Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture

«is an imaginative construct in the minds of intellectuals and the wider public, not a straightforward historical reality “out there”» — el constructo, con la salvedad que sigue en la misma frase: sí remite a tendencias religiosas de existencia real.

«cultural memory of what we now call “Western esotericism” was constructed during the eighteenth century as the polemical Other of modernity, which was defining its own identity in that very process» — la memoria cultural como fabricación del siglo XVIII.

«having been expelled from intellectual discourse altogether, it ended up as a discredited waste-basket category of rejected knowledge» — la expulsión, en el cuerpo del libro.

«our very concepts of Western esotericism did indeed emerge as a singularizing and hegemonizing construct (directed, however, against “paganism” more than against Judaism or Islam) in the context of specifically Protestant and Enlightenment polemics» — y las polémicas que la produjeron, con el paréntesis que precisa contra quién iban dirigidas.

«If dominant historical images of the Other turn out to be simplifications or distortions, then the parallel images of ourselves – our basic identity – will have to be reconsidered and revised as well» — el corolario metodológico.

«That the ancient wisdom narrative is constituted of no fewer than three macrohistorical models, each with their own implications and internal logic, may have been a weakness theoretically, but could be an advantage in practice» — los tres modelos macrohistóricos, con la ventaja práctica que les adjudica.

«By the term ‘Ancient Theology’ I mean a certain tradition of Christian apologetic literature which rests on misdated texts» — la definición de teología antigua es de D. P. Walker, citado en nota.

«The concept of prisca theologia indicates that the true knowledge would be anterior to Greek philosophy and would actually be found, although perhaps in an enigmatic and esoteric form, among the pre-classical sages such as Zoroaster, Mercurius Trismegistus, and Orpheus» — la definición de prisca theologia es de Charles B. Schmitt, citado en bloque.

«It does not believe that knowledge . . . has ever been lost for centuries, but believes that it can surely be found in each period, albeit sometimes in attenuated form» — y la de philosophia perennis también es de Schmitt; los puntos suspensivos están en la fuente.

«thinks in terms of growth and development, imagining a gradual “education of humanity” to prepare it for the final revelation» — la tercera vía, la que suele olvidarse.

«first used by Marsilio Ficino and “launched” into scholarly debate in 1954» — la fuente dice PRIMER USO, no acuñación, y adjudica el lanzamiento del término al debate erudito a 1954.

«the exact term prisca theologia is used so rarely in the Renaissance that Walker thought he had invented it» — y lo matiza al revés en la plana siguiente.

«The term philosophia perennis was invented by Steuco, but Schmitt expresses surprise at how rarely it is actually used in his De perenni philosophia» — el invento de Steuco, con la sorpresa de Schmitt por lo poco que el propio Steuco lo usa.

«it only became famous after having been divorced from its original meaning, by Leibniz in 1714» — y su fama posterior.

«Isaac Casaubon who exploded the myth of Hermes Trismegistus by demonstrating, in 1614, that the Corpus Hermeticum had not been written in very ancient times but as recently as the first centuries» — la datación de 1614.

«Casaubon’s dating of the Corpus Hermeticum, in reaction to Baronius’ listing of Hermes Trismegistus as a gentile prophet, has received much attention in» — y su ocasión: la lista de profetas gentiles de Baronio.

«the ancient wisdom narrative of the Renaissance was grounded in what must now be seen as an inherently a-historical approach to historical questions» — el enfoque ahistórico; la fuente escribe «a-historical» con guion.

«the “sentiments and values” associated with a given system of thought are usually given preference over rational considerations, and people tend to favor arguments that support their beliefs» — por qué el relato sobrevive a la crítica filológica: Hanegraaff lo toma de Evans-Pritchard.

«The story of anti-apologeticism begins with Jacob Thomasius (1622– 1684),92 father of the more famous Christian Thomasius» — el arranque del anti-apologetismo; el «92» es la llamada de nota, tal cual la imprime la capa de texto.

«Pagan philosophy and biblical truth are entirely different animals: blurring the distinction between them results in bad history as well as doctrinal confusion» — y su formulación.

«where history is concerned, I cannot go against my principles by trying to persuade others that what I see to be Ethiopians are actually swans» — Thomasius en su propia voz, citado en la misma plana.

«Superstition is to religion what astrology is to astronomy: that is the very foolish daughter of a wise and intelligent mother» — el dicho es de Voltaire, que Hanegraaff llama «oft-quoted witticism».

«Tylor found the term “superstition” too strongly loaded with pejorative connotations to be used as a scholarly concept, and hence coined the term “survivals” as an alternative» — la carga peyorativa del término, tal como Hanegraaff reporta el motivo de Tylor en 1871.

«you cannot talk about magic without using the term magic» — la circularidad, exclamada por H. S. Versnel; la atribución cae al otro lado del salto de plana, y por eso la cita circula huérfana.

«The term “magic” is an important object of historical research, but definitely unsuitable as an etic instrument for doing research» — y la tesis propia de Hanegraaff, que es lo que él sí firma.

«the landmark book that gave birth to the study of Western esotericism as a specific domain of research: Ehregott Daniel Colberg’s Platonisch-Hermetisches Christenthum of 1690» — Colberg como pionero.

«the entire domain was dropped from the history of philosophy after Brucker, no other discipline took it up, and the Enlightenment paradigm came to dominate how it was perceived by intellectuals and academics» — Brucker como punto de exclusión.

«he in fact disliked the concept of a “Renaissance,” and emphasized the continuity of ancient and medieval thought into modernity» — el rechazo de Thorndike a la ruptura renacentista.

«Legacies from the past? Yes. Inheritances from previous period? Yes. Survivals? Yes. Resemblances to our forebears? Yes. Reformations? Perhaps. Reactions? Unfortunately. But no rebirths or restorations!» — y Thorndike en su propia voz, en nota.

«He would make us believe that the magician . . . was the ancestor of the modern investigator; that reason is the fruit of unreason; and truth, of superstition and occultism» — el ataque de George Sarton en su reseña de 1924.

«there is a fatal flaw to the argument: it just so happens that the Corpus Hermeticum contains virtually nothing that, by any definition, could be construed as “magic!”» — la negación sobre el Corpus Hermeticum, con la cláusula que la enmarca.

«Yates puts the reader on the wrong foot by stating that “the Asclepius purports to describe the religion of the Egyptians» — y la objeción sobre el Asclepius.

«it seems that Garin essentially created the paradigm that was later linked to Yates and her work» — la adjudicación del paradigma a Garin, con los dos atenuantes —«it seems», «essentially»— dentro de la cita.

«He therefore exhorted his colleagues that the history of the reception of the hermetic writings should urgently be put on the agenda of Renaissance research and, in so doing, laid the foundations for the academic recovery of the “Hermetic Tradition.» — y la exhortación previa de Kristeller, de 1938.

«article published in 1977, Robert S. Westman claimed that Yates had advanced a “thesis” about how magical interpretations of the Copernican cosmos had prepared the way for the mathematization and mechanization of that cosmos during the seventeenth century, and proceeded to deconstruct it in great detail» — quién formuló la «tesis Yates».

«It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Yates ever intended to present any such “thesis”» — y la abstención de Hanegraaff sobre si Yates tuvo alguna vez una tesis.

«next book . . . will not be a ‘Yates thesis’ but only another Yates attempt at laborious digging, or a sign-posting of fields in the hope that others will dig more deeply» — la respuesta de la propia Yates, de 1979, en nota.

«under a barrage of hostile questioning, Westfall retorted in exasperation, ‘I did not write» — el I did not write NO es de Yates: es de Richard Westfall, en un congreso sobre la alquimia de Newton, recordado por Margaret Jacob. La frase se completa en la plana siguiente, these manuscripts, con el hedge del propio recuerdo: or words to that effect.

«there emerges a sinister scenario according to which Giovanni Pico’s legacy may deliberately have been doctored and manipulated by his nephew, under the immediate influence of Savonarola and his circle at the San Marco» — el legado de Pico manipulado por su sobrino, escenario que Hanegraaff acredita a Steven Farmer y que presenta con «may».

«Sibly’s personal library provided Francis Barrett with what he needed to compile The Magus (1801):323 a digest of plagiarized materials taken from already existing translations of, most importantly, Agrippa’s De occulta philosophia, ps.-Agrippa’s Fourth Book of Occult Philosophy, ps.-Peter of Abano’s Heptameron, and Giovanni della Porta’s Magia Naturalis» — The Magus de Barrett como compilación plagiaria, con la lista de lo plagiado; el «323» es la llamada de nota.

«Hence all three oracles that dealt with goetia were removed by him from Psellus’ collection132 along with the adjective “Chaldaean,” and the remaining series was attributed to Zoroaster and the Magi» — la reatribución de los Oráculos Caldeos por Plethon.

«eliminated six oracles from it and presented the result together with his commentary and a brief “explanation” under a new title: Magical Sayings of the Magi, Disciples of Zoroaster» — y el título con que los reeditó; la fuente da dos cifras —seis oráculos eliminados, tres de goecia retirados— y no las reconcilia.

«Picatrix (which he believes to be the name of an author)» — Weyer trata «Picatrix» como nombre de autor.

«had already become entirely biblical in that no more mention was made of Hermes Trismegistus. All the credit for Egyptian masonry went to Moses» — las Constituciones de Anderson atribuyen la masonería egipcia a Moisés, excluyendo a Hermes.

«In this manner the category of “the occult” emerged during this period as a conceptual waste-basket for “rejected knowledge,” and it has kept functioning as the academy’s radical “Other” to the present day» — la definición, en el cuerpo, del conocimiento rechazado que da nombre al subtítulo.

«Anti-eclectic historiography seeks to correct the attenuated and ideology-driven pictures of Western history that result from such forms of eclecticism, by calling attention to the historical role and significance of the various currents and ideas that have ended up in the reservoir of “rejected knowledge” since the period of the Enlightenment» — el programa historiográfico que propone.

«Such direct experiential knowledge, or gnosis, is attained through “ecstatic” states of mind» — la gnosis.

«I do not mean to suggest that these two interrelated elements amount to a definition of Western esotericism, which would allow us to write “its” history as a specific historical tradition or domain» — y su abstención expresa: no ofrece una definición del esoterismo occidental.

«texts that presented chymistry as concerned with recovering ancient secrets – typically concealed by obscure language, enigmatic symbolism, or other techniques of dissimulation – became perceived as “alchemy.”» — cómo se fabricó la frontera entre alquimia y química.

«adjective “esoteric” made its first appearance in Lucian of Samosata’s satire Vitarum Rustio 26 (second century» — el primer uso documentado del adjetivo; «Vitarum Rustio» es lo que imprime la capa de texto, y la lectura restituida —Vitarum auctio, la sátira de Luciano— no está cotejada contra el facsímil.

«The rumor of a Rosicrucian group founded by a certain Jacob Rose in 1660 is a good illustration of how easily myths are created in these domains, by authors who keep copying one another’s statements without checking the original source» — cómo se fabrican los mitos en este dominio, dicho sobre un caso del propio campo.

«Academics tend to look on “esoteric,” “occult,” or “magical” beliefs with contempt, but are usually ignorant about the religious and philosophical traditions to which these terms refer, or their relevance to intellectual history.» — la presentación de solapa condensa la denuncia del libro: el desprecio académico convive con el desconocimiento de aquello que se desprecia; el texto es de la editorial, no del cuerpo de la obra.

«And yet, all these names – “esotericism,” “hermeticism,” “the occult,” “magic,” “mysticism,” “superstition,” “the irrational,” and so on – refer to something that unquestionably seems to exist, in our history and all around us.» — el problema de partida que plantea la introducción: todos los nombres disponibles —esotericism, hermeticism, the occult, magic, mysticism, superstition, the irrational— apuntan a algo que parece existir sin que ninguno lo nombre con claridad.

«Bookshops have special sections devoted to it, artists and poets claim to be inspired by it, theologians warn against its dangers.» — la presencia cultural del fenómeno se constata por sus efectos, incluida la advertencia teológica contra él.

«And whenever that happens, most of us are at least dimly aware of an emotional response of some kind: discomfort, irritation, amusement, contempt, or perhaps some vague feeling of curiosity, puzzlement, even excitement.» — señala que el encuentro con ese material dispara una respuesta emocional antes que una pregunta, y enumera el registro completo, del desprecio a la excitación.

«What we do not do, or only very rarely, is take a persistent look at it and ask ourselves questions about what we see.» — y que lo que casi nunca se hace es mirarlo con detenimiento y preguntarse por lo que se ve.

«The generic “we” in the above refers primarily, although not exclusively, to intellectuals and academics like myself.» — precisa a quién señala con ese nosotros: a los intelectuales y académicos, entre los que se cuenta.

«Questions of this kind have occupied me since the day, during my years as an undergraduate student, when I came across a book by a German scholar, Will-Erich Peuckert.» — data su propio interés en el hallazgo estudiantil de Will-Erich Peuckert, y así sitúa el origen de la pregunta en una lectura, no en una tradición.

«At the time when I began exploring it, there was exactly one academic chair devoted to this continent of learning as a whole, and no university program where students could study it as part of a regular curriculum.» — cifra el estado institucional del campo cuando empezó: una sola cátedra dedicada al continente entero y ningún programa donde estudiarlo como currículo regular.

«At the time of writing, there are at least three, all in Europe: still a very modest number, especially if one considers the vastness of the terrain, but an encouraging beginning that promises more to come.» — y al escribir, al menos tres, todas en Europa; lo llama un número muy modesto frente a la extensión del terreno.

«They even seem to have agreed about what to call it: Western esotericism.» — adjudica al consenso reciente el nombre con que hoy se designa el campo, Western esotericism.

«But no matter how extravagant the claims that have been made about this continent, one thing is clear: it has always been considered the domain of the Other.» — sostiene que, por encima de cualquier reclamo hecho sobre ese continente, ha sido siempre considerado el dominio del Otro.

«How much truth there is to these perceptions of otherness is an open question, which I will not try to answer directly.» — y se abstiene expresamente de responder cuánta verdad hay en esas percepciones de otredad: la deja como pregunta abierta.

«What must be emphasized, however, is that our perceptions of “esotericism” or “the occult” are inextricably entwined with how we think about ourselves:» — lo que sí afirma es que las percepciones del esoterismo o de lo oculto están entretejidas con cómo nos pensamos a nosotros mismos.

«I have written it in the hope that after traveling through six centuries in their company, and returning home to our own time, intellectuals and academics will discover that their familiar world no longer looks quite the same.» — declara el efecto que espera del libro: que tras seis siglos de recorrido el mundo familiar del lector académico ya no le parezca el mismo.

«However, at a time when critical neutrality had not yet emerged as a historiographical ideal, any such history had to be based upon theological and metaphysical premises and assume the shape of a history of truth: it was not expected merely to discuss the various opinions of earlier thinkers, but rather, to demonstrate the sources of true knowledge and wisdom, trace the paths they had followed through time, and make clear how those trajectories harmonized or coincided with the unquestionable truth of Christian doctrine.» — reconstruye la condición de posibilidad del relato: antes de que existiera el ideal de neutralidad crítica, toda historia tenía que ser una historia de la verdad, no un repertorio de opiniones ajenas.

«for them, metaphysical verities grounded in divine revelation were the self-evident foundation for intellectual inquiry, and there was not yet any compelling reason to see them as incompatible with the business of historiography.» — y explica por qué eso no era incoherencia: para esos autores las verdades metafísicas reveladas eran el fundamento evidente de la indagación, sin conflicto visible con la historiografía.

«The history of truth and Western esotericism, is usually referred to as prisca theologia (ancient theology) or philosophia perennis (perennial philosophy).» — nombra las dos etiquetas con que esa historia de la verdad se conoce habitualmente.

«However, in a penetrating analysis of his perspective, Michael J. B. Allen has warned against too easy associations between the concept of prisca theologia and that of philosophia perennis, linked to the name of Agostino Steuco.» — recoge la advertencia de Michael J. B. Allen contra asociar demasiado deprisa prisca theologia y philosophia perennis; la reserva es de Allen y Hanegraaff la hace suya.

«St. Augustine: “The very thing which is now called the Christian religion was with the ancients, and it was with the human race from its beginning to the time when» — la fórmula que sostiene la continuidad entre lo antiguo y lo cristiano es de san Agustín, citada por Steuco y recogida aquí como antecedente del argumento.

«it concerned a period that had ended with the birth of Christ, and therefore had little social or political relevance for the present: neither revolutionary nor conservative in its implications, it amounted to little more than a historical opinion concerning a time that now belonged to the remote past.» — adjudica a la prisca theologia una inocuidad política: al ocuparse de un periodo cerrado con el nacimiento de Cristo, no era revolucionaria ni conservadora, sino una opinión histórica sobre un pasado remoto.

«adherents of the prisca theologia perspective could and did evoke it rhetorically, to counter criticisms that their narrative of ancient decline and contemporary recovery left no room for explaining how the advent of Christianity had been a step forward in the history of truth.» — señala el uso retórico que sus partidarios le daban al esquema progresivo, para responder a la objeción de que su relato de declive no dejaba sitio al cristianismo como avance.

«pia philosophia is merely one option among many similar terms that were used at the time,» — y advierte que pia philosophia es solo una opción entre muchos términos equivalentes de la época, contra la tentación de fijar una terminología que la fuente no fija.

«Tools sharp enough to really keep the ancient theology apart from philosophy were not developed until the emergence of Protestant anti-apologeticism» — data la aparición de instrumentos capaces de separar la teología antigua de la filosofía en el anti-apologetismo protestante, no antes.

«These middle- and neoplatonic transformations of philosophy into religion, mythology and ritual have been a source of barely concealed embarrassment for classicists.» — nombra la reacción de los clasicistas ante la transformación platónica de la filosofía en religión, mitología y rito: un bochorno apenas disimulado.

«Thus, in his standard work The Middle Platonists, John Dillon discussed them under the telling rubric “Some Loose Ends,” and referred to this “murky area” as the “Underworld of Platonism” dominated by “sub-philosophical phenomena”:22 although their existence had to be recognized, the philosophical inferiority of their occult speculations was clearly taken for granted.» — documenta esa reacción en John Dillon, que los trató bajo el rótulo Some Loose Ends y llamó a la zona el Underworld of Platonism, con fenómenos sub-filosóficos; la inferioridad se daba por supuesta.

«Likewise, when the great French scholar Andr´e-Jean Festugi`ere discussed the same milieu in the introduction to his classic study of late antique hermetism, he saw no reason to conceal his distaste for the superstitious pseudo-philosophies that marked the “decline of rationalism” in the late Hellenistic world.» — y en André-Jean Festugière, que no ocultó su disgusto por las pseudo-filosofías supersticiosas del declive del racionalismo helenístico.

«And if modern scholars noted that the Syrian platonist Iamblichus of Chalcis introduced theurgical rites into neoplatonism, they have tended to dismiss this as a “corruption of the tradition” or an “irresoluble enigma,” while ignoring the fact that Iamblichus’ approach was far more typical of neoplatonism as a cultural phenomenon than the non-ritual philosophy of Plotinus, which remained a relative exception.» — objeta el tratamiento de la teurgia de Jámblico como corrupción o enigma: sostiene que el enfoque de Jámblico era más típico del neoplatonismo como fenómeno cultural que la filosofía sin rito de Plotino, que fue la excepción.

«To understand the historical origins of the ancient wisdom narrative, we need to overcome such normative biases, which judge religious practices and speculations by the unsuitable yardstick of rational philosophy and anachronistically project modern stereotypes of “the occult” back into the ancient past.» — formula la consecuencia metodológica: entender el origen del relato de la sabiduría antigua exige dejar de juzgar prácticas religiosas con la vara de la filosofía racional y de proyectar hacia atrás los estereotipos modernos de lo oculto.

«On this point [i.e. the problem of God], after having cited and taken notice of Plato’s testimonies, one should go further back and connect them to the teachings of Pythagoras, calling next upon the peoples of high renown so as to include their initiations, dogmas and cultural foundations, which they accomplish in full accord with Plato, in short, to all on which the Brahmans, the Jews, the Magi and the Egyptians were in agreement.» — el pasaje que Festugière pone como característico es de Numenio de Apamea, pitagórico del siglo II: remite de Platón a Pitágoras y de ahí a brahmanes, judíos, magos y egipcios.

«Far from being an isolated instance, this statement was utterly typical of the period: there are innumerable references27 to the ruling idea that the most ancient “barbarian” peoples possessed a pure and superior science and wisdom, derived not from reason but from direct mystical access to the divine,28 and that all the important Greek philosophers up to and including Plato had received their “philosophy” from these sources.» — y Hanegraaff sostiene que la idea no era excepcional sino la regla de la época: los pueblos bárbaros más antiguos tenían una ciencia superior no derivada de la razón, y de ahí la habrían recibido los griegos.

«Nevertheless, it is only as recently as 2001 that a contemporary Suhraward¯ı specialist, John Walbridge, drew the logical conclusion in coining the term “Platonic Orientalism.”31» — data en 2001 la acuñación del término Platonic Orientalism y la adjudica a John Walbridge, especialista en Suhrawardī.

«By the late Hellenistic period an informed and not overly skeptical Greek would have seen the situation as follows: The ancient Persians had their philosophers, who were known as Magi.» — la reconstrucción de lo que un griego helenístico informado habría dado por sentado es cita de Walbridge, no formulación propia.

«Very similar assumptions were common about Hermes Trismegistus as the greatest Egyptian wise man, and about the legendary sages of various other ancient nations.» — extiende la misma estructura de supuestos a Hermes Trismegisto como el mayor sabio egipcio y a los sabios legendarios de otras naciones antiguas.

«Given the basic assumption (peculiarly unhistorical to us, but quite natural to them) that all the great sages represented one and the same, timeless and universal wisdom tradition, it was not just unproblematic but perfectly logical to read Plato’s dialogues through what we now see as middle- and neoplatonic lenses.» — explica la lógica interna del procedimiento: dado el supuesto de una sabiduría única y sin tiempo —para nosotros peculiarmente ahistórico, para ellos natural—, leer a Platón con lentes medio y neoplatónicas era perfectamente lógico.

«Hence Ficino, for example, could claim that in reading the Enneads we are listening to Plato speaking through Plotinus’ mouth.» — y lo ejemplifica en Ficino, para quien al leer las Enéadas se escucha a Platón hablando por boca de Plotino.

«The point was that, even more precisely, both Plotinus and Plato were seen not as original and innovative thinkers, but as mouthpieces of one and the same ancient and universal fountain of wisdom, whose author was ultimately God himself.» — precisa el punto: ni Platón ni Plotino eran vistos como pensadores originales, sino como portavoces de una misma fuente antigua cuyo autor último era Dios.

«All this makes Platonic Orientalism a perfectly appropriate label for the late antique milieus and traditions to which the ancient wisdom discourse of the Renaissance referred.» — concluye que Platonic Orientalism es la etiqueta apropiada para los medios tardoantiguos a los que remitía el discurso renacentista de la sabiduría antigua.

«Thus, when Hecataeus of Abdera (fourth cent. bc) described how Orpheus, Homer, Solon, Pythagoras, Plato and many others had acquired their knowledge and wisdom while visiting Egypt,42 his point was to highlight that country as the original source of higher truth while dismissing Greek culture as derivative and second hand.» — data en Hecateo de Abdera, siglo IV a. C., el uso del viaje a Egipto de Orfeo, Homero, Solón, Pitágoras y Platón para presentar a Egipto como fuente y a la cultura griega como derivada.

«In sharp contrast, but following the same logic, Diogenes Laertius (third cent. ce) opened his famous book about the lives of the eminent philosophers by refuting the barbarians’ claim: those who believe that philosophy originated among the Persians, Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Indians, Celts, or Gauls “forget that the achievements which they attribute to the barbarians belong to the Greeks, with whom not merely philosophy but the human race itself began.”» — y señala que Diógenes Laercio abre sus Vidas con la operación inversa y la misma lógica: refutar la pretensión de los bárbaros devolviendo a los griegos lo que se les atribuía.

«It was a general conviction of the age that the oldest was always best, that the present was an age of decadence, a low point on the universal cycle; that the “ancients” were nearer to the gods and the beginnings of things and therefore knew much more about them.» — la convicción de que lo más antiguo es siempre lo mejor y el presente una decadencia va en cita de bloque, remitida a nota.

«To make a convincing claim of superiority towards pagan religion, Christian authors needed to counter the objection that their faith was merely a recent invention without historical depth, and hence without the legitimacy conferred by Tradition.» — plantea el problema que esa convicción creaba al cristianismo: para reclamar superioridad había que responder a la objeción de ser una invención reciente, sin la legitimidad que confiere la tradición.

«In other words, they were faced with a task that might seem impossible: that of preaching the “good news” of the gospel while simultaneously denying its novelty.» — y describe la tarea resultante como aparentemente imposible: predicar la buena nueva negando a la vez su novedad.

«To meet this challenge and defeat their opponents, the trump card they played was “Moses.”» — adjudica la salida a una sola carta jugada por los apologistas: Moisés.

«not only were the Egyptians presented as depending on Moses, but all the achievements claimed for the Egyptian Hermes could now be seen as Moses’ achievements!» — señala la jugada de Artapano, conservada en Eusebio: identificado Moisés con Hermes, todo logro egipcio atribuido a Hermes pasaba a ser de Moisés.

«The Lycurguses, and Solons, and Zoleukos, the legislator of the Locrians, and all those admired by the Greeks seem to have been but ‘yesterday or the day before’» — la comparación que deja a Licurgo, Solón y Zaleuco como de ayer o anteayer frente a Moisés es de Flavio Josefo, citado.

«The essential logic of their argumentation, which would become basic to the ancient wisdom discourse of the Renaissance, is presented with particular lucidity in an anonymous treatise from the third or early fourth century, titled Ad Graecos de vera religione but traditionally known as the Cohortatio ad Graecos and attributed, incorrectly,54 to Justin Martyr (second cent.).» — data el tratado Ad Graecos de vera religione entre el siglo III y comienzos del IV, y consigna que la atribución tradicional a Justino Mártir es incorrecta: el pseudoepígrafe se declara como tal.

«To show that Moses was much older than any of the Greek philosophers, Ad Graecos invokes a long list of historians, including Flavius Josephus and Diodorus Siculus (9; cf. 12).» — describe el procedimiento probatorio del tratado: para hacer a Moisés más antiguo que los filósofos griegos invoca una lista larga de historiadores, Flavio Josefo y Diodoro Sículo entre ellos.

«Nothing taught by Moses and the later Prophets came from their own intellect: their knowledge was based entirely upon a “divine and prophetic” gift bestowed upon them by God (10.2).» — y su premisa sobre el origen del saber profético: nada de lo enseñado por Moisés y los profetas venía de su intelecto, sino de un don divino y profético.

«As for Plato himself: although it was in Egypt that he must have read the Pentateuch (28.1), the author suggests (and keeps repeating) that if he did not speak more openly about Moses’ teaching of the One and Only God, this was only out of fear that what had happened to Socrates might happen to him too» — consigna el recurso con que el tratado explica el silencio de Platón sobre Moisés: el miedo a correr la suerte de Sócrates, argumento que el autor repite.

«As emphasized by the real Justin Martyr, Christianity is not radically new: it is a revival of the ancient religion inspired by the eternal Logos:» — adjudica al Justino Mártir auténtico —por oposición al tratado que se le atribuye mal— la tesis de que el cristianismo no es radicalmente nuevo, sino reanimación de la religión antigua inspirada por el Logos eterno.

«At their altar devoted to “the Unknown God,” the Athenians had been worshiping the Christian God without knowing it, and hence Paul told them that “whom you ignorantly worship, him I declare unto you” (Acts 17:23).» — señala el modelo autorizado del que se colgaba esa tesis: el altar ateniense al Dios desconocido, en el discurso del Areópago.

«Following the same logic, the apologetic argument in the wake of Justin Martyr made it possible for Christian platonists to interpret Plato and all the other authorities of “Platonic Orientalism” as unconscious Christians, who had been inspired by the divine Logos without knowing it.» — y la consecuencia que habilitaba para los platónicos cristianos: leer a Platón y a las demás autoridades del orientalismo platónico como cristianos inconscientes, inspirados por el Logos sin saberlo.

«The argumentation follows the essential logic of philosophia perennis, but could also easily be interpreted in support of pia philosophia, suggesting some kind of progress: the implicit or unconscious Christianity of the good pagans who lived in accordance with the universal Logos has now become explicit and conscious, so to speak, in the Christian message.» — precisa que ese argumento sigue la lógica de la philosophia perennis pero admite lectura progresiva, hacia la pia philosophia: lo implícito en los paganos buenos se vuelve explícito en el mensaje cristiano.

«The reason is simply that, far from being the original source of the ancient religion, Moses with his doctrine of radical or exclusive monotheism had been responsible for its corruption: “the goatherds and shepherds who followed Moses as their leader were deluded by clumsy deceits into thinking that there was only one God, [and] without any rational cause . . . these goatherds and shepherds abandoned the worship of many gods.”» — la acusación de que Moisés corrompió la religión antigua con su monoteísmo exclusivo es de Celso, citado; en su lectura los pastores que lo siguieron fueron engañados sin causa racional.

«Not only did Christianity originate as a rebellion against Jewish tradition,68 which is already bad enough, but the Christians with their new religion deliberately break with all other traditions as well: they are a people without roots, who “wall themselves off and break away from the rest of mankind.”» — y Celso agrava el cargo contra los cristianos: gente sin raíces que se amuralla y se aparta del resto de la humanidad.

«Far from being the original source of higher culture, the Greeks are mere imitators; Christianity is the most recent manifestation of the “wisdom of the barbarians,” of which Moses is the earliest representative.» — resume la posición de Taciano en su Contra los griegos: los griegos como meros imitadores y el cristianismo como manifestación más reciente de la sabiduría de los bárbaros, cuyo primer representante es Moisés.

«Origen concedes that the pagans may also have been inspired by God directly: “God has implanted in the souls of all men the truths which He taught through the prophets and the Saviour.”» — consigna la concesión de Orígenes, en su propia voz: Dios implantó en el alma de todos los hombres las verdades que enseñó por los profetas y el Salvador.

«the Christians do not even “adhere to the god who is honored among the Jews according to their customary rites, but . . . cut out for themselves a new kind of track in a pathless desert.”» — el reproche de que los cristianos se abren una senda nueva en un desierto sin caminos es de Porfirio, citado.

«Unlike Celsus, however, Porphyry attacked Christian claims for the anteriority of Moses from a historian’s perspective, with precise philological and chronological arguments.» — y distingue el método de Porfirio del de Celso: atacó la anterioridad de Moisés desde la perspectiva del historiador, con argumentos filológicos y cronológicos precisos.

«Eusebius offers a systematic history of culture in order to defend a by now familiar thesis: not only is Christianity true and ancient, but it is true because it is ancient.» — formula la tesis que Eusebio defiende con su historia sistemática de la cultura, y que es el nervio del relato: el cristianismo es verdadero porque es antiguo.

«But while he repeats many of the arguments of earlier apologists, the scholarly sophistication of Porphyry’s polemics forces him to develop an account that is considerably more complex than theirs,» — y adjudica a la sofisticación erudita de Porfirio el efecto de obligar a Eusebio a una respuesta más compleja que la de los apologistas anteriores.

«Although Eusebius introduces a clear element of progress here, the true religion established as Christianity was itself not new: it embodies the ancient religion of the Hebrews, as it had existed prior even to the establishment of Jewish religion by Moses:» — señala que en Eusebio el elemento de progreso convive con la negación de novedad: la religión verdadera establecida como cristianismo encarna la religión antigua de los hebreos, anterior incluso a la instituida por Moisés.

«While this does not make Judaism inferior, it does make Christianity superior.» — y precisa el saldo del argumento, que no rebaja al judaísmo pero jerarquiza.

«Eusebius’ knowledge of this tradition was very profound90 and particularly important for us, for although the religion of the pagans is rejected as demonic, he believes the platonic philosophy to be derived from Hebrew sources and to agree in its essence with Christianity.» — consigna la asimetría de Eusebio: rechaza como demoníaca la religión de los paganos y a la vez cree la filosofía platónica derivada de fuentes hebreas y coincidente en lo esencial con el cristianismo.

«It is from this context that we must understand Eusebius’ famous quotation of a statement by Numenius: “What is Plato but Moses speaking Attic Greek?”» — la sentencia sobre Platón como Moisés en ático es de Numenio, citada por Eusebio; Hanegraaff la sitúa en ese contexto y no la asume.

«and Augustine emphasizes that Hermes Trismegistus may have lived “long before the sages or philosophers of Greece, [but] nonetheless after Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph, and, indeed, after Moses himself.”93» — Agustín data a Hermes Trismegisto antes que los sabios griegos pero después de los patriarcas y del propio Moisés, con lo que salva la anterioridad hebrea.

«Augustine insists that “no one has come closer to us than the platonists,”95 but adds that the true beliefs shared by Christians and platonists might also be held by wise men or philosophers of other nations, “be they Atlantic Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldaeans, Scythians, Gauls or Spaniards.”96» — la fórmula de que nadie se acercó tanto a nosotros como los platónicos es de Agustín, que en el mismo lugar la extiende a sabios de otras naciones y enumera cuáles.

«Augustine is pleading his cause with the platonists “because their writings are better known,” but he points out that “any other philosophers of any nation” who have thought in the same way concerning God are, to that extent, in agreement with Christianity as well.» — y explica su propio criterio de selección: alega con los platónicos porque sus escritos son más conocidos, no porque sean los únicos.

«Hardly less important is that they were vying over a different kind of symbolic capital, according to the rules determined in each case by the dominant culture: the patristic apologists had needed to prove that their religion could claim the authority of an ancient and venerable Tradition, but the Renaissance humanists needed to demonstrate that the pagan sources could be reconciled with theological orthodoxy.» — marca la diferencia entre las dos operaciones que compara: los apologistas patrísticos debían probar que su religión tenía tradición antigua; los humanistas renacentistas, que las fuentes paganas se conciliaban con la ortodoxia.

«With this possibility, the outlines of Western esotericism begin to emerge.» — y sitúa ahí el punto donde empiezan a dibujarse los contornos de lo que hoy se llama esoterismo occidental.

«They called him Plato and Socrates, for he was not inferior to those two in wisdom, as everybody would agree.» — el elogio que equipara a Pletón con Platón y Sócrates es de un testimonio contemporáneo citado, no valoración propia.

«at the time of the Council, he writes, the young Cosimo de’ Medici had often listened to Plethon, who had “spoken of the platonic mysteries like a second Plato.”» — data en 1492 el recuerdo de Ficino, en la dedicatoria a Lorenzo de Médici de su traducción de Plotino: el joven Cosme habría escuchado a Pletón hablar de los misterios platónicos como un segundo Platón.

«The implication is that during those meetings Plethon had sown the seeds that had blossomed two decades later in the Platonic Academy of Florence.» — y consigna la implicación de ese recuerdo —la semilla de la Academia platónica florentina— como implicación, sin suscribirla.

«Hence during the festivities around the feast of St. John at the closing of the Council in 1439, the Greeks were dazzled by a luxurious procession of men dressed up like the Magi following the star.» — describe la procesión de hombres vestidos de Reyes Magos con que se cerró el Concilio en 1439.

«This spectacle was staged presumably in honor of their own presence, but carried a subtext of Western superiority that they were unlikely to miss:» — y le lee un subtexto de superioridad occidental que los griegos difícilmente pasarían por alto.

«for all their wisdom, the Eastern sages had been obliged to travel all the way to the West, and having reached their destination they had knelt and paid homage to God’s representative on earth.» — explicitado así: con toda su sabiduría, los sabios de Oriente tuvieron que viajar hasta Occidente y arrodillarse ante el representante de Dios en la tierra.

«Twenty years later, in 1459, Cosimo de’ Medici commissioned a great fresco by Benozzo Gozzoli called The Journey of the Magi, in which the memory of the Council still resonates strongly.» — data en 1459 el encargo de Cosme de Médici a Benozzo Gozzoli del fresco El viaje de los Reyes Magos, donde sostiene que todavía resuena la memoria del Concilio.

«it was taken for granted that the Magi who venerated the Christ child could have been none other than the disciples of Zoroaster.» — señala el supuesto que hacía funcionar el paralelo: se daba por descontado que los Magos que veneraron al niño no podían ser otros que discípulos de Zoroastro.

«Plato makes his return because he is the inheritor at the same time of the Magi (according to Plethon) and of Hermes (according to the Latin Fathers, notably Augustine and Lactantius)» — la conclusión de que Platón regresa por ser heredero a la vez de los Magos y de Hermes es de Brigitte Tambrun, citada en bloque.

«the latter was poorly understood not only by the humanists, but even by the scholastics, who claimed his authority but actually knew him mainly through Latin and Arab sources» — consigna su diagnóstico sobre el conocimiento de Platón en Occidente: mal entendido no solo por los humanistas, también por los escolásticos, que invocaban su autoridad conociéndolo por vía latina y árabe.

«To correct such misunderstandings, Plethon during his sojourn in Florence wrote a short text in Greek, Wherein Aristotle disagrees with Plato, usually referred to as De differentiis.» — data en la estancia florentina de Pletón el opúsculo griego conocido como De differentiis, escrito para corregir esos malentendidos.

«It purported to demonstrate that Aristotle went wrong whenever he departed from Plato and is considered the opening shot in the famous Plato–Aristotle controversy of the Renaissance,» — y lo adjudica como disparo inicial de la controversia renacentista entre Platón y Aristóteles.

«Much more important, indeed central, to our concerns is Plethon’s version of the Chaldaean Oracles and his commentaries on them.» — declara central para su asunto la versión de los Oráculos Caldeos que hizo Pletón, junto con sus comentarios.

«As we have seen, this collection – famously referred to by Franz Cumont as the “Bible” of the late antique theurgists – is among the most important textual references of “orientalist“ middle platonism and had enjoyed an exalted status in the late neoplatonist curriculum.» — y recuerda que la colección, que Franz Cumont llamó la Biblia de los teúrgos tardoantiguos, tenía estatuto elevado en el currículo neoplatónico tardío.

«This Jew was an adherent of Averroes and other Persian and Arabic interpreters of Aristotle’s works, which the Jews had translated into their own language, but he paid little regard to Moses or the beliefs» — la noticia del maestro judío de Pletón, seguidor de Averroes y de los intérpretes persas y árabes de Aristóteles, viene de Jorge Escolario, que atacaba a Pletón como hereje y pagano.

«He was ostensibly a Jew but in fact a Hellenist.» — y es Escolario quien lo describe como judío solo en apariencia, heleno de hecho.

«Plethon himself never mentions Elissaeus, and his enemy Scholarios remains our only direct source, but the latter’s statements make sense if they are placed in context.» — Hanegraaff marca el límite de la evidencia: Pletón nunca menciona a Elisseo y el enemigo Escolario es la única fuente directa, aunque sus afirmaciones cobran sentido en contexto.

«That the latter was wholly grounded in Greek philosophy, and Platonic Orientalism in particular, has been demonstrated exhaustively by John Walbridge.» — adjudica a John Walbridge la demostración de que la escuela iluminacionista está enteramente fundada en filosofía griega, y en el orientalismo platónico en particular.

«Plethon had “no previous knowledge” of Zoroaster before being introduced to the Persian sage by his Jewish master.» — y consigna que Pletón no tenía conocimiento previo de Zoroastro antes de que su maestro judío se lo presentara.

«Whoso questions the truth of this . . . let him engage in mystical disciplines and service to those visionaries, that perchance he will, as one dazzled by the thunderbolt, see the light blazing in the Kingdom of Power and will witness the heavenly essences and lights that Hermes and Plato beheld.» — la invitación a la disciplina mística para ver la luz que contemplaron Hermes y Platón es de Suhrawardī, citado.

«Plethon, for his part, now seems to have concluded that whereas Zoroaster and the Magi were the depositors of the ancient, true and universal131 religion of Zoroaster, the “Chaldaeans” represented a later development that had corrupted the truth, leading to the false doctrine of dualism and practices of sorcery.» — reconstruye la conclusión de Pletón: Zoroastro y los Magos depositarios de la religión antigua y verdadera, y los caldeos un desarrollo posterior que la corrompió con el dualismo y la hechicería; lo dice con seems now to have concluded.

«Scholarios himself, however, preserved those parts he felt he needed to back up his accusations.» — y señala la ironía de la transmisión: lo que se conserva de esos textos son las partes que Escolario guardó para sostener sus acusaciones.

«Back in Mistra, Plethon wrote his major philosophical synthesis, the Nomoi (Laws), which seems to have been made known only to the select membership of his intimate circle of pupils.» — data en el regreso a Mistra la síntesis filosófica mayor de Pletón, los Nomoi, que al parecer solo circuló entre su círculo íntimo de discípulos.

«Plethon is explicit in presenting his list of “lawgivers and philosophers” as a positive category against its negative counterpart, consisting of “poets and sophists.”» — señala que Pletón presenta su lista de legisladores y filósofos como categoría positiva frente a su contraparte negativa, poetas y sofistas.

«Plethon’s genealogy is a deliberate alternative to the Christian apologetic literature since Justin Martyr, according to which the Greeks were dependent upon Moses.» — y adjudica a esa genealogía un propósito deliberado: ser alternativa a la literatura apologética cristiana desde Justino, que hacía depender a los griegos de Moisés.

«Orpheus is not mentioned among the early Greek sages138 nor is Proclus among the neoplatonists;139 but most striking is the absence of Hermes and Moses.» — releva las ausencias de la lista de Pletón, y señala como la más llamativa la doble ausencia de Hermes y de Moisés.

«One negative characteristic of “sophists” is that they are forever in search of the new, whereas Plethon declares that he has invented nothing» — consigna la marca con que Pletón separa al sabio del sofista: el sofista busca siempre lo nuevo, y él declara no haber inventado nada.

«Plethon, defending a universal and perennial tradition of ancient wisdom grounded in the religion of Zoroaster and the Magi, was breaking so deliberately with the patristic apologetic tradition that the conclusion cannot be avoided: what he had in mind was nothing less than a revival of paganism in deliberate opposition to Christianity.» — su lectura de la maniobra: la ruptura con la tradición apologética patrística es tan deliberada que la conclusión resulta inevitable, un renacimiento del paganismo en oposición al cristianismo.

«If we give credence to the testimony of George of Trebizond, Plethon believed that his philosophy was destined to replace Christianity and Islam as the religion of the future.» — acredita a Jorge de Trebisonda el testimonio de que Pletón creía a su filosofía destinada a reemplazar al cristianismo y al islam, y lo condiciona expresamente a que se le dé crédito.

«Concerning the fact that Plethon was indeed a “neo-pagan” opponent of Christianity (although he obviously had to conceal this, since preaching his views openly would have been a capital offense in Byzantium) there is near-universal agreement among specialists.» — reporta un consenso casi universal entre especialistas sobre el neopaganismo de Pletón, con el motivo del disimulo: predicarlo abiertamente en Bizancio era delito capital.

«On the contrary, we will see that Renaissance platonism was a deeply Christian phenomenon;» — y acota de inmediato el alcance: el platonismo renacentista fue un fenómeno profundamente cristiano.

«Nevertheless, one might say that with Plethon, the pagan cat was out of the bag.» — la fórmula con que resume el efecto de Pletón sobre lo que vino después.

«We already saw that in the frankly paranoid imagination of George of Trebizond, who believed in a full-blown conspiracy of platonists seeking the destruction of Christianity, Plethon was a “poisonous viper” hiding behind the mask of a venerable philosopher.» — consigna la versión hostil de Jorge de Trebisonda, que él mismo llama francamente paranoica: una conspiración de platónicos para destruir el cristianismo, con Pletón como víbora venenosa tras la máscara del filósofo.

«Scholarios described Plethon as a man who had been “dominated by Hellenic ideas” since his youth and was reading the Greek poets and philosophers not for the sake of their language but “in order to associate himself with them.”» — y la de Escolario, que lo describía dominado por ideas helénicas desde joven y leyendo a los poetas griegos para asociarse con ellos, no por su lengua.

«His case shows that once the basic textual sources of the platonic tradition became available to a Christian culture where the need for religious reform was widely felt, paganism became a religious option in theory at least.» — extrae de ese caso la tesis que le importa: disponibles las fuentes platónicas en una cultura cristiana que sentía necesidad de reforma, el paganismo se volvió una opción religiosa, al menos en teoría.

«He therefore arranged for him to learn Greek, gave him a manuscript of Plato’s complete dialogues,159 and a villa in Careggi that became the center of the new Platonic Academy under Ficino’s leadership.» — así continúa la leyenda de la Academia platónica: Cosme habría hecho aprender griego a Ficino, le habría dado los diálogos completos de Platón y la villa de Careggi.

«We have no independent evidence that Cosimo actually met Plethon; if he did, there was a serious language barrier between them; the picture of Cosimo as a Platonist is questionable; the idea of the “Platonic Academy” rests on only two passages by Ficino himself;» — y así la desmenuza objeción por objeción: no hay evidencia independiente del encuentro con Pletón, había barrera de lengua, la imagen de Cosme platónico es dudosa y la Academia descansa en dos pasajes del propio Ficino.

«Hankins concludes that Ficino formed the center only of a kind of “informal gymnasium” for his pupils, which, moreover, was not particularly platonic in orientation, did not stand under the patronage of the Medici, and was not located in Careggi (“Myth,” 449» — recoge la conclusión de James Hankins: lo que hubo fue una suerte de gimnasio informal para sus discípulos, ni particularmente platónico ni bajo patronazgo de los Médici ni ubicado en Careggi.

«In his “Platonic Academy of Florence,” published in 2002, Field conceded many of Hankins’ points but disagreed with some others, and concluded that even if there was no formal institution under Medici patronage, the term “Platonic Academy” remains appropriate for referring to Ficino’s circle» — y consigna sin armonizarla la posición contraria de Arthur Field, que en 2002 concedió muchos puntos a Hankins y aun así sostuvo que la expresión Academia platónica sigue sirviendo para el círculo de Ficino.

«Another, no less attractive, story concerns the arrival in Florence, in 1462, of a manuscript of the Corpus Hermeticum attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, which had been brought from Byzantium by a monk, a certain Leonardo da Pistoia.» — data en 1462 la llegada a Florencia del manuscrito del Corpus Hermeticum traído de Bizancio por el monje Leonardo da Pistoia, y llama a ese relato otra historia atractiva.

«Yates was undoubtedly right about the crucial importance of Ficino’s Pimander for the reception history of hermetism in the Renaissance; but rather than seeing the latter as a quasi-autonomous tradition of hermetic magic, I will suggest it is better understood as merely a dimension – albeit a very important one – of the more general history of Platonic Orientalism in the Renaissance.» — su corrección a Frances Yates, hecha concediéndole lo esencial: acierta sobre la importancia del Pimander de Ficino, pero el hermetismo se entiende mejor como dimensión del orientalismo platónico que como tradición cuasi autónoma de magia hermética.

«Whether he had any familiarity with Plethon’s Nomoi remains somewhat unclear.» — y donde no hay evidencia se abstiene: la familiaridad de Ficino con los Nomoi de Pletón queda poco clara.

«These young men were defending the beauties and virtues of Plato and pagan poetry, but were frequently exhorted to rather follow the “pure and sincere wisdom of the Church Fathers” and turn away from the degenerate pagan philosophy, particularly Plato, “a pagan alien from God and from the gifts of Christ.”» — documenta la presión sobre los jóvenes que defendían a Platón y la poesía pagana: se les exhortaba a volver a la sabiduría pura de los Padres y a apartarse del pagano ajeno a Dios.

«According to a credible account by Zanobi Acciaiuoli, Ficino had “very often” told him that as a young man he had indeed fallen into “pernicious heresy,” but had been saved by the providential intervention of the aged archbishop of Florence, Antoninus, an opponent of humanism who had told him to read Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles as an antidote against his unregulated study of Plato.» — acredita a Zanobi Acciaiuoli el relato de que Ficino había caído de joven en herejía perniciosa y fue salvado por el arzobispo Antonino, enemigo del humanismo, que le recetó la Summa contra gentiles como antídoto.

«In a telling dialogue by Antonio degli Agli, the author warns Ficino against the vanity and error of pagan thought, and exhorts him to “Tarry not in turning yourself back to the knowledge of God, and leave Plato and others of his sort behind!”» — y consigna la advertencia de Antonio degli Agli contra la vanidad del pensamiento pagano, con su exhortación a dejar atrás a Platón.

«Boccaccio had defended the same concept of “poetic theology,” with Orpheus and Moses among its major representatives» — data en Boccaccio la misma teología poética, con Orfeo y Moisés entre sus representantes mayores.

«Ficino merely mentions these opinions, does not take a position himself, and never returns to the question of historical primacy.» — marca la abstención de Ficino ante la primacía histórica: menciona las opiniones, no toma posición y no vuelve sobre la cuestión.

«one year later the question was settled once and for all, in favor of neither Hermes nor Moses:» — y data un año después el desenlace, que no favorece ni a Hermes ni a Moisés.

«Ficino decided to give preference to Zoroaster as the very earliest priscus theologus.» — la decisión de Ficino: Zoroastro como el más antiguo de los priscos teólogos.

«he suggested that Abraham himself had already taken the Zoroastrian wisdom with him when he set out from the city of Ur of the Chaldaeans» — con el puente que la hace compatible con la Escritura: Abraham ya habría llevado consigo la sabiduría zoroástrica al salir de Ur de los caldeos.

«Ficino now made the Persian sage precede not only Hermes Trismegistus, but Moses as well.» — y su consecuencia cronológica, que es la que importa: el sabio persa antecede no solo a Hermes, también a Moisés.

«Ficino himself was too cautious to be very explicit about this implication, but it appears to have been expressed without any ambiguity by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola:» — señala que Ficino fue demasiado cauto para explicitar esa implicación y adjudica a Pico della Mirandola haberla dicho sin ambigüedad.

«Thus it happened that a pious philosophy was born in those days among the Persians under Zoroaster and among the Egyptians under Mercurius, and that each was in accord with the other.» — la metáfora del nacimiento de una filosofía piadosa simultánea entre persas y egipcios es de Ficino, citado; el propio Hanegraaff la lee como reformulación de la pia philosophia patrística.

«while engaged in this in Persia he thoroughly investigated every virtue and power of nature, in order to know those sacred and sublime secrets of the divine intellect; which subject many people called theurgy, others Cabala or magic.» — y la equiparación de la magia de Zoroastro con el culto de Dios, llamada por unos teurgia y por otros cábala o magia, es de Pico, citado en bloque.

«However, the ancient theologians were accustomed to concealing the divine mysteries by means of number symbolism and poetic fable.» — consigna el supuesto hermenéutico que lo sostiene todo: los teólogos antiguos acostumbraban ocultar los misterios divinos con simbolismo numérico y fábula poética.

«As pointed out by Michael J. B. Allen, Ficino did not really conceive of his list of the six earliest sages in terms of strict historical genealogy:» — acredita a Michael J. B. Allen la lectura de que Ficino no concebía su lista de seis sabios como genealogía histórica estricta.

«rather than assuming a transmission based upon direct contact between one sage and the next, he was mainly concerned with a “transmission of vision” to each of the gentile nations,» — sino como transmisión de una visión a cada nación gentil, no como contacto directo de un sabio con el siguiente.

«We have seen that it had been a crucial issue for the patristic apologists and their opponents, but although Ficino inherited a body of texts that had been based upon the premise that earlier was necessarily better, that premise was no longer so binding or central for him.» — señala el desplazamiento: Ficino hereda textos fundados en la premisa de que lo anterior es mejor, pero esa premisa ya no le resulta vinculante ni central.

«In discussions with his critics, the “symbolic capital” at stake was, as has been suggested above, no longer “Tradition” but “orthodoxy.”» — y nombra el capital simbólico que estaba en juego en su época: ya no la tradición, sino la ortodoxia.

«the most ancient period of wisdom, before Plato, the historical and chronological concern with genealogical transmission seems to have receded, in Ficino’s mind, in favor of timeless metaphysics: if the divine truth revealed to the ancients had been absolute and immutable, and all of them had been in perfect accord about it, this rendered the “search for origins” a somewhat futile exercise.» — explica por qué la búsqueda de orígenes pierde interés para Ficino: si la verdad revelada a los antiguos era absoluta e inmutable y todos concordaban, rastrear quién fue primero resulta ejercicio algo fútil.

«In terms of Hankins’ distinction between a period of “inspiration” followed by one of “interpretation” this is entirely logical.» — y remite esa lógica a la distinción de Hankins entre un periodo de inspiración y otro de interpretación.

«Beyond a shadow of doubt I myself have found that the principal mysteries in Numenius, Philo, Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus were in fact received from St. John, St. Paul, Hierotheus and Dionysius the Areopagite.» — la afirmación de haber hallado que los misterios de Numenio, Filón, Plotino, Jámblico y Proclo venían de Juan, Pablo, Hieroteo y Dionisio es de Ficino, citado en bloque: invierte la dirección del préstamo.

«On these foundations the great Church Fathers, Augustine in particular, re-established the ancient religion in its superior Christian form; but in later centuries it had evidently become “veiled” again, as the later platonists themselves went astray» — reconstruye el esquema de velamiento y recuperación con que Ficino ordena la historia: los Padres restablecen la religión antigua en forma cristiana superior y luego vuelve a velarse.

«It is important to emphasize how strongly this perspective differs from Plethon’s agenda of restoring Hellenistic paganism as an alternative to Christianity.» — subraya la distancia entre ese programa y el de Pletón, que quería restaurar el paganismo helenístico como alternativa al cristianismo.

«Christianity was the supreme manifestation of the ancient wisdom as such, and that any decline of true “platonism” therefore meant quite literally a decline of Christianity itself.» — porque para Ficino el cristianismo es la manifestación suprema de la sabiduría antigua, y todo declive del platonismo verdadero es literalmente un declive del cristianismo.

«Ficino’s program of a religio that transcends (almost!) all single religions should . . . not be confused with pluralism, syncretism, irenicism or ecumenism, for, in De christiana religione, Ficino uses a variety of (apologetic) arguments to prove that the true religion is only and exclusively the Christian one!» — la advertencia de no confundir esa religio con pluralismo, sincretismo, irenismo ni ecumenismo es de Michael Stausberg, citado; los puntos suspensivos están en la fuente.

«In his manner of reasoning, Ficino was basically following in the footsteps of the early Christian apologists and unassailable authorities like Augustine.» — y adjudica el modo de razonar de Ficino a la huella de los apologistas cristianos tempranos y de autoridades inatacables como Agustín.

«As expressed in a famous letter to Paul of Middelburg, Ficino believed that he was living at the beginning of a “new age”: after the long darkness of the Middle Ages, the Golden Age was now returning, with Florence as its center.» — data en la carta a Pablo de Middelburg la conciencia de Ficino de vivir el comienzo de una nueva edad, con Florencia por centro tras la larga oscuridad medieval.

«The reformed Christianity dreamt of by Ficino did not materialize, or at least not in the way that he was hoping for:» — y cierra el balance: el cristianismo reformado que Ficino soñaba no se materializó, o no del modo que esperaba.

«Pico’s project was a supreme (and extreme) example of the ancient wisdom narrative in the Renaissance, as will be seen, but its most innovative feature was the inclusion of a great number of theses concerned with kabbalah, the secret tradition of the Jews.» — califica el proyecto de Pico como ejemplo supremo y extremo del relato de la sabiduría antigua, y localiza su innovación en la incorporación masiva de tesis sobre la cábala.

«Pico became the founder of a new tradition known as Christian kabbalah, which would be taken up by numerous authors after him and developed into one of the most important currents» — adjudica a Pico la fundación de la cábala cristiana, retomada después por numerosos autores hasta volverse una de las corrientes principales.

«Probably because of this focus, they usually mention the prisca theologia only in passing, as a neighboring but presumably somewhat separate phenomenon concerned with pagan rather than Jewish sources.» — objeta a los especialistas en cábala cristiana que mencionen la prisca theologia solo de pasada, como fenómeno vecino y separado por ocuparse de fuentes paganas.

«Schmitt’s discussion of Pico is notable for the near-absence of any reference to Jewish kabbalah (“Perennial Philosophy,” 511–513, with only a passing mention of “Hebrew mystics”).» — y lo documenta en Charles B. Schmitt, cuyo tratamiento de Pico casi no refiere a la cábala judía.

«It is crucial to appreciate the subtle point that Pico della Mirandola, Johannes Reuchlin, and those who followed in their wake, were not concerned with Jewish esotericism on its own terms, but with the ancient and universal wisdom as they saw it.» — su punto sutil, que es el que ordena todo el capítulo: Pico, Reuchlin y sus seguidores no se ocupaban del esoterismo judío en sus propios términos, sino de la sabiduría antigua y universal tal como ellos la veían.

«The only difference was that whereas the Fathers had been concerned with proving the anteriority of the Mosaic Law with respect to pagan scriptures, Christian kabbalists believed they had made a sensational new discovery: Moses had received from God not only the written Law intended for all, but also a more profound teaching of secret theology reserved for the few:» — y la novedad que los cabalistas cristianos creían haber descubierto: Moisés recibió, además de la Ley escrita para todos, una enseñanza más honda de teología secreta reservada a unos pocos.

«But God commanded him to publish the law indeed to the people, yet not to pass on in writing the interpretation of the law, or to make it generally known, but to reveal it himself under a great oath of silence» — la formulación de ese mandato de silencio es de Pico, citada en bloque.

«All that remained, therefore, was to enlighten its adherents about its true meaning: the Jews could now be converted to the Christian message» — y la consecuencia misionera que se seguía: bastaba ilustrar a los judíos sobre el sentido verdadero de su propia tradición para convertirlos.

«Pico wanted his great debate to begin on January 6, the feast of Epiphany and “symbolic date of the submission of the pagan gentes to Christ in the persons of the Magi.”» — señala la fecha elegida para el debate, 6 de enero, y su carga simbólica: la sumisión de las gentes paganas a Cristo en la persona de los Magos.

«Farmer suggests that although we can obviously never be sure, Pico may have seriously considered the possibility that “his Vatican debate would end with the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse crashing through the Roman skies.”» — acredita a Steven Farmer la conjetura de que Pico pudo considerar en serio que su debate vaticano terminara con los cuatro jinetes del Apocalipsis; la conjetura va con su propia reserva, que nunca podremos estar seguros.

«Clearly the project had very little to do with attitudes of religious tolerance, irenism, or an appreciation of Judaism on its own terms. On the contrary, it was thoroughly apologetic and polemic, adversus Iudaeos, pro Christianis.» — niega que el proyecto tuviera que ver con tolerancia religiosa o con apreciar el judaísmo en sus propios términos: lo llama apologético y polémico, adversus Iudaeos.

«If they agree with us anywhere, we shall order the Hebrews to stand by the ancient traditions of their fathers; if anywhere they disagree, then drawn up in Catholic legions we shall make an attack upon them.» — y la declaración de guerra en legiones católicas contra los hebreos allí donde discrepen es de Pico, citada.

«the only major scholar who has looked systematically at the relation between Christian kabbalah and the ancient wisdom narrative is Moshe Idel.» — reconoce a Moshe Idel como el único estudioso mayor que ha mirado sistemáticamente la relación entre cábala cristiana y relato de la sabiduría antigua.

«Idel claims that the unilinear theory was developed “mostly by Jewish authors” whereas Christians were “fascinated more” by the multilinear view,» — y expone su tesis: la teoría unilineal desarrollada sobre todo por autores judíos, y los cristianos más fascinados por la multilineal.

«An initial problem is that there is no particular reason why unilinearity would automatically imply a Mosaic origin:» — su primera objeción a Idel: no hay razón para que lo unilineal implique automáticamente un origen mosaico.

«it is quite possible to envision a unilinear transmission starting with a pagan sage, such as Zoroaster in the cases of Plethon and Ficino, or Hermes in the case of Lodovico Lazzarelli.» — y lo muestra con casos: una transmisión unilineal puede arrancar en un sabio pagano, Zoroastro en Pletón y Ficino, Hermes en Lodovico Lazzarelli.

«However, although their perspective was supposedly dominated by multilinearity, Idel has to concede that Christians did not actually expound that theory in a very elaborate manner;» — señala además la concesión que el propio Idel se ve obligado a hacer: los cristianos no expusieron la teoría multilineal de manera muy elaborada.

«Here the core problem, in my opinion, lies in the unquestioned assumption that prisca theologia implies linear genealogies at all.» — y localiza el problema de fondo en un supuesto no examinado, que la prisca theologia implique genealogías lineales.

«What ultimately undermines Idel’s theory, then, is its neglect of a third, nonlinear option which emphasizes the wisdom of an era in which time itself had barely begun:» — su objeción final a Idel: descuidar una tercera opción no lineal, la que subraya la sabiduría de una era en que el tiempo apenas había empezado.

«Pico therefore points to Moses as the most ancient theologian.» — consigna que Pico señala a Moisés como el teólogo más antiguo.

«Everything indicates, then, that Pico indeed believed in a succession of wisdom that began with Moses.» — y concluye con hedge propio, todo indica, que Pico creía en una sucesión de sabiduría iniciada en Moisés.

«nothing in Pico’s statements (or in those attributed to him by Pietro Crinito)237 requires us to assume a deliberate “multilinear” doctrine of independent pagan revelations, although nothing refutes it either.» — marca el límite de lo que la evidencia permite decir: nada en Pico obliga a suponer una doctrina multilineal deliberada de revelaciones paganas independientes, y nada la refuta tampoco.

«Such a doctrine is simply not there.» — y lo dice sin adornos: esa doctrina sencillamente no está ahí.

«Pico seems concerned only with the broadest outlines of what we have been calling a Platonic Orientalist perspective, and with emphasizing the centrality of the Hebrews among them.» — lo que sí adjudica a Pico es la preocupación por los trazos más amplios del orientalismo platónico y por la centralidad de los hebreos dentro de él.

«The historiographical question of how, and by what routes, divine wisdom might have been transmitted among those peoples does not seem to interest him; and even the question of possible pagan revelations next to the one given to Moses seems very much a non-issue.» — y niega interés de Pico por la pregunta historiográfica de rutas y transmisiones, o por la de revelaciones paganas junto a la de Moisés.

«who could doubt, he writes, that thinkers who had traveled all the way to Egypt driven by their ardent desire for the truth would not have visited Judaea as well, so that “after having tasted from the streams, they might drink from the fountain as well”?» — el argumento de que los filósofos viajeros a Egipto habrían visitado también Judea, para beber de la fuente y no solo de los arroyos, es de Reuchlin.

«From there it was handed on from generation to generation, and although it was certainly passed on by Moses, Reuchlin puts remarkably little emphasis on the latter’s role.» — señala un desplazamiento en Reuchlin: la cábala se transmite de generación en generación y, aunque pase por Moisés, su papel recibe notablemente poco énfasis.

«In other words, the orientalist perspective remains strongly in evidence; but Christian kabbalah had by now mutated into a prisca theologia derived neither from pagan nor from Mosaic wisdom, but from Adam himself.» — con la mutación que resulta: una prisca theologia que ya no deriva ni de la sabiduría pagana ni de la mosaica, sino del propio Adán.

«As Chaim Wirszubski remarks in his classic study, Pico set out to prove the Christian truth by means of Jewish kabbalah, but “as thesis after thesis yields up its secrets, a remarkable thing emerges: Pico’s [kabbalistic theses] evidently outgrew their original purpose.”» — recoge la observación de Chaim Wirszubski: las tesis cabalísticas de Pico desbordaron su propósito original.

«Not only did the biblical text reveal hidden levels of meaning never suspected before, but the correspondences that could be established with pagan mythology and philosophy seemed simply stupefying.» — y describe el efecto que las desbordó: además de niveles ocultos en el texto bíblico, correspondencias estupefacientes con la mitología y la filosofía paganas.

«This assumption made it possible for pagan mythology to play a serious role in Christian theology, since it meant that beneath the external surface of stories about the gods, one could discover their hidden secret: the ancient wisdom concordant with Christian truth.» — explica qué habilitaba ese supuesto: bajo la corteza de los relatos sobre los dioses cabía descubrir la sabiduría antigua concordante con la verdad cristiana, y así la mitología pagana entraba en la teología.

«Pico’s fascination with secrecy and concealment, however, went far beyond anything found in Ficino, and would become crucial for the subsequent development of the discourse on ancient wisdom.» — y adjudica a la fascinación de Pico por el secreto y el ocultamiento un alcance que excede con mucho a Ficino y que resultará decisivo para el discurso posterior.

«Consequently it was not human prudence but a divine command to keep these things secret from the people, and to communicate them only to the perfect.» — la justificación del secreto como mandato divino y no prudencia humana es de Pico, citada en bloque.

«The dialectics of concealment and revelation are central to Jewish kabbalah,256 and were obviously highlighted even more because of Pico’s emphasis on its status as the secret revelation to Moses:» — sitúa la dialéctica de ocultamiento y revelación en el centro de la cábala judía, subrayada aún más por el énfasis de Pico en su estatuto de revelación secreta a Moisés.

«Mysticism is the negation of the veracity of communicative language, and the belief in a non-communicative truth lying in a symbolical fashion deep within revealed divine language.» — la definición del misticismo como negación de la veracidad del lenguaje comunicativo es de Joseph Dan, citada en nota.

«the resulting combination was made even more potent by the addition of yet another ingredient pioneered by Pico, that of the symbolism of numbers.» — y adjudica a Pico la introducción del simbolismo de los números como ingrediente que potencia esa combinación.

«One might say, then, that this summa perfectly encapsulates all the main developments I have been tracing so far: the ancient wisdom of the pagan sages (seen as including magic and the other so-called “occult sciences”),266 the kabbalah received by Moses, and the notion of a hidden philosophy grounded in Christian truth.» — lee el De occulta philosophia de Agripa como suma de todo lo que viene rastreando: sabiduría antigua de los sabios paganos, cábala recibida por Moisés y filosofía oculta fundada en verdad cristiana.

«To all these factors must be added the very simple but basic one of caution: being perceived as an apologist of paganism, Judaism, or the magical arts could be dangerous.» — añade un factor simple y básico que la historiografía suele omitir: la cautela, porque pasar por apologista del paganismo, del judaísmo o de las artes mágicas podía ser peligroso.

«But as there are many divinities [numina] there are likewise many names [nomina]: Jupiter, Sol, Apollo, Moses, Christus, Luna, Ceres, Proserpina, Tellus, Maria. But take care not to say that out loud.» — la equiparación de Júpiter, Moisés, Cristo y María como numina, con su propio pedido de silencio, es de una carta privada del humanista Mutianus Rufus a Heinrich Urban en 1505.

«It is not hard to imagine how orthodox readers would react to seeing Moses, Maria and even Christ presented as numina on a par with Jupiter, Apollo, or the goddess of the moon.» — y comenta la reacción previsible de un lector ortodoxo ante Moisés, María y Cristo puestos a la par de Júpiter o Apolo.

«Initially the answer might seem clear: Gemistos Plethon had been accused of being a pagan subversive, Ficino’s love for the ancient sages worried his friends, Pico’s theses were condemned by the pope, and Agrippa’s writings on magic caused him to be perceived (very unfairly) as a black magician in league with the devil.» — enumera las represalias que sufrieron los protagonistas y consigna su propio juicio sobre una de ellas: que a Agripa se lo tuviera por mago negro fue muy injusto.

«I have been arguing that this ancient wisdom narrative, grounded in Platonic Orientalism and patristic apologetics, is the conceptual foundation of the initial “referential corpus” of Western esotericism270 to which later generations have kept referring to the present day.» — formula la tesis que sostiene todo el capítulo: ese relato de sabiduría antigua es el fundamento conceptual del corpus referencial del esoterismo occidental al que las generaciones posteriores siguen remitiendo.

«The credits for having made such an attempt must go to Agostino Steuco (1497/1498–1548), who with his De perenni philosophia of 1540 published the standard treatment of the subject.» — y adjudica a Agostino Steuco, con su De perenni philosophia de 1540, el tratamiento estándar del asunto.

«Steuco worked as a prior in Reggio and Gubbio from 1533 on, and in 1538 received the honorable invitation to take charge of the Vatican library: “the most prominent scholarly post open to a humanist.”» — data en 1538 el nombramiento de Steuco al frente de la Biblioteca Vaticana, y recoge la valoración de que era el puesto erudito más prominente abierto a un humanista.

«Interestingly, it would seem that, in his youth, Steuco rejected the new platonic and kabbalistic philosophies: among his early writings that have not been preserved, there were titles such as Liber contra theologiam platonicorum and Liber contra cabalistas or Contra cabalisticas superstitiones.» — señala como dato interesante que el joven Steuco rechazaba las nuevas filosofías platónica y cabalística, y nombra los títulos perdidos que lo registran.

«In his mature work, however, he developed a concept of philosophia perennis that may be characterized as both extreme in its universalism and orthodox in its relative distance with respect to kabbalistic and magical-symbolical methods of interpretation.» — caracteriza su obra madura con dos rasgos a la vez: extrema en universalismo y ortodoxa por su distancia relativa frente a los métodos cabalísticos y mágico-simbólicos.

«Steuco proposes his “perennial philosophy,” deeply permeated by platonism, in 1540, on the eve of the Council of Trent: at a moment when, after the Protestant Reformation, the chance of restoring the unity of the Christian world would seem to be exhausted, and the very ideal» — data la philosophia perennis en 1540, víspera de Trento, cuando la restauración de la unidad cristiana parecía agotada tras la Reforma.

«On the contrary: the truth had always been available, and always would be, and the Church had been its legitimate representative since the birth of Christ.» — y resume la respuesta de Steuco a esa crisis: la verdad siempre estuvo disponible, y la Iglesia es su representante legítima desde el nacimiento de Cristo.

«Seeing these traces, these remnants of wisdom, we believed they had been as it were the rays of a light greater in the early ages, and later most great; and thus that all things faced towards one truth.» — la imagen de los vestigios como rayos de una luz mayor en los primeros tiempos es de Steuco, citado.

«Hence, although he does sketch the broad outlines of a development from Chaldaea and Egypt (with Zoroaster and Hermes as the most ancient sages, but Moses as the oldest scriptor)281 to the Greeks and the Hebrews, his real concern is not with historical questions» — precisa que su interés no es histórico aunque esboce un recorrido de Caldea y Egipto a griegos y hebreos, con Zoroastro y Hermes como sabios más antiguos y Moisés como el escritor más antiguo.

«All that ever matters to him is the basic point that the One Truth has always been available for those who search for it, although never more perfectly than in the Catholic Church.» — porque lo único que le importa es que la Verdad única siempre estuvo al alcance de quien la busca, nunca tan perfectamente como en la Iglesia católica.

«Steuco is not trying to learn from or about the pagans, but rather, intends to teach them the true nature of their own philosophy.» — y de ahí la inversión del gesto erudito: Steuco no busca aprender de los paganos, sino enseñarles la verdadera naturaleza de su propia filosofía.

«Once it is understood that whatever is true in pagan doctrine is already present in Catholicism, but “cleansed of errors and restored to [its] rightful place,”285 the supreme spiritual authority of the Church can no longer be in any doubt.» — con el corolario de autoridad: si todo lo verdadero del paganismo ya está en el catolicismo, limpio de errores, la autoridad espiritual suprema de la Iglesia deja de ser discutible.

«I have been arguing that the ancient wisdom narrative of the Renaissance, grounded in Platonic Orientalism and patristic apologetics, created the conceptual foundation of the initial “referential corpus” of Western esotericism.» — reformula la tesis del capítulo: el relato renacentista de sabiduría antigua, fundado en orientalismo platónico y apologética patrística, creó el fundamento conceptual del corpus referencial del esoterismo occidental.

«That the initial referential corpus of Western esotericism was grounded in a historiographical concept of “ancient wisdom” has far-reaching implications, as will be seen» — y anuncia que ese fundamento historiográfico tiene implicaciones de largo alcance.

«As I emphasized at the very beginning of this chapter, the discourse developed at a time when historical consciousness as we understand it was still in its infancy, and the enthusiasts of ancient wisdom were arguing on the basis not of critical historiography, but of unquestionable theological and metaphysical assumptions.» — insiste en la condición de época: el discurso se formó cuando la conciencia histórica estaba en pañales, y sus entusiastas argumentaban desde supuestos teológicos y metafísicos incuestionados, no desde historiografía crítica.

«Frances Yates was right in emphasizing that philological criticism destroyed the very foundation of the ancient wisdom narrative and rendered it intellectually untenable.» — le concede a Frances Yates el punto: la crítica filológica destruyó el fundamento mismo del relato y lo volvió intelectualmente insostenible.

«A second consequence is that the philological “destruction” of the ancient wisdom narrative should itself be understood within a wider context as well: it did not stand on its own, but was part of a much wider and more complicated series of religious narratives, which had the common feature that their basic “sentiments and values” demanded a sharp rejection of “paganism” and a criticism of its historical liaison with Christianity.» — y añade su propia segunda consecuencia: esa destrucción filológica no operó sola, sino dentro de una serie más amplia de relatos religiosos cuyos sentimientos y valores exigían rechazar el paganismo.

«Eventually, critical philology proved lethal to the intellectual legitimacy not only of “the Hermetic Tradition,” but of all varieties of the ancient wisdom narrative: not only the hermetic writings were robbed of their ancient origins» — amplía el alcance del daño: la filología crítica resultó letal para la legitimidad no solo de la Tradición hermética, sino de todas las variedades del relato de sabiduría antigua.

«explains why, in spite of its increasing association with such problematic dimensions as magic and Jewish kabbalah, the philosophia perennis could be presented as thoroughly orthodox even by a Vatican cleric like Agostino Steuco in the years before the Council of Trent.» — explica por qué la philosophia perennis pudo presentarse como plenamente ortodoxa incluso en un clérigo vaticano como Steuco, pese a su asociación creciente con la magia y la cábala judía.

«As formulated by Frances Yates, as the century moved on into darker years, the orthodox opposition to Renaissance occult philosophy hardened . . .» — el diagnóstico del endurecimiento de la oposición ortodoxa a la filosofía oculta renacentista es de Frances Yates, citada en bloque.

«The hopes for unity had not materialised; Reformation and Catholic reaction had increased disunity.» — y sigue en la misma cita de Yates: las esperanzas de unidad no se cumplieron y la reacción católica aumentó la desunión.

«The papacy of Clement VIII (1592–1605) might be seen as a culmination of that development, with the burning of Giordano Bruno in 1600 as an obviously symbolic low point.» — sitúa la culminación de ese proceso en el papado de Clemente VIII y llama a la quema de Giordano Bruno en 1600 un punto bajo obviamente simbólico.

«Each one of these dimensions is of great importance for the study of Western esotericism, or for understanding the complicated “process of destruction” by means of which the great Western tradition of Christian platonism gave way, between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, to worldviews that we recognize as “modern.”» — declara el interés que esas dimensiones tienen para el campo: entender el proceso de destrucción por el que la tradición occidental del platonismo cristiano cedió, entre los siglos XVI y XVIII, a las visiones que llamamos modernas.

«This happened, however, as the outcome of a long tradition of anti-platonic4 and, more generally, anti-pagan polemics which had been provoked by the platonic revival of Florentine humanism and its heirs.» — y adjudica ese desenlace a una larga tradición de polémica antiplatónica y antipagana provocada por el renacer platónico del humanismo florentino.

«One of the major humanists of quattrocento Italy, George was also a paranoid fanatic who believed in a conspiracy of platonists preparing the coming of the Antichrist.» — describe a Jorge de Trebisonda con las dos cosas juntas: uno de los grandes humanistas del quattrocento y un fanático paranoico que creía en una conspiración platónica para preparar la venida del Anticristo.

«Not only is Plato attacked there as a pitifully poor philosopher, but he is also accused of every possible error, sin, or weakness (including sexual depravity, drunkenness, idolatry, sorcery, and demon-worship) and described as the very fountainhead of all heresies.» — detalla su ataque a Platón, acusado de toda falta imaginable y descrito como fuente de todas las herejías.

«Because George saw Greek Christianity as platonic, and Roman Catholicism as aristotelian, the idea of the “fourth Plato” on the throne of St. Peter evoked the specter of a Greek/platonist takeover of the Church of Christ.» — y reconstruye la lógica confesional que lo alimentaba: el cristianismo griego como platónico y el catolicismo romano como aristotélico, de modo que un cuarto Platón en el trono de Pedro equivalía a una toma griega de la Iglesia.

«Farmer argues that Gianfrancesco (in collaboration with his personal physician Giovanni Mainardi, an ardent Savonarolan) tampered with his uncle’s legacy to an extreme degree,» — expone la tesis de Steven Farmer sobre Gianfrancesco Pico, que con su médico savonaroliano habría manipulado en grado extremo el legado de su tío.

«In spite of these great efforts on behalf of Giovanni Pico’s legacy, everything that Gianfrancesco published under his own name goes straight against the “pagan learning” that was so essential to his uncle’s program.» — y apunta el indicio que la sostiene: todo lo que Gianfrancesco publicó con su propio nombre va en contra del saber pagano que era esencial al programa de su tío.

«the manuscript is no longer available, and those attacks on the prisci theologi may also be interpolations by Gianfrancesco,12 in which case we could be dealing with a blatant attempt at “depaganizing” Giovanni Pico in the interest of posthumously turning him, as strongly as possible, into a Christian evangelical convert.» — consigna la hipótesis con su condicional intacto: si los ataques a los prisci theologi son interpolaciones de Gianfrancesco, se trataría de un intento flagrante de despaganizar a Giovanni Pico y convertirlo póstumamente en converso evangélico.

«Like Savonarola, Gianfrancesco points to sacred scripture as the sole, exclusive and absolutely infallible source of true knowledge:» — sitúa a Gianfrancesco Pico en la estela de Savonarola: la Escritura como fuente única, exclusiva y absolutamente infalible del conocimiento verdadero.

«Gianfrancesco Pico held that the aim of the historical study of philosophy was to demonstrate the conditions of human philosophical thinking when deprived of the light of revelation, or claiming independence from it.» — y le adjudica un fin polémico para la historia de la filosofía: mostrar en qué queda el pensamiento humano privado de la luz de la revelación o reclamando independencia de ella.

«In other words, the history of philosophy unaided by divine inspiration can only be conceived of as a history of error and division.» — de donde la filosofía sin inspiración divina solo puede concebirse como historia del error y de la división.

«It follows that the proper domain of historiography, in contrast, must consist in describing the development of merely human and hence fallible opinions.» — con la consecuencia para el oficio: el dominio propio de la historiografía queda en describir el desarrollo de opiniones meramente humanas y por tanto falibles.

«In contrast to George of Trebizond, Pico was somewhat softer on Plato than on Aristotle;18 and this is perhaps not surprising, because it made it easier for him to keep seeing the early Fathers as preservers of biblical revelation in spite of their platonic leanings.» — señala que fue más blando con Platón que con Aristóteles, al revés que Jorge de Trebisonda, y explica la conveniencia: así podía seguir viendo a los primeros Padres como custodios de la revelación pese a su platonismo.

«Nevertheless, prisci theologi such as Zoroaster, Hermes, or Orpheus had been looking for the truth in vain: deprived of revelation, they merely discovered attributes of divinity instead of penetrating its essence.» — y el saldo que reserva a los priscos teólogos: Zoroastro, Hermes u Orfeo buscaron la verdad en vano y solo dieron con atributos de la divinidad, sin penetrar su esencia.

«In polite but explicit opposition to his uncle’s program of reconciliation, Gianfrancesco therefore states that the teachings of the pagan philosophers “must be demolished” and “invalidated.”» — consigna la oposición cortés pero explícita al programa conciliador de su tío: las enseñanzas de los filósofos paganos deben ser demolidas e invalidadas.

«It is important to realize that even authors who were generally sympathetic to the ancient wisdom might still be cautious about the dangers of magic, paganism, and heresy: as has been clearly pointed out by D. P. Walker, this was particularly true for the reception of the prisca theologia in France, with important authors such as Jacques Lef`evre d’Etaples, Symphorien Champier, and a series of others.» — advierte que la simpatía por la sabiduría antigua convivía con la cautela ante magia, paganismo y herejía, y acredita a D. P. Walker haberlo mostrado para la recepción francesa de la prisca theologia.

«Given that context, it was inevitable that critics would begin to question whether the “learned magic” of the Florentines was as innocent of demonism as they claimed.» — y presenta como inevitable la pregunta que vendría: si la magia docta de los florentinos era tan inocente de demonismo como ellos decían.

«From age fourteen to eighteen, between 1530 and 1534/1535, Weyer was an apprentice to Cornelius Agrippa.» — data entre 1530 y 1534 el aprendizaje de Johann Weyer con Cornelio Agripa, entre sus catorce y sus dieciocho años.

«On the other hand, we are permitted to philosophize, dispute, and formulate deductions by means of our intellect concerning all created things, but we are not to place our faith and hope in them.» — la distinción entre lo que la fe reserva y lo que al intelecto le está permitido es de Agripa, citado: se puede filosofar sobre lo creado sin poner en ello la fe ni la esperanza.

«Weyer knew that Agrippa’s piety was genuine, and later defended his master against accusations of black magic and demon-worship; but he moved much closer to the younger Pico’s position in arguing that the magical arts were not only uncertain, but pernicious and dangerous as well.» — marca dónde Weyer se aparta de su maestro: defendió la piedad de Agripa contra las acusaciones de magia negra y aun así sostuvo, con el Pico joven, que las artes mágicas no solo eran inciertas sino perniciosas.

«Borrowing directly from Gianfrancesco Pico’s De rerum praenotione, Weyer continues the lineage up to the present, with special mention of Julian the Apostate, Roger Bacon, Peter of Abano, Albertus Magnus, Arnaud of Vilanova, Picatrix (which he believes to be the name of an author), and Cecco d’Ascoli.» — señala que Weyer toma la genealogía directamente del De rerum praenotione de Gianfrancesco Pico y la prolonga hasta su presente, con Juliano, Roger Bacon, Pedro de Abano, Alberto Magno, Arnau de Vilanova y Cecco d Ascoli; Picatrix figura ahí porque Weyer lo tiene por nombre de autor.

«Nevertheless, Weyer’s genealogy of demon-worship is a perfect example of Platonic Orientalism turned negative.» — y le pone nombre a la operación: un ejemplo perfecto de orientalismo platónico vuelto del revés.

«A lineage is drawn that begins with Zoroaster and the ancient cultures of the Orient, moves on westward to the Greeks, and is adopted from there by the neoplatonists; but far from being a tradition of venerable ancient wisdom, it is a demonic genealogy of darkness.» — describe la simetría exacta: el mismo recorrido de Zoroastro y el Oriente a los griegos y de ahí a los neoplatónicos, pero como genealogía demoníaca de tinieblas en vez de tradición venerable.

«But del Rio’s perspective is less paranoid than Bodin’s and Weyer’s, and although his narrative is quite compatible with a Platonic Orientalist framework understood negatively, there is no particular emphasis on the dramatic notion of a platonic or pre-platonic “genealogy of darkness.”» — distingue a Martín del Río de Bodin y de Weyer: su perspectiva es menos paranoica y no carga el acento en una genealogía de las tinieblas.

«Patrizi went so far as to ask the pope to have it put on the curriculum of every school and university in Christendom, to replace the old scholastic manuals that were based upon what Patrizi denounced as the anti-Christian heresies of Aristotle.» — consigna la petición de Francesco Patrizi al papa: que su obra entrara en el currículo de toda escuela y universidad de la cristiandad, en reemplazo de los manuales escolásticos.

«It is one of the cruel ironies of history that Giordano Bruno seems to have thought that this development might signal a turning of the tide in his favor as well,51 whereas of course he was to be executed in Rome under the same pope.» — y registra la ironía cruel de que Giordano Bruno leyera ese episodio como un giro a su favor, cuando sería ejecutado bajo el mismo papa.

«That Patrizi’s work was initially received as being in perfect accord with Christian piety by the highest clerical circles of Rome is remarkable, for in fact Patrizi goes even farther than Ficino in downplaying the importance of the Hebrew patriarchs and prophets in favor of the pagan philosophers.» — llama notable la buena acogida romana inicial a Patrizi, porque va más lejos que Ficino en rebajar a los patriarcas y profetas hebreos en favor de los filósofos paganos.

«Patrizi’s genealogies exist in several variations, but their main elements are that Ham either is identical with Zoroaster or had a son of that name, who was a contemporary of Abraham and was known in Egypt as Osiris.» — expone la genealogía de Patrizi con sus variantes: Cam identificado con Zoroastro o padre de un Zoroastro contemporáneo de Abraham y conocido en Egipto como Osiris.

«Nevertheless, in spite of this condemnation, the initial welcome accorded to Patrizi shows that even by the early 1590s the debate over platonism was by no means settled among Counter-Reformation theologians, and a philosophia perennis along the lines of Agostino Steuco still had considerable credibility.» — y extrae de esa acogida su conclusión historiográfica: en los primeros años 1590 el debate sobre el platonismo no estaba cerrado entre los teólogos de la Contrarreforma y una philosophia perennis a la Steuco conservaba crédito.

«It was just one year later, however, and three years after Patrizi’s Nova de universis philosophia, that from the same Counter-Reformation milieu there came a full-scale attack on platonism which is of pivotal importance for our concerns» — data un año después de Patrizi el ataque en toda regla al platonismo salido del mismo medio contrarreformista, y lo declara de importancia decisiva para su asunto.

«Given the general climate of repression and persecution in Italy at the time, this fact alone must have lent an intimidating quality to what turns out to be a thorough indictment of the platonic enemy.» — y lee la ausencia de aprobación eclesiástica en aquel clima de represión como algo que por sí solo debió dar un aire intimidante a la acusación.

«At the beginning of his book, Crispo printed a catalogue of authors who should be “read with caution.”» — describe el dispositivo con que Crispo abre su libro: un catálogo de autores que deben leerse con cautela.

«Crispo’s attack on platonism is belligerent in the extreme, and permeated by military metaphors.» — caracteriza su ataque como beligerante en extremo y saturado de metáforas militares.

«His story begins with Satan, the “ancient serpent” who had fallen from his heavenly seat far before the creation of man.» — cuyo relato arranca en Satán, la serpiente antigua caída de su asiento celeste mucho antes de la creación del hombre.

«However, the Fathers made a fatal mistake: rather than insisting on the exclusive truth of the Christian faith against the absolute evil of pagan religion, they engaged in a practice of “comparative religion.”» — y llega a la acusación central contra los Padres: en vez de insistir en la verdad exclusiva de la fe cristiana, se pusieron a practicar religión comparada.

«Thus . . . it often happened that the Fathers allowed religion to be compared with religion, that is to say, the sacred one with the profane.» — la formulación de que los Padres dejaron comparar religión con religión, la sagrada con la profana, es de Crispo, citada.

«Having once entered the “unworthy arena of comparison” (indignam comparationis arenam) the Fathers ended up attributing anything genuinely pious or religious to the gods of Greece; and from there, “not daring to refuse to the Egyptians what they allowed the Prophets,” they were led to see it as having originated in Egypt.» — y su consecuencia: entrada la arena indigna de la comparación, los Padres acabaron atribuyendo lo piadoso a los dioses de Grecia y, por no negar a los egipcios lo que concedían a los profetas, dándole origen egipcio.

«Even though the bulk of Crispo’s work was devoted to systematic rather than historical discussions,60 his De Platone caute legendo plays a role of particular importance» — pese a que el grueso de la obra sea sistemática y no histórica, le adjudica un papel de importancia particular.

«It would end up destroying the grand Renaissance tradition of Christian platonism, but did not stop there:» — y describe el alcance de lo que esa crítica acabaría haciendo con la gran tradición renacentista del platonismo cristiano.

«From here all kinds of superstitions, lies and depravities could form an array and begin to infect the Church of God.» — la imagen de las supersticiones formando escuadrón para infectar la Iglesia de Dios es de Crispo, citada.

«But critics who investigated the Florentine agenda more closely were bound to discover a disconcerting truth: to a surprising extent, those paganizing heretics seemed to have the Fathers of the Church on their side!» — nombra el descubrimiento incómodo que esperaba a quien examinara de cerca la agenda florentina: en medida sorprendente, esos herejes paganizantes tenían de su lado a los Padres de la Iglesia.

«As demonstrated by the case of Crispo, critics who wished to refute the Florentine agenda were now forced to consider the possibility that the ante-Nicene Fathers themselves had been responsible for inviting the virus of paganism into the body of Christ.» — y la posibilidad que eso forzaba a considerar: que los propios Padres prenicenos hubieran invitado el virus del paganismo al cuerpo de Cristo.

«It is not hard to see that this second possibility carried an enormous polemical potential from Protestant perspectives, since it strongly suggested that Roman Catholicism and its dogmatic tradition as a whole might be exposed as a pagan perversion.» — señala el potencial polémico protestante de esa segunda vía: dejaba expuesto al catolicismo romano y a su tradición dogmática entera como perversión pagana.

«The controversy over the Platonism of the Fathers – often referred to by the famous but problematic catch-phrase of a “Hellenization of Christianity” – is of great complexity, and has played a crucial role in theological and philosophical controversies from the sixteenth through the nineteenth century, focused in particular on Trinitarian theology.» — llama problemática a la expresión helenización del cristianismo con que suele resumirse la controversia, y data su papel en las disputas teológicas entre los siglos XVI y XIX, centradas en la Trinidad.

«Strange though it may seem to us, used as we are to thinking of rational philosophy and science as primary agents of “progress,” these debates must be counted among the most important factors in the historical process leading towards “modernization.”» — y contra la intuición de que el progreso lo mueven la filosofía racional y la ciencia, cuenta esos debates teológicos entre los factores más importantes del proceso hacia la modernización.

«As pointed out by Martin Mulsow, the anti-platonic critique resulted in the gradual but inexorable “destruction” of a great intellectual tradition that had been integral to Christian culture before the Reformation.» — acredita a Martin Mulsow el diagnóstico de que la crítica antiplatónica destruyó gradual e inexorablemente una gran tradición intelectual que era parte integral de la cultura cristiana anterior a la Reforma.

«For our concerns in this chapter, it is of crucial importance to understand that precisely their criticism of patristic platonism is inseparable from the emergence of a new kind of historical consciousness.» — y sostiene lo que le importa del episodio: la crítica del platonismo patrístico es inseparable de la emergencia de una conciencia histórica nueva.

«In other words, in sharp contrast to the unbroken continuity of truth proclaimed by Catholic historians from Agostino Steuco to Cesarius Baronius (see below), the Protestant perspective was based upon the conviction that the Church had badly gone astray between the apostolic period and the present time.» — contrapone las dos historiografías sin conciliarlas: la continuidad ininterrumpida de la verdad que proclaman los católicos de Steuco a Baronio, y la convicción protestante de que la Iglesia se extravió gravemente desde la era apostólica.

«The overall narrative was based upon an extreme dualism that opposed the pristine purity of the original gospel to the heaps of superstitions adopted by the Roman Church from the pagans and the Jews.» — describe el dualismo extremo de las Centurias de Magdeburgo, que oponen la pureza prístina del evangelio original a los montones de supersticiones que Roma tomó de paganos y judíos.

«In this protestant delineation, the church starts in the apostolic age in perfect purity, and is perverted by a process of slow canker, till it has become changed into its opposite, and is now the church not of Christ, but of anti-Christ, an instrument not for saving men but for destroying them.» — la formulación elegante de esa curva de degradación, hasta la iglesia del anticristo, es de Mark Pattison, citado.

«Although these Fathers could not possibly be interpreted as adhering to Lutheran doctrine, they still lived close to the apostolic period and well before Constantine, and the Centuriators did not dare go so far as to classify them among the heretics:» — y consigna el límite que ni los centuriadores se atrevieron a cruzar: los Padres prenicenos, imposibles de leer como luteranos, tampoco fueron clasificados entre los herejes.

«First, if even an anti-Catholic polemicist as extreme as Flacius Illyricus still hesitated to attack the ante-Nicene Fathers, this says something about how daring it was for a Counter-Reformation ideologist like Crispo to criticize them only a few decades later.» — de ahí su primera inferencia: si un polemista anticatólico tan extremo como Flacio Ilírico titubeaba ante los Padres prenicenos, se mide lo audaz que fue criticarlos desde el bando contrarreformista pocas décadas después.

«And second, it shows that by the 1560s and 1570s, even the strongest enemies of Roman Catholicism had not yet discovered the real potential of anti-platonism as a weapon against it.» — y la segunda: hacia 1560 y 1570 ni los enemigos más fuertes de Roma habían descubierto todavía el potencial del antiplatonismo como arma contra ella.

«In other words, in spite of an incredibly impressive documentation (the full resources of the Vatican library and other Italian libraries were put at his disposal), Baronius’ approach was wholly lacking in any sense of historical criticism, and merely compiled heaps of data without seeking to differentiate pious legend from plausible fact.» — objeta a Baronio que, con toda la documentación del Vaticano a su disposición, careciera de sentido crítico y apilara datos sin distinguir la leyenda piadosa del hecho plausible.

«He concluded that the Fathers had indeed adopted quite a number of terms, rites and ceremonies from the “ancient superstitions,” although he added that in doing so, they had turned them into something pious and good.» — y adjudica a Casaubon la concesión con salvedad: los Padres adoptaron términos, ritos y ceremonias de las supersticiones antiguas, aunque al hacerlo los volvieran piadosos y buenos.

«Plato himself had come to believe in the existence of one single, supreme divinity; but to avoid problems with the polytheist beliefs of his environment, he had spoken about God’s three main characteristics (goodness, wisdom, power) in allegorical terms, as if they were hypostases or gods.» — reconstruye el argumento de Jacques Souverain: Platón habría llegado a un dios único y hablado alegóricamente de sus tres caracteres para evitar problemas con el politeísmo de su entorno.

«I make no distinction at all between the Jewish Cabala & the Valentinian Pleroma: these two systems are either equally ridiculous, that is if you take them literally, or they are equally reasonable, that is if you search in them for the hidden sense that rests under the cortex of allegory.» — la equiparación de la cábala judía con el pleroma valentiniano, ridículas o razonables según se lean literal o alegóricamente, es de Souverain, citado.

«For our concerns, most important is the fact that, in the century after Crispo, those who denounced platonism as the essence of pagan error no longer perceived it only as an enemy coming from outside, but had begun to see it as a virus that had infected Christianity from within, starting with the Patristic apologists.» — marca el desplazamiento decisivo del siglo posterior a Crispo: el platonismo deja de verse como enemigo externo y pasa a ser un virus que infectó al cristianismo desde dentro, empezando por los apologistas patrísticos.

«The historiographical implications would prove to be far-reaching, not only for the study of philosophy, but also for the study of what we nowadays refer to as Western esotericism.» — y anuncia el alcance de sus implicaciones historiográficas, también para lo que hoy se llama esoterismo occidental.

«In 1576, Benito Pereira devoted a book to the ancient philosophers, emphasizing that there had been sages among all the “barbarian” peoples, whose philosophy was not only more ancient but also much purer than that of the Greeks.» — data en 1576 el libro de Benito Pereira sobre los filósofos antiguos, que sostenía que hubo sabios entre todos los pueblos bárbaros y que su filosofía era más antigua y más pura que la griega.

«Hence their approach has usefully been labeled “anti-apologeticism”:91 a term which emphasizes their ambition of developing a radical alternative to» — explica por qué la etiqueta anti-apologeticismo resulta útil: subraya la ambición de una alternativa radical al programa de los apologistas.

«Here we see that, at least by this time, adherence to the Platonic Orientalist perspective did not necessarily imply a positive appreciation of paganism.» — y consigna lo que ese caso enseña: adherir a la perspectiva orientalista platónica ya no implicaba, a esas alturas, apreciar positivamente el paganismo.

«However, as the theoretical implications of his approach were further developed by his successors, not only did this result in the autonomization of history of philosophy as a discipline (not to mention that of “Western esotericism,” as will be seen), but also in profound problems for Christian theology:» — señala el doble efecto que sus sucesores sacaron del enfoque de Thomasius: la autonomización de la historia de la filosofía como disciplina y problemas profundos para la teología cristiana.

«Thomasius’ razorsharp distinction between the philosophy of antiquity and the religion of Christianity may have been drawn with the most pious of intentions, but ended up undermining the very orthodoxy it was supposed to defend.» — y formula la ironía central del episodio: la distinción afiladísima entre filosofía antigua y religión cristiana pudo trazarse con la más piadosa de las intenciones y acabó minando la ortodoxia que venía a defender.

«His goal was to “purify” Christian theology from its contamination by pagan error.» — declara cuál era la meta de Thomasius: purificar la teología cristiana de su contaminación por el error pagano.

«He has sometimes been regarded as the founder of the history of philosophy as a discipline, and for good reason; but it is important to understand that his basic source of motivation was not philosophical or historical, but dogmatic.» — admite que se lo tenga por fundador de la historia de la filosofía como disciplina y a la vez advierte que su motivación de fondo no era filosófica ni histórica, sino dogmática.

«Thomasius’ explorations were guided by a strongly professed “love of historical truth,” and a severe rejection of any attempt to manipulate it for the sake of promoting personal interests of whatever kind, including those of historians.» — y consigna la otra cara: un amor por la verdad histórica declarado con fuerza y un rechazo severo a manipularla por intereses propios, incluidos los de los historiadores.

«However, whereas Flacius Illyricus and his collaborators had pointed to the papacy as the diabolical cause of Christian perversion, for Thomasius the ultimate source of heresy was pagan philosophy, and platonism in particular.» — marca el desplazamiento de la causa del mal respecto de las Centurias: donde Flacio Ilírico señalaba al papado, Thomasius señala a la filosofía pagana y en particular al platonismo.

«The true core of all pagan error was, in other words, its rejection of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, in favor of the eternity of the world.» — resume el núcleo del error pagano según Thomasius: el rechazo de la creación desde la nada en favor de la eternidad del mundo.

«As a result, the entire history of the Church prior to the Reformation became synonymous with the history of heresy.» — con la consecuencia que arrastra: la historia entera de la Iglesia anterior a la Reforma se vuelve sinónimo de historia de la herejía.

«Thomasius considered the Reformation as the most thorough attempt at a de-Hellenization of Christianity thus far, but in his own century he was concerned about seeing the pagan heresies of platonism making their comeback even in Protestant contexts.» — señala que Thomasius tenía a la Reforma por el intento más a fondo de deshelenización del cristianismo y temía el regreso de las herejías platónicas incluso en medios protestantes.

«Thomasius’ Protestant counter-narrative, in contrast, recognized that ultimate religious truth cannot be subject to change and development without losing its absoluteness, and therefore cannot have a history.» — y reconstruye la premisa de ese contrarrelato: la verdad religiosa última no puede cambiar ni desarrollarse sin perder su carácter absoluto, y por tanto no puede tener historia.

«It followed that the history of thought could only be a history of error.» — de donde se sigue lo que da título al capítulo: la historia del pensamiento solo puede ser una historia del error.

«The central characteristic of this new development was “enthusiasm” (Enthusiasmus, Schw¨armerei), that is to say, the extreme emphasis on personal religious or even ecstatic experience at the expense of doctrinal belief.» — nombra el rasgo central del fenómeno que Thomasius llama Enthusiasmus o Schwärmerei: el énfasis extremo en la experiencia religiosa o extática personal a costa de la creencia doctrinal.

«Like all manifestations of heresy, enthusiasm was based upon the core error of the eternity of the world: in this case in the form of the platonic doctrine of emanation and restitution, which held that the soul has its origin in an eternal, divine substance and will return to it again.» — y su reducción al mismo error de fondo: el entusiasmo, como toda herejía, descansaría en la eternidad del mundo, aquí bajo la forma platónica de emanación y restitución.

«Hence Thomasius was able to draw a straight line from Simon Magus and the various gnostic sects in the early history of the Church, all the way to the enthusiasm of spiritualist and early pietist currents in his own time.» — describe la línea recta que Thomasius pudo trazar desde Simón el Mago y las sectas gnósticas hasta el entusiasmo espiritualista y protopietista de su propio tiempo.

«Colberg’s Platonisch-Hermetisches Christenthum is conceptually grounded in the radical critique of syncretism developed in Thomasius’ Schediasma, which is extensively quoted; but it is important to see that Colberg does not consider philosophy to be evil in itself.» — sitúa el Platonisch-Hermetisches Christenthum de Colberg sobre la crítica del sincretismo de Thomasius, a quien cita extensamente, y advierte contra el malentendido: Colberg no tiene por mala la filosofía en sí.

«It is only the mingling of philosophy with biblical faith that must be condemned:» — lo que condena es la mezcla de filosofía con fe bíblica.

«The greatest – I would almost say: the only – danger for theology comes from the scandalous mixing of philosophical teachings and the Word of God.» — la declaración de que el mayor y casi único peligro para la teología es esa mezcla escandalosa es de Colberg, citado.

«what must be condemned is not philosophy as such, but its improper application to divine matters, which are simply beyond the scope of the weak human intellect.» — precisa el alcance de la condena: no la filosofía como tal, sino su aplicación indebida a las cosas divinas, que exceden al débil intelecto humano.

«The gospel is a teaching “which has been hidden from the beginning, which is not grasped or understood by the human mind, but has been revealed by the son of God.”» — y la definición correlativa del evangelio como enseñanza oculta desde el principio, no asequible a la mente humana sino revelada por el hijo de Dios, va en cita de Colberg.

«Father and son both became professors at the University of Greifswald, where Ehregott Daniel wrote his Platonisch-Hermetisches Christenthum along with other treatises on the history of heresy116 and practical theology.» — data la carrera de Colberg en Greifswald, donde escribió su obra junto con otros tratados de historia de la herejía y teología práctica.

«Colberg belonged to a generation for which the late date of the Hermetica was common knowledge, Zoroaster was simply ignored by him, and he evidently did not believe in the great antiquity of the kabbalah either.» — señala el cambio de generación que se le nota: para Colberg la fecha tardía de los Hermetica era conocimiento común, ignora a Zoroastro y tampoco creía en la gran antigüedad de la cábala.

«Plato continued these teachings and made them famous; he developed some kind of Trinitarian theory, which should not be confused with the Christian one, but has been taken up by Weigel, B¨ohme, and others.» — y reconstruye su genealogía doctrinal: una teoría trinitaria de Platón, que no debe confundirse con la cristiana, retomada por Weigel y Böhme.

«But Colberg also notes that whatever his modern admirers may believe about Hermes, it is all “a poem without foundations,” since the hermetic writings were evidently written after the birth of Christ, as demonstrated by Casaubon and others.» — consigna el argumento con que Colberg desarma a Hermes: un poema sin fundamentos, porque los escritos herméticos son evidentemente posteriores a Cristo, según demostraron Casaubon y otros.

«The human soul is a particle of the divine essence that should rest in God; but misusing its freedom and following its own will instead of God’s, it turned towards the external world and alienated itself from the divine source.» — expone la doctrina que Colberg atribuye a sus herejes: el alma como partícula de la esencia divina que, abusando de su libertad, se vuelve al mundo exterior y se aliena de su fuente.

«Having thus “killed the old Adam” by relinquishing his own will and his passions, he will have become sinless, and in a passive state of Gelassenheit can give himself wholly over to God’s will.» — con su remedio, la Gelassenheit: muerto el viejo Adán por renuncia a la voluntad propia y a las pasiones, el hombre se entrega pasivamente a la voluntad de Dios.

«Colberg refers to the Corpus Hermeticum to prove that Hermes Trismegistus teaches a form of platonism, but goes on to emphasize his traditional status as founder of alchemy in order to connect hermetic platonism with the “pansophical” study of» — muestra la costura del argumento de Colberg: usa el Corpus Hermeticum para probar el platonismo de Hermes y su estatuto tradicional de fundador de la alquimia para enlazar ese platonismo con el estudio pansófico.

«Colberg mentioned the common distinction between diabolical and natural magic, but emphasized that the Enthusiasts speak, rather, of a “divine supernatural magic.”» — y consigna la distinción que a Colberg le interesa: junto a la magia diabólica y la natural, los entusiastas hablan de una magia divina sobrenatural.

«Julius Sperber divided it into three types, Robert Fludd into four; but essentially, Magia means “knowledge of divine and natural things from the Book of Nature.”» — con sus subdivisiones —tres en Julius Sperber, cuatro en Robert Fludd— y el sentido común a todas: conocimiento de las cosas divinas y naturales por el Libro de la Naturaleza.

«And now we should overturn this double foundation of the Neo-Pythagorean and Platonic Theology, and show that the Cabala and the divine revelation that springs from it is nothing, that no such Light-World or threefold common World-Spirit is to be found, that the Magical letters of light that are supposed to be present in all created things . . . are Jewish and Pagan fairy-tales . . .» — el programa de derribar el doble fundamento de esa teología y declarar cuentos judíos y paganos las letras mágicas de luz es de Colberg, citado; los puntos suspensivos están en la fuente.

«Even though it is clear to see that all these claims are groundless, Colberg continues, it is still necessary to refute them in detail.» — y señala la incongruencia del gesto: aunque las tenga por infundadas de toda evidencia, Colberg juzga necesario refutarlas en detalle.

«We will see that in the decades after him, the logic of anti-apologeticism was further developed, in new directions which made it important not just to orthodox Protestants worried about sectarians, but to general historians of philosophy as well, and ultimately to the establishment of the modern academy.» — anuncia hacia dónde va la lógica del anti-apologetismo en las décadas siguientes: de la preocupación ortodoxa por los sectarios a los historiadores generales de la filosofía y al establecimiento de la academia moderna.

«Moreover, only eight years after Platonisch-Hermetisches Christenthum, a minister from Danzig, Friedrich Christoph B¨ucher, turned the same weapon against pietism in his Plato Mysticus in Pietista redivivus (1699).» — data en 1699 el Plato Mysticus in Pietista redivivus de Friedrich Christoph Bücher, que volvió la misma arma contra el pietismo.

«Its conceptual center was, again, the doctrine of emanation, and B¨ucher spoke about the whole tradition in drastic terms as “Satan’s school of the Platonists and Kabbalists.”» — y la expresión escuela de Satán de los platónicos y cabalistas es de Bücher, que la usa para la tradición entera.

«While connections between heterodox Protestant spiritualism and pietism had often been drawn before, it was B¨ucher who now provided such associations with a theoretical foundation, by using the logic of anti-apologeticism to describe them both as latter-day manifestations of the grand heretical tradition of platonism.» — le adjudica el paso teórico: no fue el primero en asociar espiritualismo heterodoxo y pietismo, pero sí quien le dio fundamento describiendo a ambos como manifestaciones tardías de la gran tradición herética del platonismo.

«Hence Thomasius’ double notion of the eternity of the world and the centrality of “gnosis” remained crucial to how the heretical tradition was construed.» — insiste en que la doble noción de Thomasius, eternidad del mundo y centralidad de la gnosis, siguió organizando cómo se construía la tradición herética.

«B¨ucher’s attack provoked a variety of responses from pietists, including Spener himself, who claimed that he had never read Plato or the platonists and (with profound irony) expressed his surprise at learning from B¨ucher “that there was so much good in the writings of the Platonici.”» — recoge la respuesta irónica de Spener, que decía no haber leído nunca a Platón ni a los platónicos y se declaraba sorprendido de aprender por Bücher cuánto bien había en sus escritos.

«In other words, the “inner knowledge” by means of ecstatic states which had been denounced as pagan gnosis by Thomasius and Colberg, was accepted by Spener as a legitimate avenue of revelation; and accordingly, elements of truth might well be found in the writings of pagan philosophers.» — marca la inversión: el conocimiento interior por estados extáticos que Thomasius y Colberg denunciaban como gnosis pagana es aceptado por Spener como vía legítima de revelación, y con él la posibilidad de verdad en los filósofos paganos.

«K¨opke argued that there was much truth in Greek philosophy, but it had all been adopted from Judaism:» — expone la posición de Köpke: hay mucha verdad en la filosofía griega, pero toda ella tomada del judaísmo.

«Socrates, Zeno, Plato, and Aristotle have written many good things . . . Their lives and teachings are similar in many respects to the divine truth and wisdom, and a cause for shame for many Christians.» — la concesión de que Sócrates, Zenón, Platón y Aristóteles escribieron muchas cosas buenas, vergüenza de muchos cristianos, es de Köpke, citado.

«In the meantime the Egyptian sages still retained much that resembled the truth, but out of hate and envy they did not want to admit that they had received it from Joseph and the descendants of Jacob; instead, they attributed it to another author or original source, whom they called Hermes or Mercurius, about whom all kinds of things can be read in the pagan writers» — y también de Köpke la explicación del nombre de Hermes: los sabios egipcios, por odio y envidia, no quisieron admitir que lo habían recibido de José y los descendientes de Jacob y lo atribuyeron a otro autor.

«But it should be noted that some scholars attribute the writings that the world has come to know under the name of Hermes Trismegistus not to the ancient Egyptian Mercurius, but to a much younger philosopher, who lived after the birth of Christ, and claim that he was nothing but a cento, or (similar to how Luther speaks about the al-Koran of Muhammad) a beggar’s mantle patched together from the Christian, Platonic and Egyptian doctrine» — que además registra la datación tardía de los escritos herméticos como opinión de algunos eruditos, y los llama centón o manto de mendigo remendado, con la comparación luterana sobre el Corán.

«Furthermore, K¨opke agreed with his anti-apologetic opponents in rejecting the doctrine of the eternity of the world; but unlike them, he argued that the early Greek philosophers had adopted the teaching of creatio ex nihilo from the Jews, and the turn towards heresy had occurred only at a later stage.» — señala dónde Köpke coincide con sus adversarios y dónde no: rechaza la eternidad del mundo con ellos, pero sostiene que los primeros griegos tomaron de los judíos la creación desde la nada y que el giro herético fue posterior.

«Published in 1700, this title contains the entire program of the work: it assumes that church history cannot be discussed separately from the history of philosophy, and argues that the true theology grounded in the “mystery of the cross” has been available not just since the birth of Christ, but since the very beginning of the world.» — lee el título de Zierold de 1700 como programa entero: la historia de la Iglesia no se separa de la historia de la filosofía, y la teología verdadera existe desde el comienzo del mundo, no desde el nacimiento de Cristo.

«Zierold was particularly radical in his manner of preserving the centrality of Moses: Moses was the crucial ancient sage indeed, for not only was he the author of the Pentateuch, but (in spite of the division into three post-Noachite streams located in different geographical areas)» — y adjudica a Zierold un modo particularmente radical de preservar la centralidad de Moisés, autor del Pentateuco y sabio antiguo decisivo pese a la división en tres corrientes posnoáquicas.

«Zierold’s approach left no room for paganism as a competing counter-tradition, and hence “error” of any kind could only be described in terms of decline or deviation from the one ancient truth.» — con la consecuencia estructural: sin paganismo como contratradición rival, el error solo puede describirse como declive o desviación de la única verdad antigua.

«The original language of wisdom had been Hebrew, and the decline of true piety went hand in hand with the decline of this perfect language.» — y su versión lingüística: el hebreo como lengua original de la sabiduría, cuyo declive corre parejo al de la piedad verdadera.

«Arnold knew the works of Thomasius Sr. and Colberg, and politely referred to them from time to time, but here and elsewhere in his Impartial History he systematically refused to be drawn into any historical-critical discussion about whether, or how, pagan philosophy might be related to Christianity in any of its forms, whether “heretical” or “orthodox.”» — señala la negativa sistemática de Gottfried Arnold, que conocía a Thomasius padre y a Colberg, a entrar en discusión histórico-crítica sobre la relación entre filosofía pagana y cristianismo.

«Arnold appears to have agreed with the anti-apologists that there could be no concord of any kind between pagan philosophy and Christian faith.» — y consigna en qué sí coincidía con los anti-apologistas: no cabe concordia alguna entre filosofía pagana y fe cristiana.

«The classic reference comes from Tertullian’s De praescriptione haereticorum: Hence [i.e. from philosophy] spring those “fables and endless genealogies” (1 Tim. 1:4) and “fruitless questions and words” (Tit. 3:9) which “spread like a cancer” (2 Tim. 2:17).» — la referencia clásica del argumento es Tertuliano, citado: de la filosofía brotan las fábulas y genealogías interminables que cunden como el cáncer.

«Contrary to K¨opke and Zierold, Arnold refused to even discuss questions concerning the historical relation between paganism and Christianity because, in his view, there could be no such relation.» — marca la diferencia con Köpke y Zierold: Arnold se niega incluso a discutir la relación histórica entre paganismo y cristianismo porque a su juicio tal relación no existe.

«“Athens” and “Jerusalem,” or philosophy and faith, are not just incompatible but wholly incommensurable: they share no common measure that is applicable to both, and therefore no discussion is even possible.» — y formula el argumento en su forma fuerte: Atenas y Jerusalén no son solo incompatibles, son inconmensurables, y por eso no cabe discusión.

«According to Arnold, the tragedy of the orthodox polemicists was that, while claiming to offer a cure for the disease of heresy, they were themselves symptomatic of that disease: as shown by their addiction to doctrinal quarreling, not only had they entered the arena of philosophy, but they had been thoroughly perverted by it.» — reconstruye la tragedia que Arnold veía en los polemistas ortodoxos: pretendían curar la enfermedad de la herejía y eran ellos mismos su síntoma, pervertidos por la arena filosófica en que entraron.

«They believed that the battle between orthodoxy and heresy should take place in the arena of theology, but failed to realize that only “Athens” has such arenas; they wished to purify Christian theology from pagan contamination, but were blind to the fact that their own theology was a product» — con la vuelta de tuerca que remata el argumento: solo Atenas tiene arenas de disputa, de modo que su propia teología era ya producto de aquello que querían purgar.

«The nature of the “paradigm shift” represented by Arnold’s Impartial History is important but subtle, and can easily be misunderstood.» — advierte que el cambio de paradigma que representa la Historia imparcial es sutil y se malentiende con facilidad.

«Rejecting the patristic apologists merely for their involvement with platonism would imply that criteria for distinguishing between true Christianity and heresy could be found on the level of verbal doctrine (whether one calls it philosophical or theological) – but this would be precisely the “Athenian” error that Arnold was criticizing.» — explica por qué Arnold no podía rechazar a los apologistas patrísticos por platónicos: buscar el criterio de verdad en la doctrina verbal sería incurrir en el error ateniense que él criticaba.

«The only true criterion, for Arnold, is whether an author’s works exemplify the spirit of humble faith and practical piety that is the mark of the true Christian.» — y nombra el único criterio que Arnold admite: si la obra de un autor ejemplifica el espíritu de fe humilde y piedad práctica.

«But very soon, this pure spiritual community had fallen into sin: faith degenerated into dogmatism, communal love gave way to selflove, and inner peace and unity were broken by external strife and sectarian disputes.» — resume su relato de la caída: la fe degeneró en dogmatismo, el amor comunitario cedió al amor propio y la unidad se rompió en disputas sectarias.

«If Arnold called his history “impartial,” this certainly did not imply an attitude of “disinterested” neutrality on his part, let alone a position of methodological agnosticism as we might understand it today.» — y desactiva el equívoco del título: la imparcialidad de Arnold no implicaba neutralidad desinteresada ni agnosticismo metodológico en el sentido de hoy.

«Arnold could claim to write from a position “above the parties” because, in his opinion, the distinction between true and false had nothing to do with doctrinal matters at all.» — explica desde dónde podía Arnold escribir por encima de los partidos: porque a su juicio la distinción entre verdadero y falso no tenía nada que ver con la doctrina.

«But as already suggested, Arnold’s “impartiality” did not imply neutrality, for in fact his church history amounted to a simple reversal: the “orthodox” emerged from his History as the real heretics, and the “heretics” as the true Christians.» — y describe el resultado real: una simple inversión, con los ortodoxos saliendo de la Historia como los verdaderos herejes y los herejes como los verdaderos cristianos.

«It is important to understand that this happened not merely because of Arnold’s personal biases, but because his claim of impartiality was self-defeating to begin with: in terms of the underlying theory of decline, the orthodoxy that was supposed to be treated “impartially” was already marked as heretical by virtue of being institutional and doctrinal.» — objeta que eso no vino solo de sus sesgos personales: la pretensión de imparcialidad se derrotaba a sí misma, porque en su teoría del declive la ortodoxia ya estaba marcada como herética por ser institucional y doctrinal.

«Arnold emphasizes that, like God himself, the true wisdom is a hidden and secret mystery169 that transcends human reason, and reveals itself only in the intimacy of the humble and pious heart.» — consigna el principio suprahistórico que Arnold oponía a las disputas: una sabiduría oculta que trasciende la razón y se revela solo en la intimidad del corazón humilde.

«Because of the focus on wisdom rather than words, the term “theosophia” is more appropriate than “theologia.”» — y la consecuencia terminológica que Arnold extrae de poner la sabiduría por encima de las palabras: theosophia antes que theologia.

«Arnold was convinced that only a historian who had personally experienced “inner illumination” would be able to write an adequate history of Christianity at all, because otherwise he would be missing the all-important criterion for recognizing truth.» — expone su exigencia al oficio del historiador: solo quien haya experimentado personalmente la iluminación interior podría escribir una historia adecuada del cristianismo.

«It was possible to discover documented evidence of instances of inner illumination by studying the historical sources, but the experience itself had a transcendent origin and therefore could not be accounted for by means of historical research.» — con el corte que eso impone a la investigación: cabe hallar en las fuentes evidencia documentada de esa iluminación, pero la experiencia misma tiene origen trascendente y no se explica por medios históricos.

«But when some author, and also the Leipzig Schediasma, mentions yet another source of this [mystical] theology, namely platonic philosophy, then this question may easily be resolved . . . For the true and essential source of this divine gift remains, like all other good and perfect gifts, none other than God alone, with his holy revealed Word, and never some teaching or doctrine created from the human will, let alone a pagan philosophy.» — la desestimación del Schediasma de Leipzig, remitiendo el don divino a Dios solo y nunca a doctrina de voluntad humana, es de Arnold, citado; los puntos suspensivos están en la fuente.

«His only concern was with “true” Christianity as he saw it, not with Christianity as a historical phenomenon that emerges in close interaction and exchange with its cultural environment.» — y resume el estrechamiento del objeto: a Arnold solo le interesaba el cristianismo verdadero tal como él lo veía, no el cristianismo como fenómeno histórico en intercambio con su entorno cultural.

«As shown by the reference to Hermes, Arnold did not exclude the possibility that ancient sages might occasionally have said something true; but again, simply because philosophy is pagan and not Christian, it is of no concern to a historian of Christianity.» — señala que Arnold no excluía que un sabio antiguo dijera de vez en cuando algo verdadero, pero que por ser pagana la filosofía no incumbe al historiador del cristianismo.

«While all the approaches we have been discussing so far could be seen as rudimentary exercises in the comparative history of religions, Arnold’s leading principles were in fact incompatible with historiography proper: they rested on a pure essentialism that ruled out any historical comparison from the outset.» — y su objeción de fondo: los principios de Arnold eran incompatibles con la historiografía propiamente dicha, porque un esencialismo puro descarta de entrada toda comparación histórica.

«It is grounded in the same paradox as its Renaissance ancestors – it tries to write the history of something that cannot have a history, because it is considered beyond change and development – but is considerably more radical in its insistence on direct “inner” spiritual experience or gnosis as the only reliable means of access to the one universal truth, which is now sharply juxtaposed against any “external” and therefore (from this» — lo enlaza con la misma paradoja de sus antecesores renacentistas —escribir la historia de algo que no puede tener historia— y le adjudica un radicalismo mayor al poner la experiencia interior como único acceso fiable.

«On the level of doctrines and ideas (whether religious or philosophical), the Renaissance “history of truth” tradition was in the process of losing the battle against the Critici, whose arguments were simply superior; but by moving the center of attention from ideas to nonverbal “experience,” authors like Arnold could claim that historical criticism itself had its limitations, and that historical-mindedness might make one blind to the true experiential core of faith.» — y explica la jugada que eso permitía: perdida la batalla de las ideas contra los Critici, desplazar el centro a la experiencia no verbal dejaba a la crítica histórica con sus propios límites.

«Christian Thomasius is traditionally seen as the “Father of the German Aufkl¨arung,” and not without good reason.» — acepta con reservas la tradición que llama a Christian Thomasius padre de la Ilustración alemana.

«Thomasius inherited his father’s dislike for syncretic mixtures of theology and philosophy; but he went far beyond him in defending the ideal of a practical and useful philosophy wholly free of metaphysics» — y marca dónde excede al padre: hereda su aversión a las mezclas de teología y filosofía y va mucho más lejos defendiendo una filosofía práctica y útil sin metafísica.

«Thomasius put it, “man will never be freed from prejudices, unless with the help of history he understands the origin of prejudices.”» — la fórmula de que nadie se libra de los prejuicios sin entender por la historia su origen es de Christian Thomasius, citado.

«Such an approach has, of course, become constitutive of the history of philosophy as a modern discipline; but necessary and inevitable though this process of academic emancipation may have been, we will see that it came at a price.» — reconoce que ese enfoque constituyó la historia de la filosofía moderna y a la vez anuncia el precio que tuvo esa emancipación académica.

«The truth is more widely spread than one might think, but very often it is blurred, and very often also enveloped, even enfeebled, mutilated, corrupted, by additions that spoil it or render it less useful.» — la observación de que la verdad está más extendida de lo que se cree pero llega enturbiada, mutilada y corrompida por añadidos es de Leibniz, citada.

«It is one of the ironies of history that precisely this eclectic method in historical research was praised in a famous passage by Leibniz under a title which, against the background of our previous discussions, could not have been more badly chosen: that of philosophia perennis!» — y señala la ironía del caso: Leibniz elogió ese método ecléctico bajo el título peor elegido posible, el de philosophia perennis.

«So great was Leibniz’s authority among later generations, and so complete was the eclipse of the ancient wisdom narrative after the period of the Enlightenment, that this evident confusion between philosophia perennis and Enlightenment eclecticism would become normative among philosophers for over two and a half centuries, until Charles B. Schmitt revived the memory of the original Renaissance perspective in his seminal article of 1966.» — con la consecuencia que le importa: la autoridad de Leibniz volvió normativa esa confusión entre philosophia perennis y eclecticismo ilustrado durante más de dos siglos y medio, hasta que Charles B. Schmitt recuperó la perspectiva renacentista original.

«Pseudo-philosophy has a preference for useless speculation. Examples are scholastic metaphysics, the Lullian philosophy (which should better be called “Nullian”), Leibniz’s Ars Combinatoria, and a whole range of divinatory systems: “the ars onirocritica, the ars chiromantica, the ars geomantica, the ars astrologia, in one word: all the artes divinatoriae, which are nothing else but pagan miscarriages.”» — enumera los ejemplos de pseudofilosofía que da Heumann, con su juego sobre Lulio y su lista de artes adivinatorias tenidas por abortos paganos.

«Here, Heumann’s target is the philosophia sectaria, which from all the philosophers chooses to follow only one, thereby accepting his errors along with his true insights and treating him as if he were a god (“for a man without errors is not a man but a god”), while dismissing all other philosophers as if they were “dumb asses.”» — y define su blanco, la philosophia sectaria, que sigue a un solo filósofo, acepta sus errores junto con sus aciertos y lo trata como un dios mientras desdeña a los demás.

«A true philosopher should not appeal to vain authorities, but to clear evidence [Beweis-Gr¨unde];187 and this allows him to eclectically sift truth from error in any philosophical school.» — frente a ella, el criterio que Heumann propone: no autoridades vanas sino evidencia clara, que permite cribar eclécticamente la verdad del error en cualquier escuela.

«Thus I also consider Plato’s philosophy to be false in many respects, because again and again he appeals to the traditiones veterum, to which belongs his entire Daemonologia, which should not therefore be considered a part of the platonic Wisdom, but of platonic foolishness.» — y su aplicación a Platón, en su propia voz: la Daemonologia entera no es parte de la sabiduría platónica sino de la necedad platónica, por apelar a las traditiones veterum.

«From what has been said thus far, it clearly follows that the philosophy by which the papists were driven into paganism, and which is known as philosophiam barbaricam, is necessarily a false and fake philosophy.» — la identificación de la filosofía que llevó al paganismo a los papistas con la philosophia barbarica, falsa y espuria, es también de Heumann, citado.

«Heumann makes a sharp distinction between the barbarian nations drenched in superstition, and Greece as the home and origin of true philosophy.» — reconstruye la partición de Heumann: las naciones bárbaras empapadas de superstición por un lado, Grecia como patria y origen de la filosofía verdadera por el otro.

«But the true philosophers were no idolaters, on the contrary: their religion was a reasonable theologia naturalis, and therefore they are best referred to as “naturalists.”» — con su corolario sobre los filósofos verdaderos, que no eran idólatras sino naturalistas de una theologia naturalis razonable.

«Only with Erasmus and the Reformation did it become possible for philosophy to revive again.» — y su datación del renacer: solo con Erasmo y la Reforma la filosofía pudo revivir.

«Whereas philosophy should bring enlightenment, by the so-called “symbolic philosophy” one is led from darkness to darkness.» — consigna la objeción de Heumann a la llamada filosofía simbólica: donde la filosofía debería iluminar, ella lleva de tiniebla en tiniebla.

«I am convinced, and can prove it with examples, that from among those who went over from the Lutherans to the Papist Church, and did so seriously and without hypocrisy, most were induced to this by industrious reading of the Patres.» — la afirmación de que la mayoría de los luteranos convertidos al catolicismo lo hicieron por leer con aplicación a los Padres es de Heumann, citada.

«In juxtaposing these principles against the “fundamental errors” which lead to false philosophy, Heumann shows himself a faithful heir of Thomasius father and son (who are quoted continually throughout the treatise): these errors are the belief that the world is co-eternal with God, that the human soul is material, and that matter is capable of thinking and acting out of itself.» — enumera los errores fundamentales que Heumann opone a sus principios —mundo coeterno con Dios, alma material, materia capaz de pensar— y lo llama heredero fiel de los dos Thomasius, citados sin cesar en el tratado.

«But nevertheless, Diogenes Laertius was right that only in Greece was philosophy developed into its true form:» — consigna que Heumann da la razón a Diógenes Laercio en que solo en Grecia la filosofía alcanzó su forma verdadera.

«The so-called “barbarian philosophy” does not deserve that name, for its goal is not wisdom but idolatry.» — y le niega el nombre a la llamada filosofía bárbara, porque su fin no sería la sabiduría sino la idolatría.

«Heumann ended with a quotation from Arnold Geulinx: “What we understand from Divine Revelation, and would not have understood without it, we afterwards also understand through reason – and even so clearly that we imagine we could have understood this truth through the light of reason alone.”» — el cierre con Arnold Geulinx, citado: lo entendido por revelación divina se entiende después también por razón, y con tal claridad que uno se imagina haber podido entenderlo solo con ella.

«The “Enlightenment paradigm” announced so clearly in Heumann’s Acta Philosophorum was the beginning of the eclipse of “Western esotericism” in modern intellectual discourse.» — su tesis sobre el efecto de los Acta Philosophorum: ahí empieza el eclipse del esoterismo occidental en el discurso intelectual moderno.

«He was laughing in their face while waving them goodbye: “adieu, dear Philosophia Chaldaeorum, Persarum, Aegyptiorum, &c . . .» — y la despedida burlona a las filosofías caldea, persa y egipcia es de Heumann en su propia letra.

«Thus the foundations were established not only for the disappearance of most references to “Western esotericism” in textbooks of history of philosophy, but also for a new genre of Enlightenment literature intended for “learning and entertainment”: that of “histories of stupidity.”» — señala el doble efecto de esos cimientos: la desaparición de casi toda referencia al esoterismo en los manuales de historia de la filosofía y un género ilustrado nuevo, las historias de la estupidez.

«as clearly formulated already by Hegel, “The object of philosophy is the unchangeable, eternal truth as it exists in and for itself. History, however, narrates what existed at one time, but then disappeared and was replaced by something else; thus philosophy cannot have a history, and in history philosophy cannot exist”» — la formulación de que la filosofía no puede tener historia, por versar sobre la verdad eterna e inmutable, es de Hegel, citado.

«Most completely, however, it rules in Theosophy, particularly since Paracelsus, Val. Weigel, Rob. Fludd and our Jacob B¨ohme managed to present and spread it in newly embellished forms.» — la queja de que el sistema de emanación reina sobre todo en la teosofía desde Paracelso, Weigel, Fludd y Böhme es de Adelung, citada.

«Even here, then, we still encounter the two central characteristics that we have seen so often before: the system of emanation based upon belief in the eternity of the world, and the emphasis on inner illumination.» — y Hanegraaff señala que ahí reaparecen las dos marcas de siempre: el sistema emanacionista fundado en la eternidad del mundo y el énfasis en la iluminación interior.

«Brucker promised to return the materials within a year’s time, and later claimed that he had in fact tried to do so; but he had entrusted the task to a certain Mr. St¨ubner in Leipzig, who turned out to be unreliable and caused the materials to be lost.» — consigna el episodio de los manuscritos que Heumann prestó a Brucker y que se perdieron, con la explicación que Brucker dio y su reparto de culpa en un tal Stübner de Leipzig.

«According to a contemporary biographer, his herculean labors on the history of philosophy were at least partly therapeutic: in addition to a weak physical constitution, Brucker suffered from heavy attacks of “melancholy,” and only by studying very hard could he distract himself from his fears and depressions.» — recoge de un biógrafo contemporáneo que los trabajos hercúleos de Brucker eran en parte terapéuticos: solo estudiando muy duro distraía sus ataques de melancolía.

«The manner of Brucker’s death in 1770 could not have been more symbolic for this archetypical Stubengelehrter and exemplary representative of the Protestant work-ethic: he fell in his study, having tried to lift a heavy volume from an upper shelf.» — y no se priva de la ironía sobre su muerte en 1770, caído en su estudio al intentar bajar un volumen pesado de un estante alto.

«The German version is titled Kurze Fragen aus der Philosophischen Historie: it seeks to cover the entire history of thought from before the Flood until the present day, and does so in a question-and-answer format.» — describe el alcance de las Kurze Fragen: la historia entera del pensamiento desde antes del Diluvio hasta el presente, en formato de preguntas y respuestas.

«The title is deceptive, for while the questions may be short enough, the answers are often extremely lengthy; and increasingly from one volume to the next, everything Brucker cannot put in his main chapters he puts in his notes, which are printed in small letters and often turn into minor monographs of their own, with incredibly detailed references and bibliographies.» — y llama engañoso el título, porque las respuestas son larguísimas y las notas acaban volviéndose pequeñas monografías.

«In response to the increasing demand for a Latin version accessible to a non-German readership, Brucker decided to rewrite the entire history anew, and in even greater detail – but with fewer footnotes – and the result was his Historia critica philosophiae, which is now generally considered the monument of the history of philosophy in the eighteenth century.» — data en la demanda de una versión latina la reescritura completa que dio la Historia critica philosophiae, hoy tenida por el monumento de la disciplina.

«The importance of this work can hardly be overestimated. It became the indispensable reference for the history of philosophy not only in Germany, but over the whole of Europe, throughout the eighteenth and even far into the nineteenth century.» — y mide su importancia: referencia indispensable no solo en Alemania sino en toda Europa durante el siglo XVIII y buena parte del XIX.

«Diderot in fact plundered the Historia critica philosophiae without any scruples, while taking care to turn the heavy and serious prose of the German Protestant minister into elegant French. His editorial work has been described as a “masterwork of adaptation and subtle deception: by a few interventions, Diderot artfully change[d] . . . the serious chapters of the Historia critica into a graceful reading full of allusions and double entendres, which were excellently suited to the esprit philosophique.”» — acusa a Diderot de saquear sin escrúpulos la Historia critica volviendo elegante en francés la prosa del pastor protestante alemán, y recoge la descripción de esa labor como obra maestra de adaptación y engaño sutil.

«It is the monument to which all the Enlightened spirits in Europe referred at the time . . . The eighteenth century is dominated by Brucker: he is the only point of reference here.» — el juicio de que el siglo XVIII está dominado por Brucker, único punto de referencia, es de Lucien Braun, citado en su obra estándar.

«Brucker undertook the task of surveying the entire history of human thought with the aim of separating the philosophical “wheat” from the pseudo-philosophical “chaff.”» — define la tarea que Brucker se dio: recorrer toda la historia del pensamiento humano para separar el trigo filosófico de la paja pseudofilosófica.

«For Brucker, the truth of the biblical revelation is a matter of faith beyond rational demonstration; but in evaluating historical materials, he thinks and argues entirely as an Enlightenment critic.» — y describe su doble régimen: la verdad de la revelación bíblica es asunto de fe fuera de demostración racional, pero al evaluar materiales históricos piensa y argumenta enteramente como crítico ilustrado.

«He argues essentially the way academic historiography still argues today, albeit with a strong normative agenda.» — con la observación que más incomoda: argumenta en lo esencial como sigue argumentando hoy la historiografía académica, aunque con una agenda normativa fuerte.

«Although Brucker clearly distinguishes these various “systems” and treats them separately, his discussion shows that they are essentially branches of one and the same great tree of pagan superstition.» — señala que Brucker distingue y trata por separado los sistemas paganos y aun así los presenta como ramas de un mismo gran árbol de superstición.

«Pythagoreanism and platonism is in fact a perversion that distorts Plato’s teachings by mixing them up with a variety of pagan superstitions derived from Chaldaea and Egypt.» — consigna su juicio sobre el neoplatonismo: una perversión que distorsiona a Platón mezclándolo con supersticiones caldeas y egipcias.

«Brucker of course does not use that term: rather confusingly, he speaks of the “secta eclectica”227 while pointing out on many occasions that it is in fact an example of “syncretism that puts a knife to the throat of healthy philosophy.”» — y advierte de la confusión terminológica: Brucker la llama secta eclectica mientras la describe como sincretismo que pone el cuchillo en la garganta de la filosofía sana.

«Since the pagan theology, through its many fables and other absurd teachings about the gods, had come to be a horror not only for the Christians, who were now spreading all over the world, but even for the philosophers themselves . . . they sought to give themselves a better image by explaining the fables in a mystical manner and thereby free them from the accusation of absurdity.» — la explicación de que los filósofos paganos, avergonzados de sus propias fábulas, se pusieron a interpretarlas místicamente es de Brucker, citado.

«Since most of the neoplatonists had a melancholic temperament, they were continuously led astray by the products of their overheated imagination; in short, their entire system rested on an “unfounded enthusiasm.”» — y el diagnóstico por temperamento —neoplatónicos melancólicos extraviados por su imaginación recalentada, con un entusiasmo sin fundamento— es también de Brucker.

«The purpose of prayer is to get in contact with these beings, and this happens by means of ecstatic trances.» — así resume Brucker la función del rezo en ese sistema: entrar en contacto con esos seres por trances extáticos.

«and so there were famous Jewish teachers, who expounded the Kabbalah, that is to say, the secret tradition, and who applied the pythagorean, platonic and other pagan inventions to the Law and the Book of Moses, and in so doing introduced a special and secret . . . dark and confused theology and philosophy.» — y la definición de la cábala como tradición secreta que aplicó las invenciones pitagóricas y platónicas a la Ley de Moisés, introduciendo una teología oscura y confusa, va en cita de Brucker.

«In both cases the result was, in Brucker’s opinion, an impenetrable mass of irrational speculation, expressed by means of obscure language and imagery.» — resume el veredicto de Brucker sobre ambas: una masa impenetrable de especulación irracional en lenguaje e imaginería oscuros.

«It should be noted that Brucker’s analysis here is far more neutral and businesslike than before.» — y observa un cambio de tono en esa parte, mucho más neutral y práctica que antes.

«Brucker refutes their ideas essentially on scholarly grounds, by pointing out philological errors, misdatings, incorrect historical interpretations, and so on.» — porque ahí Brucker refuta sobre bases eruditas: errores filológicos, dataciones equivocadas, interpretaciones históricas incorrectas.

«For because they were of the opinion that the ancient Hebrew, Chaldaean, Egyptian, Orphic, Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy was essentially one and the same thing, and that it all emanated from the ur-ancient divine philosophy, they concluded that everything in it had to be in harmony with the Christian religion, and as a result they attempted to reconcile these teachings – perverted and wrong anyway, and packed together from all kinds of fraudulent texts – with the Christian religion.» — el resumen de la premisa que atribuye a sus adversarios —una sola filosofía antigua, hebrea, caldea, egipcia, órfica, pitagórica y platónica, emanada de la divina primordial— es de Brucker, citado.

«Their systems are based not on the light of reason but on claims of internal, divine illumination; by means of it, they believe they have privileged» — y su objeción a los teósofos, que fundan sus sistemas no en la luz de la razón sino en pretensiones de iluminación divina interior.

«The internal logic of Protestant anti-apologeticism had now resulted in a clear distinction between three main domains in the history of thought:» — formula el resultado del anti-apologetismo protestante: una distinción clara entre tres dominios en la historia del pensamiento, que es la que ordena el capítulo.

«According to them, it had to be written according to a methodology of eclecticism; that is to say, the historian’s task was to survey the entire history of thought, and select from it only those traditions that were in accord with sound human reason.» — describe el método que esa distinción imponía al historiador: recorrer la historia entera del pensamiento y seleccionar solo lo acorde con la razón humana sana.

«Reason and revelation could not be contradictory, but they were autonomous and incommensurable: each should keep strictly within its own domain, to avoid the “apologetic” confusion and crypto-paganism that had been the very essence of Roman Catholic theology.» — y el pacto entre razón y revelación que la sostenía: no contradictorias pero autónomas e inconmensurables, cada una en su dominio, para evitar la confusión apologética y el criptopaganismo.

«Essentially, this third domain represented the continuation of pagan religion concealed as Christianity.» — define el tercer dominio, que es el que da origen al objeto del libro: la continuación de la religión pagana disimulada como cristianismo.

«With Christianity it shared its religious nature, but it differed from Christianity in that it was false religion, not based on Revelation.» — con su estatuto exacto: comparte con el cristianismo la naturaleza religiosa y se distingue por ser religión falsa, no fundada en la Revelación.

«However, the very nature of their theoretical concept implied that its representatives were the negative counterpart of both reason and faith, and therefore could not claim to remain a legitimate part of the history of either.» — y la consecuencia lógica que decidió su destino académico: siendo contrapartida negativa de la razón y de la fe a la vez, no podía reclamar lugar legítimo en la historia de ninguna de las dos.

«From now on, they began to vanish from the textbooks of history of philosophy and church history, where they still have the status of mere footnotes today.» — de ahí su desaparición de los manuales de historia de la filosofía y de historia de la Iglesia, donde según él siguen hoy con estatuto de mera nota al pie.

«But because this view of history could not keep its ground against the rational standard of historical-philological criticism and against the progressive thrust of Enlightenment philosophy of history, it found itself increasingly pushed into the esoteric sub-currents of intellectual history» — traza el destino del relato de sabiduría antigua tras la Ilustración: incapaz de sostenerse ante la crítica histórico-filológica, quedó empujado a las subcorrientes esotéricas de la historia intelectual.

«In other words, the ancient wisdom narrative now lost its status as a serious option in mainstream intellectual discourse, but survived as the historiographical model to which most modern esoteric currents adhere.» — con la formulación que le importa: perdió estatuto de opción seria en el discurso principal y sobrevivió como el modelo historiográfico al que adhieren la mayoría de las corrientes esotéricas modernas.

«far from representing the light of divine truth, it came to be imagined as its sinister enemy, up to the extreme imaginary of a demonic “genealogy of darkness” originating in the machinations of “the ancient serpent,” the devil.» — y el reverso de esa moneda: lejos de representar la luz de la verdad divina, pasó a imaginarse como su enemigo siniestro, hasta la genealogía demoníaca de tinieblas nacida de la serpiente antigua.

«In its later development, as will be seen, the essential logic of religionism would allow academics to ignore, or reject, any argumentation that might threaten the integrity of “religion” as such by relating (and thereby potentially reducing) it to historical or social factors.» — su objeción al religionismo, formulada como advertencia sobre lo que su lógica permite: ignorar o rechazar toda argumentación que amenace la integridad de la religión relacionándola con factores históricos o sociales.

«In all its phases of development, the crucial reference of religionist approaches is to an irreducible experience of “the sacred,” considered as a reality sui generis.» — y su referencia constante en todas sus fases, una experiencia irreductible de lo sagrado tenida por realidad sui generis.

«The basic assumption of the Enlightenment paradigm is that Reason is the universal yardstick for evaluating the truth or seriousness of any worldview, whether religious or philosophical.» — nombra el supuesto básico del paradigma ilustrado: la Razón como vara universal para medir la verdad o seriedad de cualquier visión del mundo.

«Both are ideological, not empirical: they do not start by investigating historical evidence, but by stipulating “absolute” criteria of truth a priori, and whatever does not satisfy those criteria is without any further interest to them.» — y la objeción que les hace a los dos por igual: son ideológicos y no empíricos, porque estipulan criterios absolutos de verdad a priori en vez de partir de la evidencia histórica.

«However, none of this detracts from the lasting achievements of the anti-apologetic school: the combination of a methodology of historical criticism with a theoretical focus on the “Hellenization of Christianity” as the conceptual core and historical origin (“the platonic egg,” to quote their own favorite metaphor) of everything that is nowadays known as “Western esotericism.”» — reconoce lo que la escuela anti-apologética legó, sin retirarle las críticas anteriores: crítica histórica sumada a un foco teórico en la helenización del cristianismo como núcleo conceptual, el huevo platónico de su propia metáfora.

«Hence Enlightenment ideology eventually trumped historical criticism, leading to endless cases of historians showing deep embarrassment about the fact that their objects of research so often failed to live up to modern standards of rationality.» — y lo que se perdió: la ideología ilustrada acabó triunfando sobre la crítica histórica, con historiadores incomodísimos porque sus objetos no daban la talla de la racionalidad moderna.

«Such embarrassment is clearly based on anachronistic projections, and does nothing to help us understand the historical realities under scrutiny.» — objeta esa incomodidad como proyección anacrónica que no ayuda a entender las realidades históricas examinadas.

«Indeed, if one of the most lasting achievements of the Enlightenment has been its insistence that “prejudice” in any form should be subjected to critical investigation, then there is no good reason to make an exception for the anti-“pagan,” anti-“mystical” and even anti-“religious” prejudice ingrained in the Enlightenment itself, partly derived from its Protestant roots,» — y vuelve el arma ilustrada contra la Ilustración: si su logro más duradero fue someter todo prejuicio a examen, no hay razón para exceptuar el prejuicio antipagano y antimístico que ella misma dejó incrustado.

«Barth left no doubt that his concept of Christian theology was the polar opposite of any scholarly study of religion (Religionswissenschaft), because the latter, instead of accepting the absolute truth of Revelation, reduced it to just another hegemonic claim made by a religion, Christianity in this case.» — consigna la posición de Karl Barth, para quien la teología cristiana era lo opuesto de todo estudio científico de la religión, porque este reduce la Revelación a una pretensión hegemónica más.

«From this point of view, the study of Western esotericism that will be defended here might be characterized as anti-eclectic historiography.» — y nombra su propia propuesta: una historiografía anti-ecléctica.

«It questions the selective procedures by which historians since the period of the Enlightenment have been narrowing the study of philosophy down to what they consider “real” philosophy, the study of Christianity to that of “real” Christianity, the study of science to that of “real” science (as will be seen in Chapter 3), and even the study of religion to that of “real” religion or the study of art to that of “real” art.» — que cuestiona los procedimientos selectivos con que los historiadores han venido estrechando la filosofía a lo que tienen por filosofía real, el cristianismo a cristianismo real y la ciencia a ciencia real.

«The history of philosophy has been our dominant framework, up to this point, for studying how intellectuals, from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, tried to come to terms with the presence of “paganism” in Christian culture.» — declara el marco que ha venido usando hasta aquí, la historia de la filosofía, para seguir cómo los intelectuales lidiaron con la presencia del paganismo en la cultura cristiana.

«This picture is going to change dramatically in the present chapter, as we enter a period in which Christianity slowly but surely loses its hegemonic position in intellectual discourse, while academic historians of philosophy abandon the currents and ideas associated with “Platonic Orientalism” as unworthy of serious study.» — y anuncia el cambio de escenario: el cristianismo pierde su hegemonía en el discurso intelectual mientras los historiadores académicos abandonan lo asociado al orientalismo platónico por indigno de estudio serio.

«But this would no longer do for a new generation of authors whose worldviews were deeply impacted by the new natural sciences and philosophies.» — señala por qué el viejo aparato dejó de servir a una generación cuyas visiones del mundo estaban marcadas por las nuevas ciencias naturales.

«Because of their focus on philosophy and theology, the anti-apologists had mentioned these arts or sciences only in passing, without assigning them a very important role in their constructs of pagan heresy.» — observa que los anti-apologistas, centrados en filosofía y teología, apenas mencionaban esas artes o ciencias y no les daban papel importante en sus construcciones de la herejía pagana.

«The furor over Bekker’s thesis was, as Jonathan Israel reminds us, “assuredly the biggest intellectual controversy of Early Enlightenment Europe, producing a stupendous 300 publications for and against.”» — y mide el escándalo en torno a la tesis de Bekker con la cifra que aporta Jonathan Israel, la mayor controversia intelectual de la Ilustración temprana, con trescientas publicaciones a favor y en contra.

«It will be remembered that precisely such a concept (the coeternity of God and the world) had been highlighted by Jacob Thomasius as the core doctrine of all pagan error, and sharply contrasted with the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.» — recuerda que la coeternidad de Dios y el mundo era justamente lo que Jacob Thomasius señalaba como doctrina nuclear de todo error pagano, opuesta a la creación desde la nada.

«That it greatly facilitated the acceptance of the mechanical philosophy is an understatement, and it certainly made it easy to perceive any panentheist concept of “living nature” as tainted with pagan superstition.» — y extrae la consecuencia con ironía: decir que eso facilitó la aceptación de la filosofía mecánica es quedarse corto, y volvió fácil ver toda naturaleza viva panenteísta como manchada de superstición pagana.

«We will see that anachronistic distortions, and hence bad scholarship, are not just likely but unavoidable if the three terms are used in an uncritical manner to interpret the past.» — advierte lo que ocurre con superstición, magia y lo oculto usados sin crítica para interpretar el pasado: la distorsión anacrónica no es probable sino inevitable.

«Although the terms “superstition,” “magic,” and “occult” have long histories, they were essentially reinvented during the period of the Enlightenment, in such a manner that they could serve to demarcate “the Other of science and rationality.”» — su tesis sobre esos tres términos: tienen historias largas, pero fueron reinventados en la Ilustración de modo que sirvieran para demarcar el Otro de la ciencia y la racionalidad.

«One is that applying them to earlier periods leads to anachronistic distortions, because Enlightenment preoccupations are thereby projected upon materials that have very little to do with them.» — con la primera objeción a su uso: aplicarlos a periodos anteriores proyecta preocupaciones ilustradas sobre materiales que poco tienen que ver con ellas.

«A second is that they are wholly unsuitable as neutral instruments in scholarly interpretation: they belong to the category of value judgments10 and political Kampfbegriffe (battle concepts),11 not of valid “etic” terminology.» — y la segunda: no sirven como instrumentos neutrales porque pertenecen a la clase de los juicios de valor y de los conceptos de combate, no a la terminología etic válida.

«In this chapter, I will therefore analyze them strictly as “emic” terms.» — de ahí la decisión metodológica que anuncia para el capítulo, analizarlos estrictamente como términos emic.

«The term “superstition”13 is undoubtedly the most uniformly pejorative of the three key terms, although that is not how it began its career.» — señala que superstición es el más uniformemente peyorativo de los tres términos clave, y a la vez que no empezó así su carrera.

«Tylor himself carefully distinguished “survivals” from “magic,” and discussed them in separate chapters; but later readers were less precise, and have frequently treated the two concepts as coming down to one and the same thing.» — consigna la precisión que Tylor sí guardaba entre supervivencias y magia, y el aplanamiento que hicieron sus lectores posteriores al tratarlas como una misma cosa.

«emic, is contextual, etic language can never claim any perfect “objectivity”; but subjective biases and anachronistic projections can be recognized for what they are, and replaced by alternatives that are less distorting, more neutral, and therefore more suitable for “etic” discourse.» — formula su posición sobre la objetividad del lenguaje etic: ninguna es perfecta, pero los sesgos y las proyecciones anacrónicas pueden reconocerse y sustituirse por alternativas menos distorsionantes.

«The analogy with translation from one language to another is close and instructive: perfection will forever elude us, but this does not imply the impossibility of replacing bad translations with superior ones.» — con la analogía que la explica: como en la traducción, la perfección se escapará siempre y eso no impide reemplazar una mala por otra mejor.

«Deisi could mean fear, but also “awe” or “respect,” and daimones could be gods, goddesses, semidivinities, or any other kind of superhuman being, regardless of their good or evil intentions.» — reconstruye la neutralidad original del término griego: deisi podía ser temor pero también reverencia, y daimones cubría todo ser sobrehumano sin distinción de intención.

«However, as pointed out by Dale Martin, it was turned into a negative term in the context of a new and revolutionary concept introduced by Plato and Aristotle, who “taught that the ontological hierarchy of nature was matched by an ethical hierarchy: beings who were superior in nature and power were assumed to be superior ethically.”» — y acredita a Dale Martin el giro negativo: Platón y Aristóteles enseñaron que la jerarquía ontológica de la naturaleza se correspondía con una jerarquía ética.

«However, cracks in the philosophical concept of a matching ontological and ethical hierarchy had begun to appear by the beginning of the Common Era, as philosophers began to doubt whether daimones were really all good and benevolent;21 and in their polemics against pagan intellectuals, Christians turned the tables on their pagan opponents by arguing that the so-called gods were actually evil demons.» — data en el comienzo de la era común las grietas de esa correspondencia, cuando los filósofos empezaron a dudar de que los daimones fueran todos benévolos.

«but not as particularly dangerous; in the Roman Empire, however, superstitio came to be seen as referring to the “depraved, strange, spooky and dishonorable” religious practices imported from foreign peoples, such as the Egyptians, Druids or Chaldaeans.» — describe la deriva romana del término, aplicado a prácticas religiosas importadas de egipcios, druidas o caldeos y tenidas por depravadas y deshonrosas.

«The term was applied to a very wide spectrum of practices, subdivided by Harmening into the categories superstitio observationis (such as the reading of signs and omens, visions, dreams, oracles, and the observation of “good or bad times”), superstitio divinationis (including notably astrology, but also necromancy and a variety of other mantic arts), and superstitio artis magicae (to which we will return).» — recoge la subdivisión medieval que propone Harmening entre superstitio observationis y superstitio divinationis, con las prácticas que caen en cada una.

«As formulated by Stuart Clark, “that [Roman Catholicism] was the quintessence of superstition was a view so general to Protestant cultures that it ranks as the merest of commonplaces in the history of early modern religion.”» — y el lugar común protestante de que el catolicismo era la quintaesencia de la superstición va en cita de Stuart Clark.

«Although superstition is thus a conceptual compound, it was easy to see its different connotations as part of one single psychological Gestalt, for example by suggesting that out of fear of invisible beings, a superstitious man engages in excessive ritual acts (or an excessive obsession with performing them correctly) and is therefore bowing to them to win their favor, instead of relying on simple faith in the one true God.» — explica cómo un compuesto conceptual pudo leerse como una sola Gestalt psicológica: del miedo a los seres invisibles se derivaría el exceso ritual y la obsesión por ejecutarlo correctamente.

«What we see here is that from a religious error, superstition has become an intellectual one: rather than being religiously wrong, or sinful, it is simply mistaken.» — y marca el desplazamiento decisivo del término: de error religioso a error intelectual, de pecaminoso a simplemente equivocado.

«On such foundations, it became easy to conclude, as did the Encyclop´edie, that superstition is “the unhappy daughter of the imagination”:» — la definición de la superstición como hija infeliz de la imaginación es de la Encyclopédie, citada.

«One sees how easily we arrive, by this route, at what Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park refer to as the Enlightenment’s “Unholy Trinity: Enthusiasm, Superstition, Imagination.”» — y la trinidad impía de entusiasmo, superstición e imaginación es rótulo de Lorraine Daston y Katherine Park, no suyo.

«Essentially, his battle was not against Christianity, or against religion as such, but against the pagan errors that had crept into it.» — precisa contra qué peleaba Voltaire: no contra el cristianismo ni contra la religión, sino contra los errores paganos que se le habían colado.

«Thus, in his treatise on tolerance he followed tradition in seeing astrology as superstitio, but did so by setting it against religion, not science:» — y en qué marco: en su tratado sobre la tolerancia trata la astrología como superstitio oponiéndola a la religión, no a la ciencia.

«Less well known than this oft-quoted witticism, which praises both science and religion as “wise and intelligent,” is the entry “Superstition” in his Dictionnaire philosophique, where he states that “Almost everything that goes beyond the worship of a supreme Being and the submission of the heart to his eternal orders is superstition,”44 and emphasizes its relation to fanaticism.» — señala la entrada Superstition de su Dictionnaire philosophique, menos citada que el chiste célebre, donde casi todo lo que excede el culto al Ser supremo queda del lado supersticioso.

«And as far as history was concerned, Voltaire appears to have been entirely in line with the anti-apologist perspective: “Born in paganism, adopted by Judaism, superstition infected the Christian Church from the very beginning.”» — y la fórmula de que la superstición nació en el paganismo, la adoptó el judaísmo e infectó desde el principio a la Iglesia cristiana es de Voltaire, citada; Hanegraaff la alinea con la perspectiva anti-apologista.

«But content was important and the force of arguments did matter: they were not just convenient weapons in power competition, but had (and have) the ability to convince.» — y contra una lectura puramente estratégica de esas polémicas, sostiene que el contenido importaba y que los argumentos tenían y tienen capacidad de convencer, no solo de servir en una competencia de poder.

«Mauss used the term magic for “any rite that is not part of an organized cult: a rite that is private, secret, mysterious, and ultimately tending towards one that is forbidden.”» — la definición de la magia como todo rito ajeno a un culto organizado, privado, secreto y tendiente a lo prohibido es de Marcel Mauss, citada.

«Functionalist approaches are therefore based upon religion, not science, as the theoretical opposite of magic: as formulated by Durkheim, “there is something inherently anti-religious about the maneuvers of the magician.”» — y consigna que en los enfoques funcionalistas el opuesto teórico de la magia es la religión y no la ciencia, con la sentencia de Durkheim sobre lo inherentemente antirreligioso de las maniobras del mago.

«It was based upon the perceived contrast between a worldview or mentality grounded in “instrumental causality” (which assumes the presence of secondary causes or mechanisms that mediate between causes and effects) and one grounded in “participation” (where causes and effects are seen as associated, or merging, to the point of identity or consubstantiality, without assuming the presence of mediating links).» — describe el contraste sobre el que se levanta la otra familia de teorías: causalidad instrumental frente a participación.

«His conclusion is that magic cannot be salvaged as an etic term; and in fact, in the study of religion since the 1990s it seems to be in the process of vanishing from standard terminology.» — consigna la conclusión ajena de que la magia no se salva como término etic, y el dato de que desde los años noventa parece estar desapareciendo de la terminología estándar del estudio de la religión.

«Although radical “postmodern” versions of this phenomenon have received most attention in the popular media, many historians have found that one does not need the theoretical machinery of French post-structuralism to understand a very basic point about much of traditional terminology in the study of religion: its thorough dependence on normative modernist ideologies and implicit hegemonic claims» — y advierte que no hace falta el aparato del posestructuralismo francés para ver lo básico sobre la terminología tradicional del estudio de la religión.

«In theories of this kind, it is clearly science, not religion, that serves as the theoretical opposite of magic: alternatives to instrumental causality are believed to be the heart of the matter.» — señala que en las teorías de ese otro tipo el opuesto teórico de la magia es la ciencia y no la religión, porque el asunto pasa a ser la alternativa a la causalidad instrumental.

«The evidence in this regard, as laid out in detail by Styers, is so abundant and straightforward that one can only marvel at how long, and how effectively, this essentialist and totalizing discourse on “magic versus religion and science” has kept academics spellbound, as if they were trapped themselves in a magic circle without escape:62 “you cannot talk about magic without using the term magic,”» — y expresa su asombro de que un discurso esencialista y totalizador sobre magia frente a religión y ciencia haya mantenido hechizados a los académicos tanto tiempo.

«One sign of this is the fact that whereas Styers thoroughly deconstructs the term “magic,” he speaks of “superstition” as if its meaning and its relation to magic are unproblematic and not in need of any explanation» — objeta a Randall Styers que deconstruya a fondo el término magia y trate en cambio superstición como si su sentido no necesitara explicación.

«The basic theoretical approaches represented by Tylor, Mauss, and L´evy-Bruhl have been mixed, combined, adapted, and reinterpreted by later authors in manifold ways, but almost without exception on the basis of a tacit acceptance of the triad “magic – religion – science” as universal concepts.» — y su diagnóstico sobre la herencia de Tylor, Mauss y Lévy-Bruhl: mezclada y reinterpretada de mil modos, casi siempre sobre la aceptación tácita de la tríada magia, religión y ciencia como conceptos universales.

«The historical evidence for this basic point is overwhelming, and has been presented and analyzed by Randall Styers in a landmark study published in 2004.» — data en 2004 el estudio de Styers que reunió esa evidencia y lo llama un trabajo que marca un hito.

«For that reason (contra Dickie, Versnel, or Bremmer) we should resist the temptation of using our term “magic” in discussing what may have been known as» — y saca la consecuencia práctica contra colegas nombrados, Dickie, Versnel y Bremmer: resistir la tentación de usar nuestro término magia para lo que en aquel entonces se llamaba de otro modo.

«Again, the problem is not the use of etic terminology as such (which is often indispensable in scholarly analysis, as pointed out, for example, by Dickie, Magic and Magicians, 18–20, in agreement with Versnel and Bremmer, as well as Jardine, “Etics and Emics”), but the use of this particular terminology.» — con la aclaración de qué es lo que objeta: no la terminología etic en sí, a menudo indispensable, sino esta terminología en particular.

«Jan Bremmer rightly points out that magic was contrasted not with religion tout court, but with normative religious practice, so that it became all but indistinguishable» — da la razón a Jan Bremmer en que la magia no se contrastaba con la religión sin más, sino con la práctica religiosa normativa.

«Up through the twelfth century, if you asked a theologian what magic was you were likely to hear that demons began it and were always involved in it.» — la caracterización de lo que un teólogo anterior al siglo XII habría contestado sobre la magia va en cita, y sirve al libro para fijar el punto de partida demonológico.

«The decisive change in these traditional understandings occurred around the thirteenth century, with the emergence of magia naturalis as an alternative to demonic magic.» — data en torno al siglo XIII el cambio decisivo: la aparición de la magia natural como alternativa a la magia demoníaca.

«With the disintegration of the Roman Empire, knowledge of Greek had vanished from Western Europe almost completely;» — recuerda la pérdida casi total del griego en Europa occidental tras la desintegración del Imperio romano.

«However, it survived in the eastern parts of the former empire, and, with the rapid expansion of Islam after Muhammad’s death in 632, much of the regions where Greek learning was still intact came under Muslim rule.» — y su supervivencia en el oriente del antiguo imperio, cuyas regiones quedaron bajo dominio musulmán con la expansión del islam tras la muerte de Mahoma en 632.

«The caliphal library of Cordoba, for example, is believed to have held no fewer than 400,000 volumes, in a period when even the largest libraries in Christian Europe» — cifra la desproporción con el ejemplo de la biblioteca califal de Córdoba, a la que se atribuyen cuatrocientos mil volúmenes.

«From the twelfth century on, multiple texts from the corpus of Greek natural philosophy and science and its medieval Islamic elaborations began to be translated from Arabic into Latin, leading to an unprecedented revival of classical materials concerning the sciences of nature.» — data en el siglo XII el arranque de las traducciones del árabe al latín que devolvieron a Occidente la filosofía natural griega y sus elaboraciones islámicas.

«Reacting to the standard post-eighteenth-century image of astrology as “pseudoscience,” Lynn Thorndike pointed out as early as 1955 that modern historians of science have been “strangely blind” to the fact that classical astrology was grounded in a concept of universal, immutable natural law.» — recoge la objeción de Lynn Thorndike, de 1955, contra la imagen de la astrología como pseudociencia: los historiadores de la ciencia han estado extrañamente ciegos a que la astrología clásica se fundaba en una ley natural universal e inmutable.

«Gerbert of Aurillac (the later Pope Sylvester II) in the tenth century and Constantine the African in the eleventh studied in Islamic Spain, and began making translations,» — data en Gerberto de Aurillac y Constantino el Africano los estudios en la España islámica que iniciaron las traducciones.

«Patristic polemics against astrology largely focused on fatalism, seen as incompatible with the notion of free will, and this would remain an important issue through the Middle Ages;77 but already in Tertullian’s De idolatria, astrology was presented as a species falling under the more general genus of magic, condemned as an idolatrous practice invented by the fallen angels.» — señala dónde se concentró la polémica patrística contra la astrología, en el fatalismo incompatible con el libre albedrío, y consigna que ya en Tertuliano la astrología aparece como especie del género magia.

«Although Isidore, too, had ranged the various kinds of divination under “magic” and condemned all of them as involving contact with demons,82 in his section on “astronomy” he had also distinguished between astrologia superstitiosa and an acceptable astrologia naturalis.» — y localiza en Isidoro la distinción entre astrologia superstitiosa y una astrologia naturalis aceptable, junto a su condena general de la adivinación.

«it is highly important that the same author was responsible for reviving the memory of Augustine’s largely forgotten condemnation of the “godmaking passages” in the hermetic Asclepius, where Hermes praised the ancient Egyptian practice of creating statues and drawing the souls of divine entities down into them.» — adjudica al mismo autor haber revivido la condena olvidada de Agustín a los pasajes del Asclepius sobre la fabricación de dioses, donde Hermes elogia la práctica egipcia de atraer almas divinas a las estatuas.

«Thorndike’s thesis that during the Middle Ages “even the most educated men believed in astrology” (Place of Magic, 5) is mildly misleading since the revival of astrology happened only with the translations from Arabic sources in the later Middle Ages (cf. Thorndike, History, vol. i, 551–782).» — corrige a Thorndike sin retirarle el mérito: decir que en la Edad Media hasta los más educados creían en la astrología induce a error, porque su renacer solo llegó con las traducciones del árabe.

«he himself also remained under the spell of the medieval Christian categorization of astrology as superstitio (as shown by his characterization of Sarton’s language as “factually correct,” and his adoption of similar language in the rest of the article).» — y le objeta además haber quedado bajo el hechizo de la categorización medieval de la astrología como superstitio, según se ve en su propio lenguaje.

«While legitimating natural magic in principle, it nevertheless forced its defenders into a defensive position, for they always needed to convince theological critics that what they claimed were natural processes did not actually involve some “addressative”» — describe el precio de legitimar en principio la magia natural: sus defensores quedaban en posición defensiva, obligados siempre a convencer al crítico teológico de que no había nada addressativo en sus procesos.

«Weill-Parot points out that the al-Kindian position was unacceptable in a Christian scholastic framework, as shown by the attack on De radiis by Giles of Rome in his Errores philosophorum: pushed to the limit, it could be used to undermine even the possibility of prayers addressed to God!» — recoge de Nicolas Weill-Parot por qué la posición de al-Kindi era inaceptable en el marco escolástico, con el ataque de Egidio Romano al De radiis: llevada al límite, socavaba hasta la posibilidad de rezar a Dios.

«It is therefore hardly surprising that the phenomenon known as Renaissance magic, beginning with Ficino, is characterized by profound ambiguities on the theoretical level: drawing on a great variety of Latin, Greek and Arabic sources, it had to combine aristotelian with platonic strands of natural philosophy and metaphysics, it needed to present both of them as compatible with Christian doctrine, it had to convince the theologians that magic was strictly natural, but nevertheless, it also wanted to see that same natural magic as the supreme religious wisdom derived from Zoroaster!» — y explica por qué la magia renacentista es teóricamente ambigua desde Ficino: tenía que combinar hebras aristotélicas y platónicas de filosofía natural sobre fuentes latinas, griegas y árabes.

«As remarked by Jean-Pierre Brach, the Renaissance saw a series of famous attempts at theorizing and systematizing magic against the background of the scholastic distinction between natural and ritual (angelic or demonic) magic, but “the elaboration of a synthetic approach had, in many cases, the not-so-paradoxical effect of partially blurring the basic differences that were assumed to exist between them.”» — la observación de que los intentos renacentistas de sistematizar la magia tuvieron el efecto nada paradójico de difuminar la distinción escolástica es de Jean-Pierre Brach.

«The brilliance of this scheme was that it could encompass all the ancient materials that were now available, while assigning to each discipline its proper place in an orderly hierarchy:» — señala qué hacía brillante ese esquema: podía abarcar todo el material antiguo disponible asignando a cada disciplina su lugar en una jerarquía ordenada.

«In short, even if many authors kept referring to magia naturalis, in fact there was no real distinction any more between a prisca theologia and a prisca magia.» — y saca la consecuencia que le importa: por más que muchos autores siguieran hablando de magia natural, ya no había distinción real entre una prisca theologia y una prisca magia.

«Notwithstanding some vague claims of a remote and noble ancestry, it had begun its life as a wholly negative term for despicable demonic and idolatrous practices;» — reconstruye la carrera del término magia: empezó como término enteramente negativo para prácticas demoníacas e idolátricas despreciables.

«however, it had managed to gain a degree of respectability by setting itself off sharply against its former identity, as magia naturalis;» — y ganó respetabilidad justamente marcando distancia de su identidad anterior, como magia naturalis.

«Many of them kept calling attention to its doubtful origins, suggesting that its splendid garb was just a show, and the old heart of darkness was still beating underneath.» — con la sospecha que nunca se disipó: muchos seguían señalando su origen dudoso, como si el ropaje espléndido fuera puro espectáculo y el viejo corazón de tinieblas siguiera latiendo debajo.

«a philosopher like David Hume in the eighteenth century was still perfectly aware of the connection, and made a point of emphasizing that the ideas of “power, force, energy, or necessary connection” were “more obscure and uncertain” than any other.» — consigna que Hume seguía siendo consciente de la conexión y subrayaba que poder, fuerza, energía o conexión necesaria eran nociones más oscuras e inciertas que ninguna otra.

«The elusiveness of the concept of “force” is captured very nicely by a quotation from the nineteenth-century philosopher Otto Liebmann: “Kr¨afte sind Kausalgespenster, aber reale, nicht imagin¨are” (“Forces are phantoms of causality, but they are real, not imaginary”:» — la definición de las fuerzas como fantasmas de la causalidad, reales y no imaginarios, es del filósofo decimonónico Otto Liebmann, citado.

«This made them into the black box of scholastic science: a necessary part of the technical apparatus, but also a reminder that God» — describe la función de las cualidades ocultas como caja negra de la ciencia escolástica: parte necesaria del aparato técnico y a la vez recordatorio del límite.

«Note that apart from invisible “forces” connecting causes and effects, non-causal connections usually referred to as “correspondences” fall under the “occult” umbrella as well (cf. n. 110, below),» — y precisa el alcance del paraguas de lo oculto, que cubre no solo fuerzas invisibles sino conexiones no causales, las llamadas correspondencias.

«In his seminal article of 1982 (“What happened to Occult Qualities”), Keith Hutchison argued that not the concept of qualitates occultae as such, but their banishment into the category of the» — expone la tesis de Keith Hutchison en su artículo de 1982: lo decisivo no fue el concepto de qualitates occultae en sí, sino su destierro a una categoría.

«The concept of qualitas occulta came to play a key role in the project of emancipating the ancient sciences from the domain of superstitio, and legitimating them as magia naturalis.» — adjudica al concepto de cualidad oculta un papel clave en el proyecto de emancipar las ciencias antiguas del dominio de la superstitio y legitimarlas como magia natural.

«The emergence of the concepts of “occult philosophy” and the “occult sciences” during the sixteenth century becomes not just understandable, but almost predictable against these backgrounds.» — y sostiene que sobre ese trasfondo la aparición en el siglo XVI de la filosofía oculta y las ciencias ocultas no solo se entiende, sino que resulta casi previsible.

«Far from rejecting occult qualities, as has traditionally been assumed by historians of science, philosophers and scientists in the wake of Descartes were arguing that they could and should be made into an object of research, and sought to account for them in mechanical terms (cf. d’Alembert’s» — corrige lo que los historiadores de la ciencia han supuesto tradicionalmente: lejos de rechazar las cualidades ocultas, los filósofos posteriores a Descartes sostenían que podían y debían volverse objeto de investigación.

«Even more than that, they rejected “manifest qualities” and argued that all qualities were occult, but nevertheless knowable!» — y va más lejos: rechazaron las cualidades manifiestas y sostuvieron que todas las cualidades son ocultas, aunque cognoscibles.

«This subtle but important process of conceptual transformation amounted, in other words, to a re-enchantment of magia naturalis.» — y nombra el efecto de esa transformación conceptual, sutil e importante: un reencantamiento de la magia natural.

«They are occult and hidden because they cannot be known with certainty by way of demonstration.» — la definición de lo oculto por su inaccesibilidad a la demostración cierta va en cita de la fuente de época.

«This is why the ancient sages considered it good to establish a certain limit, beyond which one cannot pass in researching the reasons of things.» — y con ella la justificación del límite: por eso los sabios antiguos tuvieron por bueno fijar una frontera que no se debe cruzar al investigar las razones de las cosas.

«May nobody be scandalized by these appellations, which have such a bad reputation everywhere, and are so much abused. Rather, I will give them other names: that of the elemental science, the celestial one, and the super-mundane or intelligible one.» — la petición de que nadie se escandalice por unos nombres de tan mala fama, y el rebautizo en ciencia elemental, celeste e inteligible, es de Blaise de Vigenère, citado.

«On the contrary: from the outset, the term implied an underlying, “hidden” unity and coherence, ultimately grounded in the “ancient wisdom” (of Hermes Trismegistus in particular).» — sostiene que el rótulo ciencias ocultas nunca fue solo práctico: implicaba desde el principio una unidad oculta fundada en la sabiduría antigua, la de Hermes Trismegisto en particular.

«It is of critical importance to understand that, in this framework, it was much more than just a pragmatic umbrella category for covering a range of otherwise diverse and relatively autonomous sciences.» — e insiste en que entenderlo importa de modo crítico: era mucho más que un paraguas pragmático sobre ciencias diversas y relativamente autónomas.

«But by far the most explicit and sustained defense of the “unity of the occult sciences,” understood as the essentially irrational and superstitious counterpart to reason and science, comes from a contemporary scholar of English literature and history of science, Brian Vickers.» — adjudica a Brian Vickers, estudioso de la literatura inglesa y de la historia de la ciencia, la defensa contemporánea más explícita y sostenida de esa unidad de las ciencias ocultas entendida como contrapartida irracional de la razón.

«Shumaker went as far as stating that anyone holding such beliefs today was “the victim of some special psychological need”» — y consigna hasta dónde llegó Wayne Shumaker, que atribuía a quien hoy sostuviera esas creencias una necesidad psicológica especial.

«It would seem, then, that Vickers does not see the alleged “unity of the occult sciences” as a relatively recent phenomenon grounded in the Renaissance synthesis from Ficino through Agrippa, but as one that can be traced all the way back to its origins in the ancient Near East.» — describe la impresión que deja Vickers, de una unidad rastreable hasta el antiguo Cercano Oriente y no nacida de la síntesis renacentista de Ficino a Agripa.

«However, such an impression would ultimately be misleading, for, in its essence, “the occult” according to Vickers is not a historical phenomenon at all, but a universal tendency of the human mind.» — y por qué esa impresión engaña: en su esencia, lo oculto según Vickers no es fenómeno histórico sino tendencia universal de la mente humana.

«In short, the occult sciences are grounded not in experimentation, explanatory theories, or even just ideas, but in abiding pre-rational mental habits that are structurally similar to those of “primitive” peoples.» — con la consecuencia que le atribuye: las ciencias ocultas no se fundarían en experimentación ni en teorías ni siquiera en ideas, sino en hábitos mentales prerracionales semejantes a los de los pueblos primitivos.

«Vickers makes a strong plea for the use of anthropological categories in the study of history, and mentions a range of authorities; but as pointed out by Patrick Curry, his approach is based essentially on what was highlighted above as one of the three basic theoretical approaches to “magic,” Lucien L´evy-Bruhl’s theory of “participation” versus “causality.”» — y acredita a Patrick Curry haber mostrado que ese aparato antropológico descansa en la teoría de Lévy-Bruhl.

«Vickers refers to Robin Horton for describing science and the occult as respectively “open” and “closed” systems, but as pointed out by Curry (ibid., 306; referring to Horton, Patterns, 319), Horton himself has eventually rejected that dichotomy as “ripe for the scrap heap.”» — con el dato que Curry añade sobre la otra autoridad invocada: el propio Robin Horton acabó rechazando su dicotomía entre sistemas abiertos y cerrados.

«If the “occult sciences” are really a homogeneous unity, there would seem to be no point in seeking to differentiate between its various manifestations or studying their historical development in detail.» — y señala la consecuencia práctica de tomar esas ciencias por unidad homogénea: no habría razón para diferenciar sus manifestaciones ni para estudiar su desarrollo histórico en detalle.

«science is based upon “the rejection of occult symbolism.”» — la fórmula de que la ciencia se funda en el rechazo del simbolismo oculto es de Brian Vickers, citada.

«This stringent application of the traditional “magic versus science” argument to the historiography of science has been sharply attacked by representatives of the “new historiography”» — consigna el ataque de la llamada nueva historiografía a esa aplicación estricta del argumento magia contra ciencia.

«recent scholarship emphasizes that, to the contrary, the residual influence of the unifying Renaissance concept of occulta philosophia has caused a sort of blindness with regard to the relative independence and autonomy of disciplines such as astrology and magic» — y resume su hallazgo inverso: la influencia residual del concepto renacentista de occulta philosophia produjo una ceguera ante la independencia relativa de disciplinas como la astrología y la magia.

«For exactly the same reasons as “magic,” then, the concept of “occult sciences” must indeed be rejected as valid scholarly terminology.» — su conclusión terminológica, que corre pareja a la de magia: el concepto de ciencias ocultas debe rechazarse como terminología erudita válida.

«In Newman and Grafton’s defense for the independence of astrology and alchemy, one cannot help noticing a certain degree of impatience with the “occult philosophy” of the Renaissance, held responsible for the “hackneyed” thesis of a “unity of the occult sciences,” and constantly evoked by scholars of “the Hermetic Tradition” since Frances Yates in the 1960s.» — y observa la impaciencia con que William Newman y Anthony Grafton, al defender la independencia de astrología y alquimia, tratan a la filosofía oculta renacentista.

«There is no agreement even about basic terminological conventions in this extremely complex domain of overlapping concepts, speculative systems, worldviews, and mental habits.» — admite el estado del terreno sin maquillarlo: no hay acuerdo ni siquiera sobre las convenciones terminológicas básicas en un dominio de conceptos, sistemas y hábitos mentales superpuestos.

«was not just an arbitrary or merely decorative conceit but something seen as existing independently in the world itself, and discusses similar examples of “analogical thinking” in authors like Kepler and Kircher.» — señala que para esos autores la analogía no era ocurrencia decorativa sino algo existente en el mundo mismo, y remite a casos como Kepler y Kircher.

«The delicate task for historians consists in recognizing and analyzing these dimensions as integral to much of pre-modern thinking, and to the Renaissance philosophia occulta in particular, and yet to do so without falling prey to the bad dualistic habit of playing them out against “science” (whether it is to denigrate their irrationality or to defend their poetic beauty).» — y formula la tarea delicada del historiador: reconocer esas dimensiones como parte integral del pensamiento premoderno sin caer en el mal hábito dualista de enfrentarlas a la ciencia.

«A particularly clear example is the pervasive fascination with a “natural language” of “real symbols” (highly relevant to astrology and talismanic magic) in which signs are treated as being what they signify, so that names or images do not just “refer” to persons or things, but are assumed to somehow contain their very essence.» — describe el ejemplo más claro, la lengua natural de símbolos reales donde el signo es lo que significa, de modo que nombres e imágenes no remiten a las cosas sino que las contienen.

«The fact is that such concepts were proclaimed, not just as a frivolous afterthought but deliberately and persistently, by highly trained intellectuals.» — y subraya el dato que impide despacharlo: esas concepciones fueron proclamadas deliberada y persistentemente por intelectuales de altísima formación.

«Even allowing for the power of traditional authority, it therefore makes no sense to dismiss them as instances of irrationality, lack of logical competence, primitive thinking, or plain stupidity.» — de donde niega que tenga sentido tratarlas como irracionalidad, incompetencia lógica, pensamiento primitivo o simple estupidez.

«Nor are they representative of some “occult” subculture out of touch with mainstream intellectual discourse, as popular clich´es would have it.» — ni como subcultura oculta desconectada del discurso intelectual dominante, según quiere el cliché popular.

«Both frameworks are equally capable of rejecting the other as fundamentally false and misleading.» — y consigna la simetría entre los dos marcos que distingue: cada uno es igualmente capaz de rechazar al otro como fundamentalmente falso.

«Nevertheless, on closer scrutiny, we appear to be dealing with a very uneasy marriage (or, if one prefers, a series of only partly successful marriage attempts) between two strongly different, even logically incompatible intellectual paradigms or styles of thinking.» — y su lectura de la unión entre ambos: un matrimonio muy incómodo, o una serie de intentos de matrimonio solo en parte logrados, entre paradigmas intelectuales lógicamente incompatibles.

«There is no doubt that the fertile combination of Lutheranism and alchemical modes of thought became responsible for the most important forms of creative innovation in what we now see as “Western esotericism” after the sixteenth century, those of Rosicrucianism and the Christian Theosophy associated with Jacob B¨ohme and his followers.» — adjudica a la combinación de luteranismo y modos alquímicos de pensar las innovaciones más importantes de lo que hoy llamamos esoterismo occidental tras el siglo XVI, rosacrucismo y teosofía de Böhme.

«There is no doubt that alchemical symbolism can be used for illustrating Jungian psychology, but it is a common mistake to conclude from this that Jung’s theories provide a valid framework for the historiography of alchemy, or that alchemy is “really” about spiritual transformation.» — distingue lo que concede a Jung de lo que le niega: el simbolismo alquímico sirve para ilustrar su psicología, y de ahí no se sigue que sus teorías valgan como marco historiográfico ni que la alquimia trate en realidad de transformación espiritual.

«That alchemical models came to be applied to religious contexts by many authors at least after the sixteenth century is impossible to deny,» — y a la vez no niega el hecho contrario: que muchos autores aplicaran modelos alquímicos a contextos religiosos al menos desde el siglo XVI es imposible de negar.

«If we wish to understand the relation between alchemy and religion in Western culture, we must therefore begin by trying to forget contemporary Jungian notions of “spiritual alchemy” and make an effort to understand the sources in their original historical and intellectual context.» — su instrucción metodológica al respecto: olvidar las nociones contemporáneas de alquimia espiritual y esforzarse por entender las fuentes en su contexto histórico e intelectual original.

«Logically, such a shift implies that although religious elements may be found in the relevant textual corpus, these are not “really” alchemical, and may thus be marginalized as relatively unimportant or even dismissed as wholly irrelevant.» — señala lo que implica lógicamente el desplazamiento contrario: si lo alquímico se define por lo técnico, los elementos religiosos del corpus dejan de ser realmente alquímicos y pueden marginarse o descartarse.

«In a seminal article on the philosophical foundations of medieval alchemy, Barbara Obrist has shown how the very fact that the qualitates occultae were considered inaccessible to the human intellect led to the idea, as early as the second half of the thirteenth century, that they could be accessed by means of other and “higher” faculties for gaining knowledge: those of direct intuition or divine revelation.» — recoge de Barbara Obrist que la inaccesibilidad de las qualitates occultae al intelecto humano llevó ya en la segunda mitad del siglo XIII a pensarlas accesibles por otras vías.

«To have any chance at achieving certain knowledge in the domain of alchemy, one therefore needed to submit oneself to the divine truth by means of faith, which in thirteenth-century Western society meant the eucharistic theology of God’s incarnation and the resurrection of Christ.» — reconstruye la consecuencia de ese planteamiento: alcanzar conocimiento cierto en alquimia exigía someterse a la verdad divina por la fe, que en el siglo XIII significaba la teología eucarística de la encarnación y la resurrección.

«This stone cannot be apprehended by the human intellect but can only be known through divine inspiration or revelation, and is what enabled the ancient sages to prophesy.» — y la piedra que no se aprehende por el intelecto sino por inspiración o revelación, la misma que habría permitido profetizar a los sabios antiguos.

«Of course, this is another example of the “re-enchantment” of the qualitates occultae discussed earlier.» — lo enlaza con su propia categoría: otro ejemplo del reencantamiento de las cualidades ocultas.

«For a thinker like Lazzarelli this made perfect sense, for his earlier Crater Hermetis consisted of a brilliant interpretation of the Corpus Hermeticum as concerned with exactly the same goal: reversing the effects of the Fall by means of a “literal” transformation or interior regeneration (rebirth) that restored man to his original divine nature.» — explica por qué eso encajaba con Lazzarelli, cuyo Crater Hermetis leía el Corpus Hermeticum con la misma meta, revertir los efectos de la Caída por una regeneración interior literal.

«In a period when Hermes Trismegistus’ status as one of the most ancient teachers of wisdom had not yet been called into doubt, there is nothing surprising about the fact that alchemical materials attributed to him or linked to his name assumed great interest for intellectuals with such religious and eschatological agendas.» — y sitúa el interés en su contexto: cuando el estatuto de Hermes como maestro antiquísimo aún no se ponía en duda, no sorprende que el material alquímico ligado a su nombre atrajera agendas religiosas y escatológicas.

«On the contrary: alchemical practice could be seen as a necessary part of interior regeneration.» — con la consecuencia que niega la oposición habitual: la práctica alquímica podía verse como parte necesaria de la regeneración interior.

«The Rosicrucian Fama Fraternitatis (1614) criticized “the ungodly and accursed gold-making” but presented Christian Rosenkreutz as adept at metallic transmutation and placed Paracelsus’ work in his inner sanctuary;» — señala la tensión dentro de la Fama Fraternitatis de 1614, que critica la impía fabricación de oro y a la vez presenta a Christian Rosenkreutz como adepto en la transmutación metálica.

«The role of practical alchemy in this current could range from very important, as in Khunrath, to negligible or non-existent, as in B¨ohme; but it is important to emphasize that even in the latter case, references to alchemical transmutation were not just metaphors for purely “spiritual” processes.» — gradúa el papel de la alquimia práctica en esa corriente, muy importante en Khunrath y nulo en Böhme, y advierte que ni aun en ese caso las referencias a la transmutación son meras metáforas de procesos espirituales.

«On the contrary: against the docetist implications of platonic idealism, B¨ohme’s perspective was thoroughly incarnational and rooted in organic concepts (not just metaphors) of birth and generation.» — al contrario, describe la perspectiva de Böhme como encarnacional y arraigada en conceptos orgánicos de nacimiento y generación, contra las implicaciones docetistas del idealismo platónico.

«He described how out of the mysterious and unknowable Ungrund before all manifestation, God himself had been born as a body, constituted of the darkness of “wrath” (Zorn, associated with the God of the Old Testament) redeemed by the light of “love” (associated with Christ).» — resume su cosmogonía: desde el Ungrund incognoscible, Dios mismo nace como cuerpo, hecho de la oscuridad de la ira redimida por la luz del amor.

«The universal process of “reintegration” involves the salvation not just of human individuals, but of Nature itself: the fallen body of God should be restored by being transmuted into its original perfection as an eternal world of light.» — y el alcance de la reintegración que se sigue: no solo salvación de individuos humanos sino de la Naturaleza, con el cuerpo caído de Dios transmutado a su perfección original.

«This entire theosophical scheme based on alchemical/paracelsian models was resolutely incarnational and anti-idealist,184 and can therefore be called “spiritual” only with reservations.» — con la reserva terminológica que impone: ese esquema teosófico es resueltamente encarnacional y antiidealista, y solo con reservas puede llamarse espiritual.

«Precisely this concept of nature as a spiritual body that could be transmuted into divine light made it highly attractive to eighteenth-century thinkers who rejected Enlightenment rationalism as a dualist heresy that pitted empty rational abstractions against an equally empty world of mere matter-in-motion.» — explica el atractivo de esa naturaleza como cuerpo espiritual transmutable para los pensadores del siglo XVIII que veían en el racionalismo ilustrado una herejía dualista.

«A much more convincing solution has been suggested, almost in passing, by Allen G. Debus in 1985.» — acredita a Allen G. Debus, casi de pasada en 1985, una solución mucho más convincente al problema de deslindar alquimia y química.

«Debus pointed out that whereas the French chemical textbooks of the seventeenth century paid scant attention to the historical backgrounds of their discipline, the Paracelsians and alchemists were marked by a strong interest in presenting themselves as the inheritors of an ancient and venerable tradition going back to Hermes Trismegistus, if not all the way to Adam.» — y expone en qué consiste: los manuales químicos franceses del siglo XVII apenas atendían a los antecedentes históricos de su disciplina, mientras paracelsianos y alquimistas se presentaban como herederos de una tradición antigua y venerable.

«Both were doing science, but they looked differently at what they were doing, and were perceived differently.» — con la formulación que evita el anacronismo: ambos hacían ciencia, pero miraban distinto lo que hacían y eran percibidos de otro modo.

«My suggestion is that, by and large, the former trend was discredited along with the general decline of the ancient wisdom narrative and was eventually rejected under the label of “alchemy,” while the latter trend developed into what we now recognize as “chemistry.”» — y su propia sugerencia sobre el reparto de nombres: la primera tendencia se desacreditó junto con el relato de la sabiduría antigua y acabó rechazada bajo la etiqueta alquimia, y la segunda se volvió lo que hoy llamamos química.

«Such a separation was all the more logical because, as explained by Robert Halleux, the basic assumptions of the former were becoming a serious obstacle from the perspective of the latter: the main point of experientia – that is to say, of putting the procedure into practice in the laboratory – consists in demonstrating to the operator that he has understood the art.» — recoge de Robert Halleux por qué la separación era lógica: el sentido de la experientia era demostrarle al operador que había entendido el arte.

«Here we touch upon the main weakness of alchemical experientia: reduced to the role of illustrating the theory, it never questions the correctness of the latter.» — sigue en la cita de Halleux la debilidad principal de esa experientia: reducida a ilustrar la teoría, nunca cuestiona su corrección.

«The Ancients are right, no matter what happens in the laboratory.» — con su remate, que los Antiguos tienen razón pase lo que pase en el laboratorio.

«William Newman and Lawrence Principe have emphasized the function of alchemical Decknamen and symbolic imagery, often derived from Greek mythology, as straightforward codes for technical recipes since the Middle Ages and through the early modern period.» — y consigna la posición de William Newman y Lawrence Principe sobre los Decknamen y la imaginería alquímica: códigos directos de recetas técnicas desde la Edad Media.

«The emphasis on secrecy led to a distinction between two basic styles of writing in chymical literature, much earlier than the terminological separation between alchemy and chemistry.» — data la partición entre dos estilos de escritura química mucho antes que la separación terminológica entre alquimia y química.

«But in this Art [of metallic transmutation] one does the complete opposite, for sometimes one has begun at the end & ended at the beginning, & all that with so little order that, not at all having determined what it is, they have driven their readers into despair about never understanding nothing of it.» — la queja de que en este arte se empieza por el final y se acaba por el principio, desesperando al lector, es de David de Planis Campy en 1633, citado.

«Remarkably, however, the idea that the transmission of secret knowledge required some kind of formal organization does not seem to have occurred to anyone before the early seventeenth century.» — señala como notable que a nadie se le ocurriera, antes del siglo XVII, que transmitir conocimiento secreto exigiera alguna organización formal.

«Already in this earliest instance, the knowledge was concerned with the secrets of nature studied by what was becoming known as the “occult” sciences.» — y precisa qué conocimiento era ese ya en el primer caso: los secretos de la naturaleza estudiados por lo que empezaba a llamarse ciencias ocultas.

«The fascinating question of when and where, exactly, the legend of a Rosicrucian brotherhood led to the emergence of actual Rosicrucian organizations can only be answered on the basis of precise archival researches and must be left here for specialists to decide.» — se abstiene sobre cuándo y dónde la leyenda rosacruz dio lugar a organizaciones reales: lo remite a investigación de archivo y a los especialistas.

«However, in a seminal study of 1988, David Stevenson has shown that the date of 1717 is “almost an irrelevance in the» — y recoge de David Stevenson, en un estudio de 1988, que la fecha de 1717 es casi irrelevante.

«They equate masonry with one of the seven liberal sciences or arts, that of geometry.» — reconstruye la leyenda del oficio masónico, que equipara la masonería con una de las siete artes liberales, la geometría.

«Jabal had inscribed the secrets of the art on a pillar that survived the great Flood and was discovered by Hermarius, a great-grandson of Moses and in fact none other than Hermes Trismegistus.» — con su eslabón hermético: los secretos del arte inscritos en un pilar que sobrevivió al Diluvio y hallados por Hermarius, bisnieto de Moisés y nada menos que Hermes Trismegisto.

«Abraham and his associate Euclid taught it to the Egyptians, and it eventually reached the Holy Land, where King David and his son Solomon used it to build the great temple of Jerusalem.» — y su tramo bíblico: Abraham y su asociado Euclides la enseñan a los egipcios y llega a Tierra Santa, donde David y Salomón la usan para el templo.

«Fanciful as these legendary histories might be, there was nothing extraordinary about them.» — advierte contra el asombro fácil ante esas historias legendarias: no tenían nada de extraordinario.

«The other crafts, too, used to claim supremacy by boasting of their great antiquity: in fact, another son of Lamech, Tubal-Cain, was often invoked» — porque los demás oficios reclamaban supremacía del mismo modo, jactándose de su gran antigüedad.

«This made it all the more natural that the craft got associated with the Rosicrucian brotherhood and its alchemical concerns, particularly as it began to accept “non-operative” masons (members who were not masonic craftsmen) during the seventeenth century.» — explica por qué el oficio acabó asociado a la hermandad rosacruz y a sus intereses alquímicos, sobre todo al empezar a admitir masones no operativos en el siglo XVII.

«Iudiciall Astrologie is the Key of Naturall Magick, and Naturall Magick the Doore that leads to [the] Blessed Stone.”» — la fórmula de la astrología judiciaria como llave de la magia natural y de esta como puerta a la piedra bendita es de Elias Ashmole, citado, a quien presenta como creyente típico en la unidad de las ciencias ocultas.

«Freemasonry was not originally the rationalist and humanitarian movement that it eventually became, at least in England.» — corrige la imagen recibida: la masonería no fue originalmente el movimiento racionalista y humanitario en que acabó convirtiéndose, al menos en Inglaterra.

«Since the Rosicrucians were believed to harbor the ancient and secret knowledge of the occult sciences, alchemy in particular, it was quite natural to have similar suspicions about the Freemasons.» — y explica la sospecha que recaía sobre ella: como se creía a los rosacruces depositarios del saber secreto de las ciencias ocultas, era natural sospechar lo mismo de los masones.

«In fact, if anything represented a departure from the tradition, it was the rationalist, humanitarian and deist outlook that came to dominate English Freemasonry.» — con la inversión que remata el argumento: si algo se apartó de la tradición fue justamente la mirada racionalista, humanitaria y deísta que llegó a dominar la masonería inglesa.

«English Freemasonry needed an impressive historical pedigree, but had apparently decided that it could dispense with a “hermetic” one.» — lee la operación de las Constituciones como decisión deliberada: la masonería inglesa necesitaba un linaje histórico imponente y decidió que podía prescindir de uno hermético.

«The implications of this novel idea were enormous, not least from a political perspective, for it implied that hidden (“occult”) conspiracies might be silently at work to subvert and overthrow the existing order – for good or evil, depending on one’s perspective.» — señala el alcance político de la idea nueva: que conspiraciones ocultas pudieran estar trabajando en silencio para subvertir el orden existente, para bien o para mal según quien mire.

«This thesis was taken up by Enlightenment thinkers as famous as Voltaire and Frederick the Great: “Jesus was in fact an Essene; he was imbued with the morality of the Essenes, which is much like Zeno’s.» — la identificación de Jesús como esenio imbuido de una moral parecida a la de Zenón es de Federico el Grande, citado.

«In the formulation of Andreas Riem in 1792, “Christianity is therefore really ‘Essaism,’ which retained its purity until Paul accepted the heathens into Christianity.”» — y la fórmula de que el cristianismo es en realidad esenismo, puro hasta que Pablo admitió a los gentiles, es de Andreas Riem en 1792.

«But non-masonic Enlightenment thinkers, too, began to look at the Essenes/Therapeutae as a secret brotherhood with enlightened ideals that had had its representatives everywhere.» — consigna que también pensadores ilustrados ajenos a la masonería empezaron a ver a esenios y terapeutas como hermandad secreta de ideales ilustrados presente en todas partes.

«The idea of the Essenes as a brotherhood devoted to a reasonable religion on deist foundations made them irresistible to English Freemasonry.» — y explica por qué resultaban irresistibles para la masonería inglesa: una hermandad dedicada a una religión razonable sobre fundamentos deístas.

«But to present Freemasonry convincingly as the inheritor of ancient initiatic orders, a large historical gap still needed to be bridged.» — nombra el problema que quedaba por resolver: para presentar la masonería como heredera de órdenes iniciáticas antiguas había que salvar un hueco histórico enorme.

«Since the Temple of Jerusalem plays such a central role in masonic symbolism, it cannot surprise that Freemasons developed a special interest in the chivalric Order that had been charged with its defense.» — y por qué los templarios lo llenaban: el Templo de Jerusalén es central en el simbolismo masónico y ellos fueron la orden encargada de defenderlo.

«As the Templars established themselves in the Holy Land, so it was argued, they had made contact with secret Essenian and Pythagorean traditions that had managed to survive there since antiquity.» — resume el argumento: instalados en Tierra Santa, los templarios habrían contactado tradiciones secretas esenias y pitagóricas sobrevivientes desde la antigüedad.

«In the oldest document about this legend, from around 1760, one reads that he passed them on to his cousin De Beaujeu, who passed them on to» — y data hacia 1760 el documento más antiguo de esa leyenda de transmisión.

«the Jesuit Abb´e Barruel was claiming in his famous M´emoires pour servir `a l’histoire du Jacobinisme (1798–1799) – which has been described as “the bible of the secret society mythology”246 – that the threat had indeed become a catastrophic reality with the French Revolution.» — data en 1798 las Mémoires del abate Barruel, descritas por otros como la biblia de la mitología de las sociedades secretas, donde la amenaza se declara consumada en la Revolución francesa.

«Ever since, conservatives of every ilk have been tempted to follow his lead in blaming the modern world and its democratic institutions on a demonic conspiracy of underground organizations.» — y traza su descendencia: desde entonces los conservadores de toda laya han caído en la tentación de culpar al mundo moderno y a sus instituciones democráticas de una conspiración demoníaca.

«With the increasing separation of Church and state during the nineteenth century, it became possible for such organizations to establish themselves as new religious movements in competition with the traditional ecclesiastical institutions.» — señala qué habilitó la separación decimonónica de Iglesia y Estado: que esas organizaciones pudieran establecerse como nuevos movimientos religiosos en competencia con las instituciones eclesiásticas.

«the announcement in the previous quotation that “the doors will open and the light will shine for all” clearly echoes the prophecy of the Rosicrucian Fama Fraternitatis that “a door will open for Europe,” leading to a “general reformation” of the world.» — y oye en el anuncio de que las puertas se abrirán y la luz brillará para todos el eco de la Fama Fraternitatis y su reformación general del mundo.

«However, two new paradigms emerged in the decades around 1700: a “religionist” approach grounded in the centrality of direct, unmediated, personal experience of the divine, and a skeptical Enlightenment alternative grounded in rationality and “sound judgment.”» — recapitula los dos paradigmas surgidos en las décadas en torno a 1700: el religionista, fundado en la experiencia directa e inmediata de lo divino, y la alternativa ilustrada escéptica, fundada en la racionalidad y el juicio sano.

«Both positions are ideological rather than empirical, and essentially non-historical: for the former, the centrality of religious experience makes the outcomes of historical criticism ultimately irrelevant to what religion is “really” all about, whereas the latter treats the historical currents and ideas with which we are concerned as non-historical universals of human thinking and behavior (“prejudice,” “superstition,” “foolishness,” or “stupidity”).» — y su objeción común: ambos son ideológicos antes que empíricos y esencialmente no históricos.

«In spite of their clearly non-historical assumptions – or perhaps, more worryingly, because of them – these new paradigms have both been remarkably successful in academic culture:» — con la observación que más le inquieta: pese a esos supuestos no históricos, o quizá por ellos, los dos paradigmas han tenido un éxito notable en la cultura académica.

«the Enlightenment paradigm has been dominant through the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, and we will see how important the religionist option would become particularly in the twentieth century.» — y su reparto en el tiempo: el paradigma ilustrado dominante en el siglo XIX y buena parte del XX, y el religionista cobrando importancia en el XX.

«Following the laws of supply and demand, it worked not just in favor of Enlightenment agendas, whether radical or moderate, but also led to an unprecedented wave of popular literature in the domains associated with “superstition,” “magic” and the “occult sciences.”» — señala el efecto no buscado de la revolución de los medios impresos: por oferta y demanda, benefició a las agendas ilustradas y a la vez desató una ola sin precedentes de literatura popular sobre superstición, magia y ciencias ocultas.

«It did not matter that many authors or compilers of such publications professed a wish to expose the dangers or stupidity of superstition, or just wanted to amuse their readers: regardless of their intentions, part of the public undoubtedly read them from a different perspective, and took an interest in these materials for their own sake.» — y advierte que la intención del autor no gobierna la lectura: aunque muchos compiladores dijeran querer exponer el peligro o la estupidez de la superstición, parte del público los leía desde otra perspectiva.

«All books of secrets, all those that are dealing with the Great Work, with mystical and kabbalistic science, are in great demand.» — la observación de que los libros de secretos y de ciencia mística y cabalística tienen gran demanda es de un observador francés de la época, citado.

«By 1825, Collin de Plancy could speak hyperbolically of “twenty thousand volumes” on such “bizarre matters,” and although most of it was little more, in his opinion, than “ridiculous heaps of extravagances, or imperfect compilations, or dry discussions without aim or coherence,”255 the important point is that there was a large market for them.» — y la cifra hiperbólica de veinte mil volúmenes sobre materias bizarras es de Collin de Plancy en 1825, que los tenía por montones ridículos de extravagancias.

«Most of those who catered to this demand were no longer intellectual professionals and academics but amateur scholars, or autodidacts.» — marca quién surtía esa demanda: ya no profesionales del intelecto ni académicos, sino eruditos aficionados y autodidactas.

«Most materials available in print during this period were lacking in any sense of historical criticism or scholarly contextualization, and these failings were matched by an increasing state of ignorance among professional scholars.» — y describe el círculo que se cierra: material impreso sin crítica histórica ni contextualización erudita, y un desconocimiento creciente entre los estudiosos profesionales.

«The author, a libertine and abb´e de salon,260 lived a short but troubled life: condemned to death, together with his sister and two brothers, for having murdered an uncle (in revenge for his murder of their father), he managed to avoid capture but was killed by a relative on the road to Lyon in 1673» — consigna la vida breve y agitada de Montfaucon de Villars, condenado a muerte con sus hermanos por matar a un tío en venganza y muerto por un pariente camino de Lyon.

«According to Paracelsus, this term stood for the ancient “ars caballistica”:» — y remite el término del título a Paracelso, para quien nombraba el antiguo ars caballistica.

«Note that these lines were written more than half a century after the Rosicrucian manifestoes, but still in a period from which we have no irrefutable evidence for the actual existence of such more or less organized circles concerned with alchemy and the “occult arts.”» — marca el límite documental del asunto: medio siglo después de los manifiestos rosacruces seguimos sin evidencia irrefutable de la existencia real de esos círculos organizados.

«The protagonist describes himself as a skeptic who is masquerading as an enthusiast to get himself admitted among these “elect” and satisfy his curiosity.» — describe la posición del protagonista de la novela, un escéptico que finge entusiasmo para ser admitido entre los elegidos y satisfacer su curiosidad.

«Of the several novels that he managed to publish in his lifetime, Comte de Gabalis was an instant hit.» — y el dato de recepción: entre las novelas que Montfaucon de Villars publicó en vida, el Comte de Gabalis fue un éxito inmediato.

«Very interestingly, the Comte de Gabalis appears to have adopted Cornelius Agrippa’s heretical belief that the Fall consisted in sexual intercourse,270 but with a novel twist:» — adjudica a la novela un préstamo herético de Cornelio Agripa, la Caída como acto sexual, con un giro nuevo.

«Great sages like Zoroaster were, in fact, such children born from the union of humans and elementals.» — y en la doctrina del personaje los grandes sabios como Zoroastro serían hijos de la unión entre humanos y elementales.

«The so-called “fallen angels” who fell in love with the daughters of man were really elementals, and superior children (“giants”) were born from their union.» — con su relectura de los ángeles caídos, que en el relato serían elementales enamorados de las hijas de los hombres.

«The stories of witches, the sabbath, and incubi and succubi having intercourse with human beings are tragic distortions of the marriages between elements and humans and their festive assemblies in honor of the “Sovereign Being.”» — y de la brujería, donde el sabbat y los íncubos serían distorsiones trágicas de esos matrimonios y de sus asambleas festivas.

«The elementals had also been behind the ancient pagan oracles; and the voice lamenting the death of the great god Pan, famously recorded in Plutarch’s Cessation of the Oracles, belonged to a sylph.» — la voz que lamenta la muerte del gran Pan en Plutarco pasa a ser, en el mismo relato, la de una sílfide.

«Alexander Pope took inspiration from this version for his Rape of the Lock, and intimated that the novel might be not just what it seemed: “both in its title and size [it] is so like a novel, that many of the fair sex have read it for one by mistake» — y el dato de recepción que añade Alexander Pope, que se inspiró en esa versión para su Rape of the Lock e insinuó que muchas lectoras la habían tomado por novela por error.

«It hinted at secret organizations (never referred to as Rosicrucian, but easily recognizable as such) focused on the occult practices of magic, astrology, alchemy, and contact with invisible spiritual beings.» — describe lo que la novela insinuaba: organizaciones secretas nunca llamadas rosacruces pero fácilmente reconocibles, centradas en magia, astrología, alquimia y trato con seres espirituales invisibles.

«At the core of these practices, it suggested, there was the prospect (in fact central to Agrippa’s occulta philosophia) of a profound spiritual transformation that reverses the effects of the Fall and makes it possible for man to regain the supra-human knowledge and power that had been his original birthright.» — y el núcleo que les atribuía, central en la filosofía oculta de Agripa: una transformación espiritual que revierte los efectos de la Caída y devuelve al hombre su saber y poder originales.

«The combination with Paracelsianism and the “occult sciences,” alchemy in particular, resulted in exactly the kind of “platonic-hermetic” religion that Colberg would attack in his foundational synthesis twenty years later.» — con la consecuencia histórica que le importa: esa combinación con el paracelsismo y las ciencias ocultas produjo justo la religión platónico-hermética que Colberg atacaría veinte años después.

«The Church had distorted the truth by turning the benevolent spirits of nature into evil demons, prohibiting any contact with them as pagan idolatry, and rejecting sex between humans and demons (incubi or succubi) as the non plus ultra of moral depravity.» — resume la acusación que la novela dirige a la Iglesia: haber convertido a los espíritus benévolos de la naturaleza en demonios malignos y prohibido todo trato con ellos como idolatría.

«But the Count of Gabalis defended exactly the opposite: he was denouncing “normal” sex as carnal practice that kept us in our fallen and sinful state, while praising “marriage” with the spirits of nature as the royal road towards spiritual regeneration.» — y su inversión moral: el sexo normal denunciado como práctica carnal que mantiene al hombre en estado caído, y el matrimonio con los espíritus de la naturaleza elogiado como vía regia de regeneración.

«We do not know whether Montfaucon de Villars just meant to write an amusing novel with a sexy theme, or may have had somewhat more serious intentions: his protagonist seems to hover between skepticism and credulity, and never clearly makes up his mind.» — se abstiene sobre la intención del autor: no sabemos si quiso solo una novela divertida de tema picante o algo más serio, y su protagonista nunca se decide entre escepticismo y credulidad.

«Felt claimed to be able to make the elementals visible by means of a “chemical and kabbalistic” process, and it was in response to this lecture that Colonel Olcott seems to have conceived the idea of founding a Society “for this kind of study.» — data en una conferencia sobre elementales el origen de la idea de fundar una sociedad para su estudio: la reacción del coronel Olcott al anuncio de Felt de volverlos visibles por un proceso químico y cabalístico.

«But for others, the presence of spiritual forces in the natural world inspired positive feelings of awe and wonder, and what they were afraid of was alienation: the emptiness of a world of mere matter in motion, wholly indifferent – as famously expressed by Pascal287 – to the thoughts, hopes, or feelings of human beings.» — describe el otro polo del ánimo cultural: para muchos la presencia de fuerzas espirituales en la naturaleza inspiraba asombro, y lo que temían era la alienación de un mundo de mera materia en movimiento.

«And this, too, is not magic as the credulous call it . . . It is but the science by which Nature can be controlled.» — la fórmula de que no es magia sino la ciencia con que se controla la Naturaleza es de Bulwer-Lytton en Zanoni, citada.

«If Montfaucon de Villars’ type of satire was just a bit too subtle to prevent such interpretations, there was nothing subtle about the intentions of its most famous counterpart: the History of the Extravagant Imaginations» — contrapone al tono sutil de Montfaucon de Villars la intención nada sutil de su contraparte más famosa, la Historia de las imaginaciones extravagantes.

«In spite of its satirical intentions, the former created a classic image of “the occult” as a mysterious science of transformation, practiced by “adepts” and focused on the hidden forces and spirits of nature;» — y consigna el efecto que la sátira produjo pese a sí misma: creó una imagen clásica de lo oculto como ciencia misteriosa de transformación practicada por adeptos.

«From the eighteenth century on, this development can be studied in a newly emerging genre of popular compendia intended to enlighten the masses about “the occult” and, eventually, similar reference works that no longer tried to warn the public but rather sought to provide information,» — data en el siglo XVIII el género de compendios populares sobre lo oculto, primero para ilustrar a las masas y luego para informar sin advertir.

«For example, Le Brun had originally been led to his investigations by an article on the dowsing rod in the Journal de Savans in 1700, and he discussed that topic through no fewer than seventeen chapters of his second volume, concluding that dowsing undoubtedly worked, but not by natural causes:» — y documenta la ambivalencia de Le Brun: dedicó diecisiete capítulos a la varilla de zahorí y concluyó que sin duda funcionaba, aunque no por causas naturales.

«For Le Brun himself, the “enchantment of the world” was evidently the very heart of superstition.» — con la fórmula que sintetiza su posición: para Le Brun el encantamiento del mundo era el corazón mismo de la superstición.

«Le Brun, the battle against “prejudice” in favor of “straight reason” implied an attack on the credulous belief in the ancient authorities that kept being quoted as historical sources:» — señala qué implicaba para Le Brun la batalla contra el prejuicio en favor de la recta razón: atacar la creencia crédula en las autoridades antiguas citadas como fuentes históricas.

«how unpleasant to be always obliged to defy the Compilators & the Historians who have had a reputation in the world,” he complained, and went on to quote Seneca: “to be a historian & a liar is almost the same thing.”» — y su queja, con la sentencia de Séneca que la remata sobre historiadores y mentirosos, va en cita del propio Le Brun.

«A certain De Saint-Andr´e, a medical consultant of King Louis XV of France, published his much noted “Letters on Magic” in 1725, and the abb´e Claude-Marie Guyon devoted the eighth volume of his Biblioth`eque Eccl´esiastique (1771) to the same domains, but although they were almost half a century apart, their approaches were still very similar.» — data las Cartas sobre la magia de De Saint-André en 1725 y el octavo volumen de la Bibliothèque Ecclésiastique del abate Guyon en 1771.

«Like Naud´e, De Saint-Andr´e and Guyon argued that many phenomena attributed to magic by the common people could in fact be explained by purely natural causes; but both made a point of emphasizing that supernatural causation and demonic intervention were nevertheless possible and real.» — y consigna lo que ambos comparten con Naudé: muchos fenómenos atribuidos a la magia se explican por causas naturales, y aun así la causación sobrenatural y la intervención demoníaca siguen siendo posibles y reales.

«Le Brun’s ambivalent attempts at using naturalist arguments within a general context dominated by traditional Christian demonology remained very much the norm in similar works during the rest of the century.» — describe la norma del siglo: intentos ambivalentes de argumentación naturalista dentro de un marco general dominado por la demonología cristiana tradicional.

«Interestingly, alchemy is absent entirely; and apart from their origin in the ancient Orient, there was no further attempt to place the various “superstitions” in any historical context.» — y releva dos ausencias en esos compendios: la alquimia falta del todo y no hay intento de situar históricamente las supersticiones más allá de su origen oriental.

«They differed from Le Brun in adopting Agrippa’s distinction between a pure and noble magic of the ancients that had only later degenerated into “criminal and condemnable” practices.» — marca dónde De Saint-André y Guyon se apartan de Le Brun: adoptan la distinción de Agripa entre una magia pura y noble de los antiguos y su degeneración posterior.

«Superstition, which attaches itself to all religions, always ends up destroying it. It, alone, reigns eternal; the centuries go by without enfeebling it, and time does not break its leaden scepter; it gains mastery over all hearts; and even he who no longer believes in God still believes in predictions and dreams.» — la imagen de la superstición como parásito perenne que reina eterno, y de quien ya no cree en Dios pero sigue creyendo en predicciones, es de Collin de Plancy, citada.

«Notwithstanding an explicit agenda of “exterminating” superstition by bringing its evils to light,310 most of the entries in Dictionnaire infernal just provided factual information, and it became an indispensable reference work.» — y observa la distancia entre programa y ejecución: pese a su agenda declarada de exterminar la superstición, casi todas las entradas del Dictionnaire infernal se limitaban a informar, y la obra se volvió referencia indispensable.

«Salverte has been hailed as an early pioneer of the “theorization of the occult sciences,”312 but this gives too much credit to his singularly muddleheaded discussions of badly digested bits of information.» — objeta que se salude a Eusèbe Salverte como pionero de la teorización de las ciencias ocultas: le parece demasiado crédito para discusiones singularmente confusas sobre información mal digerida.

«Those who studied the occult sciences deserve our respect, even though their ideas are false.» — y consigna su fórmula sobre el respeto debido a quienes estudiaron esas ciencias aunque sus ideas fueran falsas.

«Gnosticism is based upon a mixture of Christianity with “the dogmas of a high oriental kabbalah,” and their oriental cult was passed on by secret societies through the Middle Ages.» — resume la genealogía que esos compendios daban por buena: el gnosticismo como mezcla de cristianismo con dogmas de una alta cábala oriental, transmitida por sociedades secretas a lo largo de la Edad Media.

«In the country of the philosophes and the French Revolution, popular compendia of the occult tended to be somewhat more polemical in tone than across the Channel.» — y una diferencia nacional de tono: en el país de los philosophes y la Revolución los compendios populares de lo oculto tendían a ser más polémicos que del otro lado del Canal.

«The most prominent eighteenth-century author in this domain, Ebenezer Sibly, was even a convinced defender.» — con la excepción inglesa que nombra: Ebenezer Sibly, el autor más prominente del siglo XVIII en ese terreno, era además un defensor convencido.

«It could not make any claim to originality other than for its hand-tinted portraits of demons, but the book was a success.» — mide El Magus de Barrett sin concesiones: sin más originalidad que sus retratos coloreados a mano de demonios, y aun así un éxito.

«The purpose of his school was “to investigate the hidden treasures of Nature; to bring the Mind to a contemplation of the Eternal Wisdom; to promote the discovery of whatever may conduce to the perfection of Man . . . ”» — y cita el propósito declarado de su escuela, investigar los tesoros ocultos de la Naturaleza y llevar la mente a contemplar la Sabiduría Eterna.

«We know of only one student, a Dr. John Parkins, but for later occultists this was enough to imagine Barrett as an important link in the initiatic chain by which the occult sciences were supposed to have been handed down from the Renaissance through the “dark ages” of the early nineteenth century to the Victorian era.» — señala la desproporción entre el dato y la leyenda: se conoce a un solo alumno, y a los ocultistas posteriores les bastó para imaginar a Barrett como eslabón de la cadena iniciática.

«Given that fact, a critical or historical approach to the masses of derivative information on “occult” beliefs and practices was not just unnecessary but unwanted:» — explica por qué en ese mercado el enfoque crítico o histórico no solo era innecesario sino indeseado.

«It is true that, from time to time, he insinuates that this hermetic Philosophy is false, chimerical and ruinous.» — la observación de que Lenglet Dufresnoy insinúa a ratos la falsedad de la filosofía hermética es de reseñistas contemporáneos suyos, citados.

«But more often, he presents it to us as a sublime science, and as an admirable art, and the great work as something real.» — y de ellos también la contraparte: más a menudo la presenta como ciencia sublime y arte admirable, y la gran obra como algo real.

«The secret knowledge about it had been passed on from Hermes Trismegistus to the Druids, Gymnosophists, Magi, Chaldaeans, Homer, Thales, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and so on;» — reconstruye la cadena que esos autores trazaban: de Hermes Trismegisto a druidas, gimnosofistas, magos, caldeos, Homero, Tales, Orfeo y Pitágoras.

«It was therefore logical for them to develop a special interest in how those ancient secrets had been passed on through history, and their overviews could serve as a model for historiographies of “the occult.”» — y explica por qué esas visiones de conjunto pudieron servir de modelo a las historiografías de lo oculto.

«Masonic historiographies were similar in that they, too, liked to trace the secret knowledge to the Orient and as far back into history as possible,» — señala el parecido de las historiografías masónicas con las alquímicas: también rastreaban el saber secreto hasta Oriente y lo más atrás posible.

«As we have seen, the ancient Mysteries, the Pythagorean brotherhood, and the order of the Essenes were attractive candidates for the early period, followed by the Knights Templar for the Middle Ages and the transmission of masonic secrets from the Middle East to Europe, where the lineage was believed to have continued with the Rosicrucians and modern Freemasonry.» — y enumera los candidatos con que llenaban cada tramo: misterios antiguos, hermandad pitagórica y esenios para lo antiguo, templarios para la Edad Media.

«As more information became available about India and its religions since the early nineteenth century, it became possible for masonic authors to push the oriental origins of the order even further eastward; and as the antagonism between Freemasonry and Roman Catholicism (the Jesuit order in particular) grew stronger, the gnostic and Manichaean heretics moved increasingly into the picture as well: according to the logic of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend,” the more they were demonized by Catholics, the more attractive they were bound to become for masons.» — data en el siglo XIX el desplazamiento del origen aún más al este, a medida que llegaba información sobre la India y crecía el antagonismo con Roma.

«If the concept of “secret societies through the ages” had its origin in Freemasonic attempts to construct a pedigree for the Craft, it eventually got divorced from masonic agendas and developed into an autonomous sub-genre of its own.» — y traza la emancipación del género: nacido para dar linaje al oficio masónico, acabó divorciado de agendas masónicas y convertido en subgénero autónomo.

«Heckethorn – an English bibliophile, probably of Swiss descent, who earned his living as an estate agent339 – claimed that his own work began as a translation of de Castro, but had “speedily assumed a more independent form” as he decided to delete parts of the original and add many new sections to it.» — consigna el método de Heckethorn con sus propias palabras: su obra empezó como traducción de de Castro y pronto tomó forma más independiente, borrando partes y añadiendo secciones.

«Their relevance for our concerns consists mainly in the fact that such works added considerable plausibility to the general idea that “Western esotericism” could be described in terms of secret organizations or hidden brotherhoods.» — y su relevancia para el asunto del libro: esas obras dieron plausibilidad considerable a la idea de describir el esoterismo occidental como organizaciones secretas o hermandades ocultas.

«Outside the sphere of masonic publication, however, that idea remained no more than a vague suggestion at best,» — con el límite que le pone: fuera de la esfera masónica esa idea no pasó de sugerencia vaga.

«As described in Godwin’s groundbreaking study The Theosophical Enlightenment, occultism in the English-speaking world was very strongly indebted to an anti-Christian mythographical tradition grounded in the work of Enlightenment libertines, who had argued that religion had its origin not in divine revelation but in a “natural religion” of solar worship and phallicism.» — acredita a Joscelyn Godwin y su Theosophical Enlightenment la deuda del ocultismo anglófono con una tradición mitográfica anticristiana de libertinos ilustrados.

«If anything emerges with perfect clarity from the best-informed study of these milieus, Jean-Pierre Laurant’s L’´esot´erisme chr´etien en France au XIXe si`ecle, it is that French occultism was dominated by countless abb´es (pretended or real) and other Catholics who were trying to come to terms with the legacy of the Revolution and its sensationally successful assault on the traditional authority of “altar and throne.”» — y a Jean-Pierre Laurant el hallazgo sobre el otro lado del Canal: el ocultismo francés estaba dominado por incontables abates, fingidos o reales, y otros católicos.

«Their attitudes towards modernization and progress were of great complexity, and can by no means be characterized simply as “conservative” and “traditionalist,” but they all shared an obsessive nostalgia for the lost unity of a universal Tradition that had expressed itself by means of spiritual symbolism.» — advierte contra simplificar sus posiciones como conservadoras o tradicionalistas, y nombra lo único que compartían, una nostalgia obsesiva por la unidad perdida de una Tradición universal.

«His Histoire de la magie of 1860 is based (in spite of the title) upon a universalist understanding of “kabbalah,” presented as the key that unlocks the secrets of all religions and philosophies.» — y señala la discordancia entre el título y el contenido de la Histoire de la magie de Éliphas Lévi, de 1860, que descansa en una cábala universalista presentada como llave de todas las religiones.

«What makes L´evi’s work intellectually interesting is the fact that he does not present magic and kabbalah dualistically, as a counterculture against Christianity (let alone a “secret tradition” of initiates), but dialectically, as the hidden truth of Roman Catholicism which both reveals and conceals itself in the very coincidentia oppositorum of light and darkness.» — su lectura de Lévi, y lo que la hace interesante: no presenta magia y cábala como contracultura frente al cristianismo sino dialécticamente, como la verdad oculta del catolicismo romano.

«L´evi’s basic law of equilibrium (the law of two) implies, as he often repeats, that there can be no truth without error, no light without darkness, and no concept of God without a concept of Satan.» — expone la ley del equilibrio que Lévi repite: no hay verdad sin error, ni luz sin tinieblas, ni concepto de Dios sin concepto de Satán.

«L´evi supported this view by extensive quotations in French from Francesco Patrizi’s Magia philosophica (1593),353 which contains a Latin translation of the Chaldaean Oracles.» — y documenta la fuente de sus oráculos: citas extensas en francés de la Magia philosophica de Patrizi, de 1593, que contiene una traducción latina de los Oráculos Caldeos.

«From that moment on, the magic of the “ancient world” became obsolete: “a sad beauty spread over its dead remains . . . a cold beauty without life.”» — la sentencia de que sobre los restos muertos de la magia antigua se extendió una belleza triste y sin vida es de Lévi, citada.

«Henceforth Christianity became the legitimate carrier of the true kabbalah, and its survivals outside the Church, whether Jewish or pagan, lack such legitimacy.» — y su consecuencia doctrinal: el cristianismo pasa a ser el portador legítimo de la cábala verdadera, y sus supervivencias fuera de la Iglesia carecen de legitimidad.

«Considered as the perfect, realized and living expression of kabbalah, that is to say, of the ancient tradition, Christianity is still unknown, and that is why the kabbalistic and prophetic book of the Apocalypse remains unexplained.» — la afirmación de que el cristianismo, como expresión viva de la cábala, sigue siendo desconocido y por eso el Apocalipsis queda sin explicar, es también de Lévi.

«In other words: there is no such thing as a secret tradition of initiatic organizations, but there does exist a hidden, secret, “esoteric” dimension to the exoteric church,» — y Hanegraaff extrae la fórmula que corrige la imagen corriente: no hay tradición secreta de organizaciones iniciáticas, pero sí una dimensión oculta y esotérica de la iglesia exotérica.

«This is why his Histoire de la magie even contains several formal declarations of submission to the authority of the Church,» — con el dato que lo confirma: la Histoire de la magie contiene varias declaraciones formales de sumisión a la autoridad de la Iglesia.

«Waite seems to have had no antenna for the dialectical nature of L´evi’s thinking,» — objeta a Arthur Edward Waite no haber tenido antena para el carácter dialéctico del pensamiento de Lévi, y le adjudica haber legado una interpretación deformada a sus lectores.

«However, the underlying assumption that L´evi’s “magical” or “kabbalistic” beliefs had to be heretical from a Catholic perspective, thereby forcing him to make a choice, is unwarranted in view of our discussions in Chapter 1: these occultist beliefs might be perceived as incompatible with Christian orthodoxy by nineteenth-century outsiders, but we have seen that a Catholic like Constant, whose seminary training had made him familiar with patristic tradition, could provide excellent arguments for defending their orthodoxy.» — y desarma el supuesto de que esas creencias tuvieran que ser heréticas desde una perspectiva católica, con lo que la elección que se le atribuye a Lévi resulta injustificada.

«In the absence of any serious competitors, Waite’s prodigious output did make him the virtually unavoidable authority, until far into the twentieth century, for anybody who wished to place the various currents associated with “the occult” in some kind of historical framework.» — reconoce el efecto de la producción prodigiosa de Waite: a falta de competidores serios, fue la autoridad casi inevitable hasta bien entrado el siglo XX para quien quisiera un marco histórico de lo oculto.

«To assess Waite’s achievements fairly, one must recognize that his schooling was minimal, he never attended university, and had virtually no models or predecessors for his detailed historical studies in what he himself preferred to call “the Secret Tradition” of the West.» — y pide juzgarlo con justicia recordando sus condiciones: escolaridad mínima, sin universidad y sin modelos ni predecesores para sus estudios sobre lo que él llamaba la Tradición Secreta.

«Waite’s corrupt translations were used regularly by historians of science until the middle of [the twentieth] century, as witnessed by their frequent citation in articles in Ambix and Isis, as well as in scholarly books; some authors still continue to refer to them.» — documenta el alcance del daño: las traducciones corruptas de Waite fueron usadas con regularidad por historiadores de la ciencia hasta mediados del siglo XX, según muestran las citas en Ambix e Isis.

«It is not to the credit of Jewish scholarship that the works of the few writers who were really informed on the subject were never printed, and in some cases were not even recorded, since there was nobody to take an interest.» — y la contraparte del abandono en el estudio de la cábala, con el reproche de Gershom Scholem a que las obras de los pocos autores realmente informados nunca se imprimieran por falta de interés.

«After having known him for thirty-eight years, even his close friend Arthur Machen had to admit “I have not the faintest notion as to his real beliefs.”» — consigna el desconcierto de Arthur Machen, amigo de Waite durante treinta y ocho años, que confesaba no tener la menor idea de sus creencias reales.

«I believe to this day . . . that there is a Church behind the Church on a more inward plane of being; and that it is formed of those who have opened the iridescent shell of external doctrine and have found that which abides within it.» — y la profesión de fe de Waite en una Iglesia detrás de la Iglesia, en un plano más interior, va en su propia voz.

«At least in his mature years, Waite does not seem to have thought of the “Secret Tradition” as some esoteric school or initiatory organization.» — precisa cómo entendía Waite la Tradición Secreta al menos en su madurez: no como escuela esotérica ni organización iniciática.

«He referred to the latter category as the “Holy Assembly,” and saw it as working in a hidden, “inward” manner through historical traditions such as alchemy or kabbalah.» — sino como una Asamblea Santa que obraría de modo oculto e interior a través de tradiciones históricas como la alquimia o la cábala.

«Its basic assumption is that the term “esotericism” refers not primarily to initiatic organizations (although these may be included too), but to the “inner” spiritual dimensions that are believed to be discreetly present under the surface of “exoteric” traditions.» — y nombra el supuesto que de ahí se hereda: esoterismo referido no tanto a organizaciones iniciáticas como a dimensiones espirituales interiores presentes bajo la superficie de las tradiciones exotéricas.

«but although the quality of his work improved as he developed a more critical attitude in his later writings,371 he still failed to do so in a manner that could satisfy professionals.» — con el balance sobre Waite: su trabajo mejoró al volverse más crítico en los escritos tardíos y siguió sin alcanzar lo que los profesionales podían aceptar.

«That, however, means the disenchantment of the world.» — la sentencia sobre el desencantamiento del mundo es de Max Weber, citada.

«one can support his analysis without subscribing to a sui generis concept of “magic” as opposed to “science” or “religion.”» — y Hanegraaff marca su distancia: se puede sostener ese análisis sin suscribir un concepto sui generis de magia opuesta a la ciencia o a la religión.

«Modernization is therefore the key to understanding the emergence of Western esotericism (or whatever alternative term one might prefer) as a concept or a category in the study of Western culture.» — su tesis sobre el origen de la categoría: la modernización es la clave para entender la emergencia del esoterismo occidental como concepto en el estudio de la cultura occidental.

«This combination makes the domain nowadays known as “Western esotericism” into much more than just a collection of currents and ideas that happen to have been neglected or overlooked: rather, by being conceptualized as “the Other of science and rationality” it functions as the dark canvas of presumed backwardness, ignorance or irrationality that modernity needs in order to paint the outlines of its own identity in shining colors of light and truth.» — y su función, que excede el olvido: conceptualizado como el Otro de la ciencia y la racionalidad, funciona como el lienzo oscuro sobre el que se recorta la identidad presunta.

«For intellectuals of such a persuasion, it was obvious that disenchantment had turned the world into a spiritual Waste Land abandoned by the gods.» — describe la reacción que ese proceso provocó: para ciertos intelectuales el desencantamiento había convertido el mundo en una Tierra Baldía espiritual abandonada por los dioses.

«Thus the domain came to be dominated almost exclusively by amateur scholars and their popular writings for the general market, with predictably negative results as regards historical sophistication, critical analysis, and factual knowledge pure and simple.» — y su efecto sobre el saber: el dominio quedó casi por completo en manos de eruditos aficionados y su literatura popular, con resultados previsiblemente negativos en sofisticación histórica y conocimiento factual.

«It would take the better part of the twentieth century for this situation to improve.» — con el plazo que le pone a esa situación, buena parte del siglo XX para empezar a mejorar.

«This was the Satan of irresponsible dilettantism, who does not know the secret of construction, because he does not know the secret of destruction.» — el epígrafe sobre el Satán del diletantismo irresponsable, que ignora el secreto de la construcción por ignorar el de la destrucción, es de Gershom Scholem.

«Gemistos Plethon had expected the imminent restoration of an ancient and universal religion on Platonic Orientalist foundations,» — recuerda lo que Pletón esperaba, la restauración inminente de una religión antigua y universal sobre bases orientalistas platónicas.

«But nothing in their intellectual culture could have prepared them for the avalanche of unprecedented events and revolutions that was about to hit Europe instead,» — y lo que en cambio ocurrió, para lo que nada en su cultura intelectual podía prepararlos.

«During the three centuries after Ficino, radical reformers rejected the tradition of the Church itself and ended up destroying the unity of Western Christendom forever;» — enumera los tres siglos posteriores a Ficino: reformadores radicales que rechazaron la tradición de la Iglesia y destruyeron para siempre la unidad de la cristiandad occidental.

«All this happened because countless thinkers and activists were willing to attempt what no adherent of the ancient wisdom narrative could ever have considered:» — y nombra lo que ningún adherente del relato de la sabiduría antigua habría podido siquiera considerar.

«It is important to prevent misunderstandings about the nature of the relation between “tradition” and “innovation” in the context of Western esotericism.» — advierte contra los malentendidos sobre la relación entre tradición e innovación en el esoterismo occidental.

«Contrary to the stereotype that sees them as inherently static and “resistant to change” – a kind of insulated anomaly, somehow exempt from history and time – the various intellectual currents and practices associated with magic and the occult have always gone through processes of creative development, transformation, and innovation.» — y niega el estereotipo de corrientes estáticas y resistentes al cambio, una anomalía aislada exenta de la historia: las corrientes asociadas a la magia y lo oculto siempre pasaron por procesos de desarrollo creativo.

«However, no matter how creative their representatives may have been, they never saw themselves as making a new start and heading in an entirely new direction towards an unknown future.» — con el límite que les reconoce: por creativos que fueran, sus representantes nunca se vieron empezando de nuevo hacia un futuro desconocido.

«Jacob Thomasius was even more right than he probably realized himself: concepts of creatio ex nihilo have always been alien to Western esoteric modes of thought.» — y le concede a Jacob Thomasius más razón de la que él mismo sabía: los conceptos de creación desde la nada siempre fueron ajenos a los modos de pensar esotéricos occidentales.

«Although the author of this autobiographical fragment, Franz Anton Mesmer, is known as a man of the Enlightenment, the description makes him look rather like a Romantic visionary.» — observa que Mesmer, conocido como hombre de la Ilustración, se parece en su propio relato autobiográfico más bien a un visionario romántico.

«In Mesmer’s original approach, patients typically went through a violent “crisis” as part of the healing process; but one of his followers, the marquis de Puys´egur, developed a technique through which the patient fell into a peculiar trance» — y data en el marqués de Puységur la técnica que sustituyó la crisis violenta del método de Mesmer por un trance peculiar.

«The complicated further development of “mesmerism” and somnambulism has been documented extensively, and there is no longer any doubt about its key importance» — con su juicio sobre el estado de la cuestión: la importancia clave del mesmerismo y el sonambulismo está documentada extensamente y ya no admite duda.

«The basic concept was quickly adopted by a whole series of major authors, including Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Joseph Ennemoser, Johann Carl Passavant, Dietrich Georg Kieser, Carl Joseph Hieronymus Windischmann, and Justinus Kerner.» — enumera quiénes adoptaron enseguida ese concepto médico, de Schubert y Hegel a Ennemoser, Passavant, Kieser, Windischmann y Kerner.

«The cerebral system, associated with rational thinking and discursive language, is dominant during our waking life; but its ganglionic counterpart takes over when we fall asleep, and our soul then starts speaking to us in its own “hieroglyphic” and poetic language of images and symbols.» — describe el reparto entre los dos sistemas: el cerebral domina la vigilia con el pensamiento racional, y el ganglionar toma el relevo en el sueño, cuando el alma habla en lengua jeroglífica y poética de imágenes.

«Such abilities are, however, neither miraculous nor supernatural: they are natural human faculties, potentially available to us all.» — y consigna el estatuto que esa teoría daba a tales capacidades: ni milagrosas ni sobrenaturales, sino facultades humanas naturales potencialmente disponibles para todos.

«while the Enlightenment reduces everything to cold logic and discursive prose, its alternative expresses itself through profound symbols and poetic language.» — con la oposición estilística que la acompaña: la Ilustración reduciéndolo todo a lógica fría y prosa discursiva, y su alternativa expresándose en símbolos profundos y lenguaje poético.

«In other words: against the cold rational knowledge of the brain associated with the cerebral system, the German Romantic mesmerists highlighted the superior spiritual “knowledge of the heart” associated with its ganglionic counterpart.» — resume la jerarquía que proponían los mesmeristas románticos alemanes: contra el conocimiento racional frío del cerebro, un conocimiento espiritual superior del corazón.

«This knowledge included “paranormal” or clairvoyant perception, but went far beyond it to embrace metaphysical realms.» — que incluía la percepción clarividente y la excedía con mucho hacia lo metafísico.

«Following the micro/macrocosmic correspondence thinking of paracelsian and swedenborgian theory, the heart as the center of the human organism corresponded with the sun as the center of the solar system; and this center, in turn, corresponded with the unfathomable light of divinity at the heart of all creation.» — y su andamiaje de correspondencias micro y macrocósmicas, paracelsiano y swedenborgiano: el corazón al centro del organismo como el sol al centro del sistema, y este a su vez como la luz insondable de la divinidad.

«Anybody who accepted such an epistemological hierarchy was forced to rethink a whole series of dualisms constitutive of Enlightenment rationalism, as will be seen.» — señala lo que esa jerarquía epistemológica obligaba a hacer a quien la aceptara: repensar toda una serie de dualismos constitutivos del racionalismo ilustrado.

«for our present concerns, however, are the historiographical implications: anything that Enlightenment historiography had sought to consign to the waste-basket of history – magic, divination, clairvoyance, symbolism, the occult – now came to be perceived as manifestations of the soul and its hidden powers, and highlighted as central to the historical development of human culture!» — y sus implicaciones historiográficas: lo que la historiografía ilustrada había mandado al cesto —magia, adivinación, clarividencia, simbolismo, lo oculto— pasaba a leerse como manifestación del alma.

«At the same time, however, because anything pertaining to the soul was believed to be of universal and eternal validity, historicity and temporality themselves were downplayed in favor of timeless truths, and mere “external events” in favor of their “inner essence.”» — con el precio que eso traía: creído lo del alma de validez universal y eterna, la historicidad y la temporalidad quedaban rebajadas en favor de verdades intemporales y de esencias interiores.

«One can see this clearly, for example, in one of the earliest German Romantic authors who attempted to sketch a history of “magnetism,” Johann Carl Passavant.» — y lo documenta en Johann Carl Passavant, de los primeros románticos alemanes en esbozar una historia del magnetismo.

«Of the history of humanity we know almost nothing but the outer occurrence, the dead letter, the skeleton of times.» — la queja de que de la historia humana no sabemos sino el suceso externo, la letra muerta, el esqueleto de los tiempos, es de Passavant, citada.

«In what sounds like a far echo of Augustine he emphasized that Christianity “should not be seen as a new doctrine,” and hence cannot be compared with any other historical religion, but was the fullest and purest manifestation» — oye en Ennemoser un eco lejano de Agustín cuando sostiene que el cristianismo no debe verse como doctrina nueva y por eso no se compara con ninguna otra religión histórica.

«In sharp contrast with Enlightenment naturalism or positivism, however, Ennemoser’s Romantic/mesmerist Naturphilosophie was based upon a concept of “living nature”» — marca el contraste con el naturalismo ilustrado o positivista: la Naturphilosophie mesmerista de Ennemoser descansa en un concepto de naturaleza viva.

«He emphasized that these powers were neither supernatural nor demonic in origin, as claimed by traditional Christianity, but no superstitious illusions either, as claimed» — y sitúa esos poderes entre dos negaciones: ni sobrenaturales ni demoníacos como pretendía el cristianismo tradicional, ni ilusiones supersticiosas como pretendía el otro bando.

«Add to this the evident dependence of Romantic mesmerism and Naturphilosophie on the German traditions of Paracelsianism and Christian theosophy, and it is clear that in Ennemoser’s history» — señala la dependencia evidente del mesmerismo romántico y la Naturphilosophie respecto de las tradiciones alemanas del paracelsismo y la teosofía cristiana.

«although Ennemoser believes strongly in action at a distance and the power of mind over matter, and distinguishes between “visionary” (schauende) and “active” (wirkende) magic,32 he is ultimately most interested in magic as a means of achieving “higher (or deeper) knowledge” of the world.» — y precisa dónde está el interés último de Ennemoser: cree en la acción a distancia y distingue una magia visionaria de una activa, pero le importa sobre todo la magia como vía de conocimiento superior del mundo.

«The most ancient peoples were literally in an infantile state. Humanity still “hung on to nature by the umbilical cord and sat in the Creator’s lap”:37 it lived in a barely conscious, dreamlike state of innocence, intimately one with nature.» — la imagen de una humanidad antigua colgada de la naturaleza por el cordón umbilical y sentada en el regazo del Creador es de Ennemoser, citada.

«Ennemoser has to admit that there was also “superstition and idolatry,” but hardly dwells on it: “Faith, love and obedience were everywhere the pillars.”» — y consigna lo que Ennemoser admite de mala gana y despacha rápido, que también hubo superstición e idolatría, frente a su fórmula de que fe, amor y obediencia eran los pilares.

«Because Ennemoser sees magic as a universal phenomenon rooted in natural human abilities, he does not trace it back to Persia but emphasizes its presence throughout the ancient Orient, including India and China.» — explica una consecuencia de tener la magia por fenómeno universal arraigado en capacidades naturales: Ennemoser no la remonta a Persia sino que la ve en todo el Oriente antiguo, India y China incluidas.

«Ennemoser argues that the ancient forms of temple healing were based upon a “natural science” whose basic principles were the same as those of modern mesmerism.» — y su tesis sobre la curación en los templos antiguos, fundada en una ciencia natural de principios idénticos a los del mesmerismo moderno.

«Ennemoser’s leading metaphor is that of an individual’s life: humanity progresses from birth and childhood through adolescence to full maturity.» — nombra su metáfora rectora, la vida de un individuo: la humanidad progresa del nacimiento y la niñez a la madurez plena.

«He divides it into three parts: the “ancient world” (the Oriental peoples, the Egyptians, the Israelites), the world of the Greeks and Romans, and the “Germanic world” (from the ancient Germans and Nordic peoples through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, continuing into the present).» — con la partición en tres del recorrido: mundo antiguo, mundo grecorromano y mundo germánico desde los antiguos germanos hasta el presente.

«History then reveals itself as a deeply meaningful drama in several acts: it narrates the story of how, with many twists and turns, the inborn potential of human consciousness slowly but certainly comes to full realization, according to God’s providential design.» — y el sentido que le da al conjunto: un drama profundamente significativo en varios actos, donde el potencial innato de la consciencia humana se realiza según el designio providencial de Dios.

«All the other pagan peoples with their various religious systems are twigs torn off from the great tree of life: although they vegetate, they are capable of no inner development» — la imagen de los demás pueblos paganos como ramas arrancadas del gran árbol de la vida, que vegetan sin desarrollo interior, es de Ennemoser.

«The role of kabbalah in Ennemoser’s narrative remains somewhat unclear: he discusses it not in his chapter on “the Old Covenant” (which concentrates on dreams, visions, and trances in the Old Testament), but in the introductory parts of his book,48 and his understanding of the topic appears to be based entirely on Franz Joseph Molitor’s famous» — y se abstiene sobre el papel de la cábala en su relato, que declara poco claro, con el dato de dónde la trata y de dónde parece venirle su comprensión del asunto.

«The Jews, with their forward-looking mentality, developed a new kind of magic based upon a humble reliance on divine grace rather than the hubris of human autonomy.» — resume la excepción judía en el relato de Ennemoser: una magia nueva fundada en la confianza humilde en la gracia divina y no en la hybris de la autonomía humana.

«Since Ennemoser always emphasizes “inner” processes rather than external causality, it is easy for him to avoid a dependence of Judaism on pagan Egypt: although they spent so much time in that country, the Jews adopted very little of its magical traditions.» — y señala el recurso que le permite evitar la dependencia de Egipto: al acentuar siempre los procesos interiores por sobre la causalidad externa, los judíos habrían tomado muy poco de las tradiciones mágicas egipcias.

«In line with this source, Ennemoser hardly bothers to differentiate between Jewish and Christian manifestations: to explain what kabbalah is all about, he freely refers to such authorities as Reuchlin, Knorr von Rosenroth, Paracelsus, B¨ohme, Pordage, Pasqually, Saint-Martin, Henry More, Schelling, and von Baader.» — objeta que Ennemoser apenas distinga entre manifestaciones judías y cristianas de la cábala, y releva las autoridades que mezcla para explicarla, de Reuchlin y Knorr von Rosenroth a Böhme, Saint-Martin y Schelling.

«Ennemoser’s discussions of Greek culture demonstrate how strongly he associates the Greeks with myth, rather than with rational philosophy: for him, Greek culture is essentially “poetic,” which means that it is thoroughly “magical.”» — y muestra cuánto asocia Ennemoser a los griegos con el mito antes que con la filosofía racional: cultura esencialmente poética y por eso enteramente mágica.

«Only the faithful observer and worshipper of Nature, who traces her signs and listens to her voices, gets to know the hidden laws of Nature . . . while the rest of the world, as if half asleep, gets ever more alienated from the divine and sinks away in illusion and superstition.» — la fórmula de que solo el observador fiel de la Naturaleza conoce sus leyes ocultas mientras el resto del mundo se aliena de lo divino es de Ennemoser, citada.

«Flourishing in Alexandria, neoplatonic “eclecticism” was the essential medium through which all the magical traditions of the declining pagan world were transmitted to Christianity.» — consigna el papel que Ennemoser da al eclecticismo neoplatónico de Alejandría: medio esencial por el que las tradiciones mágicas del mundo pagano en declive pasaron al cristianismo.

«It is clear to Ennemoser that belief in witchcraft was a tragic mass delusion, and he does not want to spend much time on phenomena that may be associated with “magic” but cannot easily be interpreted in terms of magnetism, such as» — y su juicio sobre la brujería, que tiene por trágico delirio de masas y despacha rápido por no dejarse interpretar en clave magnética.

«Ennemoser ends his book with “the arch-magus in the true sense,” who has gained a deeper insight into “the life and spirit of humanity” than anyone else: the “true German» — con el remate del libro en el archimago en sentido verdadero, que habría alcanzado la comprensión más honda de la vida y el espíritu de la humanidad.

«The ancient Orient . . . appears to us, so to speak, as a living image of the primitive childhood of the past.» — y la imagen del Oriente antiguo como imagen viva de la infancia primitiva del pasado, en su propia voz.

«Ennemoser became one of the most frequently plagiarized sources of Helena P. Blavatsky’s Isis Unveiled: with no fewer than 107 passages, Emmette Coleman (“Sources of Madame Blavatsky’s Writings,” 356) ranked him second place, after the 134 passages» — cifra el saqueo que hizo Blavatsky en Isis Unveiled: 107 pasajes tomados de Ennemoser, según el recuento de Emmette Coleman, que lo ubica en segundo lugar.

«Along very similar lines as Ennemoser, he traced the history of magnetism a.k.a. magic from the Chaldaean Magi to Mesmer, but without the heavy evolutionist/providentialist slant.» — y sitúa a Kiesewetter en la misma línea, con la diferencia que sí importa: sin la fuerte inclinación evolucionista y providencialista de Ennemoser.

«Max Dessoir remembered him as a large bald man with a red face, who was “anything but an ascetic or navel-gazer” but, rather, “was living quite a wild life” and had no patience for pious upper-class ladies swooning over the occult:» — recoge el retrato que Max Dessoir dejó de Kiesewetter, hombre corpulento y de cara colorada, nada asceta ni contemplativo, sin paciencia para las damas de sociedad enamoradas de lo oculto.

«Remarkable about Kiesewetter is that he was faithful like a child when it came to ancient manuscripts, but a stubborn and mocking skeptic about reports from his own time» — y la asimetría que le llama la atención: crédulo como un niño ante los manuscritos antiguos y escéptico burlón ante los reportes de su propio tiempo.

«From such a perspective, “Western esotericism” was no longer understood in terms of a syncretism between pagan/platonic ideas and biblical Christianity, but as comprising the sum of historical evidence for the mysterious powers of nature and the human mind prematurely discarded by the Enlightenment.» — describe el cambio de definición que ese enfoque trae: el esoterismo occidental deja de entenderse como sincretismo entre lo pagano platónico y el cristianismo bíblico y pasa a ser la suma de evidencia sobre poderes misteriosos descartados prematuramente por la Ilustración.

«Both authors agreed that what mattered in history was not the dead letter but the living spirit, not outward doctrines but inward experience, not the knowledge of the brain but the knowledge of the heart.» — traza el paralelo entre Arnold y Ennemoser: para ambos lo que importa en la historia no es la letra muerta sino el espíritu vivo, no la doctrina externa sino la experiencia interior.

«Arnold argued that faith had nothing in common with reason; and similarly, Ennemoser saw no point in using the language of the brain to speak about the truths of the soul.» — con su correlato: como Arnold sostenía que la fe nada tiene en común con la razón, Ennemoser no veía sentido en hablar de las verdades del alma con el lenguaje del cerebro.

«Both authors would have readily agreed that when it comes to spiritual realities, critical debate is useless: there is simply no alternative to direct spiritual experience.» — y la consecuencia que ambos habrían suscrito: en materia espiritual el debate crítico es inútil y no hay alternativa a la experiencia directa.

«Arnold’s perspective had allowed for no real development of “Christianity” at all, because absolute truth has no history; Ennemoser, however, could claim that whereas the truths of nature and the soul were indeed eternal, man’s capacity to understand them had developed dramatically over the course of the centuries.» — marca dónde se separan: para Arnold la verdad absoluta no tiene historia y el cristianismo no se desarrolla, mientras Ennemoser podía sostener que lo eterno es la verdad y lo que se desarrolla es la capacidad humana de entenderla.

«Around 1930, a wealthy woman of Dutch descent, Olga Fr¨obe-Kapteyn (1881–1962), began organizing summer conferences in her beautiful villa in Ascona on the shore of the Lago Maggiore, Switzerland.» — data hacia 1930 el comienzo de las conferencias de verano que Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn organizaba en su villa de Ascona.

«Eranos meetings are still being organized today, by several competing organizations, but the original series came to an end in 1988, when Ritsema decided to abandon» — y precisa el estado del asunto: hay reuniones Eranos hasta hoy a cargo de organizaciones rivales, pero la serie original terminó en 1988.

«As a new development, the second, postwar period began by a broadening of scope, with the invitation of natural scientists such as the biologist Adolf Portmann and the physicist Erwin Schr¨odinger; but the heyday came in the 1950s and 1960s, when Eranos attracted a truly remarkable series of scholars of religion from all over the world, many of whom became celebrities.» — sitúa el apogeo de la posguerra en los años cincuenta y sesenta, tras una ampliación del espectro que invitó a científicos naturales como Adolf Portmann y Erwin Schrödinger.

«Formulated in the most general terms, a willingness to take myth and symbolism seriously and explore their relevance to history and modern culture is what the Eranos meetings were all about.» — define en términos generales de qué iba Eranos: la disposición a tomar en serio el mito y el simbolismo y explorar su relevancia para la historia y la cultura moderna.

«The core speakers of Eranos appear to have been animated by feelings of urgency and grave intellectual responsibility, occasionally leading even to a sense of messianic vocation to resolve “the crisis of the modern world.”» — describe el ánimo de sus oradores centrales, con urgencia y grave responsabilidad intelectual, y a veces con un sentido mesiánico de vocación para resolver la crisis del mundo moderno.

«Basic to the characteristic Eranos perspective, I suggest, was a conviction that the representatives of Enlightenment and positivism had committed a serious error of judgment in assuming that just by dumping “myth,” “magic,” or “the irrational” into the waste-basket of history, one could make them go away.» — y formula la convicción que él propone como básica de esa perspectiva: la Ilustración y el positivismo habrían errado gravemente al suponer que tirando el mito y lo irracional al cesto de la historia se los hacía desaparecer.

«On the collective as well as on the individual level, the “primitive” or “savage” energies of the unconscious psyche could be kept under the surface for some time, but their pent-up energy might erupt and wreak havoc again at any moment.» — expone la tesis junguiana correspondiente: las energías primitivas de la psique inconsciente pueden mantenerse bajo la superficie un tiempo, y su energía contenida puede estallar en cualquier momento.

«Some of Jung’s contemporaries, such as Ludwig Klages, Alfred Schuler, or Stefan George, in fact embraced such a prospect with enthusiasm, because they hated instrumental rationality and bourgeois society and hoped for its violent destruction.» — y consigna a quienes recibieron esa perspectiva con entusiasmo por razones opuestas: Ludwig Klages, Alfred Schuler y Stefan George, que odiaban la racionalidad instrumental y esperaban la destrucción violenta de la sociedad burguesa.

«neither the individual nor the collective was capable of living by “reason” alone.» — resume la premisa compartida: ni el individuo ni el colectivo son capaces de vivir solo de razón.

«At bottom, this is the question that animated the Eranos meetings and accounts for their remarkable coherence over more than half a century.» — y sitúa ahí la pregunta que animó los encuentros y explica su coherencia notable durante más de medio siglo.

«The neglect of this lineage in favor of a Freudocentric one has resulted, as Sonu Shamdasani puts it, in “nothing less than the complete mislocation of Jung and complex psychology in the intellectual history of the twentieth century.”» — la fórmula de que descuidar ese linaje en favor de uno freudocéntrico equivale a una completa dislocación de Jung en la historia intelectual del siglo XX es de Sonu Shamdasani, citada.

«If understood as a historical current that tried to demarcate itself from spiritualism (for example Pasi, “Occultism,” 1367), then Jung has very little to do with it.» — acota la etiqueta ocultismo aplicada a Jung: entendida como corriente histórica que se demarcaba del espiritismo, Jung tiene muy poco que ver con ella.

«In his acclaimed Discovery of the Unconscious (1970), Henri F. Ellenberger created the foundations for a more adequate historical contextualization of the Swiss psychologist and his work.» — data en 1970 el Discovery of the Unconscious de Henri Ellenberger como fundamento de una contextualización histórica más adecuada del psicólogo suizo.

«He showed that Jung must be seen as a “late offshoot of Romanticism” who “returns to the unaltered sources of psychiatric romanticism and philosophy of nature.”» — y cita su tesis: Jung como retoño tardío del romanticismo que vuelve a las fuentes inalteradas del romanticismo psiquiátrico y la filosofía de la naturaleza.

«Titled “On the Two Ways of Thinking,” it is based entirely upon the distinction of “daytime” and “nightside“ consciousness pioneered by Schubert, Kerner, and his contemporaries.» — señala que el texto de Jung sobre las dos maneras de pensar descansa por entero en la distinción entre conciencia diurna y nocturna acuñada por Schubert, Kerner y sus contemporáneos.

«Jung writes that the dreamlike and associative type was more prominent in antiquity, and resulted in mythology instead of science.» — y expone la tesis de Jung sobre ese tipo asociativo y onírico, más prominente en la antigüedad y productor de mitología en lugar de ciencia.

«The same type of thinking is known to all of us from childhood, and is equally typical of the “lower races, like the negroes.”» — la equiparación de ese modo de pensar con el de la infancia y con el de las razas inferiores es de Jung, citada; Hanegraaff la reproduce como dato del evolucionismo romántico que le adjudica.

«Unfortunately, Noll’s historical scholarship is simply discarded along with the “cult”-thesis by his critic Shamdasani, who refuses to even acknowledge his existence in his important Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology, and summarily dismisses his historical contributions, without arguments, in Cult Fictions, 7–8 and n. 20.» — objeta a Shamdasani haber descartado la erudición histórica de Richard Noll junto con su tesis de la secta, sin reconocer siquiera su existencia y sin argumentos.

«On the contrary: the growth towards maturity means that rational “daytime consciousness” emancipates itself from the dreamlike state of childhood, but this carries the risk of suppressing the latter rather than integrating it harmoniously.» — expone el elemento de innovación que sí le reconoce a Jung: la conciencia diurna racional se emancipa del estado onírico de la infancia con el riesgo de reprimirlo en vez de integrarlo.

«We know that Jung was familiar with the literature of German Romantic mesmerism from early on;98 but in spite of Ellenberger’s work, that intellectual milieu still seems terra incognita to most scholars of his oeuvre, and the connection has not been explored nearly as seriously as one might expect.» — y señala una laguna del campo: pese a Ellenberger, el medio del mesmerismo romántico alemán sigue siendo terra incognita para casi todos los estudiosos de Jung.

«The general assumption underlying this entire parallelism is a Romantic evolutionism extremely similar to Ennemoser’s.» — nombra el supuesto que sostiene ese paralelismo, un evolucionismo romántico extremadamente parecido al de Ennemoser.

«In both cases, human consciousness is seen as evolving through history from the “lower races” and cultures to the higher ones, and contemporary European/Germanic culture is believed to be its most advanced manifestation so far.» — y lo describe sin atenuantes: la conciencia humana evolucionando de las razas y culturas inferiores a las superiores, con la cultura europea y germánica contemporánea como su manifestación más avanzada.

«Jung believed that psychology should become the foundation of all other disciplines, including history: its role should be “to counter the fragmentation of the sciences, and to provide a basis for a synthesis of all knowledge.”» — consigna la ambición disciplinar de Jung, que la psicología fuera fundamento de todas las demás disciplinas, la historia incluida, y proveyera base para una síntesis de todo el saber.

«The German Romantic mesmerists insisted that they were exploring facts of consciousness (Thatsachen) that belonged to the natural order and had nothing to do with “miracles” or the supernatural.» — insiste en la autocomprensión de los mesmeristas románticos alemanes: exploraban hechos de la conciencia pertenecientes al orden natural, sin nada que ver con milagros ni con lo sobrenatural.

«Against the trend of increasing specialization, Eranos should be a platform for interdisciplinary collaboration paving the way for such a universal science of the soul.» — y el programa que de ahí se seguía para Eranos, plataforma de colaboración interdisciplinaria contra la especialización creciente, hacia una ciencia universal del alma.

«Both were concerned with studying the basic “facts of consciousness” empirically, in contemporary patients, and historically, by exploring the records of the past for evidence of the same types of phenomena and experiences.» — marca lo que Ennemoser y Jung tenían en común: estudiar empíricamente los hechos básicos de la conciencia en pacientes contemporáneos y en los registros del pasado.

«In both cases, the result was that everything that had been consigned to the waste-basket of history by the Enlightenment returned to center stage; but Ennemoser and Jung both argued that this domain should be understood in a new way, as a manifestation of the soul and its hidden powers, and should therefore be recognized as central to the historical development of human culture.» — con el efecto historiográfico compartido: lo desechado por la Ilustración vuelve al centro, pero entendido de otro modo, como manifestación del alma y de sus poderes ocultos.

«There are, however, at least two important differences between Jung and his German Romantic predecessors.» — y anuncia dos diferencias importantes entre Jung y sus predecesores románticos alemanes.

«First, Ennemoser’s story was typical of his time in that it was grafted upon a traditional concept of Christian salvation: he was thinking in terms of a providentialist Heilsgeschichte focused on Judaism as the central tradition of human evolution, culminating in the appearance of Christ as the pivotal event of history.» — la primera, que el relato de Ennemoser iba injertado en una historia de salvación cristiana, providencialista y centrada en el judaísmo como tradición central de la evolución humana.

«Jung, however, wanted an unbroken historical continuity from antiquity to his own time, and created one by postulating a lineage from gnosticism and neoplatonism through alchemy up to modern psychology:» — y la segunda, que Jung quería continuidad histórica ininterrumpida y la creó postulando un linaje del gnosticismo y el neoplatonismo por la alquimia hasta la psicología moderna.

«But when I began to understand alchemy, I realized that it represented the historical link with gnosticism, and that a continuity therefore existed between past and present.» — la declaración de haber entendido la alquimia como eslabón histórico con el gnosticismo es de Jung, citada.

«We must, however, be careful with this interpretation. There is no doubt that in his studies of alchemical symbolism, “Jung’s real concern was the transformation of the psyche,” but it is important not to confuse the two statements.» — introduce una distinción que pide no confundir: que el interés real de Jung fuera la transformación de la psique es indudable, y no es lo mismo que decirlo de la alquimia.

«The former amounts to a massive, and manifestly untenable, claim about alchemy as a historical phenomenon.» — porque lo segundo equivale a una afirmación masiva y manifiestamente insostenible sobre la alquimia como fenómeno histórico.

«Reacting to the enormous popularity of such interpretations in post-war Jungian milieus and alchemical scholarship, Principe and Newman have sharply criticized Jung for effectively writing laboratory alchemy out of the picture and claiming that “alchemy’s real concern was the transformation of the psyche.”» — y consigna la crítica de Lawrence Principe y William Newman a Jung por dejar fuera del cuadro la alquimia de laboratorio.

«It begins with a statement that is remarkably negative about the purely “spiritual” understanding of alchemical symbolism in the wake of Jacob B¨ohme:» — señala que el texto de Jung abre con una afirmación notablemente negativa sobre la comprensión puramente espiritual del simbolismo alquímico posterior a Böhme.

«Tilton points out that the “projection” of psychical contents onto the matter in the alembic was understood by Jung not as a conscious process, as assumed by Principe and Newman, but as an unconscious one.» — recoge de Hereward Tilton la precisión sobre qué entendía Jung por proyección de contenidos psíquicos en el alambique: un proceso inconsciente y no consciente, contra lo que suponen Principe y Newman.

«In other words, Jung calls purely “spiritual” alchemy a degenerate phenomenon! Further» — y su conclusión, dicha con signo de admiración: Jung llama fenómeno degenerado a la alquimia puramente espiritual.

«The decisive thing is, however, that we are dealing not at all [gar nicht], or at least for the greatest part not [wenigstens zum gr¨oßten Teil nicht] with chemical experiments, but probably [vermutlich] with something like psychic processes expressed» — la formulación alemana de Jung, con sus tres atenuantes dentro —gar nicht, wenigstens zum größten Teil nicht, vermutlich—, es la que Hanegraaff restituye contra la versión inglesa.

«Jung’s American audience was led astray by the defective English version; and» — y adjudica el malentendido a la traducción defectuosa que extravió al público estadounidense de Jung.

«the “spiritual alchemy” highlighted by Tilton was in fact dismissed by the Swiss psychologist as “bombastic” and “empty of content.”» — con el saldo de la corrección: la alquimia espiritual que Tilton destacaba fue descartada por el psicólogo suizo como bombástica y vacía de contenido.

«When we look at the history of humanity, we see only what happens on the outermost surface of events – and even that distorted by the turbid mirror of tradition.» — la sentencia de que al mirar la historia humana solo vemos la superficie de los sucesos, distorsionada por el espejo turbio de la tradición, es de Jung, citada.

«The great events of world history are, at bottom, profoundly unimportant.» — y sigue en la misma cita: los grandes acontecimientos de la historia universal son en el fondo profundamente irrelevantes.

«Of course, such a perspective condemns the specialized historian to the subservient role of providing the psychologist with data suitable for illustrating the dynamics of the unconscious:» — describe el papel subordinado que esa perspectiva reserva al historiador especializado, proveedor de datos para ilustrar la dinámica del inconsciente.

«the result is a “paintby-numbers history of religions,” as humorously formulated by Arthur McCalla, “in which [psychologists] provide the picture with its color-code and invite historians to sit quietly and color it in.”» — y la imagen de una historia de las religiones para colorear por números, con los psicólogos dando el código de color, es de Arthur McCalla, citado.

«The incompatibility of Jungian psychology with the most basic principles of historical research is acknowledged even by scholars who are otherwise sympathetic towards Jung’s work,124 and is hardly in need of further demonstration.» — sostiene que la incompatibilidad de la psicología junguiana con los principios básicos de la investigación histórica la reconocen incluso estudiosos simpatizantes de Jung.

«Academic study of the “occult sciences” had seemed all but dead by the end of the nineteenth century, but Jung’s psychology seemed capable of making the Waste Land revive, by causing “magic” and astrology to appear in a new light as well.» — y a la vez consigna por qué su obra pudo ser aire fresco: el estudio académico de las ciencias ocultas parecía muerto a fines del siglo XIX y su psicología parecía capaz de revivir la Tierra Baldía.

«Obviously this amounted to a systematic assault on the entire fabric of nineteenth-century positivism,130 and illustrates Jung’s ambition of setting up psychology as the master-science relevant not just to the humanities, but perhaps even to physics.» — lee la sincronicidad como asalto sistemático a todo el tejido del positivismo decimonónico, y como muestra de la ambición de Jung de erigir la psicología en ciencia maestra.

«Summing up: from the perspective of the academic study of “Western esotericism,” Jung’s essential contribution is that he took the basic idea (invented by German Romantic mesmerism, with Ennemoser as the paradigmatic example) of a history of the magical “nightside of nature” and its experiential manifestations, but repackaged it in modern psychological terms as the history of Western culture’s suppressed unconscious.» — y resume la contribución esencial de Jung para el estudio académico del esoterismo occidental: haber tomado la idea del lado nocturno de la naturaleza, inventada por el mesmerismo romántico alemán.

«The positive religions, particularly the monotheistic ones, are “external” products of time and historical circumstance – they have had a beginning, and will have an end – but underneath them, there has always been this permanent and universal substratum: a kind of objective paganism expressing itself by symbols and myths, and grounded in the universal human search for self-knowledge, or gnosis.» — expone el supuesto religionista sobre las religiones positivas: productos externos del tiempo con principio y fin, bajo los cuales habría un sustrato permanente y universal.

«The paradoxical nature of any such attempt is obvious; and at least in its more sophisticated representatives, this sometimes lends religionism a quality of intellectual daring bordering on the heroic.» — y reconoce lo que ese intento tiene de audaz: en sus representantes más sofisticados, la paradoja del religionismo raya en lo heroico.

«The relative emphasis placed on either temporality or eternity was, however, different with each of these scholars.» — marca las diferencias de acento entre esos estudiosos en cuanto al peso relativo de la temporalidad y la eternidad.

«True, history may at bottom be an illusion, but an illusion without which no perception of the essence is possible in time.» — la fórmula de que la historia puede ser en el fondo una ilusión, sin la cual ninguna percepción de la esencia es posible en el tiempo, va en cita de Scholem.

«But whereas colleagues with Christian backgrounds like Corbin or Eliade saw historical existence as a prison or nightmare and “historicism” as the enemy, for a Zionist Jew like Scholem such an attitude was impossible.» — contrapone las posiciones sin armonizarlas: colegas de formación cristiana como Corbin o Eliade veían la existencia histórica como prisión o pesadilla, y para un judío sionista como Scholem esa actitud era imposible.

«He was deeply convinced that the very identity of contemporary Judaism was determined “by historical consciousness, by the feeling of a continuity with the past and a common hope for the future,”134 and his understanding of history was therefore inseparable from a dimension of messianic expectation.» — porque Scholem tenía la identidad del judaísmo contemporáneo por determinada por la conciencia histórica y la continuidad con el pasado, inseparable de una expectativa mesiánica.

«But at the same time, the fact that eternity cannot appear in time means that the hope that sustains Jewish identity through history can only be called an “aspiration to the impossible.”» — con la tensión que eso deja abierta: si la eternidad no puede aparecer en el tiempo, la esperanza que sostiene la identidad judía solo puede llamarse aspiración a lo imposible.

«Under these conditions, the historian must have the courage to “descend into the abyss” of history, knowing that he might encounter nothing but himself, and guided by nothing but a desperate hope for the impossible: that against all human logic, the transcendent might inexplicably “break through into history” one day, like “a light that shines into it from altogether elsewhere.”» — y la exigencia que impone al historiador, descender al abismo de la historia sabiendo que puede no encontrar más que a sí mismo.

«It remains, nevertheless, that in his published writings he appears as the very model of a “historian’s historian,”140 and in this regard it would have made little difference if he had chosen never to reveal his personal hopes and motivations.» — y aun así, en sus escritos publicados Scholem aparece como el modelo mismo del historiador de los historiadores, sin que sus esperanzas personales cambien el resultado.

«Scholem is therefore best interpreted as a scholar who felt the temptation of religionism but resisted it, explicitly and largely successfully.» — su adjudicación sobre Scholem, con el matiz dentro: sintió la tentación del religionismo y la resistió, explícitamente y en buena medida con éxito.

«What it does mean is that he adopted the metaphysical perspective of his favorite authors as his own, and opposed it in the strongest possible wordings against the “disease,” “profanation,” “corruption,” even “satanic inversion” represented by historical reductionism.» — y su lectura opuesta de Corbin, que adoptó como propia la perspectiva metafísica de sus autores favoritos y opuso a la reducción histórica los términos más duros, enfermedad, profanación, corrupción, inversión satánica.

«This does not mean that he disregarded the study of primary sources: on the contrary, he spent his life studying the works of Suhraward¯ı, Ibn ‘Arabi and a range of other important Iranian theosophers in their original language, and his enormous contribution to the study of medieval Islamic mysticism is undisputed.» — aclara lo que eso no significa: Corbin dedicó su vida a estudiar en lengua original a Suhrawardī, Ibn Arabi y otros teósofos iraníes, con una contribución enorme.

«All this makes it pointless to judge Corbin’s work by the criteria of academic historiography: as Maria E. Subtelny bluntly puts it, he was simply “not interested in historical truth.”» — y por eso declara ocioso juzgar su obra con los criterios de la historiografía académica, con la sentencia de Maria E. Subtelny de que Corbin no estaba interesado en la verdad histórica.

«Corbin chose the narrow path of metaphysics, and accepted that this made him into an “occidental exile,”154 speaking on behalf of a spiritual world that had become alien and incomprehensible to practically all his contemporaries.» — describe el precio que Corbin aceptó al elegir la senda estrecha de la metafísica, la de un exiliado occidental que habla por un mundo espiritual vuelto ininteligible para sus contemporáneos.

«Living in this world, the “gnostic” is a “stranger” to it, because he has at least discovered the true nature of his condition, and knows that his true home is elsewhere.» — con la figura que la nombra: el gnóstico como extranjero en este mundo, que ha descubierto la naturaleza verdadera de su condición.

«He relied essentially on secondary sources to provide him with information on a wide variety of religious traditions, and his sympathizing ex-student Robert Ellwood describes him quite correctly as “not at heart a scholar, much less a politician or social scientist, but a litterateur, a writer and literary critic.”» — señala que Eliade se apoyaba en fuentes secundarias, y suscribe la descripción de su ex alumno Robert Ellwood: no un erudito de corazón sino un literato.

«It is therefore somewhat ironic – understandable though it may be, given the dominance of his “Chicago school” in the American study of religion, not to mention the posthumous scandal of his political past – that precisely Eliade’s oeuvre has become the focus of intense methodological debate in the study of religion.» — y registra la ironía de que sea justamente su obra la que ocupe el centro del debate metodológico, dada la dominancia de su escuela de Chicago y el escándalo póstumo de su pasado político.

«Rather than looking for an implicit method in Eliade’s writings, I believe it is more fruitful to emphasize the absence of method in his work.» — propone invertir la pregunta habitual: en vez de buscar un método implícito en Eliade, subrayar la ausencia de método en su obra.

«Temporary relief from this oppressive awareness was granted only by special moments of “grace”: evident models of what Eliade would later refer to as “hierophanies.”» — y sitúa el origen de sus hierofanías en momentos personales de gracia que le daban alivio temporal de una conciencia opresiva.

«The emotion that I felt then nailed me to the ground.» — la descripción de una emoción que lo clavó al suelo, en el cuarto cerrado de la casa de su infancia, es de Eliade, citada.

«scholars like Russell McCutcheon and Daniel Dubuisson have claimed that fascism and antisemitism are structurally encoded in Eliade’s scholarship.» — consigna la posición de Russell McCutcheon y Daniel Dubuisson, para quienes el fascismo y el antisemitismo están estructuralmente codificados en la erudición de Eliade.

«Whereas Corbin was inspired by very similar emotions and personal experiences165 but went on to embrace a consistent metaphysical worldview, I see no indication that Eliade ever did so.» — y marca su propia diferencia entre los dos casos: Corbin partió de emociones muy semejantes y abrazó una metafísica consistente, y de Eliade no ve indicio de que lo hiciera.

«He is a puer aeternus. He remains a child in aeternum: he participates in the atemporal beatitude of the Spirit, and not in the becoming of history”» — la figura del puer aeternus que participa de la beatitud atemporal del Espíritu y no del devenir de la historia va en cita ajena sobre Eliade.

«German Romantic culture always remained somewhat alien to him, but occultist authors played a role in awakening the youthful Eliade’s interest in comparative religion and the Orient, and convincing him of the reality of paranormal phenomena.» — consigna lo que Eliade sí debe a los autores ocultistas: despertaron su interés juvenil por la religión comparada y el Oriente y lo convencieron de la realidad de los fenómenos paranormales.

«This myth must be re-invigorated if life still has some meaning, if it still deserves to be lived.» — la exigencia de revigorizar el mito para que la vida conserve sentido va en cita de Eliade.

«But by far the most important “esoteric” factor in Eliade’s intellectual development was the Traditionalism of Ren´e Gu´enon, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, and Julius Evola.» — y adjudica al tradicionalismo de René Guénon, Coomaraswamy y Julius Evola el factor esotérico de lejos más importante en su desarrollo intelectual.

«Eliade’s brochure Alchimia asiatic˘a (1935) was “based upon one masteridea: alchemy is not a ‘proto-chemistry,’ it is not a ‘proto-science,’ but an autonomous spiritual discipline whose reasonings and goals have nothing to do with the intellectual instruments and the results of modern chemical experiments” (Turcanu, Mircea Eliade, 233).» — la idea maestra de su folleto de 1935, la alquimia como disciplina espiritual autónoma y no como protociencia, va en cita.

«Nevertheless, Eliade never became a convinced Traditionalist.» — y a la vez niega la conclusión fácil: Eliade nunca llegó a ser un tradicionalista convencido.

«He did not accept the notions of a “primordial tradition,” an initiatic transmission of traditional knowledge, and cyclical decline, and, most importantly, he interpreted Traditionalist beliefs not as metaphysical truths, but as expressions of the fundamental needs of homo religiosus: man’s (and Eliade’s) desire for unity and reintegration in the life of the cosmos, as an emotional response to the existential anguish of temporal being.» — enumera lo que no aceptó —tradición primordial, transmisión iniciática, declive cíclico— y lo decisivo, que leía esas creencias no como verdades metafísicas sino como expresiones de las necesidades del homo religiosus.

«They clearly answered a widely felt need for alternatives to the dominant trends of thought – notably, in Eliade’s own words, existentialist pessimism and “the chaos and meaninglessness of modern life”182 – and became essential parts of the Zeitgeist of the 1960s.» — explica el éxito por la demanda: respondían a una necesidad extendida de alternativas al pesimismo existencialista y al caos y sinsentido de la vida moderna, y se volvieron parte del Zeitgeist de los sesenta.

«Eliade’s books do seem to have been experienced as “therapeutic” by a wide postwar readership, including many academics.» — y observa que sus libros parecen haber sido vividos como terapéuticos por un público amplio de posguerra, académicos incluidos.

«This is how a range of basic assumptions originating in European interbellum scholarship on “myth” came to be accepted as a matter of course, not just by a wide international audience, but also by many of the scholars who, from the 1960s onwards, began to become interested in “hermetic” or “occult” traditions as an object of study.» — con el efecto que le importa: supuestos nacidos en la erudición europea de entreguerras sobre el mito pasaron a darse por descontados entre los estudiosos que desde los sesenta se interesaron por lo hermético.

«Prior to this, Scholem had been devoting his life to recovering the “esoteric” dimensions of Judaism, and from a very different perspective, Corbin had done the same for Islam;189 but perhaps surprisingly, a similar project focused on the third of the great scriptural religions, Christianity, had not taken shape, and began to emerge only during the 1970s in the work of Antoine Faivre.» — y registra la asimetría del campo: Scholem había recuperado las dimensiones esotéricas del judaísmo y Corbin las del islam, y un proyecto equivalente para el cristianismo faltaba.

«As pointed out by Moshe Idel, Scholem’s understanding was based upon the idea of a sharp antagonism between “a Kabbalistic mode of thought motivated by a mythical universe, and the ‘history-saturated’ consciousness of the rabbinic mind”;190 and, moreover, Scholem maintained that this mythical universe, deeply informed by the paganism of the ancient Near East, had entered Judaism “from outside,” so to speak, by way of gnosticism.» — recoge de Moshe Idel el supuesto de Scholem, un antagonismo agudo entre el modo cabalístico de pensar, movido por un universo mítico, y la conciencia saturada de historia de la mente rabínica.

«In short, Scholem saw Jewish “esotericism” as an eruption of mythical consciousness into the historical consciousness of rabbinic Judaism, triggered by contact with non-Jewish sources.» — y resume esa lectura: el esoterismo judío como irrupción de la conciencia mítica en la conciencia histórica del judaísmo rabínico, disparada por el contacto con fuentes no judías.

«This “inner” (“esoteric”) dimension was seen as the true secret – the “well of turbulent vitality” in Scholem’s words – of “outward” (“exoteric”) religion.» — nombra lo que esos estudiosos tenían por secreto verdadero de la religión exotérica, con el pozo de vitalidad turbulenta que es fórmula de Scholem.

«We will see that until the early 1990s, very much the same perspective dominated Antoine Faivre’s understanding of “esotericism” in Christian culture.» — y anuncia que la misma perspectiva dominó hasta comienzos de los noventa la comprensión que Antoine Faivre tenía del esoterismo en la cultura cristiana.

«Now, the problem is that such normative judgments may be appropriate for philosophers or theologians, but cannot be supported on the basis of historical evidence.» — formula su objeción de método: esos juicios normativos pueden convenirle a un filósofo o a un teólogo, pero no se sostienen sobre evidencia histórica.

«As pointed out by Steven Wasserstrom, in Scholem’s writings and, much more extremely, those of Corbin, the “esoteric” dimensions were promoted from a position of marginality to one of centrality with Judaism and Islam, at the expense of the purely doctrinal, legalistic, and other “exoteric” dimensions that have in fact dominated much of the beliefs and practices of ordinary Jews and Muslims.» — acredita a Steven Wasserstrom la observación de que en Scholem, y mucho más en Corbin, las dimensiones esotéricas pasaron de la marginalidad a la centralidad a costa de las doctrinales y legales.

«This emphasis is understandable as a reaction against the eclecticism of previous scholars, who had marginalized and suppressed “mysticism” as irrelevant to their ideas of “true” Judaism and Islam;196 but this does not make it any more correct as a general statement about those religions.» — entiende ese énfasis como reacción contra un eclecticismo previo que marginaba el misticismo, y aun así niega que eso lo vuelva correcto como afirmación general sobre esas religiones.

«But it is perhaps more correct that many scholars embraced it with enthusiasm, because at some level of consciousness they shared the dream of escaping from history.» — y arriesga una explicación de su acogida entusiasta: en algún nivel de conciencia, muchos estudiosos compartían el sueño de escapar de la historia.

«But we have seen that in the same period that saw the emergence of religionism, there also emerged a counter-paradigm based upon Enlightenment assumptions, which saw Reason as the universal yardstick for evaluating the truth or seriousness of any worldview.» — recuerda el contraparadigma nacido en el mismo periodo, fundado en supuestos ilustrados, con la Razón como vara universal para medir cualquier visión del mundo.

«Such essentialism is a belief, not a fact of history.» — con la frase que resume su objeción a ambos esencialismos: es una creencia, no un hecho de la historia.

«they no longer needed to be discussed as traditions (“platonism,” “hermeticism,” even “paganism”), but could be dismissed as synonymous with irrationality as such.» — y describe el efecto de esa reducción: ya no había que discutir tradiciones como platonismo, hermetismo o paganismo, bastaba despacharlas como sinónimo de irracionalidad.

«Georg Luk´acs developed the basic argument about “irrationalism” and fascism in his classic study Die Zerst¨orung der Vernunft, based upon the Marxist adaptation of Hegelian belief in an inseparable connection between Reason and historical progress.» — data en Die Zerstörung der Vernunft de Georg Lukács el argumento básico sobre irracionalismo y fascismo, sobre la adaptación marxista de la creencia hegeliana en el vínculo entre Razón y progreso histórico.

«In the wake of Luk´acs, Horkheimer, and Adorno, these basic assumptions became a dominant factor in the thinking of left-leaning intellectuals and academics after World War II; and particularly in Germany, the result was a virtual taboo on the study of anything related to esotericism or the occult, except of course from a perspective of Ideologiekritik.» — y su efecto institucional en Alemania tras la guerra: un tabú virtual sobre el estudio de cualquier cosa relacionada con el esoterismo o lo oculto.

«Most of the critical attacks on Eranos by academics have been inspired, directly or indirectly, by these assumptions typical of Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School;203 and many scholars of Western esotericism have, at some point in their career, been forced to defend themselves against the suspicion of holding far-right sympathies.» — con la consecuencia personal que consigna para su propio gremio: muchos estudiosos del esoterismo occidental han tenido que defenderse en algún momento de la sospecha que esos supuestos generan.

«But fortunately, it had not vanished for good.» — y la frase con que cierra el diagnóstico del eclipse: por fortuna, el campo no había desaparecido para siempre.

«However, research of a similar kind focused on the period after antiquity developed only piecemeal and gradually; and with the notable exception of historically corrupt overviews for the general market written by esoteric or occultist authors, mostly of French provenance,206 comprehensive or synthetic works remained rare.» — describe el estado de la investigación posterior a la antigüedad: desarrollo gradual y a pedazos, con visiones de conjunto escritas para el mercado general por autores esotéricos u ocultistas, históricamente corruptas.

«None of his works were translated, and he left no pupils to continue his approach, so that his oeuvre has remained an isolated phenomenon in spite of its pioneering importance.» — explica por qué la obra de Peuckert quedó aislada pese a su importancia pionera: ninguna traducción y ningún discípulo que continuara su enfoque.

«The magical worldview described in Pansophie and Gabalia is seen as organically rooted in the rural Middle Ages, and Peuckert wants to show that, far from simply declining or vanishing in the face of modernity, “only now, stirred by some impulse, it unfolded its most seductive blossom . . . [F]rom this ‘decay,’ there emerged an unheard-of world that still remains wholly unknown to us.”» — resume la tesis de Pansophie: lejos de declinar ante la modernidad, esa visión mágica del mundo desplegó justo entonces su flor más seductora.

«He did so with an infectious enthusiasm and very impressive erudition, and his books remain a pleasure to read for those who can appreciate his inimitable style of writing; but although Peuckert became» — y elogia su erudición y su estilo inimitable, que hacen de sus libros un placer para quien pueda apreciarlo.

«One may reasonably assume that this had to do with the virtual taboo on such areas of research in Germany after World War II, to which I referred earlier.» — con una conjetura declarada como tal sobre por qué no dejó escuela: cabe suponer que tuvo que ver con el tabú alemán de posguerra sobre esas áreas.

«The American historian Lynn Thorndike (1882–1965) devoted his life to exploring the role of “magic” in the intellectual history of Europe, starting with his dissertation defended at Columbia University in 1905,217 at the age of twenty-three, and culminating in the monumental eight-volume work known as A History of Magic and Experimental Science, published between 1923 and 1958.» — data en 1905 la tesis doctoral de Lynn Thorndike en Columbia, a los veintitrés años, y en su obra monumental de ocho volúmenes la culminación de una vida dedicada al papel de la magia en la historia intelectual europea.

«Peuckert described pansophy as a quintessentially German perspective ultimately grounded in the platonic notion, as expounded by Ficino, of the two “wings of the soul”» — y consigna cómo describía Peuckert la pansofía: una perspectiva quintaesencialmente alemana fundada en la noción platónica, expuesta por Ficino, de las dos alas del alma.

«In spite of its obvious contribution to scholarship, Thorndike’s work was initially received with considerable harshness, even hostility, from the direction of classical philology and history of science.» — registra la acogida inicial de la obra de Thorndike, dura y aun hostil desde la filología clásica y la historia de la ciencia.

«Sarton emphasized (italics in the original) that “science is essentially a cumulative, a progressive activity,” characterized by rationality and skepticism.» — la definición de la ciencia como actividad esencialmente acumulativa y progresiva, con las cursivas en el original, es de George Sarton.

«Magic was presented as its radical opposite: “[o]ne irrational idea is as good as another.» — y de Sarton también la contraparte, que en la magia una idea irracional vale tanto como otra.

«Sarton’s formulation, science is essentially progressive, while magic is essentially conservative.» — con su formulación central: la ciencia esencialmente progresiva, la magia esencialmente conservadora.

«There can be no compromise between them; they cannot possibly walk together – for one is going forwards, and the other backwards.» — y su conclusión de que no cabe compromiso alguno entre ambas, porque una va hacia adelante y la otra hacia atrás.

«at one point, Sarton describes the history of science as “a growing light eating up the darkness”» — consigna además la imagen con que Sarton describe la historia de la ciencia, una luz creciente que devora la oscuridad.

«the very distinction between magic and experimental science no longer appeared to be so clearcut.» — y anota el desenlace historiográfico, que la distinción misma entre magia y ciencia experimental dejó de parecer tan nítida.

«the Middle Ages could no longer be seen as an age of darkness and decline into superstition and ignorance» — junto con la caída de la Edad Media como era de oscuridad y declive hacia la superstición.

«Thorndike was thinking not as a partisan of modern science, but as an intellectual historian interested in contextuality and complexity.» — marca desde dónde pensaba Thorndike: no como partidario de la ciencia moderna sino como historiador intelectual interesado en la contextualidad y la complejidad.

«His job, as he saw it, was not that of protecting the project of modernity and progress against the perceived specter of irrationalism or superstition, or engaging in “hero worship or debunking,”236 but simply that of trying to describe and interpret the past as faithfully as possible:» — y cómo entendía su oficio: ni proteger el proyecto de la modernidad del espectro del irracionalismo ni entregarse al culto del héroe o al desenmascaramiento, sino describir e interpretar el pasado con la mayor fidelidad.

«We would not credit it with the least particle of modern science that does not belong to it, nor would we deprive it of any of that magic which constitutes in no small measure its peculiar charm.» — la declaración de no acreditarle al pasado ni una partícula de ciencia moderna que no le pertenezca, ni privarlo de la magia que constituye su encanto peculiar, es de Thorndike.

«Thorndike emphasized the inherent conservatism of human thought: “Even the most intellectual men seem to have a limited number of ideas, just as humanity has a limited number of domesticated animals.» — y de Thorndike también la tesis sobre el conservadurismo inherente del pensamiento humano, con su símil de los animales domesticados.

«If Sarton was thinking like a gardener, then, Thorndike was thinking like a biologist.» — resume la diferencia entre ambos con una imagen: Sarton pensaba como jardinero y Thorndike como biólogo.

«With the famous studies published by Frances A. Yates in the 1960s and 1970s, such interpretations were no longer possible.» — y data en los estudios de Frances Yates de los años sesenta y setenta el momento en que esas interpretaciones dejaron de ser posibles.

«Contrary to Thorndike, Yates was quite traditional in pitting the Middle Ages as a period of darkness and stagnation against the Renaissance as an age of light and progress that led the way towards the momentous rise of “genuine science” in the seventeenth century.» — señala lo tradicional que era Yates en un punto: oponía la Edad Media oscura y estancada al Renacimiento como edad de luz y progreso.

«However, instead of simply associating the former period with magic and the latter with reason and science, she made the surprising move of applying the contrast to magic itself: far from being static and “resistant to change,” magic was capable of creative renewal and reform, and Yates even went as far as to suggest that it might be the real key to the phenomenon of the Italian Renaissance» — y su movimiento sorprendente, aplicar ese contraste a la magia misma: capaz de renovación creativa y de reforma en vez de estática y resistente al cambio.

«Such an approach implied that magic was an intellectual tradition in its own right, capable of historical change and development, even progress, and possibly leading towards “genuine” science: a revolutionary notion that must surely have caused scholars like Sarton to turn in their graves.» — con la consecuencia que llama revolucionaria: la magia como tradición intelectual por derecho propio, capaz de cambio, desarrollo y hasta de progreso hacia la ciencia genuina.

«As regards her central interests, Frances Yates was essentially self-educated, and this helps explain her remarkable independence of mind, her willingness to explore unconventional pathways of research, and her lifelong refusal to be intimidated by established disciplinary boundaries.» — y explica la independencia de Yates por su formación: esencialmente autodidacta en sus intereses centrales, sin dejarse intimidar por las fronteras disciplinarias establecidas.

«For her, the new “Warburgian history” meant “history in the round, encyclopedic history, the history of symbolism and imagery integrated with general history,”253 but such a degree of interdisciplinarity was still very uncommon at the time.» — consigna qué entendía ella por la nueva historia warburgiana, una historia en redondo y enciclopédica que integra el simbolismo con la historia general, entonces muy poco común.

«Yates had been fascinated by Giordano Bruno’s Cena de le ceneri since the mid-1930s, but always felt that “some major clue was missing.”» — y su propio testimonio de que llevaba desde los años treinta con Bruno sintiendo que le faltaba alguna clave mayor.

«Yates’ prose was bubbling with almost childlike enthusiasm and excitement, but somehow managed to combine this with a tone of quiet authority that commanded respect for the opinions of what was obviously a very experienced scholar.» — describe el efecto de su prosa, con entusiasmo casi infantil combinado con un tono de autoridad tranquila.

«We have seen that this implication had already been a source of deep worry for Sarton in his review of Thorndike; and since the 1960s it became a major issue not only due to Frances Yates’ work, but also because it was becoming impossible to ignore the importance of “hermetic” currents such as the prisca theologia and alchemy in the oeuvre of Isaac Newton.» — y sitúa el debate que se abre: la implicación que ya inquietaba a Sarton se vuelve asunto mayor desde los sesenta, no solo por Yates.

«I am not an alchemist, nor do I believe in its premises . . . Nevertheless, I have undertaken to write a biography of Newton, and my personal preferences cannot make more than a million words he wrote in the study of alchemy disappear”» — la declaración de no ser alquimista ni creer en sus premisas, y de que las preferencias personales no hacen desaparecer el millón de palabras que Newton escribió sobre alquimia, es de Richard Westfall.

«Not only did Yates “destroy whole categories of analysis,” then, but she created new ones as well.» — su balance sobre Yates: no solo destruyó categorías enteras de análisis, también creó otras nuevas.

«It was only now, after several centuries of oblivion and neglect by the intellectual and academic establishment, that the forgotten counterculture of the West had been rediscovered at last, thanks to the researches of an academic outsider.» — reconstruye el atractivo de ese relato: una contracultura olvidada de Occidente redescubierta al fin, tras siglos de olvido, por una outsider de la academia.

«The message was clear: Yates’ master-narrative appeared to expose mainstream accounts of science and progress as ideological constructs by means of which the establishment had attempted, and was still attempting, to suppress and silence its rivals.» — con el mensaje que sus lectores leyeron en él: los relatos dominantes sobre ciencia y progreso quedaban expuestos como construcciones ideológicas para silenciar a los rivales.

«For many of Yates’ readers, moreover, the step from rediscovery to restoration was easy to make: the hermeticists of the seventeenth century might have lost the battle against establishment religion and science, but perhaps their contemporary heirs could get it right!» — y el paso siguiente que muchos dieron con facilidad, del redescubrimiento a la restauración: quizá los herederos contemporáneos sí lo lograrían.

«If the new generation was calling for a “re-enchantment of the world,” then Frances Yates’ Hermetic Tradition provided an excellent model.» — señala el encaje con la demanda de la época: para una generación que pedía un reencantamiento del mundo, la Tradición Hermética de Yates ofrecía un modelo excelente.

«Kristeller had come to the realization that the great importance of the Corpus Hermeticum to Marsilio Ficino and to Renaissance culture in general had been sorely neglected by historians.» — y devuelve a Kristeller la constatación previa, que los historiadores habían descuidado gravemente la importancia del Corpus Hermeticum para Ficino y para la cultura renacentista.

«As concluded by Hilary Gatti, what made her book “in some way canonical for the English-speaking world” was therefore not so much the originality of this story as the “remarkable stylistic tour the force” by which she succeeded in making it available “in a language that avoided the dryness and tedium of so much academic prose.”» — con la conclusión de Hilary Gatti sobre qué volvió canónico su libro en el mundo anglófono: no tanto la originalidad del relato como el notable tour de force estilístico.

«Although he recognized the differences between the “philosophical” and “technical” Hermetica, Garin saw them as sharing the same animated universe in which all things were interconnected by means of correspondences:» — reconstruye el paso de Garin: reconocía la diferencia entre los Hermetica filosóficos y los técnicos y aun así los veía compartiendo un mismo universo animado de correspondencias.

«Now, if one may draw a clear distinction between the Pimander, the Asclepius, and the theological writings on the one hand, and the innumerable magical-alchemical treatises on the other, one still must not forget the subtle and profound subterranean connection that unites the former to the occultist, astrological, and alchemical tradition of the latter.» — la advertencia sobre la conexión subterránea sutil y profunda que uniría el Pimander y el Asclepius con los tratados mágico-alquímicos es de Garin, citada.

«Although Garin had planted the seeds of this phenomenon himself, he was right to call for caution and emphasize the need for terminological precision.» — y le concede razón en su reclamo de cautela y precisión terminológica, aunque él mismo hubiera sembrado el fenómeno.

«In all these [i.e. Yates’] works the notion of “Hermetic Tradition” tends to be broadened enormously, to the extent of becoming both all-encompassing and elusive.» — objeta que en la obra de Yates la noción de Tradición Hermética se ensancha hasta volverse a la vez omniabarcante y escurridiza.

«First of all, we have seen that Hermes Trismegistus was only one among a whole series of oriental sages who were important within the ancient wisdom discourse of the Renaissance.» — con su primer argumento: Hermes Trismegisto era solo uno más entre una serie de sabios orientales importantes en el discurso renacentista de la sabiduría antigua.

«If one were to name the various ancient wisdom narratives after the wise man who was believed to be at their origin, then Plethon and Ficino were clearly defending not a Hermetic but a “Zoroastrian” Tradition, and Pico a “Mosaic” one.» — y su consecuencia burlona pero precisa: nombradas por su sabio de origen, Pletón y Ficino defendían una tradición zoroástrica y Pico una mosaica, no una hermética.

«Yates must have realized that the case of Lazzarelli messed up her narrative of what “hermeticism” should be: hermetic as he might be, his work had nothing to do» — señala que el caso de Lazzarelli desbarataba el relato de Yates, hermético como era y ajeno a lo que ella entendía por hermetismo.

«These facts lead to an unavoidable conclusion: while the history of the reception of the Hermetica in the Renaissance remains as important as ever, Frances Yates’ concept of a “Hermetic Tradition” is simply impossible to uphold.» — y formula la conclusión que llama inevitable: la historia de la recepción de los Hermetica sigue siendo importantísima y el concepto de Tradición Hermética de Yates es sencillamente insostenible.

«The notorious “god-making passages” of the Asclepius on which Yates built most of her narrative (see n. 285, below) were central to Lazzarelli as well; but he interpreted them allegorically as referring to the ability of spiritually regenerated man to literally participate in God’s creative powers.» — con el ejemplo que lo muestra: los pasajes de fabricación de dioses del Asclepius, centrales también para Lazzarelli, que él interpretaba alegóricamente como participación del hombre regenerado en los poderes creadores de Dios.

«Yates realized that she could not ignore Agrippa in a book on Renaissance magic, but although she devoted a whole chapter to him, she did so with obvious distaste (see above, n. 244).» — y una observación sobre el gusto de Yates: dedicó a Agripa un capítulo entero con evidente disgusto, porque no podía ignorarlo en un libro sobre magia renacentista.

«Regretfully, then, we must say goodbye to the grand narrative of “the Hermetic Tradition” created by Frances Yates.» — despide el gran relato con pesar declarado, no con celebración.

«It must be emphasized that all the elements that she managed to place back on the agenda of international scholarship were important indeed and remain of the greatest interest to historians:» — y subraya lo que sí queda en pie: todos los elementos que Yates devolvió a la agenda de la erudición internacional eran importantes y siguen siendo del mayor interés.

«One can only conclude that Westman had not actually looked at this “concrete textual locus” but took Yates at her word.» — y una objeción concreta a Robert Westman: no puede haber mirado el locus textual concreto que invocaba, sino que tomó a Yates por su palabra.

«As I hope to have shown, all these various problematic areas in Yates’ “grand narrative” follow from how she looked at two central concepts in Renaissance culture: that of an ancient wisdom tradition, and that of magic.» — resume de dónde salen todos esos problemas: de cómo Yates miró dos conceptos centrales de la cultura renacentista, el de tradición de sabiduría antigua y el de magia.

«It is only during the 1990s that this terminology slowly began to give way to a new one, that of “Western esotericism,” along with the emergence of a new research paradigm pioneered by the French scholar Antoine Faivre.» — data en los años noventa el reemplazo de esa terminología por la de esoterismo occidental, con el nuevo paradigma de investigación que abrió Antoine Faivre.

«Interestingly, Meiners and Eichhorn were far from believing that the ancient Pythagorean brotherhoods had been concerned with an “enthusiastic” or mystical doctrine derived from Egypt: rather, they imagined their ancient “esotericists” as rationalists and freethinkers with a Republican program, similar to enlightened Freemasons and Weishaupt’s Illuminaten, who had kept their beliefs secret out of sheer political necessity.» — y consigna un dato que contraría la expectativa: Meiners y Eichhorn no imaginaban a los esotéricos pitagóricos como místicos de doctrina egipcia sino como racionalistas y librepensadores de programa republicano.

«It was Gabler who objected that “imitation of the Egyptian and Greek mysteries” had, after all, played a role in the “esotericism” of the ancient Pythagoreans, and this is how the substantive came to be understood in Jacques Matter’s Histoire critique du gnosticisme of 1828.» — adjudica a Gabler la objeción que reintrodujo la imitación de los misterios egipcios y griegos en el esoterismo pitagórico, y a la Histoire critique du gnosticisme de Jacques Matter, de 1828, la fijación del sustantivo.

«In his Revision der Philosophie, published anonymously in 1772, the German philosopher and historian Christoph Meiners drew a distinction between “exoteric” and “esoteric” philosophy, referring to practitioners of the latter as Esoteriker (esotericists); and in a critical footnote to Meiners’ work in Johann Gottfried Eichhorn’s Urgeschichte (1792), Johann Philipp Gabler coined the novel substantive Esoterik (esotericism).» — data en 1772 la Revision der Philosophie de Christoph Meiners, publicada anónimamente, donde aparece la distinción entre filosofía exotérica y esotérica y el término Esoteriker.

«In his important book of 1828, he used “gnosticism” and “gnosis” as mutually interchangeable terms for “the introduction into Christianity of all the cosmological and theosophical speculations that had formed the most important part of the ancient religions of the Orient, and which the new platonists had adopted in the Occident as well.» — y consigna cómo usaba Matter los términos gnosticismo y gnosis, intercambiables, para la introducción en el cristianismo de las especulaciones cosmológicas y teosóficas de las religiones antiguas de Oriente.

«The emanation of all spiritual beings out of God, the progressive degeneration of these emanations, redemption and return to the purity of the Creator, re-establishment of the original harmony of all beings, the felicitous and truly divine life of all in God himself: those are the fundamental teachings of gnosticism . . .» — la descripción de la emanación, la degeneración progresiva y el retorno a la pureza del Creador podría venir directamente de Martines de Pasqually, a cuya corriente martinista estaba afiliado el propio Matter.

«What Matter described as “gnosis/gnosticism” was essentially an illuminist credo in the lineage of Pasqually’s theosophy.» — con la adjudicación que de ahí saca: lo que Matter describía como gnosis o gnosticismo era en lo esencial un credo iluminista en el linaje de la teosofía de Pasqually.

«It should be noted, however, that, technically at least, “esotericism” had not yet become a synonym for it:» — y la precisión cronológica que impide el anacronismo: esotericismo no era todavía, técnicamente, sinónimo de aquello.

«For the basic worldview in question, or the various currents that represented it, it was rather the term “gnosis” that was now beginning to gain some currency.» — sino que para esa visión del mundo el término que empezaba a ganar terreno era gnosis.

«Baur’s book did much to popularize the concept of “gnosis” as a general, quasi-historiographical category, but while this notion can be traced through many esoteric or esotericizing authors through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, its impact on academic literature remained limited at least until the period after World War II.» — y acota el alcance de Baur: popularizó la gnosis como categoría cuasi historiográfica, con impacto limitado en la literatura académica.

«The publication of Auguste Viatte’s two-volume work, Les sources occultes du romantisme: Illuminisme-Th´eosophie (Paris, 1928), marked an important date in the investigation of esoteric literature.» — la valoración de la obra de Auguste Viatte de 1928 como fecha importante en la investigación de la literatura esotérica es de Mircea Eliade, en una reseña de 1973.

«It revealed an unknown or perhaps carefully neglected dimension of the Enlightenment – the religious concern of a great section of European intelligentsia, considered until that time antireligious or religiously indifferent.» — y sigue en esa cita lo que Viatte había revelado: una dimensión desconocida o cuidadosamente descuidada de la Ilustración, la preocupación religiosa de buena parte de una intelectualidad tenida por indiferente.

«The sensation caused by this work among literary historians and critics as well as among historians of ideas stimulated a number of researches on the esoteric and occult movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.» — con el efecto que le atribuye, una oleada de investigaciones sobre los movimientos esotéricos y ocultistas de los siglos XVIII y XIX.

«This made “hermeticism” a thing of the past, which could play no role of any real importance in the modern world.» — señala el efecto contrario del marco de Yates: dejaba el hermetismo como cosa del pasado, sin papel de importancia real en el mundo moderno.

«Once it became evident how successfully these traditional currents had managed to cross the epistemological barrier of the eighteenth century, the way was open for scholars to explore their further development as well.» — y lo que se abrió al verse que esas corrientes habían cruzado con éxito la barrera epistemológica del siglo XVIII.

«It would appear that fantastic literature was his point of entrance into the domain that the French call l’Imaginaire, and a love for myths, images, and symbols was to remain a constant factor in his scholarly oeuvre.» — data en la literatura fantástica la entrada de Faivre al dominio que los franceses llaman l Imaginaire, y consigna esa constante en su obra.

«He might well have spent the rest of his career as a specialized historian in Germanic studies, had it not been for a second factor: the impact on his thinking of the Eranos approach to religion, and of Henry Corbin and Gilbert Durand in particular.» — y nombra el segundo factor que lo desvió de la germanística: el impacto del enfoque de Eranos y, en particular, de Henry Corbin y Gilbert Durand.

«About eight years ago, an article by Henry Corbin devoted to the Divine Wisdom, as well as his preface to C. G. Jung’s book (Response to Job) and the work devoted to Ibn ‘Arabi, revealed to me what one cannot summarize in ten lines, and made suddenly clear to me that it is possible to work as a philosopher without thereby neglecting history.» — el reconocimiento de que un artículo de Corbin le reveló que era posible trabajar como filólogo sin quedarse ahí es de Faivre, citado.

«As will be seen, this insight derived from Corbin – and strongly supported by the leading French scholar of the imaginaire Gilbert Durand, whom he met around the same time – marked the beginning of Faivre’s religionist period.» — y Hanegraaff data en esa influencia el comienzo de lo que llama el periodo religionista de Faivre.

«At the same time, in 1969, that Corbin’s work was opening up a new approach to history for him, Faivre’s studies of illuminism and Christian theosophy were crowned with the doctorate and the publication of his large study of Eckartshausen; and without passing through the usual lower university positions, he got a full professorship at the University of Paris in the same year, followed by one at the University of Bordeaux in 1972.» — con los datos de carrera que lo acompañan: doctorado en 1969 y publicación de su estudio sobre Eckartshausen, sin pasar por los puestos universitarios habituales.

«Because of its importance to Faivre’s religionist period, and its considerable impact on how he came to develop his notion of “Western esotericism,” we must take a somewhat closer look at this remarkable initiative.» — justifica el detenimiento en la Université Saint-Jean de Jérusalem por su importancia para ese periodo y por su impacto en la noción de esoterismo occidental que Faivre acabaría desarrollando.

«It was the brainchild of Henry Corbin, and the most explicit vehicle of his personal understanding of “esotericism.”» — y la adjudica sin rodeos: fue idea de Henry Corbin y el vehículo más explícito de su comprensión personal del esoterismo.

«Spurred on by these spiritual commitments, and deeply concerned about the “crisis” of contemporary intellectual life, Corbin decided (together with Faivre and a few other academics, supported by an impressive group of international scholars)312 to found an “international center for comparative spiritual research,” focused on the three “religions of the book” and devoted to the “restoration and revival of the traditional studies and sciences in the occident.» — data la fundación de ese centro internacional de espiritualidad comparada en la preocupación de Corbin por la crisis de la vida intelectual contemporánea, con Faivre y otros académicos.

«In his opening address, Corbin left no doubt about the religious and spiritual nature of his initiative, or its uncompromising hostility towards the evils of the modern world.» — y consigna que el propio Corbin no dejó dudas, en su discurso inaugural, sobre la naturaleza religiosa de la iniciativa ni sobre su hostilidad sin concesiones al mundo moderno.

«The founding committee consisted of Henry Corbin (President), Gilbert Durand (Vice-President), Antoine Faivre (Chancellor), Richard Stauffer (Treasurer), and Robert de Chateaubriant (General Secretary).» — nombra el comité fundador con sus cargos, de Corbin como presidente a Faivre como canciller.

«The list of supportive academics reads like a “who’s who” of French and international scholarship in esotericism and Eranos-inspired study of religion, and included the philosopher of Judaism Armand Abecassis, the ethnologist Jean Servier, the scholar of Renaissance hermeticism Jean-Franc¸ois Maillard, important scholars of Christian theosophy such as Ernst Benz, Pierre Deghaye, and Bernard Gorceix, the philosopher and scholar of theosophy and Naturphilosophie Jean-Franc¸ois Marquet, the scholar of German idealism Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron, and last but not least, Mircea Eliade (who incorrectly claimed to have been a founding member in his Journal iii, 201).» — y describe la lista de académicos que la apoyaban como un quién es quién de la erudición francesa e internacional en esoterismo y estudio de la religión inspirado en Eranos.

«The evil that it intends to confront is the total confusion in the spirits, souls, and hearts, a confusion resulting from the disaster of the secular institutions of the West.» — la definición del mal a combatir, una confusión total de espíritus, almas y corazones nacida del desastre de las instituciones seculares de Occidente, es de Corbin, citada.

«In saying that a spiritual oecumenicalism cannot be pursued by the exoteric path of a confrontation with the dogmas or institutions, one essentially bestows the meaning of interiorism upon the “esoteric” quest.» — y de él también la equiparación de la búsqueda esotérica con el interiorismo, una vez descartada la vía exotérica de la confrontación con dogmas e instituciones.

«Corbin went on to point out that, in contrast to the great theological and philosophical systems of Western culture, “the treasure of the spiritual sciences, which can be grouped under the more or less happy or adequate term ‘esotericism’” was still buried in libraries, without adequate institutional settings to safeguard and promote it.» — con su queja institucional: el tesoro de las ciencias espirituales agrupadas bajo el término más o menos feliz de esoterismo seguía enterrado en las bibliotecas.

«As a result, it had become easy prey for ignorant “improvisers without discernment,” as shown by the current wave of “pseudo-esotericisms.”» — de donde su diagnóstico sobre la ola de pseudoesoterismos, presa fácil de improvisadores ignorantes y sin discernimiento.

«But such a project could not be pursued from a perspective of scholarly detachment: “the level of spiritual reality proper to the traditional sciences remains inaccessible if the researcher does not himself go through a new birth.”» — y la condición que Corbin le pone al investigador, que el nivel de realidad espiritual propio de las ciencias tradicionales queda inaccesible si él mismo no pasa por un nuevo nacimiento.

«The theosophers or esotericists tended to be badly understood because they either speak their own language, which is understood only by their peers and by poets, or try to make themselves understood in the inadequate language of the philosophers and theologians.» — consigna el argumento de Faivre sobre por qué se entiende mal a teósofos y esotéricos: hablan una lengua propia que solo comprenden sus pares y los poetas, o se explican en la lengua inadecuada de filósofos y teólogos.

«Faivre tried to demarcate his own approach from two types of dogmatic either/or thinking, those of traditionalist esotericism and rationalist reductionism;328 and presented “esotericism” as a kind of mental space mediating between the radical “homogenizing” extremes of dualism, ecstatic mysticism, and the established churches.» — y su deslinde de dos pensamientos dogmáticos de todo o nada, el del esoterismo tradicionalista y el del reduccionismo racionalista, con el esoterismo como espacio mental mediador.

«In conclusion, he emphasized that next to Eliade’s oeuvre, Corbin’s notions of the “imaginal” and the creative imagination and Durand’s studies of the “regimes of the imaginary” provided the key to his Introduction, and hence to his understanding of esotericism.» — con la declaración de sus llaves: junto a la obra de Eliade, lo imaginal y la imaginación creadora de Corbin y los regímenes de lo imaginario de Durand.

«The crucial event was that Aristotle’s principles of identity, non-contradiction and the excluded middle had come to be applied not only to the created world, where they were indispensable to the development of science and technology, but to metaphysical reality as well.» — nombra el acontecimiento crucial según Faivre: que los principios aristotélicos de identidad, no contradicción y tercero excluido se aplicaran no solo al mundo creado, donde eran indispensables, sino también a la realidad metafísica.

«One can only conclude that at this point in his intellectual career, Faivre was speaking as a Christian theosopher, deeply concerned about the Umwertung aller Werte that had caused the crisis of the modern world.» — y su lectura de quién habla ahí: en ese punto de su carrera Faivre hablaba como teósofo cristiano, preocupado por la transvaloración que habría causado la crisis del mundo moderno.

«and condemned perpetually to either use cunning or defend themselves openly, little by little these [forms of thinking] have coalesced into a strange mass that, for lack of a better term, has been called esotericism since about a century ago, and is still seen by many as just a cabinet of curiosities where the best rubs shoulders with the worst.» — la imagen de unas formas de pensar condenadas a la astucia o a la defensa abierta, coaguladas en una masa extraña llamada esoterismo desde hace un siglo, es de Faivre, citada.

«The religionist approach by no means vanished from Faivre’s scholarship, as will be seen, but by the end of the 1970s it was becoming less explicit.» — matiza la periodización que él mismo propone: el enfoque religionista no desapareció de la obra de Faivre, solo se volvió menos explícito hacia el final de los setenta.

«Corbin had suggested the new title “History of Christian Esotericism” for a chair that had just become vacant, because it seemed to correspond more or less to the competences of the favorite candidate, the specialist of Christian kabbalah Franc¸ois Secret.» — data en una sugerencia de Corbin el título Historia del esoterismo cristiano para una cátedra vacante, ajustado a las competencias del candidato favorito, el especialista en cábala cristiana François Secret.

«Corbin’s idea was accepted by his colleagues for want of anything better.» — y consigna con qué criterio se aceptó ese nombre: a falta de algo mejor.

«Faivre was more consistent in emphasizing the centrality of “nature” (understood very much in terms of German Romantic Naturphilosophie) as a living body intermediary between the dead weight of pure matter and the cool abstractions of pure spirit.» — señala en qué fue más consistente Faivre, en la centralidad de la naturaleza entendida al modo de la Naturphilosophie romántica alemana, cuerpo vivo intermedio entre la materia y el espíritu puro.

«To contextualize these discussions properly, it is important to understand that popular contemporary “esotericism” played no role of any importance in Faivre’s work until the 1980s.» — data el ingreso del esoterismo popular contemporáneo en la obra de Faivre: ninguno de importancia antes de los años ochenta.

«In the academic context to which he was used, the term was functioning in erudite discussions on a high intellectual level, among sophisticated scholars and philosophers who, more than anything, shared an abhorrence of the dogmatic Marxism that had come to dominate much of French academic life since the events of 1968.» — y describe el uso del término en el medio académico al que estaba acostumbrado, discusiones eruditas entre estudiosos que compartían sobre todo el rechazo al marxismo dogmático de la vida académica francesa.

«Faivre’s unpublished diaries show how, almost immediately after arrival, he found himself confronted with the vogue of “new religious movements” and the alternative lifestyles nowadays associated with the New Age – not to mention a general expectation among students and colleagues that this European professor of “esoteric and mystical currents” would certainly know all about them!» — con lo que muestran sus diarios inéditos: apenas llegado a Berkeley se topó con la moda de los nuevos movimientos religiosos y los estilos de vida alternativos.

«Nevertheless, the tension between such religionist engagement and the requirements of historiography proper became an increasingly pressing issue for Faivre during the later 1980s.» — señala la tensión que se le volvió apremiante hacia el final de los ochenta, entre el compromiso religionista y las exigencias de la historiografía propiamente dicha.

«Furthermore, Faivre’s growing irritation with the dogmatic antimodernism and intolerant attitudes of the “perennialists” at the annual conferences of the American Academy of Religion359 would appear to have contributed to a renewed appreciation for the virtues of the French tradition of la¨ıcit´e ingrained in his home institution, the ´Ecole Pratique des Hautes ´Etudes, and the merits of secular historiography in general.» — y apunta un factor concreto: la irritación creciente de Faivre con el antimodernismo dogmático y las actitudes intolerantes de los perennialistas en los congresos de la American Academy of Religion.

«He discussed the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches and solutions, and presented his own proposal as a “methodological tool susceptible of being completed and corrected” by future research.» — consigna cómo presentó Faivre su propia propuesta, como herramienta metodológica susceptible de ser completada y corregida por investigaciones futuras.

«We have seen that the crucial notion of imagination/mediations was derived straight from Corbin’s concepts of the mundus imaginalis; but by combining it with living nature, Faivre steered away from any docetic understanding towards an incarnational perspective in line with the central notion of Naturphilosophie.» — traza la genealogía de sus criterios: imaginación y mediaciones viene directamente del mundus imaginalis de Corbin, y al combinarlo con naturaleza viva Faivre se alejó de toda lectura docética.

«Transmutation was perhaps the most innovative aspect: obviously inspired by Faivre’s long-standing interest in “spiritual” alchemy and paracelsian thought, it lent a dynamic and developmental aspect to what might otherwise have been a somewhat static picture of “esotericism.”» — y señala cuál le parece el aspecto más innovador, la transmutación, que da un aspecto dinámico a lo que habría sido un cuadro estático.

«that nineteenth-century spiritualism may often have been “intimately mingled” with esotericism but is not seen as belonging to that domain “properly speaking”;» — releva una consecuencia del criterio de Faivre: el espiritismo decimonónico pudo estar íntimamente mezclado con el esoterismo sin pertenecer propiamente a ese dominio.

«Moreover, the latter describes essentially an “enchanted” worldview pitted against the “secularization of the cosmos,”368 and this makes it doubtful, to say the least, whether it can account for the secularization of esotericism itself since the nineteenth century.» — y su objeción de fondo: si esa definición describe una visión encantada del mundo opuesta a la secularización del cosmos, es dudoso que pueda dar cuenta de la secularización del esoterismo mismo desde el siglo XIX.

«In fairness to Faivre, he has never denied that his approach does contain elements of “mediation” such as Ficino’s spiritus, but nevertheless tends to highlight the pure intellect and look negatively at nature and the body.» — con la salvedad que le concede en justicia, que Faivre nunca negó los elementos de mediación de su enfoque.

«Yet others were inspired by explicit commitment to the “inner traditions” of the West, and hoped that bringing them to the attention of a wider audience might stimulate a new spiritual revival.» — consigna el motivo de algunos de los nuevos estudiosos, el compromiso explícito con las tradiciones interiores de Occidente y la esperanza de estimular con ellas un renacer espiritual.

«What set these new trends of scholarly and popular writing apart from the predominantly sociological concern with new religious movements was their attention to history, and especially the history of ideas.» — y lo que distinguía esa tendencia de la sociología de los nuevos movimientos religiosos: su atención a la historia y sobre todo a la historia de las ideas.

«As a result, specialists were working in relative isolation, scattered over a variety of disciplines, with very few opportunities to meet and discuss their research, present it to the wider» — describe el aislamiento previo de los especialistas, dispersos por disciplinas distintas y con pocas ocasiones de encontrarse.

«While I cannot presume to be neutral in presenting such an account, I will at least try to be fair.» — declara su propia posición al narrar su parte de esa historia: no puede presumir de neutralidad, y se propone al menos ser justo.

«which is limited to the empirical and can neither presume to make statements about the existence or non-existence of metaphysical realities, nor strictly rule out the possible legitimacy» — y define el enfoque empírico por lo que se le prohíbe: no puede pronunciarse sobre la existencia o inexistencia de realidades metafísicas ni descartar de plano su posible legitimidad.

«Of course such an “empirical” approach does not imply any naive belief in “detached” objectivity.» — con la reserva que evita el malentendido: ese enfoque no implica creencia ingenua en una objetividad desapegada.

«It does not deny the subjectivities of the scholar, but advocates a critical attitude towards one’s own biases as well as those of others» — sino una actitud crítica hacia los propios sesgos tanto como hacia los ajenos.

«During the sessions in Mexico City, presided over by Faivre and myself, the effect of our commitment to empirical/historical research became evident almost immediately: it resulted in a clear distance between the “religionist” participants, who found it natural to use their research as a vehicle for expressing esoteric or spiritual commitments, and their “historically-oriented” counterparts who had no wish to do so.» — narra el efecto inmediato de ese compromiso empírico e histórico en las sesiones de Ciudad de México: una distancia clara respecto de los participantes religionistas.

«The selected proceedings of the Mexico volume were published in 1998,380 and sessions on Western esotericism became a normal part of subsequent IAHR conferences (Durban 2000, Tokyo 2005, Toronto 2010).» — y data en 1998 las actas seleccionadas de ese volumen, con las sesiones sobre esoterismo occidental ya normalizadas en los congresos siguientes.

«I had the honor of being appointed to this chair, which now made it possible to create a complete academic curriculum for Western esotericism.» — consigna en primera persona su nombramiento en esa cátedra y lo que permitió, crear un currículo académico completo para el esoterismo occidental.

«From 2001 on, Brill began publishing the new peer-reviewed journal Aries: Journal for the Study of Western Esotericism, followed from 2006 on by a parallel “Aries Book Series” that brings out monographs, collective volumes, and text editions.» — data en 2001 el arranque de la revista Aries en Brill y en 2006 la colección de libros paralela.

«And last but not least, due to the initiative of one of its senior editors, Hans van der Meij, a comprehensive Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism (over 1200 pages, with c. 150 contributors) was published by Brill in 2005.» — y en 2005 el Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism, con más de mil doscientas páginas y unos ciento cincuenta colaboradores.

«Finally, whereas Faivre in his entry “Esotericism” for Eliade’s Encyclopedia of Religion (1987) could still state that “There is no single book on the history of esotericism,”387 today a choice of introductory textbooks is available.» — mide el cambio con una cita de Faivre en la enciclopedia de Eliade de 1987, cuando aún podía decirse que no había un solo libro sobre la historia del esoterismo.

«Nevertheless, the academic study of “Western esotericism” is still just in its early infancy, and continuous vigilance remains necessary to prevent it from losing what has been gained.» — y frena el entusiasmo: el estudio académico del esoterismo occidental está apenas en su infancia y hace falta vigilancia continua para no perder lo ganado.

«These problems are related to the fact that for many scholars today – especially those working on late modern and contemporary topics – the label “esotericism” seems to have been transformed from an academic liability into a desired commodity:» — nombra el riesgo nuevo: para muchos estudiosos de temas contemporáneos la etiqueta esoterismo habría pasado de lastre académico a mercancía deseada.

«Using the term discourse draws attention to the mechanisms of ideology and power that include and accept certain voices, while at the same time excluding others.» — consigna qué gana el análisis del discurso: atención a los mecanismos de ideología y poder que aceptan ciertas voces mientras excluyen otras.

«The same goes, no less obviously, for the three “discursive strategies” highlighted by Hammer, based upon the appeal to “tradition,” “rationality and science,” and “experience”:391 by and large, they have dominated my chapters 1 and 2, 3, and 4 respectively.» — y admite que las tres estrategias discursivas que destaca Olav Hammer —tradición, racionalidad y ciencia, experiencia— dominan respectivamente sus propios capítulos.

«While Hammer used discourse analysis within the wider framework of a text-based intellectual history, others have argued that a “discursive study of religion” should become the normative framework for all future research.» — marca la diferencia con quienes van más lejos: Hammer usó el análisis del discurso dentro de una historia intelectual basada en textos, y otros proponen el estudio discursivo de la religión como marco normativo de toda investigación futura.

«but his theoretical and methodological apparatus comes at a price that not all scholars will be willing to pay.» — y anuncia su objeción a von Stuckrad en términos de costo: su aparato teórico y metodológico tiene un precio que no todos los estudiosos estarán dispuestos a pagar.

«As he notes himself, von Stuckrad “wrestled with the concept of ‘Western esotericism’ for years.”» — con el propio testimonio de von Stuckrad, que lidió durante años con el concepto de esoterismo occidental.

«but he began to express reservations particularly about its concentration on Christian esotericism in the early modern period, at the expense of “the vivid Esoteric discourse in late antiquity and medieval times”» — y sus reservas por la concentración en el esoterismo cristiano de la primera modernidad, a costa del discurso esotérico de la antigüedad tardía y de la Edad Media.

«Von Stuckrad also adopted my reservations about whether Faivre’s criteriology could account for the “secularization of esotericism” and about the risk of essentialist interpretations» — registra qué le tomó von Stuckrad: sus propias reservas sobre si la criteriología de Faivre puede dar cuenta de la secularización del esoterismo y sobre el riesgo de lecturas esencialistas.

«Interestingly, in 2005 he still believed that “large parts of what I understand by esotericism can also be found in other cultures”» — y llama interesante un cambio de posición: en 2005 todavía creía que buena parte de lo que entendía por esoterismo se halla también en otras culturas.

«Instead, he now prefers to speak of “esoteric discourse in Western culture.”» — con el término que hoy prefiere, discurso esotérico en la cultura occidental.

«To correct the simplifying pictures that have been the result, and that still dominate much of the current scholarly and popular discourse,400 we must sharpen our awareness not just of the plurality of religious options in the history of Europe, but, rather, of religious pluralism as a dynamic process that involves the active (polemical and apologetic) negotiation of identity and difference.» — expone el programa de von Stuckrad: afinar la conciencia no solo de la pluralidad de opciones religiosas en Europa sino del pluralismo religioso como proceso dinámico.

«Von Stuckrad’s agenda for the study of religion in Europe is ambitious and interesting, but it comes at a price.» — y su valoración con el reparo dentro: ambicioso e interesante, pero con un precio.

«Accordingly, von Stuckrad’s true concern is with general discursive processes of identity formation by means of exclusion, marginalization, or “othering,” not with the historical currents or ideas that have been excluded, marginalized or “othered.”» — nombra el desplazamiento del objeto que le objeta: lo que interesa son los procesos discursivos de formación de identidad por exclusión, no las corrientes históricas excluidas.

«The problem is not just the cynicism of such a perspective, which seems blind to anything except competitions over power and capital.» — y le atribuye un cinismo ciego a todo lo que no sea competencia por poder y capital.

«the important thing is not what Lazzarelli was trying to tell his readers, but only what his discourse might be telling us.» — con el ejemplo que lo hace tangible: dejaría de importar lo que Lazzarelli intentaba decir a sus lectores y solo importaría lo que su discurso nos dice a nosotros.

«Of course there is nothing wrong with such an analysis in itself: on the contrary, it may yield very interesting insights.» — y a la vez concede que no hay nada de malo en ese análisis en sí y que puede rendir hallazgos muy interesantes.

«von Stuckrad seeks to demonstrate this agenda by focusing on “esoteric” discourses, in a Foucauldian sense, that transgress or ignore the boundaries» — consigna cómo busca von Stuckrad demostrar su agenda, atendiendo a discursos esotéricos en sentido foucaultiano que transgreden o ignoran las fronteras.

«The notions of secrecy as social capital (along the lines of Georg Simmel and Pierre Bourdieu) and claims of perfect knowledge have therefore become central to von Stuckrad’s analysis» — y las nociones que se le vuelven centrales, el secreto como capital social a la manera de Simmel y Bourdieu y las pretensiones de conocimiento perfecto.

«But rather than allowing philosophy to paralyze them, good historians know from working experience that it is possible to improve our knowledge about what happened in the past, that the sources can speak to us and we can understand much of what they tell us, and that misrepresentations of past events can be recognized as such and replaced by better interpretations.» — su defensa del oficio contra la parálisis filosófica: los buenos historiadores saben por experiencia de trabajo que se puede mejorar el conocimiento del pasado y que las fuentes pueden hablarnos.

«If nothing else, discursive approaches are salutary reminders of how deeply knowledge is implicated with power; and they can be invaluable in analyzing such processes as identity formation and “othering,” or exposing the ideological subtexts of scholarly research.» — con lo que sí les reconoce a los enfoques discursivos, recordar cuán implicado está el conocimiento con el poder y servir para analizar la formación de identidades y la construcción del otro.

«My point is simply that the theoretical superiority of von Stuckrad’s postmodernism is by no means self-evident: as demonstrated for example by Mary Fulbrook (Historical Theory, 28–30 and passim), historical empiricism does not exclude self-reflexivity and theoretical awareness.» — su objeción a la superioridad teórica del posmodernismo de von Stuckrad va en nota, apoyada en Mary Fulbrook: el empirismo histórico no excluye la autorreflexividad ni la conciencia teórica.

«one cannot ignore the fact that Foucault’s philosophical sophistication went at the expense of his historical analyses, which are often wholly mistaken» — y en la misma nota objeta que la sofisticación filosófica de Foucault fue a costa de sus análisis históricos, con la lista de trabajos que lo documentan.

«It seems to me that the dilemma is not so absolute as it is sometimes presented.» — suaviza el dilema entre constructo y realidad: le parece menos absoluto de lo que a veces se presenta.

«None of them can claim to be a straightforward description of “esotericism” as an empirical reality out there (a “tradition,”» — y niega que ninguna de esas historiografías pueda pretender describir sin más el esoterismo como realidad empírica ahí afuera.

«However, and this is the other side of the coin, they do not do so at random.» — con la otra cara de la moneda, que es la que salva el oficio: no lo hacen al azar.

«The only intellectual approach that took the “pagan” dimension seriously was the anti-apologetic historiography pioneered by Jacob Thomasius, Colberg, and Brucker.» — adjudica a la historiografía anti-apologética de Jacob Thomasius, Colberg y Brucker el único enfoque intelectual que tomó en serio la dimensión pagana.

«It will come as no surprise, then, that I see this prematurely abandoned intellectual tradition as the one that points in the right direction for the future study of Western esotericism.» — y declara que ve en esa tradición abandonada prematuramente la dirección correcta para el estudio futuro del esoterismo occidental.

«The factor of “paganism” has been neglected by modern scholars of Western esotericism to an extent that seems amazing» — con el reproche a su propio gremio: el factor del paganismo ha sido descuidado por los estudiosos modernos hasta un punto que le parece asombroso.

«The opposite of monotheism is not polytheism, or idolatry, but cosmotheism, the religion of the immanent God and the veiled truth, which both reveals and conceals itself in a thousand images:» — la definición del cosmoteísmo como opuesto real del monoteísmo, y no el politeísmo ni la idolatría, es de Jan Assmann, citado.

«This is what Frances Yates called – without further explanation – the “religion of the world”7 found in the hermetic writings, based upon the fundamental assumption that the divine is at home in the world.» — y enlaza eso con lo que Frances Yates llamó, sin explicarlo más, la religión del mundo de los escritos herméticos.

«cosmotheism could never be strictly integrated into a Judaeo-Christian framework; but as an integral part of the “pagan” Hellenistic philosophies that were adopted into Christian theology from the early patristic period on, it could not possibly be kept out of it either.» — formula la tensión que organiza su cierre: el cosmoteísmo nunca pudo integrarse estrictamente en un marco judeocristiano y tampoco pudo dejarse fuera, por venir con las filosofías helenísticas adoptadas en la teología.

«the logical incompatibility of monotheism and cosmotheism has led to an endless series of creative attempts to resolve it.» — y de esa incompatibilidad lógica hace derivar la serie interminable de intentos creativos por resolverla.

«Cosmotheism was carried forward by Romantics into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as an alternative to the disenchantment of the world;8 and it appeared capable of adapting even to secular conditions, thereby mutating into strange new forms that would have been unimaginable in previous centuries.» — traza su continuación: los románticos llevaron el cosmoteísmo al siglo XIX y al XX como alternativa al desencantamiento, y este mostró capacidad de adaptarse incluso a condiciones seculares.

«Thus we see that the intuitive notion of a triad “faith – reason – gnosis”10 can be given a precise historical meaning:» — con la tríada que propone dotar de sentido histórico preciso, fe, razón y gnosis.

«The aspiration to such knowledge is inseparable from a worldview that makes it theoretically possible: esoteric discourse is characterized not so much by “claims of higher or perfect knowledge”11 but, rather, by the claim that direct knowledge of ultimate reality is possible and available for those who pursue it.» — precisa su desacuerdo con la fórmula de las pretensiones de conocimiento superior o perfecto: el discurso esotérico se caracteriza más bien por sostener que el conocimiento directo de la realidad última es posible y está disponible.

«but they have little to say about its actual historical manifestations and its representatives, who seldom attempt to push a massive worldview of “cosmotheism and gnosis” but usually try to negotiate a space where they may survive within a culture dominated by monotheism and the appeal to divine revelation and rationality.» — y acota lo que esos parámetros no explican: las manifestaciones históricas concretas y sus representantes, que rara vez empujan una visión masiva y suelen negociar un espacio donde sobrevivir.

«If “Western esotericism” is perceived as a relatively separate domain, then, this is not because it in fact represents a kind of hidden gnostic and cosmotheist “counterculture” that existed historically in Christian and secular society but, rather, because it has been polemically constructed as such.» — con la tesis que sostiene el libro entero: si el esoterismo occidental se percibe como dominio separado no es porque haya existido como contracultura gnóstica oculta, sino porque fue construido polémicamente como tal.

«Such perspectives no longer needed to be seriously refuted, but could be simply dismissed as “foolishness” and “stupidity.”» — y el efecto retórico de esa construcción, que dispensaba de refutar en serio y permitía despachar por necedad y estupidez.

«The ancient wisdom narrative had been governed by what is known in anthropological theory as a grammar of “encompassment”: by being included within a larger framework of prisca theologia or philosophia perennis, the pagan “Other” could be constructed as really “belonging to us” (that is, Christianity).» — nombra la gramática que gobernaba el relato antiguo, la del encompassment: incluido en la prisca theologia, el Otro pagano se construía como algo que en realidad nos pertenece.

«However, as explained by Gerd Baumann, this type of binary opposition is always subject to reversal, resulting in a sophisticated dialectics of rejection and desire.» — y recoge de Gerd Baumann que toda oposición binaria de ese tipo está sujeta a inversión, con una dialéctica sofisticada de rechazo y deseo.

«Its very alterity can turn the excluded “Other” into an object of attraction, and once it has been constructed as an “alternative option” in the collective imagination, people may well shift their allegiance to it.» — porque la alteridad misma puede volver atractivo al Otro excluido una vez construido como opción alternativa en el imaginario colectivo.

«In this manner, what Enlightenment thinkers rejected as bad could be embraced as good by Romantics, who constructed their identity in conscious opposition against the “Other” of empty rationalism and soulless science.» — y así lo que la Ilustración rechazó como malo pudo ser abrazado como bueno por los románticos, que construyeron su identidad contra el racionalismo vacío y la ciencia sin alma.

«In our everyday use of language we are almost never conscious of the grammar that structures our sentences, and, somewhat similarly, scholars or intellectuals are seldom aware of the “orientalizing” grammar that structures discourses of academic identity.» — con el símil que explica por qué eso pasa inadvertido: como con la gramática de nuestras frases, los académicos rara vez advierten la gramática orientalizante que estructura los discursos de identidad académica.

«We have seen how Christoph August Heumann, at the very origin of the modern history of philosophy, advocated a practice of dumping these aspects of the past into “the sea of oblivion,” because “superstitious idiocies belong in no better library.”» — y el ejemplo que ya había documentado, Heumann proponiendo arrojar esos materiales al mar del olvido porque las idioteces supersticiosas no merecen mejor biblioteca.

«To avoid an ambiguity that has led to some unfortunate misunderstandings, I propose to expand the terminology in a logical manner, by distinguishing between “historiography” and “mnemohistoriography” as well: if the former tries to describe what actually happened in the past, the latter tries to describe the genesis and historical development of what a given culture imagines has happened.» — propone una ampliación terminológica para evitar malentendidos, distinguir historiografía de mnemohistoriografía según se describa lo ocurrido o su recuerdo.

«For example, it is unlikely that the pure or “classic” monotheism referred to above ever existed in ancient Israel, or that such an ideology was sharply pitted against a “cosmotheist” alternative, or indeed that its supposed founder Moses was a historical personality at all.» — y aplica esa distinción a su propio material de partida: es improbable que el monoteísmo clásico existiera nunca en el Israel antiguo, y que su fundador Moisés fuera siquiera un personaje histórico.

«I believe that the conclusion is unavoidable.» — declara inevitable su conclusión, y lo dice como creencia, no como demostración.

«These parameters do not reside in a space of mental abstractions or theoretical absolutes, but are grounded in the dynamics of monotheistic religion and the appeal to faith and reason:» — sitúa sus parámetros donde pueden ser históricos: no en abstracciones mentales ni absolutos teóricos, sino en la dinámica de la religión monoteísta y la apelación a la fe y la razón.

«I have been advocating an anti-eclectic historiography:24 one that does not select only what it believes to be “true” or “serious,” but questions the established canon of modern intellectual and academic culture (its collective “memory bank”) and recognizes that our common heritage is of much greater richness and complexity than one would infer from standard academic textbooks.» — y reformula su programa de historiografía anti-ecléctica: no seleccionar solo lo que se cree verdadero o serio, y cuestionar el canon establecido de la cultura intelectual moderna.

«Anti-eclectic historiography obviously does not claim to discard mechanisms of selection altogether:» — con la salvedad que le quita el filo utópico: esa historiografía no pretende descartar del todo los mecanismos de selección.

«The point is, rather, to provide an antidote against the view that historians should select their materials on the basis of normative, doctrinal, or philosophical judgments.» — sino servir de antídoto contra la idea de que el historiador debe seleccionar sus materiales según juicios normativos, doctrinales o filosóficos.

«In this process, what used to be strange and alien will eventually become normalized as just another dimension of Western culture;» — y describe adónde lleva ese proceso, a que lo extraño y ajeno acabe normalizado como una dimensión más de la cultura occidental.

«These perspectives may still not be acceptable within academic discourse, which has approaches and methodological principles all of its own, but need not on that account be dismissed as dangerous, stupid, or wrong.» — con la distinción que preserva sin ceder terreno: esas perspectivas pueden seguir siendo inaceptables dentro del discurso académico sin que haya que descartarlas por peligrosas, estúpidas o erróneas.

«If I am correct in my assessment that what we now call “esotericism” is the Other by which our modern Western identities have been constructed – according to the logic of an “orientalizing” grammar of identity/alterity – then the two depend on each other and cannot exist alone.» — y la consecuencia de su tesis sobre la identidad: si el esoterismo es el Otro con que se construyeron nuestras identidades occidentales modernas, ambos dependen uno del otro y ninguno existe solo.

«These are open questions, to which I have no answer.» — cierra abstenéndose, con las preguntas abiertas para las que declara no tener respuesta.

«All that I do know is the prime directive that should guide scholarly research and intellectual exploration: not to hold on to what we already know well enough, allowing it to dominate the whole of our vision and thought, but being ready to discard our prejudices and revise our preconceptions in the light of new knowledge.» — y con lo único que dice saber, la directriz de no aferrarse a lo ya sabido y estar dispuesto a descartar prejuicios y revisar preconcepciones.

«study of esotericism” then becomes a crypto-philosophical or crypto-theological pursuit» — su objeción de fondo al religionismo académico.

«spiritualities are mostly creatures of compromise» — cómo caracteriza a las espiritualidades que estudia; la fuente lo imprime en minúscula, dentro de la frase.

«the notion of “correspondences” is clearly an alternative to instrumental causality, “living nature” stands against a mechanistic worldview, “imagination/mediations” implies a multi-leveled neoplatonic cosmology as opposed to a cosmos reducible to only matter in motion» — las características faivrianas del esoterismo: son de Antoine Faivre, no formulación suya.

«the realm of Nature itself included a mysterious Nachtseite, now conceptualized as the unconscious» — el giro romántico que sitúa la Nachtseite de la naturaleza en el inconsciente.

«Scholem took the trouble to read everything that occultists (Eliphas L´evi, Blavatsky, de Guaita, Papus, Saint-Yves d’Alveydre, Waite, Westcott, Crowley, Regardie, Pullen-Burry, MacGregor Mathers, Steiner) had to say about “kabbala.” Usually the verdict was negative, as shown by his many marginal notes» — Gershom Scholem leyó a doce ocultistas sobre la cábala y dejó constancia marginal de su veredicto.

«That the term “occult sciences” originated with de Vigen`ere is suggested, although not explicitly stated» — el origen del rótulo «ciencias ocultas», que François Secret sugiere sin afirmarlo.

«intended to protect the study of the ancient sciences against theological censure» — la magia natural como concepto apologético, y no como práctica: la fuente además dice «entre los primeros» autores en usar el término, no «primer uso».

«I wish to acknowledge my profound debt to Lehmann-Brauns» — la deuda metodológica que declara con Sicco Lehmann-Brauns.

«the true meaning of alchemical images such as those in Michael Maier’s Atalanta Fugiens lies in an independent and autonomous spiritual reality» — y la posición contraria de Faivre en su primera conferencia de Eranos, 1973, sobre los emblemas de la Atalanta.

«risks giving food to a singularizing and hegemonizing discourse» — la objeción de Kocku von Stuckrad al propio rótulo, que Hanegraaff reporta.

Prisca theologia (la teología antiquísima) — Sitúa el conocimiento verdadero como anterior a la filosofía griega.

Philosophia perennis (filosofía perenne) — No cree que el conocimiento se haya perdido durante siglos; término de Steuco.

Magia Natural — Término apologético que separa el estudio legítimo de la naturaleza de la magia demoníaca; primer uso en Guillermo de Auvernia.

Gnosis (conocimiento salvífico) — Conocimiento directo y experiencial de la naturaleza divina del alma, alcanzado en estados extáticos.

Ocultismo (occultisme) — Término del siglo XIX para designar colectivamente magia, astrología y alquimia.

Correspondencias — Alternativa a la causalidad instrumental: relación no causal preestablecida entre fenómenos.

Theurgia (obra divina) — Contraparte positiva de la goecia dentro del arte de tratar con inteligencias.

Goetia (γοητεία, arte goético) — Arte de invocar y controlar demonios; contraparte negativa de la magia.

Chymistry — Término de Newman y Principe para la práctica indistinta de alquimia y química en el s. XVII.

Decknamen (nombres cubiertos) — Nombres-código que cifran recetas técnicas en la literatura alquímica.