inferencia de 2.1.5 sobre la permanencia de los astros.

«For the other soul, by which we are ‘we’, is the cause of our well-being and not of our existence.» — la distinción de 2.1.5 entre el alma que nos hace ser y la que nos hace ser nosotros.

«From Timaeus’ having, then, made the body of the universe out of earth and fire in order that it might be» — 2.1.6 examina la composición del cuerpo del universo partiendo del Timeo.

«For it would seem odd to have any water among so much fire, and as for air, if it is present in heaven, i» — la dificultad que 2.1.6 le encuentra a poner agua y aire en el cielo.

«Nevertheless, we shall maintain that earth and water are immediately bound together because each contains» — la tesis que Plotino sostiene sobre la unión inmediata de tierra y agua.

«For they say that not even earth can be constituted without moisture, since water’s moisture is a cohesiv» — la opinión ajena que 2.1.6 recoge: la humedad como agente cohesivo de la tierra.

«But there is no necessity for fire to be present in earth.» — la negativa con que 2.1.7 responde a esa exigencia.

«And Plato gives evidence of this when he says ‘god kindled a light in the second revolution from the eart» — la cita del Timeo con que 2.1.7 apoya la naturaleza del sol.

«Actually, given that the kind of fire that produces the purest light is situated in the upper region and» — el reparto de los fuegos según su región en 2.1.7.

«So, heaven does not require another body in order to persist, nor again in order for its revolution to be» — la conclusión de 2.1.8 sobre la autosuficiencia del cielo.

«So, one must not say that the heavenly bodies require nourishment, either, nor should one make any statem» — y la negativa que la acompaña sobre el alimento de los astros.

«Why does it ‘move in a circle’?2 Because it is imitating Intellect.» — 2.2.1 abre el tratado del movimiento del cielo con la pregunta y la respuesta en una línea: gira porque imita al Intelecto. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«It is directed to itself, involves both perceptual and intellectual self-awareness, is vital,» — los rasgos que 2.2.1 le adjudica a ese movimiento: vuelto sobre sí y con conciencia de sí. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Perhaps the circular motion in question is also not spatial, or if it is, then only accidentally.» — la reserva que Plotino se guarda en 2.2.1 sobre el carácter espacial de ese movimiento.

«If it does not, then, move in a circle, it will be dispersed12 in a series of straight lines. It must, th» — la alternativa que 2.2.1 descarta: dispersión en líneas rectas. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«The centre of the circle naturally remains at rest, but if the outer periphery should remain at rest, it» — la imagen del círculo con que 2.2.2 explica el reposo del centro.

«But if soul is leading it around, it does not involve any toil on its part.» — y por qué ese giro no cuesta esfuerzo según 2.2.2.

«For each, right where it is, encompasses god and gives praise, not as the result of an act of calculative» — 2.2.3 describe el culto de los astros: cada uno abarca al dios y lo alaba donde está, y no por razonamiento.

«Now they [astrologers] actually claim that as they move, the planets2 not only produce states of poverty» — 2.3.1 abre la discusión con la astrología citando lo que los astrólogos sostienen sobre lo que producen los planetas. El corchete es del traductor y el tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Most importantly, they describe some planets as evil and others as good, and yet the ones that are called» — el reparo principal de 2.3.1: llamar malos a unos planetas y buenos a otros.

«Further, when the planets see one another, they cause one thing, and if they don’t, they cause something» — y el reparo a las configuraciones: que el efecto dependa de si los planetas se ven o no.

«We must consider whether these things moving [through heaven] are ensouled or without souls.» — la disyuntiva con que 2.3.2 ordena el examen.

«But [they will say] the planets are not doing this willingly; rather, they are forced to do so by their l» — la réplica que Plotino pone en boca de los astrólogos y que hace de los planetas instrumentos forzados.

«In fact, it is ridiculous for some planet to become different and to provide different gifts depending on» — el reparo de 2.3.3 a que un planeta cambie de naturaleza según su posición.

«Surely, each of them is always at the centre13 for some locations on earth and declining for others, and» — el argumento de la perspectiva terrestre: cada planeta está a la vez en el centro para unos lugares y declinando para otros. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«This claim is also unreasonable – that this planet delights in seeing that one, but when another p» — 2.3.4 sigue con los aspectos y llama irrazonable que un planeta se deleite al ver a otro.

«And regarding their claim that the moon’s coming together with this or that planet is good if it is indee» — 2.3.5 examina la doctrina de las conjunciones de la luna.

«For when it is full from our perspective, it would be completely dark to that planet, which is on the oth» — y el argumento óptico con que Plotino la objeta: la luna llena para nosotros está oscura para el planeta del otro lado.

«The one which they call ‘Zeus’ [Jupiter] is composed of fire in a wellbalanced mixture, and so, too, the» — 2.3.6 traduce las cualidades planetarias a mezclas de fuego. Los corchetes con el nombre latino son del traductor, y *wellbalanced* sale unido en la capa de texto.

«And Hermes [Mercury] is indifferent to all of them, as they think, being the same as all of them.» — la indiferencia que se le atribuye a Mercurio, consignada como opinión ajena.

«And to call this planet ‘Ares’ [Mars] and that planet ‘Aphrodite’ [Venus] and to claim they cause acts of» — y el reparo de 2.3.6 a nombrar los planetas por dioses y derivar de ahí sus efectos.

«But if these planets are signalling future events – just as we say many other things are indicative of th» — el giro decisivo de 2.3.7: los planetas como signos, no como causas.

«So, let us suppose that the stars are like letters always being written in heaven – or rather, already wr» — la imagen con que 2.3.7 fija esa doctrina: los astros como letras escritas en el cielo.

«The stars, then, are parts, and we are, too.» — el principio que sostiene la lectura de signos: astros y hombres son partes del mismo todo.

«Everything is full of signs, and the one who understands one thing on the basis of another is a wise man» — la fórmula de 2.3.7 sobre el mundo lleno de signos y el sabio que los lee.

«For the existence of a single system makes reasonable the prediction by means of birds and all the other» — y hasta dónde llega esa doctrina en 2.3.7: la unidad del sistema hace razonable también la adivinación por las aves.

«Wealth and poverty, then, are due to the chance encounter of external factors, but what about virtues and» — 2.3.8 separa los bienes externos de las virtudes al repartir causas.

«Virtues are due to the ancient state of soul,36 but vices to the soul’s chance encounter with external fa» — y el reparto que hace: las virtudes vienen del estado antiguo del alma. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«And in Timaeus, the god who is the producer of the cosmos provided ‘the soul’s principle’, and the gods m» — el apoyo que 2.3.9 toma del Timeo para el origen del principio del alma.

«These principles bind us to the stars, since we receive soul from them» — el vínculo con los astros que Plotino sí concede: recibimos de ellos alma.

«In fact, ‘we’ are what we truly are, the ones to whom nature provided the possibility of ruling over» — la definición del nosotros en 2.3.9 y la capacidad de gobierno que trae consigo.

«For this reason, ‘we must fly from here’44 and ‘separate’45 ourselves from our accretions» — el imperativo de fuga que 2.3.9 repite, con la separación de lo añadido. El tramo corta antes de las llamadas de nota.

«the stars do not merely signify for this person; rather, he himself becomes a part, in a way, and complie» — la diferencia que 2.3.9 marca según cómo se viva: quien se identifica con el compuesto queda dentro de lo que los astros hacen.

«And the sun and the other heavenly bodies are actually also double like this; they allow nothing objectio» — el desdoblamiento que 2.3.9 le adjudica también a los astros.

«the star’s power of choice, that is, its genuine soul, is looking towards what is best.» — y adónde mira la parte alta del astro según Plotino.

«If this is so, then we must admit even now that the stars signify the future.» — lo que 2.3.10 concede a la astrología después de haber negado lo demás.

«And we must take this, too, to heart; how the influences coming from the stars are not received in the wa» — y el principio con que 2.3.10 rebaja esas influencias: no se reciben como salieron.

«For not only are they not what they were there, they do not even remain such as they were when they arriv» — el remate de esa rebaja.

«Moreover, the influences of the stars actually combine into a single whole, and each of the living b» — 2.3.10 explica cómo actúan de hecho los astros: combinándose en un todo único.

«For the heavenly bodies do not produce the horse, but they do give something to the horse.» — la fórmula con que Plotino mide la aportación de los astros.

«The human being comes into being from the human being’s expressed principle, but sometimes the exter» — y el reparto entre el principio expresado y los factores externos en la generación.

«But when the matter dominates, the nature of the offspring does not, so that the offspring does not» — el caso en que la materia manda, según 2.3.12.

«And this should be our starting point: Soul is certainly managing this sensible universe in accordan» — el punto de partida que 2.3.13 declara para lo que sigue.

«But the nature [i.e. soul] of the rational living being has its charioteer from itself.» — la imagen del auriga en 2.3.13, con el corchete del traductor.

«It can effect a qualitative change in both directions – for the worse and for the better – but it ca» — lo que 2.3.13 concede al influjo externo y lo que le niega.

«But if virtue is responsible without the body, then we must grant most of the credit to virtue alone» — cómo reparte 2.3.14 el crédito entre la virtud y el cuerpo.

«And concerning marriages, it is either choice or chance and circumstance deriving from the universe.» — el reparto de causas para los matrimonios en 2.3.15.

«Lachesis reveals the lots, and Atropos necessarily brings these circumstances about without exceptio» — los nombres míticos con que 2.3.15 nombra el reparto y su cumplimiento.

«Rather, Soul must be much prior to the rest, inasmuch as it has the rank of a principle,75 and it mu» — el rango que 2.3.15 le reconoce al Alma: principio, y muy anterior a lo demás. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«No, rather there are expressed principles, though they are not there as productive agents but as kno» — cómo están los principios expresados en el Alma según 2.3.16: no como agentes productores.

«For example, men today differ from the men of old, because the expressed principles give way to the» — la consecuencia histórica que 2.3.16 saca de esa merma.

«The expressed principle forms and compels the better things to exist, but whatever is not such lies» — el alcance del principio expresado en 2.3.17.

«And so, there is ‘one from all’,84 where all come to be as either better or worse things, but exist» — la fórmula de la unidad del todo que 2.3.17 invoca. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But since it is referring to what is in it, there is no need of calculative reasoning.» — la razón por la que la producción del Alma no razona, según 2.3.18.

«For many or even all of them provide some benefit to the universe – poisonous snakes do, for example» — el argumento de 2.3.18 sobre la utilidad de lo aparentemente dañino, con su ejemplo.

«The first and the second principles are at rest, and the third is itself at rest but is also acciden» — el reparto de reposo y movimiento entre los tres primeros principios en 2.3.18.

«Matter is required for things that are coming to be and being made from one thing into another – it» — 2.4.3 define para qué hace falta materia.

«But in the intelligible world, matter is all things at once.» — la tesis de 2.4.3 sobre la materia inteligible.

«For although it is absolutely and in every way partless, there is still some sense in which it is di» — la dificultad que 2.4.4 se plantea sobre lo inteligible sin partes.

«If, on the other hand, it is eternal, there will be more than one principle and the primary Beings w» — la consecuencia que 2.4.2 saca de hacer eterna a la materia.

«Intellect discovers the duality19 of the composite body. For it divides until it arrives at somethin» — cómo el intelecto llega a la materia según 2.4.5: dividiendo hasta lo que ya no se divide. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But this dark underside among the intelligibles is different from the dark underside among the sensi» — la distinción que 2.4.5 traza entre las dos oscuridades.

«For once the divine matter has received that which defines it, it possesses a definite and intellect» — qué le pasa a la materia divina al recibir su determinación.

«The sensible matter, by contrast, does become something definite, but it has neither life nor intell» — y qué le falta a la sensible aun determinada.

«For this reason, even those22 who say that matter is substance should be taken to be speaking correc» — la concesión de 2.4.5 a quienes llaman sustancia a la materia. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«For the Forms are generated in the sense of having a principle from which they derive their b» — en qué sentido admite 2.4.5 que las Formas sean generadas.

«The Motion and Difference that are proceeding from the first24 are indefinite, and they require the» — el papel del Movimiento y la Diferencia en la génesis de la materia inteligible, en 2.4.5. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«That, then, there must be something that underlies bodies and is different from them is made clear b» — el argumento de 2.4.6 en favor de un sustrato distinto de los cuerpos.

«But they cannot be form. For how could they have mass and magnitude without matter?» — el dilema de 2.4.6 sobre los elementos.

«They are, therefore, composed of matter and form.» — y su conclusión.

«As for the [philosopher Anaximander] who posits the unlimited as matter,36 let him tell us what this» — la objeción de 2.4.7 a quien pone lo ilimitado por materia; el corchete con el nombre es del traductor. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But neither will atoms have the rank of matter, since they don’t even exist.» — la negativa de 2.4.7 a los átomos.

«For every body is entirely divisible.» — la razón que la sostiene.

«If it is indeed without quality, it is clear that it cannot be a body, since then it would possess a» — el argumento de 2.4.8 contra hacer cuerpo a la materia.

«Matter, though, should not be composite but rather something that is by its own nature simple and on» — la exigencia de simplicidad que 2.4.8 le pone a la materia.

«And in general, we must posit that every incorporeal nature is without quantity, and matter, too, is» — la regla general que 2.4.9 enuncia sobre lo incorpóreo y la cantidad.

«For even Quantity itself does not have a quantity; rather, it is what partakes of it that has one.» — el argumento con que 2.4.9 lo sostiene.

«So, it is clear from this, too, that Quantity is a Form.» — y lo que de ahí se sigue sobre la Cantidad.

«And just as with the eye, when colour is impossible to see, we see darkness, which is the matter of» — la comparación del ojo y la oscuridad con que 2.4.10 explica ese conocimiento.

«Thus, ‘matter’s lack of magnitude’ is just an empty expression.» — la objeción que 2.4.11 recoge y que va a responder.

«So, what is going to receive the form need not be mass; rather, the generation of mass can occur tog» — la respuesta de 2.4.11: lo que recibe la forma no tiene que ser masa.

«Matter, then, contributes greatly to bodies.» — el arranque de 2.4.12.

«So, matter is necessary for quality and for magnitude, and therefore also for bodies.» — la conclusión de 2.4.12.

«Is it, then, picked up by touch? No, because it is not a body.» — el recorrido de los sentidos que 2.4.12 hace para mostrar que la materia no se percibe.

«Rather, it is grasped by a type of reasoning that does not come from intellect, but one that operate» — y con qué se la capta entonces, según Plotino.

«But that is the issue that must be investigated, whether matter is a privation or whether privation» — la cuestión que 2.4.14 deja planteada sobre materia y privación.

«In fact, unlimitedness is double. And how do they differ? Just as an archetype and an image differ.» — la distinción de 2.4.15 entre dos ilimitados, por la relación de arquetipo e imagen.

«For the more an image has fled from existence and truth, the more unlimited it is.» — la proporción que 2.4.15 traza entre alejamiento del ser e ilimitación.

«And whereas the matter of things that are subject to generation is always taking on different forms» — la diferencia que 2.4.3 traza entre la materia de lo generado, que va tomando formas distintas, y la otra.

«For this reason, too, matter is also thoroughly dark, because the light is the expressed principle» — la metáfora de la luz y la oscuridad con que 2.4.5 sitúa la materia: oscura porque la luz es el principio expresado.

«But this is not in fact the case; on the contrary, it preserves it in existence.» — 2.4.16 niega que el límite destruya a lo ilimitado y sostiene lo contrario.

«Likewise, whenever the female desires the male, the female is not destroyed;74 rather she is made st» — la analogía con que 2.4.16 lo ilustra. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«In fact, if it were unlimited in quantity, it would be destroyed.» — la condición bajo la cual sí habría destrucción, según 2.4.16.

«But we must first say what ‘potentially’ means, if indeed ‘potentially’ should not be spoken of with» — 2.5.1 abre el tratado exigiendo definir el en potencia antes de usarlo.

«It is clear, then, that ‘is potentially’ is found among sensibles, but we must investigate whether i» — y dónde lo localiza de entrada.

«What is potentially is indeed like a kind of substrate underlying affections, shapes, and forms that» — la definición de lo que está en potencia que 2.5.1 propone.

«If this is indeed the case, what is potentially does not come to be actually; rather, what is actual» — la corrección que 2.5.2 le hace al modo corriente de hablar del paso de la potencia al acto.

«For again, what is actual is the complex, and not matter here and the form imposed on it there.» — y en qué consiste lo actual según Plotino: el compuesto.

«For the potentially wise Socrates is the identical man who becomes actually wise.» — el caso que 2.5.2 exceptúa: el sujeto que persiste.

«He is a knower due to his soul, and his soul was that which was potentially knowing, since it is int» — y dónde pone Plotino ese poder: en el alma.

«Even Aristotle, for example, says that the fifth body is immaterial.» — la adjudicación a Aristóteles que 2.5.3 recoge sobre el quinto cuerpo.

«In fact, it is because each intelligible being is form and is what it is perfectly.» — la razón por la que no hay potencia en lo inteligible, según 2.5.3.

«If then, matter is none of the beings, it is necessarily not even a being.» — el argumento de 2.5.4 sobre la materia y el ser.

«And it is not anything actually, since it is nothing in itself; rather, it is what it is – matter.» — y la fórmula con que 2.5.4 la deja siendo solo materia.

«Since, therefore, it has its truth in non-being, it is far from actually being any of the beings.» — la tesis de 2.5.5: la verdad de la materia está en el no ser.

«We must, therefore, say, as it seems, that matter exists only potentially, in order that it might be» — la conclusión del tratado 2.5.

«It is just like with the seed, where everything is together6 and each is everything and there is not» — la imagen de la semilla con que 2.6.1 explica la unidad de lo inteligible. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«For example, in a swan or ceruse 8 whiteness completes the essence, but in you it exists accidentall» — el ejemplo del cisne y el albayalde con que 2.6.2 distingue la cualidad que completa la esencia de la accidental. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«In fact, we should distinguish between two kinds of qualification such that the one is substantial a» — la distinción que 2.6.2 propone entre dos tipos de cualificación.

«For in the case of the swan the visible white is not essence-completing, since a swan could become n» — el criterio que Plotino aplica al cisne.

«Hence, we are always making mistakes about what something is, slipping up in our investigations into» — la consecuencia epistemológica que 2.6.3 saca de esa confusión.

«And it only makes sense that this happens in the case of sensible things, since none of them is Subs» — y por qué el error es propio de lo sensible.

«In fact, it is not a quality; rather, form is an expressed principle.» — la corrección de 2.6.3 sobre el estatuto de la forma.

«In fact, we should not say that those things which are said to complete the substance are qualities,» — la regla que 2.6.3 fija para lo que completa la sustancia.

«In fact, it is because intelligible qualities do not indicate what sort of thing something is, nor d» — la diferencia entre las cualidades inteligibles y las sensibles según 2.6.3.

«We must look into the so-called complete blending of bodies.» — 2.7.1 abre el tratado de la mezcla completa.

«We can leave aside those thinkers who attribute this to juxtaposition, since they are having the bod» — la primera posición que Plotino aparta.

«Some thinkers, then, have only the qualities fusing together while juxtaposing the matter of each of» — la segunda posición que 2.7.1 examina.

«On the other side are those thinkers who introduce complete blending.» — la posición contraria en 2.7.1.

«For just as the other qualities are not destroyed, neither should the magnitude be destroyed, and ju» — el argumento de simetría con que 2.7.1 defiende la magnitud.

«But if the papyrus received a magnitude, some mass has been added to it; and if mass has been added» — el caso del papiro con que 2.7.2 mide la adición de masa.

«Because, when one quality joins another quality, it is not simply the quality it was but is together» — lo que 2.7.2 sostiene sobre lo que resulta al juntarse dos cualidades.

«They cannot pass through solids because they have such qualities as prevent passing through.» — la explicación que 2.7.3 da de la impenetrabilidad, por cualidades y no por materia.

«Or else because it is only accidentally that magnitude is seen, since colour is the primary object o» — la segunda explicación que 2.8.1 ofrece: la magnitud se ve por accidente, porque el objeto primario de la vista es el color.

«Yet colours become dim with distance, not small; it is magnitudes that become small.» — la asimetría que 2.8.1 observa entre el color y la magnitud a distancia.

«But when all of the components are seen, we measure them accurately and know their magnitudes.» — la condición que 2.8.1 pone para medir bien: ver todos los componentes del intervalo.

«Distant things seem smaller to those seeing them because light tends to get contracted to fit» — 2.8.1 abre el tratado de la visión a distancia con la explicación por contracción de la luz. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen.

«And objects far away appear close by because the length of the interval separating them from us is s» — el caso inverso que 2.8.2 explica por el mismo principio, el acortamiento aparente del intervalo.

«For Intellect just is as it is; always the same and established in a steady state of activity.» — 2.9.1 fija la unidad del Intelecto contra quienes lo desdoblan.

«So, we ought not to posit any more principles than these nor any superfluous conceptual distinctions amon» — la regla de economía con que 2.9.1 cierra: nada de principios de más.

«For it is not licit for the worse part to drag the entire soul down.» — 2.9.2 niega que la parte peor del alma arrastre al alma entera.

«This soul of the universe granted to the body of the universe the possession of as much of it as it can p» — la relación entre el alma del universo y su cuerpo según 2.9.3.

«Since it is always in a state of illumination, then, and possesses this light unceasingly, the soul [of t» — por qué el alma del universo no decae según 2.9.3; el corchete es del traductor.

«Rather, it is necessary that each give of itself to another; neither would the Good be Good, nor would th» — el principio de la donación que 2.9.3 enuncia: cada cosa da de sí a otra, y sin eso ni el Bien sería Bien.

«So, it is necessary that all things be always in succession, and those other than that which is first are» — la consecuencia sobre el orden de procesión en 2.9.3.

«So, the intelligibles that are said to be ‘generated’ did not come into being; rather, they were and will» — cómo entiende 2.9.3 que los inteligibles sean generados.

«Even if its recollection is murky, would it not rather incline towards the intelligible world in order no» — la pregunta con que 2.9.4 objeta la caída culpable del Alma.

«And one must not insist on the badness of the sensible cosmos’ generated state on account of its having m» — el reparo de 2.9.4 a cargarle al cosmos su estado generado.

«It is outrageous that these men who have bodies such as human beings have, as well as appetites, pains, a» — el reparo que 2.9.5 dirige a quienes desprecian el cosmos teniendo ellos cuerpo, apetitos y dolores.

«And it is outrageous to say that our soul – even the soul of the basest of human beings – is immortal and» — y la tesis gnóstica que 2.9.5 consigna para objetarla: que el alma del peor de los hombres sea inmortal y divina y no lo sean el cielo y los astros.

«But they do not honour this creation or this earth, claiming that for them a ‘new earth’» — el dato doctrinal que 2.9.5 consigna: la tierra nueva de esos adversarios. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«According to them, immediately after the paradigm was produced its creator inclined towards the sensible» — el relato que 2.9.6 les atribuye sobre el paradigma y su creador.

«then this is just the jargon of men trying to market their own school.» — la fórmula con que 2.9.6 califica ese vocabulario.

«It is as if, having never been exposed to the time-honoured language33 of the Greeks, they make this voca» — y de dónde dice Plotino que sale ese vocabulario: de no haber frecuentado la lengua antigua de los griegos. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«For, in general, these men have drawn some of their material from Plato, while the rest consists of innov» — el reparto que 2.9.6 hace de la doctrina adversaria entre lo tomado de Platón y lo innovado.

«And, in general, they are wrong about the manner of creation and» — el cargo de 2.9.6 sobre su lectura de Platón.

«And by naming a multiplicity of intelligibles, they think they will appear to have discovered the precise» — el reparo a la multiplicación de inteligibles.

«There are no hard feelings if they tell us in which respects they intend to disagree with Plato, but they» — la distinción que 2.9.6 hace entre discrepar de Platón y hacerlo sin decirlo.

«It has, then, already been stated49 that this sensible cosmos neither started existing nor will stop exis» — la tesis cosmológica que 2.9.7 recuerda. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«And these men were not the first to say that our soul’s association with the body is not the preferred [m» — el dato de linaje que 2.9.7 opone a la novedad del adversario; el corchete es del traductor.

«But the soul of the universe itself could not be bound by the things that are bound by it.» — la asimetría que 2.9.7 fija entre el alma del universo y los cuerpos.

«For example, if some shoot is grafted onto another plant, and this plant suffers some affection, the shoo» — la comparación del injerto con que 2.9.7 explica el contagio de afecciones.

«For neither is fire in its entirety extinguished when the fire in you is extinguished since even if all f» — la comparación del fuego con que 2.9.7 separa el todo de la parte.

«For the constitution is not the same in the universe and in an individual living being.» — la diferencia de constitución que 2.9.7 declara entre el universo y el viviente particular.

«This is comparable to the case of a great company of dancers moving in order with a tortoise being strand» — la imagen del coro de danzantes y la tortuga con que 2.9.7 explica lo que perece por no seguir al todo.

«To ask why Soul has created the cosmos is identical to [their] asking why there is Soul and why th» — cómo 2.9.8 desarma la pregunta del adversario; el corchete es del traductor.

«We must, then, teach these men, if they will kindly suffer our teaching, what the nature of these things» — el tono con que Plotino se dirige a ellos en 2.9.8.

«For if there is only the intelligible, there is nothing further beneath it [in the order of procession],» — el argumento de 2.9.8 sobre la necesidad de lo que sigue a lo inteligible; el corchete es del traductor.

«But if a cosmos is necessary and there is no other cosmos, then our cosmos is the one that preserves the» — y la conclusión que 2.9.8 saca sobre este cosmos.

«For the entire earth is indeed filled with all kinds of living beings including immortal ones, and everyt» — la descripción de la tierra llena de vivientes con que 2.9.8 responde al desprecio del mundo.

«Even if you are murdered, you got what you wanted.» — la réplica cortante de 2.9.9 a quien se queja del mundo.

«And if you are now set on complaining about the world, there is no necessity for you to remain a citizen» — y la salida que Plotino les ofrece en la misma línea.

«And if these gods are not what that god is, this is only natural. But if you insist on despising these go» — 2.9.9 admite la diferencia entre los dioses visibles y el dios, y objeta el desprecio de aquellos.

«And it is possible to the extent that Intellect leads it. But wanting to go beyond Intellect is already t» — el límite que 2.9.9 le pone a la aspiración del adversario: querer pasar del Intelecto ya es salirse.

«Foolish people are sold on accounts such as these as soon as they hear ‘You will be superior not only to» — cómo explica 2.9.9 el atractivo de esa doctrina: la promesa de ser superior a todo.

«For one should not be focused on one’s heart’s desires but on the whole universe.» — la regla de mirada que 2.9.9 opone al reclamo del adversario.

«But we are not addressing the Gnostics themselves – 10 15 20 25 30 5 for there is no other means left to» — 2.9.10 declara a quién se dirige realmente el tratado: no a los gnósticos sino a los propios discípulos. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen.

«They claim that soul fell down as did a certain Wisdom88 – regardless of whether soul started it, or whet» — la doctrina que 2.9.10 les atribuye sobre la caída del alma y de una Sabiduría. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«they generate what they call the Demiurge, and by making him reject his mother,89 they drag» — y el resto del relato que 2.9.10 les atribuye: el Demiurgo que reniega de su madre.

«First, then, if it did not go down but merely illuminated the darkness, how can it be right to say that i» — la objeción de 2.9.10 a la fórmula de la iluminación de las tinieblas.

«Next, even this rational conception of the cosmos, which they call ‘the foreign earth’91 and which was br» — el término que 2.9.11 les atribuye para el paradigma. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Next, is it not extraordinary that they themselves came down into this cosmos not as images of souls but» — el reparo de 2.9.11 a que ellos se exceptúen de lo que dicen de las demás almas.

«But perhaps they themselves would have created the cosmos this way, since they are in possession of genui» — la ironía con que 2.9.12 responde a la crítica del Demiurgo.

«But if it is unnatural, then what is unnatural will already be present in the intelligible world,» — el dilema de 2.9.12 sobre el origen del mal.

«This is because they do not know the ordered sequence of what comes first, second, third,104 and so on, c» — el cargo de 2.9.13: desconocer el orden de las hipóstasis. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«The person, therefore, who complains about the nature of the cosmos does not know what he is doing, nor d» — la consecuencia que 2.9.13 saca de ese desconocimiento.

«rather, one should graciously allow each thing to have its own nature, while oneself pursuing» — la regla que Plotino opone: dejar a cada cosa su naturaleza.

«For whenever they compose ‘charms’ in the belief that they are addressing those higher Beings – not only» — 2.9.14 pasa a la práctica del adversario: los ensalmos que componen creyendo dirigirse a los Seres superiores. Es uno de los lugares donde el tratado trata de operaciones mágicas.

«And when they claim that they purge diseases, if what they mean is that purging is due to self-control an» — la distinción con que 2.9.14 acepta una parte de su terapéutica y rechaza otra.

«Those, however, who consider the matter carefully will not be fooled into thinking that diseases have any» — la posición de Plotino sobre la etiología demoníaca de las enfermedades.

«So, if the daemon is famished and the drug turns the contents of the stomach into liquid, does it at that» — el argumento reductivo con que 2.9.14 examina la idea del demonio expulsado por una droga.

«I leave it to you to examine their other claims by reading their writings and especially to contemplate t» — cómo remite Plotino a sus discípulos a los propios escritos del adversario en 2.9.14.

«The kind of philosophy that we pursue brings out, in addition to all its other benefits, simplicity of ch» — lo que Plotino reclama para su propia filosofía en 2.9.14, y que es uno de los pocos lugares donde el texto habla de sí mismo como escuela.

«There are two schools of thought concerning the achievement of life’s goal.» — el reparto con que 2.9.15 ordena el examen del fin de la vida.

«Now Epicurus did away with providence and prescribes the pursuit 10 15 20 25 30 35 of pleasure and enjoyi» — la doctrina de Epicuro que 2.9.15 consigna para comparar. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen.

«If, however, they are already in possession of their ‘gnosis’, then they ought to be pursuing this someth» — el término del adversario que Plotino cita entre comillas en 2.9.15.

«In fact, it is virtue that leads one to the goal and that reveals god, when it is present in the soul tog» — la tesis de 2.9.15 sobre la virtud como vía.

«But again, to have disdain for the cosmos, the cosmic gods, and its other beautiful parts is not to becom» — el reparo de 2.9.16 al desprecio del cosmos.

«But if they have come to despise the nature of body because they heard Plato disparaging body for» — 2.9.17 identifica de dónde toman el desprecio del cuerpo y lo separa de lo que Platón sostiene.

«Next, beauty in a part is not identical to beauty in a whole, nor is beauty in all parts [individually] i» — la distinción de 2.9.17 entre la belleza de la parte y la del todo; el corchete es del traductor.

«But perhaps it is impossible for something that is really beautiful on the outside to be ugly on the insi» — la tesis que 2.9.17 propone sobre el acuerdo de dentro y fuera.

«For whatever is beautiful in its entirety on the outside, is something whose inside has dominated it.» — y la razón en que la funda.

«But as long as we have a body, we must remain in the houses constructed for us by our sister-soul,136 a g» — la imagen con que 2.9.18 fija la relación debida con el cuerpo: casas construidas por el alma hermana. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«The soul of the cosmos, then, remains unfazed, since there is nothing that could faze it.» — la impasibilidad del alma del cosmos según 2.9.18.

«But we who live down here can repel the fazing blows through virtue, some of them being rendered smaller» — y lo que nos queda a nosotros según el mismo capítulo.

«And if they should actually claim that they alone are capable of contemplation, this doesn’t make them co» — el último reparo del tratado 2.9, contra la pretensión de exclusividad contemplativa.

«But if all things come to be because of a cause, it is easy to grasp the 25 30 5 10 15 immediate causes o» — la regla causal que 3.1.1 enuncia. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen.

«Others,12 claiming that the motion of the universe contains and produces everything by means of» — 3.1.2 sigue el censo de doctrinas causales con la que hace del movimiento del universo la causa de todo. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«One would not be too far from the truth in dividing all these philosophers in turn into two gro» — cómo reparte 3.1.2 a esos filósofos en dos grupos.

«On this view, neither prophecy nor mantic could exist at all, nor what is produced from a craft» — el argumento de 3.1.3 contra el azar de los átomos: con él no habría ni profecía ni arte.

«And what about when the soul actually opposes the affections of the body?» — la objeción de 3.1.4 a la causalidad corpórea.

«our own function and our essence as a living being will be altogether destroyed as we are carri» — y lo que se pierde con ella: la función propia y la esencia de viviente.

«But we must grant to ourselves what is ours while admitting that some things come from the univ» — la fórmula de reparto que 3.1.5 propone entre lo nuestro y lo que viene del universo.

«We admit also that things come to us from regions and differences of environment, for example,» — lo que 3.1.5 concede al medio y al lugar.

«But if they conclude that events are caused by the stars from the fact that they foretell what» — el paso indebido que 3.1.5 le imputa a la astrología: de predecir a causar.

«So, whenever they say of nobility that it comes from famous fathers and mothers, how is it poss» — el contraejemplo de la herencia con que Plotino objeta la causalidad astral.

«Indeed, individual things come about through their own natures; a horse comes into being» — el principio que 3.1.6 opone: cada cosa viene por su propia naturaleza.

«We grant that the revolution of the universe can also cooperate – even though it concedes most» — y lo que 3.1.6 le concede a la revolución del universo: cooperar.

«We should rather say that their motion contributes to the preservation of the universe as a who» — qué papel le deja 3.1.6 al movimiento de los astros.

«It remains to look at the principle, assumed to be one, which interweaves and in a way links to» — el giro de 3.1.7 hacia la doctrina del principio único que entreteje las causas.

«And any act of ours will be like that of other living beings and of children who proceed by bli» — lo que quedaría de la acción humana bajo esa doctrina, según 3.1.7.

«When it is without body it is most in control of itself, free and outside the influence of cosm» — la tesis de 3.1.8 sobre la libertad del alma sin cuerpo.

«The superior soul controls more, the inferior less; for when the soul yields something to the c» — la proporción que 3.1.8 traza entre perfección del alma y control.

«But the best actions come from us; for this is our nature when we are alone.» — la fórmula con que 3.1.9 adjudica al alma sola las mejores acciones.

«The nature of Intellect and Being is the true and primary cosmos, one that is not separated fro» — la tesis de 3.2.1: el cosmos verdadero y primario es el Intelecto y el Ser.

«And since it is everywhere one and perfect at every point, it remains stable and does not enter» — la estabilidad que 3.2.1 le adjudica por ser uno y perfecto en todo punto.

«Rather, the ability to produce something by itself belongs to what is not completely in a satis» — el principio que 3.2.1 enuncia sobre quién produce y por qué.

«For the [true cosmos] is blessed precisely because it achieves great things by not producing an» — y la paradoja con que lo cierra; el corchete es del traductor.

«So, Intellect, while giving something of itself to matter, fashioned everything while remaining» — cómo produce el Intelecto según 3.2.2: dando de sí y permaneciendo.

«For this reason, it had need of the harmony produced by the coming together of ‘Intellect and n» — la fórmula del Timeo que 3.2.2 vuelve a traer para el mundo sensible.

«And it isn’t reasonable for anyone to find fault even with this world as not being beaut» — el giro de 3.2.3 en defensa de la belleza de este mundo.

«So, the person who finds fault with the whole because of the parts would be off target in his c» — la falla de método que 3.2.3 le encuentra a la queja contra el mundo.

«For you must not expect equal attributes in things that are not equal.» — la regla que 3.2.3 opone a esa queja.

«For you don’t ask a finger to see.» — y el ejemplo con que la vuelve evidente.

«Human injustices against each other, however, might have as their cause the desire for the Good» — la causa que 3.2.4 le encuentra a la injusticia entre hombres: el deseo del Bien mal dirigido.

«order does not exist because of disorder nor law because of lawlessness, as one philosopher thi» — la inversión que 3.2.4 objeta a un filósofo no nombrado.

«But living beings which have autonomous motion can incline someti» — lo que 3.2.4 le reconoce al viviente con movimiento propio.

«Only the good are happy and it is for the same reason that the gods, too, are happy.» — la tesis de 3.2.5 sobre la felicidad.

«some things, such as poverty and illness, make a positive contribution to the very people who s» — lo que 3.2.5 le concede a la pobreza y a la enfermedad.

«and that this is the sign of the greatest power, to be able to make good use even of evils and» — la fórmula con que 3.2.5 mide la potencia mayor.

«In general, then, evil must be considered to be a lack of goodness, but the lack of goodness mu» — la definición del mal que 3.2.5 repite.

«For this reason, ‘evils will not be done away with’;29 both because some things are less than o» — la sentencia de Platón que 3.2.5 asume sobre la permanencia de los males. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Just as it makes no difference even if the bad man is handsome in body and the good man is ugly» — el argumento de 3.2.6 sobre los bienes externos y el mérito.

«It is, then, not appropriate that we who allow that ‘responsibility lies with the chooser’33 sh» — la fórmula del mito de Er que 3.2.7 asume. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But it is neither pious nor respectful to blame the product by conceding that some of its parts» — el reparo de 3.2.7 a culpar al producto entero por sus partes.

«But the reality is that he lies between gods and beasts, and inclines in both directions, and s» — el lugar intermedio que 3.2.8 le da al ser humano.

«For it is not those who pray but those who take care of the land who harvest the fruits, nor do» — la regla práctica con que 3.2.8 acota la eficacia de la plegaria.

«And this is what living by the law of providence means, actually doing what its law dictates.» — la definición de vivir según la providencia en 3.2.9.

«But we, like those unskilled in the craft of painting, find fault when the colours are not beau» — la comparación con la pintura en 3.2.11: el reparo a los colores oscuros que el cuadro necesita.

«In fact, if someone were to criticize a play b» — y la comparación con la obra de teatro, en la que el reparo cae por sí solo.

«Someone who once murdered his mother will become a woman and be murdered by her child54 and one» — la ley de compensación que 3.2.13 enuncia con su ejemplo. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Hence, we have the name ‘Adrasteia’55 by divine decree. For this ordering of things is truly Ad» — el nombre que 3.2.13 le da a ese ordenamiento. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«For all that is divine produces in accord with its own nature. And its nature is in accord with» — el principio con que 3.2.13 cierra ese punto.

«From here we may perceive a sort of great and beautiful statue,60 whether it has come into bein» — la imagen de la estatua con que 3.2.14 mira el universo. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«We must look upon murders and every kind of death, and the capture and plundering of cities as» — la mirada que 3.2.15 propone sobre las muertes y los saqueos: como cambios de escena.

«And we should also bear in mind that one should not take tears and lamentation as evidence for» — y la advertencia sobre las lágrimas como prueba.

«It would be as if a poet created an actor in one of his plays who insulted and ran down the aut» — la imagen con que 3.2.16 devuelve la objeción del adversario.

«So, the activity of life is craftlike, just as someone dancing could be said to be in motion.» — la definición de la actividad de la vida en 3.2.16, con su comparación.

«For although it is at war with itself through its parts, it is one and harmonious just as the p» — cómo convive el conflicto con la armonía en 3.2.16.

«But since it is an expressed principle, it contains differences within itself and the most extr» — por qué el principio expresado tiene que contener diferencias, según 3.2.17.

«Turning over the substantiality and constitution of this universe to spontaneity or to chance» — 3.2.1 abre el tratado de la providencia negando que la sustancialidad y la constitución de este universo vengan de lo espontáneo o del azar; es el íncipit que Porfirio cita en su catálogo con el número 47.

«Now in the case of eternal Beings,2 it is not possible to trace those of them that are first» — 3.1.1 abre el tratado del destino distinguiendo lo que tiene causa de lo primero, que no la tiene.

«He does not appoint them as leading actor, second or third actor, but by giving each of th» — la imagen del director de escena con que 3.2.17 explica el reparto de papeles.

«In human dramas, then, the author provides the words while each of the actors has it from» — la diferencia que 3.2.17 marca entre el drama humano y el real.

«And this whole universe is beautiful, not if each of us is a Linus,75 but if each by contr» — cómo 3.2.17 funda la belleza del todo en la diferencia y no en la igualdad. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«And their discordant sounds are subsumed in the beauty of the whole and what is contrary t» — y qué hace el todo con los sonidos discordes.

«For the fitting and beautiful is found in the whole if each is placed where he should be,» — la regla de lugar que 3.2.17 enuncia.

«But souls are concordant with each other and so, too, are their deeds.» — la concordia de las almas que 3.3.1 sostiene.

«For when all things are set in motion from a single principle, they come together in a uni» — el principio de unidad de movimiento en 3.3.1.

«Chance circumstances are not of prime importance for the good life, yet even they follow f» — lo que 3.3.2 concede a las circunstancias.

«The ruling principle weaves all together, each side making its contribution in accord with» — la imagen del tejido con que 3.3.2 describe el principio rector.

«Everything has been arranged by the general’s providence which keeps an eye on actions and» — la comparación militar con que 3.3.2 describe la providencia.

«So, living beings that come into being are not only souls, but diminutions of souls, a sor» — la fórmula con que 3.3.3 describe a los vivientes generados.

«And this whole expressed principle does indeed become less as it hastens into matter and w» — la merma del principio expresado al entrar en la materia, en 3.3.3.

«So, it turns out that blame should rest on people who have come into being and that the wo» — adónde lleva 3.3.4 la responsabilidad.

«But as it is, only a human being, when he is bad, is deserving of blame and this is, I thi» — por qué solo el ser humano es culpable según 3.3.4.

«For he is not only what he has been made to be, but he possesses another principle which i» — y la razón que lo sostiene: tiene otro principio.

«And one might trace back an individual’s character to his previous life,12 his expressed p» — 3.3.5 remite el carácter a la vida anterior. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«And it is to the events of previous lives that we must trace back the calculation insofar as» — y a qué remite Plotino el cálculo de lo que a cada quien toca.

«Fate commences from the inferior part while what is above is just providence.» — la línea con que 3.3.5 separa el destino de la providencia.

«And so, evil deeds20 are linked with good ones but are not brought about by providence» — cómo se enlazan las malas acciones con la providencia sin venir de ella, en 3.3.5. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«For example, Helen’s beauty had one effect on Paris, whereas Idomeneus did not experience» — el ejemplo con que 3.3.5 muestra que la misma causa no produce el mismo efecto.

«For it is not the role of the diviner to indicate the cause, but only the fact» — el límite que 3.3.6 le pone al adivino: dice el hecho, no la causa.

«When the soul leaves the body, however, it becomes that which predominated in it.» — la ley de 3.4.2 sobre lo que el alma llega a ser al salir del cuerpo.

«And so, those who maintain their humanity will return as human beings,11 while those who l» — el reparto de renacimientos que 3.4.2 deriva de esa ley. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Those who pursued astronomy and were always raising themselves to heaven, but without wisd» — el caso del astrónomo sin sabiduría en el reparto de 3.4.2.

«The human being who practises civic virtue will become a human being, but one who shared t» — y el de quien practica la virtud cívica.

«This is why it is rightly said that ‘we will choose’.» — la fórmula del mito de Er que 3.4.5 asume sobre la elección.

«But if he can follow the daemon which is above him, he comes himself to be above, living t» — la promesa de 3.4.6: seguir al daimon de arriba es subir uno mismo.

«And we abide with all the rest of the intelligible parts above, but are tied to the sensib» — la doble sede del alma que 3.4.6 describe.

«For in Timaeus, 33 he bears witness that this daemon is not entirely outside» — el apoyo del Timeo para que el daimon no sea del todo externo. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«In fact, then, he is himself a daemon or on the level of a daemon and his daemon is a god.» — el escalón más alto de 3.4.6: quien vive arriba es él mismo daimon y su daimon es dios.

«He actually stated that it is not only an affection which occurs in the souls,1 but he als» — 3.5.1 abre el tratado del amor recordando que no es solo una afección del alma. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Nature comes into being from the intelligible world, from the Good and, clearly, from Beau» — el origen que 3.5.1 le da a la naturaleza.

«And if they come to a recollection of the archetype from the beauty of this world, the lat» — la función anamnética que 3.5.1 le da a la belleza de aquí.

«And the person whose love of beauty is pure, will love beauty alone whether he has recalle» — el criterio de pureza del amor en 3.5.1.

«But those who want to generate illicitly and contrary to nature, take their start on the n» — y el caso contrario que 3.5.1 consigna.

«The first group are better, but both the first and the second are self-controlled.» — la gradación que 3.5.2 hace entre los amantes.

«For the desire for the Good often involves the fall into evil.» — la fórmula con que 3.5.2 explica la caída desde el deseo del Bien.

«The former is ‘motherless’ and transcends marriages because there are no marriages in heav» — la lectura alegórica de las dos Afroditas en 3.5.2.

«And we must think that there are many Aphrodites, too, in the universe, becoming daemons i» — la multiplicación de Afroditas y Amores que 3.5.4 deriva de las muchas almas.

«So, this individual Love leads each soul to the nature of the Good; the Love of the higher» — qué hace cada Amor según 3.5.4.

«So, we must grasp how we manage to distinguish gods from daemons.» — la cuestión que 3.5.6 plantea.

«But it is better to call nothing in the intelligible world a daemon; rather, if there is t» — la regla de nomenclatura que 3.5.6 propone.

«And yet many people think that the substantiality of a daemon as daemon is accompanied by» — la opinión corriente sobre el cuerpo del daimon, consignada en 3.5.6.

«Hence, we must suppose, too, that the good persons in the sensible world focus their love» — cómo se reparte el amor entre los hombres según 3.5.7.

«But the loves of those who have fallen into ways contrary to nature are all pathological s» — y cómo llama 3.5.7 a los amores contra naturaleza.

«But more clearly in Philebus when he says that ‘in Zeus there is a royal» — la cita del Filebo con que 3.5.8 identifica a Zeus.

«But myths, if indeed they are going to be myths, must separate temporally their narrative» — la regla de lectura del mito que 3.5.9 enuncia: el mito separa en el tiempo lo que no está separado.

«And so, Love has of necessity always existed as a result of Soul’s desire to attain what i» — la conclusión de 3.5.9 sobre la eternidad del Amor.

«For that which is completely devoid of good would certainly never search for the Good.» — el principio con que 3.5.9 explica la mezcla de carencia y recurso en el Amor.

«Human beings, then, have another principle, although not all human beings use everything» — el límite que 3.3.4 le pone al privilegio del principio propio: no todos lo usan del todo.

«says that a soul enters into other living beings, in a sense becoming diffe» — la doctrina de la transmigración que 3.3.5 adjudica a Platón: el alma entra en otros vivientes volviéndose en cierto modo distinta.

«If the active part of us is that by which we make use of our faculty of sense-perception,» — 3.4.3 identifica qué parte de nosotros obra: aquella con la que usamos la percepción.

«It is not appropriate to disbelieve that Love is a real existent, that is, a Substance» — la tesis de 3.5.3: el Amor es un existente real y una sustancia.

«But we must rather consider that non-rational expressed principles and unaffecting af» — 3.6.1 fija los términos del tratado sobre la impasibilidad del alma.

«For we do talk about having to ‘remove’ evil, as though there were some evil present» — el modo de hablar que 3.6.2 pone a examen: quitar el mal como si fuera algo presente.

«When we say, then, that ‘virtue’ is a ‘harmony’ and ‘vice a discord’,8 would we be ex» — las definiciones corrientes de virtud y vicio que 3.6.2 recoge. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But nothing is added to it; rather, it just does exactly what it is by nature.» — la fórmula con que 3.6.3 niega que al alma se le añada nada.

«Just as in sight when seeing is active, the eye is what is affected, so beliefs are l» — la analogía del ojo con que 3.6.3 localiza la afección en el órgano y no en el alma.

«To deny that alterations and intense perceptions of them occur in the soul is the sig» — la salvedad con que 3.6.3 evita el extremo contrario: negar toda alteración sería contrario a la evidencia.

«Now shame is in the soul when a belief about something base occurs to it, but the bod» — el reparto entre alma y cuerpo en la vergüenza, según 3.6.3.

«And what we call fear has its origin in the soul, but the paleness comes from the blo» — y el mismo reparto en el miedo.

«But this ‘part’ of soul, the faculty of affection, is not a body but a kind of form.» — la tesis de 3.6.4 sobre la facultad afectiva.

«But what could be meant by the ‘purification’ of the soul when the soul is never stai» — la dificultad que 3.6.5 se plantea sobre el sentido de purificar lo que no se mancha.

«In fact, purification would be leaving it alone and not with others or not looking at» — y la respuesta que propone: dejarla sola y no mirar hacia lo otro.

«But since matter, too, is one of the things without body, even if in a different way,» — el giro de 3.6.6 hacia la segunda impasibilidad, la de la materia.

«And this is what is totally real and it is that which ‘gives away’36 nothing of its e» — cómo define 3.6.6 lo totalmente real. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Indeed, if we are correct in stating this, Being must also be alive, that is, having» — la consecuencia que 3.6.6 saca sobre el Ser: tiene que estar vivo.

«For this reason, it is eternal, stable, never receives anything and nothing enters it» — los atributos que 3.6.6 le adjudica por lo mismo.

«But real awakening is a rising up from the body, not with it.» — la fórmula con que 3.6.6 enmienda la idea corriente de despertar.

«Yet it is neither soul nor intellect nor li» — la serie de negaciones con que 3.6.7 describe la materia.

«For this reason, everything which it» — la fórmula con que 3.6.7 llama mentira a todo lo que la materia anuncia.

«Light is a particularly good example since it doesn’t even cause an alteration of sha» — el ejemplo de la luz con que 3.6.9 explica una acción que no altera.

«Then, just as a thing which suffers damage is not damaged by any chance encounter, so» — el principio de la afección selectiva en 3.6.9.

«Indeed, what has no opposition would not be affected by any opposite.» — y su consecuencia sobre la materia.

«This would result in it no longer being the ‘all-receiver’53 since it would obstruct» — el término del Timeo que 3.6.10 usa para la materia. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Hence, this is why I think that Plato, too, thought this issue through and expresse» — cómo 3.6.11 adjudica a Platón la misma tesis sobre la materia.

«But matter does not gain anything extra for its constitution from anything coming to» — lo que 3.6.11 le niega a la materia en toda participación.

«And so, its participation is not, as people think, the participation of something aff» — y cómo queda entonces la participación según 3.6.12.

«But this is identical to being incapable of being affected.» — la equivalencia con que 3.6.12 cierra el punto.

«For the phrase ‘receives the shapes of air and water’ tones down the mention of being» — cómo lee 3.6.13 la fórmula del Timeo sobre la receptora de figuras.

«And the expression, which is also criticized,73 where Plato calls it the ‘place’ of F» — la expresión de Platón que 3.6.14 defiende. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«For this reason, then, the images in mirrors are not believed to exist or to exist to» — la comparación de los espejos con que 3.6.14 mide el ser de lo que aparece en la materia.

«And the beggar asks not for what the giver has, but is in love with whatever he can g» — la imagen del mendigo con que 3.6.14 describe a la materia.

«For the soul has within itself activities and opposing expressed principles by which» — lo que el alma tiene y la materia no, según 3.6.15.

«But matter, because it is much weaker in power than soul and possesses nothing of Bei» — y la razón de la debilidad de la materia.

«So, the matter would not get anything from the shape or magnitude.» — la conclusión de 3.6.16.

«Yet, matter still preserves its own nature and makes use of size like a cloak which i» — la imagen del manto con que 3.6.18 describe la relación de la materia con la magnitud.

«The forms, then, that enter the matter as their ‘mother’88 do it no harm or good.» — el nombre mítico que 3.6.19 pone a examen. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«‘receptacle’ and ‘nurse’ are more appropriate names for it, but ‘mother’ is applied m» — los nombres que 3.6.19 prefiere para la materia frente al de madre.

«Hence, I think, the wise men, too, of long ago, speak allegorically91 in their mystic» — cómo lee 3.6.19 las representaciones de los ritos mistéricos antiguos: los sabios de antaño hablaban por alegoría. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«And although we should consider that some of the ancient and blessed philosophers hav» — el arranque de 3.7.1, que es una declaración de método sobre los antiguos.

«But if someone were to imagine what time is before achieving a clear vision of eterni» — el orden que 3.7.1 impone: primero la eternidad.

«So, eternity is not the substrate but that which, in a way, shines forth from the sub» — la definición de eternidad que 3.7.3 propone.

«And so, that which neither was nor will be but is only,17 and has stable existence be» — cómo describe 3.7.3 lo eterno por los tiempos que le faltan. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But the primary and blessed Beings do not even have a desire for» — lo que 3.7.4 les niega a los Seres primarios: el deseo de lo por venir.

«And our conception tells us that it is identical with god, meaning this god [Intellec» — la identificación que 3.7.5 hace de la eternidad con el dios; el corchete es del traductor.

«And eternity could be well described as god displaying and manifesting itself for wha» — la fórmula con que 3.7.5 define la eternidad.

«If then, neither future nor past is relevant to it, ‘is’ is the most truthful thing o» — la consecuencia gramatical que 3.7.6 saca sobre lo eterno.

«Perhaps it would have been better to use only the phrase ‘that which is’.» — la corrección que 3.7.6 propone al uso de siempre.

«But because of the existence of the pretence of philosophy, there came about the addi» — a qué adjudica 3.7.6 la necesidad de añadir el siempre.

«Time cannot be motion whether one takes all motions and, in a way, makes a single mot» — la primera negación de 3.7.7 en la doxografía del tiempo.

«Of those who say it is motion, some would say that it is all motion,40 others that it» — el reparto doxográfico que 3.7.7 hace de las doctrinas del tiempo. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«And so, extended motion and its interval are not themselves time but are in time.» — la conclusión de 3.7.8 sobre el intervalo.

«For it is clear that time is that in which motion takes place.» — lo que 3.7.9 da por claro antes de seguir.

«We must now examine how time can be the number or better, since motion is continuous,» — el giro de 3.7.9 hacia la definición aristotélica del tiempo como número.

«Why indeed can time not exist even before the soul is there to measure it unless one» — la objeción de 3.7.9 a hacer depender el tiempo de la medida del alma.

«For there is absolutely no need for time to owe its existence to the soul’s measuring» — y la negativa que la acompaña.

«But next, it ensured that the universe that had come to be should be enslaved to time» — 3.7.11 cuenta la génesis del tiempo desde el alma y su efecto sobre el universo.

«For because soul presents one of its activities after another, then another again» — la definición del tiempo por la sucesión de actividades del alma, en 3.7.11.

«We should not understand time as coming from outside the soul, just as eternity in th» — la regla que 3.7.11 fija sobre dónde está el tiempo.

«From what we have said, we must think of the nature of time as the extent of the kind» — la definición del tiempo que 3.7.12 propone.

«If then, it should retreat and become unified and time is abolished, it is clear that» — el experimento mental con que 3.7.12 muestra la dependencia del tiempo respecto del alma.

«And so, the motion of the universe will be measured by time, and time will be, not as» — la inversión que 3.7.12 hace de la definición corriente.

«The circuit of heaven, then, indicates time in which it is.» — la fórmula de 3.7.13 sobre el cielo como indicador y no como medida.

«Plato, however, said that the substantiality of time was neither measuring nor being» — la lectura que 3.7.13 hace de Platón sobre la sustancialidad del tiempo.

«If this life, then, were to turn back to unity, if that were possible, time, too, wou» — y la consecuencia sobre la abolición del tiempo.

«If, before attempting to be serious, we were actually to begin by playing and say tha» — 3.8.1 abre el tratado de la contemplación con el juego declarado: que todas las cosas aspiran a contemplar; es el íncipit que Porfirio cita.

«For now, let us ask about earth itself and trees and plants in general what contempla» — y a quién extiende 3.8.1 esa pregunta: a la tierra, a los árboles y a las plantas.

«For nature must be a form and not composed of matter and form;9 for what need does it» — la tesis de 3.8.2 sobre qué es la naturaleza. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«This is no minor sign that in animals and in plants expressed principles are what pro» — el signo con que 3.8.2 sostiene que lo productor son principios expresados.

«For it is the result of a contemplation that remains, a contemplation which has not d» — de qué es resultado la producción de la naturaleza según 3.8.3.

«And if someone were to ask nature why it produces, if it were willing to listen and a» — la prosopopeya con que 3.8.4 hace hablar a la naturaleza.

«It means that what we call ‘nature’ is a soul, offspring of a prior soul having a mor» — la definición de naturaleza en 3.8.4: alma nacida de un alma anterior.

«And if anyone wants to grant it some kind of comprehension or perception, it is not w» — el límite que 3.8.4 le pone a la comprensión de la naturaleza.

«And so, the action which appears to be in accordance with contemplation is the weakes» — la jerarquía que 3.8.5 fija entre la contemplación y la acción.

«For this reason, the charioteer24 gives the horses something of what he saw» — la imagen del Fedro con que 3.8.5 explica el reparto de lo contemplado. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Action, therefore, is for the sake of contemplatio» — la tesis central de 3.8.6: la acción es por la contemplación.

«And so, contemplation is the goal even for those who are acting, and what they are un» — y su formulación para quienes obran.

«For this reason, the expressed principle must not remain external but be unified with» — la exigencia de unidad entre el que conoce y lo conocido, en 3.8.6.

«But in persons engaged in action, the soul fits what it has to the external.» — la diferencia entre el alma que obra y la que contempla, en 3.8.6.

«For to produce is to make a form exist and this means to fill everything with contemp» — la ecuación de 3.8.7 entre producir y llenar de contemplación.

«And the bad craftsman is like someone who produces ugly forms.» — cómo explica 3.8.7 el fracaso del artesano.

«But when contemplation ascends from nature to Soul and from Soul to Intellect, the ac» — la escala de contemplaciones que 3.8.8 recorre.

«It must be, then, that Intellect comprises both as really one.» — la unidad de conocedor y conocido en el Intelecto, según 3.8.8.

«But this is a contemplation that is alive, not an object of contemplation like that i» — y en qué se distingue esa contemplación de la nuestra.

«And every life is intellection of a sort, but one kind more obscure than another, just as» — la tesis de 3.8.8 sobre la vida como intelección graduada.

«So, if the truest life is life with intellection, and this is identical with the true» — la identificación de 3.8.8 entre la vida más verdadera y el Intelecto.

«For all things are not a principle, 40 45 50 5 10 15 but all things are from a princi» — la distinción de 3.8.9 entre el principio y todo lo que de él viene. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen.

«It must, however, be a principle and be prior to everything so that everything can ex» — la exigencia que 3.8.9 le pone al primer principio.

«The wonder is, rather, how the multiplicity of life has come from what is not a multi» — la pregunta que 3.8.10 declara asombrosa.

«And if you grasp it after removing Existence from it, you will be amazed.» — el ejercicio de sustracción que 3.8.10 propone sobre el Uno.

«For this reason, when you have uttered ‘the Good’, don’t make any mental additions.» — la regla de discurso que 3.8.11 impone sobre el Bien.

«For while Intellect needs the Good, the Good does not need Intellect.» — la asimetría que 3.8.11 fija entre el Intelecto y el Bien.

«Intellect’, Plato says, ‘sees the Ideas that are in the Living Being’.» — 3.9.1 abre la serie de consideraciones sueltas con una cita del Timeo; es el íncipit que Porfirio registra con el número 13.

«The soul of the universe never came to be or came to a place; for it never was anywhe» — la tesis de 3.9.3 sobre el alma del universo.

«Plato, too, I think, never says that the soul is in a body, but that the body enters» — y la inversión que 3.9.3 le adjudica a Platón: no el alma en el cuerpo sino el cuerpo en el alma.

«So, the partial [i.e., particular] soul is illuminated when it directs itself towards» — la ley de 3.9.5 sobre la iluminación del alma particular; el corchete es del traductor.

«But when it directs itself to what is below it, it enters into non-being.» — y su reverso.

«Soul itself must be like sight; Intellect is what is visible to it, but it is indefin» — la comparación de 3.9.5 entre el alma y la vista.

«But the first, which transcends Being, does not think. Intellect is the Beings and Mo» — la negación que 3.9.9 pone sobre lo primero: no piensa.

«For motion is desire and the first has no desires.» — y la razón que la sostiene.

«That which is consciously aware of itself and thinks itself is secondary.» — el rango que 3.9.9 le da a la conciencia de sí.

«Souls are also in the intelligible world; for it is from there that they come to be i» — 4.1 sitúa el origen de las almas en lo inteligible.

«Intellect, then, is always without separation and is indivisible, and Soul in the int» — la indivisibilidad del Intelecto y del Alma de allá, en 4.1.

«The reason is that it does not totally depart, but there is an element of it that has» — la fórmula del alma que no se va del todo, en 4.1.

«Let us actually stipulate that there are some things that are primarily divisible and» — 4.2.1 fija la partición de lo divisible y lo indivisible con la que trabaja.

«It is even so with colours and all qualities and each shape, which can exist simultan» — el ejemplo de las cualidades presentes a la vez en muchos cuerpos, en 4.2.1.

«For it is not one in the way that a body is one; for a body is one by its continuity,» — la diferencia entre la unidad del alma y la del cuerpo, en 4.2.1.

«And he who beholds this greatness of the soul, and who beholds its power, will acknow» — la exhortación de 4.2.1 a mirar la grandeza del alma.

«Though it does not itself possess magnitude, it is present to objects of every magnit» — la fórmula con que 4.2.1 concilia la ausencia de magnitud con la presencia universal.

«The soul must, therefore, be in this way both one and many, 9 and divided and indivis» — la tesis central del tratado 4.2.

«it is that which encloses all things in one embrace and directs them with wisdom, con» — la función que 4.2.2 le adjudica al alma sobre el todo.

«Concerning the soul, the right course, I feel, would be to conduct our enquiry in suc» — 4.3.1 abre los problemas del alma; es el íncipit que Porfirio registra con el número 27.

«In conducting this enquiry indeed, we should be obeying the injunction of the god whe» — el precepto délfico con que 4.3.1 justifica la indagación sobre el alma.

«Now, however, let us turn once again to those who say that our souls are derived from» — el adversario que 4.3.1 examina: quienes derivan nuestras almas del alma del universo.

«But perhaps one should try to grasp more clearly what ‘part’ means in the case of thi» — el método de 4.3.2: precisar qué quiere decir parte antes de discutir.

«It is, though, clear that soul is not divided in the manner of magnitudes, nor would» — la negativa de 4.3.3 sobre el modo de división del alma.

«It is due to the organs being different that there are different apprehensions, but a» — cómo explica 4.3.3 la variedad de percepciones sin multiplicar las almas.

«The soul of the universe is always transcendent, because it does not have the propert» — la diferencia que 4.3.4 fija entre el alma del universo y la nuestra.

«In fact, no Being perishes, since even the intellects in the intelligible world, just» — la imperecibilidad que 4.3.5 predica de los Seres.

«But why has the soul of the universe, though being of the same kind as ours, produced» — la pregunta de 4.3.6 sobre la diferencia de obra entre el alma del universo y la nuestra.

«Or rather, it is because the soul of the universe has not departed from Soul but has» — la respuesta que 4.3.6 prefiere.

«For when souls preserve themselves in a safe condition, they produce with the greates» — la proporción que 4.3.6 traza entre la condición del alma y su obra.

«For one must suppose that the ‘seconds and thirds’33 were so called because they are» — la fórmula del Timeo sobre las almas segundas y terceras, en 4.3.6. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But what about the passage in Philebus which suggests that other souls are parts of t» — la objeción textual que 4.3.7 se plantea desde el Filebo.

«He makes his position quite clear, however, in Timaeus where, when the soul of the un» — y el pasaje con el que 4.3.7 la responde.

«Since all souls come from the identical source that the soul of the universe comes fr» — el origen común de todas las almas que 4.3.8 sostiene.

«but each soul is what it is according to what is active in it;46 that is, by one bein» — el principio de individuación de las almas en 4.3.8. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«In fact, it is unlimited in power because its power is unlimited, not in the sense th» — en qué sentido es ilimitada el alma según 4.3.8.

«It is not detached from itself when it is in the finger or in the foot.» — el ejemplo con que 4.3.8 muestra la presencia indivisa del alma.

«But we must also investigate how soul comes to be in body.» — el segundo problema que 4.3.9 abre.

«For there never was a time when the universe was not ensouled, nor when body existed» — la tesis de 4.3.9 sobre la eternidad de la animación del universo.

«Indeed, this [cosmos] has, in a way, come to be like a beautiful and variegated house» — la imagen de la casa bella y variada con que 4.3.9 describe el cosmos; el corchete es del traductor.

«It is ensouled in this kind of way, having soul not of itself, but for itself, ruled» — la fórmula con que 4.3.9 describe la posesión de alma por el cosmos.

«And the soul’s shadow extends as far as the expressed principle that derives from it.» — la imagen de la sombra del alma en 4.3.9.

«For craft is posterior to soul and imitates it, making obscure and weak imitations, j» — el rango que 4.3.10 le da al arte frente al alma.

«It seems to me that the sages of old who wanted to attract to themselves the presence» — 4.3.11 explica la práctica de las estatuas de culto: los sabios de antaño querían atraer la presencia de seres divinos y por eso miraban a la naturaleza del todo. Es uno de los lugares donde el tratado trata de operaciones con imágenes.

«And that is sympathetic which is in any way imitative of it, like a mirror able to ca» — y el principio que 4.3.11 pone bajo esa práctica: lo simpático es lo que imita, como un espejo que capta.

«Nothing, after all, is a long way off or far from anything else, and yet again things» — la fórmula de 4.3.11 sobre la no distancia entre las cosas, que es la base de la simpatía cósmica.

«Evidence of this is the concord of the souls w» — el indicio que 4.3.12 aduce de la concordia entre las almas y el orden del universo.

«The souls go neither voluntarily nor because they have been sent – or at least their» — la fórmula con que 4.3.13 evita los dos extremos sobre el descenso de las almas.

«For the universal bears down upon each thing, and the law does not derive its power o» — la ley que 4.3.13 describe.

«Now one may interpret this story any way one wants; the important thing is that it is» — la licencia de lectura que 4.3.14 concede sobre el mito de Prometeo.

«It is, then, appropriate to attribute to the order of the world the punishments that» — el reparto de 4.3.16 entre lo que toca al orden del mundo y lo que no.

«Injustice which is actually done by one person to another is unjust for the perpetrat» — la distinción que 4.3.16 hace entre lo injusto para quien lo hace y para quien lo padece.

«One should believe that this structured ordering is ‘not without god’78 nor unjust bu» — la fórmula con que 4.3.16 cierra ese punto. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«In fact, calculative reasoning comes in when the soul is already in difficulty, fille» — cuándo aparece el razonamiento discursivo según 4.3.18.

«But in the intelligible world all body is pure, and each is like an eye, and nothing» — la descripción de los cuerpos de allá en 4.3.18.

«As a general principle, then, we should say that none of the parts of the soul, nor y» — el principio general de 4.3.20 sobre el estar del alma en el cuerpo.

«Nor will it be in it as a part in a whole; for the soul is not a part of the body.» — una de las negaciones con que 4.3.20 va descartando los modos de estar en algo.

«So, it is clear that none of the ways of something being in something else that we ha» — el resultado de esa serie de negaciones en 4.3.21.

«Plato, therefore, does well in not locating the soul in the body in the case of the u» — la lectura de Platón que 4.3.22 aprueba: el alma no está en el cuerpo sino al revés.

«But where will the soul come to be when it has departed from the body?» — la pregunta con que 4.3.24 abre el destino del alma tras la muerte.

«But when you look for them, look not with your eyes, nor as if you are looking f» — la advertencia de método de 4.3.24 sobre cómo buscar las almas.

«Indeed, one should not attribute memory to a god or to Being or to Intellect; fo» — la negativa de 4.3.25 a poner memoria en el dios, en el Ser o en el Intelecto.

«Now, if the living being is a complex in the sense of being something different arising from its two components, in the first place it is absurd to say that the living being is neither body nor soul; for the living being» — el argumento de 4.3.26 sobre a quién pertenece el recordar.

«In any case, the shade of Heracles in Hades136 – I think we must consider this s» — el caso de la sombra de Heracles en el Hades, con el que 4.3.27 examina el reparto de memorias. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«When it has been purified of body to a greater extent, it will pass in review ev» — lo que le pasa a la memoria del alma al purificarse, según 4.3.27.

«Memory, then, belongs to the faculty of imaginative representation, and remember» — la adjudicación de 4.3.29: la memoria es de la facultad imaginativa.

«For intellection is one thing and apprehension of intellection another, and we a» — la distinción de 4.3.30 entre la intelección y su aprehensión.

«And, in general, the duality of the souls escapes our notice.» — la fórmula con que 4.3.31 enuncia la duplicidad del alma.

«Indeed, to the extent that it strives upwards, it forgets more things – unless p» — la proporción inversa entre ascenso y memoria en 4.3.32.

«So, anyone saying that the good soul is forgetful would be right in this sort of» — la paradoja que 4.3.32 acepta sobre el olvido del alma buena.

«For it flees from the many, and brings the many together into one, thus getting» — y la razón que la sostiene.

«Everything in the intelligible world, after all, is permanently present, for the» — la permanencia de lo inteligible que 4.4.1 invoca contra la memoria de allá.

«In fact, one will not retain memory of oneself, nor will one remember that one i» — la consecuencia de 4.4.2 sobre la identidad en la contemplación.

«In fact, we should say that no change takes place when soul moves from what belo» — la negativa al cambio en el tránsito del alma, en 4.4.3.

«And having been fitted to it, it is united with it while not being dissolved, bu» — cómo describe 4.4.3 la unión sin disolución.

«One must think of memory, after all, not only as covering the situation where on» — la ampliación del concepto de memoria en 4.4.4.

«One must not give an account of them using guesswork or syllogistic reasoning wh» — la regla de método de 4.4.5 sobre cómo hablar de los astros.

«In fact, they are always alive; and the ‘always’ implies one identical thing.» — la razón por la que 4.4.7 niega memoria a los astros.

«Further, when someone always does the identical thing, it would be pointless for» — el argumento de la repetición en 4.4.8.

«if one were to liken their motion to a dance,25 if it is to one that at some tim» — la imagen de la danza con que 4.4.8 describe el movimiento de los astros. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«But since what orders the cosmos is double, we speak of one aspect of it as the» — el desdoblamiento del principio ordenador en 4.4.10.

«For what else would calculative reasoning be if not seeking to find wisdom and a» — la definición del razonamiento discursivo por su carencia, en 4.4.12.

«The person who calculates is the same as someone playing the lyre with a view to» — la comparación del citarista con que 4.4.12 describe al que razona.

«But this is identical with his own wisdom, since for such a one his will is wisd» — la identificación de voluntad y sabiduría en el principio, según 4.4.12.

«And what is produced from it as an image seen in matter is nature, in which Bein» — la definición de naturaleza como imagen en la materia, en 4.4.13.

«But nature acts on matter and is affected by it, whereas that soul which is befo» — la diferencia entre la naturaleza y el alma anterior a ella, en 4.4.13.

«It is in a way like light; when it has departed, air has none of it, but the lig» — la comparación de la luz con que 4.4.14 describe lo que el alma deja en el cuerpo.

«In the worst man, the individual is identified with the composite, and the human» — la escala de hombres que 4.4.17 traza según dónde se ponga el yo.

«But in the best human being, the one who separates himself, the ruling principle» — y el extremo superior de esa escala.

«We say that pain is cognition of the body’s withdrawal as it is being deprived o» — la definición de dolor en 4.4.19.

«It is the body, though, that is pained.» — y el reparto que la acompaña.

«The burning is there, but it is the soul that perceives it, taking it to itself» — la fórmula de 4.4.19 sobre la quemadura y su percepción.

«And the whole soul perceives the affection there without itself being affected;» — la impasibilidad del alma dentro de la percepción del dolor, en 4.4.19.

«But nature, like a mother, as if it were aiming 30 35 5 10 15 20 at what the thi» — la imagen de la madre con que 4.4.20 describe a la naturaleza. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen.

«For the corporeal appetites of children, adolescents, and adults are different,» — la evidencia de 4.4.21 sobre el origen corporal del apetito.

«That the earth, then, has a faculty of growth one would infer from the things th» — la tesis de 4.4.22 sobre el alma vegetativa de la tierra.

«But how does it perceive? Well, how, for that matter, do the stars?» — la pregunta que 4.4.22 devuelve a quien objeta la percepción de la tierra.

«Sense-perception is certainly not something that is confined to flesh, nor in ge» — la negativa de 4.4.22 a encerrar la percepción en la carne.

«We should indeed take as a premise that sense-perception is the apprehension of» — la definición de percepción con que 4.4.23 trabaja.

«If what we are now saying is indeed sound, sense-perception must occur through c» — la condición corporal de la percepción según 4.4.23.

«One might say of the sun and the other heavenly bodies, after all, that they see» — lo que 4.4.25 admite sobre la vista de los astros.

«People actually call this soul Hestia and Demeter, employing divine terms and in» — los nombres divinos con que la gente llama al alma de la tierra, consignados en 4.4.27.

«It is clear enough, after all, that we become angry not only in response to suff» — el punto de partida de 4.4.28 sobre el ánimo.

«There is one kind of anger, then, that is stimulated non-rationally and drags re» — el reparto de las dos iras en 4.4.28.

«Evidence for this is that on dead bodies hair grows, and» — el indicio que 4.4.29 aduce sobre el resto de alma en el cadáver.

«It is clear that none of the light remains in things that have been lit.» — la comparación de la luz con que 4.4.29 describe lo que se va con el alma.

«For it is clear that if they do these things in response to people’s prayers, an» — 4.4.30 plantea el problema de las plegarias dirigidas a los astros.

«It is, then, clear from many perspectives that the cosmos’ revolution produces e» — lo que 4.4.31 da por claro sobre la acción de la revolución del cosmos.

«Nor indeed should we make the choice of the stars responsible for the accidents» — la negativa de 4.4.31 a cargarle a la elección de los astros lo que nos pasa.

«So, first, we should say that this universe is ‘one living being encompassing al» — la fórmula del Timeo con que 4.4.32 funda la simpatía cósmica.

«This unified universe is actually in a condition of sympathy, and is one in the» — la definición de simpatía del todo en 4.4.32; es el principio que sostiene después la explicación de la magia.

«And since it is a living being and forms part of a unity, nothing is so distant» — la consecuencia sobre la distancia: en un viviente único nada está lejos.

«And indeed, there is in the universe as a whole something analogous to spiritedn» — los análogos psíquicos que 4.4.32 encuentra en el universo entero.

«Since there is certainly no element of» — la negativa al azar en la revolución celeste, en 4.4.33.

«But the parts of the person who is performing the dance cannot, necessarily, be» — la comparación del danzante con que 4.4.33 explica la necesidad de las posturas.

«For we did not attribute the actions either to their bodies or to their choices;» — lo que 4.4.35 les niega a los astros como causa.

«And we must also believe that any other heavenly body, as though radiating light» — cómo describe 4.4.35 la acción de cada astro.

«For whatever has being is such as to act and to be acted on;116 and in the case» — el principio general de acción y pasión en 4.4.36. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Nothing, then, that belongs to the universe can be rejected by it.» — el arranque de 4.4.37.

«We should, then, grant that each particular thing has a certain non-rational pow» — lo que 4.4.37 le concede a cada cosa: un poder no racional propio.

«And many things happen due to these powers, not by the power of choice of those» — y la consecuencia: muchas cosas ocurren por esos poderes y no por elección.

«On the other hand, whatever maleficent influence is said to come from the stars» — cómo trata 4.4.38 la influencia maléfica que se atribuye a los astros.

«Nevertheless, all things are woven into a unity and exhibit a wonderful concord,» — la fórmula del tejido y la concordia en 4.4.38.

«In fact, they are due to the operation of sympathy, and because there is by natu» — la explicación de 4.4.39 por simpatía y no por elección.

«Indeed, many things are attracted and bewitched without any other person contriv» — 4.4.40 abre el tratamiento de la magia: hay atracción y hechizo sin que nadie los urda.

«And this is the primary ‘magician’ and ‘spell-binder’.» — y a quién adjudica Plotino ese poder primero: a la naturaleza misma del todo, que llama con esos dos nombres.

«And because men naturally love, and the things that make them love attract each» — la explicación del amor por atracción natural en 4.4.40.

«It is, however, neither the power of choice nor reason that is charmed by music,» — qué parte del hombre queda expuesta al encanto según 4.4.40: no la elección ni la razón.

«When, however, one prays to a heavenly being, something emanates from that being» — cómo explica 4.4.41 la eficacia de la plegaria sin darle oído al astro.

«But there is no question of the sun, or another heavenly body, hearkening to a p» — y la negativa que la acompaña.

«But if in one lyre a vibration can be transmitted from another to the extent tha» — la comparación de las dos liras con que 4.4.41 explica la acción a distancia.

«We must also grant that there are many powers not requiring acts of choice and t» — lo que 4.4.42 concede sobre los poderes sin elección.

«And if the person who is making the request is evil, that should be no occasion» — la consecuencia moral que 4.4.42 saca sobre quien pide mal.

«We should not, then, allow that the universe is affected.» — la negativa de 4.4.43 sobre la afección del universo.

«In fact, he is in his soul unaffected with respect to sorcery, that is, his facu» — 4.4.43 pregunta si el sabio queda expuesto a la hechicería y contesta por la parte del alma.

«Only that which is focused on itself is immune to sorcery.» — la regla con que 4.4.43 fija quién queda a salvo del hechizo.

«It is only contemplation that is left to be immune to sorcery, because no one wh» — y su formulación en 4.4.44: solo la contemplación queda inmune.

«What else would one call this but sorcery?» — cómo llama 4.4.44 a la acción no deliberada que arrastra al hombre.

«Only that person is not subject to sorcery who, when he is being drawn by his ot» — el criterio final de 4.4.44 sobre quién no está sujeto al hechizo.

«So, it is not unreasonable to say that souls change places and do not always ret» — lo que 4.4.45 admite sobre el cambio de lugar de las almas.

«As for punishments, they correspond to treatments o» — la analogía médica con que 4.4.45 explica los castigos.

«But since sense-perception is the apprehension of things that are not intelligib» — la definición de percepción en 4.5.1.

«For this reason, it is through the medium of corporeal organs that cognition occ» — y la consecuencia sobre los órganos.

«But it consists of light, and light travels in a straight line.» — la premisa óptica de 4.5.2.

«But if light is not a body, there is no need for a body.» — la tesis de 4.5.4 sobre la luz.

«For light is a property of each individual or fiery body; indeed, even stones of» — cómo define 4.5.6 la luz como propiedad del cuerpo luminoso.

«For each being has an activity, which is a likeness of itself, so that while the» — el principio de la doble actividad, en 4.5.7: cada ser tiene una actividad que es semejanza de sí.

«But one must say that light is entirely incorporeal, even if it belongs to a bod» — la tesis de 4.5.7 sobre la incorporeidad de la luz.

«It is, then, clear that the living being is in sympathy with itself.» — la conclusión de 4.5.8 sobre la simpatía del viviente consigo mismo.

«Sight, therefore, is not of something situated within, but rather of something n» — la tesis de 4.6.1 sobre la vista, contra la teoría de la impresión.

«In fact, the soul reports on objects that it does not possess; for this is chara» — y lo que 4.6.2 le adjudica al alma: informar de objetos que no posee.

«But rhetoric, music, and every craft that brings influence to bear on the soul,» — el paralelo que 4.4.31 traza entre la influencia de los astros y las artes que obran sobre el alma.

«In fact, we should attribute both, actions and significations, to the» — el reparto que 4.4.35 hace entre acciones y significaciones de los astros. Dentro del verbatim va la columna de números de línea del margen.

«For not even those who are charmed by incantations are charmed in this way, even» — y lo mismo vale para los ensalmos, según 4.4.40.

«It has also certainly become clear what our role is in the scheme of things, tha» — lo que 4.4.45 da por aclarado sobre nuestro lugar en el orden del todo.

«After all, the permanence of impressions is an indication of weakness rathe» — la inversión que 4.6.3 hace del argumento de la impresión.

«Both sense-perception and memory, therefore, are a kind of strength.» — la tesis de 4.6.3 sobre la percepción y la memoria.

«A human being is certainly not something simple, but there is in him a soul» — 4.7.1 abre el tratado de la inmortalidad con la composición del ser humano; es el íncipit que Porfirio registra con el número 2.

«For fire and air and water and earth are in themselves soulless; in the cas» — la premisa de 4.7.2 contra el materialismo.

«But it is quite impossible for a composition of bodies to generate life, an» — la imposibilidad que 4.7.2 declara.

«Soul, however, is co-affective with itself; but from indivisibles neither a» — el argumento de la co-afección del alma consigo misma, en 4.7.3.

«After all, no body would even exist if the soul’s power did not exist.» — la inversión con que 4.7.3 hace depender el cuerpo del alma.

«And so, they will end up saying that soul and god are nothing else but matt» — la consecuencia que 4.7.4 le encuentra a esa doctrina.

«If anything is going to have sense-perception of anything, it itself must b» — la premisa de 4.7.6 sobre la unidad del sujeto perceptor.

«So, this must be in the nature of a central point, with the sense-perceptio» — la imagen del punto central con que 4.7.6 explica la convergencia de los sentidos.

«If then, thinking is apprehending without involving the body, far more so s» — el argumento de 4.7.8 desde el pensar hacia la incorporeidad del alma.

«Beauty and Justice are both, I presume, without magnitude; and,» — la premisa de 4.7.8 sobre las virtudes sin magnitud.

«But if they are eternal and permanent, they are not bodies.» — y su conclusión.

«Further, neither breath nor blood pervades the whole body, but soul does.» — el contraste empírico que 4.7.8 aduce.

«Soul, on the other hand, can penetrate thus wholly; it is, therefore, incor» — la inferencia de 4.7.8 desde la penetración total a la incorporeidad.

«the soul, after all, is prior, while an attunement is supervenient; the one» — la objeción de 4.7.8 a la doctrina del alma como armonía.

«Further, if it is an entelechy, there can be no opposition of reason to app» — y la objeción a la doctrina de la entelequia.

«That the soul is akin to ‘the more divine nature and the eternal’ is someth» — la tesis de 4.7.10 sobre el parentesco del alma con lo divino.

«Examine it by actually subtracting that element,85 or rather let one subtra» — el método de sustracción que 4.7.10 propone para ver el alma. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«It is as if gold were to become ensouled, and next, knocking off the earthy» — la imagen del oro que se limpia de tierra, con que 4.7.10 describe la purificación.

«How indeed could soul be destroyed, since life is not added to it from outs» — el argumento de 4.7.11 por la vida propia del alma.

«But, really, there is only one nature which lives in actuality.» — la unidad de naturaleza viva que 4.7.12 sostiene.

«But the soul is one and a simple nature, whose actuality consists in its li» — la definición de alma en 4.7.12, de la que cuelga su indisolubilidad.

«For nothing from Being will ever perish.» — el axioma con que 4.7.14 cierra el argumento.

«But for those who also have need of conviction fortified by sense-perceptio» — el giro de 4.7.15 hacia los testimonios sensibles.

«Also, it is a fact that many souls which were formerly in human bodies, whe» — el testimonio que 4.7.15 aduce sobre las almas que fueron de hombres.

«indeed, by instituting oracles and prophesying by other means, they both gr» — y qué hacen esas almas según 4.7.15: instituir oráculos y profetizar.

«I behold a beauty of wondrous quality, and believe then that I am most to b» — el pasaje en primera persona con que 4.8.1 abre el tratado del descenso: la salida del cuerpo y la belleza contemplada; es el íncipit que Porfirio registra con el número 6.

«Heraclitus, who exhorts us to investigate this very thing, postulating the» — el primero de los antiguos que 4.8.1 convoca.

«Empedocles, in turn, having stated that it is the law for souls that have e» — el segundo, con la ley que atribuye a las almas caídas.

«the divine Plato, who, among many other beautiful pronouncements on the sou» — cómo nombra 4.8.1 a Platón entre esos antiguos.

«The soul of the universe, then, was sent down into it by the god for this p» — la tesis de 4.8.2 sobre el descenso del alma del universo.

«It is just for this reason that Plato says that our soul, too, if it would» — el paralelo que 4.8.2 traza para nuestra alma.

«For there are two kinds of care of everything, that of the totality being a» — la distinción de 4.8.2 entre dos cuidados del todo.

«It is the role of the more rational soul to think,39 but not solely that; o» — el reparto de funciones del alma en 4.8.3. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«they also possess a power directed towards this world, like a light which i» — la imagen de la luz con que 4.8.3 describe la potencia del alma vuelta a este mundo.

«When it looks towards what is prior to it, it thinks, but when it looks to» — la doble mirada del alma en 4.8.3.

«So, there is no discordance between the ‘sowing into the world of ge» — 4.8.5 declara que no hay discordancia entre las dos maneras de decir el descenso; es el lugar donde el tratado reconoce tensiones en Platón.

«After all, every process towards the worse is involuntary, but if something» — el principio con que 4.8.5 concilia lo voluntario y lo involuntario del descenso.

«if indeed it is inherent in each nature to produce what comes after it, and» — la ley de producción que 4.8.6 enuncia.

«The higher element remains always in its proper seat, while what follows it» — y la permanencia del superior que la acompaña.

«And if, against the belief of others, one is to venture to express more cle» — el aviso con que 4.8.8 introduce su tesis más propia, y que la declara contraria a la creencia de otros.

«it is not the case, after all, that we take cognizance of everything which» — la razón por la que no advertimos esa parte no descendida, según 4.8.8.

«For the experience of evil results in a clearer knowledge of the Good in th» — lo que 4.8.7 le concede a la experiencia del mal.

«And an utterance pronounced quietly has an effect on what is far distant fr» — el segundo indicio que 4.9.3 aduce para lo mismo.

«But as it is, we posit that it is incorporeal and a Substance.» — la posición de 4.9.4 sobre el alma única.

«A science, after all, is a whole, and its parts are such as for the whole t» — la comparación con la ciencia que 4.9.5 usa para el todo y las partes del alma.

«In the intelligible world all is transparent, and each individual, too.» — la fórmula con que 4.9.5 cierra la cuarta Enéada.

«They specify that the breath is ‘possessed of intellect’ and the fire is» — cómo consigna 4.7.4 la doctrina estoica del soplo dotado de intelecto.

«But that soul could not be called a body has been stated in different ways» — el balance de 4.7.8 antes de pasar a las doctrinas del alma como armonía y como entelequia.

«And if spells and magical procedures in general serve to bring people» — 4.9.3 aduce los ensalmos y los procedimientos mágicos como indicio de la unidad de las almas; junto con 4.4.40–45 es el otro lugar donde el tratado trata de la magia.

«The first is to show how the things now honoured by the soul are in fact di» — el doble propósito que 5.1.1 declara para el tratado.

«The second is to teach the soul to remember the sort of lineage it has and» — y su segunda mitad: recordarle al alma de qué linaje viene.

«Soul itself made the sun and this great heaven, and it ordered it, and make» — la obra que 5.1.2 le adjudica al Alma.

«The soul is, however, not like that, and it does not make something alive b» — la diferencia entre el alma y el cuerpo que 5.1.2 marca.

«But the explanation for gods, being gods, must necessarily be a god more se» — el ascenso que 5.1.2 exige desde los dioses visibles.

«Since, then, Soul is derived from Intellect, it is intellectual, and its ow» — la dependencia del Alma respecto del Intelecto en 5.1.3.

«For whenever Soul looks into Intellect, what it thinks and actualizes are o» — cómo actúa el Alma cuando mira al Intelecto, según 5.1.3.

«Intellect, then, makes Soul even more divine by being its father and by bei» — la relación de paternidad entre el Intelecto y el Alma, en 5.1.3.

«It does not even seek to enlarge itself, since it is absolutely perfect.» — la perfección del Intelecto en 5.1.4.

«For thinking could not occur if there was not Difference as well as Identit» — la exigencia de los géneros mayores para que haya pensamiento, en 5.1.4.

«In fact, if you were to remove Difference, it would become one and fall sil» — la consecuencia de quitar la Diferencia, en 5.1.4.

«Before the Dyad is the One; the Dyad is second and, having come from the On» — el orden del Uno y la Díada en 5.1.5.

«It is that which is simple and prior to this multiplicity, which is the cau» — cómo nombra 5.1.5 al principio anterior a esa multiplicidad.

«It must be that for everything in motion there is something towards which i» — el principio de 5.1.6 sobre el término de todo movimiento.

«A radiation of light comes from it, though it reposes, like the light from» — la imagen de la irradiación con que 5.1.6 describe la producción desde el Uno.

«Perfumes especially witness to this, for so long as they exist, something f» — el ejemplo de los perfumes en 5.1.6.

«Nothing can come from it except what is next greatest after it.» — la ley de procesión que 5.1.6 fija.

«This is why the One is none of the Beings in Intellect, although everything» — la negación con que 5.1.7 separa al Uno de los Seres.

«And it is also because of this that we get Plato’s threefold division: the» — cómo adjudica 5.1.8 a Platón la división en tres.

«Parmenides previously touched on this doctrine to the extent that he identi» — el precedente de Parménides que 5.1.8 consigna, con la reserva que sigue.

«although he neglects to give an accurate account due to his antiquity.» — y la reserva con que 5.1.9 acota a ese precedente.

«Aristotle later said that the first principle was ‘separate’112 and ‘intell» — el segundo precedente que 5.1.9 examina, y el punto en que Plotino se separa de él. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«but when he says that ‘it thinks itself’,114 he no longer makes it the firs» — la objeción de 5.1.9 a Aristóteles: al hacerlo pensarse a sí mismo deja de ser lo primero. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«And just as in nature these aforementioned three are found, so it is necess» — la correspondencia que 5.1.10 traza entre las tres hipóstasis y lo que hay en nosotros.

«And his exhortation ‘to be separate’128 is not meant spatially» — cómo lee 5.1.10 el mandato platónico de separarse. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«How, then, given that we have such great things in us, do we not grasp them» — la pregunta de 5.1.12 sobre por qué no advertimos lo que tenemos dentro.

«For not everything in soul is immediately sensible, but it comes to us when» — la respuesta que 5.1.12 da.

«Whenever, then, Soul comes to be in a plant, it is like another part of it,» — la presencia del Alma en la planta según 5.2.2.

«nowhere but in that which is nowhere, and at the same time it is also every» — la fórmula con que 5.2.2 responde adónde va el alma de la raíz cortada.

«In fact, that which is said to think itself for the reason that it is a com» — 5.3.1 abre el examen del pensarse a sí mismo por el caso del compuesto.

«So, one should suppose that a grasping of itself belongs to something simpl» — la exigencia que 5.3.1 pone al verdadero pensarse a sí mismo.

«We should start by saying that its faculty of sense-perception is only of e» — el reparto de facultades con que 5.3.2 empieza.

«Sense-perception is our messenger, but Intellect ‘is our king’.» — la fórmula con que 5.3.3 jerarquiza la percepción y el intelecto.

«In fact, it is ours and not ours. For this reason, we use it and do not use» — la paradoja de 5.3.3 sobre la posesión del Intelecto.

«It is, then, actually as Intellect that he sees himself.» — la condición que 5.3.4 pone para el verdadero conocimiento de sí.

«In this way, therefore, Intellect and» — la identidad de Intelecto e inteligible en 5.3.5.

«For necessity is in Intellect, but persuasion is in soul.» — el reparto entre necesidad y persuasión en 5.3.6.

«For it is certainly not practical intellect, which looks to externals and d» — la distinción de 5.3.6 entre el intelecto práctico y el puro.

«Light, therefore, sees another light; therefore, it sees itself.» — la fórmula de la luz que se ve a sí misma, en 5.3.8.

«And this light shone in the soul and illuminated it, that is, made it intel» — y lo que esa luz hace en el alma.

«But the soul, having arisen from Intellect as a light around it, is depende» — la relación de dependencia del alma en 5.3.9.

«For our life has been fragmented, that is, we have many lives, whereas Inte» — la fórmula con que 5.3.9 opone nuestra vida fragmentada a la del Intelecto.

«But when there is total stability, it will not think.» — la consecuencia de 5.3.10 sobre el pensar y el movimiento.

«So, it is not some one thing among all things, but prior to all things, whi» — la posición del Uno respecto de todo, en 5.3.11.

«But the One did not desire anything, for if it did, it would be incomplete» — la negativa de 5.3.12 sobre el deseo en el Uno.

«The god, then, who is above Soul is multiple, and it is possible for» — 5.1.5 llama múltiple al dios que está sobre el Alma, y abre ahí el camino hacia lo simple anterior.

«Fire produces the heat that comes from it, and snow does not only hold its» — los ejemplos naturales con que 5.1.6 apoya la doctrina de la actividad doble.

«For it is the principle of all things,2 but is not those things» — la fórmula de 5.2.1 sobre el Uno: principio de todo sin ser ninguna de esas cosas.

«The truth, therefore, should not be about something different from itself;» — la definición de verdad en el Intelecto, según 5.3.5.

«We could say that Intellect contemplates god. But if someone will ag» — el giro de 5.3.7 hacia la relación del Intelecto con el dios.

«The existence of Intellect, then, is activity,46 and there is nothing else» — la definición del Intelecto como actividad, en 5.3.7.

«For this reason, the One is, in truth, ineffable, for whatever you mig» — la inefabilidad del Uno enunciada en 5.3.13.

«But we have it in such a way that we can speak about it, though we can» — la fórmula con que 5.3.14 acota lo que se puede decir del Uno.

«But just as those who are inspired and possessed have knowledge to the» — la comparación con los inspirados y poseídos, en 5.3.14.

«It is, therefore, many, though, nevertheless, desirous of the One.» — la condición del Intelecto en 5.3.15.

«But Intellect is a ‘one-everything’, because it comes after the princi» — la fórmula con que 5.3.15 nombra al Intelecto.

«But we must sing another charm if we are to find one to relieve her la» — la imagen del ensalmo con que 5.3.17 describe lo que el alma necesita.

«For there must be something simple prior to all 5 10 15 20 things and» — la exigencia de 5.4.1 sobre lo simple anterior a todo.

«In the case of other things, we see whatever comes to perfection, gene» — la observación empírica con que 5.4.1 sostiene la ley de generación.

«This is the case not only for things that have choice, but also for th» — y su extensión a lo que no elige.

«That these things come from it is a matter of necessity.» — la necesidad de la procesión en 5.4.1.

«There is activity which is activity of the substance and there is acti» — la distinción de la doble actividad, en 5.4.2, que es una de las fórmulas más citadas del tratado.

«But if the intelligibles are without thought or without life, what sor» — la objeción de 5.5.1 contra poner los inteligibles fuera del Intelecto.

«So, one should not seek for intelligibles outside Intellect, nor asser» — la tesis que da título al tratado 5.5.

«That first god is seated or settled above Intellect, as if on a sort o» — la imagen con que 5.5.3 sitúa al primer dios sobre el Intelecto.

«But perhaps the name ‘One’ just indicates an elimination of plurality.» — cómo lee 5.5.6 el propio nombre del Uno.

«For this reason, it is necessary not to pursue it, but to remain in st» — la instrucción práctica de 5.5.8: no perseguirlo sino quedarse en quietud.

«It did not, however, come as one expected; rather, it came as if it ha» — cómo describe 5.5.8 la llegada de esa luz.

«And soul is not in the cosmos, but rather the cosmos is in Soul.» — la inversión de 5.5.9 sobre el lugar del cosmos.

«But when you try to see it, look at the whole.» — y la instrucción que la acompaña.

«It is necessary to look at each thing by that by which each should pro» — la regla de adecuación entre el órgano y el objeto, en 5.5.11.

«It is also necessary to consider how people have forgotten what they o» — el diagnóstico de 5.5.12 sobre el olvido.

«People do not see it because it is present when they are asleep.» — la razón que 5.5.12 da de esa ceguera.

«But not all see that which is beautiful, and when it is generated, the» — la asimetría entre el Bien y lo bello en 5.5.12.

«The Good is prior not in time, but in truth, which has a prior power.» — la clase de anterioridad que 5.5.12 le reconoce al Bien.

«For that which produces is better than that which is produced.» — el axioma con que 5.5.13 cierra el tratado.

«Thinking, therefore, must be simple and yet not simple.» — la paradoja con que 5.6.1 abre el tratado.

«For an intellect must be generated in order to think, and being an int» — el argumento de 5.6.2 contra hacer pensante a lo primero.

«Further, if the Good is simple and must lack nothing, it would have no» — la razón de 5.6.4 para negarle pensamiento al Bien.

«And it thinks nothing because there is nothing other than it to think.» — y su formulación más escueta.

«And so, one should compare the first principle to light, the second to» — la comparación de los tres principios con la luz, el sol y la luna, en 5.6.4.

«Thinking, therefore, living, and existence are together in the realm o» — la tríada de 5.6.6 en el ámbito del Intelecto.

«Thinking, therefore, is many and not one.» — la conclusión de 5.6.6.

«In fact, there is, if I and everyone else have a means of ascent to th» — la respuesta de 5.7.1 sobre si hay Ideas de individuos.

«If, though, the soul of each contains the expressed principles3 of all» — el argumento de 5.7.1 desde los principios expresados del alma. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«We need not fear this unlimitedness in the intelligible world, for eve» — cómo desactiva 5.7.1 la objeción de lo ilimitado.

«The stone which has acquired the beauty of form by craft does not appe» — 5.8.1 abre el tratado de la belleza inteligible con la piedra trabajada.

«The beauty was, therefore, in the craft, and it was far superior there» — y adónde lleva ese ejemplo: la belleza estaba en el arte.

«Indeed, nature which produces such beautiful things takes precedence i» — la primacía de la naturaleza sobre el arte, en 5.8.2.

«If you have seen yourself as beautiful, you must remember it.» — la exhortación de 5.8.2.

«There is, then, an expressed principle in nature that is the archetype» — la doctrina del arquetipo de la belleza corpórea, en 5.8.3.

«The One is seated at the summit of the intelligible,» — la posición del Uno en 5.3.12, en la cumbre de lo inteligible.

«If that which is first is perfect, that is, the most» — la premisa de 5.4.1 sobre la perfección de lo primero, de la que cuelga la necesidad de que algo venga de él.

«For Intellect is not of objects – as sense-perception is of sensibles» — la diferencia entre el Intelecto y la percepción en 5.4.2: el Intelecto no es de objetos como la percepción es de sensibles.

«So, it is necessary to rush towards the One from the sensible world, a» — el imperativo de ascenso en 5.5.4.

«In fact, the activity of seeing is twofold, as with the eye» — el desdoblamiento de la visión en 5.5.7, que sostiene la analogía del Uno con la luz.

«But please do not, for my sake, look at it through other thing» — la advertencia de método de 5.5.10 sobre cómo mirar al Uno.

«But it is identical with itself and» — lo que 5.6.5 pone por encima de la conciencia de sí: la identidad consigo del Bien.

«For adorning his soul and providing light coming from a greater light,» — cómo se ve la belleza en el alma virtuosa según 5.8.3.

«everything is transparent and there is nothing dark or opaque, but eve» — la descripción del mundo inteligible en 5.8.4: todo transparente, nada oscuro ni opaco.

«There is no weariness in the intelligible world. But there is a lack o» — y la ausencia de fatiga en ese mundo.

«Regarding scientific understanding in the intelligible world, which Pl» — el giro de 5.8.4 hacia la sabiduría de allá.

«For this reason, the ancients said that the Ideas are Beings, that is,» — cómo adjudica 5.8.5 a los antiguos la identificación de Ideas y Seres.

«The wise men of Egypt seem to me to have grasped this, whether with pr» — 5.8.6 atribuye a los sabios de Egipto la comprensión de esa doctrina, con la reserva dicha en la misma frase.

«When they want to display their wisdom, they don’t use forms of letter» — y en qué consistía esa comprensión según Plotino: no escriben con letras.

«Rather, they draw images and carve them in their temples – each thing» — el procedimiento que Plotino les atribuye: imágenes grabadas en los templos, una por cosa.

«But then, everything that is here is in the intelligible world in a mo» — el principio de correspondencia que 5.8.7 enuncia entre los dos mundos.

«For this reason, the creation is without effort.» — la consecuencia de 5.8.7 sobre la creación.

«And it was well said that we should thus not seek a cause for a princi» — la regla que 5.8.7 asume sobre no buscar causa del principio.

«So, let us grasp by discursive thinking44 this cosmos all together as» — el ejercicio de imaginación con que 5.8.9 pide ver el cosmos entero a la vez. El tramo corta antes de la llamada de nota.

«Let there be formed in your soul, then, the image of a luminous sphere» — y la imagen concreta que propone: una esfera luminosa formada en el alma.

«For where would Beauty be had it been deprived of its existence?» — la pregunta con que 5.8.9 ata la belleza al ser.